Kenya after Kenyatta || "Human Souvenirs of Another Era": Europeans in Post-Kenyatta Kenya

"Human Souvenirs of Another Era": Europeans in Post-Kenyatta KenyaAuthor(s): Marion E. DoroSource: Africa Today, Vol. 26, No. 3, Kenya after Kenyatta (3rd Qtr., 1979), pp. 43-54Published by: Indiana University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4185876 .

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"Human Souvenirs of Another Era":

Europeans in PostaKenyatta Kenya

Marion E. Doro

Perhaps the most significant clue to the future of the Europeans in Kenya after Kenyatta is that they have attracted little, if any, attention. In a recent analysis of Kenya without Kenyatta one observer made passing reference to the Europeans in his description of the December 12, 1978 Jamhuri Day celebrations: "On the fringes are a few whites and Asians, human souvenirs of another era, now hanging on as proof that Kenya can work as a multi-racial society."' This is in striking contrast to the dominant political role of the Europeans in Kenya's colonial period, and raises the question whether this is to be their epitaph.

The Two Types of European Residents

It is important to note that there are two white communities in Kenya: one is the settler class of colonial vintage, the other consists of the expatriate professionals on contract to provide expertise for multi-national corporations, government agencies, and private organizations. Most Africans tend to regard them as all the same because Europeans are perceived as holding jobs which should be Africanized. But there is a sub- stantial difference between the two groups. Those of colonial vintage have a commitment to Kenya as "home,"2 based on residence of a generation or more, while the expatriates have a short-term outlook about the country which they regard as a place to practice their profession temporarily in the pursuit of their careers.

1. Sanford J. Ungar, Kenya: Without Kenyatta, The Adantic, 243, 6, June 1979, p. 8.

2. Analysts often note that settlers requently referred to England as "home," but interview evidence suggests this vocabulary differs little from that used by first generation immigrants anywhere in the world. Commenting on her expeuiences in the early 1920s, Elspeth Huxley observed in Love Among the Daughters, (London: Chatto & Windus, 1968): "England was always called Home in those days, but it was not. It was a foreign land whose people spoke our language: little else was the same."

Marion E. Doro is Professor of Government at Connecticut Coltege, New London. Connecticut.

Vol. 26 (1979) No. 3 43



In 1978 the total white population was estimated at 40,000, con- siderably less than the 53,000 who lived there at the time of independence in 1963. More important, the current population represents a major turnover in the composition of the European community, especially from that of its peak population of 61,000 in 1960. At that time the white community consisted of a mixture of settler class and what may be labelled as "semi-expatriates," i.e., those for whom Kenya was "home" only as long as the Europeans maintained their dominant status and racial segregation. Today the settler class probably does not exceed 25 per cent of the white population; of this approximate 10,000 persons, nearly 4,000 have taken Kenyan citizenship and most of them express the belief that they expect to live out their days in the country. They were initially ambivalent about this sentiment, however. This ambivalence was eased by United Kingdom legislation which provided generous terms for reclaiming British citizenship, but was reflected in the frequency with which families divided national allegiances among them, some members taking Kenya citizenship, others retaining their original nationality and often including their young children on their passport. Such precautions were taken in the immediate post-independence period as hedges against their worst fears which were never realized. Now that the settler class is no longer politically dominant the Africans accept them - citizen and non-citizen - as part of the fabric of their society.

On the whole, the expatriates today are a class apart from the settler group. Among third world capitals Nairobi is an ideal location for a job tour abroad; the extraordinarily beautiful environment, the healthy climate, and the high degree of modernization are especially attractive for professionals who wish to have their dependents with them. The number of expatriates - i.e., non-citizen employees - declined rapidly during the 1970s, from 33,600 in 1970 to 12,593 in 1977. Not all of these non- citizen employees, especially those included in the earlier figure, are foreign professionals; many were European or Asian residents whose jobs were gradually Africanized. In 1977 roughly two-thirds of the expatriates were employed in the private sector and most of them held specialized positions such as managers, teachers or engineers; in contrast, there were only 10 clerks and typists and 213 secretaries in this category. The rate of renewal of work permits has also declined from ten percent in 1972 to three percent in 1976.3

It is the permanency-orientation of the settler class which not only distinguishes it from the expatriates but also gives Kenya its current reputation as a multi-racial society. The origin of the idea is found in Kenya's colonial legacy and was reinforced by Kenyatta's famous Nakuru "forgive and forget" speech to the settlers in 1961. The future of this 3. The Standard, December 2 and December 6, 1977.

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particular group may be suggestive of the future of whites as citizens or permanent residents of other African countries.

The Development of Multi-Racialism in Kenya

Kenya's multi-racial condition has evolved through several stages. Throughout the colonial era socio-economic status was defined on the basis of race, and J.S. Furnivall's classic definition of a plural society clearly applied - i.e., races that meet in the marketplace but do not mingle. This was true for all the races in Kenya: white, African, and Asian. During the 1950s scattered and uncoordinated efforts were mitiated by the British Council, various religious groups and other voluntary associations to promote social inter-race relations;4 although these were rather self- conscious efforts and reached out mainly to elite African groups, they nevertheless opened the way to a degree of social mingling which never developed in other white settler societies. Some of the multi-racial organizations started during this period, such as St. Julian's Community- a meeting place and rest center - are phasing out their activities.5 Among the others, the United Kenya Club - which provided a public forum for African leaders at a time when there were few opportunities for public inter-racial exchanges - remains as a major center of social life in Nairobi for all races. The series of multi-racial constitutions introduced in the mid- 1950s promoted political multi-racialism and provided the means for a peaceful transition to independence based on African majority rule. The pattern of multi-racial behavior continued into the post-independence period although it is no longer formalized in institutional structures. While multi-racialism was used to depoliticize the issue of race, at the same time it does not mean that all races enjoy comparable political power or that Kenya's minority groups can regenerate either their past or present influence into an indefinite future. However, it has meant that the white community has been able to live in relative peace and harmony with the African majority, at least for the lifetime of the pre-independence settler class.

To understand the present status of the settler class in Kenya one must evaluate their past status, not vis a vis the Africans - which is already extensively documented - but as a settler society in Africa. This approach does not minimize either the good will or the "forgive and forget" attitude

4. See: Richard Frost, Race AgainstTime, London: Rex Collings, 1978.

5. The Goveming Body of St. Julian's Community has accepted a proposal of the Church of Anglican Bishops' to offer the property to the Church of the Province of Kenya to be used as a possible future pastoral training center by the Council of Anglican Provinces in Africa.

Vol. 26 (1979) No. 3 45



the African leaders adopted toward the settlers after independence; rather it focuses on the capacity of the settlers to maintain a colonial system. There are a number of criteria by which to judge the strength and durability of a white community in Africa. Three which may be considered generally are: longevity and sufficiency of their numbers; the extent of their political control and cohesion; and, their capacity to manipulate or monopolize the allocation of resources. A review of these factors indicates that Kenya's white community can be characterized as a settler society which simply made maximal use of minimal power.

Until World War II white immigration to Kenya Colony was relatively slow. By 1948 the European population was 30,000.6 This probably represented the most stable white population of the colonial era, at least in terms of those who identified with the country as "home." During the decade of 1948-1958 the white population doubled, despite the Mau Mau Emergency and the introduction of multi-racial government. Indeed, the highest inflow of immigrants occurred in 1956, the year of a divisive European election campaign in which the major issue was power-sharing with the Africans. For that same period the emigration rate was at about five percent annually, and this represented a routine turnover of expatriates in various administrative or management positions. The Euro- pean population reached its highest level at 61,000 in 1960, the year of the first Lancaster House agreement which gave the Africans an elected majority in the Legislative Council. 1960 marked the first year in which emigration figures exceeded immigration. Although the net decease of whites was less than 200 that year, the emigration rate rose dramatically for the next four years, resulting in an average outflow of 3,700 annually until 1965 when the white population leveled off at 42,000.

The Political and Economic Role of The Settlers

Population figures alone are not an index to political strength, but the immigration statistics clearly indicate that the white community was never appreciably large7 and that fifty percent of the Europeans were post-World II arrivals. It is difficult to determine what percentage of the total population could be regarded as "settler" as distinct from "semi-expatriates" or temporary immigrants. However, various sources of evidence suggest that

6. The statistics for this section are drawn from the annual Statistical Abstract of Kenya for the years 1962-1966, which is compiled and published by the Economics and Statistics Division of the Ministry of Finance & Economic Planning. The name of the agency varied slightly during that period.

7. The white population of other "settler societies" at comparable stages of their development are: Algeria 1,033,000 (1958): Angola 78,826 (1950); Belgian Congo 76,764 (1952 est.); Mozambique 48,813 (1950); Northem Rhodesia 50,000 (1953 est.); Southern Rhodesia 160,000 (1953 est.); South West Africa 49,612 (1951): South Africa 2,642,713 (1951).

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the permanent portion of the community rarely exceeded 25 per cent and that the population increases in the 1950s were primarily in the urban areas where commercial interests - both local and international - were expanding. This trend altered the socio-economic composition of the community more than the settlers realized at the time. Of particular importance were the commercial interests which, in due course would decide they could serve African farmers as easily as European farmers. Equally significant were the differences in attitudes between some of the pre-World War II residents who believed they could control change in the Colony, and the post-World War 11 immigrants whose identification with colonialism was greater than their attachment to the country.

The degree of political dominance which the Europeans achieved is best described by Donald Rothchild as "the structure of privilege"8 and this was sufficient to promote settler interests but not to acquire autonomous authority in the Colony. Unlike Southern Rhodesia where there was strong Company rule and European participation in the governance of the area before colonial rule began, Kenya's settlers only gradually acquired political influence in the colonial administration, first informally through pressure groups and then formally in the Legislative Council in 1920. By 1948 the settlers had gained formal membership in the Executive Council where they could influence the policy making process. Although the more realistic leaders among them realized they would not achieve self- government they nevertheless obtained sufficient cumulative power through their influence on such institutions as the marketing boards and the Finance Committee of the Legislative Council to control the allocation of resources.

However, they were aware that their position was dependent on the support of the British Government which allowed them to acquire and use power unless or until it was an embarrassment abroad. As a result the settlers developed a scolding relationship with the government - resentful of the colonial administration's authority, they were frequently critical; confident of their kith and kin relationship they were demanding and cooperative in turn. Until the Emergency in 1952 British support was fairly consistent, and among other things that support enabled the white community to secure 16,000 square miles - the White Highlands exclusively for their own farming and settlement purposes. Although the Africans had 52,000 square miles of rich lands, their areas were poorly farmed, over-populated and underdeveloped. In contrast, the settlers lacked the numbers and the financial resources to develop all of the Highlands, and extensive tracts were developed as large plantations

8. Donald Rothchild, Racial Bargaining In Independent Kenya, New York: Oxford University Press, 1973, chapter 3.

Vol. 26(1979) No. 3 47



financed by British companies. Whether or not they fully utilized their land they could either monopolize or manipulate the country's major resource, i.e., its agricultural potential. Their political power stemmed mainly from the economic system they created rather than from their material input into it.

Apart from British support, the maintenance of political dominance rested on two features: the absence of an effective African opposition and a degree of political cohesion among the Europeans. That cohesion was built on two inter-related principles of settler political behavior. The first was that in a pluralistic multi-racial society no politician could cross communal boundaries with impunity, and this meant that no political alliances or advantages could be offered to the Asians or the Africans except on settler terms. Given the mores of the time this mode of behavior was easily enforced. The second was that European unity had to be maintained at all costs. The constant feuding of the Europeans with the colonial administration masked some of their differences. The greatest source of diversity had always been the conflict of interests between the rural-agricultural and urban-commercial sectors of the white community. However, their inter-dependency and the common goal of economic development minimized these differences. It was not until the African nationalists effectively challenged the "structure of privilege" in the 1950s that the differences between the two groups surfaced and were politicized.

The Limits of Settler Power

It was at this point that the dimensions of settler power proved to be limited, although it did not seem so at the time. Throughout the colony's history the settler-farmers were the most conspicuous element in the country's politics. They had successfully demanded land, the dominant participatory role in the political system, policies which marshalled African labor on their farms and limited African economic development, subsidies, and other advantages. All these demands were based on the claim that they were the mainstay of the economy. However, as Colin Leys has pointed out " . . . this was a myth;" the vital core of the economy rested on "the more fundamental relationship between foreign capital, represented by plantation and ranch production and the urban, commercial sector, and African peasant producers and wage workers."9 Myth or no myth, the British government was supportive of the settlers, business groups maintained a public silence, and the Africans perceived the Europeans as the major barrier to their aspirations. This impression was

9. Colin Leys, Underdevelopment in Kenya, London: Heinemann, 1975, pp. 36 and 39.

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reinforced by numerous visits of British officials to the Colony and their equally numerous public appearances with settler leaders. However, the public "British connection" implied more than it meant, and disguised more than it revealed.

By the mid-1950s neither the British government nor British business interests regarded the continuation of settler power as crucial to their interests. The government's central goal was to extricate itself from an untenable position; clearly it could not afford to pay the high cost of the Emergency and to resist African nationalism. Indeed, British officials pri- vately warned settler leaders that the status quo could not be continued indefinitely. At the same time it could not afford to abandon kith and kin or risk losing business investments. The same period was also marked by the emergence of a new generation of settler leaders who appeared on the political scene as early as the 1948 legislative elections, and by 1954 emerged as influential figures in Kenya politics. In a society with a very narrow political spectrum some of these leaders were regarded as wild- eyed liberals. These included Michael Blundell - later Sir Michael - who became the Minister for Agriculture and later led the moderate New Kenya Group; Wilfred Havelock - later Sir Wilfred - who was a major organizing force within the New Kenya Group; and Sir Ernest Vasey, one time mayor of Nairobi and later Minister for Finance. Although such leaders initially supported political multi-racialism in the hope that Europeans could control political developments, the fact that they supported any form of power-sharing represented a major shift in settler politics. As a result the British govenrment was quick to identify and support settler leaders who were prepared to cross communal lines and move toward political accommodation with the Africans. The moderates risked their political credibility by making such a shift; reactionary Euro- peans scorned the moderates as sell-outs, and radical Africans regarded multi-racialism as nothing more than a political trick. But the British government concentrated much of its energies on this policy and exploited this shift within the settler community.

The subsequent effect of this maneuver led to an internecine struggle which broke European unity. It is beyond the scope of this article to analyze the dynamics of settler politics, but from 1956 onward the Europeans were divided between the moderates who supported multi- racialism and the conservatives who either resisted any changes or advocated varying forms of separate development. As an index to the differences between them one might note the socioeconomic composition of the sixteen Europeans who attended the 1960 Lancaster House conference. In summary, the moderates were primarily from urban areas, Vol. 26 (1979) No. 3 49



long term residents and with the longest experience as members of the Legislative Council; the conservatives were mainly frona the rural-agricultural areas, retired officers, the shortest term residents, and the most recently elected members of the Legislative Council. One might also note that the moderates were more prepared to redefine their identity and the kind of life-style that would be acceptable to them. At the 1960 conference they accepted majority rule on the condition that they could retain control over their schools and hospitals; the conservatives either walked out at the end of the meetings or simply rejected the conference results. In retrospect the differences do not seem so significant, but it was the moderates who stayed in Kenya after majority rule and the conservatives who led the white exodus from the country.

The Land Question

Given the settler-farmer's role in Kenya's economy - myth or not - the threat of their exodus was perceived as a threat to the future economic stability of the country. For various and often contradictory reasons white and African leaders, as well as the British government and British businesses, shared the common belief that it was necessary to preserve the capitalist structure created under the settler's influence in order to promote economic and political stability. The ownership and use of the White Highlands - which by 1960 had been desegregated -was at the heart of the issue, as it always had been and will likely continue to be. White leaders feared that if farmers deserted or ruined-their farms the commercial network would come unravelled, land values would be depressed, and the whole European economic position would be undermined. African leaders were faced with the need not only to defuse the land issue by providing settlement opportunities for the landless, but to maintain sufficient political and economic stability to attract foreign investment for development purposes. Britain was anxious that Kenya begin its independence in a stable condition; moreover, the Conservative Party - which was the government of the day - had to concern itself with the kith and kin issue and the reactions of business interests at home. With the land issue as leverage some moderate and conservative leaders acted, not always in unison, to persuade Britain to support a land transfer scheme to buy out the farmers who wished to leave. Through a complex set of negotiations the African government financed a land transfer scheme with monies provided mainly by the British government, and began the process of buying out the European farms for resale to African farmers. The scheme was designed and set in motion before independence.

The land transfer program has been analyzed frequently and critically 50 AFRICA TODAY



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for its effects on Kenya's economy. 10 The relevance for the Europeans was two-fold: the pledge to buy out white farmers effectively prevented what could have been an abrupt exodus of settlers and allowed for an orderly transfer of land and capital; the structure of land allocation and the agricultural-commercial relationship were not radically altered. In short, the capitalist structure created under the colonial administration was passed on intact to the independence government; the Europeans, whether they stayed or left, were thus assured that the loss of political power did not mean economic ruin. At the same time, the land transfer program marked the end of the Europeans' role in Kenya's farming community; non-citizens are prohibited by law from owning agricultural land, and political pressures on non-African citizens to sell their farms are gradually forcing them out of the farming sector of the economy.

The Settler Class Today

The role of the white settler class today does not differ greatly from the position of political and economic accommodation forged between the whites and the independence government. However, it has been greatly diminished by the Africanization process and is largely dependent on the settler's citizenship. From the time of independence one of the government's major goals was to Africanize both the public and private sector as rapidly as possible. Between 1967 and 1972 the number of non-citizens in wage employment was reduced by fifty percent, and while this included Asians as well as Europeans both communities experienced similar reductions. According to the government's 1974-1978 Development Plan the country will have only a miniscule number of non-citizens engaged in wage-employment by 1982. However, whites were less vulnerable than Asians, partly because they had skills which Africans needed but could not acquire quickly.

After independence a few of the settlers who took citizenship remained in important government posts for some time - Bruce McKenzie served as Minister of Agriculture for several years and was active in the management of Kenya's airways until his death in mid-1978 - but most of them either moved into, or remained with, business and services which are locally owned or are multi-national corporations. Professionals, such as doctors, lawyers, and architects, continued to practice and began

10. For an analysis of the land transfer see: Gary Wasserman, Politics of Decolonization. London: Cambridge University Press, 1976; for other commentaries on the land transfer scheme and its implications for Kenya's economy, see: Colin Leys, ibid.; Gerald Hotham and Arthur Hazlewood, Aid and Inequality in Kenya: BrtiUsh Development Assistance to Kenya, London: Croom Helm, 1976: Christopher Leo, "The Failure of the 'Progressive Farmer' in Kenya's Million-Acre Settlement Scheme", Journal of Modem African Studies, 16, 4. December 1978, 619-38.

Vol.26(1979) No. 3 51



to absorb Africans into their firms. A number of former farm owners became farm managers for Africans during the transition period of the land transfer scheme, but they have been replaced as more Africans take over the management of their own farms. Settler citizens who worked in edu- cational institutions and voluntary associations continue in their occu- pations much as they did before independence.

African sensitivities about the use of non-African experts will further reduce the rate and level of European participation in the socio-economic life of the country. It will not matter much whether the whites are citizens or non-citizens, although there is little reason at this time to believe that the government will deliberately purge its economy of the current white parti- cipants. Two factors will gradually phase out the role of the settler class. The first is the aging process which is thinning the ranks of the activists of the 1950s generation; most of that group are in their early seventies and either retirement or death will remove them from active roles. Sir Michael Blundell, who became chairman of the East African Breweries, retired in late 1977; his African successor, Kenneth Matiba, hailed him as a "true- mwananchi.""l In April 1979 the death of Lord Delamere - son of the most famous of the earliest settlers - symbolized the waning of an era. Replacement by death and retirement is giving way to displacement through Africanization, and this will affect the future of the settler's off- spring who currently find themselves faced with the prospect of being dis- criminated against in favor of Africans. The government explains the Africanization process with an argument used frequently in support of affirmative action in the United States: employment in public and private sectors should reflect the racial composition of the country, therefore granting positions to black rather than white citizens is merely a matter of redressing the imbalance and injustices of the colonial era.

Fragments of the settlers' social life-style remain. There is still horse racing in Nairobi on Sundays and the once exclusively white private club at Muthaiga continues to cater for a members' only clientele. But the African bettors now outnumber the Europeans at the race track and while the Muthaiga Club is still the exclusive domain of the elite of Kenyan society it is no longer a white, Anglo-Saxon preserve. The Norfolk Hotel retains its quaint colonial atmosphere, but there are no longer up-country farmers to crowd its Delamere Room on the weekends. Fashionable residential areas are multi-racial, but the servants' quarters and work hours have changed very little. Social life is primarily a private affair; guests consist of one's own generation and status - black and white - and Nairobi residents increa- singly buy or rent retirement or vacation homes at the Coast. Night life at the International Casino and the expensive restaurants is left to the expatriates and the tourists. And, the small, up-country hotels and English-like 11. The Standard, November 21, 1977.

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inns have either closed or manage to continue operating with fewer clientele and limited business hours. Rural Europeans have migrated to Nairobi and Mombasa; urbanites follow a life pattern whose outlines gradually fade against an African background which has absorbed them without destroying them. Even the legendary white hunter is disappearing from the scene, initially because of the Africanization process and then finally, in December 1977, when the government banned game hunting as part of an effort to save wild life.

The current relationship between the Europeans and the Africans can be characterized as amicable ambivalence. The amicability rests on the longevity of the peaceful accommodation between the moderates who remained and the Africans who not only accepted their presence but utilized the post-independence accommodation to maintain the economic system and to gain access to its rewards. The ambivalence arises out of charges from Africans on the left that Kenya need not, and ought not, rely on non-Africans for their economic development. The implications of this attitude for the younger white generation is that there will be minimal opportunities for them in the future. In short, the vitality of the community will simply fade away. For the present, any concern Europeans may have for their personal safety and security is probably not much greater than that experienced by similarly affluent Africans or Asians. Those who are thinking it is time to go are doing so because the future seems unpromising rather than unsafe.

Conclusion

Clearly, the future of the European community in Kenya after Kenyatta is closely tied to the success and durability of the moderate and capitalist oriented government on which they staked their future after independence. Kenya's political stability since independence is largely attri- butable to the means and measures used by the government to regulate the economy; the use of foreign investments and loans have integrated the country into the western industrial system more thoroughly than it ever was during the colonial era. Critics, both inside and outside Kenya, have pointed out the extent to which the transfer of political authority was accompanied by the entrenchment of the colonial economic system and the expansion of multi-national interests.

Although President Daniel arap Moi has promised to make a syste- matic review of the government's socio-economic policy, it is doubtful that he will radically alter Kenya's existing capitalist orientation. Mwai Kibaki,

Vol. 26 (1979) No. 3 53



the new Vice President, recently stated the government's outlook at the opening of the General Motors assembly plant outside Nairobi.

I personally believe that we have chosen a path which is social demo- cracy ... we have taken the view that the role of the state in development is not to nationalize all the land, not to nationalize all the industry and not to nationalize all the citizens. It is rather that the state will make a contribution to planning and in helping to spread the incomes so that social welfare reaches everybody. Hence the role of the state is to participate in industry jointly with others.12

It is worth noting that the construction of the General Motors plant included the services of the structural engineers of Howard Humphreys and Sons (EA) Ltd., and the architectural firm of Hughes and Polking- thorne, two of Kenya's oldest European businesses. If one seeks an answer to the question of the future role of the Europeans it may be said that the economic system they helped launch may remain afloat much longer than any of the reactionary settlers or radical Africans ever thought possible. As for the Europeans themselves, they are indeed "the human souvenirs of another era."

12. Weekly Review, April 13, 1979, p. 27.

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Kenya after Kenyatta || "Human Souvenirs of Another Era": Europeans in Post-Kenyatta Kenya