Legacies and Devises

7/29/2019 Legacies and Devises

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Legacies and Devises

[G.R. No. L-22036. April 30, 1979.]

TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE REVEREND FATHER PASCUAL RIGOR. THE PARISH PRIEST OF

THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH OF VICTORIA, TARLAC, Petitioner-Appellant, v. BELINA RIGOR,

NESTORA RIGOR, FRANCISCA ESCOBAR DE RIGOR and JOVITA ESCOBAR DE FAUSTO, Respondents-

Appellees.

SYNOPSIS

In his will, the late Father Pascual Rigor of Victoria, Tarlac, devised forty-four hectares of ricelands to his nearest malerelative who would study for the priesthood and provided that the administration of the ricelands would be under theresponsibility of the parish priest of Victoria during the time that there is no qualified devisee as contemplated in the will.

During the testate proceedings, the trial court approved the project of partition and directed the administratrix to deliver tothe devisees their respective shares. Inasmuch as no nearest male relative of the testator claimed the devise and as the

administratrix and the legal heirs believed that the parish priest of Victoria had no right to administer the ricelands, thesame were not delivered to him. The latter, however, petitioned for delivery of the ricelands to the church. The lower

court, after first declaring the bequest inoperative, later reconsidered its findings in an order, on the ground that thetestator had a grandnephew (born after the testators death), who was a seminarian, and directed the administrator of theestate to deliver the ricelands to the parish priest of Victoria as trustee. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the

order.

The Supreme Court ruled that the will referred to the nearest male relative of the testator who was living at the time of hisdeath and not to any indefinite time thereafter, because in order to be capacitated to inherit, the devisee must be living atthe moment the succession opens, except in case of representation, when it is proper. Decision affirmed.

SYLLABUS

1. TESTAMENTARY SUCCESSION; TESTATORS INTENT IS THE LAW OF THE CASE.In testamentarysuccession cases, as in cases involving the law of contracts and statutory construction, where the intention of the

contracting parties or of the lawmaking body is to be ascertained, the primary issue is the determination of the testatorsintention which is the law of the case (dicat estor et eirt lex). The will of the testator is the first and principal law in the

matter of testaments. When his intention is clearly and precisely expressed, any interpretation must be in accord with theplain and literal meaning of his words, except when it may certainly appear that his intention was different from thatliterally expressed.

2. ID.; CAPACITY TO INHERIT.In order to be capacitated to inherit, the heir, devisee or legatee must be living at the

moment the succession opens, except in case of representation, when it is proper (Art. 1025, Civil Code).

3. ID.; WHERE BEQUEST IS INOPERATIVE.If the bequest for any reason should be inoperative, it shall be mergedinto the estate, except in cases of substitution and those in which the right of accretion exists (Art. 956, New Civil Code).The Civil Code recognizes that a person may die partly testate and partly intestate, or that there may be mixed succession.

The old rule as to the indivisibility of the testators will is no longer valid. Thus, if a conditional legacy does not takeeffect, there will be intestate succession as to the property covered by the said legacy.

4. ID.; WHERE WILL DOES NOT DIPOSE OF ALL PROPERTIES.Legal succession takes place when the will"does not dispose of all that belongs to the testator (Art. 960(2), New Civil Code).

This case is about the efficaciousness or enforceability of a devise of ricelands located at Guimba, Nueva Ecija, with a

total area of around forty-four hectares. That devise was made in the will of the late Father Pascual Rigor, a native ofVictoria, Tarlac, in favor of his nearest male relative who would study for the priesthood.

The parish priest of Victoria, who claimed to be a trustee of the said lands, appealed to this Court from the decision of theCourt of Appeals affirming the order of the probate court declaring that the said devise was inoperative (Rigor v. Parish

Priest of the Roman Catholic Church of Victoria, Tarlac, CA-G.R. No. 24319-R, August 1, 1963).


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The record discloses that Father Rigor, the parish priest of Pulilan, Bulacan, died on August 9, 1935, leaving a willexecuted on October 29, 1933 which was probated by the Court of First Instance of Tarlac in its order of December 5,

1935. Named as devisees in the will were the testators nearest relatives, namely, his three sisters: Florencia Rigor-Escobar, Belina Rigor-Manaloto and Nestora Rigor-Quiambao. The testator gave a devise to his cousin, Fortunato

Gamalinda.

In addition, the will contained the following controversial bequest (paragraphing supplied to facilitate comprehension of

the testamentary provisions):

To implement the foregoing bequest, the administratrix in 1940 submitted a project of partition containing the followingitem:

"5. LEGACY OF THE CHURCH

"That it be adjudicated in favor of the legacy purported to be given to the nearest male relative who shall take thepriesthood, and in the interim to be administered by the actual Catholic Priest of the Roman Catholic Church of Victoria,

Tarlac, Philippines, or his successors, the real properties hereinbelow indicated, to wit:

"Title No. Lot No. Area in Has. Tax Dec. Ass. Value

T-6530 3663 1.6249 18740 P340.00T-6548 3445-C 24.2998 18730 7,290.00

T-6525 3670 6.2665 18736 1,880.00T-6521 3666 11.9251 18733 3,580.00

"Total area and value44.1163 P13,090.00"

Judge Roman A. Cruz in his order of August 15, 1940, approving the project of partition, directed that after payment ofthe obligations of the estate (including the sum of P3,132.26 due to the church of the Victoria parish) the administratrixshould deliver to the devisees their respective shares.

It may be noted that the administratrix and Judge Cruz did not bother to analyze the meaning and implications of Father

Rigors bequest to his nearest male relative who would study for the priesthood. Inasmuch as no nephew of the testatorclaimed the devise and as the administratrix and the legal heirs believed that the parish priest of Victoria had no right toadminister the ricelands, the same were not delivered to that ecclesiastic. The testate proceeding remained pending.

About thirteen years after the approval of the project of partition, or on February 19, 1954, the parish priest of Victoria

filed in the pending testate proceeding a petition praying for the appointment of a new administrator (succeeding thedeceased administratrix, Florencia Rigor), who should deliver to the church the said ricelands, and further praying that the

possessors thereof be ordered to render an accounting of the fruits. The probate court granted the petition. A newadministrator was appointed. On January 31, 1957 the parish priest filed another petition for the delivery of the ricelandsto the church as trustee.

The intestate heirs of Father Rigor countered with a petition dated March 25, 1957 praying that the bequest be declared

inoperative and that they be adjudged as the persons entitled to the said ricelands since, as admitted by the parish priest ofVictoria, "no nearest male relative of" the testator "has ever studied for the priesthood" (pp. 25 and 35, Record onAppeal). That petition was opposed by the parish priest of Victoria.

Finding that petition to be meritorious, the lower court, through Judge Bernabe de Aquino, declared the bequest

inoperative and adjudicated the ricelands to the testators legal heirs in his order of June 28, 1957. The parish priest file dtwo motions for reconsideration.

Judge De Aquino granted the second motion for reconsideration in his order of December 10, 1957 on the ground that thetestator had a grandnephew named Edgardo G. Cunanan (the grandson of his first cousin) who was a seminarian in the

San Jose Seminary of the Jesuit Fathers in Quezon City. The administrator was directed to deliver the ricelands to theparish priest of Victoria as trustee.


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The legal heirs appealed to the Court of Appeals. It reversed that order. It held that Father Rigor had created atestamentary trust for his nearest male relative who would take the holy orders but that such trust could exist only for

twenty years because to enforce it beyond that period would violate "the rule against perpetuities." It ruled that since nolegatee claimed the ricelands within twenty years after the testators death, the same should pass to his legal heirs, citing

articles 888 and 912(2) of the old Civil Code and article 870 of the new Civil Code.

The parish priest in this appeal contends that the Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the testator created a public

charitable trust and in not liberally construing the testamentary provisions so as to render the trust operative and to preventintestacy.

As refutation, the legal heirs argue that the Court of Appeals declared the bequest inoperative because no one among thetestators nearest male relatives had studied for the priesthood and not because the trust was a private charitable trust.

According to the legal heirs, that factual finding is binding on this Court. They point out that appellant priests change oftheory cannot be countenanced in this appeal.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library

In this case, as in cases involving the law of contracts and statutory construction, where the intention of the contracting

parties or of the lawmaking body is to be ascertained, the primary issue is the determination of the testators intentionwhich is the law of the case (dicat testor et erit lex. Santos v. Manarang, 27 Phil. 209, 215; Rodriguez v. Court of Appeals,L-28734, March 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 546).

The will of the testator is the first and principal law in the matter of testaments. When his intention is clearly and precisely

expressed, any interpretation must be in accord with the plain and literal meaning of his words, except when it maycertainly appear that his intention was different from that literally expressed (In re Estate of Calderon, 26 Phil. 333).

"The intent of the testator is the cardinal rule in the construction of wills." It is "the life and soul of a will." It is "the firstgreatest rule, the sovereign guide, the polestar, in giving effect to a will." (See Dissent of Justice Moreland in Santos v.

Manarang, 27 Phil. 209, 223, 237-8.)

One canon in the interpretation of the testamentary provisions is that "the testators intention is to be ascertained from th e

words of the will, taking into consideration the circumstances under which it was made", but excluding the testators oraldeclarations as to his intention (Art. 789, Civil Code of the Philippines).

To ascertain Father Rigors intention, it may be useful to make the following restatement of the provisions of his will: svirtual 1aw library

1. that he bequeathed the ricelands to anyone of his nearest male relatives who would pursue an ecclesiastical career untilhis ordination as a priest.

2. That the devisee could not sell the ricelands.3. That the devisee at the inception of his studies in sacred theology could enjoy and administer the ricelands, and onceordained as a priest, he could continue enjoying and administering the same up to the time of his death but the deviseewould cease to enjoy and administer the ricelands if he discontinued his studies for the priesthood.4. That if the devisee became a priest, he would be obligated to celebrate every year twenty masses with prayers for the

repose of the souls of Father Rigor and his parents.5. That if the devisee is excommunicated, he would be divested of the legacy and the administration of the ricelands

would pass to the incumbent parish priest of Victoria and his successors.6. That during the interval of time that there is no qualified devisee, as contemplated above, the administration of thericelands would be under the responsibility of the incumbent parish priest of Victoria and his successors, and

7. That the parish priest-administrator of the ricelands would accumulate annually the products thereof, obtaining orgetting from the annual produce five percent thereof for his administration and the fees corresponding to the twenty

masses with prayers that the parish priest would celebrate for each year, depositing the balance of the income of the devisein the bank in the name of his bequest.

From the foregoing testamentary provisions, it may be deduced that the testator intended to devise the ricelands to hisnearest male relative who would become a priest, who was forbidden to sell the ricelands, who would lose the devise if he

discontinued his studies for the priesthood, or having been ordained a priest, he was excommunicated, and who would beobligated to say annually twenty masses with prayers for the repose of the souls of the testator and his parents.


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On the other hand, it is clear that the parish priest of Victoria would administer the ricelands only in two situations: one,during the interval of time that no nearest male relative of the testator was studying for the priesthood and two, in case the

testators nephew became a priest and he was excommunicated.

What is not clear is the duration of "el intervalo de tiempo que no haya legatario acondicionado", or how long after thetestators death would it be determined that he had a nephew who would pursue an ecclesiastical vocation. It is that patentambiguity that has brought about the controversy between the parish priest of Victoria and the testators legal heirs.

Interwoven with that equivocal provision is the time when the nearest male relative who would study for the priesthood

should be determined. Did the testator contemplate only his nearest male relative at the time of his death? Or did he havein mind any of his nearest male relatives at anytime after his death?

We hold that the said bequest refers to the testators nearest male relative living at the time of his death and not to anyindefinite time thereafter. "In order to be capacitated to inherit, the heir, devisee or legatee must be living at the moment

the succession opens, except in case of representation, when it is proper" (Art. 1025, Civil Code).

The said testamentary provisions should be sensibly or reasonably construed. To construe them as referring to thetestators nearest male relative at anytime after his death would render the provisions difficult to apply and createuncertainty as to the disposition of his estate. That could not have been his intention.

In 1935, when the testator died, his nearest legal heirs were his three sisters or second-degree relatives, Mrs. Escobar, Mrs.

Manaloto and Mrs. Quiambao. Obviously, when the testator specified his nearest male relative, he must have had in mindhis nephew or a son of his sister, who would be his third-degree relative, or possibly a grandnephew. But since he couldnot prognosticate the exact date of his death or state with certitude what category of nearest male relative would be living

at the time of his death, he could not specify that his nearest male relative would be his nephew or grandnephews (the sonsof his nephew or niece) and so he had to use the term "nearest male relative."

It is contended by the legal heirs that the said devise was in reality intended for Ramon Quiambao, the testators nephewand godchild, who was the son of his sister, Mrs. Quiambao. To prove that contention, the legal heirs presented in the

lower court the affidavit of Beatriz Gamalinda, the maternal grandmother of Edgardo Cunanan, who deposed that afterFather Rigors death, her own son, Valentin Gamalinda, Jr., did not claim the devise, although he was studying for the

priesthood at the San Carlos Seminary, because she (Beatriz) knew that Father Rigor had intended that devise for hisnearest male relative belonging to the Rigor family (pp. 105-114, Record on Appeal).

Mrs. Gamalinda further deposed that her own grandchild, Edgardo G. Cunanan, was not the one contemplated in FatherRigors will and that Edgardos father told her that he was not consulted by the parish priest of Victori a before the latter

filed his second motion for reconsideration which was based on the ground that the testators grandnephew, Edgardo, wasstudying for the priesthood at the San Jose Seminary.

Parenthetically, it should be stated at this juncture that Edgardo ceased to be a seminarian in 1961. For that reason, thelegal heirs apprised the Court of Appeals that the probate courts order adjudicating the ricelands to the parish priest of

Victoria had no more leg to stand on (p. 84, Appellants brief).

Of course, Mrs. Gamalindas affidavit, which is tantamount to evidence aliunde as to the testators intention and which ishearsay, has no probative value. Our opinion that the said bequest refers to the testators nephew who was living at thetime of his death, when his succession was opened and the successional rights to his estate became vested, rests on a

judicious and unbiased reading of the terms of the will.

Had the testator intended that the "cualquier pariente mio varon mas cercano que estudie la carrera eclesiastica" wouldinclude indefinitely anyone of his nearest male relatives born after his death, he could have so specified in his will. Hemust have known that such a broad provision would suspend for an unlimited period of time the efficaciousness of his

bequest.

What then did the testator mean by "el intervalo de tiempo que no haya legatario acondicionado" ? The reasonable view isthat he was referring to a situation whereby his nephew living at the time of his death, who would like to become a priest,


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was still in grade school or in high school or was not yet in the seminary. In that case, the parish priest of Victoria wouldadminister the ricelands before the nephew entered the seminary. But the moment the testators nephew entered the

seminary, then he would be entitled to enjoy and administer the ricelands and receive the fruits thereof. In that event, thetrusteeship would be terminated.

Following that interpretation of the will, the inquiry would be whether at the time Father Rigor died in 1935 he had anephew who was studying for the priesthood or who had manifested his desire to follow the ecclesiastical career. That

query is categorically answered in paragraph 4 of appellant priests petitions of February 19, 1954 and January 31, 1957.He unequivocally alleged therein that "no nearest male relative of the late (Father) Pascual Rigor has ever studied for the

priesthood" (pp. 25 and 35, Record on Appeal).

Inasmuch as the testator was not survived by any nephew who became a priest, the unavoidable conclusion is that the

bequest in question was ineffectual or inoperative. Therefore, the administration of the ricelands by the parish priest ofVictoria, as envisaged in the will, was likewise inoperative.

The appellant in contending that a public charitable trust was constituted by the testator in is favor assumes that he was a

trustee or a substitute devisee. That contention is untenable. A reading of the testamentary provisions regarding thedisputed bequest not support the view that the parish priest of Victoria was a trustee or a substitute devisee in the eventthat the testator was not survived by a nephew who became a priest.

It should be understood that the parish priest of Victoria could become a trustee only when the testators nephew liv ing at

the time of his death, who desired to become a priest, had not yet entered the seminary or, having been ordained a priest,he was excommunicated. Those two contingencies did not arise, and could not have arisen, in this case because nonephew of the testator manifested any intention to enter the seminary or ever became a priest.

The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that this case is covered by article 888 of the old Civil Code, now article 956, which

provides that if "the bequest for any reason should be inoperative, it shall be merged into the estate, except in cases ofsubstitution and those in which the right of accretion exists" ("el legado . . . por qualquier causa, no tenga efecto, serefundir en la masa de la herencia, fuera de los casos de sustitucion y derecho de acrecer").

This case is also covered by article 912(2) of the old Civil Code, now article 960(2), which provides that legal succession

takes place when the will "does not dispose of all that belongs to the testator." There being no substitution nor accretion asto the said ricelands, the same should be distributed among the testators legal heirs. The effect is as if the testator hadmade no disposition as to the said ricelands.

The Civil Code recognizes that a person may die partly testate and partly intestate, or that there may be mixed succession.

The old rule as to the indivisibility of the testators will is no longer valid. Thus, if a conditional legacy does not takeeffect, there will be intestate succession as to the property covered by the said legacy (Macrohon Ong Ham v. Saavedra,51 Phil. 267).


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[G.R. No. L-17587. September 12, 1967.]

PHILIPPINE BANKING CORPORATION, representing the estate of JUSTINA SANTOS Y CANON

FAUSTINO, deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LUI SHE, in her own behalf and as administratrix of the intestate of

Wong Heng, deceased,

SYLLABUS

1. LEASE CONTRACT; RESOLUTORY CONDITION; OPTION, VALIDITY OF.Plaintiff-appellant assails thevalidity of the lease agreement for want of mutuality. Paragraph 5 of the lease contract states that the lessee may at any

time withdraw from the agreement. It is claimed that this stipulation offends article 1308 of the Civil Code. Held: Art.1256 (now 1308) of the Civil Code in our opinion creates no impediment to the insertion in a contract of a resolutorycondition permitting the cancellation of the contract by one of the parties. Such a stipulation, as can be readily seen, does

not make either the validity or the fulfillment of the contract upon the will of the party to whom is conceded the privilegeof cancellation; for where the contracting parties have agreed that such option shall exist, the exercise of the option is as

much in the fulfillment of the contract as any other act which may have been the subject of agreement. Indeed, thecancellation of a contract in accordance with conditions agreed upon beforehand is fulfillment (Taylor v. Tang Pao, 43

Phil. 873).

In the case of Singson Encarnacion v. Baldomar, 77 Phil. 470, the lessees argued that they could occupy the premises as

long as they paid the rent. This is of course untenable, for as this Court said, "If this defense were to be allowed, solong asdefendants elected to continue the lease by continuing the payment of the rentals, the owner would never be able to

discontinue it; conversely, although the owner should desire the lease to continue, the lessee could effectively thwart hispurpose if he should prefer to terminate the contract by the simple expedient of stopping payment of the rentals." Here incontrast, the right of the lessee to continue the lease or to terminate it is so circumscribed by the term of the contract that it

cannot be said that the continuance of the lease depends upon his will. At any rate, even if no term had been fixed in theagreement, this case would at most justify the fixing of a period but not the annulment of the contract.

2. PURCHASE AND SALE; CUSTODIA LEGIS; SALE, VALIDITY OF. That the land could not ordinarily be leviedupon while in custodia legis does not mean that one of the heirs may not sell the right, interest or participation which he

had or might have in the land under administration. The ordinary execution of property in custodia legis is prohibited inorder to avoid interference with the possession by the court. But the sale made by an heir of his share in an inheritance,

subject to the result of the pending administration, in no wise stands in the way of such administration." (Jakosalem v.Esfols, 73 Phil. 628).

3. CONTRACTS; CONSIDERATION; EFFECT OF.The fact that no money was paid at the time of the execution ofthe document does not rule out the possibility that the considerations were paid some other time as the contracts in fact

recite. What is more, the consideration need not pass from one party to the other at the time a contract is executed becausethe promise of one is the consideration of the other.

4. ID.; ALIENS; CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITION, CIRCUMVENTION OF.Where a scheme to circumvent theConstitutional prohibition against the transfer of lands to aliens is readily revealed as the purpose for the contracts then the

illicit purpose becomes the illegal cause rendering the contracts void. Thus, if an alien is given not only a lease of, but alsoan option to buy, a piece of land by virtue of which the Filipino owner cannot sell or otherwise dispose of his property,

this to last for 50 years, then it becomes clear that the arrangement is a virtual transfer of ownership whereby the ownerdivests himself in stages not only of the right to enjoy the land (jus possidendi jus utendi, just fruendi and jus abutendi)

but also of the right to dispose of it (jus disponendi)rights the sum total of which make up ownership. If this can be

done, then the Constitutional ban against alien landholding in the Philippines, as announced in Krivenko v. Register ofDeeds, is indeed in grave peril.

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; REMEDY OF PARTIES.It does not follow that because the parties are in pari delicto they will beleft where they are without relief. Article 1416 of the Civil Code provides as an exception to the rule in pari delicto that

"when the agreement is not illegal per se but is merely prohibited, and the prohibition by law is designed for the protectionof the plaintiff, he may, if public policy is thereby enhanced, recover what he has paid or delivered."cralaw virtua1aw

library6. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; TRANSFER OR ASSIGNMENT OF PRIVATE AGRICULTURAL LAND; REASON


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FOR PROVISION.The constitutional provision that save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agriculturalland shall be transferred or assigned except individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of

the public domain in the Philippines (Art. XIII, Sec. 5) is an expression of public policy to conserve lands for theFilipinos.

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; LANDS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN; PROHIBITION AGAINST ALIENLANDHOLDING; RECOVERY OF PROPERTY IN SALES ENTERED INTO PRIOR TO THE KRIVENKO

DECISION NOT AVAILABLE IN VIEW OF THE PARE DELICTO DOCTRINE. The doctrine as announced in thecase of Rellosa v. Gaw Chee Hun, 93 Phil. 827 is that while the sale by a Filipino-vendor to an alien-vendee of a

residential or a commercial lot is null and void as held in the Krivenko case, still the Filipino-vendor has no right torecover under a civil law doctrine, the parties being in pari delicto. The only remedy to prevent this continuing violationof the Constitution which the decision impliedly sanctions by allowing the alien vendees to retain the lots in question is

either escheat or reversion. Thus: "By following either of these remedies, or by approving an implementary law as abovesuggested, we can enforce the fundamental policy of our Constitution regarding our natural resources without doing

violence to the principle of pari delicto.

2. ID.; ID: ID.; ID.; APPLICATION OF THE PARI DELICTO RULE IN PREVIOUS CASES TOO EXTREME. Since the sales in question took place prior to the Krivenko decision, at a time when the assumption could be honestlyentertained that there was no constitutional prohibition against the sale of commercial or residential lots by Filipino-

vendor to alien-vendee, in the absence of a definite decision by the Supreme Court, it would not be doing violence toreason to free them from the imputation of evading the Constitution. For evidently evasion implies at the very least

knowledge of what is being evaded. The new Civil Code expressly provides: "Mistakes upon a doubtful or difficultquestion of law may be the basis of good faith." (Art. 526, par. 3). According to the Rellosa opinion, both parties areequally guilty of evasion of the Constitution, based on the broader principle that "both parties are presumed to know the

law." This statement that the sales entered into prior to the Krivenko decision were at that time already vitiated by a guiltyknowledge of the parties may be too extreme a view. It appears to ignore a postulate of a constitutional system, wherein

the words of the Constitution acquire meaning through Supreme Court adjudication.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RESTORATION BY ALIEN-VENDEE OF PROPERTY TO FILIPINO-VENDOR MAY BE

ALLOWED UPON RESTITUTION OF PURCHASE PRICE.Alien-vendee is incapacitated or disqualified to acquireand hold real estate. That incapacity and that disqualification should date from the adoption of the Constitution on

November 15, 1935. That in capacity and that disqualification, however, was made known to Filipino-vendor and to alien-vendee only upon the promulgation of the Krivenko decision on November 15, 1947 Alien-vendee therefore, cannot beallowed to continue owning and exercising acts of ownership over said property, when it is clearly included within the

constitutional prohibition. Alien-vendee should thus be made to restore the property with its fruits and rents to Filipino-vendor, its previous owner, if it could be shown that in the utmost good faith, he transferred his title over the same to

alien-vendee, upon restitution of the purchase price of course.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; REACQUISITION OF PROPERTY SOLD THE BETTER REMEDY IN CONSONANCEWITH THE DICTATES OF JUSTICE AND EQUITY.The Constitution frowns upon the title remaining in the alien-vendees. Restoration of the property upon payment of price received by Filipino vendor or its reasonable equivalent as

fixed by the court is the answer. To give the constitutional provision full force and effect, in consonance with the dictatesof equity and justice, the restoration to Filipino-vendor upon the payment of a price fixed by the court is the better

remedy. He thought he could transfer the property to an alien and did so. After the Krivenko case had made clear that hehad no right to sell nor an alien-vendee to purchase the property in question, the obvious solution would be for him toreacquire the same. That way the Constitution would be given, as it ought to be given, respect and deference.

Justina Santos y Canon Faustino and her sister Lorenza were the owners in common of a piece of land in Manila. This

parcel, with an area of 2,582.30 square meters, is located on Rizal Avenue and opens into Florentino Torres street at theback and Katubusan street on one side. In it are two residential houses with entrance on Florentino Torres street and theHen Wah Restaurant with entrance on Rizal Avenue. The sisters lived in one of the houses, while Wong Heng, a Chinese,

lived with his family in the restaurant. Wong had been a long-time lessee of a portion of the property, having a monthlyrental of P2,620.

On September 22, 1957 Justina Santos became the owner of the entire property as her sister died with no other heir. Then


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already well advanced in years, being at the time 90 years old, blind, crippled and an invalid, she was left with no otherrelative to live with. Her only companions in the house were her 17 dogs and 8 maids. Her otherwise already existence

was brightened now and then by the visits of Wongs four children who had become the joy of her life. Wongs himselfwas the trusted man to whom she delivered various amounts for safekeeping, including rentals from her property at the

corner of Ongpin and Salazar streets and the rentals which Wong himself paid as lessee of a part of the Rizal Avenueproperty. Wong also look care of the payment, in her behalf, of taxes, lawyers fees, funeral expenses, masses, salaries ofmaids and security guard, and her household expenses.

"In grateful acknowledgment of the personal services of the Lessee to her," Justina Santos executed on November 15,

1957, a contract of lease (Plff Exh. 3) in favor of Wong, covering the portion then already leased to him and anotherportion fronting Florentino Torres street. The lease was for 50 years, although the lessee was given the right to withdrawat any time from the agreement; the monthly rental was P3,120. The contract covered an area of 1,124 square meters. Ten

days later (November 25), the contract was amended (Plff Exh. 4) so as to make it cover the entire property, including theportion on which the house of Justina Santos stood, at an additional monthly rental of P360. For his part Wong undertook

to pay, out of the rental due from him, an amount not exceeding P1,000 a month for the food of her dogs and the salariesof her maids.

On December 21 she executed contract (Plff Exh. 7) giving Wong the option to buy the leased premises for P120,000,payable within ten years at a monthly installment of P1,000. The option, written in Tagalog, imposed on him the

obligation to pay for the food of the dogs and the salaries of the maids in her household, the charge not to exceed P1,800 amonth. The option was conditioned on his obtaining Philippine citizenship, a petition for which was then pending in the

Court of First Instance of Rizal. It appears, however, that this application for naturalization was withdrawn when it wasdiscovered that he was not a resident of Rizal. On October 28, 1958 she filed a petition to adopt him and his children onthe erroneous belief that adoption would confer on them Philippine citizenship. The error was discovered and the

proceedings were abandoned.

On November 18, 1958 she executed two other contracts, one (Plff Exh. 5) extending the term of the lease to 99 years,and another (Plff Exh. 6) fixing the term of the option at 50 years. Both contracts are written in Tagalog.

In two wills executed on August 24 and 29, 1959 (Def. Exhs. 285 & 279), she bade her legatees to respect the contractsshe had entered into with Wong, but in a codicil (Plff Exh. 17) of a later date (November 4, 1959) she appears to have a

change of heart. Claiming that the various contracts were made by her because of machinations and inducements practisedby him, she now directed her executor to secure the annulment of the contracts.

On November 18 the present action was filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila. The complaint alleged that thecontracts were obtained by Wong "through fraud, misrepresentation, inequitable conduct, undue influence and abuse of

confidence and trust of and (by) taking advantage of the helplessness of the plaintiff and were made to circumvent theconstitutional prohibition prohibiting aliens from acquiring lands in the Philippines and also of the Philippine

Naturalization Laws." The court was asked to direct the Register of Deeds of Manila to cancel the registration of thecontracts and to order Wong to pay Justina Santos the additional rent of P3,120 a month from November 15, 1957 on theallegation that the reasonable rental of the leased premises was P6,240 a month.

In his answer, Wong admitted that he enjoyed her trust and confidence as proof of which he volunteered the information

that, in addition to the sum of P3,000 which he said she had delivered to him for safekeeping, another sum of P22,000 hadbeen deposited in a joint account which he had with one of her maids. But he denied having taken advantage of her trustin order to secure the execution of the contracts in question. As counterclaim he sought the recovery of P9,210.49 which

he said she owed him for advances.

Wongs admission of the receipt of P22,000 and P3,000 was the cue for the filing of an amended complaint. Thus on June9, 1960, aside from the nullity of the contracts, the collection of various amounts allegedly delivered on differentoccasions was sought. These amounts and the dates of their delivery are P33,724.27 (Nov. 4, 1957); P7,344.42 (Dec. 1,

1957); P10,000 (Dec. 6, 1957); P22,000 and P3,000 (as admitted in his answer). An accounting of the rentals from theOngpin and Rizal Avenue properties was also demanded.

In the meantime as a result of a petition for guardianship filed in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, the Security


9/48

Bank & Trust Co. was appointed guardian of the properties of Justina Santos, while Ephraim G. Gochangco wasappointed guardian of her person.

In his answer, Wong insisted that the various contracts were freely and voluntarily entered into by the parties. He likewise

disclaimed knowledge of the sum of P33,724.27, admitted receipt of P7,344.42 and P10,000, but contended that theseamounts had been spent in accordance with the instructions of Justina Santos; he expressed readiness to comply with anyorder that the court might make with respect to the sum of P22,000 in the bank and P3,000 in his possession.

The case was heard, after which the lower court rendered judgment as follows:

" [A]ll the documents mentioned in the first cause of action, with the exception of the first which is the lease contract of15 November 1957, are declared null and void; Wong Heng is condemned to pay unto plaintiff thru guardian of her

property the sum of P55,554.25 with legal interest from the date of the filing of the amended complaint; he is also orderedto pay the sum of P3,120.00 for every month of his occupation as lessee under the document of lease herein sustained,

from 15 November 1959, and the moneys he had consigned since then shall be imputed to that; costs against WongHeng." virtua1aw library

From this judgment both parties appealed directly to this Court. After the case was submitted for decision, both partiesdied, Wong Heng on October 21, 1962 and Justina Santos on December 28, 1964. Wong was substituted by his wife, Lui

She, the other defendant in this case, While Justina Santos was substituted by the Philippine Banking Corporation.

Justina Santos maintainednow reiterated by the Philippine Banking Corporationthat the lease contract (Plff Exh. 3)should have been annulled along with the four other contracts (Plff Exhs. 4-7) because it lacks mutuality; because itincluded a portion which, at the time, was in custodia legis, because the contract was obtained in violation of the fiduciary

relations of the parties; because her consent was obtained through undue influence, fraud and misrepresentation; andbecause the lease contract, like the rest of the contracts, is absolutely simulated.

Paragraph 5 of the lease contract states that "The lessee may at any time withdraw from this agreement." It is claimed thatthis stipulation offends article 1308 of the Civil Code which provides that "the contract must bind both contracting parties;

its validity or compliance cannot be left to the will of one of them." library

We have had occasion to delineate the scope and application of article 1308 in the early case of Taylor v. Uy Tiong Piao.We said in the case:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Article 1256 [now art. 1308] of the Civil Code in our opinion creates no impediment to the insertion in a contract forpersonal service of a resolutory condition permitting the cancellation of the contract by one of the parties. Such a

stipulation, as can be readily seen, does not make either the validity or the fulfillment of the contract dependent upon thewill of the party to whom is conceded the privilege of cancellation; for where the contracting parties have agreed that suchoption shall exist, the exercise of the option is as much in the fulfillment of the contract as any other act which may have

been the subject of agreement, Indeed, the cancellation of a contract in accordance with conditions agreed uponbeforehand is fulfillment. 2

And so it was held in Melencio v. Dy Tiao Lay 3 that a "provision in a lease contract that the lessee at any time before he

erected any building on the land, might rescind the lease, can hardly be regarded as a violation of article 1256 [now art.1308] of the Civil Code." library

The case of Singson Encarnacion v. Baldomar cannot be cited in support of the claim of want of mutuality, because of adifference in factual setting. In that case, the lessees argued that they could occupy the premises as long as they paid the

rent. This is of course untenable, for as this Court said "If this defense were to be allowed, so long as defendants elected tocontinue the lease by continuing the payment of the rentals, the owner would never be able to discontinue it; conversely,although the owner should desire the lease to continue the lessees could effectively thwart his purpose if they should

prefer to terminate the contract by the simple expedient of stopping payment of the rentals." Here, in contrast, the right ofthe lessee to continue the lease or to terminate it is so circumscribed by the term of the contract that it cannot be said that

the continuance of the lease depends upon his will. At any rate, even if no term had been fixed in the agreement, this casewould at most justify the fixing of a period 5 but not the annulment of the contract.


10/48

Nor is there merit in the claim that as the portion of the property formerly owned by the sister of Justina Santos was still inthe process of settlement in the probate court at the time it was leased, the lease is invalid as to such portion. Justina

Santos became the owner of the entire property upon the death of her sister Lorenza on September 22, 1957 by force ofarticle 777 of the Civil Code. Hence, when she leased the property on November 15, she did so already as owner thereof.

As this Court explained in upholding the sale made by an heir of a property under judicial administration:

"That the land could not ordinarily be levied upon while in custodia legis does not mean that one of the heirs may not sell

the right, interest or participation which he has or might have in the lands under administration. The ordinary execution ofproperty in custodia legis is prohibited in order to avoid interference with the possession by the court. But the sale made

by an heir of his share in an inheritance, subject to the result of the pending administration, in no wise stands in the way ofsuch administration." 6

It is next contended that the lease contract was obtained by Wong in violation of his fiduciary relationship with JustinaSantos, contrary to article 1646, in relation to article 1941 of the Civil Code, which disqualifies "agents (from leasing) the

property whose administration or sale may have been entrusted to them." But Wong was never an agent of Justina Santos.The relationship of the parties, although admittedly close and confidential, did not amount to an agency so as to bring the

case within the prohibition of the law.

Just the same, it is argued that Wong so completely dominated her life and affairs that the contracts express not her will

but only his. Counsel for Justina Santos cites the testimony of Atty. Tomas S. Yumol who said that he prepared the leasecontract on the basis of the data given to him by Wong and that she told him that "what ever Mr. Wong wants must be

followed." 7

The testimony of Atty. Yumol cannot be read out of context in order to warrant a finding that Wong practically dictated

the terms of the contract. What his witness said was:

"Q Did you explain carefully to your client, Doa Justina the contents of this document before she signed it?

"A I explained to her each and every one of these conditions and I also told her these conditions were quite onerous for

her, I dont really know if I have expressed my opinion, but I told her that we would rather not execute any contractanymore, but to hold it as it was before, on a verbal month to month contract of lease.

"Q But, she did not follow your advice, and she went with the contract just the same?

"A She agreed first . . .

"Q Agreed what?

"A Agreed with my objections that it is really onerous and I was really right, but after that, I was called again by her andshe told me to follow the wishes of Mr. Wong Heng."Q So, as far as consent is concerned, you were satisfied that this document was perfectly proper?

"A. Your Honor, if I have to express my personal opinion, I would say she is not, because, as I said before, she told me"Whatever Mr. Wong wants must be followed." 8

Wong might indeed have supplied the data which Yumol embodied in the lease contract, but to say this is not to detractfrom the binding force of the contract. For the contract was fully explained to Justina Santos by her own lawyer. One

incident, related by the same witness, makes clear that she voluntarily consented to the lease contract. This witness saidthat the original term fixed for the lease was 99 years but that as he doubted the validity of a lease to an for that length of

time, he tried to persuade her to enter instead into a lease on a month-to-month basis. She was, however, firm andunyielding. Instead of heeding the advice of the lawyer, she ordered him, "Just follow Mr. Wong Heng." 9 Recounting theincident Atty. Yumol declared on cross examination:

"Considering her age, ninety (90) years old at the time and her condition, she is a wealthy woman, it is just natural when

she said This is what I want and this will be done. In Particular reference to this contract of lease, when I said This isnot proper, she said "You just go ahead, you prepare that, I am the owner, and if there is any illegality, I am the only


11/48

one that can question the illegality."

Atty. Yumol testified that she signed the lease contract in the presence of her close friend. Hermenegilda Lao, and hermaid, Natividad Luna, who was constantly by her side. 11 Any of them could have testified on the undue influence that

Wong supposedly wielded over Justina Santos, but neither of them was presented as a witness. The truth is that even aftergiving his client time to think the matter over, the lawyer could not make her change her mind. This persuaded the lowercourt to uphold the validity of the lease contract against the claim that it was procured through undue influence.

Indeed, the charge of undue influence in this case rests on a mere inference 12 drawn from the fact that Justina Santos

could not read (as she was blind) and did not understand the English language in which the contract is written, but thatinference has been overcome by her own evidence.

Nor is there merit in the claim that her consent to the lease contract, as well as to the rest of the contracts in question, wasgiven out of a mistaken sense of gratitude to Wong who, she was made to believe, had saved her and her sister from a fire

that destroyed their house during the liberation of Manila. For while a witness claimed that the sisters were saved by otherpersons (the brothers Edilberto and Mariano Sta. Ana) 13 it was Justina Santos herself who according to her own witness,

Benjamin C. Alonzo, said "very emphatically" that she and her sister would have perished in the fire had it been forWong. 14 Hence the recital in the deed of conditional option (Plff Exh. 7) that" [I]tong si Wong Heng ang siyangnagligtas sa aming dalawang magkapatid sa halos ay tiyak na kamatayan," and the equally emphatic avowal of gratitude in

the lease contract (Plff Exh. 3).

As it was with the lease contract (Plff Exh. 3), so it was with the rest of the contracts (Plff Exhs. 4-7)the consent ofJustina Santos was given freely and voluntarily. As Atty. Alonzo, testifying for her, said:

" [I]n nearly all documents, it was either Mr. Wong Heng or Judge Torres and/or both. When we had conferences theyused to tell me what the documents should contain. But, as I said, I would always ask the old woman about them and

invariably the old woman used to tell me: Thats okay. Its all right."

But the lower court set aside all the contracts, with the exception of the lease contract of November 15, 1957, on the

ground that they are contrary to the expressed wish of Justina Santos and that their considerations are fictitious. Wongstated in his deposition that he did not pay P360 a month for the additional premises leased to him because she did not

want him to, but the trial court did not believe him. Neither did it believe his statement that he paid P1,000 asconsideration for each of the contracts (namely, the option to buy the leased premises, the extension of the lease to 99years, and the fixing of the term of the option at 50 years), but that the amount was returned to him by her for safekeeping.

Instead, the court relied on the testimony of Atty. Alonzo in reaching the conclusion that the contracts are void for want ofconsideration.

Atty. Alonzo declared that he saw no money paid at the execution of the documents, but his negative testimony does notrule out the possibility that the consideration were paid at some other time as the contracts in fact recite. What is more, theconsideration need not pass from one party to the other at the time a contract is executed because the promise of one is theconsideration for the other. 16

With respect to the lower courts finding that in all probability Justina Santos could not have intended to part with her

property while she was alive nor even to lease it in its entirety as her house was built on it, suffice it to quote thetestimony of her own witness and lawyer who prepared the contracts (Plff Exhs. 4-7) in question, Atty. Alonzo:

"The ambition of the old woman before her death, according to her revelation to me, was to see to it that these propertiesbe enjoyed, even to own them, by Wong Heng because Doa Justina told me that she did not have any relatives, near or

far, and she considered Wong Heng as a son and his children her grandchildren; especially her consolation in life waswhen she would hear the children reciting prayers in Tagalog."

"She was very emphatic in the care of the seventeen (17) dogs and of the maids who helped her much, and she told me tosee to it that no one could disturb Wong Heng from those properties. That is why we thought of the ninety-nine (99) years

lease; we thought of the adoption, believing that thru adoption Wong Heng might acquire Filipino citizenship; being theadopted child of Filipino citizen." 18


12/48

This is not to say, however, that the contracts (Plff Exhs. 3-7) are valid. For the testimony just quoted while dispellingdoubt as to the intention of Justina Santos, at the same time gives the clue to what we view as a scheme to circumvent the

Constitutional prohibition against the transfer of land of aliens. "The illicit purpose then becomes the illegal causerendering the contracts void.

Taken singly, the contracts show nothing that is necessarily illegal, but considered collectively, they reveal an insidiouspattern to subvert by indirection what the Constitution directly prohibits. To be sure, a lease to an alien for a reasonable

period is valid. So is an option giving an alien the right to buy real property on condition that he is granted Philippinecitizenship. As this said in Krivenko v. Register of Deeds:

" [A]liens are not completely excluded by the Constitution form the use of lands for residential purposes. Since theirresidence in the Philippines is temporary, they may be granted temporary rights such as a lease contract which is not

forbidden by the Constitution. Should they desire to remain here forever and share our fortunes and misfortunes, Filipinocitizenship is not impossible to acquire."

But if an alien is given not only a lease of, but also an option to buy, a piece of land, by virtue of which the Filipino owner

cannot sell or otherwise dispose of his property, 21 this to last for 50 years, then it becomes clear that the arrangement is avirtual transfer of ownership whereby the owner divests himself in stages not only of the right to enjoy the land (jus

possidendi, jus utendi, jus fruendi and jus abutendi) but also of the right to dispose of it (jus disponendi)rights the sum

total of which make up ownership. It is just as if today the possession is transferred, tomorrow, the use, the next day, thedisposition, and so on, until ultimately all the rights of which ownership is made up are consolidated in an alien. And yet

this is just exactly what the parties in this case did within this pace of one year, with the result that Justina Santosownership of her property was reduced to a hollow concept. If this can be done, then the Constitutional ban against alienlandholding in the Philippines, as announced in Krivenko v. Register of Deeds, 22 is indeed in grave peril.

It does not follow from what has been said, however, that because the parties are in pari delicto they will be left where

they are, without relief. For one thing, the original parties who were guilty of a violation of the fundamental charter havedied and have since been substituted by their administrators to whom it would be unjust to impute their guilt. 23 Foranother thing, and is not only cogent but also important, article 1416 of the Civil Code provides, as an exception to the

rule on pari delicto, that When the agreement, is not illegal per se but is merely prohibited and the prohibition by law isdesigned for the protection of the plaintiff, he may, if public policy is thereby enhanced, recover what he has paid or

delivered." The Constitutional provision that "Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall betransferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the publicdomain in the Philippines 24 is an expression of public policy to conserve lands for the Filipinos. As this Court said in

Krivenko:

"It is well to note at this juncture that in the present case we have no choice. We are construing the Constitution as it isand not as we may desire it to be. Perhaps the effect of our construction is to preclude aliens admitted freely into thePhilippines from owning sites where they may build their homes. But if this is the solemn mandate of the Constitution wewill not attempt to compromise it even in the name of amity or equity.

"For all the foregoing, we hold that under the Constitution aliens may not acquire private or public agricultural lands,including residential lands and, accordingly, judgment is affirmed, without costs."

That policy would be defeated and its continued violation sanctioned if, instead of setting the contracts aside and orderingthe restoration of the land to the estate of the deceased Justina Santos, this Court should apply the general rule of pari

delicto. To the extent that our ruling in this case conflicts with that laid down in Rellosa v. Gaw Chee Hun 26 andsubsequent similar cases, the latter must be considered as pro tanto qualified.

The claim for increased rentals and attorneys fees made in behalf of Justina Santos, must be denied for lack of merit.

And what of the various amounts which Wong received in trust from her? It appears that he kept two classes of accounts,one pertaining to amounts which she entrusted to him from to time, and another pertaining to rentals from the Ongpin

property and from the Rizal Avenue property, which he himself was leasing.


13/48

With respect to the first account, the evidence shows that he received P33,724.27 on November 8, 1957 (Plff. Exh. 16);P7,354.42 on December 1, 1957 (Plff. Exh. 13); 10,000 on December 6, 1957 (Plff. Exh. 14); and P18,928.50 on August

26, 1959 (Def. Exh. 246), or a total of P70,007.19. He claims, however, that he settled his accounts and that last amount ofP18,928.50 was in fact payment to him of what in the liquidation was found to be due to him.

He made disbursements from this account to discharge Justina Santos obligations for taxes, attorneys fees, funeralservices and security guard services, but the checks (Def. Exhs. 247-278) drawn by him for this purpose amount to only

P38,442.84 27 Besides, if he had really settled his accounts with her on August 26, 1959, we cannot understand why hestill had P22,000 in the bank and P3,000 in his possession, or a total of P25,000. In his answer, he offered to pay this

amount if the court so directed him. On these two grounds, therefore, his claim of liquidation and settlement of accountsmust be rejected.

After subtracting P38,442.84 (expenditures) from P70,007.19 (receipts), there is a difference of P31,564 which, added tothe amount of P25,000, leaves a balance of P56,564.35 28 in favor of Justina Santos.

As to the second account, the evidence shows that the monthly income from the Ongpin property until its sale in July,

1959 was P1,000 and that from the Rizal Avenue property, of which Wong was the lessee, was P3,120. Against thisaccount the household expenses and disbursements for the care of the 17 dogs and the salaries of the 8 maids of JustinaSantos were charged. This account is contained in a notebook (Def. Exh. 6) which shows a balance of P9,310.49 in favor

of Wong. But it is claimed that the rental from both the Ongpin and Rizal Avenue properties was more than enough to payfor her monthly expenses and that, as a matter of fact, there should be a balance in her favor. The lower court did not

allow either party to recover against the other. Said court:

" [T]he documents bear the earmarks of genuineness; the trouble is that they were made only be Francisco Wong and

Antonia Matias, nick-name Toning,which was the way she signed the loose sheets, and there is no clear proof thatDoa Justina had authorized these two to act for her in such liquidation; on the contrary if the result of that was a deficit

as alleged and sought to be there shown, of P9,210.49, that was not what Doa Justina apparently understood for as thecourt understands her statement to the Honorable Judge of the Juvenile Court . . . the reason why she preferred to stay inher home was because there she did not incur in any debts . . . this being the case, .. the Court will not adjudicate in favor

of Wong Heng on his counterclaim; on the other hand, while it is claimed that the expenses were much less than therentals and there in fact should be a superavit, . . . this Court must concede that daily expenses are not easy to compute, for

this reason, the Court faced with the choice of the two alternatives will choose the middle course which after all ispermitted by the rules of proof, Sec. 69, Rule 123 for in the ordinary course of things, a person will live within his incomeso that the conclusion of the Court will be that there is neither deficit nor superavit and will let the matter rest here."

Both parties on appeal reiterate their respective claims but we agree with the lower court that both claims should be

denied. Aside from the reasons given by the court, We think that the claim of Justina Santos totalling P37,235 as rentalsdue to her after deducting various expenses, should be rejected s the evidence is none too clear about the amounts spent byWong for food, 29 masses 30 salaries of of her maid. 31 His claim for P9,210.49 must likewise be rejected as hisaverment of liquidation is belied by his own admission that even as late as 1960 he still had P22,000 in the bank andP3,000 in his possession.

ACCORDINGLY, the contracts in question (Plff Exhs. 3-7) are annulled and set aside; the land subject-matter of the

contracts is ordered returned to the estate of Justina Santos as represented by the Philippine Banking Corporation; WongHeng (as substituted by the defendant-appellant Lui She) is ordered to pay the Philippine Banking Corporation the sum ofP56,567.35, with legal interest from the date of the filing of the amended complaint; and the amounts consigned in court

by Wong Heng shall be applied to the payment of rental from November 15, 1959 until the premises shall have beenvacated by his heirs. Costs against the defendant-appellant.


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[G.R. No. 48627. February 19, 1943. ]

TESTATE ESTATE OF VICENTE SINGSON PABLO, deceased. ROSALIA ROSARIO VDA. DE SINGSON,

Petitioner-Appellee, v. JOSEFINA F. VDA. DE LIM, oppositor-appellee, EMILIA FLORENTINO ET AL.,

oppositors-appellees, EVARISTO SINGSON ET AL., Oppositors-Appellants.

SYLLABUS

DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION; INTERPRETATION OF TESTAMENTARY PROVISION IN CONNECTIONWITH ARTICLE 751 OF THE CIVIL CODE.Don Vicente Singson Pablo, a lawyer, died without any descendant or

ascendant, his nearest surviving relatives being his widow, four brothers, and four nieces, the children of a deceased sisterHe left a will which was duly probated, clause 8 of which provides that "all of my properties not disposed of otherwise inthis testament shall be distributed in equal parts to all who are entitled thereto." Article 751 of the Civil Code, in turn,

provides that "a disposition made in general terms in favor of the testators relatives shall be understood as made in favorof those nearest in degree." The authorities differ on the interpretation of article 751. Some hold that under said article the

nephews and nieces inherit by representation together with the brothers and sisters of the testator, as in legal succession;while others, Manresa among them, hold that said article excludes nephews and nieces when brothers and sisters survive.

Held: That the testator, by referring to "all who are entitled thereto," instead of referring to his "relatives," precisely meantto avoid the uncertainty of the interpretation of article 751 and to indicate his wish that the residue of his estate bedistributed in equal parts to all who would have been entitled to inherit from him had he died intestate.

Don Vicente Singson Pablo, a lawyer of Vigan, Ilocos Sur, died on April 15, 1938, without any descendant or ascendant,

his nearest surviving relatives being his widow Doa Rosalia Rosario, four brothers, and four nieces, the children of adeceased sister. He left a will which was duly probated, clause 8 of which reads as follows:

The widow, as administratrix, presented a project of partition in which the properties not disposed of in the will wereadjudicated to the four brothers and the four nieces of the deceased "in the proportion provided in paragraph 8 of the will."

The brothers, appellants herein, objected to the project of partition insofar as it includes the nieces of the deceased, on theground that under clause 8 of the will, in relation to article 751 of the Civil Code, they were not entitled to any share. Thenieces also objected to the project of partition, alleging that certain other specified properties had been omitted therefrom,

which formed part of the properties not disposed of and which under clause 8 of the will "should be distributed in equalparts to all who are entitled thereto." The trial court sustained the contention of the nieces (appellees herein) and ordered

the administratrix "to amend the project of partition so as to include therein the said properties and that all of those notdisposed of in the will be adjudicated in equal parts to the brothers and nieces of the deceased." library

The only question raised in this appeal is the interpretation of clause 8 of the will above quoted. Said clause provides that"all of my properties not disposed of otherwise in this testament shall be distributed in equal parts to all who are entitled

thereto." In this connection appellants invoke article 751 of the Civil Code, which provides that "a disposition made ingeneral terms in favor of the testators relatives shall be understood as made in favor of those nearest in degree." virtua1aw libraryThe trial court noted that the testator, who was a lawyer, did not use the word "relatives" in the clause in question. We donot need to decide here whether, had the testator used the word "relatives," the nieces would be excluded. The authorities

differ on the interpretation of article 751. Some hold that under said article the nephews and nieces inherit byrepresentation together with the brothers and sisters of the testator, as in legal succession; while others, Manresa among

them, hold that said article excludes nephews and nieces when brothers and sisters survive. We think the testator, byreferring to "all who are entitled thereto," instead of referring to his "relatives," precisely meant to avoid the uncertainty ofthe interpretation of article 751 and to indicate his wish that the residue of his estate be distributed in equal parts to all

who would have been entitled to inherit from him had he died intestate.

The order appealed from is affirmed, with costs. So ordered.


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[G.R. No. L-18753. March 26, 1965.]

VICENTE B. TEOTICO, Petitioner-Appellant, v. ANA DEL VAL CHAN, ETC., Oppositor-Appellant.

SYLLABUS

1. CITIZENSHIP; NATURALIZATION; ALIEN WIFE OF CITIZEN NOT AUTOMATICALLY CITIZEN BUT MUSTPROVE COMPLIANCE WITH REQUIREMENTS.The alien wife of a Filipino citizen does not automatically

become a Philippine citizen upon her husbands naturalization. She must first prove that she has all the qualificationsrequired by Section 2 and none of the disqualifications enumerated in Section 4 of the Naturalization Law before she may

be deemed a Philippine citizen.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; REASON FOR RULE; POLICY OF SELECTIVE ADMISSION TO PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP.

The rule laid down by this Court in this and in other cases heretofore decided is believed to be in line with the nationalpolicy of selective admission to Philippine citizenship which after all is a privilege granted only to those who are found

worthy thereof, and not indiscriminately to anybody at all on the basis alone of marriage to a man who is a citizen of thePhilippines, irrespective of moral character, ideological belief, and identification with Filipino ideals, customs and

traditions.

Maria Mortera y Balsalobre Vda. de Aguirre died on July 14, 1955 in the City of Manila leaving properties worth

P600,000.00. She left a will written in Spanish which she executed at her residence in No. 2 Legarda St., Quiapo, Manila.She affixed her signature at the bottom of the will and on the left margin of each and every page thereof in the presence of

Pilar Borja, Pilar G. Sanchez, and Modesto Formilleza, who in turn affixed their signatures below the attestation clauseand on the left margin of each and every page of the will in the presence of the testatrix and of each other. Said will wasacknowledged before Notary Public Niceforo S. Agaton by the testatrix and her witnesses.

In said will the testatrix made the following preliminary statement: that she was possessed of the full use of her mental

faculties; that she was free from illegal pressure or influence of any kind from the beneficiaries of the will and from anyinfluence of fear or threat; that she freely and spontaneously executed said will and that she had neither ascendants nordescendants of any kind such that she could dispose of all her estate.

Among the many legacies and devises made in the will was one of P20,000.00 to Rene A. Teotico, married to the

testatrixs niece named Josefina Mortera. To said spouses the testatrix left the usufruct of her interest in the Calvobuilding, while the naked ownership thereof she left in equal parts to her grandchildren who are the legitimate children ofsaid spouses. The testatrix also instituted Josefina Mortera as her sole and universal heir to all the remainder of her

properties not otherwise disposed of in the will.

On July 17, 1955, Vicente B. Teotico filed a petition for the probate of the will before the Court of First Instance ofManila which was set for hearing on September 3, 1955 after the requisite publication and service to all parties concerned.

Ana del Val Chan, claiming to be an adopted child of Francisca Mortera, a deceased sister of the testatrix, as well as anacknowledged natural child of Jose Mortera, a deceased brother of the same testatrix, filed on September 2, 1955 an

opposition to the probate of the will alleging the following grounds: (1) said will was not executed as required by law; (2)the testatrix was physically and mentally incapable to execute the will at the time of its execution; and (3) the will was

executed under duress, threat or influence of fear.

Vicente B. Teotico filed a motion to dismiss the opposition alleging that the oppositor had no legal personality to

intervene. The probate court, after due hearing, allowed the oppositor to intervene as an adopted child of FranciscoMortera, and on June 17, 1959, the oppositor amended her opposition by alleging the additional ground that the will is

inoperative as to the share of Dr. Rene Teotico because the latter was the physician who took care of the testatrix duringher last illness.

After the parties had presented their evidence, the probate court rendered its decision on November 10, 1960 admitting thewill to probate but declaring the disposition made in favor of Dr. Rene Teotico void with the statement that the portion to

be vacated by the annulment should pass to the testatrixs heirs by way of intestate succession.


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Petitioner Teotico, together with the universal heir Josefina Mortera, filed a motion for reconsideration of that part of thedecision which declares the portion of the estate to be vacated by the nullity of the legacy made to Dr. Rene Teotico as

passing to the legal heirs, while the oppositor filed also a motion for reconsideration of the portion of the judgment whichdecrees the probate of the will. On his part, Dr. Rene Teotico requested leave to intervene and to file a motion for

reconsideration with regard to that portion of the decision which nullified the legacy made in his favor.

The motions for reconsideration above adverted to having been denied, both petitioner and oppositor appealed from the

decision, the former from that portion which nullifies the legacy in favor of Dr. Rene Teotico and declares the vacatedportion as subject of succession in favor of the legal heirs, and the latter from that portion which admits the will to

probate. And in this instance both petitioner and oppositor assign several error which, stripped of non-essentials, may beboiled down to the following: (1) Has oppositor Ana del Val Chan the right to intervene in this proceeding?; (2) Has thewill in question been duly admitted to probate?; and (3) Did the probate court commit an error in passing on the intrinsic

validity of the provisions of the will and in determining who should inherit the portion to be vacated by the nullification ofthe legacy made in favor of Dr. Rene Teotico?

These issues will be discussed separately.

1. It is a well-settled rule that in order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a probate proceeding he must have aninterest in the estate, or in the will, or in the property to be affected by it either as executor or as a claimant of the estate

(Ngo The Hua v. Chung Kiat Hua, Et Al., L-17091, September 30, 1963); and an interested party has been defined as onewho would be benefitted by the estate such as an heir or one who has a claim against the estate like a creditor (Idem.). On

the other hand, in Saguinsin v. Lindayag, Et Al., L-17750, December 17, 1962, this Court said:

"According to Section 2, Rule 80 of the Rules of Court, a petition for letters of administration must be filed by an

interested person. An interested party has been defined in this connection as one who would be benefitted by the estate,such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor (Intestate Estate of Julio Magbanwa 40 O.G.,

1171). And it is well settled in this jurisdiction that in civil actions as well as special proceedings, the interest required inorder that a person may be a party thereto must be material and direct, and not merely indirect or contingent. (Trillana v.Crisostomo, G. R. No. L-3370, August 22, 1951; Rapinosa v. Barrion, 70 Phil. 311)." library

The question now may be asked: Has oppositor any interest in any of the provisions of the will, and, in the negative,

would she acquire any right to the estate in the event that the will is denied probate?

Under the terms of the will, oppositor has no right to intervene because she has no interest in the estate either as heir,

executor, or administrator, nor does she have any claim to any property affected by the will, because it nowhere appearstherein any provision designating her as heir, legatee or devisee of any portion of the estate. She has also no interest in the

will either as administratrix or executrix. Neither has she any claim against any portion of the estate because she is not aco-owner thereof, and while she previously had an interest in the Calvo building located in Escolta, she had alreadydisposed of it long before the execution of the will.

In the supposition that the will is denied probate, would the oppositor acquire any interest in any portion of the estate left

by the testatrix? She would acquire such right only if she were a legal heir of the deceased, but she is not under our CivilCode. It is true that oppositor claims to be an acknowledged natural child of Jose Mortera, a deceased brother of the

deceased, and also an adopted daughter of Francisca Mortera, a deceased sister of the testatrix, but such claim cannot giveher any comfort for, even if it be true, the law does not give her any right to succeed to the estate of the deceased sister of

both Jose Mortera and Francisca Mortera. And this is so because being an illegitimate child she is prohibited by law from

succeeding to the legitimate relatives of her natural father. Thus, Article 992 of our Civil Code provides: "An illegitimatechild has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; . . ." And the

philosophy behind this provision is well expressed in Grey v. Fabie, 68 Phil., 128, as follows:

"Between the natural child and the legitimate relatives of the father or mother who acknowledged it, the Code denies any

right of succession. They cannot be called relatives and they have no right to inherit. Of course, there is a blood tie, but thelaw does not recognize it. In this, article 943 is based upon the reality of the facts and upon the presumptive will of the

interested parties; the natural child is disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate family; the legitimate family is, inturn, hated by the natural child; the latter considers the privileged condition of the former and the resources of which it is


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thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the natural child nothing but the product of sin, a palpable evidence of ablemish upon the family. Every relation is ordinarily broken in life; the law does no more them recognize this truth, by

avoiding further grounds of resentment. (7 Manresa, 3d ed., p. 110.)"

The oppositor cannot also derive comfort from the fact that she is an adopted child of Francisca Mortera because underour law the relationship established by adoption is limited solely to the adopter and the adopted does not extend to therelatives of the adopting parents or of the adopted child except only as expressly provided for by law. Hence, no

relationship is created between the adopted and the collaterals of the adopting parents. As a consequence, the adopted isan heir of the adopter but not of the relatives of the adopter.

"The relationship established by the adoption, however, is limited to the adopting parent, and does not extend to his otherrelatives, except as expressly provided by law. Thus, the adopted child cannot be considered as a relative of the

ascendants and collaterals of the adopting parents, nor of the legitimate children which they may have after the adoption,except that the law imposes certain impediments to marriage by reason of adoption. Neither are the children of the

adopted considered as descendants of the adopter. The relationship created is exclusively between, the adopter and theadopted, and does not extend to the relatives of either." (Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. 1, p. 652)

"Relationship by adoption is limited to adopter and adopted, and does not extend to other members of the family of either;but the adopted is prohibited to marry the children of the adopter to avoid scandal." (An Outline of Philippines Civil law

by Justice Jose B. L, Reyes and Ricardo C. Puno, Vol. 1, p. 313; See also Caguioa, Comments and Cases on Civil law,1955, Vol. 1, pp. 312-313; Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines, 1959 ed., Vol. 1, p. 515)

It thus appears that the oppositor has no right to intervene either as testamentary or as legal heir in this probate proceedingcontrary to the ruling of the court a quo.

2. The next question to be determined is whether the will Exhibit A was duly admitted to probate. Oppositor claims that

the same should not have been admitted not only because it was not properly attested to but also because it was procuredthru pressure and influence and the testatrix affixed her signature by mistake believing that it contained her true intent.

The claim that the will was not properly attested to is contradicted by the evidence of record. In this respect it is fit that westate briefly the declarations of the instrumental witnesses.

Pilar Borja testified that the testatrix was in perfect state of health at the time she executed the will for she carried herconversation with her intelligently; that the testatrix signed immediately above the attestation clause and on each and

every page thereof at the left-hand margin in the presence of the three instrumental witnesses and the notary public; that itwas the testatrix herself who asked her and the other witnesses to act as such; and that the testatrix was the first one to

sign and later she gave the will to the witnesses who read and signed it.

Pilar G. Sanchez also testified that she knew the testatrix since 1945; that it was the testatrix herself who asked her to be awitness to the will; that the testatrix was the first one to sign and she gave the will later to the witnesses to sign andafterwards she gave it to the notary public; that on the day of the execution of the will the testatrix was in the best of

health.

Modesto Formilleza also testified that he was asked by the testatrix to be one of the witnesses to the will; that he read andunderstood the attestation clause before he signed the document, and that all the witnesses spoke either in Spanish or inTagalog. He finally said that the instrumental witnesses and the testatrix signed the will at the same time and place and

identified their signatures.

This evidence which has not been successfully refuted proves conclusively, that the will was duly executed because it wassigned by the testatrix and her instrumental witnesses and the notary public in the manner provided for by law.

The claim that the will was procured by improper pressure and influence is also belied by the evidence. On this point thecourt a quo made the following observation:

"The circumstance that the testatrix was then living under the same roof with Dr. Rene Teotico is no proof adequate in law


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to sustain the conclusion that there was improper pressure and undue influence. Nor is the alleged fact of isolation of thetestatrix from the oppositor and her witnesses, for their supposed failure to see personally the testatrix, attributable to the

vehemence of Dr. Rene Teotico to exclude visitors, took place years after the execution of the will on May 17, 1951.Although those facts may have some weight to support the theory of the oppositor, yet they must perforce yield to the

weightier fact that nothing could have prevented the testatrix, had she really wanted to, from subsequently revoking her1951 will if it did not in fact reflect and express her own testamentary dispositions. For, as testified to by the oppositorand her witnesses, the testatrix was often seen at the Escolta, in Quiapo and in Sta. Cruz, Manila, walking and

accompanied by no one. In fact, on different occasions, each of them was able to talk with her."

We have examined the evidence on the matter and we are fully in accord with the foregoing observation. Moreover, themere claim that Josefina Mortera and her husband Rene Teotico had the opportunity to exert pressure on the testatrixsimply because she lived in their house several years prior to the execution of the will and that she was old and suffering

from hypertension in that she was virtually isolated from her friends for several years prior to her death is insufficient todisprove what the instrumental witnesses had testified that the testatrix freely and voluntarily and with full consciousness

of the solemnity of the occasion executed the will under consideration. The exercise of improper pressure and undueinfluence must be supported by substantial evidence and must be of a kind that would overpower and subjugate the mind

of the testatrix as to destroy her free agency and make her express the will of another rather than her own (Coso v. Deza,42 Phil., 596). The burden is on the person challenging the will that such influence was exerted at the time of itsexecution, a matter which here was not done, for the evidence presented not only is sufficient but was disproved by the

testimony the instrumental witnesses.

3. The question of whether the probate court could determine the intrinsic validity of the provisions of a will has beendecided by this Court in a long line of decisions among which the following may be cited:

"Opposition to the intrinsic validity or legality of the provisions of the will cannot be entertained in probate proceedingbecause its only purpose is merely to determine if the will has been executed in accordance with the requirements of the

law." (Palacios v. Palacios, 58 O.G. 220)

". . . The authentication of a will decides no other questions than such as touch upon the capacity of the testator and the

compliance with those requisites or solemnities which the law prescribes for the validity of wills. It does not determinenor even by implication prejudge the validity or efficiency of the provisions; these may be impugned as being vicious or

null, notwithstanding its authentication. The questions relating to these points remain entirely unaffected, and may beraised even after the will has been authenticated. . . .

"From the fact that the legalization of a will does not validate the provisions therein contained, it does not follow that suchprovisions lack of efficiency, or fail to produce the effects which the law recognizes when they are not impugned by

anyone. In the matter of wills it is a fundamental doctrine that the will of the testator is the law governing the interestedparties, and must be punctually complied with in so far as it is not contrary to the law or to public morals." (Montaano v.Suesa, 14 Phil., pp. 676, 679-680)

"To establish conclusively as against everyone, and once for all, the facts that a will was executed with the formalities

required by law and that the testator was in a condition to make a will, is the only purpose of the proceedings under thenew code for the probate of a will. (Sec. 625.) The judgment in such proceedings determines and can determine nothing

more. In them the court has no power to pass upon the validity of any provisions made in the will. It can not decide, forexample, that a certain legacy is void and another one valid." Castaeda v. Alemany, 3 Phil., 426, 428)

Pursuant to the foregoing precedents the pronouncement made by the court a quo declaring invalid the legacy made to Dr.Rene Teotico in the will Exhibit A must be set aside as having been made in excess of its jurisdiction. Another reason why

said pronouncement should be set aside is that the legatee was not given an opportunity to defend the validity of thelegacy for he was not allowed to intervene in this proceeding. As a corollary, the other pronouncements, touching on thedisposition of the estate in favor of some relatives of the deceased should also be set aside for the same reason.

WHEREFORE, with the exception of that portion of the decision which declares that the will in question has been duly

executed and admitted the same to probate, the rest of the decision is hereby set aside. This case is ordered remanded tothe court a quo for further proceedings. No pronouncement as to costs.


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[G.R. No. 2599. October 27, 1905. ]

CARMEN LINART Y PAVIA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MARIA JUANA UGARTE Y ITURRALDE, Defendant-

SYLLABUS

1. INTESTATE SUCCESSION; COLLATERAL HEIRS; REPRESENTATIONS.The intestate left as heirs T., thedaughter of a sister of the deceased, and C., a granddaughter of another sister of the deceased: Held, That C. was entitled

to no part of the inheritance. (Arts. 921, 925, Civil Code.)

2. ID.; CHILDREN; GRANDCHILDREN.The word children in intestate estates can not include "grandchildren."

Ramon Iturralde y Gonzalez having died intestate on the 28th of December, 1900, Maria Juana Ugarte e Iturralde asked

that she be judicially declared the legitimate heir of the deceased.

There being no legitimate heirs to the estate either in the direct ascendant line of succession, the petitioner presentedherself as a collateral descendant - that is to say, as the legitimate niece of the deceased. Her mother, Maria Juana Iturralde

y Gonzalez, as well as the deceased, Ramon Iturralde y Gonzalez, were children of Manuel Iturralde and Josefa Gonzalez.

The petition of Maria Juana Ugarte e Iturralde, then the only claimant to the estate, having been heard in accordance with

the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure in force at the time, intestate proceedings were instituted, and she wasdeclared, in an order made on the 31st of January, 1901, without prejudice to third parties, to be the heir of the deceased,

Ramon Iturralde y Gonzalez.

In the month of December, 1904, however, Carmen Linart, through her guardian, Rafaela Pavia, claimed one-half of all

the estate of the deceased, Ramon Iturralde y Gonzales, and asked at the same time that Maria Juana Ugarte e Iturralde,who had been declared the lawful heir of the deceaseda fact which this new relative did not denybe required to

render an account of the property of the estate.

The father of the petitioner was in the same collateral degree of succession as Maria Juana Ugarte e Iturralde. Pablo

Linart, the father of Carmen Linart, was the legitimate son of Maria Josefa Iturralde y Gonzalez, another sister of RamonIturralde y Gonzalez. They, and Maria Juana Iturralde y Gonzalez are the common trunk from which the three branches

issue

Documents

Legacies and Devises