Klaus-Dieter Mathes - Can Sutra Mahamudra Be Justified on the Basis of Maitripa's Apratisthanavada.pdf

Can sutra mahamudra be justified on the basis

of Maitripa’s Apratisthänaväda?1

Kl au s - Di e t e r Mathes , Hamburg

General remarks

The term sutra mahamudra is a controversial one, suggesting as it does that the practice and realization of mahamudra is possible outside the Tantras, namely on the basis of the Sutras. Such an approach was propagated by sGam po pa (1079-1153) but criticized by Sa skya Pandita (1182-1251), who maintained that there is no conventional expression for mahamudra in the paramita tradition, and that the wisdom of mahamudra can only be a wisdom arisen from empowerment. ’Gos Lo tsa ba gZon nu dpal (1392-1481), however, defends sGam po pa’s mahamudra by pointing out that it has Indian origins, in the persons of Jnanaklrti and Maitrlpa (ca. 1007 - ca. 1085)2 (together with the latter’s disciple Sahajavajra, 11th cent.).3 Kon sprul Bio gros mtha’ yas (1813— 1899) thus distinguishes in his Ses bya kun khyab mdzod (vol. 3, 375f.) besides the generally accepted mantra mahamudra, a sutra mahamudra and an essence mahamudra. Mantra mahamudra is transmitted according to the methods taught by the Mantrayana, and this involves Tantric empowerment. Essence mahamudra leads to the sudden or instantaneous realization of one’s natural mind (tha mal gyi ses pa). Sutra mahamudra is defined in the following way:

1 The present article was made possible through a research project financed by the German Research Council (DFG). I am grateful to Prof. Harunaga Isaacson for having read this paper before it was published. Improvements to my English by Philip H. Pierce (Nepal Research Centre, Kathmandu) are gratefully acknowledged.

2 Tatz 1994: 65. On the life of Maitripa, see Tatz 1987: 695-711.

3 See Mathes in print a.

B. Kellner, H. Krasser, H. Lasic, M.T. Much, H. Tauscher (eds.), Pramanakirtih. Papers dedicated. to Ernst Steinkellner on the occasion o f his 70th birthday. Part 2. (Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde 70.2) Wien 2007, pp. 545-566.

546 Klaus-Dieter Mathes

Vis-à-vis the objective part of nisprapafica and luminosity, which is in accordance with the Sütra tradition, the subjective part enters into equipoise with the aid of amanasïkâra pith-instructions.4

In other words, not to fabricate anything by “not becoming mentally engaged” Camanasikara) is the only way mind can approach emptiness or reality, which is characterized by “being free from mental fabrications” (nisprapafica). gZon nu dpal finds this practice described in Sahajavajra’s commentary on Maitrïpa’s Tattvadasaka and thus characterizes this commentary in his Blue Annals as follows:

In essence it is the pâramitâs, it is in accordance with the [Way of] Mantras, and its name is mahâmudrâ.5

In the Tattvadasakatîkà, phenomena are not only ascertained as being empty, but also experienced as luminosity in a samâdhi which realizes reality as it is (yathâbhütasamâdhi). The latter is made possible by pith-instructions, and Tattvadasaka 2cd implies that this is supreme Madhyamaka adorned with pith- instructions whose main purpose is to enable a direct experience of emptiness as luminosity on a path that unites samatha with a particular form of vipasyand.6 It is well known that Maitrïpa favours the Madhyamaka “tenet of not abiding in any phenomena” (Sarvadharmàpratisthànavàda) over the inferior Madhyamaka “tenet of non-duality [in the sense of everything being] like an illusion” (Mâyopamâdvayavâda).7 A literal translation of Skt. sarvadhar- mâpratisthâna would be “not being grounded in all phenomena,” which means that phenomena should not be reified in any conceivable way. This is very clear from the Sekanirdesapanjikâ of Ràmapàla (one of the four main disciples of Maitrïpa),8 who glosses apratisthdna as “not to reify [anything]” and “not to become mentally engaged.”9 In the corresponding root text, Sekanirdesa,10

4 Koň sprul Bio gros mtha’ yas: Ses bya kun khyab mdzod, vol. 3, 375,18-20: mdo lugs daň mthun pad spros bral ’od gsal gyi yul la / yul can yid la mi byed pad gdams pas mňam par ’jog pa daň /

5 gZon nu dpal: Deb ther sňon po 847, vol. 2, 18-19: ňo bo pha rol tu phyin pa / sňags daň rjes su mthun pa miň phyag rgya chen po.

6 For a detailed discussion of the Tattvadasaka see Mathes 2006: 209-223.

7 SeeTatz 1994: 67.

8 See Roerich 1949-53: 842.

9 SNPS(C), fol. 18a4; SNPS(pe), fol. 15b6-7: sarvasminn ... apratisthana^m a^manasikaro ’naropah a C omits.

The Tibetan translation (SNPT, fol. 334b4) differs slightly: “apratisthdna [means] not

stanza 29cd, Maitrlpa informs us that mahamudra is also known as “[the practice of] not abiding (apratisthana) in anything.”11 In other words, the yogin simply refrains from projecting wrong notions (such as an independent existence or characteristic signs) onto anything arisen in dependence, whether skandhas, dhatus or ayatanas.12 Philosophically, this amounts to the Prasangika attitude of not postulating any position of one’s own, and in fact, for ’Ba’ ra ba rGyal mtshan dpal bzan (1310-1391), the Apratisthana-Madhyamaka is identical with Prasangika.13

The practice of not becoming mentally engaged (amanasikara) is described in such sutras as the Jndndlokdlamkara (see below) and the Nirvikalpapravesa- dhdranl. In the latter, the Bodhisattva abandons all wrong projections onto reality by not becoming mentally engaged. For Sahajavajra amanasikara does not mean that one does not see any objects as a result of having closed one’s eyes. It is rather that one does not focus on a putative own-being of entities as a result of analysis or the pith-instructions of one’s guru.14 In his Amanasikaradltd- ra, Maitrlpa gives the following mahamudra-interpretation of amanasikara:

The letter a stands for luminosity, and manasikara for blessing from within (svadhisthana).15 It is both a and manasikara, so we get amanasikara.16 Through this, namely by [operating with] the words amanasikara and so forth,17 one arrives at the expression “a blessing from within [that is] inconceivable luminosity” [i.e.,] an awareness which is a non-dual continuity in which inseparable emptiness and compassion are united as a pair.18

Can sutra mahamudra be justified on the basis of Maitiipa’s Apratisthanavada? 547

to reify [anything], in virtue of not becoming mentally engaged.” (rab tu mi gnas pa ni yid la byed pa med pas sgror gdags pa med pa ’o f)

10 Or also Sekaniniaya, as it is referred to in the TattvaratnavalT (TRAS 21,14).

11 SNs 36,11 (SN 29cd): sarvasminn apratisthdnam mahdmudreti kTrtyate /

12 SNPs(C), fol. 18a4; SNPs(Pe), fol. 15b6: sarvasminn iti pratltyasamutpa^nna^skandha- dhatvdyatanddau... a Pe omits

13 Mimaki 1982: 34.

14 See Mathes 2005: 15 and 19-20.

15 For the meaning of svadhisthana in the Tattvadasaka and its tika, see Mathes 2006: 212.

16 This means that a-manasikara is taken here as a karmadharaya compound.

17 I.e., luminosity and blessing from within.

18 AMAS 142,17-20: a iti prabhasvarapadam / manasikara iti svadhisthanapadam as casau manasikaras cety amanasikarah / etendmanasikdradipadair acintyaprabhasva- rasvddhisthanapadxnn sunyatdkarundbhirmayuganaddhadvayavahisamvedanam apadi-


In other words, the practice of Apratisthana-Madhyamaka (amanasikara) not only consists of not reifying anything by not focusing on an own-being or the like, but also enables a direct experience of mind’s inconceivable luminosity, just as phenomena are said to be experienced as luminosity in the Tattva- dasaka.

Apratisthana-Madhyamaka in the Tattvaratnavall19

Maitrlpa begins his Tattvaratnavall by pointing out that there are three yanas (namely the Sravakayana, Pratyekayana, and Mahayana) and four tenets (namely Vaibhasika, Sautrantika, Yogacara, and Madhyamaka). The Mahayana is further divided into the Way (naya) of Paramitas and the Way of Mantras. While the Way of Paramitas can be pursued either on the basis of Sautrantika (sic!), Yogacara, or Madhyamaka, the Way of Mantras is explained in line with the tenets of Yogacara and/or Madhyamaka. The latter is further divided into the tenet of Mayopamadvaya and the one of Apratisthana.20 It is clear that Apratisthana-Madhyamaka is considered the highest tenet within the Way of Mantras. The latter is not taken as a ydna different from Mahayana, but explained in line with Yogacara and/or Madhyamaka. It should be noted, however, that Vajrapani, another of the four main disciples of Maitrlpa,21 summarizes this part of the Tattvaratnavall with the interesting comment that the distinction among three yanas and four tenets is only made for the benefit of gradualists, who are considered inferior:

In order that sentient beings of inferior intellect may realize them, I shall summarizeall [tenets on] reality, writing down just a little. [But] first of all, there are two types

tarn bhavatiti...

191 may refer to Tatz (1994: 65-120), who has already translated (or paraphrased) some of the passages quoted in the present paper. It is only for terminological reasons that I present my own translation.

20 TRAS 14,5-14 (=NGMPP Reel No. B 22/24, fol. 9al—4) tatra trim ydndni / srdva- kayanam / pratyekayanam / mahdyanam ceti / sthitayas catasrah / vaibhasikasauatran- tikayogacaramadhyamakabhedena / ... mahdyanam ca dvividham / paramitdnayo mantranayas ceti / tatra yahb paramitdnayah sauctrdntikayogdcdramadhyamakasthityd vydkhyayate / mantranayas tu yogdcaramadhyamakasthitya vydkhyayate / ... evarn mddhyamiko ’pi mayopamadvayavadisarvadharmdpratisthdnavddibheddt dvividhah /

a The ms. reads -srau- instead of -sau-. b The ms. reads yd instead of yah.0 The ms. reads sru- instead of sau-.

21 See Roerich 1949-53: 842.

of persons, the monkey-like and the crow-like. The monkey-like realizes [reality] gradually, and the crow-like instantaneously. It is with those who realize [reality] gradually in mind that the three yanas [are presented] .. .22

In other words, there is only one reality, and it can be realized instantaneously. Everything else is provisional presentations functioning as steps for those who need a ladder. This passage from Vajrapani’s commentary provides perfect doctrinal support for Kon sprul’s essence mahamudra. It should be further noted that Vajrapani divides Mahayana - all this well within the system for the gradualist - into a causal yana of defining characteristics and the Vajrayana of fruition.23

The presentation of Apratisthana-Madhyamaka in the Tattvaratnavall starts with an examination (vicara) of this tenet in six stanzas. This is followed by a warning about the possible danger of the related samadhi (described as adopting the view that nothing exists at all, being in a state of dull nothingness)24 and a presentation of the fruit, namely the three kdyas. In the following we shall take a closer look at the first three of these six stanzas. The first one is identical with Mahay dnavimsika, stanza 4, the second is similar to Sekanirdesa, stanza 29, and the third is identical with Sekanirdesa, stanza 32.25

The Tibetan commentary on the Tattvaratnavall (namely the Rin chen phreh ba’i bsadpa, probably by Ti pi ’bum la ’bar)26 starts its elucidation of these six stanzas on Apratisthana by first explaining the introductory sentence in the Tattvaratnavall, which is as follows:

Can sutra mahamudra be justified on the basis of Maitnpa’s Apratisthanavada? 549

22 GPKUt 290b4-6: ... bio dman skye bos rtogs bya’i phyir// de Hid thams cad mdor bsdus nas // cuň zad tsam zig bri bar bya // re zig gaň zag ni gňis te / spre 'u Ita bu daň / khva ta Ita bu’o // spre'u Ita bu ni rim gyis ’jug p a ’o // khva ta Ita bu ni cig car du ’jug pa ’o // rim gyis jug pa 'i dbaň du byas na theg pa ni gsum ste I....

23 GPKUt 291a3: theg pa chen po la’aň gňis te / rgyu mtshan ňid kyi theg pa daň/’bras bu rdo rje theg pa 'o /

24 TRÁS 20,21—22: sarvárthocchedo jadlbhávo vaa samadhimalam /; TRÁT(P) 129b5: don thams cad chad par Ita daň / bem (text: bems) p o ’i raň bzin du gyur pa ni tiň ňe’dzin gyi dri ma’o / a The edition reads: jadlbhavah

25 As already pointed out by Tatz (1994: 109, fn. 57).

26 The “Rin chen phreri ba’i bšad pa” is contained in the collection Grub pa sde bdun daň sňiň po skor gsum yid la mi byed pa ’i chos skor bzugs so. According to the present Chetsang Rinpoche it was compiled under the direction of the 17th ’Bri guň abbot Kun dga’ rin chen (1475-1527). See also ‘Bri guň gdan rabs, p. 183.


What now follows is an examination of the Sarvadharmapratisthanavadins.27

The Rin chen phreh ba’i bsadpa explains:

The object of comprehension is the [two] inseparable truth[s]. As for reality, it is all appearances [namely] the mind, and what is simply beyond all mental fabrication. The appearance aspect of it is what is called “apparent [truth]” and the aspect of it that is free from [mental] fabrication is called “ultimate [truth].” And these two are connected to the point of identity just as what is created and what is impermanent are.28

In other words, the main stance of this Madhyamaka tenet is that the apparent and ultimate must be taken as aspects of the same reality, and thus as sharing an identity. Such a shared identity is also maintained by Zva dmar Chos grags ye ses (1453-1524) on the basis of Bodhicittavivarana,29 stanza 68:

... This is because the apparent is explained as emptiness and emptiness alone is the apparent, the one certainly not occurring without the other, as, for example, [two properties] of a vase, namely [its having been] created and, as a consequence of this, [its] impermanence [share] the bond of identity.30

This finds also support in Maitripa’s Apratisthanaprakasa, stanza 7:

The mere arising of phenomena is inconceivable [even] for original awareness.

This very [arising] is called emptiness without falling into [the extreme of] nihil-

27 TRAS 20,6 : sarvadharmdpratisthanavddindm tv ayam vicdrah /

28 Rin chen phreň ba’i bšad pa 195bl—2: gzal bya ni bden pa dbyer med do I I de kho na Hid ni snaň ba thams cad sems yin la / sems kyis spros pa thams cad las ’das pa tsam zig ste / snaň ba’i cha nas kun rdzob zes bya ziň // spros pa daň bral ba’i cha nas don dam zes bya ste / de gňis kyaň by as pa daň mi rtag pa Itar bdag cig p a ’i ’brel p a ’o //

29 For the role the Bodhicittavivarana plays in the mahámudrá tradition of the bKa’ brgyud pas, see Mathes in print b.

30 Žva dmar Chos grags ye ses: Tshig don gsal ba 104,4-7: kun rdzob de yaň stoň pa ňid du bsad la / stoň ňid de kho na yaň kun rdzob yin pas / gcig med na gcig mi ’byuň ba ňes pa ’i phyir / dper na bum pa ’i byas pa daň / de rkyen gyi dbaň du gyur nas mi rtag pa dag bdag gcig pa ’i ’brel ba bzin no /

31 APPS 80,3-4: utpáda eva dharmandm acintyo nijasamvidd / sa eva šunyatd proktd nanířcchedanugaminl //

a According to the manuscript from the National Archives in Kathmandu (NGMPP, reel no. B 22/24, fol. 31a2) and the Tibetan (APPT(P) 122b3: chad p a ’i rjes su ’gro ma yin no). The Japanese edition has nanyo-.

The last pada “without falling into [the extreme of] nihilism” excludes the possibility that the arising of phenomena is simply being negated here. Calling it emptiness allows it, rather, to be admitted as dependent arising.32 In other words, the equation of the apparent (i.e., dependent arising) with emptiness is taken as implying that any reification or denial of the members of dependent arising, that is, the mere appearances which are not abandoned in Apratisthanavada (see below), result in samsaric experiences of the apparent (which is the mere arising of phenomena in pada 7a), whereas the absence of reification and denial - or “non-abiding” - reveals dependent arising for what it is, namely emptiness.

TattvaratnavalT, Apratisthana section, stanza 1

In the first stanza of the Apratisthana section Maitrlpa thus denies the four ontological possibilities of reifying or denying the phenomenal world on the basis of a tetralemma formed with the pair “eternal” (sasvata) and “annihilated” (ucchedin):

The manifold [world] is not taken to be eternal or said to be annihilated;

Nor is it a combination of both eternal and annihilated, nor can it be that neither is the case.33 (TRA 1) (= Mahdyanavimsika, stanza 4)

The Rin chen phren ba ’i bsad pa does not go into detail, but simply explains that “eternal” does not apply, for nothing is established in its own right {no bos gati yah ma grub pa), whereas annihilation (ucchedin) is ruled out on the ground that the appearances of the apparent truth have not been abandoned.34 The refutation of the third and fourth possibility is not further commented upon, but the third one (i.e., something is existent and non-existent at the same


32 See Mulamadhyamakakarika XXIV. 18ab (MMKS 35,18): yah pratityasamutpadah sunyatam tarn pracaksmahe /

33 TRAS 20,7-8 (=MV 74,7—8): na matairf sasvatam visvam na cocchedi samlhitam / sasvatocchedi no yugmamb nanubhayam vinobhayam //

a MVS 74,7: netam (corrected to nedam in the Japanese edition).b According to NGMPP, B 22/24, fol. 12b5-6al; and MVS 74,8. Shastri reads yug-myam.

34 Rin chen phreh ba’i bsad pa 195b3: “ucchedin” should not be taken as the mere interruption of existence, but as a synonym of utter non-existence. “Is not said” [means:] the appearances of the apparent have not been abandoned {chad pa ni yod pa rgyun chad pa tsam la mi bya’i // med pa tsam gyi (text: gyis) rnam grans du bya’o // khas mi len cespa ni // kun rdzob kyi snah ba mi spanspa’o //).

552 Klaus-Dieter Mathe s

time) can be ruled out on the grounds that the combination of two impossible positions is likewise impossible. The fourth extreme, namely a negation of this combination (“nor can it be that neither is the case”) must be suspended because the manifold world cannot be posited as something indeterminate,35 namely as something in between the extremes, for this would be a mental fabrication, of which type of construction reality is considered to be free. Being a result fabricated by analytical activity, this fourth extreme should not be confounded with the realization of a reality beyond the four extremes of mental fabrication. This is clear from the Mahâyânavimsikâ, in which Maitnpa introduces his Mahâyâna presentation of the fruit or the union as a pair (yuganad- dha) by repeating the first stanza from the Apratisthâna section of the Tattva- ratnâvalï (namely the one on the exclusion of the four extremes). In the stanza which follows in the Mahâyânavimsikâ (in pâdas 5ab) Maitrïpa adds the following explanation:

Knowers of reality know reality which is free from [these] four extremes.36 (MV 5ab)

What this reality precisely relates to, is explained in the three introductory stanzas of the Mahâyânavimsikâ. The first two define the goal as the “original/natural kâya” (nijakâya), which is the nature of the three kâyas (sometimes equated with the svâbhâvikakâya), and in the third stanza Maitnpa declares:

The seeing of this [nijakâya] is deep insight (vipasyanâ), given that nofthing] is reified.

This will be explained now in accordance with the Mantrayâna.37 (MV 3)

In other words, to see (without reification) the original kâya is taken in MV 4a- 5b as knowing a reality which is beyond the ontological possibilities of the tetralemma. The third introductory stanza is particularly noteworthy, for the only thing Tantric about this general exposition of the Mahâyâna goal is a vipasyanâ practice of seeing without reification, that is realizing the possibility of working with direct perceptions of reality or one’s true nature of mind. This is precisely what Kon sprul’s sütra mahâmudrâ, which is also taken as being in accordance with Mantrayâna (see above), is.

35 See Seyfort Ruegg 1981:39.

36 MVS 74,9: catuskotivinirmuktam tattvam tattvavido viduh /

37 MVS 74,5-6: darsanam ca bhaved asya anäropäd vipasyanä / mantrayänänusärena tad idam vaksyate ’dhuna I I


TattvaratnavalT, Apratisthana section, stanza 2

The second stanza continues the same line of thought:

The wise [come to] know the reality of things as not abiding in anything.

Now this is not just a thought because a [conceptual] mind does not know the natureof mind.38 (TRA 2)

The Rin chen phreh ba’i bsad pa explains: “the wise [come to] know the reality of things which is not grounded in any of these [extremes].”39 The reality of things can only be known by not falling into the extremes of the tetralemma formulated in the preceding stanza, and this is not achieved by only thinking about it. The realization of reality by not abiding in any extreme, rather, recalls Sekanirdesa, stanza 29 (see below), where such a practice (i.e., apratisthana) is called mahamudra. This raises the question whether such an approach is then Tantric,40 all the more so since Maitrlpa introduces mahamudra first in its classical Tantric context of the four mudras in Sekanirdesa, stanza 26:

Having approached a karmamudra, one should meditate on the dharmamudra.

Hereafter [follows] mahamudra, from which the samaya[mudra\ arises.41

In his Sekanirdesa, Maitrlpa presents Tantric empowerment on the basis of the four moments (i.e., the moments of enjoying manifold appearances, maturation, freedom from defining characteristics, and relaxation) which correspond to the four joys (i.e., joy, supreme joy, co-emergent joy, and [joy of] no joy). The four

38 TRAS 20,9-10: sarvasminn apratisthanam* vastutattvam vidur budhah / athaisa kalpana naiva yac cid vetti na cittatam //

a NGMPP, B 22/24, fol. 12b6, reads sarvasmin pratisthanam with one aksara missing in the first pada. Shastri proposes sarvasmin pratisthane ca, which does not make any sense.

TRAt (DK, 181a2; P, 129bl) reads: / ’di ni thams cad mi gnas pas (DK: pa) // dhos po de hid mkhaspas rig // de nas (P: des na f) ’di Ita bu’i mam rtog gis // sems ni sems kyis rig ma yin /. The third rkah pa is not metrical.

39 Rin chen phreh ba’i bsad pa 195b4: “The reality which is not grounded in any extreme ... is the experiential object of the knowledge of the wise” (mtha ’ thams cad du mi gnas pa ’i de kho na hid de ... mkhas pa ’i Ses pa ’i spyod yul lo /).

40 Sahajavajra thus asks in his Sthitisamuccaya (SS V.7cd): “[One’s practice] may be free from investigation, but how can it be free from the tradition of mantras?” (SSs 1 lb4: paramarsam vinaiva syat katham mantranayam vina If).

41 SNs 56,5-6: karmamudram samasadya dharmamudram vibhavayet / tasya urdhvam mahamudra yasyah samayasambhavah //


moments (and thus the four joys) are also linked with the four mudrâs in Sekanirdesa, stanza 38, the moment of enjoying manifold apperances (in this context, the sight of a beautiful woman) being related to the karmamudrâ, the moment of maturation to dharmamudrâ, the moment of freedom from defining characteristics to mahâmudrâ, and the moment of relaxation to samayamudrâ.42

It should be noted that Maitrïpa also explains the four moments and joys on the level of each mudrn (except mahâmudrâ). Thus the four joys are first enjoyed physically with the help of a karmamudrâ43 and then on the level of dharmamudrâ, based on the realization that the sights and sounds of the manifold world are one’s own mind and so forth. Being the immediate cause of mahâmudrâ and excellent maturation on the path, dharmamudrâ is also the fruit of maturation.44 Having realized mahâmudrâ, one displays form-foayas (i.e., the samayamudrâ) for the sake of others. The four joys of the samayamudrâ are explained as the ones of the manifested deities.

Only the third moment (freedom from defining characteristics) and the corresponding co-emergent joy are considered to be pure.45 Thus mahâmudrâ is not explained in terms of the four joys, it being beyond, and thus independent of, the impurities of the other joys.46 In other words, Sekanirdesa, stanza 26 means that mahâmudrâ can be cultivated on the basis of a karmamudrâ and the

42 SNs 60,3-4: vicitram karmamudraiva dharmamudrd vipdkajd / vilaksanam maha- mudrd vimardah samayo bhavet //

43 In the commentary on the Caturmudrdnvaya (CMATX, fol. 267a 1) karmamudra is defined in the following way: “Karma- is bliss, and mudrn the recognition [of this bliss], the very moment [it appears]” {las ni bde ba ste / / phyag rgya ni dus kyi sna rise tshad du ’dzin pa).

44 SNPS(c)» fol. 16b4-5; SNPS(Pe), fol. 14a9-bl: ... dharmamudrd / iyam ca mahamu- drdydh sanfnikrstakdrahnatvdnb md°rgatayd višistapákatvád vipdkaphalam /

a CPe san- b C illegible, Pe -natvana c C ma- inserted by another hand.

45 GPKUX 319a5-6: “Such a mahdmudrd is the fruit without stains.... It is the co- emergent joy at the moment of freedom from defining characteristics” (de Ita bu’i phyag rgya chen po ni dri ma daň bral ba’i ’bras bu’o / ... mtshan ňid daň bral ba’i skad cig ma la lhan cig skyespa'i dga’ ba’o D-

46 See SN 27ab (SNs 56,7): “The [four] joys can be [maintained] with regard to each of the mudrds, except mahdmudrd” (dnanddh pratimudram syuh mahdmudrdm vind punah).

dharmamudra, but it does not need to be.47 It is against this background that Maitnpa maintains in his Sekanirdesa (stanza 29):

Not to abide (apratisthana) in anything is known as mahamudra.

Because self-awareness [i.e., mahamudra] is stainless, [the moments of enjoying] manifold [appearances] and so forth do not arise.48

Ramapala comments in his panjika:

“In anything” means in the dependently arisen skandhas, dhatus, ayatanas and so forth. “Not to abide” means not to reify, not to become mentally engaged. This is also stated [in the Jndndlokalamkara]:

The mental factors of not becoming mentally engaged are virtuous. Those of becoming mentally engaged are not virtuous49

Likewise it has been said [in the Jhandlokalamkara]:

Homage to You, who is without imagined thoughts, whose intellect is not based [on anything], who is without recollection, who does not become mentally engaged, and who is without any cognitive object.50

... One should not think that this cannot be practised because thanks to the kindness of [one’s] venerable guru, mahamudra, which has the defining characteristic of being endowed with all supreme qualities, can certainly be made directly manifest. How is it then that [mahamudra] does not have the nature of the four moments? [In 29c] it is stated: “Because self-awareness [i.e., mahamudra] is stainless.” Being stainless, the three stained moments of the manifold and so forth do not occur in it. Therefore the three [impure] joys do not arise in it either.51


47 Oral explanation from Thrangu Rinpoche (Kathmandu, April 2006).

48 SNs 56,11—12: sarvasminn apratisthanam mahamudreti kxrtyate / vimalatvat svasam- vitter vicitrader na saiiibhavah //

49 The same quotation is identified in AMAS 136,10-11 as being from the Jndnalokd- lamkara: amanasikara dharmah. kusalah / manasikara dharma akusalah. In the Jhana- lokalamkara itself I could locate only the following (JAAS 94,14-15): samksiptena sarve akusala manaskarah, samklesasya hetuh. / sarve kusaltt manaskdrah (?) vyava- danasya hetuh /

a The Japanese edition reads -lah.

50 See JAAS 146,1-2: avikalpftasamkalpa apratisthitamanasah / asmrty amanasikarah niralamba namo stu te //

a The Japanese edition reads -pa-. b The Japanese edition reads -ah.

51 SPNS(C), fol. 18a4-5; SPNs(Pe), fol. 15b6-9: sarvasminn iti pratTtyasamutpainnai- skandhadhatvdyatanadau f apratisthanam abmanasikaro 'naropah /c tad uktam


The commentary is more than clear here. The mahamudra practice of apratisthana, which does not involve becoming mentally engaged, is not only described in a sutra, namely the Jnanalokalamkara, but can be also performed through the kindness of one’s guru without the occurrence of the defiled joys and moments of Tantric practice.

Ramapala continues by calling apratisthana inconceivable wisdom which does not arise from analysis. This kind of wisdom, rather, is without effort, evolving as it does within its own sphere.52

Tattvaratnavall, Apratisthana section, stanza 3

All reification, whatever there is - all this does not exist in any respect;

In Madhyamaka [everything] is without reification. Where is then denial or the establishing [of anything]?53 (TRA 3) (= Sekanirdesa, stanza 32)

In his Sekanirdesapanjika, Ramapala works through the differences between Vijnaptimatravada and Mayopamadvayavada on the one side and his guru’s Apratisthana-Madhyamaka on the other:

[Maitrlpa taught the stanza] beginning with “[all reification,] whatever there is” for the following reason: Here in Madhyamaka any reification, i.e., determination, whatever there is - all this does not exist. [Objection:] Such a non-existence of reification is also maintained in the tradition of Vijnana[vada]. Therefore he said “in any respect.” There [i.e., in Vijnanavada] is a trace of reification [by maintaining] the real existence of consciousness. Therefore reification is not entirely absent in

pravacane /a amanasikdrad dharmdh kusaldh / manasikdrd "dharmd akusaldhe / tathd caf Is cdvikalpitasamkcilpa apratisthitamdnasa / asmrty amanasikdra nirdlamba namo stu te iti // ... hasakydhnusthdnatd ca naa mantavyd / sadgurupddaprasddenavasyam sarvdkdravaropetalaksanamahdmudraydh pratyaksTkartiim1 sakyatvat /c nanv atra katham na catuhksanarupatd /c aha /° vimalatvdt svasamlvittei* nirmalatayd /a vicitradeh ksanatrayasya samalasya ndtra sambhavah /° tato nananddtrayasambhavah

a Pe omits b C omits c Pe // d C -ra- ePe dharmdh kusaldh 1C omits g CPe om ith Pe -desakd- 1 Pe -kartur J Pe -son- k C -vitti Pe -vitter

52 SPNS(C), fol. 18b3-4; SPNS(Pe), fol. 16a4-5: tac capratisthdnam acintya*jndnam na tad vicdrdgatam /b ckim tarhic /d andbhogam svarasdbhydgatanf /d

a C -am b P& II 0 Pe kin tu hi d C omits, Pe // e Pe -ta

53 TRAS 20,11—12 (=SNs 58,6): ydvdn* sarvasamdropah sa sarvah sarvathd na hi / madhyamdrthe nirdropas tatrdpobhavidhl kntah //

a According to the Sekanirdesapanjika (see below). b Shastri reads -ro-. Corrected according to NGMPP, B 22/24, fol. 13al.

[Vijnanavada]. By this [clause “in any respect”] even the tenet of theMayopam[advayavadin] has been refuted.54

The Rin chert phreh ba’i bsad pa provides the additional information that it is the appearance as such which is taken to be free from reification for Maitnpa and his followers, whereas the proponents of Cittamatra, be they Sakara or Nir- akara, equate reification with the imagined nature.55

The difference to Cittamatra and Mayopamadvayavada is also delineated in MaitrTpa’s Pahcatathagatamudravivarana, where the five skandhas (equated with the five Tathagatas) are said to be sealed by Aksobhya in order to make one realize that all skandhas are only mind. Aksobhya, in turn, is sealed by Vajrasattva in order to exclude the ultimate existence of non-dual mind. Freed from the thom of ultimate existence, the result, namely Apratisthana-Madhya- maka, is proclaimed as being superior. Maitrlpa quickly proceeds to rule out the possible objection that this is not Apratisthana, but Mayopamadvaya awareness still being maintained:

This is not the case, [for it has been said in Yuktisastika, stanza 19]:

What has arisen dependently has not arisen in terms of its own-being.

What has not arisen in terms of its own-being - how can it be called arisen?

Awareness has arisen in dependence; therefore it is not grounded.56

In other words, awareness may be taken as non-dual (Cittamatra), or even as not existent on the ultimate level (Mayopamadvayavada); in Apratisthana-Madhya- maka it holds no privileged status at all. Arising in dependence, it is not grounded any more than anything else is.


54 SNPS(Pe), fol. 16b3-6 (missing in SPNS(C)): ydvan ityadi // yatas tatra madhyamarthe yavan samaropo ’dhyavasayah saa sarvo nasti // evamvidhabsamdbropdbhavo vijha- nanaye ’plstah / ata aha / sarvathaiveti // tatra hi vijhanasya vastusattvasamaropasyac padam asti // ato na tatra sarvatha samaropabhavah // etena mayopamasiddhdnto ’pi pratyuktah /

a Pe sa b Pe -sasa- c Pe -pasya

55 Rin chen phreh ba’i bsad pa 195b5-6: kho bo cag Itar na dbu ma’i don ni snah ba sgro btags dan bral ba zig la bya’o // gal te de Ita na mam bcas dan mam m edpa’i sems tsam pa dag na re / sgro btags ni kun btags yin pas de med par kho bo cag ’dod ces rtsodpa dan /....

56 PTMVS 50,17-51,1: tan na / yat pratltyasamutpannan notpannan tat svabhavatah / svabhavena yan notpannam utpannam nama tat katham // iti // samvedanam ca pratltyasamutpannam tasmat samvedanam evapratisthitam....


The last pada of the third Apratisthana stanza in the TattvaratnavalT (“Where is then denial or the establishing [of anything]?”) is consequently taken in the following way:

Appearances not having been abandoned, there is no denial, and given the absence of reification there is no establishing of anything either.57

This raises the question whether such statements are not already reifications on their own, and the answer in the commentary is:

This [state of] intellect which is free from reification must be realized by an inconceivable intellect.58

In other words, a mind which does not reify cannot be totally understood by discursive and analytical mind, but only by an inconceivable intellect, or as the fourth stanza of our Apratisthana section in the TattvaratnavalT puts it, effortless wisdom.59

Vajrapani’s commentary on Maitrlpa’s Apratisthanavada

In his Guruparamparakramopadesa, Vajrapani introduces his commentary on the first three Apratisthana stanzas60 in the TattvaratnavalT by quoting one of the most famous stanzas in Mahayana literature:61

There is nothing to be removed from it62 and nothing to be added.

The real should be seen as real, and seeing the real, one becomes liberated.63

57 Rin chen phren ba’i bšad pa 196a3^4: de Itar na snan ba mi spans pas dgag du med pa la / sgro mi ’dogs pas bsgrubs du yaň med do /

58 Rin chen phreň ba’i bšad pa 196a4: sgro btags daň bral ba’i bio de bsam gyis mi khyabpa’i bios rtogs par bya ba yin la /

59 TRÁS 20,13 (=SNs 58,1): “Effortless wisdom [can] be taken as inconceivable.” anabhogama hi yad jM nam tac cacintyam pracaksate /

2 NGMPP, B 22/24, fol. 13al—2, reads in both texts (TattvaratnavalT 13al and Sekanirdeša 19al) anabhoge.

60 Tatz (1994: 92-3) not only did not recognize the initial quotation as being from the Abhisamayálamkára, but also misunderstood bsal bya as “clear light,” and translated “There is no clear light here” instead of “There is nothing to be removed.”

61 For a list of texts in which it occurs, see Takasaki 1966: 300.

62 Tib. ’di la should be corrected into ’di las on the basis of the Sanskrit.

63 GPKUt 298a2: ’di la bsal bya ci yaň med // gzag par bya ba gaň yaň med // yaň dag

Based on this, Vajrapáni advises readers to neither reify or superimpose existence, nor deny in the sense of claiming non-existence.64 The question is, of course, what it precisely is from which nothing needs to be removed and to what nothing should be added, or rather what it is that should not be reified as existent or denied as non-existent. The standard Madhyamaka answer is “phenomena,” which are neither reified into something possessing an independent existence nor denied as something that has arisen in dependence on the level of apparent truth. The second answer, representative of the teachings of the third dharmacakra, is “the ultimate reality of a Buddha-element or Buddha-nature,” to which no qualities need to be added and from which no adventitious stains (which constitute the phenomenal world) must be removed, for the latter do not impair the Buddha-element. It is these adventitious stains which are not reified here, while the Buddha-element is not denied. In the first case, one would think of Abhisamaydlamkara, stanza V.21, and in the second of Ratnagotravibhaga, stanza 1.154. The Tibetan gzag par bya in pada b of Vajrapani’s quote suggests that the latter took the stanza from the Ratnagotravibhaga,65 but Vajrapani’s commentary is closer to Haribhadra’s Abhisamaydlamkdravrtti on V.21, which is as follows:

Since, then, liberation is not possible with an obstinate clinging to entities, one should ascertain that forms and so forth, as things dependently arisen, in fact exist [only] conventionally and that they lack an own-being and so forth. In doing so, one has not, with regard to any phenomenon, either removed or added anything by way of [wrong] denial or reification.66

Can sutra mahamudra be justified on the basis of Maitnpa’s Apratisthanaváda? 559

hid la yah dag blta // yah dag mthoh na mam par grol /

The stanza in the Ratnagotravibhagavyakhya (RGVVS 76,1-2) is as follows: napaneyam atah kimcid upaneyam na kimcana / drastavyam bhutato bhutam bhutadarsT vimucyate //

In the Abhisamaydlamkara (AAS 32,15-16) the reading is as follows: napaneyam atah kihcit prakseptavyam na kihcana / drastavyam bhutato bhutam bhutadarsT vimucyate //

64 GPKUt 298a2-3: “Therefore one abides neither in the reification of the existent nor in the denial of the non-existent” ( zes bya bas / yod pa’i sgro ’dogs pa dan / med pa'i skur ’debs pa la mi gnas pa ste /).

65 Skt. prakseptavyam is normally rendered as bsnan par bya in Tibetan; Skt. upaneyam as gzag par bya. Based on this, it would seem that Vajrapani quoted from the Ratna- gotravibhaga.

66 AAV Sphutarthas 72,1-3: yasmad evam bhavabhinivesena mukter anupapattir ato apavadasamaroparupam apanayanapraksepam kasyacid dharmasyakrtva idam eva pratltyasamutpannam samvrtya tathyarupam riipadi nihsvabhavadirupato nirupanl- yamf


In line with this understanding, Vajrapani first takes the manifold appearances of dependent arising and their emptiness as being inseparably connected, just as the “non-existence of water” and the “appearance of water” in a mirage:

The appearance of water in a mirage has no water; it is empty of water. It is the non-existence of water which appears as water. The appearance of water and its non-existence are not separate.67

Such a presentation harbours the danger of reifying emptiness. Vajrapani warns us that the latter does not subsist independently of the appearance, just as there is no more fire when the fuel has been exhausted:

An appearance and [its] emptiness in terms of an own-being are not separate. When various [logs] of firewood are burning, for example, [they all have] the same nature of fire. Eventually the firewood will be exhausted, but no “fire-ness” will remain. Likewise, when the state of manifold appearances has been established as emptiness by reasoning, [the appearances] are neither established as entities, nor does emptiness remain.68

Appearances are thus only provisionally called empty. In terms of definitive meaning they even do not abide as this emptiness. Vajrapani summarizes his analysis of Apratisthanavada in the following way:

In order to refute the conceptual adherence of [followers of] other [tenets] or [in other words] terminate reification and denial, [appearances] are called empty, without arising and non-dual in a provisional sense. But these [attributions] do not remain in a definitive sense for those who are expert.69

In his analysis, Vajrapani fails to address the second part of our famous Maha- yana stanza of not adding or removing anything (i.e., the real should be seen as real, and seeing the real, one becomes liberated), but in his explanation of the view (defined as working for the sake of sentient beings after purifying the first five paramitas with the help of a prajhaparamita which is without reification

67 GPKUt 298a5: ... smig rgyu la chur snah ba hid la chu med de chus stoh la / chu med pa fiid chur snah ste / chur snah ba dan chu med pa ghis tha mi dad pa yin no /

68 GPKUX 298a6-bl: snah ba rah bzin med p a ’i stoh pa hid ni tha mi dad do / dper na bud sin du ma mes bsregs na me ’i ho bor geig ste / de nas bud sin zad pa dan me hid mi gnas so / de bzin du sna tshogs su snah ba hid rig pas stoh pa hid du byas na dhos por ma grub pa dan / stoh pa hid kyah mi gnas so /

69 GPKUX 298b2: ... gzan gyi zen pa bzlog pa'am ! sgro skur gcad pa'am I drah ba’i don du stoh pa dan skye ba med pa ghis su med pa zes brjod kyi / mkhas pas gzal p a ’am / hes pa’i don du de hid mi gnas te !

and denial)70 it is the non-abiding in any reification or denial which is taken as the knowledge of reality:

Given that it is the nature of all phenomena not to have arisen in terms of an own- being, they do not abide in any [extreme of] existence or non-existence. Therefore, not to abide in any reification and denial [by calling them] existent or non-existent is the knowledge of reality.71

Vajrapáni does not say anything about reality itself. This would be counterproductive in the context of describing a practice which strictly avoids reification and denial. Still, when Maitrlpa maintains in Maháyánavimsiká, stanza 3, that the original nature of the three kdyas (i.e., the nijakaya) is seen in vi- pasyana by avoiding any reification, an interpretation along the lines of the Ratnagotravibhaga (i.e., the third dharmacakra) is required. The Buddha-element with its inseparable qualities as reality corresponds to the nijakaya, and to deny or reify the experience of any of the latter would lead the yogin astray, just as denying or reifying the appearances of the ordinary world would. Vajra- páni does in fact follow such an interpretation when he explains in his presentation of mahamudra that the latter is not different from conceptual thought, just as a rope and its wrong appearance as a snake:

As long as one fails to realize that it is a rope, it appears to be a snake, but once one realizes [the truth, it is clear] that its nature of appearing to be a snake is [shared with that of being] a rope. The very rope is the snake. The snake does not need to be removed, nor does anything of the rope need to be added. Likewise, as long as one fails to realize mahámudrá ... , it appears to be a conceptual variety.72 When it is properly realized, its nature of [appearing to be] a conceptual variety is united as a pair with its nature of [being] the non-conceptual. It is the non-conceptual (i.e., mahámudrá) which appears to be a conceptual variety. No thought whatsoever needs to be removed here, nor does anything non-conceptual need to be added.73

Can sütra mahamudra be justified on the basis of Maitnpa’s Apratisthanavada? 561

70 GPKUX 298b4-5: sgro skur med pa daň zen pa med p a ’i ses rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pas pha rol tu phyin pa Iňa mi dmigs pa gsum gyis ’khor gsum po yoňs su dag par byas nas / sems can gyi don byed pa ni Ita ba ’o /

71 GPKUt 298b6-299al: ... chos thams cad raň bzin gyis ma skyes p a ’i ňo bo ňid kyis yod med gaň yaň mi gnas pas / yod med kyi sgro skur gaň du ’aň mi gnas pa ni de kho na ňid kyi ses pa ’o /

72 I.e., the manifold appearances of the world produced by false imagining.

73 GPKUX 315b5-316al: ... thag par ma rtogs nas sbrul du snaň g i/ rtogs na sbrul du snaň ba’i raň bzin ňid thag pa yin la / thag pa ňid sbrul lo / sbrul bsal bar bya’am / thag pa gzagpar bya ba ď a ň med do / de bzin du phyag rgya chen po ... ma rtogs nas rtog pa sna tshogs su snaň ste / yaň dag par rtogs na rtog pa sna tshogs kyi raň bzin ňid mi


Mahamudrü is here taken as the true nature of mind, which is non-conceptual. Until one realizes this original state, it appears as a conceptual variety. In terms of these two categories, our stanza of neither removing nor adding anything can be taken as being in line with the Ratnagotravibhaga (stanza 1.154), and just as the rope is empty of its mistaken appearance as a snake, or the original mind of the conceptual variety, the Buddha-element is taken to be empty of adventitious stains. This is clear from Ratnagotravibhaga, stanza 1.155, against the background of which stanza 1.154 must be understood:

The [Buddha]-element is empty of adventitious [stains], which have the defining characteristic of being separable; but it is not empty of unsurpassable qualities, which have the defining characteristic of not being separable.74

The Ratnagotravibhagavyakhya on stanzas 1.154 and 1.155 is as follows:

What is taught by that? There is no characteristic sign of any of the defilements (samklesa) whatsoever to be removed from this naturally pure Buddha-element, for it is naturally devoid of adventitious stains. Nor does anything need to be added to it as the characteristic sign {nimitta) of purification, for it is of the nature to have pure properties which are inseparable [from it]. ... Thus one truly sees that something is empty of that which does not exist in it, and one truly realizes that that which remains in place is present, [and] hence exists there. Having [thus] abandoned the extremes of reification and denial, these two stanzas (RGV 1.154-5)) correctly elucidate the defining characteristic of emptiness.75

Conclusion

It could be shown that the practice of mahamudra does not need to be Tantric, but can be performed by not abiding in any extreme of reification or denial.

rtog p a ’i ran bzin du zuh du ’jug pa yin la / mi rtog pa nid rtog pa sna tshogs su snan ste / ’dir rtog pa bsal bar by a ’am / mi rtog pa gzag par by a ba ci’an med do /

74 RGVVS 76,3—4: sunya dgantukair dhatuh savinirbhdgalaksanaih / asunyo ’nuttarair dharmair avinirbhagalaksanaih //

75 RGVVS 76,5-11: kim anena paridxpitam / yato na kimcid apaneyam asty atah pra- krtiparisuddhat tathdgatadhatoh samklesanimittam agantukamalasunyataprakrtitvad asya / napy atra kimcid upaneyam asti vyavadananimittam avinirbhagasuddhadharma- tdsprakrtitvdtI ... evam yad yatra nasti tat tena siinyam iti samanupasyati / yat punar atrdvasistam bhavati tat sad ihdstlti yathdbhutam prajdndti / samdropdpavdddnta- parivarjanad avipantamb sunyatalaksanam anena slokadvayena paridTpitam /

a See A 19a4 and B 39b3. Johnston omits, probably inadvertently, -ta-. b Corrected according to A (19a4) and B (39b5).

Can sutra mahâmudra be justified on the basis of Maitnpa’s Apratisthanavada? 563

This can be achieved by not becoming mentally engaged (amanasikâra). “Nonabiding” or Apratisthana is the favoured Madhyamaka tenet among Maitrïpa and his disciples, and can be combined with the Way of Mantras. This means that while it is the favoured view during formal Tantric practice, the simple practice of not abiding by not becoming mentally engaged can likewise lead to initial direct realizations of the true nature of the three kdyas (nijakàya), then it is called “in accordance with Mantrayàna” for being a ydna of fruition (as Vajrapâni would have it). It should be noted that mahàmudrâ explanations on the level of the fruit can be also doctrinally supported by the Ratnagotravibhaga. In other words, Kon sprul has a good case for advancing his sütra niaha- mudra. In Apratisthanavada it is, of course, also possible to maintain a sudden enlightenment. Reality is free from mental fabrications, and there is no reason why a fortunate yogin (Vajrapâni’s crow-like practitioner) should not experience a total interruption of all reification and denial, and fully awaken to reality in one instant.

Abbreviations and bibliography

General abbreviations

AICSB Annual of the Institute for Comprehensive Studies of Buddhism,Taisho University

DK ’Bri gun bka’ brgyud chos mdzod, vol. ka. No place, no date.

NGMPP Nepal-German Manuscript Preservation Project

P Peking Tanjur

Primary sources (Indian)

AAS: AbhisamaydlamkaraEd. by Ramshankar Tripathi (together with the Abhisamayalamkaravrttih Sphuta- rtha) (Bibliotheca Indo-Tibetica Series 2). Samath: Central Institute of Higher Tibetan Studies 1993.

AAV Sphutarthas: Abhisamayalamkaravrttih Sphutartha See AAS

AMAS: AmanasikaradharaIn Advayavajrasamgraha. Ed. by the Study Group on Sacred Tantric Texts. AICSB 11 (March 1989), pp. 209-202 (=136-143).


APPS: ApratisthanaprakasaEd. by the Study Group on Sacred Tantric Texts. (Mikkyo-seiten kenkyukai): “The Results of a Joint Study on the Buddhist Tantric Texts: Advayavajrasamgraha - A New Critical Edition with Japanese Translation.” AICSB 13 (March 1991), pp. 259-256 (=78-81).

APPt : Apratisthanaprakasa (Tibetan translation)Rab tu mi gnas pa gsal bar ston pa. Peking Tanjur, rgyud ’grel, vol. mi, fol. 122a-b.

CMAS: CaturmudranvayaIn Advayavajrasamgraha. Ed. by the Study Group on Sacred Tantric Texts. AICSB11 (March 1989), pp. 253-238 (=92-107).

CMATt : CaturmudrdnvayatTkd (Tibetan translation)“Phyag rgya bzi’i rgya cher ’grel pa rin po che’i sning po”. Phyag rgya chen po’i rgya gzuh, vol. orn, fols. 255a-317a.

CMUt : Caturmudrd-Upadesa (Tibetan translation)“Phyag rgya bzi’i man hag.” Phyag rgya chen p o ’i rgya gzuh, vol. hum, fols. 9a- 13b. dPal spuns block print.

GPKUX: Guruparampardkrama- Upadesa (Tibetan translation)“Bla ma brgyud pa’i rim pa’i man hag.” Phyag rgya chen p o ’i rgya gzuh, vol. hum, fols. 290b-320b. dPal spuns block print.

JAAS: JhdndlokdlamkdraEd. by the Study Group on Buddhist Sanskrit Literature, The Institute for Comprehensive Studies of Buddhism, Taisho University. Tokyo: Taisho University Press 2004.

MMKS: MulamadhyamakakdrikaEd. by J.W. de Jong (The Adyar Library Series 109). Madras: The Adyar Library and Research Centre 1977.

MVS: MahdydnavimsikdIn Advayavajrasamgraha. Ed. by the Study Group on Sacred Tantric Texts. AICSB12 (March 1990), pp. 291-286 (=74-79).

PTMVS: PahcatathagatamudravivaranaIn Advayavajrasamgraha. Ed. by the Study Group on Sacred Tantric Texts. AICSB 10 (March 1988) pp. 189-178 (=44-57).

RGVS: Ratnagotravibhaga MahdydnottaratantrasastraEd. by Edward H. Johnston. Patna: Bihar Research Society 1950. (Includes the Ratnagotravibhdgavyakhyd)

RGVVS: Ratnagotravibhdgavyakhyd. See Ratnagotravibhaga[The manuscripts A and B on which Johnston’s edition is based are described in Johnston 1950: vi-vii. See also Bandurski et al. 1994: 12-3].

SNs: Sekanirdesa (also: Sekanirnaya)In Advayavajrasamgraha. Ed. by the Study Group on Sacred Tantric Texts. AICSB13 (March 1991), pp. 289-271 (=48-66).

SNt : Sekanirdeša (Tibetan translation)- “dBaň bskur (text: skur) ňes par bstan pa.” Grub pa sde bdun daň sňiň po skor gsum yid la mi byedpa’i chos skor bzugs so. DK fols. 214b-216b.- dBaň bskur ba ňes par bstan pa. P rgyud ’grel, vol. mi, fols. 154b-156b.

SNPS(q: SekanirdesapanjikaSanskrit manuscript from Cambridge, Cambridge University Library, MS Or. 149.

SNPS(Pe): Sekanirdešapaňjiká

Sanskrit manuscript from St. Petersburg, Gosvdarstvennaja Publicnaja Bibliotéka im. M.E. Saltykova-Ščcedrina, MS. 283.

SNPt : Sekanirdešapaňjiká (Tibetan translation)“dBaň bskur ňes par bstan pa’i dka’ ’grel bžugs so,” Phyag rgya chen p o ’i rgya gžuň, vol. om, fols. 317a-343a, dPal spuňs block print.

SSs: Sthitisamuccaya- NGMPP reel nos. B 24/4 and B 25/15.- See also Matsuda 1995.

TRÄS: Tattvaratnävall- In Advayavajrasamgraha. Ed. by Haraprasad Shastri (Gaekwad’s Oriental Series 40), pp. 14-22. Baroda: Oriental Institute, 1927.- See also NGMPP reel no. B 22/24.

TRÄt : Tattvaratnävall (Tibetan translation)- “De kho na nid rin po che’i phreň ba.” Grub pa sde bdun daň sňiň po skor gsum yid la mi byed p a ’i chos skor bzugs so. DK, fols. 178a-182b.- De kho na ňid rin po che’i phreň ba. P rgyud ’grel, vol. mi, fols. 126b-130b.

Primary sources (Tibetan)

Author unknown (Ti pi ’bum la ’bar?)“Rin chen phreň ba’i bšad pa.” Grub pa sde bdun daň sňiň po skor gsum yid la mi byed p a ’i chos skor bzugs so. DK, fols. 182b-199b.

Koň sprul Bio gros mtha’ yasSes bya kun khyab mdzod. 3 vols. Beijing: Mi rigs dpe skrun khaň 1982.

’Gos Lo tsä ba gŽon nu dpalDeb ther sňon po, 2 vols., Si khron mi rigs dpe skrun khaň 1984.

bsTan ’dzin padma’i rgyal mtshan (sKyabs mgon Che tshaň sku phreň bži pa)’Bri guň gdan rabs: Ňes don bstan p a ’i sňiň po mgon po ’bri guň pa chen po ’i gdan rabs chos Icyi byuň tshul gser gyiphreň ba zes bya ba bzugs so ( ’Bri guň bka’ brgyud 6). Dehra Dun: Drikung Kagyu Institute 2000.

Zva dmar Chos grags ye ses (The Fourth Žva dmar pa)Tshig don gsal ba: “Byaň chub sems ’grel gyi mam par bšad pa tshig don gsal ba žes bya ba bžugs so.” Yid bzin gyi za ma tog 1, pp. 62-123. Dharamsala: ’Gro mgon gtsug lag dpe skrun khaň 2001.

Can sütra mahamudra be justified on the basis of Maitnpa’s Apratisthanavada? 565


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Documents

Klaus-Dieter Mathes - Can Sutra Mahamudra Be Justified on the Basis of Maitripa's Apratisthanavada.pdf