Late Roman and Sucessors Army

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    ARMIES, WAR, AND SOCIETY IN THE WEST,ca.300-ca.600:

    LATE ROMAN AND BARBARIAN MILITARYORGANIZATIONS

    AND THE FALL OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE

    (Richard Abels )

    I. Roman army in the fourth and early fifth centuries II. Military aspects of the fall of the Roman Empire in the West III. The armies of the successor kingdoms IV. Justinian's attempt to reconquer the West

    Maps of the Late Roman Empire in 337 and 450 A.D.

    I. THE ROMAN ARMY IN THE FOURTH AND FIFTHCENTURIES

    OVERVIEW

    The evolution of the Roman military over the fourth and fifth centuries parallels the

    political, economic, and social changes that occurred in the Empire during this period. Inthe early fourth century A.D., the Roman military was a public institution, a force ofsoldiers and sailors recruited, trained, supplied, and paid by the Roman state through alarge and expensive bureaucracy. The Empire in the fourth century and early fifth centurieswas a non -militarized society, that is, a society in whi ch there is a well defined distinction

    between soldier and civilian. All of this was also true of the Roman military of thePrincipate (27 B.C. - A.D. 235), but much had changed since the time of Augustus, Trajan, andHadrian. The armies of late antiquity were no longer the well-disciplined infantry legions of thefirst centuries B.C. and A.D. celebrated on the History Channel. That military had died duringthe political and military chaos of the Third Century Crisis (A.D. 235-284). Although there was

    some continuity, especially in military terminology, the armies of the Late Roman Empire wereorganized, recruited, deployed, trained, and armed differently from those of thePrincipate. From the reign of Constantine (306-337), the Roman army was organized into twogroups with distinct functions, which, according to some historians, were elements of an overalldefense-in-depth strategy. Frontier troops ( limitanei ) were stationed in a system of fortificationsalong the borders, while mobile field forces ( comitatenses ) were billeted in the cities and townsof regions deemed most vulnerable to attack. The frontier troops were designed to deal with anddiscourage low intensity threats, such as raiding across the border, and to impede the progress ofmajor incursions to allow sufficient time for the mobile field forces to respond and interceptinvaders within Roman territory. Frontier and field forces included both infantry and cavalrycontingents that were organized into units and characterized by specified ranks with definedcommand structures that culminated, at least in theory, in the emperor. Cavalry, which in thelate Republic and early Empire had been supplied, for the most part, by foreign allies(auxiliaries), was now fully integrated into the Roman military; its importance and prestige grew

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    during the fifth and sixth centuries, in part because of the need for greater strategic and tacticalmobility that horses provided, and, in part, because of encounters with nomadic horsed peoplessuch as the Huns. Romes armies were complemented by a standing navy, with fleets based in

    ports along the frontiers rivers (most notably the Danube and Rhine) and in the port citiesof Italy. But, as in earlier times, the imperial navy was a subordinate (and despised) element ofthe military without a strategic mission. Its duties were limited largely to protecting Romangrain-tax fleets against pirates and conveying important imperial dispatches. Engineers, medicalservices, intelligence services and a full commissariat supported the land combat troops.

    All of this was paid for with taxes. Indeed, support of the military was the single greatestexpenditure of the Roman state. The payment of taxes, however, was the extent to which mostRoman citizens contributed or (if they were lucky) interacted with the military. The cultural andsocial divide between soldier and civilian that had begun even before Augustus

    professionalization of military service had grown wider over the centuries. In the fourth andearly fifth centuries ordinary citizens of the great metropolitan centers of the Empire Rome,Alexandria, Constantinople and most peasants in the interior of the Empire would have hadlittle if any dealings with soldiers. This was greatly to their benefit, since soldiers were notorious

    for bullying and extorting money and goods from civilians, as well as for rape. This was particularly true for the field army, whose transient troops lacked identification with the localsof the towns in which they were temporarily billeted. The brutality of the rank and file was onlychecked by the even greater brutality of their noncoms, who viewed the imposition of disciplinenot only as a military matter but as a source for extra income. This was nothing new in thefourth century, but the decline of Roman urban life in the Western half of the Empire during theThird Century Crisis abetted these abuses. The late Roman Empire had no public police forces.During the Principate, urban authorities had been responsible for enforcing law and punishingcrime. This was still true in the cities of the east andItaly in the fourth century. In thecountryside, private landowners, supported by hired soldiers known as bucellarii (literally dry -

    biscuit eaters), assumed that role within their lands. On the frontiers and in the smaller interiortowns in which troops were billeted, military commanders often were often looked to for themaintenance of law and order. In these cases, soldiers functioned as the Empires cops brutal, non -regulated cops (to quote Dr. Phyllis Culham). On the other hand, Roman civiliansociety grew more militarized in the fifth century as the army proved inadequate for thedefense of the citizenry.

    The Emperor Diocletians decision to separate military and civilian admi nistrationresponsibilities created a divide between a civilian aristocratic elite that boasted landed wealthand classical education and who served in the upper reaches of the civilian administration of theEmpire, and a military officer corps that often had risen from the ranks, as evidenced by theorigins of many of the so- called barrack -emperors of the third century. (Rankers could becomeofficers if they distinguished themselves sufficiently to merit appointment to the emperors

    personal guard, the protectores domestici , which in the fourth century served as a sortof StaffCollege. With the endemic political and military unrest of the third, fourth, and fifthcenturies, however, rising through the ranks was sometimes achieved by knocking off onessuperiors.) By the beginning of the fifth century, the only political officials who still

    possessed military command were the emperors themselves, and by time many of them werecommanders in chief in name only. Romes armies and military policies were now in thehands of generalissimos called magistri militum (masters of the soldiers). Although they were

    legally appointed by emperors, they often held power over their nominal masters. In severalinstances, emperors who felt threatened by the power of their magistri militum arranged for theirassassinations, which was easier than dismissing them. As a further check upon the ambitions of

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    generals and the possibility of military coup dtats , the supply and provisioning of troops werehandled by civilian authorities.

    The social status of the rank and file soldier was low in the fourth and fifth centuries, and,despite (theoretically) good pay, Roman citizens tended to avoid military service if they could.Conscription, hereditary military service, and, increasingly, the use of barbarian allied troops(federates) were essential to meet the manpower needs of the army.

    By the end of the sixth century military organization in what had been the WesternRoman Empire looked very different. State-maintained standing armies and navies hadceased to exist along with the regular systems of taxation and public finance that hadsupported them in the fourth and fifth centuries. Western society had been furthermilitarized, that is, the legal distinction between soldier and civilian became blurred andindistinct. Ethnic identity, which had little to do with biological descent, rather than anobligation of citizenship, was now the basis for recruitment, as barbarian rulers raised theirarmies from the population of adult free males in their realms who claimed membership in hisethnic group. The social status of the warrior rose dramatically as military service became

    redefined as a privilege associated with social identity. The ability to wield a sword rather thanknowledge of Virgil and Cicero now became the mark of nobility. The closest thing remainingto standing armies in these Germanic Successor Kingdoms were the military householdsmaintained by kings, their great royal officials, and powerful local landowners, which drewupon both German and Roman antecedents. Rather than swearing oaths of loyalty to theEmperor and the RomanState, these household warriors were bound by personal ties of loyaltyto their masters, to whom they were bound by expectation of material reward. The grant of landwas an especially prized reward for loyal service, but there was no system of paying soldierswith land or the revenues from land akin to the theme system that emerged in the EasternRoman Empire (i.e. Byzantine Empire) in the seventh century. As radical as these changes were,the imprint of Rome remained. Landed aristocrats held titles and offices of command derivedfrom the Late Roman state and its army, but the functions and status of being a count ( comes )or a duke ( dux) had changed dramatically as the bureaucracy that underlay the Roman statehad withered away in what had once been the western provinces of the Roman Empire.

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    as Germans; Picts, Scots, and Saxons in northern Britain; Moorish Bedouins in north Africa;and the Sasanian Persian Empire in the east. The main domestic threat came from periodicattempts by ambitious Roman generals to usurp imperial power or to seize parts of the empire.Because the major historical event of this period is the so- called Fall of the Roman Empire inthe West, which entailed the replacement of the Roman state in the West by various Germanickingdoms, historians have focused their attention upon the barbarian threat. The historicalreality, however, was that emperors often accorded higher priority to repelling domesticchallenges to their authority and rule, since the consequences of a successful usurpation couldmean his own death and that of his immediate family.

    Sasanian Ki ng Shapur I receives submission of E mperor Valeri an, AD 260 (Naghsh- Rostam) Ssnian empire at the time of Shpr I (Encyclopedia Bri tannica,

    www.britannica.com /)

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    Foreign threats : The most powerful military force confronting the Late Roman Empire wasthe Sasanian Persian Empire . The Sasanian Empire ruled a territory that comprises most ofmodern day Iraq, Iran, andAfghanistan, and shared a disputed frontier with Rome that stretchedover western Mesopotamia and Armenia. Because the disputed region was dotted with cities, theRoman-Persian wars were dominated by sieges and by battles arising from attempts to relievesieges. A long history of territorial warfare stretching back to the first century B.C. markedrelations between the two empires. The Emperor Trajan in 115-117 conducted an ambitious warof conquest that resulted in the occupation of Mesopotamia and Armenia, but these territorieswere abandoned by Trajans successor Hadrian because of the difficulty of defending them.Warfare between the two states became even more intense after the aggressive Sasanian dynastyfrom southern Iran replaced the Arsacid kings of Parthia/Persia in 226. The first Sasanian kingArdeshir I invaded Roman territory in 230, initiating a series of invasions and counter-invasionsthat continued until 384, when peace was secured through a formal division of Amernia. Withthe exception of two brief wars in 421-422 and 440, the Roman and Persian empires remained at

    peace until 502, when the Persian emperor Kavadh I in an attempt to extort much needed moneyfrom the eastern Roman emperor Anastasius seized first the undefended Roman town of

    Theodosiopolis (modern day Erzurum in eastern Turkey) and then the Roman fortress-city ofAmida, which fell after a three month siege. The Romans regained Amida and the lost territory by the wars end in 506. Wars between the eastern Roman Empire and the Persian Empire werefought throughout the sixth century (526-532, 540-561, and 572-591).

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    The Tetrarchs . Porphyry status from Constantinople, now in St. Marks, Venice.

    Internal threats : Questions about the Fall of Rome (whether it fell, and if it did, why andwhen did it fall?) dominate historical study the late Roman empire. Because of this, militaryhistorians have tended to focus onRomes wars with those barbarian tribes that evolved into thesuccessor kingdoms of the sixth century. But for Roman emperors during this period perhapsthe greatest and most imminent threat was civil war, either attempts by discontented orambitious generals to seize imperial power for themselves or for civilian proxies, or wars

    between co-emperors to expand their rule or to eliminate colleagues and rivals. Civil war had been endemic during the third century. Between the assassination of Emperor AlexanderSeverus by his troops in 235 to the accession of the Emperor Diolcetian in 284 there were atleast twenty six 'official' emperors, many of whom had seized political power from their

    predecessors, and an additional twenty or so generals who unsuccessfully attempted to usurp thethrone. Most of these emperors were peasants who had risen through the ranks to be generals.Historians credit Diocletian (284-305) with restoring political stability through a series ofadministrative reforms. But his success was limited. To be sure the fourth and fifth centurieswere less politically chaotic than the third century, but this era was also marked by militaryusurpations, rebellions, and civil wars. Diocletian had attempted to solve the problem ofsuccession by creating a Tetrarchy, a s ystem in which imperial rule was divided among fourindividuals, two senior emperors (Augusti), one of whom was superior to the other, and theirtwo junior colleagues (Caesars). Upon the death or resignation of an Augustus, his Caesar

    would move up, and the remaining three emperors would appoint a new Caesar to fill thevacancy. As a result, imperial rule would be self-perpetuating and succession, peaceful. This ishow it was supposed to work. In practice, the Tetrarchy barely survived the resignations ofDiocletian and his colleague Maximian in 305. Constantine (reigned 306-337), for example, hadto fight battles against Maximian, his son Maxentius, and his co-Augustus Licinius to obtain andkeep imperial power. Licinius, meanwhile, fought a civil war against his own Caesar for controlover the East. Constantines subsequent reign was internally peaceful, but the same was not thecase forConstantines successors. In the second half of the fourth century, Roman armies foughtmore battles against other Roman armies than they did against barbarians or Persians, includinga bloody and costly engagement between the Western emperor Eugenius and the EasternEmperor Theodosius on the banks of the Frigidus River in 394 that not only determined controlover the R oman empire but also to a large extent the future of Christianity as Romes officialreligion.

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    Strategically, Roman imperial military thinking had always to take into account the possibility of a rebellion by one or more generals and their armies. From the time of theRepublic until the reign of Diocletian, Roman governors were in charge of all functions ofgovernment within their provinces, military as well as civilian. Diocletian changed this bydividing responsibilities for Roman governance between civilian and military officials. Generalsstill commanded the Roman military forces in their sectors, but now they depended uponcivilian officials to provide their soldiers with pay and provisions, as well as supply them witharmor, weapons, and uniforms produced by state-run factories, also under civilian supervision.This division of functions undoubtedly reduced military efficiency, as it required commanders tocoordinate military actions with their civilian counterparts, but for that very reason it alsolessened the likelihood of successful rebellions by ambitious generals. In terms of Romansociety and culture, Diocletian's division of authority between military and civilian officialswidened the gulf between soldiers and civilians, as educated Roman aristocrats filled the higherranks of the civilian bureaucracy, leaving military command to professional soldiers, many ofwhom were the sons of soldiers.

    Military Actions 350-395 . The best way of understanding the military challenges faced by lateRoman emperors and their responses to them is by surveying the military events over a period oftime. I have chosen the forty-five year period 350 to 395 but a similar pattern would emergefrom the study of any such period in the fourth and fifth centuries.

    When the year 350 began the Empire was relatively at peace. In the previous decade, ithad experienced only a Frankish raid into Gaul (341/2) and some unrest in Britain. War alongthe eastern frontier with Persiahad raged in the early 340s, as several border towns and fortresseschanged hands, and continued sporadically until 353-358 when the aggressive Persian kingShapur II had to turn his attention to his own eastern frontier from attacks by nomad tribes. TheEmpire was ruled by two sons of Constantine the Great, Constans in the West and Constantius IIin the East. (Their older brother Constantine II had been killed a decade earlier while fightingagainst Constans for control of the West.) The peace was soon shattered when the armyof Gaul revolted against Constans, who seems to have had contempt for the soldiers, andacclaimed its low born general ( comes ) Magnentius as emperor. Constans fled upon learning ofthe revolt, but was captured and killed. Magnentius took Italy by force from another would-beusurper, while Spain and Africa peacefully submitted to his rule. Another general, Vetranio,meanwhile took advantage of the situation by assuming command of the field forces ofthe prefecture of Illyricum (Greece and the Balkans, excluding Thrace). The Eastern emperorConstantius II, who was in Antioch monitoring a threatened invasion by the Persian emperorShapur II, finally responded in late 350. He marched his army into the Balkans and cowedVetranio into giving up his command. Constantius II then defeated Magnentius in a major battlein Pannonia (351), which forced the usurped to retreat into Italy. Meanwhile, a confederation ofGerman tribes (Franks and Alamanni) took advantage of the political unrest and raided Gaul,defeating Magnent ius brother whom he had made his Caesar (subordinate emperor). Civilwar raged until 353 when Magnentius and his brother, having lost Italy, Spain, and Africa, bothcommitted suicide in Gaul.

    The civil war left Gaul vulnerable to barbarian attack on a number of flanks. In 354Constantius II appointed a veteran general of Frankish descent named Silvanus as magistermilitum per Gallias (commander-in-chief for all forces in Gaul) to deal with Frankish incursions

    over the lower Rhine near Mainz, while Constantius II from his base at Augst (now inSwitzerland) dealt with Alamanni attacks across the upper Rhine. Rather than fight the Franks,Silvanus used tax money to pay the Franks to withdraw from Roman territory. This provokedConstantius IIs suspicions. Fearing arrest and execution, Silvanus responded by declaring

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    himself emperor in the August 355. His reign, however, lasted less than a month. ConstantiusII sent his magister equitum (master of the cavalry) of the East, Ursicinus to investigate therumors of Silvanus disloyalty. Ursicinus dealt with the matter by bribing some of Silvanustroops to kill him.

    The Franks in the north and the Alamanni in the south took advantage of the civil war toinvade Gaul once more. Constantius II elevated his young cousin Julian to the rank of Caesarand sent him to Gaul to deal with the Germans. Between 356 and 359 both Constantius II andJulian waged war along the Rhine against various German tribes and confederations. Despite

    being greatly outnumbered, Julian won a major victory over the Alamanni at Strasbourg 357, inwhich he captured their king Chnodomar. The war with the Alamanni, however, continued foranother two years before they sued for peace. With Gaul for the moment safe, Julian was ableto send his magister militum per Gallias to Britain to deal with incursions in the north by thePicts.

    In 359 King Shapur II, having subdued the nomad tribes on his eastern frontier, renewedwar against the Romans. The Persian king took the border fortress of Amida after a 73 daysiege , and massacred all of its inhabitants. Recognizing the magnitude of the Persian threat,

    Constantius II summoned units from the West to join him in the East. Unwilling to leave Gaul,the discontented Gallic army responded in 360 by elevating Julian to the rank of Augustus(senior emperor). When Constantius II refused to ratify his promotion, Julian marched eastagainst his cousin. A full civil war was only averted by the sudden death of the EmperorConstantius II in the fall of 361, which left Julian as sole emperor of a reunified empire. The

    problem of Persia remained. Julian attempted to deal with this decisively by mounting in Marchof 363 a major expedition into Persia, with the intention of conquering the rival emperor.Leading an army of 65,000 men, Julian marched down the Euphrates River and defeated thePersians in battle before the city of Ctesiphon (about 20 miles southeast of modern Baghdad).Julian, however, was unable to take the city by siege. Learning that a Persian relief army was onits way, Julian decided to withdraw. The retreat became a fighting march, as the Persian armycaught up with the Romans. Julian died in late June 363 from a wound sustained in the retreat although rumors circulated that he had actually been assassinated by Christian soldiers whoresented his sponsorship of a pagan revival and the army chose one of its general, Jovian, asthe new emperor. Cut off from further retreat by a superior Persian force, Jovian was forced toaccept a humiliating peace that entailed the surrender of all Romes territory east of theTigris.The largest Roman military expeditionary force mounted in late antiquity had ended in completefailure.

    Jovian reigned only briefly. His death in 364 led the army to elect another professionalsoldier, the successful general Valentinian I, as emperor. Valentinian, in turn, chose his brotherValens to be his co-emperor. The two divided the Empire and the army, with Valentinianassuming command over the West and Valens over the East. In 365-366, while Valentinianengaged the Alamanni in the West, Valens successfully fought a civil war against Procopius, acousin of the late Julian. In 367-8 the brothers found themselves facing threats on all borders.Valentinian, who having fallen ill, elevated his son Gratian to be his co-emperor, faced major

    barbarian incursions in Britain (Picts and Scotti), which resulted in the deaths of two Romangenerals, and yet another raid across the Rhine by the Alamanni, who plundered Mainz.Meanwhile, Valens began a war against the Goths under their king Athanaric, who hadsupported Procopius in his rebellion, while the Persians captured the king of Armenia, a Roman

    ally, and invaded Georgia. Valentinian found an excellent general inthe comes Theodosius senior (father of the Emperor Theodosius I), who in 369-70

    pacified Britain and drove the Alamanni back across the Rhine. In 371-372, while Valentinianwas dealing with still further barbarian incursions into Gaul (this time by Saxons) and an

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    attempted usurpation by a Moorish prince, Valens sent troops to aid the Armenian king againstthe Persians, resulting in a victory over Shapur, leading to a five year truce signed in 373. In thefollowing three years the Roman found themselves fighting barbarian Sarmatians and Quadi inthe northwestern Balkans, and dealing with an Isaurian revolt in Asia. Valentinian died in 375while planning a punitive expedition across the Danube against the Quadi. His armyimmediately named his four year old son Valentinian II as emperor, with his older brotherGratian assuming guardianship over the child and acting as co-ruler.

    The arrival of the Huns into Europe and their attacks on the Goths in the early 370screated a new strategic situation for the Romans. In 376 the Huns defeated the tribe of Gothsknown as the Tervingi, who under their king Frithigern sought refuge within the Roman Empire.Valens, seeing in them potential recruits for the army and workers for the imperial estates,

    permitted them to cross the Danube into Thrace. In 377 Valens attention was redirected east by arevolt by the Saracens under Queen Mavia, which resulted in the Saracens ravaging RomanPhoenicia and Palestine, while Theodosius the Younger, whose father had been executed the

    previous year, was placed in command of the field forces of Illyricum where he campaignedagainst Sarmatians. Meanwhile, mismanagement by Roman officials led to conflict with the

    Gothic refugees in Thrace. Valens sent the Illyrian field army to deal with the Tervingi, while hehimself remained in Antioch to deal with the Saracen revolt. The Romans first managed to blockade the Goths in Scythia but were unable to maintain the blockade through the winter. By378 the Gothic threat was sufficiently grave for Valens to request military help from his co-emperor in the West, his nephew Gratian. The removal of troops from the Rhine frontierencouraged the German Alamannic confederation to cross the frozen Rhine into Romanterritory. Gratian responded by recalling those troops, won a victory over the invaders, andmanaged to push them back across the Rhine. With his own borders secured, Gratian now

    personally led an army to aid his uncle. Valens, jealous of the military glory that Gratian hadwon and dismissive of the threat posed by the Tervingi, decided to attack without waiting forreinforcements. The result was the disastrous Battle of Adrianople (9 August 378) in which thefield army of the East was destroyed and Valens killed.

    Gratian appointed a professional military officer, Theodosius, to succeed Valens asAugustus in the East. In 379 -383, Gratian campaigned against Goths and Alamanniin Pannonia (northwestern Balkans) and Gaulrespectively, and Theodosius fought against theSarmatians and the Goths in the eastern Balkans, which ended with the defeat of the Sarmatiansand the recognition of the Tervingi in 380 as Roman federates settled within Roman territory.Gratians campaign ag ainst the Alamanni was interrupted in 383 by the rebellion of the Romangeneral in Britain, Magnus Maximus, who declared himself emperor and invaded Gaul.Gratians army, which met the forces of Magnus Maximus near Paris, defected. Gratian himselffled, but was captured and killed. Magnus Maximus took control of Britain, Spain, and Gaul,with Gratians young half -brother Valentinian II left in charge of Italy, a situation that wasformally sanctioned by Theodosius. Meanwhile, Valentinian II continued to campaign in 384-386 against Alamanni and Sarmatians in Pannonia, while another tribe, the Greuthungi, weredefeated by Roman forces. as they crossed the Danube to escape the Huns. In 387 MagnusMaximus invaded Italy, driving Valentinian II to seek refuge in Thessalonica. Theodosius,having dispatched his magister militum for the East the Vandal Stilicho to negotiate a settlementwith the Persians, joined Valentinian in a campaign against Maximus. After a year of fighting,Theodosiuss forces captured Maxim us who, along with his son, was executed.

    In 388 Theodosius reorganized the military forces of the Eastern Empire and appointedArbogast, a Roman general of Frankish birth, commander-in-chief of Roman forces ( magistermilitum ) in the West. The period from 388 to 392 witnessed warfare against various Germantribes across the Rhine in northern Germany, within Gaul, in Thrace, and in Thessalonica. The

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    disordered conditions that prevailed in the threatened areas is underscored by a law issued byTheodosius in 391 that allowed Roman provincials to defend themselves against rogue soldiers.(This represented a marked change from 364, when the Emperor Valentinian I had issued anedict prohibiting private citizens from owning weapons.) In 392, while Arbogast wascampaigning against Franks in the Rhineland near Cologne and Stilicho was fighting the Goths,now under a new leader, Alaric , inThrace, a political breach erupted between Arbogast andTheodosius. In late 391 the Emperor Valentinian II attempted to sack his magistermilitum Arbogast. Arbogast refused to step down, stating that only Theodosius had the right toremove him from office. Soon after (392) Valentinian II suddenly died (by suicide, accordingto Arbogast), and Theodosius suspected foul play. Arbogast, fearing that Theodosius wouldorder his removal set up his own puppet-emperor, Eugenius II, a pagan Roman intellectual incharge of the imperial writing office. The result was civil war, culminating in the Battle of theFrigidus River (5-6 September) on the western side of the pass through the Julian Alps (inmodern Slovenia), which Theodosius won decisively, aided by a sudden wind storm thatChristian writers saw as miraculous. Eugenius was captured and beheaded, and Arbogastcommitted suicide. In 395, Theodosius died. He was succeeded by his two young sons,

    Arcadius and Honorius. The former (and elder) became emperor in the East and the latter in theWest. Theodosius magister militum in the West, Stilicho, assumed guardianship of Honorius.He also claimed guardianship of Arcadius but was opposed by the praetorian prefect atConstantinople Rufinus, who ruled in the young emperors name.

    Theodosius forces at the Battle of the Frigidus had included about 20,000 Visigothicfederates, whom he had deployed in the front line resulting in heavy casualties. Embittered bythe disproportionate losses they had suffered in the battle, the Visigoths under their ambitiousnew king Alaric renounced their treaty with Rome and began to ravage Thrace. Ostensibly

    because the army of the East was preoccupied with fending off Hunnic attacks in Syria and AsiaMinor, Stilicho, acting in the name of the Emperor Honorius, led a Western army into theeastern prefecture of Illyricum to oppose the Visigoths. He was in position to destroy their forceswhen he was ordered out of Illyricum by Rufinus. This led to the suspicion that Rufinus was inleague with Alaric, a suspicion strengthened by Rufinuss subsequent negotiations with Alaricthat made the Visigothic chieftain the magister militum of Roman forces in Illyricum. Certainly,Rufinus position as regent for Arcadius would have been undermined if Stilicho gained avictory over Alaric in Greece. By co-opting Alaric with a Roman command, Rufinus gained a

    powerful ally agai nst Stilicho. But Rufinus political victory was short -lived as he was shortlyafter murdered by troops under the command of Gainas, the Gothic magistermilitum in Thrace who had hitherto been Stilichos second in command.

    (For an overview of military actions in the Late Empire, see Robert Vermaat, Late RomanTimeline, 250 AD 550 AD .)

    GRAND STRATEGY: DEFENSE-IN-DEPTH

    The Greek historian Zosimus, writing around AD 500, described two profoundreorganizations of the Roman military in the first half of the fourth century:

    By the foresight of Diocletian the frontiers of the Roman Empire were everywherestudded with cities and forts and towers, in the way I have already described, andthe whole army was stationed along them, so that it was impossible for the

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    barbarians to break through, as the attackers were everywhere withstood by anopposing force. But Constantine ruined this defensive system by withdrawing themajority of the troops from the frontiers, and stationing them in cities which didnot require protection.

    Based on the evidence of Zosimus and other ancient writers, military historian and politicalscientist Edward Luttwak posited that after Emperor Diocletian (284-305) restored a preclusivedefense system that had been abandoned during the Third Century Crisis, hissuccessor Constantine the Great (306-337) dramatically reconstituted Roman grand strategy,substituting a defense-in-depth defense for Diocletians preclusive defensesystem. Constantine implemented his new strategy, according to Luttwak, through thefundamental reorganization of the Roman military. His main innovation was to establish a largemobile field army ( comitatenses ), probably in excess of 100,000 men, by withdrawing forcesfrom the frontiers ( limitanei ) and stationing them in central locations.

    Defense-in-depth is a strategy based on the idea that the borders cannot be madeimpenetrable and that invaders will inevitably breach the frontiers. To defeat these incursions

    the state constructs a series of strong points along the frontiers and along the interior lines ofcommunication (roads and rivers) reaching into the interior. These forts are designed to serve asthreats to the enemys lines of communication, as pockets of resistance, and as logistical depots.The main resistance to the incursion, however, will come from mobile field forces stationed inthe interior that will, in coordination with the smaller forces in the forts, engage the enemywithin Roman territory. The enemy, thus, can get in but once in, cannot then escape.

    Luttwak emphasized the major benefits of this strategy: 1) it is cost effective, and 2) thecentralized field armies protected the power of the emperors who controlled them. He also

    pointed out its major weakness--it sacrifices territory to the enemy and creates within the borders of a state a de facto buffer zone. This will inevitably lead to demoralization of the local population and an erosion of the logistical base.

    Although in retrospect the deployment of Roman armies and the placement of Romanfortifications along Romes frontiers appear to be elements of a defense-in-depth system andmay have functioned in practice as such, a number of Luttwaks critics have questioned whetherthe strategic intentions of the Roman emperors can in fact be accurately determined throughsuch evidence. Luttwaks lack of credentials as a classicist (he is a political scientist whose areaof specialization in the Soviet military strategy) and his use Roman history as a mechanism toexplore the ramifications of NATOs grand strategic choices during the Cold War have invitedcriticism by academic historians of the Roman Empire. These criticisms have taken two mainforms. Several historians have questioned Luttwaks assumption that Roman imperial strategywas essentially defensive, and have pointed out that contemporary sources characterize theforeign policies of most Roman emperors as aggressive rather than defensive. Others havechallenged Luttwak at a more fundamental level, suggesting that the use of modern military

    jargon such as grand strategy and defense -in- depth is b oth anachronistic andmisleading. Fergus Millar, for example, argued that the policies of Roman emperors weremainly formulated by their ad hoc responses to appeals and complaints from citizens andofficials. In arguing against any Roman grand strategy, Millar cited the practical difficulties ofcentrally controlling a state the size of the Roman Empire with the primitive system ofcommunication that emperors had at their disposal. Historian Ben Isaac added substantially to

    Millars critique in his study of the activities of the Roman imperial armies on the easternfrontier from the first to the sixth century. Isaacs argument is well summarized in a review byDr. D.S. Potter:

    http://books.google.com/books?id=zjB7PssbpAgC&pg=PA278&dq=luttwak+defence+in+depth#PPA278,M1http://books.google.com/books?id=zjB7PssbpAgC&pg=PA278&dq=luttwak+defence+in+depth#PPA278,M1http://books.google.com/books?id=zjB7PssbpAgC&pg=PA278&dq=luttwak+defence+in+depth#PPA278,M1http://books.google.com/books?id=zjB7PssbpAgC&pg=PA278&dq=luttwak+defence+in+depth#PPA278,M1http://books.google.com/books?id=zjB7PssbpAgC&pg=PA278&dq=luttwak+defence+in+depth#PPA278,M1http://books.google.com/books?id=zjB7PssbpAgC&pg=PA278&dq=luttwak+defence+in+depth#PPA278,M1
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    [T]here was no grand strategy of empire. Questions of war and peace weredecided by the emperor, most often to enhance his own glory and to satisfy hissoldiers, who would profit from foreign adventures. This was the most importantfactor because, in Isaac's view, "there was no powerful officer class in Rome, nocentral army command" (p. 383). Furthermore, he maintains that, "it is unlikelythat most Roman frontier lines were determined by choice and by a consciousdecision to halt indefinitely all further advance" (pp. 387-88). In his view, theRoman limites were not thought of as lines to cut off movements by outsiders, butrather to facilitate communication among Roman forces. When the Romansthought about expansion, they did not do so with the intention to acquire territory,

    but rather to control peoples (an important point indeed, pp. 394-95), and theyreally knew very little about lands beyond their borders. The grand strategy of theRoman army, insofar as it existed at all, was simply to control internal disorder andto be ready to conquer other peoples.

    Whether Diocletian and his successors (or his predecessors) thought in terms of grand

    strategy and, if they did, what those strategies were remain open questions and how historiansanswer them is determined to a great extent by their underlying view of the nature and capacitiesof Roman imperial rule and government.

    Many towns and cities in the Roman Empire boasted strong defenses in the fourth andfifth centuries. The third century crisis was initially responsible for this process of urbanfortification, as imperial and regional officials ordered the building of strong stone walls todefend towns and cities, even in the interior, to guard against depredation by rebel Romanarmies and barbarian raiders. It was in response to Vandal raids into Italy in 270 that theEmperor Aurelian ringed the city of Rome with a twelve mile long circuit of walls constructedfrom brick-faced concrete. The Aurelian Walls were 11 feet thick and 26 ft high, with a squaretower every 100 Roman feet (97 ft). Romes defenses were strengthened even further in the fifthcentury, with the walls doubled in height and the number of towers increased to 383. Rome wasnot unique. The collapse of Romes border defenses in the fifth century created interiorfrontiers and necessitated the erection of walls a round previously unfortified towns andcities. As archaeologist Neil Christie comments, By the end of the Roman periodartificial defences were everywhere and society lay virtually entrenched behind walls. Nodistinction can be easily drawn between a frontier province and a central one by the mid -fifthcentury, except in case of greater urban population density persisting away from the oldfrontiers, where towns in particular struggled to survive. (Christie 285) As a result, warfare inthe late Western Roman Empire and in the barbarian kingdoms that succeeded it featured siegesand devastation of the countryside in preparation for sieges.

    FORCE DEPLOYMENT IN THE FOURTH AND EARLY FIFTH CENTURIES

    DIOCLETIAN (284-305) appears to have doubled the number of legions, increasing thesize of the army dramatically, to about 400-500,000 . (John the Lydian in the 6th century givesthe figure 435,266.) To raise troops Diocletian made military service hereditary andinstituted a new system of conscription in which landowners became responsible for

    producing specified quotas of soldiers.

    Diocletian deployed his troops mainly on the border, but he also had a small field armymade up of the praetorian guard (disbanded in 312), lanciarii (cavalrylancers), Ioviani and Herculiani (elite infantry, personal following of emperor), and scholae(mounted imperial guard--mainly German). Together these forces were the emperor's comitatus ,

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    i.e. personal guard. When Diocletian needed a large expeditionary force, he used vexillationes,ad hoc units drawn from the legions. Diocletian's command structure placed praetorian prefectsimmediately below the emperors (Augusti and Caesars). These praetorian prefects wereimmensely powerful, combining both military and civilian authority: a pp was responsible forleading troops, overseeing public post and arms factories, levying men and material for publicworks, and supervising provincial governors.

    CONSTANTINE'S REFORMS : Constantine (reigned 306-337) was responsible for thegeneral reorganization of the Roman army that redefined it in late Antiquity. Constantines armywas divided into three general categories of troops, each with its own strategicmission: COMITATENSES (mobile field armies, divided into infantry, cavalry, and mixedcohorts--military elite); LIMITANEI/RIPENSES (frontier garrisons, increasingly poorly trainedand of questionable military value--the dregs of the army); and SCHOLAE (imperial guard--fiveregiments, each 500 strong, in the West; seven regiments in the East--ca AD 400: Notitia

    Dignitatum --crack troops, largely recruited from Germans; declined in military value afterTheodosius I, when emperors ceased to take the field, and became a parade-ground

    elite). Constantine also divided civil and military control.

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    Our knowledge of force deployment in the late Roman Empire is based largely upon a survivingofficial document known as the Notitia dignitatum et administrationum omnium tam civiliumquam militarium in partibus Orientis et Occidentis 408 (A.H.M. Jones, Later Roman Empire ,vol. 3:table 15). This is an administrative list of Roman civilian and military officials in the eastand the west in the early fifth century. From the titles of military officials we can reconstruct arough idea of the size and disposition of Late Roman forces. The Notitia survives inRenaissance manuscript copies of a lost ninth-century codex. The document was most likelycompiled a chief notary in the West ca. 408 (the material for the Eastern empire reflectsconditions around 408). The data for the Western Empire was updated and revised down to 423.

    Numbers : Notitia Dignitatum provides at least paper numbers for Western armies,ca. 423, and Eastern armies, ca. 423 (after A.H.M. Jones, who estimated legionsat 1,000 men for field armies and 3,000 men for frontier troops, and other units alae , vexillationes , pseudo-comitatenses , cohorts , etc. at 500 men)

    Western Empire

    comitatenses 113,000 (23,500 cavalry and 89,500 infantry)limitanei 135,000 (29,500 cavalry and 105,500 infantry) scholae 2500 (cavalry)

    Eastern Empirecomitatenses 100,000 (21,500 cavalry and 78,500 infantry)limitanei 250,000 (112,000 cavalry and 138,000 infantry)

    scholae 3500 (cavalry)

    Total Western forces: 250,500 (of which 54% were limitanei )Total Eastern forces: 353,500 (of which 70% were limitanei )Total imperial forces: 604,000

    These numbers agree with the figure given in the 6th century by Agathias. Theyrepresent, probably, the paper strength of the armies (the fiscal cost of these forces) ratherthan the true combatant strength.

    In addition to the regular troops, late Roman emperors made extensive useof FEDERATES (contingents supplied according to treaty by tribes along the borders-- theremnant of old CLIENT STATE system). Federates were to become increasingly important

    in the West after the Battle of Adrianople, AD 378. By the middle of the fifth century, theywere, to a great extent, the Roman Army in the Western empire. See below.

    COMMAND STRUCTURE AND ORGANIZATION OF THE LATE ROMAN ARMY

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    To lessen the likelihood of rebellion by ambitious generals, Diocletian divided militarycommand and civil administration, and this policy was continued by his successors. For civiladministration, the Late Roman Empire was organized into four prefectures, each of which wasdivided into dioceses, which in turn were divided into small provinces. Although lackingmilitary command, the highest civilian officials, the praetorian prefects , remained responsiblefor recruiting troops and seeing to the provision of arms and supplies within their prefectures.

    Armies and offices of high command

    Field Army ( comitatenses ): The soldier emperors of the fourth century such as Constantine theGreat and Julian were themselves the commanders-in-chief of their field armies. They wereserved by a general in charge of the infantry with the title of master of the foot ( magisterpeditum ), and a general in command of the cavalry, the master of the horse (magisterequitum ). The late fourth and early fifth centuries saw the emergence of generalissimos calledmasters of the soldiers (magistri mil itum ) or masters of both military arms(magister utr iusque mil itiae ) who, as the title implies, commanded both the infantry and thecavalry in the sector under their command. After the death of Theodosius I the Great in 395 andthe accession of his two young sons, emperors no longer led the armies. At this time also themilitary organization of the Eastern and Western halves of the empire diverged. A new systemarose in the West which featured a single commander in chief, termed the magister peditum in

    praesenti who commanded all field armies and limitanei , and to whom the other generals andsector commanders ( comites , duces , and magistri ) answered. Command in the east remained

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    to the rank of pedes (private) or eques (horse trooper). If he distinguished himself, he could be promoted to the grade of semissalis , distinguished by receiving one and a half rations, and thento a non-commissioned rank.

    For 'legions' (infantry units of c.1200 men) the old terms for non-commissioned officerscontinued to be used: optio and centurion . For the newer units, vexillationes (cavalry regimentsof c.600 troopers) and scholae (praesental regiments), new ranks were employed. In additionthere were drill instructors called campidoctores and standard bearers ( draconarii ). Non-commissioned officer ranks in vexillations and infantry auxilia were, from bottom totop: circitor , biarchus , centenarius (in theory commanded units of 100 men), ducenarius (intheory commanded units of 200 men), senator , primicerius . Promotion to all these ranks waswithin regiment. Transfers were discouraged.

    Promotion, for the most part, was a matter of longevity. A noncom, however, whodistinguished himself could be appointed a "Protector" in the emperor's guard, the Palatini , andeventually promoted to become a unit commander. In this sense, the late Roman army, unlikeRoman civilian society, functioned as a meritocracy.

    Naval forces

    The Notitia Dignitatum records Roman fleets based in the Westat Ravenna, Aquileia, Misenum (near Naples), all in Italy, and at Arles and in the mouth ofthe Somme River in Gaul. Other sources record a naval base inPisa as well. The Notitia does notlist any naval bases in the East, but there is other evidence for fleets based in Constantinople(which contained military docks), Crete, Rhodes, Alexandria, and in the Hellespont. Whetherthese Eastern naval bases were imperial, however, is uncertain. Greek cities in the Aegean andthe Black Sea went into the third century with city navies to stop piracy. The size of Romanfleets can be gauged from a number of recorded naval actions. The magister militum Stilichodispatched 5,000 men from Pisa to Africa in 398. According to the sources, the WesternEmperor Honoriuss magister militum Heraclianus in 413 commanded a fleet of 3,700, a figurethe majority of which were probably cargo vessels carrying grain and supplies and othertransport ships. One of the largest naval engagements in Antiquity occurred in 468 when theemperors Anthemius (in the West) and Leo I (in the East) combined forces to send an invasionfleet of 1,113 ships, each reputedly with 100 men aboard, against the Vandal kingdom ofCarthage. The king of the Vandals Geiseric engaged the Romans off of Cap Bon (Tunisia) witha fleet of 600 ships. In the ensuing battle, the Vandals use of fire ships proved decisi ve,

    destroying about half of the Roman fleet.Most of the fleet actions named in the sources had Roman generals in command, and itappears that naval forces were considered to belong to the military resources of the magistermilitum in charge of the territory in which the naval base lay. The sources tell us nothing aboutthe ordinary command structure of the Roman navy in the late fourth and early fifth centuries.

    For the entire history of the Roman Empire, the Navy was considered an inferior servicethat was, at best, ancillary to the land forces. The Imperial Navy had only three missions: 1) toescort the grain/tax fleets; 2) to protect against pirates (related to the first and primary mission.and 3) to deliver important imperial dispatches. The Navy had an economic-strategic missionrather than a military- strategic mission. Its professional sailors functioned much like drug

    interdictors in the Coast Guard.

    Increased emphasis upon cavalry:

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    One of the most notable differences between the armies of the Principate and the

    Dominate was the increased emphasis upon cavalry in the latter. Provision of cavalry forceshad been largely the responsibility of auxiliaries in the early Empire. This began to changeduring the Third Century Crisis, and even to a greater degree in the fourth and fifth centuries.The strategic missions of both Romes frontier and field forces required both strategic andtactical mobility. For the limitanei , this involved scouting against and intercepting barbarianraids; for the mobile field forces, it meant the movement of troops from one threatened sector toanother. Romeanswered these needs by fielding larger and more effective cavalry forces. [G.T.Dennis, ed., Maurice's Strategikon , p. viii]. The trend toward the greater use of cavalry was alsoaccelerated by Romes encounters in the fourth and fifth centuries first with the Visigoths, whomade use of horses in combat, and then, especially, with the Huns, a nomadic horse people.

    The current scholarly consensus is that cavalry played a critical role in the armies of thelate Roman Empire. Recently there has been somewhat of a backlash in the academiccommunity. Historians Hugh Elton, Michael Whitby, and A.D. Lee caution againstoveremphasizing the impo rtance of cavalry in late Roman warfare. As Elton observes, in 478,

    an Eastern field army was composed of 8,000 cavalry and 30,000 infantry. These proportionswere probably similar in the fourth century although precise figures are lacking. However, it can be roughly calculated that at Strasbourg in 357 Julian had 10,000 infantry and 3,000 cavalry. Bythe time of Justinian cavalry had become much more important, but precisely why or when thischange occurred is unknown." (105-6). Lee adds, "the greater prominence of cavalry affordedincreased tactical mobility--although the significance of this development ought not to beoveremphasized at the expense of the role of infantry, which remained fundamental" (10), and

    points out that although Procopius states th at the most important element of Justinians armies inthe early seventh century were cavalry (actually mounted archers), in his descriptions of battlesand other military actions, Procopius represents infantry as playing a central role.

    Although Elton, Whitby, and Lee are undoubtedly correct about the continued importance as wellas numerical superiority of infantry in late Roman armies, there is no gainsaying that the status and prestigeof Roman cavalry was far greater in the fourth century than it had been in the first or second centuries. AsDr. Phyllis Culham observes, During the Republic and Principate, there was no such thing as a Roman"cavalry general." No Roman consular would be riding with cavalry, or would even be mounted unless sickor injured. In contrast, by the fourth century, cavalry was the elite arm of the Roman military, andcommand of cavalry forces was as, if not more, prestigious than command of infantry units.

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    Fourth-century Roman infantryman and his weapons Fourth-centur yRoman cavalrymen (reenactors) Sasanian (Persian) heavy cavalr yman

    WEAPONRY AND EQUIPMENT

    There is debate about how widespread the use of infantry body armor was in the fourth and fifthcenturies. Hugh Elton believes that most infantry were equipped with either loricaehamatae (mail armor) or loricae saquamatae (armor made from iron scales mounted on linen orleather). Infantry carried an oval, slightly concave wooden shield, covered with linen or hide andedged with rawhide, measuring about 4ft high by 3 ft wide and a half inch thick, with a central

    boss and strap. Infantry helmets were either shaped like bowls with ridges atop running fromfront to back. Some were of the 'ridge' variety, which consisted of two sections attached to theridged crest, complemented by a neck protector at the back and large cheek flaps. Others were

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    'Spangelhelm' helmets, made up of four plates riveted to four broad vertical bands that met at thetop. All of these were riveted to a brow band and complemented with hinged cheek protectors.Offensive infantry weapons included missile weapons: the spiculum , a throwing spear with a 9inch triangular iron head attached to a wooden shaft about 5 ft long; a shorter javelin ( verutum );and a dart known as a plumbata (a short spear with a leaded weight fitted below the spear headwith a wooden shaft, measuring two to three feet long). The most important thrusting weaponwas a long double-edged sword ( spatha ), with a blade about 27 inches long, worn on a broad'German'-style belt on the left hand side. Regiments of archers armed with power 'm' shapedcomposite bows and slingers also existed.

    Cavalry regiments ranged from light cavalry armed with bows or javelins to cataphracts,clothed in chain mail, and the even more heavily armored clibanarii.Cataphracti and clibanarii rode on armored horses, and, much like eleventh century knights,were equipped with lance and shield for charging into contact. They lacked, however, stirrups.

    Ful l-scale (20 m long) replica Roman warship in the Mainz Museum fr Antike Schiff ahrt(Museum of Ancient Shipping), based on a 3 rd -4 th -century wreck .

    NAVAL VESSELS

    The Roman fleet consisted of warships and transport ships carrying troops, supplies, and horses

    (the last in specially designed vessels). Late Roman warships were oared galleys with a singlesquare sail. The standard warship was probably a trireme, that is, a ship with three banks ofoars. Equipped with rams, Roman warships were designed to be ship -killers. Transportvessels, on the other hand, were powered by sail and were not designed for military actions.

    RECRUITMENT.

    Roman soldiers were recruited from both Roman citizens (all adult males within theempire after 212 AD) and from barbarians.

    A. Recruitment from citizenry :

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    a. Length of service: Ordinary term of service was 20 years to achieve an honorabledischarge; 24 years for a veteran's discharge . Some NCOs stayed on for as many as 48 years.Veterans enjoyed fiscal privileges (immunity for themselves and their wives from the poll tax;discharge allotments of land with oxen and corn or cash bounties)

    b. Personnel Support : army fortresses and field forces had in the 5th century regimentalchaplains (most soldiers were still pagans) and regimental doctors. There were army hospitalswith army doctors and orderlies.

    c. Promotion: promotion was both through seniority and by acts of bravery . Common soldierscould rise through the ranks and be commissioned as officers. Those selected were given theirrank through an audience with the emperor in which they 'adored the sacred purple.' This madethem into protectores . The protectores formed a Corps of Officer Cadets open to ordinarysoldiers and to the sons of officers. They served on headquarters' staffs and were used formiscellaneous duties, such as rounding up recruits or arresting important persons.A protector would eventually be given command of a regiment (becoming a tribune or prefect).

    PAY AND RATIONS ( in theory , based on A.H. M. Jones).

    Pay: a. Soldiers received remuneration in the form of food, fodder, and cash. The annual pay of thecommon soldier was 4-5 solidi a year (bread for a year, at 3lbs a day--soldier's ration--cost 1solidi; meat rations, 2lb a day=2 s.; clothing=1 s per garment). In addition to regular pay (whichwas not always so regularly paid!) soldiers received bonuses on the accession day and birthdays

    of the emperor and his family.

    b. Officer pay: little is known of officer pay, except that it also was in the form of cash andrations. We do know that it was considerably higher than that of regular troops, and that it wasoften supplemented by embezzlement, kickbacks, and bribes.

    Rations: Rations for limitanei were supplied by the civilian authorities: the praetorian prefectthrough the vicars and provincial governors, who directed curial collectors to issue to thequartermasters ( actuaries ) of the regiments the supplies listed in theirwarrants. Comitatenses units were supplied in bulk by the provincial authorities in which the

    units were billeted. Armies on campaign were supplied by praetorian prefects.A soldier's rations (according to a sixth-century Egyptian papyrus source, the only table

    of rations we have) included bread (3lbs), meat (2lbs), 2 pints of wine, and 1/8 pint of oil. Oncampaign the soldier would receive biscuits instead of bread and salt pork instead of fresh meat.The amount of rations increased with each rank for non-commissionedofficers: semissalis received one-and-a-half rations; a circitor or biarchus , two rations;a centenarius , three-and-a-half rations; three and a half for a ducenarius ; four for a senator ; andfive for the primecerius .

    Billeting. a. Limitanei --lived in permanent forts on border.

    b. Comitatenses --billeted in cities, usually given one-third of the living space in private houses.Though only the magistri had a right to demand a bath, many officers coerced their hosts to

    provide them illegally with wood, bedding, and baths. Quartermasters were responsible for

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    assigning billets in cities ( hospitia in civitatibus ), and would do so by writing the names ofthose troops to be billeted on the doorpost of the houses they chose. By law, the houses ofteachers, clergy, and lawyers, and synagogues were exempted from this obligation.

    LOGISTICS

    A well known military adage attributed to Gen. Omar Bradley (among others) has it thatamateurs talk strategy and tactics, professionals talk logistics. This is a very Roman attitude.Roman military writers such as Vegetius and Procopius emphasized the centrality of logisticsfor success in warfare; for Vegetius one could not talk strategy without talking logistics.Unsurprisingly given its administrative sophistication and well developed bureaucracy, the LateRoman state (like the modern American military) excelled at logistics. Unlike medievalwarriors, Roman soldiers were paid, fed, clothed, armed, and trained by the state. This wasaccomplished through a centrally administered system of public armories ( fabricae ) and millsdistributed in those dioceses in which the main forces of the Roman army were based. Thelargest number of fabricae were devoted either to the production of shields or arma , that isweapons and armor. There were, however, also specialized workshops that produced arrows,siege equipment, and armor for heavy cavalry. As listed in the Notitia Dignitatum , thesearmories were carefully located so as to be near the bases of the field army on roads andnavigable rivers to facilitate transportations of their products, but sufficiently distant from thefrontiers to be safe from capture. The only exception to the last condition were factoriesdevoted to the production of shields. Mapping out the fabricae leaves little doubt as to thedeliberate planning behind their distribution. Although it cannot be proved, this network ofmilitary factories seems to have been established as an element of Diocletians military

    reorganization of the Empire.In the early Empire military clothing was bought from private weavers by imperialagents. In the late third century, the responsibility for clothing soldiers was transferred to thelocal communities, and the production and purchase of items of clothing became a tax known asthe vestis militaris . A system of imperial mills either supplemented or replacedthe vestis militaris , which continued into the fourth century but as a tax in cash rather than kind.By the reign of Constantine, the uniforms of soldiers, consisting of shirt, tunic, and cloaks, were

    produced in state run woolen and linen mills. Boots continued to be produced by levies, thoughthere is evidence for an imperial boot factory in 344. The switch to state mills may have beenan attempt to deal with the runaway inflation that beset Rome in the late third century. But themaintenance of state mills also proved costly, and beginning in the second half of the thirdcentury issues of uniforms were gradually commuted into cash payments.

    Horses for the cavalry were either bought on contract or supplied by imperial stud farms.There were specialized fabricae to produce armor for cavalrymen and their mounts.

    One of the characteristics of Diocletians military reorganization was the separation offinancial and military functions. This was done to create a system of checks and balances thatDiocletian hoped would lessen the incidence of military rebellion. Just as the collection ofmoney to pay the soldiers fell to a civilian official, the praetorian prefect, so too did theresponsibility for running the armories and mills fell. The functioning of the former were

    entrusted to the imperial master of the offices, while the responsibility for the mills belongedto two financial officers, the comes sacrarum largitionum , the official responsible for imperialgold and silver mines and for the payment of donatives to soldiers and civil servants, andthe comes rei privatae , responsible for the collection of imperial rents.

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    The late Roman state was capable of impressive feats of campaign logistics. Oncampaign, Romans made use of supply depots and magazines set up along the proposed routesof march. Typically, preparations for both offensive and defensive campaigns involvedrequisitioning and distributing food, fodder, and other supplies. This was the responsibility ofthe highest civilian official in a region, the praetorian prefect and the imperial officials under his

    jurisdiction. Some supplies were delivered directly to military units; others were stockpiled inmagazines along the routes to be taken by the armies. Supplies were carried in wagons and bycart animals until consumed, unless the army had the good fortune of marching alongside ariver, in which case the provisions could be more easily transported by water. The relativelysmall size of Roman expeditionary forces in relation to the total disposable tactical strength ofthe Roman army has often been the subject of commentary. One plausible explanation is thelogistical difficulties presented by larger armies. Historian John Haldon estimates that aByzantine army of 6,000 infantry, 4,000 cavalry, and 1,000 remounts would require a minimumof 23.5 tons of grain per day and that doesnt include the 30,000 gallons of water and 13 tonsof fodder the army would have required daily. The problem of transporting supplies of thismagnitude by horse and wagon is self evident. Julians Persian expeditionary force of 65,000

    men, the largest Roman army of the period, was only possible because it marched alongthe Euphrates. E ven so, he could not have advanced far if he hadnt also ordered supply depotsset up in northern Mesopotamia in preparation for the invasion.

    Establishing supply depots to which armies could march was standard operating procedure. In 361 Emperor Constantius II ordered three million bushels of grain storedin Raetia (Switzerland) on the border of Gaulin preparation for his campaign against hisrebellious cousin Julian. Accumulating and transporting this much grain was time and laborconsuming. It was most feasible in cases of wars of choice.

    THE REALITY: CORRUPTION, PECULATION, EXTORTION, INDISCIPLINE

    Historian Ramsey Macmullen provides a reality check to this rosy picture of a welladministered and well supplied late Roman military. For Macmullen the reality of Romanmilitary service in the fourth and fifth centuries can be summed up by the terms corruption,

    peculation, and extortion. (193): While the ethic prevailing in the legions had traditionally permitted extortion as a routine by and among the n oncommissioned officers and lower ranks,Macmullen observes, it was only in the third century that whole regiments and armies(meaning, surely, colonels and generals ) were seen to put profit before war. (193) The Empireas a whole, Macmullen concluded, suffered from the prevalence of venality. (196) Thelearned rhetorician Libanius, addressing the emperor in 390, bemoaned that even soldiers inrural billets were all 'on the take,' all 'selling protection' against rent and tax collectors. Thegeneral, of course, received the biggest share, but the protection money trickled down to therank and file.

    Pay . Synesius, Libanius, and other fourth century writers describe hungry soldiers clad in 'bitsof boots and ghosts of great-coats' (Libanius), because their officers had pocketed their soldiers'rations and pay (a practice known as "peculation"). Only the scholares , the imperial bodyguard,were paid on time and lived well. Limitanei 's and even the field forces' pay was often in arrears,

    as high ranking officers detoured money into their own pockets and actuaries demanded andtook kickbacks. The results were mutiny--Justinian's armies in Africa and Italy mutinied for back pay--and, more commonly, soldiers bullying and extorting money from civilians.

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    Dishonest officers (Macmullen 161) created another problem. Some pocketed moneyearmarked for their men's uniforms and equipment. Many accepted payment from their men forextended--in some cases permanent--leave. One of the greatest problems was the failure toreport deaths or desertions, since this meant that senior officers could draw for themselves thewages and benefits allotted to these 'paper troops.' Conscription, as Macmullen points out,

    became an accepted excuse for a shakedown.

    Billeting . The policy of billeting field troops in the homes of civilians, a practiceeuphemistically termed hospitality ( hospitalitas ) was given to abuses and was,understandably, extremely unpopular with those forced to share their homes (and often theirfood, goods, and even wives) with soldiers. The unpopularity of hospitalitas is evidenced by alaw against householders erasing the names of soldiers to be billeted from their doorposts.Individuals and whole cities were willing to bribe officials to be spared the expense of billetingtroops. Bishop Synesius, writing in the early fifth century, denounced a Roman commanderwhom he accused of moving his troops not on the basis of military need but to places wherethere was the most plunder. Burdened by this billeting of troops upon them, cities paid in gold

    (quoted by Lee, 168). Although householders were only obligated to give soldiers lodgings, theTheodosian Code indicates that soldiers commonly extorted amenities such as baths, oil, bedding, wood, and food from their hosts, which in military slang wascalled salgammum (pickles). An early sixth-century Syrian Christian clergyman denouncedRoman soldiers who came to defend Edessa during the Persian War of 502-505: [They] cameto our assistance ost ensibly as saviours [but] they looted us in the manner little short ofenemies. They threw many poor people out of their beds and slept in them, leaving their ownersto lie on the ground at a time of cold weather. They ejected others from their houses, going inand living in them. Others cattle they led away by force as if plundering an enemy. Theyused rough treatment on others for the sake of obtaining anything whatever.] (quoted by Lee,168-9). On top of this, soldiers were notorious for their culture of drunkenness, which often ledto brawls and rape, the latter sometimes disguised as adultery in the sources.

    Such problems were endemic with the billeting of field armies. They were less so inthe case of the limitanei . The main reasons seem to be that limitanei troops tended to be housedin border fortifications and camps outside of towns rather than in requisitioned quarters inhomes, and limitanei were far better integrated into the local communities. Frontier troops mostoften were conscripted from the areas in which they served and spent most if not all of theircareers in the same place. Field troops, by comparison, were transients, moving from city tocity, region to region, according to the orders of their superiors.

    Logistics . Although the Romans excelled at logistical support for their troops, the fourth- andfifth-century sources nonetheless complain about the behavior of troops marching throughRoman territory. Apparently, Roman soldiers were not loathe to practice self -help in obtainingfood and supplies from the locals. The problem of Roman soldiers looting Roman territory

    became particularly severe during civil wars. Then it was no longer the problem of individualsoldiers bullying and robbing locals in the areas through which the army passed, but of the armyitself living off the land if the commanders did not have the support of the regions prefects whocontrolled the distribution of the armys food and supplies.

    Discipline : "The regular army, we are told [by Ammianus], lacked discipline, energy, andcourage. It excelled only in its 'lust for plunder.'" (Macmullen, Corruption 175). As Macmullen

    points out (ibid), Vegetius, Claudian, Ambrose, Symmachus, Libanius, Synesius and the authorof the Augustan History all comment on the lack of drill, discipline, practice among soldiers, and

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    the problems of drunkenness, inadequate armor, and readiness to run away. Macmullen: "Nogeneral wanted regular Romans."

    Discipline was notoriously lax among late fourth and early fifth-century bordergarrisons ( limitanei ) and, increasingly so among the more elite field forces ( comitatenses ) of andthe 5th and 6th centuries. Many soldiers became full time farmers or tradesmen. Jones cites thecase of a comitatensis of Alexandria who weaved baskets from dawn until 1500 and then put onhis uniform and went on parade. He did this for eight years. Another soldier fromsouthern Egypt described himself in a legal document as a soldier of regiment x, by profession a

    boatman. The early fifth-century writer (and antiquarian) Vegetius famously diagnosed the

    military problem of the Empire as the result of a lack of discipline: "Victory in war does notdepend entirely upon numbers or mere courage; only skill and discipline will insure it. We findthat the Romans owed the conquest of the world to no other cause than continual militarytraining, exact observance of discipline in their camps and unwearied cultivation of the otherarts of war. ... But the security established by long peace has altered the dispositions of Romans,drawn them off from military to civil pursuits and infused into them a love of idleness and ease.

    Hence a relaxation of military discipline insensibly ensued, then a neglect of it, and it sunk atlast into entire oblivion." (Vegetius, De Re Militari ["Concerning Military Matters"], book one.). The cure he prescribed was a return to the (idealized) drill and manual of arms that he found inthe works of earlier Roman writers.

    Reality check on the reality check . Macmullen was undoubtedly correct in seeingcorruption, peculation, and extortion as rife in the late Roman army. BUT the same could besaid for the armies of the earlier Caesars. Even in the first century, Roman centurions commonlyused their positions to enrich themselves at the expense of those under their command, whilesoldiers in general were notorious for extorting money from civilians with threats of violence.These practices were so ubiquitous that the Gospel According to Luke (3:14), composed ca. 85AD, has Jesus respond to a question from some soldiers about how they ought to behave, withthe admonition: "Do not take money from anyone by force, or accuse anyone falsely, and becontent with your wages."

    The extent to which military discipline and training declined between the first andfourth centuries is questionable. A. H. M. Jones and, more recently, Hugh Elton, point out thatthe field armies of the early fifth century were still formidable military forces capable ofdefeating larger barbarian armies (e.g. Stilicho's victories of Pollentia, Verona, and Faesulae).The early seventh-century Byzantine armies of Justinian conquered Italyand Africa not because

    of numbers but because of their tactical superiority (Belisarius's army in N. Africa in 533numbered only 15,000 troops). The only battle in which a barbarian army defeated a regularRoman army in the fourth and fifth centuries was Adrianople (378), which was exceptional

    because of the poor leadership demonstrated by the Emperor Valens, which led to the Romans being caught between the German camp and the bulk of the German cavalry returning from aforaging expedition.

    BARBARIANIZATION OF THE ROMAN MILITARY

    One of the hottest areas of scholarly debate among historians of the late Roman militaryis the extent of the barbarian presence in Roman regular armies of the fourth and fifth centuries.

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    Everyone agree that many barbarians served in these forces, the great majority of barbarianas volunteers , although prisoners of war and quotas from federate tribes were also enrolled.Barbarian prisoners of war were settled in small villages under Roman prefects. These laeti were

    bred to supply troops to the armed forces. (Constantine, supposedly, settled 300,000 Sarmatiansas laeti in villages in Italy and the Balkans).

    Under Constantine, Franks and Alamans (two German tribes) dominated the scholae and barbarians were well represented throughout the fourth and fifth centuries in the elite palaceforces in the Western Roman Empire. This is an indication that barbarians were deemed to be

    better fighting material. There were many barbarians in the comitatenses ; fewer amongthe limitanei . The desirability of Germans for the armed forces underlies the decision of theEmperor Valens to welcome in the Gothic refugees of 376.

    But how barbarianized was the late Roman military? This remains an openquestion . The orthodox position is best represented by Ramsey Macmullen (Corruption andthe Decline of Rome [1988] 201-04) who maintains that from the time of Constantine Germansformed the bulk of the Roman military forces. The civil wars of the fourth century, according to

    Macmullen, pitted German auxiliaries of emperors against the German auxiliaries of pretenders.As Macmullen points out (176), from 312 on the soldiers credited with 'Roman' victories wereforces mustered from outside the empire: "No general wanted regular Romans. By the mid-fourth century the typical fighting force, as opposed to a more or less useless mass of menmerely in uniform, appears to have been half imported. A generation later, imported soldiersformed the majority. Notorious, before the century was over, barbarian commanders ofessentially barbarian armies had gained control over the empire's fate. ...The sack of Rome [byAlaric in 410] was a purely domestic event."

    Macmullens conclusions have been more recently challenged by Hugh Elton . Eltonsanalysis of the names of commanders of Roman forces in the period between 350 and 425suggests that less than a quarter of the Roman officer corps was barbarian. Eltons conclusionsare supported by the research of M.J. Nicasie (1998) into the composition of the Roman armythat fought at Adrianople in 378. Elton, moreover, points out that so- called barbarian generalssuch as Stilicho not only were Roman citizens but were so acculturated that one could notdistinguish between them and commanders of Roman ancestry.

    There was some debate in the late 4th century over the wisdom of relying on barbarianrecruits, especially after Adrianople when Theodosius recruited heavily among the Germans tomake up for the losses suffered by the army. The bottom-line, though, is that Germans inregular units were Roman soldiers, subjected to Roman discipline and training and

    commanded by regular Roman officers (some of whom were barbarians themselves). Theytended to be reliable and loyal troops. (Federates were a different matter.) One ought notto think in terms of divided loyalties: there was no German nationalism in the fourthcentury.

    Cultural Integration: Romanization . Germans (Goths, Alamanni, Burgundians, etc.)living within the Roman provinces or across the borders in Late Antiquity had been"Romanized " through long contact with the empire. Patrick Geary stresses that Roman leaders,needing recognizable states with which to deal, helped create, through gifts and diplomacy, anddefine stable tribal units. In a sense, Rome created and categorized the varieties of Goths

    (Visigoths, Ostrogoths, etc.) and saw them as having a political unity that they had not possessed until they had encountered the Romans. Germania was defined in relationship to theRoman territorial borders: without the Romans there would have been no more unity among the'Germans' than among the 'Gauls' before Julius Caesar.

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    Reciprocal cultural interaction . Along the Rhine and Danubian borders of the Empire,Germans were Romanized through commercial contacts, military arrangements, diplomacy, etc.'Romans,' on the other hand, were increasingly 'barbarianized.' This may be seen in fashion inthe adoption of 'German' trousers in the 4th century empire: in 397 the emperor Honoriusdecreed that trousers and German footwear not be word within the city of Rome. This law had to

    be reissued in 399 and 416, attesting to the popularity of German wear. In terms of materialculture, the Germans along the border and the Romans across it may have been virtuallyindistinguishable. Roman and barbarian soldiers possessed the same equipment and uniforms, ascan be seen from artistic representations of the imperial bodyguard from the time of Theodosius(ca. 388). For example, 'German' belt buckles found in 4th cemetery military graves actuallywere standard issue among Roman soldiers, manufactured by Romans. The Germanization ofthe Roman army may best be seen in Julians army in Gauldeclaring him emperor in 360through the German practice of raising the new king on a shield.

    Visigoth warr ior and his weapons, ca. 425

    Foederati within the empire .Federates were barbarian tribes allied to empire that could be called upon by treaty to

    provide contingents for distant operations (e.g. bedouin force from Syria defended Constansagainst the Goths in 378). Constantine, who favored Germans for his imperial guard,the scholae , made a treaty in 324/32 with Gothic chieftains for 40,000 western Goths todefend Constantinople as federates. (Macmullen, Corruption and the Decline of Rome [1988]202; Eusebius Vita Const. 4.5, Ammianus Marcellinus 21.10.8).

    Federates were the forces of sovereign states beyond the borders of the empire. Thedecision of the Emperor Valens to allow tens of thousands of Germans to cross the Danube in376 and the Battle of Adrianople two years later changed this. After a year of indecisivewarfare, the Emperor Theodosius (379-95) concluded that it would be impossible task to driveout the Goths from the Balkans. He made the best of a bad situation by entering a treaty with theGoths that allowed them to settle in Thrace within the borders of the empire as a federate peopleunder their own king and with their own laws and customs. The Burgundians and Alans werelater given the same privilege. Theodosius's army that defeated the pretender Eugenius in 394relied heavily on the federate forces of Alaric and Gainas. Eugenius also relied on federates.

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    After the civil war, Stilicho, needing troops to oppose Alaric, stripped the frontiers of soldiersand replaced them with federates (Macmullen, Corruption and the Decline of Rome [1988] 204).

    These federate bands, unlike the earlier federates outside the empire or the Germansserving in the Roman regular army, proved unreliable. Loyal to their own chiefs rather than tothe emperor, the barbarian foederati were willing to follow their leaders in opposition to theempire to gain better deals. Again, the example of ALARIC is instructive: "Nothing shows

    better how weakened had become the resistance against the barbarians, taken into the empiresince 380, than the settling of German federates in 397, under a king provided with a Romanoffice" (Demouget, quoted by R. Macmullen, Corruption and the Decline of Rome [1988], 204).Macmullen concludes: BY THIS DATE [410], IN ANY MILITARY SENSE, THE EMPIREWAS NO LONGER A SOVEREIGN STATE AND THE SACK OF ITS ANCIENT CAPITALBY ALARIC--A HIGH IMPERIAL OFFICIAL AND EVEN A BORN ROMAN, SO FAR ASTHE WORD HAS MEANING--HAD NO QUALITY OF INVASION ABOUT IT AT ALL.HE AND HIS MEN WERE THE ROMAN ARMY, AND HAD BEEN FOR DECADES."(Macmullen 204).

    The Western Empire in the 5th century increasingly relied upon federates.

    The Eastern Empire, in contrast, lessened its reliance upon German barbarian soldiers,and instead strengthened its border garrisons with local recruits) . Jones attributes this toheavy losses suffered by Western Roman armies during the great barbarian invasion of Italy byAlaric, 407-410, and subsequent invasions by Vandals, Alans, etc., and endemic civil war. Thesources indicate that late Roman generals, acting under and on behalf of fifth-century WesternRoman emperors (who after Theodosius ceased to take the field themselves), were in commandof armies largely composed of federates and bucellarii (generals' personal followings of

    barbarian soldiers). The great fifth-century generals, Stilicho, Constantius, Boniface, and Aetiusall relied upon bucellarii .Liebeshuetz points out that this personalization of the military 'recallsthe last century of the Republic' and was a consequence of the core of these armies having beenrecruited personally by the commander (269). Such armies could easily into personal forces,which explains the tendency of the imperial government to lose control of its armies during this

    period

    Flavius Stil icho (on left), with hi s wif e Serena and son Eucherius

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    (r ight), ca. 395. I vory diptych, Monza Cathedral, Italy.

    STILICHO AND ALARIC: a case study for the barbarianization of the Roman Army Toward the end of the fourth century, Roman field armies and auxiliary forces led by

    Romanized German commanders and barbarian federate forces led by Romanized barbarianchieftains began to merge. The careers of the Roman general Flavius Stilich