Keohane Et Al - Global is at Ion

8/2/2019 Keohane Et Al - Global is at Ion

1/17

Washingtonpost.Newsweek Interactive, LLC

Globalization: What's New? What's Not? (And So What?)Author(s): Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr.Reviewed work(s):Source: Foreign Policy, No. 118 (Spring, 2000), pp. 104-119Published by: Washingtonpost.Newsweek Interactive, LLCStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1149673 .Accessed: 16/01/2012 07:29

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms

of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

Washingtonpost.Newsweek Interactive, LLCis collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend

access to Foreign Policy.

http://www.jstor.org
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=wpnihttp://www.jstor.org/stable/1149673?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/stable/1149673?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=wpni


2/17

GobalizationWhat's N e w ? What'sN o t ? ( A n d S o What?)byRobert . KeohanendJoseph . NyeJr.

lobalization" emerged as a buzzword inthe 1990s,just as "interdependence"idin the 1970s, but the phenomena it refersto are not entirely new. Our characterization ofinterdependence ore han20yearsagonowapplieso globalizationat the turnof the millennium: Thisvaguephrase xpresses poorlyunderstoodutwidespreadeeling hattheverynature f world oliticsis changing."Some skeptics believe such terms are beyondredemptionoranalyticuse.Yetthepublicunderstandshe imageofthe globe,andthe newwordconveysan increased enseof vulnera-bilityto distantcauses.Forexample,as helicopters umigatedNewYorkCityin 1999toeradicate lethalnewvirus,hepress nnouncedthatthepathogenmighthavearrivedn thebloodstreamf a traveler,in a birdsmuggledhrough ustoms, r in a mosquitohathadflowninto a jet. Fearsof "bioinvasion"ed someenvironmentalroupsocallfora reductionn global radeand travel.Likeallpopularonceptsmeant o covera variety f phenomena,both"interdependence"nd"globalization"avemanymeanings. ounderstand hatpeopleare alking boutwhen heyusethe terms ndROBERT. KEOHANEsJames .Duke rofessorfpoliticalciencetDukeUniversity.JOSEPH . NYE R. isdeanof theJohnF.Kennedychool fGovernmenttHarvardUniversity.hisarticles drawnromheorthcominghirdditionftheir ookPower ndInterdependence:orldPolitics nTransitionNewYork:ongman,000).104 FOREIGN POLICY


3/17

Keohane&Nye

to makethem useful oranalysis,we mustbegin by askingwhetherinterdependencendglobalizationresimply wo words or the samething,orwhether here ssomething ewgoingon.THE DIMENSIONS OF GLOBALISMThe twowordsarenot exactlyparallel. nterdependenceeferso acondition, stateofaffairs.t can ncrease,sithasbeendoingonmostdimensionsincetheendofWorldWar I;or it candecline,asit did,at least n economic erms,duringheGreatDepressionf the 1930s.Globalizationmplieshatsomethingsincreasing:here smoreof it.Hence,ourdefinitionstartnot withglobalizationutwith"globalism,"a conditionhatcanincrease rdecrease.Globalisms a stateof theworldnvolving etworks f interdepen-denceatmulticontinentalistances. he linkagesccur hroughlowsand nfluencesfcapital ndgoods,nformationnd deas,andpeopleandforces,as wellas environmentallyndbiologicallyelevant ub-stancessuchasacidrainorpathogens). lobalizationnddeglobaliza-tion refero theincrease rdeclineofglobalism.Interdependenceefersosituationsharacterizedyreciprocalffectsamong ountriesramong ctorsndifferentountries. ence,globalismis a typeof interdependence,ut with twospecial haracteristics.irst,globalismeferso networksfconnectionsmultipleelationships),otto single inkages.Wewould efero economic rmilitarynterdepen-dencebetween he UnitedStatesand Japan,but not to globalismbetween heUnitedStates ndJapan.U.S.-Japanesenterdependencespartofcontemporarylobalism,ut snotbyitselfglobalism.Second, or a network f relationshipso be consideredglobal,"tmust ncludemulticontinentalistances,otsimply egional etworks.Distance s a continuous ariable,angingromadjacencybetween,say, heUnitedStatesandCanada)o oppositeidesof theglobe(forinstance,GreatBritain ndAustralia). nysharp istinction etweenlong-distancendregionalnterdependences thereforerbitrary,ndthere sno point n decidingwhetherntermediateelationships-say,betweenJapanand India or betweenEgyptand South Africa-wouldqualify.Yetglobalismwouldbe anoddword orproximate egionalrela-tionships.Globalizationrefers o the shrinkageof distance on a largescale [see box on pages 110]. It can be contrastedwith localization,nationalization, rregionalization.

SPRING 2000 105


4/17

Globalization:hat's ew?

Someexamplesmayhelp.Islam'sapiddiffusionromArabia crossAsiato what snowIndonesia asaclear nstance fglobalization,utthe initialmovement f Hinduismcross he Indian ubcontinent asnot.Tiesamonghe countriesfthe AsiaPacificEconomic ooperationforum ualifysmulticontinentalnterdependence,ecausehesecoun-tries nclude heAmericas s wellasAsiaandAustralia;uttiesamongmembersfthe Association fSoutheast sianNationsareregional.Globalism oesnot implyuniversality. t the turnof the millen-nium,more than a quarter f the Americanpopulationused theWorldWideWebcomparedwith one hundredthf 1percentof thepopulationof South Asia. Mostpeoplein the world odaydo nothave elephones;undredsfmillionsiveaspeasantsnremote illageswithonly slightconnections o worldmarkets r the global lowofideas.Indeed,globalizations accompanied y increasing aps,inmany respects,between the rich and the poor.It impliesneitherhomogenizationorequity.Interdependencend globalism re both multidimensionalhe-nomena.All toooften, heyaredefinednstrictly conomicerms, sif theworld conomydefined lobalism. utthereareseveral, quallyimportantorms fglobalism:* Economiclobalismnvolvesong-distancelows fgoods,ervices,nd

capital, swell asthe informationndperceptionshataccompanymarket xchange. t alsoinvolves he organizationf the processesthatare inked o theseflows, uchasthe organizationf low-wageproductionnAsia or heU.S. andEuropean arkets.* Militarylobalismeferso long-distanceetworksf interdependencein which orce,andthethreatorpromise f force,areemployed.goodexample fmilitary lobalismsthe"balancefterror"etweentheUnitedStates nd heSovietUnionduringhecoldwar.The twocountries'trategicnterdependenceasacuteandwellrecognized.Not onlydid it produceworld-straddlinglliances, uteithersidecouldhaveused ntercontinentalissilesodestroyheotherwithin30minutes. heir nterdependenceasdistinctive otbecauset wastotallynew,butbecausehe scaleandspeedof thepotential onflictarising romit were so enormous.* Environmentallobalismefers o the long-distanceransport f mate-rialsin the atmosphere roceans,orof biologicalsubstances uchaspathogensor genetic materials, hat affecthumanhealth and well-106 FOREIGN POLICY


5/17

Keohane& Nye

being.The depletion f the stratosphericzone ayerasa resultofozone-depletinghemicalss an exampleof environmentallobal-ism,as is the spread f the AIDSvirus romwestequatorial fricaaroundhe world ince the endof the 1970s.Someenvironmentalglobalismmaybeentirely atural,utmuchofthe recent hange asbeen induced yhuman ctivity.

* Social ndculturallobalismnvolves hemovement f ideas, nfor-mation, images,and people (who, of course,carryideasandinformationith hem).Examplesncludehemovementfreligionsor the diffusionof scientificknowledge.An importantacet ofsocialglobalismnvolvesthe imitationof one society'spracticesand institutionsby others:what some sociologistsrefer to as"isomorphism."ften,however,ocial lobalismas ollowedmilitaryand economicglobalism. deas, nformation, nd peoplefollowarmiesandeconomic lows,and in doingso, transformocietiesandmarkets.At its mostprofoundevel, socialglobalism ffectstheconsciousnessf individuals ndtheirattitudesowardulture,politics,andpersonaldentity.ndeed,ocialandcultural lobalisminteractswithothertypesof globalism, ecausemilitary,nviron-mental,andeconomicactivityconveyinformation ndgenerateideas,which may then flow acrossgeographical nd politicalboundaries. n the currentera, as the growthof the Internetreduces ostsandglobalizesommunications,he flow of ideas sincreasinglyndependentf other ormsofglobalization.This divisionof globalismnto separate imensionss inevitablysomewhatrbitrary.onetheless,t isusefuloranalysis,ecausehangesinthevariousimensionsfglobalizationo notnecessarilyccur imul-taneously. ne cansensiblyay, orinstance,hateconomic lobaliza-

tiontookplacebetweenapproximately850and1914,manifestednimperialismndincreasedradeandcapital lowsbetweenpoliticallyindependentountries;ndthatsuchglobalizationas argelyeversedbetween1914and1945.That s,economic lobalismosebetween 850and1914and ellbetween1914and1945.However,militarylobalismrose o newheightsduringhe twoworldwars, sdidmanyaspects fsocialglobalism.The worldwidenfluenza pidemicof 1918-19,whichtook 30 million lives, was propagatedn partby the flowsof soldiersaroundthe world.So did globalismdecline or risebetween 1914 and1945?It dependson whatdimensionof globalismone isexamining.SPRING 2000 107


6/17


CONTEMPORARY GLOBALISMWhenpeoplepeakolloquiallybout lobalization,hey ypicallyeferorecentncreasesnglobalism.n thiscontext, ommentsuchas"global-izationsfundamentallyew"make ensebutareneverthelessisleading.Wepreferospeak fglobalisms aphenomenonithancient oots ndofglobalizationstheprocessfincreasinglobalism,owor inthepast.Theissue snothowoldglobalisms,butrather ow"thin" r "thick"it isatanygiven ime.As anexamplef"thin lobalization,"heSilkRoadprovidedneconomic ndculturalinkbetweenncientEuropendAsia,but heroutewaspliedbyasmall roupfhardyraders,nd hegoodshatwere raded ackand orthhada directmpact rimarilynasmall andrelativelylite)stratumfconsumerslong he road. ncontrast,thick"relationsfglobalization,sdescribedypoliticalcientistDavidHeldandothers,nvolvemany elationshipshatare ntensive swellasextensive:long-distancelows hat are argeandcontinuous,ffectinghe livesofmany people.The operationsf global inancialmarketsoday, orinstance,ffect eopleromPeoriaoPenang.Globalizationstheprocessbywhichglobalismecomesncreasinglyhick.Globalismodayis differentromglobalism f the 19thcentury,whenEuropeanmperialismrovidedmuchof its political tructure,andhigher ransportndcommunicationsostsmeantfewerpeopleweredirectlynvolved.But is thereanythingaboutglobalismodaythat is fundamentallyifferentromjust20 yearsago?To saythatsomethings "fundamentally"ifferent s alwaysproblematic,inceabsolute iscontinuitiesonotexist nhumanhistory. very rabuildson others,andhistorians analwaysindprecursorsorphenomenafthe present.Journalist homasFriedmanrgues hat contemporaryglobalizationoes"farther,aster, eeper, ndcheaper.. ."Thedegreeof thickening fglobalismmaybegivingrise o threechangesnotjustin degreebutin kind: ncreasedensityof networks,ncreased insti-tutional elocity,"nd ncreasedransnationalarticipation.DensityofNetworksEconomistsusethe term"network ffects" o refer o situationswhereaproductbecomes more valuable once many people use it-take, forexample,the Internet.Joseph Stiglitz,formerchief economistof theWorld Bank,has arguedthat a knowledge-basedconomy generates"powerfulpillovereffects,often spreadingike fire and triggeringur-108 FOREIGN POLICY


7/17

KeohaneNye

therinnovationandsettingoff chainreactions f new inventions."Moreover,sinterdependencendglobalismavebecome hicker,ys-temic relationshipsmongdifferentnetworkshave becomemoreimportant.herearemore nterconnections.ntensiveconomicnter-dependenceffectsocialandenvironmentalnterdependence;ware-ness of theseconnections n turnaffects conomic elationships.orinstance, he expansion f tradecan generatendustrialctivity ncountrieswith owenvironmentaltandards,obilizingnvironmentalactivists o carryheirmessageo thesenewly ndustrializingutenvi-ronmentallyaxcountries. heresultingctivitiesmayaffect nviron-mental interdependencefor instance,by reducing ross-boundarypollution)butmaygenerate esentmentn the newlyindustrializingcountries,ffectingocialandeconomic elations.Theworldwidempact fthefinancial risishatbegannThailandinJuly1997illustrateshe extentof thesenetworknterconnections.Unexpectedly,what irstappeareds an isolated ankingndcurrencycrisis n a small"emerging arket"ountryhadsevereglobaleffects.It generatedinancialpanicelsewheren Asia,particularlyn SouthKoreaandIndonesia; romptedmergencymeetingsat the highestlevel of world inanceandhuge"bail-out"ackages rchestratedytheInternationalMonetary und IMF);nd edeventuallyoawide-spread oss of confidence n emergingmarkets nd the efficacyofinternationalinancial nstitutions.Beforethat contagious oss ofconfidencewasstemmed,Russia addefaulted n itsdebt,andaU.S.-basedhedge undhad to berescueduddenlyhrough planbrokeredby the FederalReserveBankof New York.Evenafterrecovery adbegun,Brazil equired n IMF loan,coupledwith a devaluation,oavoid inancial ollapsen 1999.Economiclobalismsnothingnew.Indeed,herelativemagnitudefcross-bordernvestmentn 1997wasnot unprecedented.apitalmar-ketswerebysomemeasures orentegratedt thebeginninghanat theend of the 20thcentury. he netoutflow fcapitalromGreatBritainin the fourdecades efore1914averaged percentof grossdomesticproduct,ompared ith 2 to 3 percentorJapan verthe lastdecade.The financial risisof 1997-99wasnot the first o be global n scale:"BlackTuesday" n Wall Street in 1929 and the collapseof Austria'sCreditanstaltbank in 1931 triggereda worldwide inancialcrisisanddepression.n the 1970s,skyrocketingil pricespromptedhe Organiza-tionof PetroleumExportingCountrieso lendsurplusunds o developed

SPRING 2000 109


8/17


D i s t a n c e : I t ' s N o t Q u i t e D e a dThe "Death f Distance"s the battlecryof the informationge.In somedomains,hisrefrainstrue; sageneralization,owever,t isa half-truth.irst,participationnglobalnterdependenceas ncreased,utmanypeople ftheworldreonly enuouslyonnectedoany ommunicationsetworkshat ran-scend heir tates,reven heirocalities.Many easantillagesnAsia,Africa,andLatinAmericareonly onnectedotheworld sa wholehroughlow ndoften hineconomic,ocial, ndpoliticalinks.Even orthosepeopleinkedextensivelyoglobalommunicationsetworks,t ismore ccurateosay hatthesignificancefdistance ariesreatly y ssue rea.Forinstance, conomicglobalism as been mostmarkedn financialmarkets.Distance s indeed rrelevant-exceptortimezones-if a stockcan be sold nstantaneouslynNewYork rHongKongbyan investornAbidjano one inMoscow.ndeed,f the stock ssoldonline, tmaybeonlya fiction hatit was"sold n the New York tockExchange."utphysicalgoodsmovemore lowlyhancapital, ecause utomobilesndcut flowerscannotbetransformedntodigitsonacomputer. rdersorsuch temscanbe sentwithoutregardo distance, ut the carsor flowers ave to movephysicallyromTokyo rBogotito JakartarCalgary.uchmovementstaking lace asterhanever-flowersarenowsent housandsfmilesby etaircraft-but t isbynomeansnstantaneousrcheap.Variabilityydistance pplieso cultural lobalisms well.The actualmovement f ideasand nformationsvirtuallynstantaneous,uthowwellnew conceptsareunderstoodnd accepteddependson how muchtheassumptions,ttitudes,ndexpectationsf differentroups f peoplevary.We can refer o thesedifferencess "culturalistance," hichhas beenshaped ypastmigrationsfpeopleand deas nd s,inturn, onstrainedy

nations,and banks in those countriesmadea profitby relending hatmoney to developingcountries in LatinAmerica and Africa (whichneeded the moneyto fundexpansionaryiscalpolicies).But the moneydriedup with the globalrecessionof 1981-83:By late 1986,morethan40 countriesworldwideweremired n severeexternaldebt.But some featuresof the 1997-99crisisdistinguish t frompreviousones. Most economists, governments, and international financialinstitutionsfailed to anticipatethe crisis,and complexnew financialinstrumentsmade t difficult o understand. vencountries hathadpre-110 FOREIGN POLICY


9/17

Keohane&Nye

geography.heU.S.presidentan talksimultaneouslyo people n Berlin,Belgrade,uenosAires,Beijing,Beirut,Mumbai,ndBujumbura-buthesamewordswillbeinterpretederydifferentlynthese evencities.Likewise,U.S.popularulturemaybeinterpretedyyouthnsomeculturessvalidat-ing fundamentallyewvaluesand ifestyles,utviewed n other ettings snothingmore hantrivialymbols,xpressednly n baseballaps,T-shirts,andmusic.Andfor omeyouthnthe same ity, uchasTehran,uch ymbolsarerepresentativefthe Great atan, rofliberation. ulturalistanceesistshomogenization.inally, lementsof social globalismhat relyon themigrationfpeople rehighlyonstrainedydistancendby egalurisdictions,becauseravel emainsostlyormostpeoplentheworld, ndgovernmentseverywhereeek o control nd imitmigration.Similar ariabilityydistance ccurswithenvironmentallobalism.Wemay ive on "onlyone earth," utpollution f riversdirectly ffects nlythosedownstream,nd hepoisonousirofmany ities ntheformerovietempire nddevelopingountriesslethalmostlyo peoplewithin ocalandregional asins.The most ethalpollutions local.Evenglobalphenomenasuchasthedepletion f the ozone ayer ndglobalwarmingarybylatitudeandclimaticactors.

There s alsogreatvariabilityydistance n military lobalism.Onlyafewcountriesave ntercontinentalissiles,ndonlythe UnitedStateshasthe logistical ndcommand ndcontrolcapabilitiesorglobal eachwithconventionalorces.Mostcountries re ocaloratbestregional owers.Atthe same ime,weak ocalactorsanuseothernetworksfglobalismo causedamage. vennonstate ctors an doso,aswitnessed henatransnationalterroristroup ombedhe WorldTradeCenternNew York.

-R.O.K. &J.S.N.viouslybeenpraisedortheirsoundeconomicpoliciesandperformancewereno lesssusceptibleo the financialcontagiontriggered yspecula-tive attacksandunpredictablehanges n market entiment.The WorldBankhadrecentlypublisheda reportentitled"TheEastAsianMiracle"(1993), andinvestment lows to Asia hadrisenrapidlyo a newpeakin1997, remaininghigh until the crisishit. In December1998, FederalReserveBoardChairmanAlan Greenspansaid: "Ihave learnedmoreabout how this new internationalinancialsystemworks n the last 12months than in the previous20 years."Sheermagnitude,complexity,

SPRING 2000 111


10/17


xxx

OWN,-

MRS,

May I interconnect you?andspeeddistinguishontemporarylobalizationromearlier eriods:Whereashedebtcrisis f the1980swasaslow-motionrainwreck hattookplaceovera period fyears,he Asianmeltdowntruckmmedi-atelyandspreadveraperiod f months.Thepoint s that heincreasinghicknessfglobalism-thedensityfnetworksf interdependence-isotjusta differencendegree.Thick-nessmeans hatdifferentelationshipsfinterdependencentersectmoredeeply t morepoints.Hence, he effects fevents n onegeographicalarea, nonedimension,anhaveprofoundffectsnothergeographicalareas, n otherdimensions. s in scientificheories f "chaos,"nd nweatherystems,mall vents noneplacecanhavecatalyticffects,othattheirconsequencesater, ndelsewhere,revast.Suchsystemsredifficultounderstand,nd heir ffects re hereforeftenunpredictable.Furthermore,henthesearehuman ystems, eopleareoftenhardatwork ryingo outwitothers, o gainan economic, ocial,or militaryadvantagerecisely yactingnunpredictableays.As aresult, lobal-ismwilllikelybe accompaniedy pervasive ncertainty.herewillbecontinual ompetitionetween ncreasedomplexitynduncertainty,112 FOREIGN POLICY


11/17

Keohane&Nye

andefforts y governments, arket articipants,ndotherso compre-hendandmanagehese ncreasinglyomplexnterconnectedystems.Globalization,herefore,oesnotmerelyffect overnance;t isaffectedby governance.requentinancialrises fthemagnitudef thecrisis f1997-99ould ead opopular ovementsolimitnterdependencend oa reversalfeconomiclobalization.haotic ncertaintystoohighapriceformostpeople o payforsomewhatigher verageevelsof prosperity.Unless ome fitsaspectsanbeeffectivelyoverned,lobalizationaybeunsustainablen itscurrentorm.Institutional elocityTheinformationevolutions attheheart feconomic ndsocial lobal-ization.thasmade ossiblehetransnationalrganizationfwork nd heexpansionfmarkets,herebyacilitatingnewinternationalivision flabor.As AdamSmith amouslyeclaredn TheWealthfNations, thedivision flaborslimited ytheextentofthemarket." ilitarylobalismpredatedhe informationevolution,eachingtsheightduringWorldWar Iandthecoldwar; utthenature fmilitarynterdependenceasbeen ransformedyinformationechnology.hepollutionhathascon-tributedo environmentallobalismas itssourcesn thecoal-oil-steel-auto-chemicalconomyhatwas argelyreated etweenhe middle fthe19thand20thcenturiesndhasbecome lobalizednlyrecently;utthe informationevolutionmayhavea majormpacton attemptsocounterndreversehenegativeffects fthis orm fglobalism.Sometimeshesechangesare incorrectlyiewed in termsof thevelocityofinformationlows.Thebiggesthangenvelocity amewiththe steamshipndespeciallyhe telegraph:he transatlanticableof1866reducedhetimeof transmissionf informationetweenLondonandNew York yoveraweek-hence, byafactor faboutathousand.Thetelephone, ycontrast,ncreasedhevelocityofsuchmessagesya fewminutessince elephonemessageso notrequireecoding), ndtheInternet, scompared iththetelephone, ynotmuchatall.Therealdifferenceies in the reduced ostof communicating,ot in thevelocity fany ndividualommunication.ndtheeffects re hereforefeltintheincreasedntensityatherhantheextensity fglobalism.n1877 it was expensive to send telegramsacrossthe Atlantic, and in1927 or even 1977 it was expensiveto telephone transcontinentally.Corporations nd the rich usedtranscontinentalelephones,but ordi-narypeoplewrotelettersunlessthere wasan emergency.Butin 2000, if

SPRING 2000 113


12/17


youhaveaccesso acomputer,heInternetsvirtuallyreeand ranspa-cifictelephone allsmaycostonlya fewcentsperminute.Thevolumeofcommunicationsas ncreasedymanyorders fmagnitude,nd heintensity fglobalismasbeenable oexpand xponentially.Marketseactmorequickly hanbefore,becausenformation if-fusesso much morerapidly ndhugesumsof capitalcanbe movedat a moment's otice.Multinationalnterprisesavechanged heirorganizationaltructures,ntegrating roductionmorecloselyon aThencreasinghicknessfglobalism-theensityfnetworksf nterdependence-isnotjusta diferencendegree.

transnational asisandenteringinto more networks andalliances, as global capitalismhas become more competitiveand more subject to rapidchange.Nongovernmentalrga-nizations (NGOs)have vastlyexpanded heirlevels of activity.Withrespectoglobalismndvelocity,herefore,necandistinguishbetweenhevelocityofagivencommunication-"messageelocity"-and"institutionalelocity."Messageelocityhaschangedittleforthepopulation entersof relatively ich countries ince the telegraphbecamemoreorlessuniversalowardhe endof the 19thcentury. utinstitutionalelocity-how rapidly systemand the unitswithin itchange-is a functionnot so muchof message elocity hanof theintensityof contact-the "thickness"f globalism.n the late 1970s,the newscyclewasthesameas it hadbeenfordecades: eople oundout theday's eadlines ywatchingheeveningnewsandgotthemorecomplete toryandanalysisrom hemorning aper.Buttheintroduc-tion of 24-hour ablenews n 1980andthe subsequentmergenceftheInternetavemadenews ycles horterndhaveputalargerremium

on smalladvantagesn speed.Untilrecently,ne newspaper id notnormally"scoop" notherby receivingandprocessingnformationan hourearlier han another:As long as the informationould beprocessed efore he dailypaper"went o bed,"t wastimely.But in2000,anhour-or even a fewminutes-makes criticaldifferenceora cabletelevisionnetwork n termsof being"ontop of a story" r"behindhe curve."nstitutionalelocityhasacceleratedmorethanmessageelocity.nstitutionalelocity eflects otonly ndividualink-agesbut networks ndinterconnectionsmongnetworks.Thisphe-nomenonswhere herealchangeies.114 FOREIGN POLICY


13/17

Keohane&Nye

TransnationalarticipationndComplexnterdependenceReducedcosts of communications ave increased he numberofparticipatingctorsandincreasedhe relevance f "complexnterde-pendence."This conceptdescribes hypotheticalworldwith threecharacteristics:ultiplechannelsbetweensocieties,with multipleactors,not just states;multipleissues,not arrangedn any clearhierarchy;nd heirrelevancef thethreat ruseof forceamong tateslinkedbycomplexnterdependence.We used heconceptofcomplexnterdependencenthe1970sprin-cipallyodescribemergingelationshipsmongpluralistemocracies.Manifestlyt did notcharacterizeelations etween heUnitedStatesandtheSovietUnion,nordid it typifyhepoliticsof theMiddleEast,EastAsia,Africa,or even partsof LatinAmerica.However,we didarguehat nternational onetaryelationspproximatedomeaspectsofcomplexnterdependencen the 1970sandthatsomebilateralela-tionships-French-GermanndU.S.-Canadian,orexample-approx-imated ll threeconditions fcomplexnterdependence.n a worldofcomplexnterdependence,eargued, oliticswouldbedifferent. hegoalsand nstrumentsfstatepolicy-and theprocessesfagendaet-tingand ssueinkage-wouldallbedifferent,swouldhesignificanceof internationalrganizations.

Translatednto the language f globalism,he politicsof complexinterdependenceouldbe one in which evelsof economic, nviron-mental,andsocialglobalism rehigh andmilitary lobalisms low.Regionalnstances fsecurityommunities-wheretateshavereliableexpectationshat orcewillnotbeused-includeScandinaviaince heearly20th century.Arguably,ntercontinentalomplex nterdepen-dencewas imitedduringhecoldwar oareas rotectedytheUnitedStates,suchas the Atlanticsecurity ommunity.ndeed,U.S. powerandpolicywerecrucial o the constructionf postwarnternationalinstitutions,angingromNATO to theIMF,whichprotected ndsup-ported omplex nterdependence.ince 1989,the declineof militaryglobalismndthe extensionof socialandeconomicglobalismo theformer ovietempirehaveimpliedheexpansion f areas f complexinterdependence,tleast o thenewandaspiringmembers fNATO inEasternEurope.Moreover, conomicandsocialglobalism eemto havecreated incentives for leadersin South America to settle territorialquarrels, ut of fearboth of beingdistractedromtasksof economicandsocialdevelopmentandof scaringawayneededinvestmentcapital.

SPRING 2000 115


14/17


Eventoday omplex nterdependences far romuniversal.Militaryforcewasusedby or threatenedgainst tates hroughouthe 1990s,from heTaiwan trait o Iraq,romKuwaito theformerYugoslavia;fromKashmiro Congo.Civil warsareendemic n muchofsub-Saha-ranAfricaandsometimes aveescalatedntointernationalarfare,swhen heDemocraticepublicfCongo'sivilwarengulfediveneigh-Interstateuse and threatofmilitaryorce have virtuallydisappeared n certainareas of the world.

boring ountries. heinformationrevolution and the voraciousappetiteof televisionviewers ordramatic visual images haveheightened global awarenessofsomeof thesecivil conflictsandmade hemmore mmediate,on-tributingo pressureorhumani-

tarianntervention,s in Bosnia ndKosovo.The various imensionsof globalization-inthis case,the social and militarydimensions-intersect, ut the results renot necessarilyonduciveo greater ar-mony.Nevertheless,nterstate se and threatof militaryorcehavevirtually isappearedncertain reas f theworld-notablyamongheadvanced,nformation-eraemocraciesorderingheAtlanticand hePacific, s well asamonga number f their esswealthyneighborsnLatinAmericaandincreasinglyn Eastern-Centralurope.The dimension f complex nterdependencehathaschangedhemost ince he1970ssparticipationnchannels fcontactamongoci-eties.Therehasbeena vastexpansionf suchchannels sa result fthedramaticall nthecostsofcommunicationver arge istances.t isnolonger ecessaryobe a richorganizationobeable ocommunicatena real-timebasiswith peoplearound he globe.Friedman alls thischange he"democratization"ftechnology,inance, nd nformation,because iminishedostshavemadewhatwereonceluxuriesvailableto a muchbroaderange fsociety."Democratization"s probablyhe wrongword,however, ince inmarketsmoneyvotes,andpeople tartout withunequaltakes.Thereis noequality,orexample,ncapitalmarkets,espitehe newfinancialinstrumentshat permitmorepeopleto participate. Pluralization"mightbe a betterword, uggestinghevast ncreasen thenumber ndvariety fparticipantsnglobalnetworks. henumber f internationalNGOsmorethanquadrupledromabout6,000to over26,000in the1990salone.Whetherheyare arge rganizationsuchasGreenpeace116 FOREIGN POLICY


15/17

Keohane&Nye

orAmnestynternational,r theproverbialthree ookswithmodemsanda faxmachine," GOsannowraiseheirvoicesas neverbefore.n1999,NGOs orldwidesed heInterneto coordinate massive rotestagainst he WorldTradeOrganization eeting n Seattle.Whethertheseorganizationsan forgea coherentand credible oalitionhasbecome hekeypoliticalquestion.Thisvastexpansionf transnationalhannels fcontact, tmulticon-tinentaldistances,eneratedythe media ndaprofusionfNGOs,ashelpedexpand he thirddimension f complex nterdependence:hemultiplessuesonnectingocieties.More ndmore ssuesreup orgrabsinternationally,ncludingegulationsndpractices-rangingromphar-maceuticalestingoaccountingndproducttandardsobanking egu-lation-that wereformerlyegardeds the prerogativesf nationalgovernments.heUruguay oundof multilateralradenegotiationsfthe late 1980s and early1990s focusedon services,once virtuallyuntouchedyinternationalegimes;ndthefinancial risis f 1997-99ledtobothpublic ndprivateffortsoglobalizehetransparentinancialreportinghathasbecome revalentnadvancedndustrializedountries.Increasedarticipationt a distanceandgreater pproximationfcomplex nterdependenceo notimplyheendofpolitics.Onthe con-trary,ower emainsmportant.ven ndomainsharacterizedycom-

plex interdependence,oliticsreflects symmetricalconomic, ocial,and environmentalnterdependence,ot justamongstatesbut alsoamong onstate ctors, nd hroughransgovernmentalelations. om-plexinterdependences not a descriptionf the world,but rather nidealconceptabstractingromreality.t is, however, n idealconceptthat ncreasinglyorrespondsorealitynmanyparts f theworld, venattranscontinentalistances-and hatcorrespondsoreclosely hanobsoletemages fworld olitics ssimplynterstateelationshat ocussolelyonforceandsecurity.So whatreallys new ncontemporarylobalism?ntensive,rthick,networknterconnectionshathave ystemicffects,ftenunanticipated.Butsuch hickglobalismsnotuniform:tvaries yregion,ocality,ndissuearea. t is lessa matter fcommunicationsessage elocity hanofdeclining ost,whichdoesspeedupwhatwe callsystemic nd nsti-tutional velocity. Globalization shrinks distance, but it does not makedistanceirrelevant.And the filtersprovidedby domesticpoliticsandpoliticalinstitutionsplaya majorrole in determiningwhateffectsglob-alizationreallyhas and how well variouscountriesadaptto it. Finally,

SPRING 2000 117


16/17


reduced ostshave enabledmoreactors o participaten worldpoliticsatgreateristances,eadingargerreas fworld oliticsoapproximatetheideal ypeofcomplexnterdependence.Although he system f sovereigntates s likely o continueasthedominanttructurentheworld,hecontent f world oliticsschanging.Moredimensionshanever-but notall-are beginningoapproachuridealizedonceptof complexnterdependence.uchtrends anbe setback,perhapsvenreversed,ycataclysmicvents, shappenednearlierphases fglobalization.istory lwaysassurprises.uthistory'surprisesalwaysccur gainsthebackgroundfwhathasgonebefore. hesurprisesof the early21stcenturywill,no doubt,be profoundlyffected ytheprocessesfcontemporarylobalizationhatwehave riedoanalyzeere.

WANT TO KNOW MORE?Interdependenceecame buzzwordnthe1970s, hanksnpart o thelandmarkworks of two economists:Richard N. Cooper'sTheEconomicsof Interdependence:conomicPolicy in the AtlanticCommunityNewYork:McGrawHill, 1968)andRaymondVernon'sSovereigntyt Bay: The Multinational preadof U.S. Enterprises(NewYork: asicBooks,1971).PoliticalcientistsRobertO.KeohaneandJosephS. NyeJr.havepublished number fworks n thetopic,includingTransnationalRelationsand WorldPolitics(Cambridge:HarvardUniversityPress,1972) andPowerand Interdependence:WorldPolitics in TransitionBoston:Little,Brown,andCompany,1977; orthcominghird dition,New York: ongman,000).Technological nd economicchangedid not stop in the 1980s,evenas the"little oldwar"wasrefocusingublic ttention,oundationresources, nd academic ashionson the moretraditionalecurityagenda.Withthecoldwar's nd,theresulting rowthn interdepen-dencebecame o clear hat ournalist homasFriedman'sell-writtenbookon globalization, he Lexus and the Olive Tree (NewYork:FarrarStrausand Giroux, 1999) became a bestseller. FriedmanengagedLeMonde iplomatique'sgnacioRamonet n a livelydebateover globalizationn the Fall 1999 issue of FOREIGNPOLICY.)WilliamGreiderpresents skepticalpost-cold-wariew in his OneWorld,ReadyorNot:The ManicLogicofGlobalCapitalismNewYork: imon& Schuster, 997).118 FOREIGN POLICY


17/17

Keohane&Nye

The mostcompleteacademicurvey f globalizationo dateis themagisterialGlobal Transformations:Politics, Economics, andCulture(Stanford:tanfordUniversityPress,1999),by DavidHeld,AnthonyMcGrew,DavidGoldblatt, ndJonathanPerraton. askiaSassenpresentsninterestingociological erspectivenGlobalizationand Its Discontents:Essayson the New Mobilityof PeopleandMoney NewYork: ewPress, 997).Frances airncrossakesasome-whatbreathlessiewof the informationevolutionn The Death ofDistance:How the Communications evolutionWill ChangeOurLives Boston:Harvard usiness choolPress, 997).Margaret.Keckand KathrynSikkink'sbookActivistsBeyondBorders:AdvocacyNetworks n International olitics(Ithaca:CornellUniversityPress,1998)offers historical erspectiven the evolutionof globalnorms,and JaredM. Diamond'sGuns, Germs,and Steel: The Fates ofHumanSocieties NewYork:W.W.Norton& Company,997)exam-ines the various imensions fglobalismveraspanof centuries.KarlPolanyi'sThe Great TransformationNew York:Farrar&Rinehart, 944;BeaconPress, 985)remains classic ccount f theriseand fall of 19th-centuryconomicglobalism.Dani Rodrik'sHasGlobalization oneToo Far?(Washington:nstituteorInternationalEconomics,997)updatesheseconcernsorthe current ra.JeffreyG.Williamson'shapter,Globalizationnd he LaborMarket,"nPhilippeAghion and JeffreyG. Williamson, ds., Growth,InequalityandGlobalization:heory,History,and Policy (Cambridge: ambridgeUniversityress, 998) sanexcellent ourceor mportantistoricalata.For inks to relevantWebsites,aswell as a comprehensivendexof relatedFOREIGN POLICYarticles, ccesswww.foreignpolicy.com.

SPRING 2000 119

Documents

Keohane Et Al - Global is at Ion