Krasner Structural Causes and Regime Consequences

Embed Size (px)

Citation preview

  • 8/13/2019 Krasner Structural Causes and Regime Consequences

    1/22

    Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening VariablesAuthor(s): Stephen D. KrasnerSource: International Organization, Vol. 36, No. 2, International Regimes (Spring, 1982), pp.185-205Published by: The MIT PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706520.

    Accessed: 25/04/2011 12:08

    Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at.http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless

    you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you

    may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.

    Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at .http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=mitpress..

    Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed

    page of such transmission.

    JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of

    content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms

    of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

    The MIT Pressis collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access toInternational

    Organization.

    http://www.jstor.org

    http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=mitpresshttp://www.jstor.org/stable/2706520?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=mitpresshttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=mitpresshttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/stable/2706520?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=mitpress
  • 8/13/2019 Krasner Structural Causes and Regime Consequences

    2/22

    Structuralcauses andregime consequences:regimes as intervening variablesStephen D. Krasner

    This volume explores the concept of internationalregimes. Interna-tional regimes are definedas principles, norms, rules, and decision-makingproceduresaroundwhich actor expectationsconverge in a given issue-area.As a startingpoint, regimes have been conceptualizedas interveningvari-ables standingbetween basic causal factors on the one hand andoutcomesand behavioron the other.This formulation aisestwo basic questions: first,whatis the relationshipbetweenbasic causalfactors suchas power, interest,and values, andregimes?Second, what is the relationshipbetween regimesand relatedoutcomes andbehavior?Thefirstquestionis relatedto a numberof basicparadigmatic ebates about the natureof international elations.Butfor the purposesof this volume the second is equallyor more important.Itraises the issue of whetherregimesmake any difference.The articlesin this volume offer threeapproaches o the issue of regimesignificance.The essays of OranYoung, andRaymondHopkinsand DonaldPuchala see regimes as a pervasive characteristicof the internationalsys-tem. No patternedbehavior can sustain itself for any lengthof time withoutgenerating a congruent regime. Regimes and behavior are inextricablylinked.Incontrast,Susan Strangearguesthatregime s a misleadingconceptthat obscures basic economicandpower relationships.Strange,representingwhat is probablythe modal position for internationalrelations scholars,elaboratesa conventional structural ritiquethatrejects any significantrolefor principles, norms, rules, and decision-makingprocedures. Most of theauthors in this volume adopt a third position, which can be labeled

    modified structural. They accept the basic analytic assumptions ofInternational Organization 36, 2, Spring 19820020-8183/82/020185-21 $1.50? 1982 by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology

    185

  • 8/13/2019 Krasner Structural Causes and Regime Consequences

    3/22

    186 International Organizationstructuralrealist approaches,which posit an internationalsystem of func-tionally symmetrical, power-maximizing tates acting in an anarchicenvi-ronment. But they maintain that under certain restrictive conditions in-volving the failureof individualaction to secure Pareto-optimaloutcomes,internationalregimes may have a significant impact even in an anarchicworld. This orientation s most explicitly elaborated n the essays of ArthurStein, RobertKeohane, and RobertJervis;it also informs the analyses pre-sented by JohnRuggie, Charles Lipson, and BenjaminCohen.The first section of this introductiondevelops definitionsof regime andregime change. The following section investigates various approaches o therelationshipbetween regimes, and behaviorand outcomes. The third sectionexamines five basic causal factors-egoistic self-interest, political power,diffuse norms and principles, usage and custom, and knowledge-that havebeen used to explain the development of regimes.

    Definingregimesand regime changeRegimes can be defined as sets of implicitor explicit principles, norms,rules, and decision-makingprocedures around which actors' expectationsconverge in a given area of international elations. Principlesare beliefs offact, causation, and rectitude. Norms are standardsof behavior definedintermsof rightsandobligations.Rules are specific prescriptionsor proscrip-tions for action. Decision-making procedures are prevailing practices formakingand implementingcollective choice.This usage is consistent with other recent formulations.Keohane andNye, for instance, defineregimesas sets of governingarrangements hatinclude networksof rules, norms,andproceduresthatregularizebehaviorandcontrol its effects. 1IHaas arguesthat a regime encompassesa mutually

    coherent set of procedures, rules, and norms.2Hedley Bull, using a some-what different erminology,refersto the importanceof rules and institutionsin international ociety where rules refer to general imperativeprincipleswhichrequireor authorizeprescribedclasses of personsorgroupsto behavein prescribedways.' 3 Institutions or Bull helpto secure adherenceto rulesby formulating, communicating, administering, enforcing, interpreting,legitimating,and adapting hem.Regimes must be understoodas something more than temporaryar-rangementsthat change with every shift in power or interests. Keohanenotes that a basic analyticdistinctionmust be made between regimes and

    1 Robert 0. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence (Boston: Little,Brown, 1977), p. 19.2 Ernst Haas, TechnologicalSelf-Reliance or Latin America: he OAS Contribution, n-ternational Organization 34, 4 (Autumn 1980), p. 553.3Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (New York: Co-lumbiaUniversity Press, 1977),p. 54.

  • 8/13/2019 Krasner Structural Causes and Regime Consequences

    4/22

    Structural causes and regime consequences 187agreements. Agreements aread hoc, often one-shot, arrangements.Thepurpose of regimes is to facilitate agreements. Similarly,Jervis argues thatthe concept of regimes implies not only norms and expectations thatfacilitatecooperation,but a form of cooperationthat is more than the fol-lowing of short-runself-interest.'4 For instance, he contends that the re-straints that have applied in Korea and other limited wars should not beconsidereda regime. These rules, such as do not bomb sanctuaries, werebased purely on short-termcalculations of interest. As interest and powerchanged, behavior changed. Waltz's conception of the balance of power, inwhich states are driven by systemic pressures to repetitive balancing be-havior, is not a regime; Kaplan's conception, in which equilibrium equirescommitment o rules that constrain mmediate,short-termpowermaximiza-tion (especially not destroying an essential actor), is a regime.5Similarly, regime-governedbehavior must not be based solely onshort-term alculations of interest. Since regimes encompass principlesandnorms, the utility functionthat is being maximizedmust embodysome senseof general obligation. One such principle, reciprocity,is emphasizedin Jer-vis's analysis of security regimes. When states accept reciprocitythey willsacrifice short-term nterests with the expectationthat other actors will re-ciprocatein the future,even if they arenot undera specific obligation o doso. This formulationis similar to Fred Hirsch's brilliant discussion offriendship,in which he states: Friendshipcontains an element of directmutualexchangeand to this extent is akin to privateeconomicgood. But it isoften much more than that. Over time, the friendship'transaction'can bepresumed,by its permanence,to be a net benefit on both sides. At any mo-ment of time, though, the exchange is very unlikelyto be reciprocallybal-anced. 6It is the infusionof behaviorwith principlesand normsthatdistin-guishes regime-governed activity in the internationalsystem from moreconventionalactivity, guidedexclusively by narrowcalculationsof interest.A fundamentaldistinctionmust be madebetween principlesand normson the one hand, and rules and procedures on the other. Principlesandnormsprovide the basic definingcharacteristicsof a regime. There may bemany rules and decision-makingprocedures that are consistent with thesame principles and norms. Changes in rules and decision-making proce-dures are changes within regimes, provided that principles and norms areunaltered.For instance, BenjaminCohen points out that there has been asubstantialincrease in private bank financing duringthe 1970s. This hasmeanta changein the rules governingbalance-of-payments djustment,but

    4 Robert Jervis's contribution to this volume, p. 357.5 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Relations (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley,1979); Morton Kaplan, Systems and Process in International Politics (New York: Wiley, 1957),p. 23; Kaplan, Towards Professionalism in International Theory (New York: Free Press, 1979),pp. 66-69, 73.6 Fred Hirsch, The Social Limits to Growth (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976),p. 78.

  • 8/13/2019 Krasner Structural Causes and Regime Consequences

    5/22

    188 International Organizationit does not mean that therehas been a fundamental hangein the regime.Thebasic normof the regimeremains the same: access to balance-of-paymentsfinancingshouldbe controlled,and conditionedon the behavior of borrow-ing countries.John Ruggiearguesthat in general he changesin internationaleconomicregimes that took place in the 1970swere norm-governed hanges.They did not alter the basic principles and norms of the embedded liberalregime that has been in place since the 1940s.Changes in principles and norms are changes of the regime itself. Whennormsandprinciplesareabandoned, hereis eithera changeto a new regimeor a disappearanceof regimesfroma given issue-area.For instance, Ruggiecontendsthat the distinctionbetween orthodoxand embedded iberalism n-volves differencesover normsandprinciples.Orthodox iberalismendorsesincreasingthe scope of the market. Embedded liberalismprescribes stateaction to contain domestic social and economic dislocations generatedbymarkets. Orthodoxand embeddedliberalismdefine differentregimes. Thechange from orthodoxliberalprinciplesand norms before World WarII toembeddedliberalprinciplesand normsafter World WarII was, in Ruggie'sterms, a revolutionary change.Fundamentalpolitical argumentsare more concerned with norms andprinciplesthan with rules and procedures.Changesin the lattermay be in-terpreted n differentways. For instance, in the areaof international rade,recent revisions in the Articles of Agreementof the General AgreementonTariffs andTrade (GATT)provide for special and differential reatmentforless developedcountries(LDCs). All industrialized ountries have institutedgeneralizedsystems of preferencesfor LDCs. Such rules violate one of thebasic norms of the liberalpostwar order, the most-favored-nation reatmentof all parties.However, the industrializednationshave treatedthese altera-tions in the rules as temporarydeparturesnecessitated by the peculiarcir-cumstancesof poorerareas. At Americaninsistence the concept of gradua-tion was formally ntroduced nto the GATTArticles after the Tokyo Round.Graduationholds that as countries become moredeveloped they will acceptrules consistent with liberal principles. Hence, Northern representativeshave chosen to interpretspecial and differential treatmentof developingcountriesas a changewithinthe regime.Speakersfor the ThirdWorld,on the other hand, have arguedthat thebasic normsof the international conomicordershould be redistribution ndequity, not nondiscrimination nd efficiency. They see the changes in rulesas changes of the regime because they identify these changes with basicchanges in principle. There is a fundamentaldifference between viewingchanges in rules as indications of change within the regime and viewingthesechangesas indicationsof changebetweenregimes.The differencehingeson assessments of whetherprinciplesand normshave changedas well. Suchassessments are never easy because they cannot be based on objective be-havioralobservations. We know deviationsfrom regimes, Ruggie avers,not simply by acts that are undertaken,but by the intentionalityand ac-

  • 8/13/2019 Krasner Structural Causes and Regime Consequences

    6/22

    Structural causes and regime consequences 189ceptability attributedto those acts in the context of an intersubjectiveframeworkof meaning. 7Finally, it is necessary to distinguishthe weakeningof a regimefromchanges within or between regimes. If the principles, norms, rules, anddecision-making procedures of a regime become less coherent, or if actualpractice is increasingly inconsistent with principles, norms, rules, and pro-cedures, then a regime has weakened. Special and differential treatment fordevelopingcountries is an indicationthat the liberalregimehas weakened,even if it has not been replacedby somethingelse. The use of diplomaticcover by spies, the buggingof embassies, the assassinationof diplomatsbyterrorists,andthe failureto provideadequatelocal police protectionare allindicationsthat the classic regimeprotectingforeignenvoys has weakened.However, the furtivenatureof these activitiesindicatesthat basic principlesand norms are not being directly challenged. In contrast, the seizure ofAmericandiplomatsby groups sanctionedby the Iraniangovernmentis abasic challengeto the regimeitself. Iran violatedprinciplesand norms, notjust rules and procedures.8In sum, change within a regime involves alterations of rules anddecision-makingprocedures,but not of normsor principles;changeof a re-gime involves alterationof normsandprinciples;andweakeningof a regimeinvolves incoherenceamongthe componentsof the regimeor inconsistencybetween the regimeand relatedbehavior.Do regimesmatter?

    It wouldtake some courage,perhapsmorecouragethan this editorpos-sesses, to answer this question in the negative. This project began with asimplecausal schematic. It assumedthat regimescould be conceived of asinterveningvariablesstandingbetween basic causal variables(most promi-nently,powerand interests)and outcomes and behavior.Thefirstattempt oanalyzeregimesthus assumedthe following set of causal relationships(seeFigure 1).RELATEDBEHAVIORBASICCAUSALVARIABLES - -a REGIMES AND OUTCOMES

    Figure 1Regimesdo not arise of theirown accord.They are not regardedas endsin themselves. Once in place they do affect relatedbehaviorandoutcomes.They are not merelyepiphenomenal.

    7John Ruggie'scontributiono this volume, p. 380.8 Iran'sbehaviormay be rootedin an Islamicview of internationalelationsthatrejectstheprevailing,European-derived egime. See RichardRosecrance, InternationalTheory Re-visited, InternationalOrganization35, 4 (Autumn1981) or a similarpoint.

  • 8/13/2019 Krasner Structural Causes and Regime Consequences

    7/22

  • 8/13/2019 Krasner Structural Causes and Regime Consequences

    8/22

    Structural causes and regime consequences 191The market s a powerfulmetaphor or many arguments n the literatureof political science, not least internationalrelations. The recent work ofKennethWaltz exemplifiesthis orientation.For Waltz, the definingcharac-

    teristic of the internationalsystem is that its componentparts (states) arefunctionallysimilar and interact in an anarchic environment.Internationalsystems are distinguishedonly by differingdistributionsof relativecapabil-ities amongactors. States are assumedto act in theirown self-interest.At aminimum hey seek their own preservationand, at a maximum,drive foruniversaldomination. ''2 hey are constrainedonly by their interactionwithotherstates in the system. Behavioris, therefore,a functionof the distribu-tion of power amongstates and the position of each particular tate. Whenpower distributionschange, behaviorwill also change. Regimes, for Waltz,can only be one small step removedfrom the underlyingpower capabilitiesthat sustain them.13The second orientation o regimes, modifiedstructural, s most clearlyreflected in the essays of Keohane and Stein. Both of these authors startfrom a conventional structuralrealist perspective, a world of sovereignstates seekingto maximizetheir interestand power. Keohaneposits thatinthe international ystem regimes derive from voluntary agreementsamongjuridically equal actors. Stein states that the conceptualization of re-gimes developed here is rooted in the classic characterizationof interna-tional politics as relationsbetween sovereignentities dedicated to theirownself-preservation,ultimately able to depend only on themselves, and pre-pared to resort to force. 14In a world of sovereignstates the basic functionof regimesis to coordi-nate state behavior to achieve desiredoutcomes in particular ssue-areas.15Such coordination is attractive under several circumstances. Stein andKeohane posit that regimes can have an impact when Pareto-optimalout-comes could not be achieved throughuncoordinatedndividualcalculationsof self-interest.The prisoners'dilemma s the classic game-theoreticexam-ple. Stein also arguesthat regimesmay have an autonomouseffect on out-comes when purelyautonomousbehaviorcouldleadto disastrousresultsforboth parties. The game of chicken is the game-theoreticanalog. Haas andothers in this volume suggestthat regimes may have significant mpactin ahighlycomplexworld in which ad hoc, individualistic alculationsof interestcould not possibly providethe necessary level of coordination.If, as manyhave argued,there is a generalmovementtoward a worldof complex inter-

    12 Waltz, Theory of International Relations, p. 118.13 Ibid., especiallychapters5 and6. This conventional tructuralist iew for therealistschoolhas its analog n Marxistanalysisto studies thatfocus exclusivelyon technologyandeconomicstructure.14 Robert0. Keohane'sand ArthurA. Stein's contributions o this volume, pp. 330 and300.15 VinodK. Aggarwalemphasizesthis point. See his Hangingby a Thread:InternationalRegimeChange n the Textile/ApparelSystem, 1950-1979, Ph.D. diss., StanfordUniversity,1981, chap. 1.

  • 8/13/2019 Krasner Structural Causes and Regime Consequences

    9/22

  • 8/13/2019 Krasner Structural Causes and Regime Consequences

    10/22

    Structural causes and regime consequences 193vergentexpectations.This leadsto conventionalizedbehavior n which thereis some expectation of rebukefor deviatingfrom ongoing practices. Con-ventionalizedbehavior generatesrecognizednorms. If the observer findsapatternof interrelatedactivity, and the connectionsin the patternare under-stood, then there must be some formof normsand procedures.While the modified structuralapproachdoes not view the perfectmar-ket as a regime,because actionthere is based purely upon individualcalcu-lation without regard to the behaviorof others, the third orientation doesregard the market as a regime. Patterns of behaviorthat persist over ex-tendedperiodsare infused with normativesignificance.A marketcannotbesustainedby calculationsof self-interestalone. It mustbe, in Ruggie'sterms,embedded in a -broader ocial environmentthat nurturesand sustains theconditions necessary for its functioning. Even the balance of power, re-garded by conventional structuralrealist analysts as a purely conflictualsituation,can be treated as a regime.'9The causal schema suggested by aGrotianorientationeither closely parallels he first cut shownin Figure 1, orcan be depicted as in Figure3.

    REGIMESBASICCAUSALVARIABLES ; t

    RELATEDPATTERNEDBEHAVIORFigure3Patternedbehaviorreflectingcalculationsof interesttends to leadto the cre-ation of regimes, and regimesreinforce patternedbehavior.The Grotian radition hat HopkinsandPuchala,andYoungdrawupon,offers a counter to structural realism of either the conventional or themodified form. It rejects the assumptionthat the internationalsystem iscomposedof sovereignstates limitedonly by the balance of power. Rather,Hopkinsand Puchala suggest that elites are the practical actors in interna-tional relations. States are rarifiedabstractions.Elites have transnational swell as national ties. Sovereignty is a behavioralvariable,not an analyticassumption.The ability of states to controlmovements across their bordersand to maintain dominance over all aspects of the internationalsystem islimited. Securityand state survival are not the only objectives. Force doesnot occupy a singularly mportantplace in internationalpolitics. Elites actwithin a communicationsnet, embodying rules, norms, and principles,which transcends nationalboundaries.This minimalistGrotianorientationhas informeda numberof theoreti-cal postulates developed duringthe postwarperiod. Functionalismsaw thepossibilityof erodingsovereignty through he multiplicationof particularis-tic interests across national boundaries. Karl Deutsch's 1957 study of inte-

    19 BuLl, The Anarchical Society, chap. 5.

  • 8/13/2019 Krasner Structural Causes and Regime Consequences

    11/22

    194 International Organizationgration, with its emphasis on societal communication,made a distinctionbetween security communitiesand anarchy.20 ome authorsassociatedwiththe concept of transnationalism ave posited a web of interdependence hatmakesany emphasison sovereigntyanalyticallymisleadingandnormativelyquestionable.Keohane and Nye's discussion of complex interdependencerejectsthe assumptionsof the primacyof force and issue hierarchyassumedby a realistperspective.2'Ernst Haas points out that what he calls organictheories-eco-environmentalism, eco-reformism,and egalitarianism-denyconventionalpower-orientedassumptions.Regimes are much more easily encompassedby a Grotianworldview.But, as the argumentsmadeby Jervis, Keohane, Stein, Lipson, andCohenindicate, the concept is not precludedby a realistperspective. The issue isnot so much whetherone accepts the possibilityof principles,norms,rules,and decision-makingproceduresaffectingoutcomes and behavior,as whatone's basic assumptionis about the normal state of internationalaffairs.Adherents of a Grotian perspective accept regimes as a pervasive andsignificantphenomenonin the international ystem. Adherents of a struc-tural realistorientationsee regimesas a phenomenonwhose presence can-not be assumedand whose existence requirescarefulexplanation.The twostandardcases are fundamentallydifferent,and it is the definitionof thestandardcase that identifiesthe basic theoreticalorientation.StephenToul-min writes that any dynamicaltheory involves some explicit or implicitreferenceto a standard ase or 'paradigm.'Thisparadigm pecifiesthe man-nerinwhich, in the courseof events, bodiesmaybe expectedto move. It isdeviationfromthat movementwhich needs to be explained.22Froma realistperspective,regimesare phenomenathat need to be explained;from a Gro-tian perspective, they are data to be described.In sum, conventional structural argumentsdo not take regimes se-riously:if basic causal variables change, regimeswill also change. Regimeshave no independentimpact on behavior. Modifiedstructuralarguments,representedhere by a numberof adherentsof a realistapproach o interna-tional relations, see regimes as matteringonly when independentdecisionmakingleads to undesired outcomes. Finally, Grotianperspectives acceptregimesas a fundamentalpartof all patternedhuman nteraction,includingbehaviorin the international ystem.Explanationsor regimedevelopment

    For those authors who see regimes as something more than epi-phenomena, the second major issue posed by a schematic that sees re-20 See ArendLijphart, The Structureof the TheoreticalRevolution n InternationalRela-tions, International Studies Quarterly 18, 1 (March 1974), pp. 64-65, for the development ofthis argument.21 Keohane andNye, Powerand Interdependence, speciallychap. 8.22 Stephen Toulmin, Foresight and Understanding:An Enquiry into the Aims of Science (NewYork:HarperTorchbooks,1961), pp. 56-57. Toulmin'suse of the term paradigm s similar o

  • 8/13/2019 Krasner Structural Causes and Regime Consequences

    12/22

  • 8/13/2019 Krasner Structural Causes and Regime Consequences

    13/22

    196 International Organizationconforms with the definitionof regimes used here. It is not so clear thatcoordination nvolves regimes.Coordinationmayonly require he construc-tion of rules. If these rules arenot informedby any proximateprinciplesornorms, they will not conformto the definitionof regimesset forth earlier.)While Stein employs a game-theoreticorientation, Keohaneutilizes in-sights from microeconomictheories of marketfailureto examine dilemmasof common interests. He is primarilyconcerned with the demand for re-gimes, the conditions under which ad hoc agreements fail to providePareto-optimaloutcomes. He maintains that Regimes can make agree-ment easierif they provideframeworks orestablishing egalliability(even ifthese are not perfect); mprovethe quantityandqualityof informationavail-able to actors;or reduce othertransactionscosts, such as costs of organiza-tion or of makingside-payments. 24 hese benefits providedby regimesarelikelyto outweighthe costs of regimeformationand maintenancewhenthereis asymmetric nformation,moralhazard, potentialdishonesty,or highissuedensity. In addition,the costs of formingregimeswill be lowerwhen there isa highlevel of formaland informal ommunicationamongstates, a conditionmore likely to be foundin open politicalsystems operatingunder conditionsof complex interdependence.Egoistic self-interest is also regardedas an importantdeterminantofregimesby severalotherauthors.Young arguesthatthere are threepathstoregimeformation:spontaneous,in which regimesemerge fromthe converg-ing expectations of many individualactions; negotiated, in which regimesare formedby explicit agreements;and imposed, in which regimes are ini-tially forced upon actors by external imposition.The firsttwo are based onegoistic calculations. Lipson argues that the differential pattern of ac-ceptance of liberalrules in the international radingregimeis a functionofdifferentialcosts of adjustmentacross industrialsectors; where costs arelow, continued adherence to liberal principles, norms, and rules is high.Cohenmaintains hat the rules of the balance-of-payments inancingregimechanged in the 1970s because higheroil prices and the petrodollarmarketaltered calculations of interest. Jervis posits that regimes in the securityarenawill only be formedwhen states accept the statusquo, the cost of waris high, and the spillover into other arenas is substantial.This last point,which echoes Keohane's argumentabout the importanceof issue density, issimilar to argumentsmade by Haas and by Puchala and Hopkins. Haasmakes interconnectednessa centralelement of his analysis:regimesare de-signedto managecomplexityandcomplexityincreaseswith interconnected-ness. Similarly,Puchalaand Hopkinsmaintain hatregimesare morelikelyto arise underconditionsof complex interdependence.Hence calculationsofegoistic self-interestemergeas centralelements in most of the articlesin thisvolume.

    24 Keohane'scontributiono this volume,p. 338.

  • 8/13/2019 Krasner Structural Causes and Regime Consequences

    14/22

    Structural causes and regime consequences 1972. Political power

    The second major basic causal variable used to explain regime de-velopment is political power. Two different orientationstoward power canbe distinguished.The first is cosmopolitanand instrumental:power is usedto secure optimal outcomes for the system as a whole. In game-theoreticterms poweris used to promote oint maximization. t is powerin the serviceof the commongood. The second approach s particularistic ndpotentiallyconsummatory.Poweris used to enhance the values of specific actorswithinthe system. These values may include increasingpower capabilitiesas wellas promotingeconomic or other objectives. In game-theoretic erms poweris used to maximize ndividualpayoffs. It is power in the service of particularinterests.a. Power in the service of the common good

    The first position is representedby a long traditionin classical andneoclassical economics associated with the provisionof public goods. Thehidden handwas Adam Smith'smost compellingconstruct: the good of allfrom the selfishness of each; there could be no more powerfuldefense ofegoism. But Smithrecognizedthat it was necessary for the state to providecertain collective goods. These included defense, the maintenanceof order,minimumevels of welfare, publicworks, the protectionof infant ndustries,and standardsfor commodities.25Economists have pointed to the impor-tance of the state for establishingproperty rightsand enforcingcontracts;that is, creatingconditions thatprevent predatoryas opposed to marketbe-havior. The statemust create institutions hat equatepublic and privateratesof return.26Keynesian analysisgives the state a prominentrole in managingmacroeconomic variables. For all of these arguments he purposeof stateaction is to furthergeneral societal interests.

    25 There s a lively debateoverpreciselyhowmuchof a roleSmithaccordsto the state.Some(see for instanceAlbert Hirschman,ThePassions and theInterests[Princeton:PrincetonUni-versityPress, 1977],pp. 103-104)maintain hatSmithwantedto limitthe folly of governmentby having t do as little as possible. Others(see for instanceColin Holmes, Laissez-faire nTheory and Practice: Britain 1800-1875, Journal of European Economic History 5, 3 [1976], p.673;and CarlosDiaz-Alejandro, DelinkingNorthand South:Unshackledor Unhinged, inAlbert Fishlow et al., Rich and Poor Nations in the World Economy [New York: McGraw-Hill,1978],pp. 124-25)havetakenthe intermediate ositionendorsedhere.Otherssee Smithtryingto establishconditions or a moralsociety thatmust be basedon individual hoice, forwhichamaterialisticallyriented,egoisticallymaintained conomic system is only instrumental.See,for instance,LeonardBillet, TheJustEconomy:The MoralBasis of the Wealthof Nations,Review of Social Economy 34 (December 1974).

    26 Jack Hirschleifer, Economicsfroma BiologicalViewpoint, Journal of Law and Eco-nomics 20 (April 1977);Weber,Economyand Society, pp. 336-37; Douglass C. North andRobert Paul Thomas, The Rise of the Western World: A New Economic History (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress, 1973),chap. 1.

  • 8/13/2019 Krasner Structural Causes and Regime Consequences

    15/22

  • 8/13/2019 Krasner Structural Causes and Regime Consequences

    16/22

    Structural causes and regime consequences 199utility of particularactors, usually states. A game-theoreticanalogymakes iteasier to distinguishbetween two importantvariants of the viewpoint ofpower in the service of particular nterests. The first assumes that pay-offsare fixed andthat an actor's choice of strategy is autonomouslydeterminedsolely by these pay-offs. The second assumes that power can be used to alterpay-offs and influence actor strategy.The first approachclosely follows the analysis that applies when purelycosmopolitan objectives are at stake, except that political power is used tomaximize individual, not joint, pay-offs. Under certain configurationsofinterest, there is an incentive to create regimes and the provision of theseregimes is a function of the distribution f power. While Keohane focuses onthe demand or regimesin his article n this volume, he has elsewhere arguedthat hegemons play a critical role in supplying he collective goods that areneeded for regimes to function effectively.29Hegemons provide these goodsnot because they are interested in the well-being of the system as a whole,but because regimes enhance their own national values.This emphasis on the need for asymmetricpower distributions supply-side considerations)shouldbe contrastedwith Stein's assertionsconcerningthe efficacy of demand. The theory of hegemonic leadership suggests thatunder conditions of declining hegemony there will be a weakeningof re-gimes. Without leadership, principles, norms, rules, and decision-makingprocedurescannot easily be upheld. No one actorwill be willing to providethe collective goods needed to make the regime work smoothly and effec-tively. Stein's analysis, on the other hand, suggests that as hegemony de-clines there will be greater incentives for collaborationbecause collectivegoods are no longer being provided by the hegemon. The international ys-tem more closely resembles an oligopoly than a perfect market.Actors areaware of how their behavioraffects others. When smaller states perceivethat a hegemon is no longer willing to offer a free ride, they are likely tobecome paying customers. For Stein, interests alone can effectively sustainorder. Hegemonic decline can lead to strongerregimes.The second line of argumentassociated with power in the service ofspecific interests investigates the possibility that powerful actors may beable to alterthe pay-offsthatconfrontotheractorsor influence he strategiesthey choose. Here power becomes a much more central concept-the ele-ment of compulsion s close at hand.Weakeractors maynot be able to makeautonomous choices. The values assigned to a particularcell may bechanged.

    In this volume Oran Young develops the notion of imposed regimes.Dominantactors may explicitly use a combinationof sanctions and incen-tives to compel other actors to act in conformitywith a particularset of29 Robert 0. Keohane, The Theory of Hegemonic Stability and Changes in InternationalEconomic Regimes, 1967-77, in Ole R. Holsti et al., Changes in the InternationalSystem(Boulder,Col.: Westview, 1980).

  • 8/13/2019 Krasner Structural Causes and Regime Consequences

    17/22

    200 International Organizationprinciples, norms, rules, and decision-makingprocedures. Alternatively,dominantactors may secure de facto complianceby manipulating pportu-nity sets so that weaker actors are compelled to behave in a desiredway.Keohaneposits that in the international ystem choices will be constrainedin ways that give greaterweightto the preferencesof morepowerfulactors.BenjaminCohennotes that the specificrules andinstitutionalarrangementsfor the Bretton Woods institutionsreflectedthe preferencesof the UnitedStates muchmorethanthose of GreatBritain.Jervispointsout thatweakerstates had littleoptionbut to follow the balance of powerregime of the 19thcenturywith its emphasison the special role of the greatpowers. In all ofthese cases more powerfulactorscreatedregimesthatservedtheir particularpurpose, and other were compelled to accept them because their pay-offswere manipulatedor theiroptions were limited.Whena hegemonicstateacts to influence he strategyof other actorstheregime s heldhostageto the persistenceof the existingdistribution f powerin the international ystem. If the hegemon'srelativecapabilitiesdecline, theregimewill collapse. Young arguesthat imposedorders are likely to disin-tegratewhen there are majorshifts in underlyingpower capabilities.Hop-kins and Puchalasuggestthatregimesthat arehighlypoliticized,diffuse,andbiased in their distributionof values are likely to undergoradicaltransfor-mation when power distributionschange. For instance, the norms of thecolonial regime collapsed because the power of its supporter, the majorEuropeanstates, eroded. This set of argumentsabout regime change andhegemonicdecline differs from the analysis emergingfrom a focus on theprovisionof collective goods for either cosmopolitanor particularistic ea-sons. Here a decline in powerleads to a changein regimebecause the hege-monis no longerable to control the pay-offmatrixor influence he strategiesof the weak, not because there is no actor to provide the collective goodsneeded for efficientregimefunctioning.

    3. Norms and principlesTo this point in the discussion, normsandprincipleshave been treatedas endogenous:they are the critical definingcharacteristicsof any given re-gime. However, normsandprinciples hat influencethe regimein a particu-lar issue-areabut are not directlyrelatedto that issue-areacan also be re-garded as explanations for the creation, persistence, and dissipation of

    regimes. The most famous example of such a formulation s Max Weber'sProtestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. Weber argues that the rise ofcapitalism s intimatelyassociatedwith the evolution of a Calvinistreligiousdoctrinethat fosters hard work while enjoiningprofligacyanduses worldlysuccess as an indicationof predestinedfate.30Fred Hirsch has arguedthat30 For a recent discussionsee David Laitin, Religion, PoliticalCulture, and the Weberian

  • 8/13/2019 Krasner Structural Causes and Regime Consequences

    18/22

    Structural causes and regime consequences 201without precapitalistvalues such as hardwork, self-sacrifice,loyalty, andhonor, capitalist systems would fall apart. Such values are critical con-straints on self-interested calculations that would too often lead to un-trustworthyand dishonestbehavior.3'Financingby various pariah groups around the world offers a clearexample of the way in which noneconomic norms have facilitated marketactivity. For instance, bills of exchange were devised by Jewish bankersduring he late MiddleAges to avoid violence andextortionfrom the nobil-ity: saferto carrya piece of paperthan to carryspecie. However, the pieceof paperhad to be honoredby the recipient.This implieda highlevel of trustand such trust was enhanced by conventions: established practices werereinforcedby the exclusionary natureof the group, which facilitatedsur-veillance and the applicationof sanctions. The importanceof conventionsfor the use of bills of exchange is reflected in the fact that they were fre-quentlyused in the Mediterraneanbasin in the 16thcentury but they werenot used at the interfacewith the non-Mediterraneanworldin Syriawhere,accordingto Braudel, two mutually suspicious worlds met face to face.Here all dealingswere in barter, or gold and silver.32In this volume, Hopkins and Puchalamake a distinctionbetween thesuperstructureand the substructure. The superstructurerefers to generaland diffuse principlesand norms that condition the principlesand normsoperative in a specific issue-area. They note, for example, that balance ofpower in 19thcenturyEuropewas a diffuse normthat influenced he natureof the regimefor colonialism.Jervisarguesthat forregimesto develop inthesecurityareathe greatpowers mustbelievethat othersshare the valuetheyplace on mutualsecurity and cooperation. 33 ohn Ruggie's highly originalanalysis of the postwar economic regime argues that it was founded uponprinciplesof embeddedrather han orthodoxliberalism.The domesticlessonof the 1930swas that societies could not tolerate the consequences of anuntrammeledmarket. This set of diffuse values, which permeated thecapitalistworld,was extendedfromthe domesticto the international pherein the BrettonWoods agreements.This discussion suggests that there is a hierarchy of regimes. Diffuseprinciplesand norms, such as hardwork as a service to God, conditionbe-haviorin specific issue-areas. In international elations, the most importantdiffuseprinciple s sovereignty.Hedley Bullrefers to sovereigntyas the con-

    Tradition, WorldPolitics 30, 4 (July 1978),especiallypp. 568-69. For anotherdiscussionofnoneconomicvalues in the rise of capitalismsee Hirschman,The Passions and the Interests.31 Hirsch,The Social Limits to Growth,chap. 11. See also MichaelWalzer, The FutureofIntellectualsand the Rise of theNew Class, New YorkReviewof Books 27 (20March1980).32 Fernand Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II(New York:Harper,1975),p. 370. Forthe tie betweenbillsof exchangeandJewishbankers eeHirschman, The Passions and the Interests, p. 72, and Immanuel Wallerstein, The ModernWorld-SystemNew York: AcademicPress, 1974), p. 147.33 Jervis'scontributiono this volume,p. 361.

  • 8/13/2019 Krasner Structural Causes and Regime Consequences

    19/22

    202 International Organizationstitutiveprincipleof the presentinternational ystem. The concept of exclu-sive controlwithina delimitedgeographicareaand the untrammeled ighttoself-helpinternationally,which emergedout of late medieval Europe, havecome to pervadethe moderninternational ystem.34In thisusage sovereigntys notan analyticassumption,t is a principlehatinfluences he behaviorof actors.With a few exceptions, such as Antarctica,Namibia, and the West Bank, sovereigntyprevails. Those areas where sov-ereigntyis not appliedare governedby vulnerableregimesor lack regimesaltogether.Sovereigntydesignates states as the only actors with unlimitedrights to. act in the internationalsystem. Assertions by other agencies aresubject o challenge.If the constitutiveprincipleof sovereigntywere altered,it is difficultto imaginethat any other internationalregime would remainunchanged.4. Usage and custom

    The last two sets of causal variablesaffecting regimedevelopmentareusage and custom, and knowledge. Usage and custom will be discussed inthis section, knowledgein the next. Usage andcustom, andknowledge,arenot treated in this volume as exogenous variablescapable of generatingaregimeon theirown. Rather, they supplementand reinforcepressuresasso-ciated with egoistic self-interest,politicalpower, and diffuse values.Usage refers to regularpatternsof behaviorbased on actual practice;custom, to long-standingpractice.35The importanceof routinizedbehavioris particularly ignificant n the positiontaken by Hopkinsand Puchalaandby Young. For these authors, patterned behavior, originally generatedpurelyby considerationsof interestor power, has a strongtendencyto leadto sharedexpectations. Patternedbehavioraccompaniedby sharedexpec-tationsis likelyto becomeinfusedwithnormativesignificance:actionsbasedpurelyon instrumental alculationscan come to be regardedas rule-likeorprincipledbehavior.They assume legitimacy.A greatdeal of western com-merciallaw, in fact, developed out of custom and usage initially generatedby self-interest.Practices that began as ad hoc private arrangementsaterbecame the basis for officialcommercial aw.36In OranYoung's discussionof both spontaneousandimposedregimes,habits and usage play a significantrole. Young does not make any strongclaims for the specific conditions that lead to spontaneousregimes. How-ever, the literatureto which he refers-Schelling, Lewis, and Hayek-

    34 Bull, TheAnarchicalSociety, pp. 8-9, 70.35 Weber,Economyand Society, p. 29.36 Leon E. Trakman, The Evolutionof the Law Merchant:OurCommercialHeritage, PartI, JournalofMaritimeLawandCommerce12,1(October1980)andPartII, ibid., 12,2 (January1981);Harold BermanandColinKaufman, The Law of InternationalCommercialTransac-tions (Lex Mercatoria), Harvard International Law Journal 19, 1 (Winter 1978).

  • 8/13/2019 Krasner Structural Causes and Regime Consequences

    20/22

    Structural causes and regime consequences 203is oriented toward a microeconomic perspective focusing on egoisticself-interest. Certain patterns of behavior are first adopted because theypromoteindividualutility. Once established, such practicesare reinforcedby the growth of regimes. Most Americandrivers(outsideNew York City)would feel at least a twingeof discomfortat driving illegallythrougha redlight at an empty intersection.Behaviorthatwas originallyonly a matterofegoistic self-interestis now buttressedby widely shared norms. Similarly,Young argues that successful imposed orders are bolstered eventually byhabitsof obedience. (It is not clear that, withoutthese habits, Young'scon-cept of imposedorders conformswiththe definitionof regime used here.) Apatternof behaviorinitiallyestablishedby economic coercion or force maycome to be regardedas legitimateby those on whom it has been imposed.Usage leads to shared expectations, which become infusedwith principlesandnorms.

    5. KnowledgeThe final variableused to explainthe developmentof regimesis knowl-edge. Like usage and custom, knowledge is usuallytreatedas an interven-ing, not an exogenous, variable.In an earlierstudy ErnstHaas, in this vol-ume the most prominentexponentof the importanceof knowledge,definedknowledgeas the sum of technical informationand of theories about thatinformationwhich commands sufficientconsensus at a given time amonginterested actors to serve as a guide to public policy designed to achievesome social goal. 37In his essay in this volume Haas points to the poten-tialitiesinherent n a stanceof cognitiveevolutionism, whichemphasizessensitivityto the consequencesof the generationof new knowledge.Knowl-edge creates a basis for cooperationby illuminating omplex interconnec-tions thatwerenot previouslyunderstood.Knowledgecan notonly enhancethe prospects for convergentstate behavior, it can also transcend prevail-inglines of ideologicalcleavage. 38 t can providea commonground orbothwhat Haas calls mechanicalapproaches(most conventional social sciencetheories) and organic approaches(egalitarianismand various environmen-tally orientedarguments).For knowledgeto have an independent mpactin the international ys-tem, it must be widely accepted by policy makers. Stein pointsout that rulesconcerninghealth, such as quarantine egulations,were radicallyalteredby

    new scientificknowledge such as the discovery of the microbethat causescholera,the transmissionof yellow fever by mosquitoes, and the use of pre-ventive vaccines. Priorto developmentssuch as these, nationalhealthregu-37 ErnstHaas, Why Collaborate?ssue-Linkage nd InternationalRegimes, WorldPolitics32, 3 (April1980),pp. 367-68.38 Ibid., p. 368.

  • 8/13/2019 Krasner Structural Causes and Regime Consequences

    21/22

    204 International Organizationlations were primarilydeterminedby political concerns. After these dis-coveries, however, nationalbehavior was determinedby an internationalregime, or at least a set of rules, dictated by accepted scientificknowledge.Jervis arguesthat in the present securityarenathe possibilitiesfor an armscontrol regime may depend on whether the Soviet Union and the UnitedStates view strategy in the same way. In particular,mutual acceptance ofMutual Assured Destruction (MAD) can provide the basis for a regime.Withoutconsensus, knowledge can have little impact on regime develop-ment in a worldof sovereign states. Ifonly some parties hold a particular etof beliefs, their significanceis completely mediatedby the power of theiradherents.New knowledge can provide the basis for what Hopkins and Puchalacall evolutionary change, which usually involves altering rules and proce-dures within the context of a given set of principlesand norms. In contrast,revolutionarychange, which generates new principlesand norms, is asso-ciatedwith shifts in power.As anexampleof evolutionarychange,BenjaminCohen points out that the fixed exchange rate system agreedto at BrettonWoods was based upon understandingsderived from the interwarexperi-ence andthen-currentknowledge aboutdomesticmonetaryinstitutionsandstructures. States were extremely sensitive to competitive devaluationandwere not confidentthat domestic monetary policy could provide insulationfrom externaldisturbances.It was much easier to accept a floatingexchangerate regime in the 1970s because the knowledge and related institutionalcapacityfor controllingmonetaryaggregateshad substantially ncreased. Ina highly complexworld, wheregoals are often ill-definedand manylinks arepossible, consensual knowledgecan greatlyfacilitate agreementon the de-velopment of an international egime.Such knowledgecan light a clear pathin a landscapethat would otherwisebe murkyand undifferentiated.In sum, the essays in this volume and the literature n generaloffer avariety of explanations for the development of regimes. The two mostprominentexogenous variablesare egoistic self-interest, usuallyeconomic,and political power. In addition, diffuse values and norms such as sover-eignty and private propertymay condition behavior within specific issue-areas. Finally, usage and custom and knowledgemay contributeto the de-velopment of regimes.

    ConclusionIn approaching he two basic questions that guidedthis exercise-theimpact of regimes on related behaviorand outcomes, and the relationshipbetween basic causal variables and regimes-the essays in this volumereflect two differentorientationsto international elations.The Grotianper-spective, which informsthe essays of Hopkinsand Puchalaand of Young,sees regimes as a pervasive facet of social interaction.It is catholic in its

  • 8/13/2019 Krasner Structural Causes and Regime Consequences

    22/22