FIRST DIVISION 

[G.R. No. 177761 : April 18, 2012] 

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, APPELLEE, VS. REMEDIOS TANCHANCO Y PINEDA, APPELLANT.

D E C I S I O N 

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Theft becomes qualified when it is committed with grave abuse of confidence.[1]cralaw 

Factual Antecedents

On appeal is the September 27, 2006 Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR. CR-H.C. No. 01409 which affirmed with modification the July 4, 2005 Decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Piñas City, Branch 198, finding appellant Remedios Tanchanco y Pineda (appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified theft.

The Information[4] against appellant contained the following accusatory allegations:

That during the period from October 2000 to May 8, 2001, in the City of Las Piñas, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above–named Accused, being then employed as Legal Secretary and Liaison Officer of ComplainantATTY. REBECCA MANUEL Y AZANZA, with intent [to] gain, with grave abuse of confidence and without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal, and carry away cash money amounting to Four Hundred Seventeen Thousand Nine Hundred Twenty-two [Pesos] and ninety centavos (P417,922.90) [from] said Complainant, to the damage and prejudice of the latter x x x.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[5]

The appellant entered a plea of “not guilty” during her arraignment.   Thereafter, trial ensued.

Version of the Prosecution

Private complainant Atty. Rebecca Manuel y Azanza (Rebecca) knew appellant for more than 25 years, the latter being the niece of her long-time neighbor.  During this period, Rebecca and her children established a close relationship with appellant to the point that they treated her as a member of their family.  In June 1999, Rebecca hired appellant to work in her office as legal secretary and liaison officer.  One of appellant’s tasks as liaison officer was to process the transfer of titles of Rebecca’s clients.

In the course of appellant’s employment, Rebecca noticed that the completion of the transfer of titles was taking longer than usual.  Upon inquiry, appellant attributed the delay to the cumbersome procedure of transferring titles, as well as to the fact that personnel processing the documents could not be bribed.  Rebecca took appellant’s word for it.  However, appellant suddenly abandoned her job on April 18, 2001.  And

when Rebecca reviewed appellant’s unfinished work, she discovered that the latter betrayed her trust and confidence on several occasions by stealing sums of money entrusted to her as payment for capital gains tax, documentary stamp tax, transfer tax and other expenses intended for the transfer of the titles of properties from their previous owners to Rebecca’s clients.

According to Rebecca, she gave appellant P39,000.00 as payment for donor’s tax in connection with a Deed of Donation and Acceptance and Deed of Partition by Donees/Co-Owners, which her client Tomas Manongsong (Tomas) paid for the partitioning of a parcel of land located in Batangas.  Upon verification from the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), however, it turned out that appellant paid only P31,709.08.  This was confirmed by the Bank of Commerce,[6] where appellant made such payment.

Appellant also received P20,000.00 from Tomas’s wife, Mila Manongsong, for the processing of the properties’ land titles. Appellant liquidated the same in a handwritten statement[7] in which she indicated payment of P10,089.45 for transfer tax under Official Receipt (OR) No. 1215709 and of P7,212.00 for registration with the Registry of Deeds of Bauan, Batangas under OR No. 5970738.  An inquiry, however, later revealed that OR No. 1215709 was issued only for the amount of P50.00, representing payment for the issuance of a certified true copy of a tax declaration,[8] while OR No. 5970738 was never issued per Certification[9] from the same Registry of Deeds.  Rebecca also found out that the documents relevant to the said transfer of titles are still with the BIR since the amount of P4,936.24 had not yet been paid.

Appellant also duped Rebecca relative to the P105,000.00 for the payment of the capital gains and documentary stamp taxes.  Said taxes arose from the sale of a house and lot covered by TCT No. (62911) T-33899-A to her client Dionisia Alviedo (Alviedo). Appellant submitted a liquidation statement[10] stating that she paid the sums of P81,816.00 as capital gains tax and P20,460.00 for documentary stamp tax under Equitable Bank OR Nos. 937110 and 937111, respectively.  However, said bank certified that said ORs do not belong to the series of ORs issued by it.[11]  As a result, Rebecca was constrained to pay these taxes with the corresponding penalties and surcharges.

Rebecca further alleged that in connection with the payment of the capital gains and documentary stamp taxes imposed on the property of another client, Carmelita Sundian (Sundian), she gave appellant P120,000.00. Appellant purportedly presented a handwritten liquidation report stating that she paid the amounts of P94,281.00 as capital gains tax and P23,571.00 as documentary stamp tax under Equitable Bank OR Nos. 717228[12] and 717229.[13]  Appellant also stated that the balance  from the money intended for processing the papers of Sundian was only P2,148.00.[14]  However, Rebecca discovered upon verification that the receipts submitted by appellant are bogus as Equitable Bank issued a Certification[15] that said ORs were issued to different persons and for different amounts.  Rebecca was again forced to refund the sum to Sundian.

With regard to Rebecca’s client Rico Sendino, Rebecca claimed that she gave appellant P35,000.00 for the payment of capital gains and transfer taxes in connection with the deed of sale executed between one Priscilla Cruz and her said client.  In the handwritten liquidation statement[16] submitted to her by appellant, the latter claimed to have paid the amount of P35,000.00 under Traders Royal Bank OR No. 1770047.[17]  Again, the receipt turned out to be a fake as said bank issued a Certification[18]negating the issuance of said OR.  And just as in transactions with her other clients, Rebecca was

forced to shell-out money from her own funds to pay the same.

Leilani Gonzaga (Gonzaga) was another client of Rebecca who engaged her services to pay the capital gains tax imposed on the sale of a property.  After Rebecca told appellant to go to the BIR, the latter indicated in her handwritten liquidation statement that she paid the capital gains tax using two Equitable PCI Manager’s Checks for which she was issued OR Nos. 1770016 and 1770017, and cash payments of P71,184.00 under OR No. 1770018 and P17, 805.00 under OR No. 1770019.[19]  However, no payments were actually made.  To complete the processing of the transaction, Rebecca had to pay the sum of P3,273.00 to the Registry of Deeds and P9,050.00 for the transfer tax imposed on the transaction.

The same thing happened with the payment of capital gains tax as a result of a Deed of Transfer with Partition Agreement of a Land executed between Rebecca’s client Edmer and his siblings, Evelyn and Renato, all surnamed Mandrique.[20] This time, appellant showed Rebecca a donor’s tax return[21]accomplished in her own handwriting as proof of payment of the sum of P12,390.00. Appellant also liquidated the amount of P6,250.00 as advance payment made to a geodetic engineer for the purpose of subdividing the property.[22]  Again, Rebecca was later able to verify that no payments in such amounts were made.

According to Rebecca, appellant likewise pocketed the sum of P10,000.00 intended for the processing of 15 titles that the latter claimed to have paid in her liquidation report.  Also, Rebecca asserted that appellant did not pay or file the proper application for the issuance of title of the Grand Del Rosario property.  Aside from the above, Rebecca was likewise constrained to complete the processing of one of the three other titles recovered from appellant and had to pay the capital gains tax imposed on the purchase of the land in the sum of more than P100,000.00.

All in all, the money supposed to be used as payments for capital gains and transfer taxes as well as for the registration of sale of properties of Rebecca’s various clients amounted to P427,992.90.  Aside from this sum, Rebecca also spent at least P650,000.00 for the reconstitution of all the documents, payment of surcharges for late filing of capital gains tax returns, transportation expenses and other incidental expenses.

Version of the Appellant

Appellant admitted that she used to be the legal secretary and liaison officer of Rebecca. In particular, as liaison officer, she attended to the transfer of titles of Rebecca’s clients such as Gonzaga, Manongsong, Alviedo and others whose names she could no longer remember.  She claimed that the processing of the title of the Manongsong property was her last transaction for Rebecca.  She was given money to pay the capital gains tax at the BIR.  When confronted with the charges filed against her, appellant merely denied the allegations.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

In its Decision[23] of July 4, 2005, the trial court found the existence of a high degree of confidence between Rebecca and appellant. It noted that the relationship between the two as employer-employee was not an ordinary one; appellant was being considered a part of Rebecca’s family.  Because of this trust and confidence, Rebecca entrusted to

appellant cash in considerable sums which were liquidated through appellant’s own handwritten statements of expenses.  However, appellant gravely abused the trust and confidence reposed upon her by Rebecca when she pocketed the money entrusted to her for processing the clients’ land titles.  And as a cover up, she presented to Rebecca either fake or altered receipts which she did not even deny during trial.  The trial court thus found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.

However, the trial court ruled that the total amount stolen by appellant was P407,711.68 and not P417,907.90 as claimed by Rebecca. It disposed of the case as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the court finds the accused Remedios Tanchanco y Pineda GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Qualified Theft as defined and penalized under Article 309, paragraph 1 and Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, and hereby sentences said accused to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the offended party in the sum of Four Hundred Seven Thousand Seven Hundred Eleven Pesos and Sixty Eight Centavos (P407,711.68) representing the total amount taken by the accused, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, with costs.

SO ORDERED.[24]

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s ruling but came up with a different figure as to the total amount taken by the appellant.  The CA noted that there was no clear justification for the award of P407,711.68 as an examination of the records revealed that appellant failed to pay or padded her expenses only in the total amount of P248,447.45, computed as follows:

On the Manongsong property:  P

10,089.45 Transfer tax[25]

P   7,212.00

Registration of the documents[26]

P   2,000.00  

Estate tax[27]

P     8,000.00

Difference between the donor’s tax that accused- appellant claimed she paid and that which she actually paid per certification of the Bank of Commerce[28]

P 27,301.45 

Sub-total

On the Alviedo property:P  81,816.00

Capital gains tax[29]

P   20,460.00

Documentary stamp tax[30]

P 102,276.00

Sub-total

On the Sundian property:

P   94,281.00

Capital gains tax[31]

P     23,571.00

Documentary stamp tax[32]

P 117,852.00

Sub-total

On the Sendino property:P   6,018.00

Ueda donor’s tax[33]

P 35,000.00 

Capital gains tax and documentary stamp tax[34]

P 41,018.00  

Sub-total

On the Mandrique property:P  10,000.00

Difference between donor’s tax per accused-    appellant’s liquidation report and the amount she actually paid[35]

P     10,000.00

Sub-total

P 248,447.45

Total[36]   (Footnotes supplied.)

Thus, the dispositive portion of its Decision[37] dated September 27, 2006 reads:

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision dated July 4, 2005 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that accused-appellant, Remedios Tanchanco Pineda is hereby ordered to indemnify the private complainant Rebecca Manuel y Azanza the sum of Two Hundred Forty-Eight Thousand Four Hundred Forty-Seven Pesos and Forty Five Centavos (P248,447.45)representing the total amount she took from the private complainant.

SO ORDERED.[38]

Issue

In this appeal, appellant again raises the lone issue she submitted to the CA, viz:

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED OF QUALIFIED THEFT DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO OVERTHROW THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE IN HER FAVOR.[39]

Appellant maintains that there is no direct evidence to prove that she actually received the alleged amounts intended for the processing of various documents.  She also denies the claim that she took the money entrusted to her during the period from May 2000 to May 8, 2001 as alleged in the Information.

Our Ruling

The appeal is not meritorious.

Courts below correctly held appellant liable for qualified theft

“The elements of the crime of Theft as provided for in Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code [(RPC)] are: (1) x x x there [was] taking of personal property; (2) x x x [the] property belongs to another; (3) x x x the taking [was] done with intent to gain; (4) x x x the taking [was] without the consent of the owner; and (5) x x x the taking was accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things.”[40]

As to the first and second elements, we quote with approval the CA’s discussion on the matter:

Accused-appellant contends that the prosecution failed to prove by direct evidence the first and basic element of the offense – that is, the taking of the sum of Php417,922.90 during the period from May 2000 up to May 8, 2001.  She claims that the prosecution failed to adduce any evidence that would prove that the accused actually received the alleged amounts handed to her for the processing of various documents.

x x x x

Regarding x x x the prosecution’s failure to present direct evidence to prove the accused-appellant’s taking of the questioned amount, it is Our view that the absence of direct evidence proving accused-appellant’s stealing and carrying away of the alleged Php417,922.90 from private respondent would not matter as long as there is enough circumstantial evidence that would establish such element of ‘taking’.  After all, Sec. 4, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that an accused may be convicted on the basis of circumstantial evidence if more than one circumstance is involved, the facts of which, inferring said circumstances have been proven, and provided that the combination of all such circumstances would suffice to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

There is no doubt, as held by the trial court, that the prosecution was able to establish the following circumstances:

1.  Accused-appellant was the legal secretary and liaison officer of private complainant from June 1999 to April 18, 2001.  She was the only person working for the private complainant during said period.

2.  As legal secretary and liaison officer, accused-appellant was tasked to process land titles of private complainant’s clients.  Her duties included the payment of taxes (documentary stamp taxes, capital gains taxes, transfer tax) for the transfer of title from previous owners to new owners/buyers of the property.

3.  Because of the nature of accused appellant’s work and the trust reposed in her by private complainant, the latter confidently gave her considerable amounts of cash without need of receipts.  The accused-appellant even admitted that she often received money from private complainant for payment of capital gains and transfer taxes.

4.  There were also instances when accused-appellant was authorized by private complainant to collect money from her clients especially when the accused-appellant ran out of money needed in the processing of titles.

5.  The accused-appellant was given a free hand in liquidating her expenses in her own handwriting.

6.  Upon verification from banks and government agencies with which the accused-appellant transacted in relation to her tasks, the private complainant discovered that what the accused-appellant submitted were handwritten ‘padded’ liquidation statements because her reported expenses turned out to be higher than what she actually spent; and worse, the ‘official’ receipts she submitted to private complainant were fake. x x x.

x x x x

7.  The accused-appellant did not specifically deny her submitting altered or fake receipts in liquidating her expenses for said taxes.

8.  And conceding her guilt, the accused-appellant suddenly disappeared leaving some of her tasks, unfinished.

x x x x

[These] pieces of circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution constitute an unbroken chain leading to a fair and reasonable conclusion that accused-appellant took sums of money that were entrusted to her by the private complainant. x x x[41]

Circumstantial evidence may prove the guilt of appellant and “justify a conviction if the following requisites concur: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.”[42]  In other words, “[f]or circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support conviction, all circumstances must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt.”[43] Here, we agree with the CA that the circumstances above enumerated lead to the reasonable conclusion that appellant took amounts of money from Rebecca.

With regard to the third element, “[i]ntent to gain (animus lucrandi) is presumed to be alleged in an information, in which it is charged that there was unlawful taking (apoderamiento) and appropriation by the offender of the things subject of asportation.”[44]  In this case, it was established that appellant padded her expenses and submitted fake receipts of her supposed payment for the processing of the transfer of land titles, to gain from the money entrusted to her by Rebecca.  Her intentional failure to properly and correctly account for the same constitutes appropriation with intent to gain.

Anent the fourth element pertaining to Rebecca’s lack of consent, same is manifested by the fact that it was only after appellant abandoned her job on April 18, 2001 that Rebecca discovered the missing sums of money.  Her subsequent acts of confirming the payment or non-payment of fees and of verifying from different banks the issuance of the purported ORs presented to her by appellant in liquidating the amounts she entrusted to the latter, negates consent on Rebecca’s part.

With regard to the fifth element, it is clear from the facts that the taking was accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things.

From these, it is clear that all the elements of theft are obtaining in this case.  The next crucial question now is, did appellant commit the crime with grave abuse of confidence as to make her liable for qualified theft?  “Under Article 310 of the [RPC], theft [becomes] qualified when it is, among others, committed with grave abuse of confidence. x x x”[45]  The grave abuse of confidence must be the result of the relation by reason of dependence, guardianship, or vigilance, between the appellant and the offended party that might create a high degree of confidence between them which the appellant abused.[46]

Here, it is undisputed that appellant was a close friend of Rebecca and her family.  It was due to this personal relationship that appellant was employed by Rebecca as a legal secretary and liaison officer.  The latter position necessarily entails trust and confidence not only because of its nature and the functions attached to it, but also because appellant makes representations on behalf of Rebecca as regards third parties.  By reason of this, all matters essentially pertaining to the conduct of business of the law office were known by, and entrusted to, appellant.  This included the safekeeping of important documents and the handling of money needed for the processing of papers of Rebecca’s clients.  It is thus safe to assume that Rebecca relied on appellant when it comes to the affairs of her law office as to create a high degree of trust and confidence between them.  And as Rebecca trusted appellant completely, and by reason of her being the liaison officer, she handed the monies to appellant without requiring the latter to sign any paper to evidence her receipt thereof.  She also allowed appellant to liquidate the expenses incurred through mere handwritten liquidation statements solely prepared by appellant and treated them, as well as the official receipts presented, as true and correct.  It thus becomes clear that it is because of the trust and confidence reposed by Rebecca upon appellant that the latter was able to make it appear from her liquidation statements that she spent the sums she received from Rebecca for their intended purposes. To conceal this, she presented to Rebecca fake or altered receipts for the supposed payment, all of which form part of the records as evidence.  Unfortunately for appellant, she was not able to refute Rebecca’s allegations against her as well as the evidence supporting the same since what she advanced during trial were mere bare denials.  The Court has “oft pronounced that x x x denial x x x [is] an inherently weak [defense] which cannot prevail over the positive and credible testimony of the prosecution witness that the accused committed the crime.”[47]  The Court therefore concludes that appellant took undue advantage of Rebecca’s confidence in her when she appropriated for herself sums of money that the latter entrusted to her for a different purpose.  The theft in this case was thus committed with grave abuse of confidence.  Hence, appellant was correctly held by the lower courts as liable for qualified theft.

With respect to appellant’s contention that she could not have taken the alleged amount of money until May 8, 2001 since her employment with Rebecca lasted only until April 18, 2001, same fails to impress.  The Information alleged that the crime was committed “during the period from October 2000 to May, 2001”.  The word “during” simply means “at some point in the course of”[48] or “throughout the course of a period of time”[49] from October 2000 to May 8, 2001.  In the Information, “during” should therefore be understood to mean at some point from October 2000 to May 8, 2001, and not always until May 8, 2001.  Further, the period alleged in the Information, which is from October 2000 to May 8, 2001 is not distant or far removed from the actual period of the commission of the offense, which is from October 2000 to April 17, 2001.

As to the total amount unlawfully taken by appellant, we hold that the sum of P407,711.68 which the trial court came up with has no basis.  After a thorough review of the records, we find as correct instead the result of the detailed computation made by the CA as to the total amount of money that appellant stole or padded as expenses, which is only P248, 447.75.

The Proper Penalty

Article 310 of the RPC provides that the crime of qualified theft shall be punished by the penalties next higher by two degrees than those respectively specified in Art. 309.  Under paragraph 1, Art. 309 of the RPC, the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods is to be imposed if the value of the thing stolen is more than P12,000.00 but does not exceed P22,000.00.  But if the value of the thing stolen exceeds the latter amount, the penalty shall be the maximum period of the one prescribed in said paragraph [prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods], and one year for each additional P10,000.00, but the total of the penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty (20) years.  In such cases and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of the RPC, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.  Here, the amount stolen by appellant, as correctly found by the CA, is P248,447.75.   Since the said amount exceeds P22,000.00, “the basic penalty is prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods to be imposed in the maximum period, which is eight (8) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to ten (10) years of prision mayor.”[50] To determine the additional years of imprisonment, P22,000.00 must be deducted from the said amount and the difference should then be divided by P10,000.00, disregarding any amount less than P10,000.00.  Hence, we have twenty-two (22) years that should be added to the basic penalty.  However, the imposable penalty for simple theft should not exceed a total of twenty (20) years.  Thus, had the appellant committed simple theft, the penalty for this case would be twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal.  But as the penalty for qualified theft is two degrees higher, the proper penalty as correctly imposed by both lower courts is reclusion perpetua.[51]

cralaw 

WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED.  The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01409 finding appellant Remedios Tanchanco y Pineda guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified theft is AFFIRMED.

Costs against the appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the PhilippinesSupreme Court

Manila 

                                                     EN BANC

  CONRADO QUE,                                           Complainant,       

-      versus    -       ATTY. ANASTACIO REVILLA, JR.                                              Respondent.

 A.C. No.  7054    PUNO, C J.,   CARPIO,   CORONA,   CARPIO MORALES,   CHICO-NAZARIO,   VELASCO, JR.,   NACHURA,   LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,   BRION,   PERALTA,   BERSAMIN,   DEL CASTILLO,   ABAD, and   VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.

           Promulgated:               December 4, 2009

x ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

             

             D E C I S I O N 

PER CURIAM: 

          In a complaint for disbarment,[1] Conrado Que (complainant) accused Atty.

Anastacio Revilla, Jr. (respondent) before the Integrated Bar of the

Philippines Committee  on  Bar  Discipline  (IBP Committee on Bar

Discipline or CBD) of committing the following violations of the provisions of the

Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138 of the Rules of Court: 

(1) The respondent’s abuse of court remedies and processes by filing a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA), two petitions for annulment of title before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), a petition for annulment of judgment before the RTC and lastly, a petition for declaratory relief before the RTC (collectively, subject cases) to assail and overturn the final judgments of the Metropolitan Trial Court[2] (MeTC) and RTC[3]in the unlawful detainer case rendered against the respondent’s clients.  The respondent in this regard, repeatedly raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction by the MeTC and RTC knowing fully-well that these courts have jurisdiction over the unlawful detainer case. The respondent also repeatedly attacked the complainant’s and his siblings’ titles over the property subject of the unlawful detainer case; 

(2) The respondent’s commission of forum-shopping by filing the subject cases in order to impede, obstruct, and frustrate the efficient administration of justice for his own personal gain and to defeat the right of the complainant and his siblings to execute the MeTC and RTC judgments in the unlawful detainer case;

 (3) The respondent’s lack of candor and respect towards his adversary

and the courts by resorting to falsehood and deception to misguide, obstruct and impede the due administration of justice. The respondent asserted falsehood in the motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of the petition for annulment of judgment by fabricating an imaginary order issued by the presiding judge in open court which allegedly denied the motion to dismiss filed by the respondents in the said case. The complainant alleged that the respondent did this to cover up his lack of preparation; the respondent also deceived his clients (who were all squatters) in supporting the above falsehood.[4]  

 

(4) The respondent’s willful and revolting falsehood that unjustly maligned and defamed the good name and reputation of the late Atty. Alfredo Catolico (Atty. Catolico), the previous counsel of the respondent’s clients.

 (5) The respondent’s deliberate, fraudulent and unauthorized

appearances in court in the petition for annulment of judgment for 15 litigants, three of whom are already deceased;

 (6) The respondent’s willful and fraudulent appearance in the second

petition for annulment of title as counsel for the Republic of the Philippineswithout being authorized to do so.

 

 

Additionally, the complaint accused the respondent of representing fifty-two

(52) litigants in Civil Case No. Q-03-48762 when no such authority was ever given

to him.  

          The CBD required the respondent to answer the complaint.

 

In his Answer,[5]  the respondent declared that he is a member of the

Kalayaan Development Cooperative (KDC) that handles pro bono cases for the

underprivileged, the less fortunate, the homeless and those in the marginalized

sector in Metro Manila. He agreed to take over the cases formerly handled by other

KDC members.  One of these cases was the unlawful detainer case handled by the

late Atty. Catolico where the complainant and his siblings were the plaintiffs

and the respondent’s present clients were the defendants.

 

With respect to paragraph 1 of the disbarment complaint, the respondent

professed his sincerity, honesty and good faith in filing the petitions complained

of; he filed these petitions to protect the interests of his clients in their property.

The respondent asserted that these petitions were  all based on valid grounds –

thelack of jurisdiction of the MeTC and the RTC over the underlying unlawful

detainer case, the extrinsic fraud committed by the late Atty. Catolico, and

theextrinsic fraud committed by the complainant and his family against his

clients; he discovered that the allegedly detained property did not really belong to

the complainant and his family but is a forest land. The respondent also asserted

that his resort to a petition for annulment of judgment and a petition for declaratory

relief to contest the final judgments of the MeTC and RTC were all parts of his

legal strategy to protect the interests of his clients.

 

On the allegations of falsehood in the motion for reconsideration of the order

of dismissal of the petition for annulment of judgment (covered by paragraph 3 of

the disbarment complaint), the respondent maintained that his allegations were

based on his observations and the notes he had taken during the proceedings on

what the presiding judge dictated in open court.  

 

          The respondent denied that he had made any unauthorized appearance in

court (with respect to paragraphs 5 and 6 of the disbarment complaint). He claimed

that the 52 litigants in Civil Case No. Q-03-48762 were impleaded by

inadvertence; he immediately rectified his error by dropping them from the

case.  On the petition for annulment of judgment, the respondent claimed that a

majority (31 out of 49) of the litigants who signed the certification constituted

sufficient compliance with the rules on forum-shopping. The respondent likewise

denied having represented the Republic of the Philippines in the second petition for

annulment of title. The respondent pointed out that there was no allegation

whatsoever that he was the sole representative of both the complainants (his

clients) and the Republic of the Philippines.  The respondent pointed out that the

petition embodied a request to the Office of the Solicitor General to represent his

clients in the case.[6]

 

The respondent submitted that he did not commit any illegal, unlawful,

unjust, wrongful or immoral acts towards the complainant and his siblings. He

stressed that he acted in good faith in his dealings with them and his conduct was

consistent with his sworn duty as a lawyer to uphold justice and the law and to

defend the interests of his clients. The respondent additionally claimed that the

disbarment case was filed because the complainant’s counsel, Atty. Cesar P. Uy

(Atty. Uy), had an axe to grind against him.

 

Lastly, the respondent posited in his pleadings[7] before the IBP that the

present complaint violated the rule on forum shopping considering that the subject

cases were also the ones on which a complaint was filed against him in CBD Case

No. 03-1099 filed by Atty. Uy before the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline. The

respondent also posited that the present complaint was filed to harass, ridicule and

defame his good name and reputation and, indirectly, to harass his clients who are

marginalized members of the KDC.

 

The Findings of the Investigating Commissioner

 

     Except for the last charge of unauthorized appearance on behalf of 52

litigants in Civil Case No. Q-03-48762, Investigating Commissioner Renato G.

Cunanan[8] (Investigating Commissioner Cunanan) found all the charges against

the respondent meritorious. In his Report and Recommendation, he stated:             While an attorney admittedly has the solemn duty to defend and protect the cause and rights of his client with all the fervor and energy within his command, yet, it is equally true that it is the primary duty of the lawyer to defend the dignity, authority and majesty of the law and the courts which enforce it. A lawyer is not at liberty to maintain and defend the cause of his clients thru means, inconsistent with truth and honor. He may not and must not encourage multiplicity of suits or brazenly engage in forum-shopping.[9]

 

On the first charge on abuse of court processes, Investigating Commissioner

Cunanan noted the unnecessary use by the respondent of legal remedies to forestall

the execution of the final decisions of the MTC and the RTC in the unlawful

detainer case  against  his clients.[10]

 

On the second charge, the Investigating Commissioner ruled that the act of

the respondent in filing two petitions for annulment of title, a petition for

annulment of judgment and later on a petition for declaratory relief  were all done

to prevent the execution of the final judgment in the unlawful detainer case and

constituted prohibited forum-shopping.[11]

 

On the third and fourth charges, Investigating Commissioner Cunanan found

ample evidence showing that the respondent was dishonest in dealing with the

court as shown in his petition for annulment of judgment; he resorted to falsities

and attributed acts to Atty. Catolico and to the presiding judge, all of which were

untrue. [12]

 

          On the fifth and sixth charges, the Investigating Commissioner disregarded

the respondent’s explanation that he had no intention to represent without authority

15 of the litigants (three of whom were already deceased) in the petition for

annulment of judgment (Civil Case No. Q-01-45556). To the Investigating

Commissioner, the respondent merely glossed over the representation issue by

claiming that the authority given by a majority of the litigants complied with the

certification of non-forum shopping requirement. The Investigating Commissioner

likewise brushed aside the respondent’s argument regarding his misrepresentation

in the second complaint for annulment of title since he knew very well that only

the Solicitor General can institute an action for reversion on behalf of the Republic

of the Philippines. Despite this knowledge, the respondent solely signed the

amended complaint for and on behalf of his clients and of the Republic.

The Board of Governors of the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline, through

its Resolution No. XVII-2005-164 on CBD Case No. 03-1100, adopted and

approved the Report and Recommendation of Investigating Commissioner

Cunanan and recommended that the respondent be suspended from the practice of

law for two (2) years.[13] On reconsideration, the Board of Governors reduced the

respondent’s suspension from the practice of law to one (1) year.[14]  

The Issue

 

The case poses to us the core issues of whether the respondent can be held

liable for the imputed unethical infractions and professional misconduct, and the

penalty these transgressions should carry.

 

The Court’s Ruling

 

Except for the penalty, we agree with the Report and Recommendation

of Investigating Commissioner Cunanan and the Board of Governors of the

IBP Committee on Bar Discipline.

 

We take judicial notice that this disbarment complaint is not the only one so

far filed involving the respondent; another complaint invoking similar grounds has

previously been filed.  In Plus Builders, Inc. and Edgardo C. Garcia v. Atty.

Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr.,[15] we suspended the respondent from the practice of law

for his willful and intentional falsehood before the court; for misuse of court

procedures and processes to delay the execution of a judgment; and for

collaborating with non-lawyers in the illegal practice of law.  We initially imposed

a suspension of two (2) years, but in an act of leniency subsequently reduced the

suspension to six (6) months.[16]

Abuse of court procedures and processes  

          The following undisputed facts fully support the conclusion that the

respondent is guilty of serious misconduct for abusing court procedures and

processes to shield his clients from the execution of the final judgments of the

MeTC and RTC in the unlawful detainer case against these clients:

 

First, the respondent filed a petition for certiorari (docketed as CA-G.R. SP

No. 53892) with prayer for the issuance of preliminary injunction and temporary

restraining order to question the final judgments of the MeTC and RTC for lack of

jurisdiction.  In dismissing the respondent’s petition, the CA held:             Even for the sake of argument considering that the petition case be the proper remedy, still it must be rejected for failure of petitioners to satisfactorily demonstrate lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City over the ejectment case.[17]

 

Second, notwithstanding the CA’s dismissal of the petition for certiorari, the

respondent again questioned the MeTC’s and the RTC’s lack of jurisdiction over

the unlawful detainer case in a petition for annulment of judgment (docketed as

Civil Case No. Q-01-45556)  before the RTC with an ancillary prayer for the grant

of a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. The RTC dismissed

this petition on the basis of the motion to dismiss filed.[18]

 

Third, the respondent successively filed two petitions (docketed as Civil

Case No. Q-99-38780  and Civil Case No. Q-02-46885) for annulment of the

complainant’s title to the property involved in the unlawful detainer case. The

records show that these petitions were both dismissed “for lack of legal personality

on the part of the plaintiffs” to file the petition.[19]

 

          Fourth, after the dismissals of the petition for annulment of judgment and

the petitions for annulment of title, the respondent this time filed a petition for

declaratory relief with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the

complainant and his siblings from exercising their rights over the same property

subject of the unlawful detainer case. The respondent based the petition on the

alleged nullity of the complainant’s title because the property is a part of forest

land.

 

          Fifth, the persistent applications by the respondent for injunctive relief in the

four petitions he had filed in several courts – the petition for certiorari, the petition

for annulment of judgment, the second petition for annulment of complainant’s

title and the petition for declaratory relief – reveal the respondent’s persistence in

preventing and avoiding the execution of the final decisions of the MeTC and RTC

against his clients in the unlawful detainer case.

 

Under the circumstances, the respondent’s repeated attempts go beyond the

legitimate means allowed by professional ethical rules in defending the interests of

his client.  These are already uncalled for measures   to avoid the enforcement of

final judgments of the MeTC and RTC. In these attempts,  the respondent violated

Rule 10.03, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which makes it

obligatory for a lawyer to “observe the rules of procedure and. . . not [to] misuse

them to defeat the ends of justice.”  By his actions, the respondent used procedural

rules to thwart and obstruct the speedy and efficient administration of justice,

resulting in prejudice to the winning parties in that case.[20]

 

 

 

Filing of multiple actions and forum shopping

 

The respondent likewise violated Rule 12.02 and Rule 12.04, Canon 12 of

the Code of Professional Responsibility,[21] as well as the rule against forum

shopping, both of which are directed against the filing of multiple actions to attain

the same objective.  Both violations constitute abuse of court processes; they tend

to degrade the administration of justice; wreak havoc on orderly judicial procedure;

[22] and add to the congestion of the heavily burdened dockets of the courts.[23] 

 

While the filing of a petition for certiorari to question the lower courts’

jurisdiction may be a procedurally legitimate (but substantively erroneous) move,

the respondent’s subsequent petitions involving the same property and the same

parties not only demonstrate his attempts to secure  favorable ruling using different

fora, but his obvious objective as well of preventing the execution of the MeTC

and RTC decisions in the unlawful detainer case against his clients. This intent is

most obvious with respect to the petitions for annulment of judgment and

declaratory relief, both geared towards preventing the execution of the unlawful

detainer decision, long after this decision had become final. 

 Willful, intentional and deliberatefalsehood before the courts

 

The records also reveal that the respondent committed willful, 

intentional and deliberate falsehood in the pleadings he filed with the lower

courts. 

First, in the petition for annulment of judgment filed before the RTC,

Branch 101, Quezon City, the respondent cited extrinsic fraud as one of the

grounds for the annulment sought.  The extrinsic fraud was alleged in the last

paragraph of the petition, as follows: In here, counsel for the petitioners (defendants therein), deliberately neglected to file the proper remedy then available after receipt of the denial of their Motion for Reconsideration … thus corruptly sold out the interest of the petitioners (defendants therein) by keeping them away to the Court and in complete ignorance of the suit by a  false pretense of compromise and fraudulent acts of alleging representing them when in truth and in fact, have connived with the attorney of the prevailing party at his defeat to the prejudice of the petitioner(defendants therein) …[24]

 

Yet, in paragraph 35 of the same petition, the respondent alleged that no second

motion for reconsideration or for new trial, or no other petition with the CA had

been filed, as he believed “that the  decisions rendered both by the MeTC and the

RTC are null and void.”[25]  These conflicting claims, no doubt, involve a

fabrication made for the purpose of supporting the petition for annulment.  Worse,

it involved a direct and unsubstantiated attack on the reputation of a law office

colleague, another violation we shall separately discuss below.  

  

             Second, the respondent employed another obvious subterfuge when he filed

his second petition for annulment of title, which was an unsuccessful attempt to

circumvent the rule that only the Solicitor General may commence reversion

proceedings of public lands[26] on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines.  This

second petition, filed by a private party and not by the Republic, showed that: (a)

the respondent and his clients requested that they be represented by the Solicitor

General in the proceedings; (b) the Republic of the Philippines was simply

impleaded in the amended petition without its consent as a plaintiff; and (c) the

respondent signed the amended petition where he alone stood as counsel for the

“plaintiffs.”  In this underhanded manner, the respondent sought to compel the

Republic to litigate and waste its resources on an unauthorized and unwanted suit.  

 

Third, the respondent also committed falsehood in his motion for

reconsideration of the order dismissing his petition for annulment of judgment

where he misrepresented to the court and his clients what actually transpired in the

hearing of June 28, 2002 in this wise:             Likewise, the proceedings on said date of hearing (June 28, 2002) show, that after both counsel have argued on the aforesaid pending incident, the Honorable Presiding Judge, in open court, and in the presence and within the hearing distance of all the plaintiffs and their counsel as well as the counsel of the defendants resolved:   TO DENY THE MOTION TO DISMISS FILED AND DIRECTED DEFENDANTS COUNSEL TO FILE AN ANSWER TO THE COMPLAINT WITHIN THE REMAINING PERIOD . [27] [Underscoring and emphasis theirs] 

 

          The records, however, disclose that the scheduled hearing for June 28,

2002 was actually for the respondent’s application for temporary restraining order

and was not a hearing on the adverse party’s motion to dismiss. [28]  The records

also show that RTC-Branch 101 held in abeyance the respondent’s application for

injunctive relief pending the resolution of the motion to dismiss filed by the

adverse party.[29] As stated in the order of the Presiding Judge of RTC-Branch 101:           

Browsing over the records of this case specifically the transcripts of stenographic notes as transcribed by the Stenographer, the same will indicate that the allegations in the Motion for Reconsideration are not true. … how can this Court make a ruling on the matter even without stating the factual and legal bases as required/mandated by the Rules. Moreover, there are no indications or iota of irregularity in the preparation by Stenographer of the transcripts, and by the Court interpreter of the Minutes of the open Court session.[Underscoring theirs]

The records further disclose that despite knowledge of the falsity of his

allegations, the respondent took advantage of his position and the trust reposed in

him by his clients (who are all squatters) to convince them to support, through their

affidavits, his false claims on what allegedly transpired in the June 28, 2002

hearing. [30]  

 

 For these acts, we find the respondent liable under Rule 10.01 of Canon 10

the Code of Professional Responsibility for violating the lawyer’s duty to observe

candor and fairness in his dealings with the court.  This provision states: CANON 10 – A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT Rule 10.01 – A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court, nor shall he mislead or allow the Court to be mislead by an artifice.

 

Likewise, the respondent violated his duty as an attorney and his oath as a

lawyer “never to mislead the judge or any judicial officer by an artifice or false

statement of fact or law.”[31]  The respondent failed to remember that his duty as an

officer of the court makes him an indispensable participant in the administration of

justice,[32] and that he is expected to act candidly, fairly and truthfully in his work.

[33] His duty as a lawyer obligates him not to conceal the truth from the court, or to

mislead the court in any manner, no matter how demanding his duties to his clients

may be.[34]  In case of conflict, his duties to his client yield to his duty to deal

candidly with the court.[35]            

In defending his clients’ interest, the respondent also failed to observe Rule

19.01, Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which reads: CANON 19 – A LAWYER SHALL REPRESENT HIS CLIENT WITH ZEAL WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF LAW Rule 19.01 – A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his clients x x x  

This Canon obligates a lawyer, in defending his client, to employ only such

means as are consistent with truth and honor.[36] He should not prosecute patently

frivolous and meritless appeals or institute clearly groundless actions.[37]  The

recital of what the respondent did to prevent the execution of the judgment against

his clients shows that he actually committed what the above rule expressly

prohibits. 

Maligning the name of his fellow lawyers  

          To support the charge of extrinsic fraud in his petition for annulment of

judgment, the respondent attacked (as quoted above) the name and reputation of

the late Atty. Catolico and accused him of deliberate neglect, corrupt motives and

connivance with the counsel for the adverse party. 

We find it significant that the respondent failed to demonstrate how he came

upon his accusation against Atty. Catolico. The respondent, by his own admission,

only participated in the cases previously assigned to Atty. Catolico after the latter

died. At the same time, the respondent’s petition for annulment of judgment also

represented that no second motion for reconsideration or appeal was filed to

contest the MeTC and RTC decisions in the unlawful detainer case for the reason

that the respondent believed the said decisions were null and void ab initio. 

Under these circumstances, we believe that the respondent has been less than

fair in his professional relationship with Atty. Catolico and is thus liable for

violating Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which obligates a

lawyer to “conduct himself with courtesy, fairness, and candor toward his

professional colleagues.”  He was unfair because he imputed wrongdoing to Atty.

Catolico without showing any factual basis therefor; he effectively maligned Atty.

Catolico, who is now dead and unable to defend himself. 

Unauthorized appearances  

          We support Investigating Commissioner Cunanan’s finding that the

respondent twice represented parties without proper authorization: first, in the

petition for annulment of judgment; and second, in the second petition for

annulment of title.[38]

 

In the first instance, the records show that the respondent filed the petition

for annulment of judgment on behalf of 49 individuals, 31 of whom gave their

consent while the other 15 individuals did not.  We cannot agree with the

respondent’s off-hand explanation that he truly believed that a majority of the

litigants who signed the certification of non-forum shopping in the petition already

gave him the necessary authority to sign for the others. We find it highly

improbable that this kind of lapse could have been committed by a seasoned

lawyer like the respondent, who has been engaged in the practice of law for more

than 30 years and who received rigid and strict training as he so proudly declares,

from the University of the Philippines College of Law and in the two law firms

with which he was previously associated.[39] As Investigating Commissioner

Cunanan found, the respondent’s explanation of compliance with the rule on the

certification of non-forum shopping glossed over the real charge of appearing in

court without the proper authorization of the parties he allegedly represented.    

In the second instance, which occurred in the second complaint for

annulment of title, the respondent knew that only the Solicitor General can legally

represent the Republic of the Philippines in actions for reversion of land.

Nevertheless, he filed an amended petition where he impleaded the Republic of

thePhilippines as plaintiff without its authority and consent, as a surreptitious way

of forcing the Republic to litigate. Notably, he signed the amended complaint on

behalf of all the plaintiffs – his clients and the Republic.

         

          In both instances, the respondent violated Sections 21 and 27, Rule 138 of

the Rules of Court when he undertook the unauthorized appearances. The settled

rule is that a lawyer may not represent a litigant without authority from the latter or

from the latter’s representative or, in the absence thereof, without leave of court.

[40] The willful unauthorized appearance by a lawyer for a party in a given case

constitutes contumacious conduct and also warrants disciplinary measures against

the erring lawyer for professional misconduct.[41]

 

The Respondent’s Defenses    

 

We find no merit in the respondent’s defenses.

 

“Good faith connotes an honest intention to abstain from taking

unconscientious advantage of another. Accordingly, in University of the East v.

Jader we said that "[g]ood faith connotes an honest intention to abstain from

taking undue advantage of another, even though the forms and technicalities of

law, together with the absence of all information or belief of facts, would render

the transaction unconscientious."[42] Bad faith, on the other hand, is a state of mind

affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive of self-interest, ill

will or for an ulterior purpose.[43]  As both concepts are states of mind, they may be

deduced from the attendant circumstances and, more particularly, from the acts and

statements of the person whose state of mind is the subject of inquiry.  

In this case, we find that the respondent acted in bad faith in defending the

interests of his clients. We draw this conclusion from the misrepresentations and

the dubious recourses he made, all obviously geared towards forestalling the

execution of the final judgments of the MeTC and RTC.  That he took advantage

of his legal knowledge and experience and misread the Rules   immeasurably

strengthen the presence of bad faith. 

We find neither sincerity nor honest belief on the part of the respondent in

pleading the soundness and merit of the cases that he filed in court to prevent the

execution of the MeTC and RTC decisions, considering  his own conduct of

presenting conflicting theories in his petitions.  The succession of cases he filed

shows a desperation that negates the sincere and honest belief he claims; these are

simply scattershot means to achieve his objective of avoiding the execution of the

unlawful detainer judgment against his clients.

 

On the respondent’s allegations regarding his discretion to determine legal

strategy, it is not amiss to note that this was the same defense he raised in the first

disbarment case.[44]  As we explained in Plus Builders, the exercise of a lawyer’s

discretion in acting for his client can never be at the expense of truth and

justice.  In the words of this cited case: 

While a lawyer owes absolute fidelity to the cause of his client, full devotion to his genuine interest, and warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights, as well as the exertion of his utmost learning and ability, he must do so only within the bounds of the law.  He must give a candid and honest opinion on the merits and probable results of his client’s case with the end in view of promoting respect for the law and legal processes, and counsel or maintain such actions or proceedings only as appear to him to be just, and such defenses only as he believes to be honestly debatable under the law.  He must always remind himself of the oath he took upon admission to the Bar that he ‘will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit nor give aid nor consent to the same’; and that he ‘will conduct [himself] as a lawyer according to the best of [his] knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to [his] clients.’ Needless to state, the lawyer’s fidelity to his client must not be pursued at the expense of truth and the administration of justice, and it must be done within the bounds of reason and common sense.  A lawyer’s responsibility to protect and advance the interests of his client does not warrant a course of action propelled by ill motives and malicious intentions against the other party.[45]

 

We cannot give credence to the respondent’s claim that the disbarment case

was filed because the counsel of the complainant, Atty. Uy, had an axe to grind

against him. We reject this argument, considering that it was not Atty. Uy who

filed the present disbarment case against him; Atty. Uy is only the counsel in this

case.  In fact, Atty. Uy has filed his own separate disbarment case against the

respondent.   

The sui generis nature of a disbarment case renders the underlying motives

of the complainants unimportant and with very little relevance. The purpose of a

disbarment proceeding is mainly to determine the fitness of a lawyer to continue

acting as an officer of the court and a participant in the dispensation of justice – an

issue where the complainant’s personal motives have little relevance. For this

reason, disbarment proceedings may be initiated by the Court motu proprio upon

information of an alleged wrongdoing. As we also explained in the case In re:

Almacen: . . .disciplinary proceedings like the present are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, this proceeding is not - and does not involve - a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution.

                                   x                      x                      x 

It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is its primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of-the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. In such posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor.[46]

 

Hence, we give little or no weight to the alleged personal motivation that drove the

complainant Que and his counsel to file the present disbarment case. 

Conclusion 

          Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the respondent committed  various

acts of professional misconduct and thereby failed to live up to the exacting ethical

standards imposed on members of the Bar. We cannot agree, however, that only a

penalty of one-year suspension from the practice of law should be

imposed.  Neither should we limit ourselves to the originally recommended penalty

of suspension for two (2) years.

 

Given the respondent’s multiple violations, his past record as previously

discussed, and the nature of these violations which shows the readiness to

disregard court rules and to gloss over concerns for the orderly administration of

justice, we believe and so hold that the appropriate action of this Court is to disbar

the respondent to keep him away from the law profession and from any significant

role in the administration of justice which he has disgraced. He is a continuing risk,

too, to the public that the legal profession serves. Not even his ardor and

overzealousness in defending the interests of his client can save him. Such traits at

the expense of everything else, particularly the integrity of the profession and the

orderly administration of justice, this Court cannot accept nor tolerate.

 

Additionally, disbarment is merited because this is not the respondent’s first

ethical infraction of the same nature.  We penalized him in Plus Builders, Inc. and

Edgardo Garcia versus Atty. Anastacio E. Revilla for his willful and intentional

falsehood before the court; for misuse of court procedures and processes to delay

the execution of a judgment; and for collaborating with non-lawyers in the illegal

practice of law.  We showed leniency then by reducing his penalty to suspension

for six (6) months.  We cannot similarly treat the respondent this time; it is clear

that he did not learn any lesson from his past experience and since then has

exhibited traits of incorrigibility.  It is time to put a finis to the respondent’s

professional legal career for the sake of the public, the profession and the interest

of justice.  

 

          WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby AFFIRM  Resolution No.

XVII-2005-164 dated December 17, 2005 and Resolution No. XVII-2008-657

dated December 11, 2008 of the Board of Governors of the IBP Committee on Bar

Discipline insofar as respondent Atty. Anastacio Revilla, Jr. is found liable

forprofessional misconduct for violations of the Lawyer’s Oath; Canon 8; Rules

10.01 and 10.03, Canon 10; Rules 12.02 and 12.04, Canon 12; Rule 19.01, Canon

19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; and Sections 20(d), 21 and 27 of

Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.  However, we modify the penalty the IBP imposed,

and hold that the respondent should be DISBARRED from the practice of law.

 

          SO ORDERED.

 

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court

Manila

  

EN BANC 

  

RE: SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM DATED JANUARY 11, 2010 OF ACTING DIRECTOR ALEU A. AMANTE, PIAB-C, OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN

   

        A.M. No. 10-1-13-SC 

                Present: 

   PUNO, C.J.,        CARPIO,   CORONA,   CARPIO MORALES,   VELASCO, JR.,   NACHURA,   LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,   BRION,   PERALTA,   BERSAMIN,   DEL CASTILLO,  ABAD,  VILLARAMA, JR.,  PEREZ, and  MENDOZA,  JJ.

 Promulgated:

             March 2, 2010

x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x              R E S O L U T I O N

  

PER CURIAM:

 

Before us for consideration are the interrelated matters listed below. 

a. The subpoena duces tecum (dated January 11, 2010 and received by

this Court on January 18, 2010), issued by the Office of the Ombudsman on the

“Chief, Office of the Administrative Services or AUTHORIZED

REPRESENTATIVE, Supreme Court, Manila,” for the submission to the

Office of the Ombudsman of the latest Personal Data Sheets and last known

forwarding address of former Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. and former

Associate Justice Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez.  The subpoena duces tecum was

issued in relation to a criminal complaint under (b) below, pursuant to Section 13,

Article XI of the Constitution and Section 15 of Republic Act No. 6770.  The Office

of the Administrative Services (OAS) referred the matter to us onJanuary 21,

2010 with a request for clearance to release the specified documents and

information.

 

b. Copy of the criminal complaint entitled Oliver O. Lozano

and Evangeline Lozano-Endriano v. Hilario G. Davide, Jr., et al., OMB-C-C-09-

0527-J, cited by the Ombudsman as basis for the the  subpoena duces tecum it

issued.  We secured a copy of this criminal complaint from the Ombudsman to

determine the legality and propriety of the subpoena duces tecum sought.

 

c. Order dated February 4, 2010 (which the Court received on February

9, 2010), signed by Acting Director Maribeth Taytaon-Padios of the Office of

the Ombudsman (with the approval of Ombudsman Ma. Merceditas Navarro-

Gutierrez), dismissing the Lozano complaint and referring it to the Supreme

Court for appropriate action.  The order was premised on the

Memorandum[1] issued on July 31, 2003 by Ombudsman Simeon Marcelo who

directed that all complaints against judges and other members of the Judiciary be

immediately dismissed and referred to the Supreme Court for appropriate action.  

OUR RULING

 

I.  The   Subpoena Duces Tecum

 

In light of the Ombudsman’s dismissal order of February 4, 2010, any

question relating to the legality and propriety of the subpoena duces tecum the

Ombudsman issued has been rendered moot and academic.  The subpoena duces

tecum merely drew its life and continued viability from the underlying criminal

complaint, and the complaint’s dismissal – belated though it may be – cannot but

have the effect of rendering the need for the subpoena duces tecum academic.

 

As guide in the issuance of compulsory processes to Members of this Court,

past and present, in relation to complaints touching on the exercise of our judicial

functions, we deem it appropriate to discuss for the record the extent of the

Ombudsman’s authority in these types of complaints. 

 

In the appropriate case, the Office of the Ombudsman has full authority to

issue subpoenas, including subpoena duces tecum, for compulsory attendance of

witnesses and the production of documents and information relating to matters

under its investigation.[2]  The grant of this authority, however, is not unlimited, as

the Ombudsman must necessarily observe and abide by the terms of the

Constitution and our laws, the Rules of Court and the applicable jurisprudence on

the issuance, service, validity and efficacy of subpoenas.  Under the Rules of

Court, the issuance of subpoenas, including a subpoena duces tecum, operates

under the requirements of reasonableness and relevance.[3]  For the production of

documents to be reasonable and for the documents themselves to be relevant, the

matter under inquiry should, in the first place, be one that the Ombudsman can

legitimately entertain, investigate and rule upon.

 

In the present case, the “matter” that gave rise to the issuance of a subpoena

duces tecum was a criminal complaint filed by the complainants Lozano for the

alleged violation by retired Supreme Court Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. and

retired Associate Justice Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019,

as amended (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act).

 

A first step in considering whether a criminal complaint (and its attendant

compulsory processes) is within the authority of the Ombudsman to entertain (and

to issue), is to consider the nature of the powers of the Supreme Court.  This Court,

by constitutional design, is supreme in its task of adjudication; judicial power is

vested solely in the Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established

by law.  Judicial power includes the duty of the courts, not only to settle actual

controversies, but also to determine whether grave abuse of discretion amounting

to lack or excess of jurisdiction has been committed in any branch or

instrumentality of government.[4]  As a rule, all decisions and determinations in the

exercise of judicial power ultimately go to and stop at the Supreme Court whose

judgment is final.  This constitutional scheme cannot be thwarted or subverted

through a criminal complaint that, under the guise of imputing a misdeed to the

Court and its Members, seeks to revive and re-litigate matters that have long

been laid to rest by the Court.  Effectively, such criminal complaint is a collateral

attack on a judgment of this Court that, by constitutional mandate, is final and

already beyond question.  

 

  A simple jurisprudential research would easily reveal that this Court has had

the occasion to rule on the liability of Justices of the Supreme Court for violation

of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019—the very same provision that the complainants

Lozano invoke in this case.

 

    In In re Wenceslao Laureta,[5] the client of Atty. Laureta filed a complaint

with the Tanodbayan charging Members of the Supreme Court with violation of

Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 for having knowingly, deliberately and with

bad faith rendered an unjust resolution in a land dispute.  The Court unequivocally

ruled that insofar as this Court and its Divisions are concerned, a charge of

violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act on the ground that such

collective decision is “unjust” should not prosper; the parties cannot “relitigate in

another forum the final judgment of the Court,” as to do so is to subordinate the

Court, in the exercise of its judicial functions, to another body.[6]

 

In re Joaquin T. Borromeo[7] reiterates the Laureta ruling, particularly that

(1) judgments of the Supreme Court are not reviewable;                        (2)

administrative, civil and criminal complaints against a judge should not be turned

into substitutes for appeal; (3) only courts may declare a judgment unjust; and (4) a

situation where the Ombudsman is made to determine whether or not a judgment

of the Court is unjust is an absurdity.  The Court further discussed the requisites for

the prosecution of judges, as follows: 

That is not to say that it is not possible at all to prosecute judges for this impropriety, of rendering an unjust judgment or interlocutory order; but, taking account of all the foregoing considerations, the indispensable requisites are that there be a final declaration by a competent court in some appropriate proceeding of the manifestly unjust character of the challenged judgment or order, and there be also evidence of malice and bad faith, ignorance or inexcusable negligence on the part of the judge in rendering said judgment or order.  

Thus, consistent with the nature of the power of this Court under our

constitutional scheme, only this Court – not the Ombudsman – can declare a

Supreme Court judgment to be unjust. 

In Alzua v. Arnalot,[8] the Court ruled that “judges of superior and general

jurisdiction are not liable to respond in civil action for damages, and provided this

rationale for this ruling:  Liability to answer to everyone who might feel himself

aggrieved by the action of the judge would be inconsistent with the possession of

this freedom and would destroy that independence without which no judiciary can

be either respectable or useful.”  The same rationale applies to the indiscriminate

attribution of criminal liability to judicial officials. 

 

Plainly, under these rulings, a criminal complaint for violation of Section

3(e) of RA 3019, based on the legal correctness of the official acts of Justices of

the Supreme Court, cannot prosper and should not be entertained. This is not to say

that Members of the Court are absolutely immune from suit during their term, for

they are not.  The Constitution provides that the appropriate recourse against them

is to seek their removal from office if they are guilty of culpable violation of the

Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal

of public trust.[9]  Only after removal can they be criminally proceeded against for

their transgressions.  While in office and thereafter, and for their official acts that

do not constitute impeachable offenses, recourses against them and their liabilities

therefor are as defined in the above rulings.    

 

Section 22 of Republic Act No. 6770, in fact, specifically grants the

Ombudsman the authority to investigate impeachable officers, but only when such

investigation is warranted: 

Section 22. Investigatory Power.  The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the power to investigate any serious misconduct in office allegedly committed by officials removable by impeachment, for the purpose of filing a verified complaint for impeachment, if warranted.

 

Conversely, if a complaint against an impeachable officer is unwarranted for lack of

legal basis and for clear misapplication of law and jurisprudence, the Ombudsman

should spare these officers from the harassment of an unjustified investigation.  The

present criminal complaint against the retired Justices is one such case where an

investigation is not warranted, based as it is on the legal correctness of their official

acts, and the Ombudsman should have immediately recognized the criminal

complaint for what it is, instead of initially proceeding with its investigation and

issuing a subpoena duces tecum.

 II. The Ombudsman’s Dismissal    of the Criminal Complant

 

As the Ombudsman’s dismissal of the criminal complaint (Oliver O. Lozano

and Evangeline Lozano-Endriano v. Hilario G. Davide, Jr., et al., OMB-C-C-09-

0527-J) clearly implied, no complete dismissal took place as the matter was

simply “referred to the Supreme Court for appropriate action.” 

 

Although it was belatedly made, we cannot fault this Ombudsman action for

the reasons we have already discussed above.  While both accused are now retired

from the service, the complaint against them still qualifies for exclusive

consideration by this Court as the acts complained of spring from their judicial

actions while they were with the Court.  From this perspective, we therefore pass

upon the prima facie merits of the complainants Lozano’s criminal complaint.

 

a.  Grounds for the Dismissal of the Complaint

 

By its express terms, the criminal complaint stemmed from the participation

of the accused in the Resolution the First Division of this Court issued in Heirs of

Antonio Pael v. Court of Appeals, docketed as G.R. Nos. 133547 and 133843.  The

retired Chief Justice and retired Associate Justice allegedly committed the

following unlawful acts: 1)      Overturning the findings of fact of the CA; 2)      Stating in the Resolution that the “Chin-Mallari property overlaps the UP property,”

when the DENR Survey Report stated that the “UP title/property overlaps the Chin-Mallari property;”

 3)      Issuing a Resolution, for which three Justices voted, to set aside a Decision for which

five Justices voted. 

 

By these acts, the retired Members of this Court are being held criminally

accountable on the theory that they violated the Constitution and the law in their

ruling in the cited cases, thereby causing “undue injury” to the parties to these

cases. 

 

After due consideration, we dismiss the criminal complaint against retired

Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. and retired Associate Justice  Ma. Alicia

Austria-Martinez under Section 3(e) of RA 3019.  We fully expound on the reasons

for this conclusion in the discussions below.

 a.     Contrary to the complainants’ position,

the Supreme Court has the power to reviewthe lower courts’ findings of fact.

 

The Supreme Court is the highest court of the land with the power to review,

revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of

Court may provide, final judgments and orders of the lower courts.[10]  It has the

authority to promulgate rules on practice, pleadings and admission to the bar, and

suspend the operation of these rules in the interest of justice.[11]  Jurisprudence

holds, too, that the Supreme Court may exercise these powers over the factual

findings of the lower courts, among other prerogatives, in the following instances:

(1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises, or

conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd of

impossible; (3)  when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is

based on a misappreciation of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting;

(6) when, in making its findings, the same are contrary to the admissions of both

appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial

court;         (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific

evidence on which they are based; (9)  when the facts set forth in the petition as

well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent;

and (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of

evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.[12]  Thus, contrary to the

complainants Lozano’ assertions in their complaint, the Supreme Court, in the

proper cases, can and does rule on factual submissions before it, and even

reverses the lower court’s factual findings when the circumstances call for this

action.

 

b.    Constitutional Provisions were misused.

 

The complainants Lozano appear to us to have brazenly misquoted and

misused applicable constitutional provisions to justify their case against the retired

Justices. We refer particularly to their use (or strictly, misuse) of  Article X,

Section 2(3) of the 1973 Constitution which they claim to be the governing rule

that the retired Justices should have followed in acting on Pael.  This constitutional

provision states:    

Cases heard by a division shall be decided with the concurrence of at least five Members, but if such required number is not obtained the case shall be decided en banc; Provided, that no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the Court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the Court sitting en banc.[13]

 

For failure of the retired Justices to act according to these terms, the complainants

claim that the former subverted the Constitution by reversing, by a vote of a

majority of only three members, the decision of the First Division unanimously

approved by its full membership of five members.

 

Had the complainants bothered to carefully consider the facts and

developments in Pael and accordingly related these to the applicable

constitutional provision, they would have discovered that Pael was decided in

2003 when the 1987 Constitution, not the 1973 Constitution, was the prevailing

Charter.  They then would have easily learned of the manner cases are heard and

decided by Division before the Supreme Court under the 1987

Constitution.  Section 4(3), Article VIII of this Constitution provides:         

Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon, and in no case, without the concurrence of at least three of such Members.  When the required number is not obtained, the case shall be decided en banc; Provided, that no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the court sitting en banc.” (Emphasis supplied.)

 

This was the provision that governed in 2003 and still governs to this day.  Thus,

the complainants’ argument and basis for their criminal complaint – that in ruling

on a motion for reconsideration, all five members of the Division should concur –

is totally wrong.

 c.      The elements of the offense charged are      not sufficiently alleged in the complaint

 

A public official can violate Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019[14] in two

ways: (1) by causing undue injury to any party, including the Government; or (2) by

giving any private party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference;[15] in

either case, these acts must be committed with manifest partiality, evident bad faith,

or gross and inexcusable negligence.   

 

“Partiality” is defined as a bias or disposition to see and report matters as

wished for, rather than as they are.  “Bad faith” connotes not only bad judgment or

negligence, but also a dishonest purpose, a conscious wrongdoing, or a breach of

duty amounting to fraud.  “Gross negligence,” on the other hand, is characterized by

the want of even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a

duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with a conscious

indifference to consequences as far as other persons are concerned.[16]

 

The criminal complaint in this case failed to allege the facts and

circumstances showing that the retired Justices acted with partiality, bad faith or

negligence. A judicial officer’s act in reviewing the findings of fact in a decision

and voting for its reversal cannot by itself constitute a violation of Section 3(e) of

Republic Act No. 3019 in the absence of facts, alleged and proven, demonstrating

a dishonest purpose, conscious partiality, extrinsic fraud, or any wrongdoing on his

or her part.  A complainant’s mere disagreement with the magistrate’s own

conclusions, to be sure, does not justify a criminal charge under Section 3(e)

against the latter. In the absence of alleged and proven particular acts of manifest

partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence, good faith and

regularity are generally presumed in the performance of official duties by public

officers.[17] 

 

For the criminal complaint’s fatal omissions and resultant failure to allege

a prima facie case, it rightfully deserves immediate dismissal.

 III. The Complainants’ Potential Liability       for Filing the Ombudsman Complaint

 

In light of the above conclusions and under the attendant circumstances of

the criminal complaints, we cannot avoid considering whether the complainants

Lozano acted properly as members of the Bar, as officers of this Court, and as

professionals governed by norms of ethical behavior, in filing their complaint. 

 

In their criminal complaint, the complainants gave a slanted view of the

powers of this Court to suit their purposes; for these same purposes, they wrongly

cited and misapplied the provisions of the Constitution, not just any ordinary

statute. As lawyers, the complainants must be familiar and well acquainted with

the fundamental law of the land, and are charged with the duty to apply the

constitutional provisions in light of their prevailing jurisprudential interpretation.

As law practitioners active in the legal and political circles, the complainants can

hardly be characterized as “unknowing” in their misuse and misapplication of

constitutional provisions.  They should, at the very least, know that the 1973

Constitution and its provisions have been superseded by the 1987 Constitution, and

that they cannot assail – invoking the 1973 Constitution – the judicial acts of

members of the Supreme Court carried out in 2003 when the 1987 Constitution

was in effect.  Their misuse of the Constitution is made more reprehensible when

the overriding thrust of their criminal complaint is considered; they used the 1973

provisions to falsely attribute malice and injustice to the Supreme Court and its

Members.

         

In our view, the complainants’ errors do not belong to the genre of plain and

simple errors that lawyers commit in the practice of their profession.  Their plain

disregard, misuse and misrepresentation of constitutional provisions constitute

serious misconduct that reflects on their fitness for continued membership in the

Philippine Bar.  At the very least, their transgressions are blatant violations of Rule

10.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides: 

Rule 10.02.  A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of a paper, the language or the argument of opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or authority, orknowingly cite as a law a provision already rendered inoperative by repeal or amendment, or assert as a fact that which has not been proved.  (Emphasis provided.)

 

To emphasize the importance of requiring lawyers to act candidly and in good

faith, an identical provision is found in Cannon 22 of the Canons of Professional

Ethics.  Moreover, lawyers are sworn to “do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing

of any in court…” before they are even admitted to the

Bar.  All  these  the complainants  appear  to  have  seriously  violated.

 

In the interest of due process and fair play, the complainants Lozano should

be heard, in relation to their criminal complaint before the Ombudsman against

retired Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. and retired Associate Justice Ma. Alicia

Austria-Martinez, on why they should not be held accountable and accordingly

penalized for violations of their duties as members of the Bar and officers of this

Court, and of the ethics of the legal profession.

 

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DISMISS the criminal complaint

entitled Oliver O. Lozano, et al. v. Hilario G. Davide, Jr., et al., OMB-C-C-09-

0527-J for utter lack of merit, and DECLARE as MOOT and ACADEMIC the

question of compliance with the subpoena duces tecum dated January 11, 2010 that

the Ombudsman issued against this Court. 

 

We hereby ORDER the complainants Atty. Oliver O. Lozano and Atty.

Evangeline Lozano-Endriano to EXPLAIN IN WRITING to this Court, within a

non-extendible period of 15 days from receipt of this Resolution, why they should

not be penalized as members of the Bar and as officers of this Court, for their open

disregard of the plain terms of the Constitution and the applicable laws and

jurisprudence, and their misuse and misrepresentation of constitutional provisions in

their criminal complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman, entitled Oliver O.

Lozano, et al. v. Hilario G. Davide, Jr., et al., OMB-C-C-09-0527-J.  

SO ORDERED.

 

  

EN BANC

 

 

CATHERINE & HENRY YU,

Complainants,   

- versus -

A.C. No. 7747

 

Present:

 PUNO, C.J.,QUISUMBING,YNARES-SANTIAGO,CARPIO,AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,CORONA,CARPIO MORALES,AZCUNA,TINGA,CHICO-NAZARIO,*

VELASCO, JR.,NACHURA,REYES,DE CASTRO, andBRION, JJ. 

Promulgated:

 

July 14, 2008

ATTY. ANTONIUTTI K. PALAÑA,

       Respondent.

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

 

 

DECISION 

 

PER CURIAM:

 

 

            On November   16,   2006,   complainants   Henry   and   Catherine   Yu   filed   a 

complaint[1] for   disbarment   against   respondent   Atty.   Antoniutti   K.   Palaña   for 

alleged acts of defraudation, before the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of 

the  Integrated Bar  of   the Philippines   (IBP).[2]  Complainants  attached therewith 

their Consolidated Complaint-Affidavit[3] which they earlier filed before the City 

Prosecutor’s Office of Makati, charging the respondent and his co-accused (in the 

criminal case), with syndicated estafa and violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (BP 

22).

 

          The facts, as found by the CBD, are as follows:

 

          Sometime in 2004, complainants met a certain Mr. Mark Anthony U. Uy (Mr. 

Uy) who introduced himself as the Division Manager of Wealth Marketing and 

General Services Corporation (Wealth Marketing), a corporation engaged in spot 

currency   trading.[4]  Mr.   Uy   persuaded   the   complainants,   together  with   other 

investors,   to  invest a minimum amount of P100,000.00 or  its  dollar  equivalent 

with said company.  They were made to believe that the said company had the so-

called “stop-loss mechanism” that enabled it to stop trading once the maximum 

allowable loss fixed at 3%-9% of the total contributions, would be reached.  If, on 

the other hand, the company would suffer loss, Wealth Marketing would return 

to   the   investors   the   principal   amount   including   the   monthly   guaranteed 

interests. Further, Wealth Marketing promised to issue, as it had in fact issued, 

postdated checks covering the principal investments.[5]

 

          It turned out, however, that Wealth Marketing’s promises were false and 

fraudulent,  and that the checks earlier   issued were dishonored for the reason 

“account closed.”  The investors, including the complainants, thus went to Wealth 

Marketing’s  office.  There,   they  discovered that  Wealth  Marketing had already 

ceased   its   operation   and   a   new   corporation   was   formed   named   Ur-Link 

Corporation (Ur-Link) which supposedly assumed the rights and obligations of the 

former.  Complainants   proceeded   to   Ur-Link   office   where   they   met   the 

respondent.  As   Wealth   Marketing’s   Chairman   of   the   Board   of   Directors, 

respondent assured the complainants that Ur-Link would assume the obligations 

of the former company.[6]  To put a semblance of validity to such representation, 

respondent signed an Agreement[7] to that effect which, again, turned out to be 

another ploy to further deceive the investors.[8] This prompted the complainants 

to   send   demand   letters   to  Wealth  Marketing’s   officers   and   directors   which 

remained   unheeded.  They   likewise   lodged   a   criminal   complaint   for 

syndicated estafa against the respondent and his co-accused.[9]

 

          Despite the standing warrant for his arrest, respondent went into hiding and 

has been successful in defying the law, to this date.

 

          In an Order[10] dated November 17, 2006, Director for Bar Discipline Rogelio 

B. Vinluan required respondent to submit his Answer to the complaint but the 

latter failed to comply.  Hence, the motion to declare him in default filed by the 

complainants.[11]  The case was thereafter referred to Commissioner Jose I. De la 

Rama, Jr. (the Commissioner) for investigation.  In his continued defiance of the 

lawful  orders  of   the  Commission,   respondent   failed   to  attend   the  mandatory 

conference and to file his position paper.  Respondent was thereafter declared in 

default and the case was heard ex parte.

 

          In   his   report,[12] the   Commissioner   concluded   that   Wealth   Marketing’s 

executives   (which   included  respondent  herein)  conspired  with  one  another   in 

defrauding the complainants  by engaging  in an unlawful  network of  recruiting 

innocent investors to invest in foreign currency trading business where, in fact, no 

such   business   existed,   as   Wealth   Marketing   was   not   duly   licensed   by   the 

Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to engage in such undertaking.  This 

was  bolstered  by   the   fact   that  Wealth  Marketing’s  financial   status   could  not 

support the investors’ demands involving millions of pesos.  It also appears, said 

the Commissioner, that Ur-Link was created only to perpetuate fraud and to avoid 

obligations.   The   Commissioner   likewise   found   that   respondent   had   been 

previously suspended by this Court for committing similar acts of defraudation.

[13]  Considering   the   gravity   of   the   acts   committed,   as   well   as   his   previous 

administrative   case   and   defiance   of   lawful   orders,   the   Commissioner 

recommended   that   respondent   be   disbarred   from   the   practice   of   law,   the 

pertinent portion of which reads:   

 

           WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, after a careful evaluation of the documents presented, including the jurisprudence laid down by the complainants involving the same respondent, and said decision of the Supreme Court forms part of the law of the land, the undersigned commissioner   is   recommending   that   respondent   Atty.   Antoniutti   K. Palaña be disbarred and his name be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys upon   the   approval   of   the   Board   of   Governors   and   the   Honorable Supreme Court.[14]

 

 

            In   its   Resolution   dated August   17,   2007,   the   IBP   Board   of   Governors 

adopted and approved the Commissioner’s report and recommendation.[15]

 

            This Court agrees with the IBP Board of Governors.

 

Lawyers are instruments in the administration of justice.  As vanguards of 

our legal system, they are expected to maintain not only legal proficiency but also 

a high standard of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing.  In so doing, the 

people’s faith and confidence in the judicial system is ensured.  Lawyers may be 

disciplined – whether in their professional or in their private capacity – for any 

conduct that is wanting in morality, honesty, probity and good demeanor.[16]

 

          In the present case, two corporations were created where the respondent 

played a vital role, being Wealth Marketing’s Chairman of the Board and Ur-Link’s 

representative.  We quote with approval the Commissioner’s findings, thus:

 

            As   correctly   pointed   out   by   the   City   Prosecutor’s   Office   of Makati,   it   appears   that   the   executive   officers   of  Wealth  Marketing Corporation conspired with each (sic) other to defraud the investors by engaging in unlawful network of recruiting innocent investors to invest in   foreign currency  trading business.  The truth of   the matter  is   that there was no actual foreign currency trading since said corporation is not   duly   licensed   or   authorized   by   the   Securities   and   Exchange Commission to perform such task.

 

            In   the   General   Information   Sheet   (Annex   “I”)   of   Wealth Marketing   and  General   Services   Corporation,   the   authorized   capital stock   is   only P9,680,000.00   and   the  paid  up   capital,   at   the  time  of [in]corporation   is   (sic)   only P605,000.00.  Said   corporation,   as   the records  will   show,  has  been  dealing  with   investors  with  millions  of pesos on hand, with the hope that their money would earn interests as promised.  However, their company resources and financial status will show that   they  are  not   in   the  position to  meet   these  demands  if  a situation such as this would arise.

 

            x x x x

 

            Furthermore,   in  order   to  evade   the   investors  who were   then asking for the return of their investments, said respondent even formed 

and  made  him  part   of   a   new   company,  Ur-Link  Corporation,  which according to the complainants, when they met the respondent, would assume   the   obligations   of   the   defunct   Wealth   Marketing Corporation.  It   is  also  evident   that   respondent   is   frolicking  with   the Securities   and   Exchange   Commission   for   the   purpose   of   employing fraud.[17]

  

         

To be sure, respondent’s conduct falls short of the exacting standards expected of 

him as a vanguard of the legal profession.

 

The fact that the criminal case against the respondent involving the same 

set   of   facts   is   still   pending   in   court   is   of   no  moment.  Respondent,   being   a 

member of the bar, should note that administrative cases against lawyers belong 

to   a   class   of   their   own.  They   are   distinct   from   and   they   may   proceed 

independently   of   criminal   cases.  A   criminal   prosecution  will   not   constitute   a 

prejudicial question even if the same facts and circumstances are attendant in the 

administrative proceedings.[18]  Besides, it is not sound judicial policy to await the 

final resolution of a criminal case before a complaint against a  lawyer may be 

acted upon; otherwise, this Court will be rendered helpless to apply the rules on 

admission   to,   and   continuing  membership   in,   the   legal   profession  during   the 

whole   period   that   the   criminal   case   is   pending   final   disposition,   when   the 

objectives of the two proceedings are vastly disparate.[19]  Disciplinary proceedings 

involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance.  They are 

undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare and for preserving courts 

of  justice from the official  ministration of persons unfit to practice law.[20]  The 

attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of the court.[21] 

 

          As to the recommended penalty of disbarment, we find the same to be in 

order.

 

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:

 

          A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so.  x x x.

 

         

Time and again, we have stated that disbarment is the most severe form of 

disciplinary sanction, and, as such, the power to disbar must always be exercised 

with great  caution for only the most  imperative reasons and  in clear cases of 

misconduct affecting the standing and moral character of the lawyer as an officer 

of the court and a member of the bar.[22]

 

          The Court notes that this is not the first time that respondent is facing an 

administrative case, for he had been previously suspended from the practice of 

law   in Samala   v.   Palaña[23] and Sps.   Amador   and   Rosita   Tejada   v.   Palaña.[24] In Samala, respondent also played an important role in a corporation known as 

First Imperial Resources Incorporated (FIRI), being its legal officer.  As in this case, 

respondent committed the same offense by making himself part of the money 

trading business when,  in fact,  said business was not among the purposes for 

which FIRI was created.  Respondent was thus meted the penalty of suspension 

for three (3) years with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts 

would be dealt with more severely.[25]  Likewise, in Tejada, he was suspended for 

six (6) months for his continued refusal to settle his loan obligations.[26]          

         

          The fact that respondent went into hiding in order to avoid service upon him 

of the warrant of arrest issued by the court (where his criminal case is pending) 

exacerbates his offense.[27]

 

          Finally, we note that respondent’s case is further highlighted by his lack of 

regard for the charges brought against him. As in Tejada, instead of meeting the 

charges   head   on,   respondent   did   not   bother   to   file   an   answer   and   verified 

position   paper,   nor   did   he   participate   in   the   proceedings   to   offer   a   valid 

explanation for his conduct.[28]  The Court has emphatically stated that when the 

integrity of a member of the bar is challenged, it is not enough that he denies the 

charges against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence against 

him.  He  must   show proof   that  he  still  maintains   that  degree  of  morality  and 

integrity which at all times is expected of him.[29]  Verily, respondent’s failure to 

comply   with   the   orders   of   the   IBP   without   justifiable   reason  manifests   his 

disrespect   of   judicial   authorities.[30]  As   a   lawyer,   he   ought   to   know   that   the 

compulsory bar organization was merely deputized by this Court to undertake the 

investigation of complaints against lawyers.  In short, his disobedience to the IBP 

is in reality a gross and blatant disrespect of the Court.[31]  By his repeated cavalier 

conduct,   the   respondent   exhibited   an   unpardonable   lack   of   respect   for   the 

authority of the Court.[32] 

         

Considering the serious nature of the instant offense and in light of his prior 

misconduct herein-before mentioned for which he was penalized with a three-

year suspension with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts would 

be dealt with more severely; and another six-month suspension thereafter, the 

contumacious behavior of respondent in the instant case which grossly degrades 

the legal profession indeed warrants the imposition of a much graver penalty --- 

disbarment.[33]  Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is most sacredly bound 

to uphold the  laws.  He  is  their  sworn servant;  and for him, of  all  men  in the 

world,  to repudiate and override the  laws,  to trample them underfoot and to 

ignore the very bonds of society, argues recreancy to his position and office, and 

sets a pernicious example to the insubordinate and dangerous elements of the 

body politic.[34]

 

WHEREFORE,   respondent  Antoniutti K.  Palaña  is  hereby DISBARRED, and 

his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll  of Attorneys.   Let a copy of this 

Decision be entered in his record as a member of the Bar; and let notice of the 

same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and on the Office of the 

Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.

 

 

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 162525             September 23, 2008

ASEAN PACIFIC PLANNERS, APP CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION*AND CESAR GOCO, petitioners, vs.CITY OF URDANETA, CEFERINO J. CAPALAD, WALDO C. DEL CASTILLO, NORBERTO M. DEL PRADO, JESUS A. ORDONO AND AQUILINO MAGUISA,**, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

QUISUMBING, J.:

The instant petition seeks to set aside the Resolutions1 dated April 15, 2003 and February 4, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 76170.

This case stemmed from a Complaint2 for annulment of contracts with prayer for preliminary prohibitory injunction and temporary restraining order filed by respondent Waldo C. Del Castillo, in his capacity as taxpayer, against respondents City of Urdaneta and Ceferino J. Capalad doing business under the name JJEFWA Builders, and petitioners Asean Pacific Planners (APP) represented by Ronilo G. Goco and Asean Pacific Planners Construction and Development Corporation (APPCDC) represented by Cesar D. Goco.

Del Castillo alleged that then Urdaneta City Mayor Rodolfo E. Parayno entered into five contracts for the preliminary design, construction and management of a four-storey twin cinema commercial center and hotel involving a massive expenditure of public funds amounting to P250 million, funded by a loan from the Philippine National Bank (PNB). For minimal work, the contractor was allegedly paid P95 million. Del Castillo also claimed that all the contracts are void because the object is outside the commerce of men. The object is a piece of land belonging to the public domain and which remains devoted to a public purpose as a public elementary school. Additionally, he claimed that the contracts, from the feasibility study to

management and lease of the future building, are also void because they were all awarded solely to the Goco family.

In their Answer,3 APP and APPCDC claimed that the contracts are valid. Urdaneta City Mayor Amadeo R. Perez, Jr., who filed the city's Answer,4 joined in the defense and asserted that the contracts were properly executed by then Mayor Parayno with prior authority from the Sangguniang Panlungsod. Mayor Perez also stated that Del Castillo has no legal capacity to sue and that the complaint states no cause of action. For respondent Ceferino J. Capalad, Atty. Oscar C. Sahagun filed an Answer5 with compulsory counterclaim and motion to dismiss on the ground that Del Castillo has no legal standing to sue.

Respondents Norberto M. Del Prado, Jesus A. Ordono and Aquilino Maguisa became parties to the case when they jointly filed, also in their capacity as taxpayers, a Complaint-in-Intervention6 adopting the allegations of Del Castillo.

After pre-trial, the Lazaro Law Firm entered its appearance as counsel for Urdaneta City and filed an Omnibus Motion7 with prayer to (1) withdraw Urdaneta City's Answer; (2) drop Urdaneta City as defendant and be joined as plaintiff; (3) admit Urdaneta City's complaint; and (4) conduct a new pre-trial. Urdaneta City allegedly wanted to rectify its position and claimed that inadequate legal representation caused its inability to file the necessary pleadings in representation of its interests.

In its Order8 dated September 11, 2002, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Urdaneta City, Pangasinan, Branch 45, admitted the entry of appearance of the Lazaro Law Firm and granted the withdrawal of appearance of the City Prosecutor. It also granted the prayer to drop the city as defendant and admitted its complaint for consolidation with Del Castillo's complaint, and directed the defendants to answer the city's complaint.

In its February 14, 2003 Order,9 the RTC denied reconsideration of the September 11, 2002 Order. It also granted Capalad's motion to expunge all pleadings filed by Atty. Sahagun in his behalf. Capalad was dropped as defendant, and his complaint filed by Atty. Jorito C. Peralta was admitted and consolidated with the complaints of Del Castillo and Urdaneta City. The RTC also directed APP and APPCDC to answer Capalad's complaint.

Aggrieved, APP and APPCDC filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. In its April 15, 2003 Resolution, the Court of Appeals dismissed the

petition on the following grounds: (1) defective verification and certification of non-forum shopping, (2) failure of the petitioners to submit certified true copies of the RTC's assailed orders as mere photocopies were submitted, and (3) lack of written explanation why service of the petition to adverse parties was not personal.10 The Court of Appeals also denied APP and APPCDC's motion for reconsideration in its February 4, 2004 Resolution.11

Hence, this petition, which we treat as one for review on certiorari under Rule 45, the proper remedy to assail the resolutions of the Court of Appeals.12

Petitioners argue that:

I.

THE APPELLATE COURT PALPABLY ERRED AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS JUDICIAL PREROGATIVES BY SUMMARILY DISMISSING THE PETITION ON THE BASIS OF PROCEDURAL TECHNICALITIES DESPITE SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE [THEREWITH]…

II.

THE TRIAL COURT PALPABLY ERRED AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS JUDICIAL PREROGATIVES BY CAPRICIOUSLY

(a.) Entertaining the taxpayers' suits of private respondents del Castillo, del Prado, Ordono and Maguisa despite their clear lack of legal standing to file the same.

(b.) Allowing the entry of appearance of a private law firm to represent the City of Urdaneta despite the clear statutory and jurisprudential prohibitions thereto.

(c.) Allowing Ceferino J. Capalad and the City of Urdaneta to switch sides, by permitting the withdrawal of their respective answers and admitting their complaints as well as allowing the appearance of Atty. Jorito C. Peralta to represent Capalad although Atty. Oscar C. Sahagun, his counsel of record, had not withdrawn from the case, in gross violation of well settled rules and case law on the matter.13

We first resolve whether the Court of Appeals erred in denying reconsideration of its April 15, 2003 Resolution despite APP and APPCDC's subsequent compliance.

Petitioners argue that the Court of Appeals should not have dismissed the petition on mere technicalities since they have attached the proper documents in their motion for reconsideration and substantially complied with the rules.

Respondent Urdaneta City maintains that the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the petition because Cesar Goco had no proof he was authorized to sign the certification of non-forum shopping in behalf of APPCDC.

Indeed, Cesar Goco had no proof of his authority to sign the verification and certification of non-forum shopping of the petition for certiorari filed with the Court of Appeals.14 Thus, the Court of Appeals is allowed by the rules the discretion to dismiss the petition since only individuals vested with authority by a valid board resolution may sign the certificate of non-forum shopping in behalf of a corporation. Proof of said authority must be attached; otherwise, the petition is subject to dismissal.15

However, it must be pointed out that in several cases,16 this Court had considered as substantial compliance with the procedural requirements the submission in the motion for reconsideration of the authority to sign the verification and certification, as in this case. The Court notes that the attachments in the motion for reconsideration show that on March 5, 2003, the Board of Directors of APPCDC authorized Cesar Goco to institute the petition before the Court of Appeals.17 On March 22, 2003, Ronilo Goco doing business under the name APP, also appointed his father, Cesar Goco, as his attorney-in-fact to file the petition.18 When the petition was filed on March 26, 2003 19  before the Court of Appeals, Cesar Goco was duly authorized to sign the verification and certification except that the proof of his authority was not submitted together with the petition.

Similarly, petitioners submitted in the motion for reconsideration certified true copies of the assailed RTC orders and we may also consider the same as substantial compliance.20 Petitioners also included in the motion for reconsideration their explanation21 that copies of the petition were personally served on the Lazaro Law Firm and mailed to the RTC and Atty. Peralta because of distance. The affidavit of service22supported the explanation. Considering the substantial issues involved, it was thus error for the appellate court to deny reinstatement of the petition.

Having discussed the procedural issues, we shall now proceed to address the substantive issues raised by petitioners, rather than remand this case to the Court of Appeals. In our view, the issue, simply put, is: Did the RTC err and commit grave abuse of discretion in (a) entertaining the taxpayers' suits; (b)

allowing a private law firm to represent Urdaneta City; (c) allowing respondents Capalad and Urdaneta City to switch from being defendants to becoming complainants; and (d) allowing Capalad's change of attorneys?

On the first point at issue, petitioners argue that a taxpayer may only sue where the act complained of directly involves illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation. The allegation of respondents Del Castillo, Del Prado, Ordono and Maguisa that the construction of the project is funded by the PNB loan contradicts the claim regarding illegal disbursement since the funds are not directly derived from taxation.

Respondents Del Castillo, Del Prado, Ordono and Maguisa counter that their personality to sue was not raised by petitioners APP and APPCDC in their Answer and that this issue was not even discussed in the RTC's assailed orders.

Petitioners' contentions lack merit. The RTC properly allowed the taxpayers' suits. In Public Interest Center, Inc. v. Roxas,23 we held:

In the case of taxpayers' suits, the party suing as a taxpayer must prove that he has sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation. Thus, taxpayers have been allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that public funds are wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.

x x x x

Petitioners' allegations in their Amended Complaint that the loan contracts entered into by the Republic and NPC are serviced or paid through a disbursement of public funds are not disputed by respondents, hence, they are invested with personality to institute the same.24

Here, the allegation of taxpayers Del Castillo, Del Prado, Ordono and Maguisa that P95 million of theP250 million PNB loan had already been paid for minimal work is sufficient allegation of overpayment, of illegal disbursement, that invests them with personality to sue. Petitioners do not dispute the allegation as they merely insist, albeit erroneously, that public funds are not involved. Under Article 195325 of the Civil Code, the city acquired ownership of the money loaned from PNB, making the money public fund. The city will have to pay the loan by revenues raised from local taxation or by its internal revenue allotment.

In addition, APP and APPCDC's lack of objection in their Answer on the personality to sue of the four complainants constitutes waiver to raise the objection under Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court.26

On the second point, petitioners contend that only the City Prosecutor can represent Urdaneta City and that law and jurisprudence prohibit the appearance of the Lazaro Law Firm as the city's counsel.

The Lazaro Law Firm, as the city's counsel, counters that the city was inutile defending its cause before the RTC for lack of needed legal advice. The city has no legal officer and both City Prosecutor and Provincial Legal Officer are busy. Practical considerations also dictate that the city and Mayor Perez must have the same counsel since he faces related criminal cases. Citing Mancenido v. Court of Appeals,27 the law firm states that hiring private counsel is proper where rigid adherence to the law on representation would deprive a party of his right to redress a valid grievance.28

We cannot agree with the Lazaro Law Firm. Its appearance as Urdaneta City's counsel is against the law as it provides expressly who should represent it. The City Prosecutor should continue to represent the city.

Section 481(a)29 of the Local Government Code (LGC) of 199130 mandates the appointment of a city legal officer. Under Section 481(b)(3)(i)31 of the LGC, the city legal officer is supposed to represent the city in all civil actions, as in this case, and special proceedings wherein the city or any of its officials is a party. In Ramos v. Court of Appeals,32 we cited that under Section 1933 of Republic Act No. 5185,34 city governments may already create the position of city legal officer to whom the function of the city fiscal (now prosecutor) as legal adviser and officer for civil cases of the city shall be transferred.35 In the case of Urdaneta City, however, the position of city legal officer is still vacant, although its charter36 was enacted way back in 1998.

Because of such vacancy, the City Prosecutor's appearance as counsel of Urdaneta City is proper. The City Prosecutor remains as the city's legal adviser and officer for civil cases, a function that could not yet be transferred to the city legal officer. Under the circumstances, the RTC should not have allowed the entry of appearance of the Lazaro Law Firm vice the City Prosecutor. Notably, the city's Answer was sworn to before the City Prosecutor by Mayor Perez. The City Prosecutor prepared the city's pre-trial brief and represented the city in the pre-trial conference. No question was raised against the City Prosecutor's actions until the Lazaro Law Firm entered its appearance and claimed that the city lacked adequate legal representation.

Moreover, the appearance of the Lazaro Law Firm as counsel for Urdaneta City is against the law. Section 481(b)(3)(i) of the LGC provides when a special legal officer may be employed, that is, in actions or proceedings where a component city or municipality is a party adverse to the provincial government. But this case is not between Urdaneta City and the Province of Pangasinan. And we have consistently held that a local government unit cannot be represented by private counsel37 as only public officers may act for and in behalf of public entities and public funds should not be spent to hire private lawyers.38 Pro bono representation in collaboration with the municipal attorney and prosecutor has not even been allowed.39

Neither is the law firm's appearance justified under the instances listed in Mancenido when local government officials can be represented by private counsel, such as when a claim for damages could result in personal liability. No such claim against said officials was made in this case. Note that before it joined the complainants, the city was the one sued, not its officials. That the firm represents Mayor Perez in criminal cases, suits in his personal capacity,40 is of no moment.

On the third point, petitioners claim that Urdaneta City is estopped to reverse admissions in its Answer that the contracts are valid and, in its pre-trial brief, that the execution of the contracts was in good faith.

We disagree. The court may allow amendment of pleadings.

Section 5,41 Rule 10 of the Rules of Court pertinently provides that if evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground that it is not within the issues raised by the pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings to be amended and shall do so with liberality if the presentation of the merits of the action and the ends of substantial justice will be subserved thereby. Objections need not even arise in this case since the Pre-trial Order42 dated April 1, 2002 already defined as an issue whether the contracts are valid. Thus, what is needed is presentation of the parties' evidence on the issue. Any evidence of the city for or against the validity of the contracts will be relevant and admissible. Note also that under Section 5, Rule 10, necessary amendments to pleadings may be made to cause them to conform to the evidence.

In addition, despite Urdaneta City's judicial admissions, the trial court is still given leeway to consider other evidence to be presented for said admissions may not necessarily prevail over documentary evidence,43 e.g., the contracts assailed. A party's testimony in open court may also override admissions in the Answer.44

As regards the RTC's order admitting Capalad's complaint and dropping him as defendant, we find the same in order. Capalad insists that Atty. Sahagun has no authority to represent him. Atty. Sahagun claims otherwise. We note, however, that Atty. Sahagun represents petitioners who claim that the contracts are valid. On the other hand, Capalad filed a complaint for annulment of the contracts. Certainly, Atty. Sahagun cannot represent totally conflicting interests. Thus, we should expunge all pleadings filed by Atty. Sahagun in behalf of Capalad.

Relatedly, we affirm the order of the RTC in allowing Capalad's change of attorneys, if we can properly call it as such, considering Capalad's claim that Atty. Sahagun was never his attorney.

Before we close, notice is taken of the offensive language used by Attys. Oscar C. Sahagun and Antonio B. Escalante in their pleadings before us and the Court of Appeals. They unfairly called the Court of Appeals a "court of technicalities"45 for validly dismissing their defectively prepared petition. They also accused the Court of Appeals of protecting, in their view, "an incompetent judge."46 In explaining the "concededly strong language," Atty. Sahagun further indicted himself. He said that the Court of Appeals' dismissal of the case shows its "impatience and readiness to punish petitioners for a perceived slight on its dignity" and such dismissal "smacks of retaliation and does not augur for the cold neutrality and impartiality demanded of the appellate court."47

Accordingly, we impose upon Attys. Oscar C. Sahagun and Antonio B. Escalante a fine of P2,00048each payable to this Court within ten days from notice and we remind them that they should observe and maintain the respect due to the Court of Appeals and judicial officers;49 abstain from offensive language before the courts;50 and not attribute to a Judge motives not supported by the record.51 Similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.

WHEREFORE, we (1) GRANT the petition; (2) SET ASIDE the Resolutions dated April 15, 2003 and February 4, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 76170; (3) DENY the entry of appearance of the Lazaro Law Firm in Civil Case No. U-7388 and EXPUNGE all pleadings it filed as counsel of Urdaneta City; (4) ORDER the City Prosecutor to represent Urdaneta City in Civil Case No. U-7388; (5)AFFIRM the RTC in admitting the complaint of Capalad; and (6) PROHIBIT Atty. Oscar C. Sahagun from representing Capalad and EXPUNGE all pleadings that he filed in behalf of Capalad.

Let the records of Civil Case No. U-7388 be remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.

Finally, we IMPOSE a fine of P2,000 each on Attys. Oscar C. Sahagun and Antonio B. Escalante for their use of offensive language, payable to this Court within ten (10) days from receipt of this Decision.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

ADM. CASE No. 7006             October 9, 2007

RE : SUSPENSION OF ATTY. ROGELIO Z. BAGABUYO, FORMER SENIOR STATE PROSECUTOR.

D E C I S I O N

AZCUNA, J.:

This administrative case stemmed from the events of the proceedings in Crim. Case No. 5144, entitled People v. Luis Bucalon Plaza, heard before the sala of Presiding Judge Jose Manuel P. Tan, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Surigao City, Branch 29.

Crim. Case No. 5144 was originally raffled to the sala of Judge Floripinas C. Buyser, RTC of Surigao City, Branch 30. In an Order dated March 14, 2002, Judge Buyser denied the Demurrer to the Evidence of the accused, declaring that the evidence thus presented by the prosecution was sufficient to prove the crime of homicide and not the charge of murder. Consequently, the counsel for the defense filed a Motion to Fix the Amount of Bail Bond. Respondent Atty. Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo, then Senior State Prosecutor and the deputized prosecutor of the case, objected thereto mainly on the ground that the original charge of murder, punishable with reclusion perpetua, was not subject to bail under Sec. 4, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court.1

In an Order dated August 30, 2002,2 Judge Buyser inhibited himself from further trying the case because of the "harsh insinuation" of Senior Prosecutor Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo that he "lacks the cold neutrality of an impartial magistrate," by allegedly suggesting the filing of the motion to fix the amount of bail bond by counsel for the accused.

The case was transferred to Branch 29 of the RTC of Surigao City, presided by Judge Jose Manuel P. Tan. In an Order dated November 12, 2002, Judge Tan favorably resolved the Motion to Fix the Amount of Bail Bond, and fixed the amount of the bond at P40,000.

Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order dated November 12, 2002, which motion was denied for lack of merit in an Order dated February 10, 2003. In October, 2003, respondent appealed from the Orders dated November 12, 2002 and February 10, 2003, to the Court of Appeals (CA).

Instead of availing himself only of judicial remedies, respondent caused the publication of an article regarding the Order granting bail to the accused in the August 18, 2003 issue of the Mindanao Gold Star Daily. The article, entitled "Senior prosecutor lambasts Surigao judge for allowing murder suspect to bail out," reads:

SENIOR state prosecutor has lashed at a judge in Surigao City for allowing a murder suspect to go out on bail.

Senior state prosecutor Rogelio Bagabuyo lambasted Judge Manuel Tan of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 29 based in Surigao City for ruling on a motion that sought a bailbond for Luis Plaza who stands charged with murdering a policeman . . . .

Plaza reportedly posted a P40-thousand bail bond.

Bagabuyo argued that the crime of murder is a non-bailable offense. But Bagabuyo admitted that a judge could still opt to allow a murder suspect to bail out in cases when the evidence of the prosecution is weak.

But in this murder case, Bagabuyo said the judge who previously handled it, Judge F[lori]pinas B[uy]ser, described the evidence to be strong. B[uy]ser inhibited from the case for an unclear reason.

x x x

Bagabuyo said he would contest Tan's decision before the Court of Appeals and would file criminal and administrative charges of certiorari against the judge.

Bagabuyuo said he was not afraid of being cited in contempt by Judge Tan.

"This is the only way that the public would know that there are judges there who are displaying judicial arrogance." he said.3

In an Order dated August 21, 2003, the RTC of Surigao City, Branch 29, directed respondent and the writer of the article, Mark Francisco of the Mindanao Gold

Star Daily, to appear in court on September 20, 2003 to explain why they should not be cited for indirect contempt of court for the publication of the article which degraded the court and its presiding judge with its lies and misrepresentation.

The said Order stated that contrary to the statements in the article, Judge Buyser described the evidence for the prosecution as not strong, but sufficient to prove the guilt of the accused only for homicide. Moreover, it was not true that Judge Buyser inhibited himself from the case for an unclear reason. Judge Buyser, in an Order dated August 30, 2002, declared in open court in the presence of respondent that he was inhibiting himself from the case due to the harsh insinuation of respondent that he lacked the cold neutrality of an impartial judge.

On the scheduled hearing of the contempt charge, Mark Francisco admitted that the Mindanao Gold Star Daily caused the publication of the article. He disclosed that respondent, in a press conference, stated that the crime of murder is non-bailable. When asked by the trial court why he printed such lies, Mr. Francisco answered that his only source was respondent.4 Mr. Francisco clarified that in the statement alleging that Judge Buyser inhibited himself from the case for an unclear reason, the phrase "for an unclear reason," was added by the newspaper's Executive Editor Herby S. Gomez.5

Respondent admitted that he caused the holding of the press conference, but refused to answer whether he made the statements in the article until after he shall have filed a motion to dismiss. For his refusal to answer, the trial court declared him in contempt of court pursuant to Sec. 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.6 The Court's Order dated September 30, 2003 reads:

ORDER

Mr. Mark Francisco for publishing this article which is a lie clothed in half truth to give it a semblance of truth is hereby ordered to pay a fine of P10,000. Prosecutor Bagabuyo, for obstinately refusing to explain why he should not be cited for contempt and admitting that the article published in the Mindanao Gold Star Daily on August 18, 2003 and quoted in the Order of this Court dated August 21, 2003 which is contemptuous was caused by him to be published, is hereby adjudged to have committed indirect contempt of Court pursuant to Section 3 of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court and he is hereby ordered to suffer the penalty of 30 days in jail. The BJMP is hereby ordered to arrest Prosecutor Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo if he does not put up a bond ofP100,000.00.

SO ORDERD.7

Respondent posted the required bond and was released from the custody of the law. He appealed the indirect contempt order to the CA.

Despite the citation of indirect contempt, respondent presented himself to the media for interviews in Radio Station DXKS, and again attacked the integrity of Judge Tan and the trial court's disposition in the proceedings of Crim. Case No. 5144.

In an Order dated October 20, 2003, the RTC of Surigao City, Branch 29, required respondent to explain and to show cause within five days from receipt thereof why he should not be held in contempt for his media interviews that degraded the court and the presiding judge, and why he should not be suspended from the practice of law for violating the Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically Rule 11.05 of Canon 118 and Rule 13.02 of Canon 13.9

In the Order, the trial court stated that respondent was interviewed by Jun Clergio, and that the interview was repeatedly aired on September 30, 2003 and in his news program between 6:00 and 8:00 a.m. on October 1, 2003. He was also interviewed by Tony Consing on October 1 and 2, 2003, between 8:00 and 9:00 a.m. in his radio program. In those radio interviews, respondent allegedly called Judge Tan a judge who does not know the law, a liar, and a dictator who does not accord due process to the people.

The hearing for the second contempt charge was set on December 4, 2003.

On November, 20, 2003, respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Extension of Time to File Answer to Contempt alleging that he was saddled with work of equal importance and needed ample time to answer the same. He also prayed for a bill of particulars in order to properly prepare for his defense.

In an Order dated November 20, 2003, the trial court denied the motion. It stated that a bill of particulars is not applicable in contempt proceedings, and that respondent's actions and statements are detailed in the Order of October 20, 2003.

On the scheduled hearing of December 4, 2003 respondent neither appeared in court nor informed the court of his absence. The trial court issued an Order dated December 4, 2003 cancelling the hearing "to give Prosecutor Bagabuyo all the chances he asks for," and ordered him to appear on January 12, 2004 to explain in writing or orally why he should not be cited in contempt of court pursuant to the facts stated in the Order dated October 20, 2003. However, respondent did not appear in the scheduled hearing of January 12, 2004.

On January 15, 2004, the trial court received respondent's Answer dated January 8, 2004. Respondent denied the charge that he sought to be interviewed by radio station DXKS. He, however, stated that right after the hearing of September 30, 2003, he was approached by someone who asked him to comment on the Order issued in open court, and that his comment does not fall within the concept of indirect contempt of court. He also admitted that he was interviewed by his friend, Tony Consing, at the latter's instance. He justified his response during the interview as a simple exercise of his constitutional right of freedom of speech and that it was not meant to offend or malign, and was without malice.

On February 8, 2004, the trial court issued an Order, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, finding preponderant evidence that Prosecutor Bagabuyo has grossly violated the Canons of the legal profession and [is] guilty of grave professional misconduct, rendering him unfit to continue to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law.

Likewise, he is also found guilty of indirect contempt of court, for which he is hereby ordered to suffer the penalty of IMPRISONMENT for ninety (90) days to be served at the Surigao City Jail and to pay the maximum fine of THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00). Future acts of contempt will be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of the relevant records be immediately forwarded to the Supreme Court for automatic review and for further determination of grounds for [the] disbarment of Prosecutor Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo.10

The trial court found respondent's denials to be lame as the tape of his interview on October 2, 2003, duly transcribed, showed disrespect of the court and its officers, thus:

TONY CONSING: Fiscal, nanglabay ang mga oras, nanglabay ang gamay'ng panahon ang samad sa imong kasingkasing nagpabilin pa ba ni. O ingnon nato duna na bay pagbag-o sa imong huna-huna karon?

(Fiscal, after the lapse of time, are you still hurt? Or have you not changed your mind yet?)

BAGABUYO : Ang akong huna-huna kon aduna man ugaling pagbag-o ang pagsiguro, ang mga Huwes nga dili mahibalo sa balaod tangtangon pagka abogado, mao kana.

(If my mind has changed at all, it is that I ensure that all judges who are ignorant of the law should be disbarred. That's it.)

x x x

BAGABUYO : Mao kana ang tinuod, Ton, ug kining akong guibatonan karon nga hunahuna mahitungod nianang mga Huwes nga dili kahibalo sa balaod, magkadugay magkalami. Kada adlao nagatoon ako. Nagabasa ako sa mga bag-ong jurisprudence ug sa atong balaod aron sa pagsiguro gayod nga inigsang-at unya nako sa kaso nga disbarment   niining di mahibalo nga Huwes, sigurado gayod ako nga katangtangan siya sa lisensiya . . . . Ang kini nga Huwes nga dili mahibalo sa balaod, pagatangtangon na, dili lamang sa pagka-Huwes kon dili sa pagka-abogado. Tan-awa ra gyod kining iyang gibuhat nga Order, Ton, ang iyang pagkabakakon . . . .

(That's true, Ton, and this conviction I have now about judges who are ignorant of the law is made firmer by time. I study everyday. I read new jurisprudence and the law to insure that when I file the disbarment case against this Judge who does not know his law, I am certain that he loses his license. . . . This judge who is ignorant of the law should not only be removed as a judge but should also be disbarred. Just take a look at his Order, Ton, and see what a liar he is . . . .)

x x x

BAGABUYO : Yes, nag-ingon ang iyang Order. . . . Ngano nga nakaingon ako nga bakakon kini, nag-ingon nga kini konong order given in open court, ang kalooy sa dios, ang iyang order sa Korte wala siya mag-ingon ug kantidad nga P100,000.00 nga bail bond. . . .

(Yes, his Order said that . . . . Why did I say that he is a liar? It states that this Order was "given in open court," and in God's mercy, he did not state the amount of P100,000.00 as bail bond. . . .)

BAGABUYO : Kay dili man lagi mahibalo sa balaod, ako

siyang gui-ingnan, Your Honor, I have the right to appeal. Mibalik dayon, ug miingon siya, BJMP arrest Bagabuyo.

(Because he does not know the law, I said, "Your Honor, I have the right to appeal." Then he came back and said, "BJMP, arrest Bagabuyo.")

x x x

BAGABUYO : . . . P100,000.00 ang iyang guipapiyansa.

Naunsa na? Dinhi makita nimo ang iyang pagka gross ignorance of the law. . . .

(He imposed a bail of P100,000.00. How come? This is where you will see his gross ignorance of the law. . . . )

x x x

TONY CONSING : So karon, unsay plano nimo karon?

(So what is your plan now?)

BAGABUYO : Sumala sa akong gui-ingon moundang lang ako kon matangtang na siya sa pagka abogado. . . .

(As I have said, I will only stop if he is already disbarred. . . .)

x x x

BAGABUYO : Nasuko siya niini kay hambugero kuno, pero angayan niyang hibaw-an nga ang trabajo sa Huwes dili ang pagtan-aw kon ang tawo hambugero . . . . Ug ang akong gisulti mao lamang ang balaod nga siya in fact at that time I said he is not conversant of the law, with regards to the case of murder. . . .

(He got angry because I was allegedly bragging but he should know that it is not for a judge to determine if a person is a braggart. . . .And what I said was based on the law. In fact, at that time, I said he is not conversant of the law, with regards to the case of murder . . . .)

x x x

BAGABUYO : Ah, mi sit down sab ako, contempt ra ba kadto . . . . Mao kana, pero unsa may iyang katuyoan – ang iyang katuyoan nga ipa-adto ako didto kay didto, iya akong pakauwawan kay iya kong sikopon, iya kong ipa-priso, pero kay di man lagi mahibalo sa balaod, ang iyang gui orderan BJMP, intawon por dios por Santo, Mr. Tan, pagbasa intawon ug balaod, naunsa ka ba Mr. Tan? Unsa may imong hunahuna nga kon ikaw Huwes, ikaw na ang diktador, no way, no sir, ours is a democratic country where

all and everyone is entitled to due process of law – you did not accord me due process of law . . . .

(I sat down. . . . That's it. But what was his purpose? He made me come in order to humiliate me because he wanted me arrested, he wanted me imprisoned, but because he is ignorant of the law, he ordered the BMJP. For God's sake, Mr. Tan, what's wrong with you, Mr. Tan? Please read the law. What is your thinking? That when you are a judge, you are also a dictator? No way, no sir, ours is a democratic country where all and everyone is entitled to due process of law – you did not accord me due process of law. . . .)

TONY CONSING: So mopasaka kang disbarment, malaumon kita nga maaksiyonan kini, with all this problem sa Korte Suprema.

(So you are filing a disbarment case? We hope that this be given action with all the problems in the Supreme Court.)

BAGABUYO : Dili ako mabalaka niana kay usa ka truck ang akong jurisprudence, nga ang mga Huwes nga di mahibalo sa balaod pagatangtangon gayod sa ilang pagka Huwes. . . . Apan unsa man intawon ang balaod ang iyang gibasa niini nadunggan ko nga kini kuno siya madjongero, mao bitaw na, madjong ang iyang guitunan?

(I am not worried because I have a truckload of jurisprudence that judges who are ignorant of the law must be removed from the Bench. But what law has he been reading? I heard that he is a mahjong   aficionado (mahjongero) and that is why he is studying mahjong .11

The trial court concluded that respondent, as a member of the bar and an officer of the court, is duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority of the court, and should not promote distrust in the administration of justice.

The trial court stated that it is empowered to suspend respondent from the practice of law under Sec. 28, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court12 for any of the causes mentioned in Sec. 2713 of the same Rule. Respondent was given the opportunity to be heard, but he opted to be silent. Thus, it held that the requirement of due process has been duly satisfied.

In accordance with the provisions of Sec. 29,14 Rule 138 and Sec. 9,15 Rule 139 of the Rules of Court, the RTC of Surigao City, Branch 29, transmitted to the Office of the Bar Confidant the Statement of Facts of respondent's suspension from the

practice of law, dated July 14, 2005, together with the order of suspension and other relevant documents.

In its Report dated January 4, 2006, the Office of the Bar Confidant found that the article in the August 18, 2003 issue of the Mindanao Gold Star Daily, which maligned the integrity and independence of the court and its officers, and respondent's criticism of the trial court's Order dated November 12, 2002, which was aired in radio station DXKS, both in connection with Crim. Case No. 5144, constitute grave violation of oath of office by respondent. It stated that the requirement of due process was complied with when respondent was given an opportunity to be heard, but respondent chose to remain silent.

The Office of the Bar Confidant recommended the implementation of the trial court's order of suspension dated February 8, 2004, and that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one year, with a stern warning that the repetition of a similar offense will be dealt with more severely.

The Court approves the recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant. It has been reiterated in Gonzaga   v. Villanueva, Jr. 16  that:

A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his oath, a patent disregard of his duties, or an odious deportment unbecoming an attorney. Among the grounds enumerated in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court are deceit; malpractice; gross misconduct in office; grossly immoral conduct; conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to the practice of law; willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; corrupt or willful appearance as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. The grounds are not preclusive in nature even as they are broad enough as to cover practically any kind of impropriety that a lawyer does or commits in his professional career or in his private life. A lawyer must at no time be wanting in probity and moral fiber which are not only conditions precedent to his entrance to the Bar, but are likewise essential demands for his continued membership therein.

Lawyers are licensed officers of the courts who are empowered to appear, prosecute and defend; and upon whom peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities are devolved by law as a consequence.17 Membership in the bar imposes upon them certain obligations.18 Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates a lawyer to "observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and [he] should insist on similar conduct by others." Rule 11.05 of Canon 11 states that a lawyer "shall submit grievances against a judge to the proper authorities only."

Respondent violated Rule 11.05 of Canon 11 when he admittedly caused the holding of a press conference where he made statements against the Order dated November 12, 2002 allowing the accused in Crim. Case No. 5144 to be released on bail.

Respondent also violated Canon 11 when he indirectly stated that Judge Tan was displaying judicial arrogance in the article entitled, Senior prosecutor lambasts Surigao judge for allowing murder suspect to bail out, which appeared in the August 18, 2003 issue of the Mindanao Gold Star Daily. Respondent's statements in the article, which were made while Crim. Case No. 5144 was still pending in court, also violated Rule 13.02 of Canon 13, which states that "a lawyer shall not make public statements in the media regarding a pending case tending to arouse public opinion for or against a party."

In regard to the radio interview given to Tony Consing, respondent violated Rule 11.05 of Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for not resorting to the proper authorities only for redress of his grievances against Judge Tan. Respondent also violated Canon 11 for his disrespect of the court and its officer when he stated that Judge Tan was ignorant of the law, that as a mahjong aficionado, he was studying mahjong instead of studying the law, and that he was a liar.

Respondent also violated the Lawyer's Oath, as he has sworn to "conduct [himself] as a lawyer according to the best of [his] knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to [his] clients."

As a senior state prosecutor and officer of the court, respondent should have set the example of observing and maintaining the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers. Montecillo v. Gica 19  held:

It is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude. As an officer of the court, it is his duty to uphold the dignity and authority of the court to which he owes fidelity, according to the oath he has taken. Respect for the courts guarantees the stability of our democratic institutions which, without such respect, would be resting on a very shaky foundation.

The Court is not against lawyers raising grievances against erring judges but the rules clearly provide for the proper venue and procedure for doing so, precisely because respect for the institution must always be maintained.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Atty. Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo is found guilty of violating Rule 11.05, Canon 11 and Rule 13.02, Canon 13 of the Code of

Professional Responsibility, and of violating the Lawyer's Oath, for which he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year effective upon finality of this Decision, with aSTERN WARNING that the repetition of a similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to respondent's personal record as an attorney, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Department of Justice, and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court

Manila

 EN BANC

 

 ATTY. JOSABETH V. ALONSOand SHALIMAR P. LAZATIN,

                    Complainants,

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

                   - versus -

 

A.C. No. 8481

[Formerly B.M. No. 1524]

 

     Present:

 

     CORONA, C.J.,

     CARPIO,

     CARPIO-MORALES,

     VELASCO, JR.,

     NACHURA,

     LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,

     BRION,

     PERALTA,

     BERSAMIN,

     DEL CASTILLO,

     ABAD,

ATTY. IBARO B. RELAMIDA, JR.,

                                   Respondent.

     VILLARAMA, JR.,

     PEREZ, and

     MENDOZA, JJ.

Promulgated:

      August 3, 2010

 

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

  

DECISION 

 

PERALTA, J.:

 

Before us is a Complaint[1] dated October 13, 2005 for disciplinary action

against respondent Atty. Ibaro B. Relamida, Jr. filed by Attys. Josabeth V. Alonso

and Shalimar P. Lazatin, counsel of Servier Philippines, Incorporated for violating

the rules on forum shopping and res judicata.

 

The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:

 

In March 2001, Jennifer Ebanen filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal

against Servier Philippines, Incorporated (Servier) docketed as NLRC-NCR-Case

No. 30-03-01583-01, alleging constructive dismissal with prayer for reinstatement

or payment of separation pay, backwages, moral and exemplary damages.

 

On July 5, 2002, the Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Servier.[2]  It held that

Ebanen voluntarily resigned from Servier and was, therefore, not illegally

dismissed.

 

Ebanen appealed at the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). On

March 31, 2003, the NLRC-Third Division affirmed the Decision of the Labor

Arbiter.[3]

 

Thus, Ebanen moved for reconsideration.  However, the NLRC denied the

same in a Resolution[4] dated May 5, 2003.

 

Unsatisfied, Ebanen filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of

Appeals which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 77968.  In a Decision[5] dated

January 16, 2004, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the findings of the NLRC

that Ebanen voluntarily resigned and that there was no constructive dismissal.

Ebanen moved anew for reconsideration, but was denied in a Resolution[6] dated

April 30, 2004.

 

Unrelenting, Ebanen filed a Petition for Review before the Supreme

Court.  However, in a Resolution[7] dated August 4, 2004, the Court found no

reversible error on the part of the CA, thus, denied said petition. Ebanen filed a

motion for reconsideration, but was denied with finality in a Resolution [8] dated

October 11, 2004.

 

Ebanen filed a Motion for Leave to Admit Second Motion for

Reconsideration of the Resolutions dated August 4, 2004 and October 11, 2004,

respectively. On January 19, 2005, the Court denied her motion.[9]

 

Persistent, Ebanen filed a Motion to Admit a Third Motion for

Reconsideration of the Resolution dated January 19, 2005. On April 20, 2005, the

Court denied her motion for being a prohibited pleading and noted without action

Ebanen’s third motion for reconsideration.[10]

 

On July 27, 2005, the Second Division of the Supreme Court noted without

action Ebanen’s Motion for Leave to Admit Supplemental Third Motion for

Reconsideration dated June 1, 2005, in view of the entry of judgment on February

17, 2005.[11]

 

On February 17, 2005, the Court’s Resolution dated August 4, 2004 has

already become final and executory; thus, a corresponding Entry of Judgment[12]has

been issued.

However, despite said entry of judgment, Ebanen, thru her counsel, Atty.

Relamida, filed  a second complaint on August 5, 2005 for illegal dismissal based

on the same cause of action of constructive dismissal against Servier, now

docketed as NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-08-07222-05.

 

Thus, on October 13, 2005, Servier, thru counsel, filed a letter-complaint

addressed to the then Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr., praying that respondents be

disciplinary sanctioned for violation of the rules on forum shopping and res

judicata.

 

Subsequently, in a Resolution[13] dated November 15, 2005, the Court

required both Ebanen and Atty. Relamida to comment on the letter-complaint

against them.

 

On January 16, 2006, respondents filed their Comments.[14] Both respondents

admitted the filing of the second complaint against Servier. They claimed that the

judgment rendered by the Labor Arbiter was null and void for want of due process,

since the motion for the issuance of subpoena duces tecum for the production of

vital documents filed by the complainant was ignored by the Labor Arbiter. They

opined that the dismissal did not amount to res judicata, since the decision was

null and void for lack of due process.  As a result, they claimed that there was also

no violation of the rule on forum shopping.[15]

 

On February 7, 2006, the Court referred the instant bar matter to the

Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and

recommendation.[16]

On January 22, 2007, the Labor Arbiter dismissed the second complaint on

the grounds of res judicata and forum shopping.  It further reiterated that Ebanen

voluntarily resigned from employment and was not constructively dismissed.

 

On March 14, 2008, during the mandatory conference before the IBP,

complainants failed to appear.  Ebanen manifested that she is not a lawyer.

 

Both parties were required to submit their respective position papers.

 

Atty. Relamida reiterated that Ebanen is not a lawyer and that she is the

daughter of Atty. Leonardo Aurelio (Atty. Aurelio), the senior partner of A.M.

Sison Jr. and Partners Law Offices where he is employed as associate lawyer.

 

He narrated that on March 28, 2001, Ebanen filed a Complaint for illegal

dismissal against Servier. He claimed that in the beginning, Atty. Aurelio was the

one who prepared and reviewed all the pleadings and it was Atty. Lapulapu Osoteo

who stood as counsel for Ebanen in the said labor case. Atty. Relamida admitted,

however, that during the filing of the second complaint he took over as counsel of

Ebanen, as requested by Atty. Aurelio.[17]  He also admitted that during the

pendency of the first complaint, he occasionally examined pleadings and signed as

counsel for Ebanen.[18]

 

Atty. Relamida reasoned out that as a courtesy to Atty. Aurelio and Ebanen,

he had no choice but to represent the latter. Moreover, he stressed that his client

was denied of her right to due process due to the denial of her motion for the

issuance of a subpoena duces tecum.  He then argued that the decision of the Labor

Arbiter was null and void; thus, there was no res judicata.[19]  He maintained that he

did not violate the lawyer’s oath by serving the interest of his client.

 

Servier, on the other hand, argued that the filing of the second complaint is a

violation of the rights of Servier, since the issue has already attained finality. It

contended that Atty. Relamida violated the rules on forum shopping for the same

act of filing a second complaint. As a consequence, they are being made to defend

themselves in a case that has been settled before the labor tribunals and

courts.  Likewise, Servier insisted that the filing of the second complaint was also a

blatant violation of the rule on res judicata.  Hence, Servier prayed that Atty.

Relamida be disciplinary dealt with due to his abuse of the processes of the courts.

 

          On April 19, 2008, the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD)

recommended that respondent Atty. Relamida be suspended from  the practice of

law for six (6) months.  It imposed no sanction on Ebanen for being a non-lawyer.

 

          In its Report, the IBP found that by filing the second complaint, Atty.

Relamida was guilty of violating the rules on res judicata and forum shopping. It

concluded that Atty. Relamida abused his right of recourse to the courts by filing a

complaint for a cause that had been previously rejected by the courts.

 

          On June 5, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors resolved to adopt and approve

with modification as to penalty the report of the IBP-CBD.  Instead, it

recommended that Atty. Relamida be suspended from the practice of law for one

(1) month for his violation of the rules on res judicata and forum shopping.

          On December 7, 2009, the Office of the Bar Confidant recommended that

the instant complaint be re-docketed as a regular administrative case against Atty.

Relamida.

 

We sustain the findings of the IBP-CBD.

 

All lawyers must bear in mind that their oaths are neither mere words nor 

an empty formality.  When they take their oath as lawyers, they dedicate their 

lives to the pursuit of justice.  They accept the sacred trust to uphold the laws of 

the land.  As the first Canon of the Code of Professional Responsibility states, "[a] 

lawyer  shall  uphold   the Constitution,  obey  the  laws of   the  land and promote 

respect for law and legal processes." Moreover, according to the lawyer’s oath 

they   took,   lawyers   should   "not   wittingly   or   willingly   promote   or   sue   any 

groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid or consent to the same."[20]

 

In the instant case, it is clear that Atty. Relamida is guilty of forum shopping

and violation of the rule on res judicata. Atty. Relamida should have refrained

from filing the second complaint against Servier.  He ought to have known that the

previous dismissal was with prejudice, since it had the effect of an adjudication on

the merits.  He was aware of all the proceedings which the first complaint went

through as by his own admission, he participated in the preparation of the

pleadings and even signed as counsel of Ebanen occasionally.[21] He knew that the

decision in the subject case had already attained finality. Atty. Relamida was well

aware that when he filed the second complaint, it involved the same parties and

same cause of action, albeit, he justified the same on the ground of nullity of the

previous dismissal.

His allegation that he was not the original counsel of Ebanen and that his

intention was only to protect the rights of his clients whom he believed were not

properly addressed in the prior complaint deserves scant consideration.  He should

know that once a case is decided with finality, the controversy is settled and the

matter is laid to rest. The prevailing party is entitled to enjoy the fruits of his

victory, while the other party is obliged to respect the court’s verdict and to comply

with it.[22]

 

The essence of forum shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the

same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively,

for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment. It exists when, as a result of an

adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion in another, or

when he institutes two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause

to increase the chances of obtaining a favorable decision. An important factor in

determining its existence is the vexation caused to the courts and the parties-

litigants by the filing of similar cases to claim substantially the same reliefs. Forum

shopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final

judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in another.  Thus, the

following requisites should concur:[23]

 x x x (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both actions, (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts, and (c) the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration.  

A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client, but not at the expense of

truth and the administration of justice. The filing of multiple petitions constitutes

abuse of the court’s processes and improper conduct that tends to impede, obstruct

and degrade the administration of justice and will be punished as contempt of

court. Needless to state, the lawyer who files such multiple or repetitious petitions

(which obviously delays the execution of a final and executory judgment) subjects

himself to disciplinary action for incompetence (for not knowing any better) or for

willful violation of his duties as an attorney to act with all good fidelity to the

courts, and to maintain only such actions as appear to him to be just and are

consistent with truth and honor.[24]

 

The filing of another action concerning the same subject matter, in violation

of the doctrine of res judicata, runs contrary to Canon 12 of the Code of

Professional Responsibility, which requires a lawyer to exert every effort and

consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of

justice.  By his actuations, respondent also violated Rule 12.02 and Rule 12.04 of

the Code, as well as a lawyer’s mandate "to delay no man for money or malice."[25]

 

The Court has, time and again, warned lawyers not to resort to forum

shopping for this practice clogs the court dockets. Their primary duty is to assist

the courts in the administration of justice.  Any conduct which tends to delay,

impede or obstruct the administration of justice contravenes such lawyer’s duty.[26] This we will not tolerate.

 

In cases of similar nature,[27] the penalty imposed by this Court was six (6)

months suspension from the practice of law. Thus, consistent with the existing

jurisprudence, we find that, in this case, the suspension of six (6) months from

practice of law is proper.

WHEREFORE, Resolution No. XVIII-2008-286, dated June 5, 2008, of the IBP, 

which found respondent Atty. Ibaro B. Relamida, Jr. guilty of violating the Rules 

on Res   Judicata and Forum   Shopping,   is AFFIRMED.   Atty.   Relaminda   is 

hereby SUSPENDED for six (6) months from the practice of law, effective upon the 

receipt of this Decision.  He is warned that a repetition of the same or a similar act 

will be dealt with more severely.

 

          Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to 

be appended to the personal record of Atty. Relamida as a member of the Bar; 

the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and the Office of the Court Administrator, 

for circulation to all courts in the country for their information and guidance.

         

          This Decision shall be immediately executory.

 

          SO ORDERED.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-35252             October 21, 1932

THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, plaintiff-appellant, vs.UY TENG PIAO, defendant-appellee.

Nat. M. Balboa and Dominador J. Endriga for appellant.Antonio Gonzales for appellee.

 

VICKERS, J.:

          This is an appeal by the plaintiff a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila absolving the defendant from the complaint, without a special finding as to costs.

          The appellant makes the following assignments of error:

          The trial court erred:

1. In finding that one Mr. Pecson gave a promise to appellee Uy Teng Piao to condone the balance of the judgment rendered against the said Uy Teng Piao and in favor of the Philippine National Bank in civil case No. 26328 of the Court o First Instance of Manila.

2. In finding that merely in selling the property described in certificate of title No. 11274 situated at Ronquillo Street, Manila, to Mariano Santos for P8,600 (Exhibit 2), the appellant had undoubtedly given the alleged promise of condonation to appellee Uy Teng Piao.

3. In finding that the consideration of document Exhibit 1 is the condonation of the balance of the judgment rendered in said civil case No. 26328.

4. In finding that said Mr. Pecson, granting that the latter has actually given such promise to condone, could bind the appellant corporation.

5. In holding that the absence of demand for payment upon appellee Uy Teng Piao for the balance of the said judgment from February 11, 1925 up to the year 1930 is "una senal inequivoca una prueba evidente" of the condonation of the balance of the said judgment.

6. In finding that by the sale of the said property to Mariano Santos for the sum of P8,600, the said judgment in civil case No. 26328 has been more than fully paid even discounting the sum of P1,300 which appellant paid as the highest bidder for the said property.

7. In declaring that the offer of appellee Uy Teng Piao as shown by Exhibits D and D-1, reflects only the desire of the said appellee Uy Teng Piao to avoid having a case with the appellant bank.

8. In finally absolving appellee Uy Teng Piao and in not sentencing him to pay the amount claimed in the complaint with costs.

          On September 9, 1924, the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered a judgment in favor of the Philippine National Bank and against Uy Teng Piao in civil case No. 26328 for the sum of P17,232.42 with interest at 7 per cent per annum from June 1, 1924, plus 10 per cent of the sum amount for attorney's fees and costs. The court ordered the defendant to deposit said amount with the clerk of the court within three months from the date of the judgment, and in case of his failure to do so that the mortgaged properties described in transfer certificates of title Nos. 7264 and 8274 should be sold at public auction in accordance with the law and the proceeds applied to the payment of the judgment.

          Uy Teng Piao failed to comply with the order of the court, and the sheriff of the City of Manila sold the two parcels of land at public auction to the Philippine National Bank on October 14, 1924 for P300 and P1,000 respectively.

          On February 11, 1925, the Philippine National Bank secured from Uy Teng Piao a waiver of his right to redeem the property described in Transfer Certificate of Title No. 8274, and on the same date the bank sold said property to Mariano Santos for P8,600.1awphil.net

          Evidently the other parcel, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 7264, was subsequently resold by the bank for P2,700, because the account of the defendant was credited with the sum of P11,300. In other words, the bank credited the defendant with the full amount realized by it when it resold the two parcels of land.

          The bank brought the present action to revive the judgment for the balance of P11,574.33, with interest at 7 per cent per annum from August 1, 1930.

          In his amended answer the defendant alleged as a special defense that he waived his right to redeem the land described in transfer certificate of title No. 8274 in consideration of an understanding between him and the bank that the bank would not collect from him the balance of the judgment. It was on this ground that the trial court absolved the defendant from the complaint.

          In our opinion the defendant has failed to prove any valid agreement on the part of the bank not to collect from him the remainder of the judgment. The alleged agreement rests upon the uncorroborated testimony of the defendant, the pertinent part of whose testimony on direct examination was as follows:

P. En este documento aparece que usted, por consideracion de valor recibido del Banco Nacional demandante en la presente causa, renuncia a su derecho de recompra de la propiedad vendida por el Sheriff en publica subasta el catorce de octubre de mil novecientos veintecuatro a favor del Banco Nacional; ¿quiere usted explicar al Honorable Juzgado, cual es esta consideracion de valor? — R. Si, señor. Esto desde mil novecientos veintitres o mil novecientos veintecuatro, no recuerdo bien, me haba dicho el señor Pecson, porque algunas veces yo no podia pagar esos intereses mensuales. Entonces me dijo Pecson, "¿como puede usted recibir alquileres y no paga usted intereses?"

P. ¿Quien es ese señor Pecson? — R. Era encargado de este asunto.

P. ¿Que era el del Banco Nacional, usted sabe? — R. Era encargado de estas transacciones. Cuando tenia necesidad siempre llamaba yo al señor Pecson. Entonces hable al señor Pecson que somos comerciantes, algunas veces los alquileres no pueden cobrarse por anticipado.

Sr. ENDRIGA. No es responsiva la contestacion a la pregunta.

Sr. GONZALEZ. Si esta explicando y no ha terminado el testigo su contestacion.

JUZGADO. Que la termine.

TESTIGO. Me dijo el señor Pecson que es cosa mala para mi "¿por que usted cobra alquileres y no paga los intereses? Mejor deje usted ya todos sus bienes para cubrir sus deudas.

P. El señor Pecson le dijo a usted "mejor deje usted ya todos sus bienes," ¿a que bienes se referia el ? — R. Al terreno de Ronquillo y al terreno de Paco.

P. ¿Cual de esos terrenos, el de Ronquillo o el de Paco, el que se refiere aqui en el Exhibit 1? — R. Paco, primeramente, los dos ambos.

P. Pero este Exhibit 1, ¿a que se refiere; al de Paco o al de Ronquillo? — R. Parece que Paco.

P. ¿No recuerda usted muy bien? — R. No recuerdo.

P. Y cuando le dijo a usted el señor Pecson mejor que dejara todos sus bienes, ¿le dijo a usted a favor de quien iba usted a dejar sus bienes? — R. Al Banco Nacional.

P. ¿Y que le dijo a usted, si le dijo a usted algo el señor Pecson con respecto al saldo deudor que usted todavia era en deber a favor del Banco Nacional? — R. No recuerdo mas; pero mas o menos de catorce mil pesos.

P. ¿Que le dijo el con respeto al saldo, si el cobraria todavia o se le condonaria?

Sr. ENDRIGA. Es alternativa la pregunta. Me opongo.

JUZGADO. Cambiese la pregunta.

P. ¿Que le dijo a usted con respeto al saldo, una vez otorgado este Exhibit 1?

SR. ENDRIGA. La pregunta no tiene ninguna base. Nos openemos.

Sr. GONZALES. Si dice el que se havian vendido todos los terrenos.

JUZGADO. Puede contestar.

Sr. ENDRIGA. Excepcion.

R. Me dijo que para que usted no cobre alquileres y no pague intereses deje usted esos terrenos de Ronquillo y terreno de Paco para cubrir ya todas mis deudas. Entonces dije ya, si, como yo tengo buena fe con este Banco. Hasta que al fin yo dije que queria yo comprar.

P. Cuando usted firmo el once de febrero de mil novecientos veintecinco este documento Exhibit 1, ¿recibio usted algun centimo de dinero del Banco? — R. Nada, absolutamente.

          When asked on cross-examination if Pecson was not in Iloilo at the time of the execution of defendant's waiver of his right to redeem, the defendant answered that he did not know; asked when Pecson had spoken to him about the matter, the defendant replied that he did not remember.

          One of the attorneys for the plaintiff testified that the defendant renounced his right to redeem the parcel of land in Calle Ronquillo, Exhibit 1, because a friend of the defendant was interested in buying it.

          The bank ought to have presented Pecson as a witness, or his deposition, if he was not residing in Manila at the time of the trial.

          With respect to the testimony of the bank's attorney, we should like to observe that although the law does not forbid an attorney to be a witness and at the same time an attorney in a cause, the courts prefer that counsel should not testify as a witness unless it is necessary, and that they should withdraw from the active management of the case. (Malcolm, Legal Ethics, p. 148.) Canon 19 of the Code of Legal Ethics reads as follows:

          When a lawyer is a witness for his client, except as to merely formal matters, such as the attestation or custody of an instrument and the like, he should leave the trial of the case to other counsel. Except when essential to the ends of justice, a lawyer should avoid testifying in court in behalf of his client.

          Defendant's testimony as to the alleged agreement is very uncertain. There is no mention in Exhibit 1 as to such an agreement on the part of the bank. Exhibit 1 relates only to the land in Calle Ronquillo. If Pecson had made any such agreement as the defendant claims, it is reasonable to suppose that he would have required the defendant to waive his right to redeem both parcels of land, and that the defendant, a Chines business man, would have insisted upon some evidence of the agreement in writing. It appears to us that the defendant waived his right to redeem the land in Calle Ronquillo, because a friend of his wished to purchase it and was willing to pay therefor P8,600, and the bank agreed to credit the defendant with the full amount of the sale.

          Furthermore, if it be conceded that there was such an understanding between Pecson and the defendant as the latter claims, it is not shown that Pecson was authorized to make any such agreement for the bank. Only the

board of directors or the persons empowered by the board of directors could bind the bank by such an agreement. There is no merit in the contention that since the bank accepted the benefit of the waiver it cannot now repudiate the alleged agreement. The fact that the bank after having bought the land for P1,000 resold it at the instance of the defendant for P8,600 and credited the defendant with the full amount of the resale was a sufficient consideration for the execution of defendant's waiver of his right to redeem.

          For the foregoing reasons, the decision appealed from is reversed, and the defendant is condemned to pay the plaintiff the sum of P11,574.38 with interest thereon at the rate of 7 per cent per annum from August 1, 1930, and the costs of both instances.

Malcolm, Villamor, Ostrand, Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Hull, Imperial and Butte, JJ., concur.

Republic of the PhilippinesSupreme Court

Manila---

 EN BANC

 

RE: LETTER OF PRESIDING JUSTICE CONRADO M. VASQUEZ, JR. ON CA-G.R. SP NO. 103692 [Antonio Rosete, et al. v. Securities and Exchange Commission, et al.]

A.M. No. 08-8-11-CA

Present:

PUNO, C.J.,

QUISUMBING,

YNARES-SANTIAGO,

CARPIO,

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,

CORONA,

CARPIO MORALES,

AZCUNA,

TINGA, 

CHICO-NAZARIO,

VELASCO, JR.,

NACHURA,

REYES,

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and

BRION, JJ.

 

Promulgated:

September 9, 2008

 

x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

 

DECISION

 

 

PER CURIAM:

 

          The   Judiciary,  which   is  acclaimed as   the  firmest  pillar  of  our  democratic 

institutions,   is   vested   by   the   Constitution  with   the   power   to   settle   disputes 

between parties and to determine their rights and obligations under the law.  For 

judicial   decisions,   which   form   part   of   the   law   of   the   land,   to   be   credible 

instruments   in   the  peaceful  and democratic resolution of  conflicts,  our  courts 

must be perceived to be and, in fact be, impartial, independent, competent and 

just.  To accomplish this end, it is imperative that members of the Judiciary from 

its highest magistrates to its humblest employees adhere to the strictest code of 

ethics   and   the   highest   standards   of   propriety   and   decorum.  Indeed,   it   is 

unfortunate   that   one   of   the   country’s   second   highest   courts,   the   Court   of 

Appeals,   should  be  presently  embroiled   in   scandal   and   controversy.  It   is   this 

Court’s bounden duty to determine the culpability or innocence of the members 

of the Judiciary involved in the said controversy and to discipline any one whose 

conduct  has   failed   to   conform  to   the   canons  of   judicial   ethics,  which  uphold 

integrity,   independence,   impartiality,   competence   and   propriety   in   the 

performance of official functions. 

 

The present administrative matter arose from the Letter dated August 1, 

2008 of  Court  of  Appeals  Presiding  Justice Conrado M. Vasquez,   Jr.   (Presiding 

Justice   Vasquez),   referring   to   this   Court   for   appropriate   action   the   much 

publicized dispute and charges of impropriety among the justices of the Court of 

Appeals (CA) involved in CA-G.R. SP No. 103692 entitled “Antonio Rosete, et al. v. 

Securities and Exchange Commission, et al.”

 

          To   assist   in   its   investigation   of   this   sensitive  matter,   the   Court   in   its 

Resolution dated August 4, 2008 constituted a three-person panel (the “Panel of 

Investigators”) composed of retired Justices of the Court; namely, Mme. Justice 

Carolina Griño-Aquino as Chairperson, Mme. Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero and 

Mr.   Justice  Romeo  J.  Callejo,  Sr.  as  Members.  The  Panel  of   Investigators  was 

tasked to investigate the (a) alleged improprieties of the actions of the Justices of 

the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 103692 (Antonio V. Rosete, et al. v. SEC, et 

al.); and (b) alleged rejected offer or solicitation of bribe disclosed respectively by 

Mr. Justice Jose Sabio and Mr. Francis de Borja.

         

          A narration of relevant events and facts, as found by the Investigating Panel, 

follows:

 On April   15,   2008,   Justice   Bienvenido   L.   Reyes   (Justice   Reyes),   then 

Chairperson   of   the   Ninth   Division   of   the   CA,   filed   an   application   for   leave 

from May 15, 2008 to June 5, 2008.[1]

 

In Office Order No. 149-08-CMV dated May 14, 2008 issued by Presiding 

Justice Vasquez, Justice Jose C. Mendoza (Justice Mendoza) was designated by the 

Raffle Committee as Acting Chairman of the Ninth Division during the absence of 

Justice   Reyes.  Apart   from   his   duties   as   regular   senior  member   of   the   Fifth 

Division, Justice Mendoza was authorized “to act on all cases submitted to the 

Ninth Division  for  final   resolution and/or  appropriate  action,  except  ponencia, 

fromMay   15,   2008 to June   5,   2008 or   until   Justice   Reyes   reports   back   for 

duty.”  The said office order likewise applied to the other Division(s) where Justice 

Reyes   had   “participated   or   took   part   as   regular   member   or   in   an   acting 

capacity.”[2]

 

On May 29, 2008, Antonio V. Rosete, Manuel M. Lopez, Felipe B. Alfonso, 

Jesus  P.  Francisco,  Christian S.  Monsod,  Elpidio  L.   Ibañez,  and Francis  Giles  B. 

Puno, as officers, directors and/or representatives of the Manila Electric Company 

(hereinafter to be collectively referred to as “Meralco”), filed with the Court of 

Appeals a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a 

writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order (TRO) against the 

Securities   and   Exchange   Commission   (SEC),   Commissioner   Jesus   Enrique   G. 

Martinez,   Commissioner   Hubert   B.   Guevarra,   and   the   Government   Service 

Insurance System (GSIS). [3]  Aside from the application for immediate issuance of 

a TRO, petitioners prayed for the issuance of a preliminary injunction that should 

thereafter be declared permanent, as well as a declaration of nullity of the cease 

and   desist   and   show   cause   orders   issued   by   the   SEC   through   Commissioner 

Martinez.  The petition was received by the CA at 10:49 a.m. on May 29, 2008 and 

docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 103692.

          On the same day, petitioners simultaneously filed at 10:48 a.m. an urgent 

motion for  a  special   raffle.  Presiding   Justice Vasquez granted the motion  in  a 

handwritten note on the face of the urgent motion,[4] and CA-G.R. No. 103692 was 

raffled to Justice Vicente Q. Roxas (Justice Roxas).[5]  At 3:10 p.m., the Office of 

Presiding Justice Vasquez received a letter from Atty. Estrella C. Elamparo (Atty. 

Elamparo), Chief Legal Counsel of the GSIS, requesting the re-raffling of the case 

“in   the   presence   of   the   parties   in   the   interest   of   transparency   and 

fairness.”[6]  At 4:10 p.m. on that day, the GSIS filed an ex-parte motion to defer 

action on any incident in the petition pending the resolution of their motion for 

the re-raffle of the case.[7]

 

Atty. Elamparo, accompanied by Atty. Orlando P. Polinar, also of the GSIS 

Law Office,  personally  filed the urgent  motion to defer  action on the petition 

pending the resolution of their motion to re-raffle the case.  Since the receiving 

clerk of the Court of Appeals could not assure them that the motion would be 

transmitted   to   the   Court   of   Appeals   Division,   Attys.   Elamparo   and   Polinar 

allegedly went to the office of Justice Roxas “for the sole purpose of personally 

furnishing him a copy” of the motion.[8]  They initially talked to a male clerk who 

referred them to one of the lawyers, who, however, told them that it was not 

possible for them to personally hand a copy of the motion to Justice Roxas.  Thus, 

Attys.  Elamparo and Polinar  left a copy of the motion to the staff but no one 

wanted to sign and acknowledge receipt of the copy.[9]

 

          On May 30, 2008, Justice Reyes filed an application for the extension of his 

leave until June 6,  2008.[10]  In   the meantime,   Justice Mendoza,  who had been 

designated to replace Justice Reyes during the latter’s absence, informed Justice 

Roxas through a letter that he (Justice Mendoza) was inhibiting from the case on 

the   ground   that   he   used   to   be   a   lawyer   of   the   Meralco.[11]  Hence,   in   an 

“Emergency  Request   for  Raffle,”   Justice  Roxas   informed the  Raffle Committee 

about the inhibition.[12]

 

Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr. (Justice Sabio) was assigned as Acting Chairman of 

the Ninth Division by raffle, “in lieu of Justice Mendoza.”[13]  At 11:30 a.m., the 

office   of   Justice  Myrna  Dimaranan-Vidal   (Justice  Dimaranan-Vidal)   received   a 

notice of emergency deliberation with the new Acting Chairman of the Special 

Ninth Division, apparently sent by Justice Roxas, stating that her presence and 

that   of   Justice   Sabio,   Jr.   were   “indispensable”   on   account   of   the   “national 

interest” involved in CA-G.R. SP No. 103692.[14]

 

          Meanwhile, Atty. Elamparo “received a telephone call from somebody who 

did   not   identify   herself   but   (who)   said   that   she   had   important   information 

regarding the Meralco case.”  The unidentified caller told Atty. Elamparo that “a 

TRO was already being prepared and that certain Meralco lawyers had in fact 

been talking to Justice Roxas.”  The caller warned Atty. Elamparo against Justice 

Roxas   who   had   “administrative   cases   and   was   ‘very   notorious,’”   but   when 

prodded, the caller would not disclose more details.[15]

 

          At about 1:30 p.m. also on May 30, 2008, Justice Sabio received a telephone 

call   in his chambers from his older brother,  Chairman Camilo Sabio (Chairman 

Sabio) of the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG).[16]  Chairman 

Sabio  informed his brother that he (Justice Sabio) had been named the “third 

member”   of   the   division   to   which   the   MERALCO-GSIS   case   had   been 

raffled.  Justice Sabio was surprised as he had not yet been “officially informed” 

about the matter.  Chairman Sabio likewise informed him that a TRO had been 

prepared.  Chairman Sabio then tried to convince Justice Sabio “of the rightness 

of the stand of the GSIS and the SEC,” and asked his brother to help the GSIS, 

which “represents the interest of the poor people.”  Justice Sabio told his brother 

that he would “vote according to [his]  conscience” and that the most that he 

could do was “to have the issuance of the TRO and the injunctive relief scheduled 

for oral arguments,” at which the respondents “must be able to convince” him 

that the TRO indeed had no legal basis.

 

          In his signed testimony,[17] which he read before the Panel of Investigators, 

Chairman Sabio narrated the circumstances of this call to his brother on May 30, 

2008. It appears to have been prompted by a call from a member of the Board of 

Trustees of GSIS. To quote from Chairman Sabio’s testimony:

 

            Last  May   30,   2008   I   was   in Davao City Airport with  my  wife, Marlene, waiting for our 1:25 P.M. PAL flight to Manila. xxx xxx xxx.

 

            As we were boarding, I received a call from Atty. Jesus I. Santos, a Member of the Board of Trustees of GSIS. We had known each other and  had  become  friends   since  before  Martial   Law because  as  Chief Counsel  of   the  Federation  of   Free  Farmers   (FFF)  we  were  opposing counsel in various cases in Bulacan.

 

            Attorney Santos informed me that the dispute between the GSIS and MERALCO was now in the Court of Appeals; and, that as a matter of fact, my brother, Justice Sabio, was chair of the Division to which the case had been assigned. Being a Trustee, Attorney Santos requested me to help. I readily welcomed the request for help and thanked him. There was  no mystery  about  his  having  known of   the   results  of   the   raffle because the lawyers are notified thereof and are present thereat. As a Trustee, Attorney Santos should be concerned and involved. As such it is his duty to seek assistance for the GSIS where he could legitimately find it. He was right in seeking my assistance.

 

            I was aware of the controversy between the GSIS and MERALCO. In essence this was  in fact a controversy between the long suffering public and the mighty – financially and politically – controlling owners of MERALCO. MERALCO is not only a public utility but also a monopoly. Fortunately, GSIS had taken up the cudgels for the long suffering public, who are at the mercy of MERALCO.

 

x x x              x x x             x x x.

 

            Immediately, I tried to contact Justice Sabio. But due to the noise I could not hear him. So I waited until we would arrive in Manila.

 

            As we were leaving the Airport, I again got in touch with Justice Sabio. After, he confirmed that he was in fact in the Division to which the petition of MERALCO had been raffled. I impressed upon him the character and essence of the controversy. I asked him to help GSIS if the legal   situation  permitted.  He   said  he  would  decide  according   to  his conscience. I said: of course.

 

x x x              x x x             x x x.

              

On the same day, May 30, 2008, GSIS filed an urgent ex-parte motion to 

inhibit Justice Roxas from CA-G.R. No. SP 103692.[18]  The Special Cases Section of 

the Court of Appeals received a copy of the motion at 11:58 a.m.[19]

 

Claiming that the TRO was issued “to pre-empt the hearing” scheduled in 

the  afternoon of   that  day  before   the  SEC,   the  GSIS  Law Office,   through  Atty. 

Marcial   C.   Pimentel,   Jr.,   set   forth   its   reason   for   the  motion   for   inhibition  as 

follows:

 

                3. Unfortunately, reports have reached respondent GSIS that the Honorable   ponente   has   been   in   contact   with   certain   lawyers   of MERALCO and has in fact already prepared a draft resolution granting the TRO without affording respondents even a summary hearing. The records of this case was (sic), per information, immediately transmitted to   the  Honorable  ponente  upon his   instructions.  The  worries  of   the respondent   were   exacerbated   when   it   learned   that   there   are supposedly   two  administrative   cases  pending  against   the  Honorable ponente, both of which involve allegations of bias and prejudice.

 

It turned out, however, that at that time, Justice Roxas had not yet been 

officially   notified   by   the   Raffle  Committee   that   the   case  was   raffled   to   him.[20] Moreover,   contrary   to   the  allegation  of  Atty.  Elamparo   that   the   raffle was 

rigged, Justice Roxas had no hand in the raffle proceeding, which was handled by 

the Division chaired by Justice Mariano del Castillo with the use of a “fool-proof 

Las Vegas tambiolo, like the lotto machine.”[21]

 

          Justice Roxas brought to the office of Justice Sabio, for the latter’s signature, 

the TRO which he had prepared, already signed by himself and Justice Dimaranan-

Vidal.  Convinced of the urgency of the TRO, Justice Sabio signed it on condition 

that the case will be set for oral arguments.

 

          Thus, at 2:08 p.m. on May 30, 2008,[22] the Special Ninth Division composed 

of Justices Sabio, Roxas, and Dimaranan-Vidal, issued the Resolution granting the 

TRO prayed   for  by   the  petitioners  and directing   the   respondents   to  file   their 

respective comments (not a motion to dismiss) to the petition within ten days 

from notice, with the petitioners given five days from receipt of that comment 

within which to file their reply.  The Special Ninth Division also set the hearing on 

the   application   for   the   issuance  of   a  writ   of   preliminary   injunction   for 10:00 

a.m. on June 23 and 24, 2008.  In the same Resolution, parties were directed to 

file   their   respective   memorandum   of   authorities   in   connection   with   the 

application   for   a   writ   of   preliminary   injunction   together   with   their 

comments/reply.  After   the  parties  had filed   their  memorandum of  authorities 

relative to the application for a writ of preliminary injunction, the prayer for the 

said writ would be considered submitted for resolution “forty five (45) days from 

promulgation  of   this   Resolution.”  The   SEC   received   a   copy  of   the  Resolution 

at 4:03 p.m. on that day.[23]

 

For Justice Roxas,  the issuance of the TRO was an implied denial  of  the 

motion for inhibition filed against him.  There was no need to put in writing the 

action on the motion for inhibition.[24]

 

          At 3:00 p.m., the Special Cases Section of the Court of Appeals received the 

Urgent Motion to Lift Temporary Restraining Order and To Hold Its Enforcement 

in Abeyance filed by the GSIS.[25] Justice Roxas did not act on the Urgent Motion 

because he did not consider it meritorious.[26]

 

          On May  31,   2008,   Justice  Sabio   received  a   cellular  phone   call   from  Mr. 

Francis De Borja (Mr. De Borja), a person he had lost contact with for almost a 

year   already.[27] Mr.  De   Borja   greeted   him  with: “Mabuhay   ka,   Justice.” When 

Justice Sabio, Jr. asked Mr. De Borja why he said that, Mr. De Borja told him that 

the Makati Business Club was happy with his having signed the TRO, to which 

Justice Sabio retorted, “I voted according to my conscience.”

 

On June 5, 2008, the GSIS Law Office received a letter dated June 2, 2008 of 

Presiding Justice Vasquez, Jr. informing GSIS Chief Legal Counsel, Atty. Elamparo, 

that the Court of Appeals could not grant her request for the re-raffling of CA-G.R. 

SP No. 103692 “in the presence of the parties in the interest of transparency and 

fairness,” as the case had been raffled in accordance with the procedure under 

the IRCA.[28]

 

On June 10, 2008, Justice B. L. Reyes reported back to work.[29]

 

 On June 11, 2008, at 3:50 p.m.,[30] the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), 

appearing for the SEC, filed a manifestation and motion praying for the admission 

of the comment (to the petition) attached thereto, as well as the advance and 

additional copies of the memorandum of authorities.

 

On June 12, 2008, at 4:53 p.m., the GSIS filed its comment/opposition to 

the   petition   in   CA-G.R.   SP   No.   103692,[31] as   well   as   its   memorandum   of 

authorities.

 

On June 16, 2008, the Division Clerk of Court, Atty. Teresita Custodio (Atty. 

Custodio),   delivered   to   Justice   Reyes   the cartilla of   the   Meralco   case,   and 

informed  him that  a  hearing  on   the  prayer   for   the   issuance  of  a  preliminary 

injunction   had   been   scheduled   at   10:00   a.m.   on   June   23   and   24,   2008.[32] However, on the same day, the Division Clerk of Court came back to retrieve 

the cartilla upon  instructions of Justice Sabio. Justice Reyes instructed his staff to 

return  thecartilla and when he asked the Division Clerk of Court why she  was 

retrieving it, she said that Justice Sabio “demanded” that it be  returned back to 

him. “Personally affronted” by the “domineering and  superior stance” of Justice 

Sabio,   Justice  Reyes   “read  and   re-read  Secs.  1,  2(d)  &  5,  Rule  VI   (Process  of 

Adjudication)” until he was satisfied that he should sit as Division Chairman in the 

Meralco case.[33]

 

On either June 17 or 18, 2008, Justice Sabio requested the rollo of CA-G.R. 

SP No. 103692 from Justice Roxas so that he could study the case before the 

hearing.[34]  Justice Roxas asked him whether Justice Reyes would preside over the 

hearing.  Justice Sabio explained the reason why he,  not   Justice Reyes,  should 

preside.  Justice Roxas promised to  instruct the Division Clerk of Court to send 

the rollo over   to   Justice  Sabio.  The  next  day,   the  Division  Clerk  of  Court   told 

Justice Sabio that the rollo was with Justice Reyes.  When the rollo was eventually 

transmitted   to   Justice   Sabio,   the  Division   Clerk   of   Court   asked   him  whether 

therollo should be with Justice Reyes. Justice Sabio explained why the rollo should 

be with him.

 

On June 18, 2008, petitioners filed a motion for an extension of five days or 

until June   23,   2008 within   which   to   file   their   consolidated   memoranda   of 

authorities and reply to the comment of the SEC.[35]

 

On June 19, 2008, MERALCO filed an ex-parte manifestation together with 

their reply to the comment of the GSIS.[36]  Meanwhile, Justice B. L. Reyes asked 

Atty.  Custodio   to   report  on  “what   transpired  between  her  and   Justice  Sabio” 

when   she   returned   the cartilla.  “Teary-eyed,”  Atty.  Custodio  begged  off   from 

making a report.[37]

 

Justice Reyes  decided to  consult   the Presiding   Justice “to avoid an ugly 

confrontation” with the Justices on the “highly politicized case involving giants of 

the Philippine society.”  He explained to the Presiding Justice his understanding of 

the   relevant   IRCA   rules   and   “the   actual   practice   in   similar   situations   in   the 

past.” The Presiding Justice promised to talk with Justice Sabio and, “for the sake 

of   transparency  and  future   reference,”   Justice  Reyes   requested  permission   to 

write an inquiry on the matter.[38] 

 

On   the   same   day,   Justice   Reyes   wrote   Presiding   Justice   Vasquez   a 

letter[39] calling   the   attention   of   Justice   Edgardo   P.   Cruz   (“Justice   Cruz”), 

Chairperson of the Committee on Rules, to the “dilemma” as to who between him 

and Justice Sabio should “receive” CA-G.R. SP No. 103692. Justice Reyes posed 

these questions before the Presiding Justice:

            Will   the   case   remain   with   Justice   Jose   Sabio,   Jr.   as   Acting Chairman of the Special 9th Division and who participated in the initial Resolution of the case?

 

            Will   the   case   revert   to   the   regular   9th Division   with   the undersigned as Chairman?

 

For   Justice  Reyes,   the   “dilemma”  was   engendered  by   this   provision  of 

Section 2 of Rule VI of the IRCA:

            (2) When, in an original action or petition for review, any of these actions or proceedings, namely: (1) giving due course; (2) granting writ of   preliminary   injunction;   (3)   granting   new   trial;   and   (4)   granting execution pending appeal have been taken, the case shall remain with the Justice to whom the case is assigned for study and report and the Justices who participated therein, regardless of their transfer to other Divisions in the same station.

 

The hearing on the application for preliminary injunction having been scheduled 

for June 23 and 24, 2008, Justice Reyes considered it “necessary” that the issues 

be resolved before that date. Moreover, the referral of the controversy to the 

Presiding Justice would give him sufficient time to seriously study the case before 

the hearing.[40]

 

On June 20, 2008, Presiding Justice Vasquez referred the letter of Justice 

Reyes   to   Justice  Cruz,  Chairperson  of   the  Committee  on  Rules,   noting   “some 

urgency involved as the hearing of the case is on Monday, June 23, 2008.”[41]

 

On   that   same   day,   Justice   Cruz  wrote   Justice   Reyes   a   letter[42] quoting 

Section 2 (d), Rule VI of the IRCA and stating that the “[i]ssuance of a TRO is not 

among   the   instances  where   ‘the   Justices  who   participated’   in   the   case   shall 

‘remain’ therein.” Hence, Justice Cruz opined that “[n]otwithstanding the issuance 

of the TRO (not writ of preliminary injunction), the case reverted to the regular 

Chairman (Justice Reyes)  of  the Ninth Division upon his  return.”  Justice Reyes 

received a copy of the letter of Justice Cruz in the afternoon of that day.[43]

 

During the hearings of this case, Justice Cruz explained his opinion before 

the   Panel.   He   opined   that   the  motion   to   lift   the   TRO   is   not   a  motion   for 

reconsideration because Rule 52 of the Rules of Court states that a motion for 

reconsideration may be filed with respect to a decision or a final resolution. A TRO 

is not a final resolution but an interlocutory order. Moreover, since the subject of 

the hearing on June 23, 2008 was on the application for preliminary injunction, 

Justice  Sabio  had  no   right   to  participate   in   the  hearing  because  as  an  Acting 

Chairman, his authority was only to act on the motion to lift the TRO.  Under the 

IRCA, the position of Justice Sabio invoked the exception to the general rule in the 

IRCA.  However,   the   settled  principle   is   to   construe  a   rule   strictly   against   the 

exception.  The participation of Justice Sabio in the hearing on June 23, 2008 was 

a “passport” to participation in the decision-making process, in violation of the 

IRCA.[44]

 

Justice Reyes having consulted with him, the Presiding Justice referred the 

matter to Justice Sabio who in turn, opined that “a temporary restraining order is 

part of the injunctive relief or at least its initial action such that he should be the 

one to chair the Division.” [45] In his office after that consultation with the Presiding 

Justice, Justice Reyes found that the Division Clerk of Court had given him a copy 

of the cartilla just in case he would preside over the hearing. In the evening, the 

Presiding Justice called up Justice Reyes to inform him that Justice Sabio “insisted 

that  he would preside over the hearing of   the case,”  and that  the opinion of 

Justice  Cruz,  who  was   “junior”   to   Justice  Sabio   “was  no  better   than  his  own 

opinion.”[46]

 

It   turned out   that,  upon receipt  of  a  copy of   the  letter  of   Justice Cruz, 

Justice Sabio told the Presiding Justice by telephone that he disagreed with the 

opinion of Justice Cruz “because he did not sign in an official capacity as Chairman 

of the Rules Committee, but in his personal capacity” and hence, the opinion of 

Justice Sabio “was as good as his, as in fact I (Justice Sabio, Jr.) am even more 

senior   than   he.”[47] Justice   Sabio   told   the   Presiding   Justice   that   he   “smelled 

something   fishy”   about   the  move   to   transfer   the   case   to   the  Ninth  Division 

especially because Justice Reyes did not inform him about it despite the fact that 

they were seated together on three occasions.

 

Justice Sabio “smelled something fishy” because a couple or so weeks ago, 

he attended a Chairpersons’  meeting regarding the  leakage of   the ponencia of 

Justice  Bato,  with   Justice  Reyes   as  Chairperson   and   Justice   Jose  Mendoza   as 

senior member. The meeting was called because prior to the promulgation of the 

decision of Justice Bato, the losing party already filed a motion for the inhibition 

of the ponente. According to Justice Sabio information on the decision could not 

have been leaked by Justice Bato but by a member of the Division.[48]

 

The   Presiding   Justice   “did   not   do   anything   anymore”   to   prevent   an 

“unpalatable” situation at the scheduled June 23, 2008 hearing, notwithstanding 

the “conflicting opinions” of Justices Reyes and Sabio. The “personal view” of the 

Presiding   Justice  was  at   the  time “with   Justice  Cruz”  but   Justice  Sabio  had  a 

“different interpretation.” Neither did the Presiding Justice suggest that the Rules 

Committee be convened because the Committee then had only two members. He 

felt that it would be “better” if Justices Reyes and Sabio “could settle it between 

themselves.” The Presiding Justice was seeing the Justices “practically” everyday 

because he did not want “these things to blow up.” However, neither did it enter 

the mind of the Presiding Justice that the hearing on June 23 could be reset.  Had 

he   known   that   there  was   a  motion   to   inhibit   Justice   Roxas,   he  would   have 

changed his position “that it should be the Sabio group.”[49]

 

Also on June 20, 2008, the GSIS requested permission to conduct a power-

point   presentation   during   the   hearing.[50] Likewise   the   SEC,   through   the  OSG 

prayed that it be allowed the use of Microsoft Powerpoint Application at the June 

23 and 24, 2008 hearings.[51] Justice Roxas did not act on the motions.

 

On June  21,  2008,   Justice  Sabio  came  to  know  that   it  was   the  Division 

chaired by Justice Reyes that would handle the case on account of the opinion of 

Justice Cruz.[52]

 

In the morning of June 23, 2008, Justice Sabio consulted with Justice Martin 

Villarama, Jr. (“Justice Villarama”) who advised him, “in no uncertain terms,” that 

his stand was “correct” and that he should remain in the case.[53] Justice Villarama 

said that the case should remain with the Special Ninth Division “regardless of the 

transfer of the ponente to the Eighth Division because of the pending motion to 

lift TRO,” which the Special Ninth Division should resolve “following the general 

rule that when a decision or resolution is rendered by a division, a motion for 

reconsideration thereof should be acted upon by all the Members of that division, 

whether regular or special, which participated in the rendition of the decision or 

resolution,   except   in   case   of   death,   retirement   or   resignation   of   such 

Member.”[54] 

 

That morning, Justice Roxas also consulted Justice Villarama. The latter told 

the former that since there was a motion to lift the TRO, Justice Roxas should first 

rule on the motion. He also advised Justice Roxas to inhibit himself from the case, 

as there might be a problem (mag-inhibit ka baka magka-problema).Justice Roxas 

told Justice Villarama that he would follow his “suggestion.”[55]

 

Justice Reyes also went to the office of Justice Villarama to tell him of his 

“strong conviction that the issuance of a TRO is not among the instances provided 

in   Sec.   2   (d),   Rule   VI   when   the   case   shall   remain  with   those   Justices  who 

participated in the case regardless of their transfer to other division(s).” Justice 

Villarama told Justice Reyes that per his “understanding and interpretation of said 

provision, x x x the case should remain with the Special Ninth Division.”[56]

 

At 9:50 a.m., the Office of the Division Clerk of Court called Justice Reyes to 

inform him that the parties and their counsels were already in the hearing room. 

Justice Reyes informed the caller that he could not preside as Justice Sabio had 

“apparently hardened his position” and he wanted to avoid an “ugly spectacle.” 

His name plate was displayed in the hearing room but Justice Sabio moved to 

another hearing room.[57] Allegedly, the removal of the nameplate of Justice Reyes 

was the talk of the Court of Appeals for weeks.[58]

 

Villaraza Cruz Marcelo and Angangco entered its appearance as counsel for 

Meralco.[59] At   the   hearing,   Justice   Sabio   presided   with   Justices   Roxas   and 

Dimaranan-Vidal  in attendance. Justice Roxas, the ponente, did not ask a single 

question.[60] Not  one  of   the   Justices   in  attendance  brought  up   the  motion  for 

inhibition filed by the GSIS against Justice Roxas.[61] In open court, the parties in 

CA-G.R.   SP   No.   103692   agreed   to   submit,   within   15   days,   simultaneous 

memoranda on the injunctive relief prayed for by the petitioners, after which the 

application for preliminary injunction would be deemed submitted for resolution.[62]

 

On June 25, 2008, or about two days after the separate conversations of 

Justice Villaram with Justices Sabio and Reyes, the Presiding Justice also consulted 

Justice Villarama about the letter-queries of Justices Roxas and Reyes on which 

Division should resolve “the matter of injunctive relief or issue the decision” in 

CA-G.R. SP No. 103692. [63] 

 

The Presiding   Justice  issued Office Order  No.  196-08-CMV reconstituting 

the Committee on Rules and designating Justice Cruz as the Chairperson,  with 

Justices Rebecca De Guia-Salvador, Reyes, Hakim Abdulwahid, and Noel G. Tijam, 

as members.[64] The Committee on Rules was tasked to propose amendments to 

the   IRCA  on   or   before August   15,   2008 “for   submission   and   adoption  of   the 

Court en banc.” (The office order was later amended by Office Order No. 196-08-

CMV on August 4, 2008 to include as members Justices Mario L. Guariña III, Lucas 

P. Bersamin, and Teresita Dy-Liacco Flores.[65]) The Rules Committee used to be 

composed   of   only   three   members,   namely:   Justices   Cruz,   Abdulwahid,   and 

Roberto Barrios, now deceased, as members, with Justice Cruz as chairperson.[66] 

 

It was also on June 25, 2008 that Presiding Justice Vasquez issued Office 

Order No. 200-08-CMV stating that, in view of the retirement of Justices Enrique 

Lanzanas,   Lucenito   N.   Tagle,   Agustin   S.   Dizon,   and   Rodrigo   Cosico,   and   the 

appointments   of   Justices   Ruben   C.   Ayson   and   Edgardo   L.   delos Santos,   the 

Divisions  would   have   a   new   composition   effective July   4,   2008.[67] Under   that 

office order, Justice Sabio became the Chairman of the Sixth Division, with Justice 

Dimaranan-Vidal as a member. Justice Reyes became the Chairman of the Eighth 

Division, with Justices Roxas and Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr. (“Justice Bruselas”) as 

members.

 

On June 29, 2008, Justice Reyes went on official leave of absence to use a 

business class airplane ticket to Sydney, Australia that he had won in an APT Golf 

Tournament   in   January   2008.   He   was   still   on   official   leave   when   the 

reorganization of the Court of Appeals took place on July 4, 2008.[68]

 

On July  1,  2008,   Justice  Roxas   told   Justice  Sabio   that  he  did  not  attend 

the Access   to  Courts (sic)   summit  on   June 30  and July  1,  2008 at   the  Court  of 

Appeals Auditorium because he was busy with the Meralco case. Justice Sabio 

was taken aback because at that time the parties had not yet submitted their 

memoranda.[69]

 

That same afternoon, Mr. De Borja again called up Justice Sabio, seeking to 

meet   with   him   for   an   “important”   matter.   Because   Justice   Sabio   had 6-8 

p.m.classes at the Ateneo Law School, they agreed to meet after his classes but 

not for long because his wife and his daughter,  Atty. Silvia Jo Sabio who is an 

Attorney   VI   in   the   Office   of   the   Chief   Justice,[70] would   be   waiting   for   him.[71] According to Justice Sabio, the conversation at that meeting with Francis de 

Borja went as follows:

 

17. By the time my class was finished at 8 pm, Mr. De Borja was already waiting   for   me   at   the   Lobby   Lounge   of   the   3rd Floor   of the Ateneo Law School.  His   first  words   to  me  were:Alam  mo   Justice kung   sino   ang   kasama   ko   sa   kotse?   Si   Manolo   Lopez. Then   he said: Noong tinatawagan kita at sinabi kong “Mabuhay ka Justice,” si Manolo Lopez ang katabi ko noon. Nasa Amerika siya, kaya ako na lang ang pumunta dito para makiusap sa ‘yo. Alam mo, itong kaso na ito is a matter of life and death for the Lopezes. And alam mo naman what the Marcoses did to them, which is being done now by the Arroyos.

 

        At   that   point   he   mentioned   the   impasse   between   Justice Bienvenido   Reyes   and   myself.   He   said: Alam   naming   may problema kayo ni Justice Reyes tungkol sa chairmanship.

        I was surprised how he came to know about it, as this was an internal  matter of  the Court  of  Appeals  which only happened fairly recently and many associate justices of the CA were not even aware of this. Just the same, I explained my stand and why I could not relinquish the chairmanship to Justice Reyes.

        He then replied: Alam mo, Justice ang opinion dito ni  Nonong Cruz ay i-challenge ang stand mo. Kaya lang, mayroon namang nagsabi na it might become messy.

        Then   he   bragged   to   me: Ako   din   ang   responsible   sa   pag-recommend at pag-hire ng Villaraza Law Firm.

        Then  he  explained   that  he  was   there   to  offer  me  a  win-win situation.

        He said: Justice,  mayroon kaming P10 million.  Ready. Just  give way to Justice Reyes.

        Then   I   said: Bakit   ganun. Nakasisiguro   sila   sa   kanya,   sa   akin hindi?

        He said: Mas komportable lang sila sa kanya.

        At that point, I was shocked that he had a very low regard for me. He was treating me like there was a price on my person. I could not describe my feelings. I was stunned. But at the same time, hindi ko rin magawang bastusin siya because I had known him since  1993  and  this  was   the  first  time that  he  had  ever treated  me   like   this,   or   shown   that   he   believed   I   could   be bought.

        So I just told him: Francis, I cannot in conscience agree to that.

        His   answer   was: Sabi   ko   nga   sa   kanila,   mahirap   ka   talaga papayag. Kasi may anak iyang Opus Dei. Numerary pa.

        At this point, I just wanted to leave, so I told him I could not stay long. I told him my wife and lawyer daughter were waiting.

        Even then, he was already insistent. His parting words before I left were: Just think about it, Justice.[72]

 

At that time, Mr. De Borja was carrying a “sealed” brown paper bag, which 

he was handling “as if something important” was inside. However, Justice Sabio 

did   not   know   if   the   bag   contained   P10   million.[73] 

In his car, Justice Sabio told his wife and his daughter, Silvia Jo, about the offer of 

Mr. De Borja for Meralco.[74]

 

In   his   affidavit   submitted   to   the   Panel   of   Investigators,  Mr.   De   Borja 

describes himself as a businessman, a deal maker, and project packager. On July 

1, 2008, he invited Justice Sabio for dinner “to touch base” and for chismis about 

the   MERALCO-GSIS   case.   As   the   latter   would   have   evening   classes   at 

the AteneoLaw School, and his wife and daughter would be waiting in their car 

after   his   classes,   they   just   agreed   to   meet   at   the   lobby-lounge   of   the 

School.  What Mr. De Borja knew about the MERALCO case allegedly came from 

news reports but he was interested in the news because he is a “confirmed free-

enterpriser.” Moreover, De Borja thought that there was “[n]othing like hearing 

things directly from the horse’s mouth.”[75]

 

When Mr. De Borja and Justice Sabio met, Mr. De Borja averred he was 

indeed carrying a bag, not an expensive looking luggage. After parking his car at 

the Rockwell basement, he took the escalator, intending to walk out of the mall. 

On his way, he passed by the Kenneth Cole shop and, since it was still early, he 

looked in and saw a T-shirt  he liked. He bought the T-shirt,  which he brought 

before the Panel of Investigators in the grey “Kenneth Cole Reaction” bag. The 

photographs of the bag and the T-shirt costing P1,650.00 are marked Exhibits “A-

De Borja” and “A-1-De Borja” and attached to the rollo of A.M. No. 08-8-11-CA, 

while the photograph of the receipt issued by the Kenneth Cole Boutique, marked 

as   Exhibit   “A-2-De   Borja,”   shows   that   the   purchase   was   made   on July   1, 

2008 at 19:47. He stressed the bag did not contain P10 million.

 

Before the Panel, Justice Sabio claimed that the bag Mr. De Borja brought 

during the hearing was not the bag that Mr. De Borja was carrying when Justice 

Sabio saw him on July 1, 2008. What Mr. De Borja allegedly brought with him to 

the lobby-lounge of the Ateneo Law School was a brown bag with paper handle 

“about 2/3 (of the Kenneth Cole bag) in size.” Justice Sabio was told by the Panel 

that   it  could be the subject  of   rebuttal  evidence but he did not present  such 

evidence.

 

According   to  Mr.   De   Borja,  Manolo   Lopez   (Mr.   Lopez),   the   owner   of 

MERALCO whose wife was a member of Martha’s Vineyard just like Mr. De Borja’s 

wife, was also an acquaintance of Mr. De Borja at the Ateneo grade school. Mr. 

Lopez did not ask him (Mr. De Borja) to contact Justice Sabio. At a party where 

Mr. De Borja met Mr. Lopez, Mr. De Borja informed him that he knew Justice 

Sabio but Mr. Lopez did not say anything.

 

Mr. De Borja denied having offered P10 million to Justice Sabio. Instead, he 

claimed that Justice Sabio  informed him that the government has offered him 

(Justice Sabio) money and a promotion to the Supreme Court to favor GSIS. When 

Mr. De Borja asked what would it take for Justice Sabio to resist the government’s 

offer,   Justice  Sabio  allegedly   replied:   “Fifty  Million.”[76]  He  alleged   that   it  was 

Justice Sabio who called up after that July 1, 2008 meeting to “feel” his reaction to 

the “P50 million solicitation.” Justice Sabio asked him: “O, ano, kumusta, ano ang 

nangyayari.”

 

Mr.  De Borja admitted having given P300,000 to Justice Sabio,  some 15 

years ago, as a balato because he came to value the friendship of Justice Sabio 

that   developed   while   the   latter   was   helping   the   Roa   family   in   a   business 

transaction. Mr. De Borja earned “more than P25 million” although he received 

only  P3 million as  down payment  out  of   the sale  of  100 hectares  of   the Roa 

property. He gave the balato of 10% of the P3 million to Justice Sabio in cash at 

the  Roa-owned  bank   in   Cagayan  de  Oro.   Since   the  Roas  had   a   lot   of   “legal 

problems,” Justice Sabio rendered advice and consultation at the time that he was 

an RTC judge in Cagayan de Oro. After the promotion of Justice Sabio to the Court 

of Appeals, Mr. De Borja invited him for dinner. They would see each other at get-

togethers of the Roas with whom Mr. De Borja is related, even at a gathering in 

the house of Mr. De Borja’s mother.[77]

 

On July 2, 2008, Justice Sabio that informed Presiding Justice Vasquez that 

he (Justice Sabio) was offered a bribe (which he rejected) to have him ousted 

from the Meralco case. The news allegedly shocked the Presiding Justice. Justice 

Sabio also went to Justice Villarama who was both “shocked and amused.” Justice 

Sabio.  did not  tell   them who the “offeror” was.  However,  a  day or  two  later, 

Justice Sabio found out that Mr. De Borja had called their mutual friend, Mrs. 

Evelyn Clavano, who was also shocked that Mr. De Borja had “the gall to ask her” 

to convince Justice Sabio to accept the bribe.[78]

 

Although   Justice   Sabio   told   the   Presiding   Justice   that   the   offer   of   P10 

million to a Justice was,  in the words of Justice Sabio, bastusan na ito, and he 

knew that  bribing a  Justice  is  a  criminal  act,   the Presiding  Justice did nothing 

because he could not “advise a fellow Justice on what to do” – the Justice would 

know what he should do. Neither did he think of consulting Justices Roxas and 

Dimaranan-Vidal on the chairmanship impasse.[79]

 

On July 3, 2008, to stop Mr. De Borja from pestering him with phone calls 

and text messages, Justice Sabio called up Mr. De Borja who told him: Mabuti 

naman   Justice   tumawag   ka,   kasi  malapit   na   ang   deadline   ng   submission   ng 

memorandum. Pinag-isipan mo bang mabuti ang offer namin? Kasi sayang din 

kung di mo tatanggapin, Kasi kahit aabot itong kaso sa Supreme Court, matatalo 

ka   din.   Sayang   lang   ‘yung   P10   million.   Baka   sisihin   ka   pa   ng   mga   anak 

mo. Shocked by what he heard, Justice Sabio said “No.” Since Mr. De Borja did not 

seem to understand why he kept saying “No,” Justice Sabio explained to him:If I 

accept that, my conscience will bother me forever. How can I face my wife and 

two daughters? One a lawyer and the other a Numerary member of Opus Dei? 

And  besides,   how can   I   reconcile  my  being  a  member  of  PHILJA’s   Ethics  and 

Judicial Conduct Department; being a lecturer of the MCLE; and being a pre-bar 

reviewer  of   the  Ateneo Law School  on Legal  and Judicial  Ethics? Mr.  De Borja 

retorted: Wala   naman   kaming   pinapagawa   sa   iyo   na   illegal,   eh. Then   he 

added: You know Justice, after two or three weeks, makakalimutan na ito ng mga 

tao.  Meron naman diyang mga Atenista  na   tumatanggap. Justice  Sabio  said: I 

don’t know about them, but I am different. Mr. De Borja then said: Well, if you will 

not accept, we will be forced to look for other ways. To this, Justice Sabio said: But 

they will have to contend with me. In parting, Mr. De Borja said: Justice, no matter 

what, saludo talaga ako sa iyo.

 

Mr.  De Borja  admitted that   Justice Sabio called him up,  but  denied the 

above conversation with Justice Sabio.

 

On July   4,   2008,   the   reorganization   of   the   Court   of   Appeals   became 

effective and brought Justices Reyes, Roxas and Bruselas to the Eighth Division. 

Justice Reyes went to see the Presiding Justice about the urgent motion for him to 

assume the chairmanship of the Division, which shows on its face that the Urgent 

Motion   dated July   10,   2008 was   received   by   the   Court   of   Appeals   at 2:08 

p.m. on July 10, 2008 and by Atty. Teresita C.  Custodio on July 9,  2008. Justice 

Reyes expressed to the Presiding Justice his apprehension that should he fail to 

assume the chairmanship, he would face administrative liability for nonfeasance 

or dereliction of duty. The Presiding Justice suggested that the respondents in the 

case be required to comment on the Urgent Motion “in a resolution to be issued 

by the former 9th Division of Justice J.L. Sabio, Jr. since to allow the new Division of 

Justice B.L. Reyes to issue the resolution x x x would render moot and academic” 

the same motion.   Justice Reyes  agreed and told  the Presiding   Justice that  he 

would be sending over the records to him so that the Presiding Justice could place 

a note thereon as to what had been agreed upon. However, the records of the 

case did not reach the Presiding Justice.[80]

 

For Justice Roxas, the July 4, 2008 reorganization was mandatory and the 

Meralco   case   followed   him   as   its ponente to   the   Eighth   Division. By   the 

reorganization,   Justice   Sabio   was   moved   from   the   disbanded   Special   Ninth 

Division  to the Sixth Division,  as   the reorganization did not  spare any Justice.[81]Moreover, the IRCA does not require that the Justices that issued a TRO be the 

same Justices that will render the decision.[82] This is because the TRO does not 

appear in Section 2 (d), Rule VII of the IRCA. Accordingly, only the issuance of a 

preliminary injunction could be an exception to the July 4, 2008 reorganization of 

the CA.[83] He believes the IRCA does not require that the Justices who heard the 

case should also decide it because the CA is a court of record and Justices may 

rely on the transcript of stenographic notes.[84] And so, once the three Justices 

have signed the decision, the ponente has the “pressing duty” to promulgate the 

decision.[85]

 

Since July   4,   2008,   Justice   Bruselas   alleged   that   he   acted   “on   all 

the ponencias” of   Justices   Reyes   and   Roxas,   “just   as   they   had   acted”   on 

hisponencias.[86]

 

On July 7, 2008, the GSIS filed its memorandum.

 

On or about July 8, 2008, Atty. Silvia Sabio, to help her father, sought the 

advice   of   Atty.   Jose  Midas  Marquez   (“Atty.  Marquez”)   regarding   the   bribery 

attempt.  Atty. Marquez advised that Justice Sabio should write the Chief Justice 

about   the   incident,   detailing   not   only   the   bribery   attempt   but   all   that   has 

transpired relative to the chairmanship issue. Atty. Silvia Sabio immediately called 

her   father   and   relayed  Atty.  Marquez’s   advice.   Later   that  date,   Justice   Sabio 

handed his daughter, Silvia, a handwritten letter for her to deliver to the Chief 

Justice.[87] The  handwritten   letter,   in  essence,   requested  permission   for   Justice 

Sabio to “unburden” himself before the Chief Justice on the Meralco case.[88]

 

At   around 2:30   p.m.,   Justice   Reyes   went   to   see   Justice   Sabio.   The 

conversation between them, as recalled by Justice Sabio, was as follows:

        As   soon   as   he   came   in,   I   said:   “Why   did   you   stab  me   behind  my back?” He said, “Why, what did I do? I asked him Why is it that you have to   resort   to   that   strategy  of   seeking   the  opinion  of   Ed  Cruz,   in   his personal capacity, when we could have discussed the matter with the PJ?

        I reminded him that we were seated three times near each other on different occasions only recently and he never mentioned to me about the plan to oust me.

        He said: Perhaps that was my fault. I should have talked to you.

        I  told him, that all  the while I  thought we were friends. Why did you have to do these things behind my back and not discuss the matter with me face to face?

        Then he said it just came about due to the urgent motion; that he was afraid Meralco would take action against him for nonfeasance for not doing his job.

        It was then that I said: Are you aware that I was offered 10M for me to give way to you?

        I   further   asked   him   the   following: In   the   first   place,   how  was   the Meralco emissary able to know that there was an impasse between you and me when that was supposed to be an internal matter?

→ If you will now insist on assuming the chairmanship after I told you of the 10Million offer, what will I think of you?

→ Are you a Trojan horse? Can you blame me if I think you are part of this whole scheme or shenanigan?

→ Does not the timing alone stink of corruption? After they failed to convince me of their offer, now they will use you to oust me? Is it because they are certain of your loyalty and they are uncertain with mine?

→ And why did they file this stupid urgent motion to assume? In my nine years in this court, I have never seen such an animal as this. This is a cowardly act, and whoever advised this stupid motion is also stupid. Why do you have to dignify such a foolish motion? They should file a motion for me to inhibit or recuse myself.

→ Why  is   it   that Meralco actively  participated  in the hearing on the 23rd and never raised any question on the alleged irregularity of my having presided over the hearing?

→ Why do you insist  on assuming the case? Are you not aware that several   days   after   the   issuance   of   the   TRO,   respondents   filed   a motion for inhibition of Justice Vicente Roxas and a motion to lift the TRO. Who then had the right to resolve such motion?

→ Under the circumstances, anong iisipin ko sa yo? Ano ang tingin ko ngayon sa iyo?

        His   feeble  answer was:  you. He then said  he did  not  know of   those pending motions. (Incidentally, these motions were never resolved.) He also   said, wala   talaga   akong   interest   dito   kundi   ayaw   ko   lang  ma charge ng non-feasance for failing to do my duty.

        I  answered him: Malayo yung non-feasance.  Hindi   ito nonfeasance.   I taught the subject for many years and this is not one of them.

        So I told him, I have made my decision on the matter. Bahala ka na. Then I stood up to show him to the door. He was silent after that and before he left, he put his arm around me.

 

For his part, Justice Reyes kept on repeating: “Wala talaga ako dito, wala akong 

interest   kung   di   yun   lang   hindi   ako  ma   non-feasance. Justice   Sabio   thought 

otherwise.

 

          Meanwhile, Justice Roxas brought to the office of Justice Dimaranan-Vidal 

“the final decision on the MERALCO case” bearing his signature, which he gave to 

Justice   Dimaranan-Vidal   for   “concurrence/dissent.”   According   to   Justice 

Dimaranan-Vidal, Justice Roxas explained to her the “rationale for his conclusion.” 

Justice  Roxas  went  out   for   a  while   and   returned   “with   an  expensive   looking 

travelling bag” from where he pulled out the “purported final decision.” Before 

the   close   of   office   hours,   Justice  Roxas   returned   to   the   chambers   of   Justice 

Dimaranan-Vidal to check if he (Justice Roxas) had signed his decision. When she 

replied that yes, he had signed it, Justice Roxas said he would pick it up the next 

day.[89]

 

          Justice Dimaranan-Vidal signed the decision notwithstanding that on July 8, 

2008 the Court of Appeals had been reorganized because she believed that the 

Special Ninth Division was still existing on account of its having issued the TRO.[90] She   also   concurred   with   the   portion   of   the   decision   recommending 

administrative sanctions against the GSIS lawyers because she believed the OSG 

or the OGCC should have appeared for the GSIS.[91]

 

          Also late that day, Justice Villarama told Justice Sabio that he had advised 

Justice Reyes to “lay off the case” and allow Justice Sabio “to continue” and to 

resolve the urgent motion for Justice Reyes to assume the chairmanship. Justice 

Villarama recalled that Justice Reyes repeatedly said: “Wala talaga ako dito Jun, 

Wala akong personal interest dito.”

 After “a careful and judicious study” of the more than 56-page decision of 

Justice Roxas, Justice Dimaranan-Vidal signed it. True to his word, Justice Roxas 

personally  picked up the decision   that  day “purportedly   for   the action of   the 

Acting Chairman, Justice Sabio,” who was then on leave of absence until July 11, 

200.[92] Notwithstanding   the   fact   that   the   parties   had   not   submitted   their 

respective   memoranda,   Justice   Dimaranan-Vidal   signed   the 

“convincing” ponencia,including   three   copies   of   the   signature   page,   because 

Justice Roxas was insistent of the urgency of the signing of the decision due to the 

impending lapse of the TRO on July 29, 2008.[93] Justice Sabio thought otherwise.[94]

 

However,   Justice   Roxas   denied   that   the   decision   he   gave   to   Justice 

Dimaranan-Vidal was the final decision. He denied that he gave it to her for her 

signature. He said it was only for her to read because she asked to read it. He said 

it was a mere draft as “everything was unofficial” – there was no rollo or logbook 

with it, it was not placed in an envelope, and it did not have the “special seal” of 

Justice Roxas. It allegedly “was thrown in the garbage can.”

 

On July 9, 2008, the OSG filed the memorandum for the SEC.

 

On July 10, 2008, Meralco filed an urgent motion praying that Justice Reyes 

assume the chairmanship of the Division,[95] alleging the reasons for the urgent 

motion as follows:

            5.   At   the   scheduled   oral   arguments   on 23   June   2008 in   the instant   case,   the   parties  were   first   directed   to   one   of   the  Hearing Rooms of the Court of Appeals. At the said room, the name plate of Justice Reyes was already placed on the table for the  justices.  Thus, petitioners were of the impression that the leave of absence of Justice Reyes was over and that he would be presiding over the oral arguments as Chairman of the Ninth Division of the Honorable Court.

 

            6.   However,   when   the   parties   were   directed   to   transfer   to another Room of the Court of Appeals for the oral arguments in the instant case, petitioners saw that the name plates on the table for the justices  included that of  Justice Sabio,  Jr.,   together with that  (sic)  of Justices Roxas and Dimaranan-Vidal. Thereafter, Justice Sabio presided over the oral arguments as Chairman of the Special Ninth Division of the Honorable  Court.  Petitioners  were,   thus,  of   the   impression   that   the regular   Chairman   of   the  Ninth   Division,   Justice   Reyes,  was   still   on temporary leave of absence.

 

            7. Subsequently, it has come to the attention of the petitioners that  Justice Reyes has already returned from his  temporary   leave of absence and has resumed his duties as Chairman of the Ninth Division of the Honorable Court.

 

            8. Under the Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals, Justice Sabio, Jr.   should   now   refrain   from  acting   as   the   chairman  of   the  Division 

hearing the instant case as he is already disqualified from acting as such upon the return of Justice Reyes.

 

8.1. With due respect, Justice Reyes cannot shirk from his bounden   judicial   responsibility   of   performing   his   duties   and functions  as  Chairman of   the  Ninth  Division  of   the  Honorable Court.

8.2. Specifically, under Section 3 (d), Rule IV of the 2002 Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals, a case can remain with the justices who participated therein only when any of the following actions have been taken: (a) giving due course; (b) granting of a writ of preliminary injunction; (c) granting of a new trial; or (d) granting of execution pending appeal:

x x x            x x x           x x x.

 

9. None of the foregoing instances apply with respect to Justice Sabio, Jr.’s continuing hold on the case. Although Justice Sabio, Jr. was one   of   the   Justices  who   issued   the   temporary   restraining   order   in favour of the petitioners in the instant case, this circumstance is not among the grounds as above-quoted, when a  justice of the Court of Appeals may remain in the Division.

 

10.  As  above-quoted,   the   rule   is   categorical   that   it   is  not   the grant of a temporary restraining order but rather the grant of a writ of preliminary   injunction that   sanctions   a   justice’s   remaining   with   the Division. Thus, the continued participation of Justice Sabio, Jr.,   in the instant case, considering the clear Rules of the Honorable Court, is not only irregular but may lead one to conclude that he is exhibiting undue interest in the instant case.

 

On this day, Justice Reyes reported back to work after his trip to Australia.[96]

 

On July 11, 2008, Justice Sabio was on leave when Justice Roxas called him 

up for a meeting to discuss the case. Justice Sabio told him that he needed ample 

time to read the memoranda of the parties. Justice Roxas promised to send  to 

Justice Sabio the memoranda immediately.[97] 

 

At 4:00 p.m., Justice Reyes received from the Eighth Division Clerk of Court 

a copy of Meralco’s Urgent Motion for him to assume the chairmanship of the 

Ninth Division.

 

On Monday,   July  14,  2008 at   the flag ceremony,   Justice Sabio requested 

Justice Roxas to meet with him as he had by then read the memoranda of the 

parties. Justice Roxas initially agreed to the meeting but he later informed Justice 

Sabio that he had another matter to attend to; neither was he available in the 

afternoon. Justice Roxas had become scarce.  Justice Sabio  learned that Justice 

Dimaranan-Vidal was also looking for Justice Roxas.[98]

 

Justice Sabio prepared a resolution on the motion for the reconsideration 

of the TRO and informed Justices Roxas and Dimaranan-Vidal that he wanted to 

discuss it with them. The resolution he prepared “never saw light.”[99]

 

At 10 a.m., Justice Roxas, with his messenger, brought the rollo of CA G.R. 

SP   No.   103692   to   Justice   Reyes,   and   told   the   latter   that   he   and   Justice 

Bruselas  would be coming over to deliberate on the case. Ten minutes later, the 

Eighth   Division   deliberated   on   the   case.[100] After   a   cursory   examination   of 

therollo, Justice Reyes found that the decision had been signed by Justices Roxas 

and Bruselas but Justice Reyes asked for more time to study the case.[101]

 

A transcript of the “Final Deliberation” on July 14, 2008 is attached to page 

1926 of Volume III of the rollo of CA-G.R. SP No. 103692 and marked as Exh. 2- 

Roxas on page 279 of the rollo of A.M. No. 08-8-11-CA. According to Justice Roxas, 

it was he who prepared the transcript from memory to “lend credence” to the 

certification of Justice Reyes at the end of the decision pursuant to Article VIII, 

Section 13 of the Constitution.[102] Justice Reyes denied having seen it or having 

authorized  its   transcription.   Justice Bruselas  did not  sign any transcript  of   the 

deliberation as he was not aware that a transcript was being taken. There was no 

stenographer   present,   as   only   the   three  of   them,   Justices   Reyes,   Roxas,   and 

Bruselas were present at the deliberation. Neither was there a recording machine. 

Justice Roxas admittedly prepared the transcript “from memory.”[103]

 

The statement attributed to Justice Reyes in the transcript that there were 

“previous  deliberations”  were  “really  meetings,”  which  they  had twice,   in   the 

office of Justice Reyes, according to Justice Roxas.[104]

 

On July 15, 2008, when she felt that the timing was right, Atty. Silvia Sabio 

testified   that   she  handed  her   father’s   letter   to   the  Chief   Justice   through  his 

private   secretary,  Ms.   Jasmin  Mateo.[105] A   few  days   later,   however,   Presiding 

Justice Vasquez told Justice Sabio that the Chief Justice would no longer meet 

with him, as the Presiding Justice had apprised the Chief Justice about the matter.[106]

 

According to Justice Reyes, at 2:00 p.m. that day, the Office of the Presiding 

Justice informed him that Justice Sabio was waiting for him in his office. As soon 

as   Justice Reyes  was  seated,   Justice Sabio  “berated”  him and accused him of 

“orchestrating matters.” Justice Sabio told him that an emissary of MERALCO had 

offered him P10 million to  drop off the case,  hence,  he asked that   if  he was 

offered that much, how much could have been offered “to the principals?”[107]

 

On July  17,  2008,  Justice Reyes went back to the office of the Presiding 

Justice and informed him of the episode in the office of Justice Sabio. He also 

went to ask Justice Villarama for his opinion as to who was “the rightful claimant” 

to the chairmanship of the Division that should decide the Meralco case. Justice 

Villarama allegedly replied that they “were both correct.”

 

On July  18,  2008,  at   the pre-launching  meeting  for   the CA-CMIS,   Justice 

Villarama had a “brief chat” with Justice Bruselas. The former told the latter that 

“both Justices Sabio and Reyes are correct in the sense that one (1) [of] them can 

properly assume chairmanship either under the exception provided in Sec. 2 (d), 

Rule  VI  of   the 2002  IRCA depending  on   the  final  disposition  of   the  prayer   for 

injunctive relief,  or  pursuant   to   the general   rule  enshrined  in  Sec.  7   (b),  Rule 

VI.”[108]

 

On July   21,   2008,   Justice   Roxas   personally   filed   with   the   Presiding 

Justice[109] an   “Interpleader   Petition”[110] praying   that   Presiding   Justice   Vasquez 

“decide  which division  Chairman (Justice Sabio’s  Former  Special  9th Division  or 

Justice   B.   L.   Reyes’   8th Division)   should   sign   the   Preliminary   Injunction   or 

Decision.”[111] Justice Roxas averred that “[t]he impasse between two Chairmen 

from two Divisions has to be resolved much earlier than July 30, 2008 because 

July 30, 2008 is the expiration date of the TRO issued by the Special 9th Division 

(signed by Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr., Justice Vicente Q. Roxas [ponente] and Justice 

Myrna Dimaranan-Vidal).” He opined that the two Chairpersons differed in the 

interpretation of Sections 1 and 2 (d) in relation to Section 5 of Rule VI on Process 

of Adjudication of the Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals (IRCA).[112] His stand 

was   that   the   IRCA “should  be strictly applied”  because  “[w]hen  the  provisions 

are clear, there is no room for interpretation.”

 

Justice Roxas endorsed his “Interpleader Petition” to Justice Reyes for his 

“signature or dissent” to the “finalized MERALCO Decision,” which had been in 

Justice Reyes’ possession since July 14, 2008.[113] He also gave the rollo of the case 

to Justice Reyes.[114]

 

Presiding   Justice  Vasquez   allegedly   told   Justice   Roxas   that   as   Presiding 

Justice, he had no authority to rule on the Interpleader Petition, which is not an 

administrative   concern   over   which   the   Presiding   Justice   must   intervene. 

Nevertheless, to avoid further discussion, the Presiding Justice told Justice Roxas 

that he would study the matter.[115]

 

On July 22, 2008, Justice Reyes wrote the Presiding Justice a letter on “what 

was discussed between us  last 17 July  2008 at  around 3:30 p.m.”[116]Apparently 

the Presiding Justice had suggested “to endorse the case and have the Special 

Ninth Division direct the respondents to file their simultaneous comments on the 

petitioners’   Urgent  Motion   (For   Honorable   BIENVENIDO   L.   REYES   to   Assume 

Chairmanship of the Division in the Instant Case) dated 10 July 2008.”

 

Justice Reyes expressed “doubts” that the suggestion was “most prudent,” 

as   the   dispute   “revolves   around   the   correct   interpretation”   of   the   IRCA.  He 

believed that since the question was “purely internal,” the CA should not seek 

“enlightenment”   from  the   litigants   for   it  would  only  be   construed  against   its 

“competence.”  He shared Justice Cruz’s and Roxas’   interpretation of the IRCA. 

Hence, he urged the Presiding Justice to decide the matter; otherwise, he would 

interpret the rules according to his “best lights and act accordingly.”

 

On July 23, 2008, Presiding Justice Vasquez asked for the rollo of CA G. R. 

No. SP No. 103692 so he could “properly submit the requested opinion.” It was 

then that  he came across  the unresolved motion praying  for  the  inhibition of 

Justice   Roxas   and   the   pending   urgent  motion   to   lift   the   TRO  or   to   hold   its 

enforcement in abeyance. The Presiding Justice considered the latter as a motion 

for reconsideration of the Resolution issuing the TRO.[117]

 

Meanwhile, at noon of that day, as Justice Reyes had not yet received “any 

reaction”   from   the   Presiding   Justice,   he   signed   the   decision   as   well   as   the 

Certification. It was promulgated on the same day.

 

The decision was promulgated without waiting for the Presiding Justice’s 

opinion on whether it was the Eighth or Special Ninth Division that should decide 

the case.  Justice Roxas alleged that he did not expect the Presiding Justice to 

“answer” or resolve the matter anyway.

 

On July 24, 2008, Presiding Justice Vasquez issued his reply to Justice Reyes’ 

letter  and  Justice  Roxas’   “Interpleader-Petition.”  The  Presiding   Justice  claimed 

having  doubts  on  whether  he  possessed  “the  authority   to  decide   the  subject 

conflict”  simply because under the IRCA,  the Presiding Justice has control  and 

supervision only  over  administrative affairs  of   the Court.  The controversy  was 

certainly  not  an administrative matter  but  Section 11 of  Rule  VIII  of   the  IRCA 

provides that the Presiding Justice “has the authority to act on any matter not 

covered” by the Rules although such action should be reported to the Court en 

banc.

 

The Presiding   Justice  expressed  in  his   letter   the  view  that  “the   (Special 

Ninth)   Division   that   issued   the   temporary   restraining   order   should   continue 

resolving the injunctive prayer in the petition” because it was the Division that 

issued the Resolution granting the TRO and setting the hearing on the application 

for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, aside from the fact that the 

parties did not contest the authority of Justice Sabio as Division Chairman at the 

time, although Justice Reyes had reported back to work.  Moreover, the motion 

for   inhibition  and  the  urgent  motion to   lift   the  TRO “have  a  bearing”  on  the 

application of Section 2 of Rule VI of the IRCA, especially because Section 7 (b) of 

Rule   VI[118] points   to   the   retention   of   the   case   by   the   Special   Ninth 

Division. Furthermore,   the  new Division  headed  by   Justice  Reyes  may  not  be 

allowed to resolve the pending incidents because two of its members, Justices 

Reyes and Bruselas did not participate in the hearing on June 23, 2008.  He did 

not believe that Justice Reyes would be charged with dereliction of duty should 

he not assume the chairmanship. The Presiding Justice ended his letter with the 

hope   that   the  matter  would   be   “laid   to   rest”   and   that   whoever   would   be 

dissatisfied “with its outcome may elevate the matter to the Supreme Court.”

 

At 2:00 p.m. that day, Justice Sabio informed the Presiding Justice that a 

decision   had   been   promulgated   in   the  Meralco   case   the   previous   day.   The 

Presiding Justice was surprised because Justices Roxas and Reyes had asked him 

to resolve the impasse on the Division chairmanship.  Upon inquiry, the Presiding 

Justice found that the decision had indeed been promulgated at 4:10 p.m. on July 

23, 2008.[119]

 

It  was also on July 24, 2008 that Justice Dimaranan-Vidal received a call 

from Justice Sabio, informing her that Meralco had offered him a bribe of P10 

million “in exchange for his voluntary stepping out from the Meralco case in order 

to give way to Justice B. L. Reyes,” and that the decision in the Meralco case had 

been promulgated by the Eighth Division.[120]  Shocked that Justice Roxas did not 

inform her  “as  a  matter of   judicial  courtesy”  of   the scrapping of   the decision 

which she signed on July 8, 2008, Justice Dimaranan-Vidal wrote a letter to the 

Presiding Justice dated July 24, 2008,[121] bringing to his attention “the apparent 

and   obvious   irregularities   in   the   handing   of   CA-G.R.   SP   No.   103692,”   and 

complaining   about   Justice   Roxas’   “lack   of   judicial   courtesy”   in   discarding   for 

reasons she would not know, his “purported final Decision” that he had asked her 

to   sign   and   which   she   signed   “after   a   judicious   study   of   the   records 

and rollothereof.”  Justice Roxas gave the lame excuse that he had “to incorporate 

therein some ten pages which he forgot to include in his Decision.”

 

Justice Dimaranan-Vidal expressed “surprise and consternation” when she 

learned “on even date that a Decision” in the case had been promulgated on July 

23, 2008 by the Eighth Division chaired by Justice Reyes, with Justices Roxas and 

Bruselas as members. She said:

           

My deepest regret is that the undersigned who already signed the supposed final draft of the Decision in the instant case which bears the signature of the ponente, was not even informed by the latter as a judicial courtesy at least, of the hurried easing out of the undersigned from the case. This inevitably posed even to an unprejudiced mind the following   questions:   under   what   basis   was   the   case   suddenly transferred to the 8th Division and why is it that neither the undersigned nor the Acting Chairman Justice SABIO, of the Special 9th Division not consulted   thereof?   and,   foremost,   what   happened   to   the   Decision which   the  undersigned   signed  after  devoting  her  precious  time and effort   in  carefully  and  laboriously  examining   the voluminous   records and rollo of the case?

 

            Sad   to   say   the   circumstance   obtaining   herein   constitute   a flagrant violation of the provision of Canon 5 particularly Sections 2 and 3   thereof   of   the   New   Code   of   Judicial   Conduct   for   the   Philippine Judiciary (A.M. No. 03-05-01-SC).   

 

On July   25,   2008,   Justice   Bruselas  wrote   the   Presiding   Justice   a   letter,[122] which was “prompted by a disturbing telephone call” he received from Justice 

Sabio   in   the  morning  of July  24,  2008.  Justice Sabio   informed Justice Bruselas 

that, “after the injunction hearing” on June 23, 2008, Meralco offered him P10 

Million “to either favor them or yield the chair” to Justice Reyes.  Justice Sabio 

told Justice Bruselas that he had informed the Presiding Justice of the “bribery 

incident” and that he “was disgusted over the turn of events because he should 

have   remained   chair   of   the   Special   9th Division   that   issued   the   TRO   on   the 

case.” Justice Bruselas informed Justice Sabio that it was the first time that he 

heard of the matter and that he had “participated in the deliberation on the case 

and  concurred  with   the ponencia”  of   Justice  Roxas  “without   such   information 

ever being taken up.” Justice Sabio told Justice Bruselas that he would not leave 

the  matter   “as   it   is”   because   he  would   bring   it   up   in   the   “open,   to  media, 

etc.”  Justice Sabio asked Justice Bruselas that if P10M was offered to him, how 

much would have been offered to the “others.”

 

Troubled by the information, Justice Bruselas went to the Presiding Justice 

where   Justice  Dimaranan-Vidal,  who  had   received   the   same   call   from   Justice 

Sabio, joined them.  After that meeting with the Presiding Justice, Justice Bruselas 

called up Justice Reyes who confirmed that he had heard about the “bribe offer” 

but   that   he   did   not   reveal   the   same   to   Justice  Bruselas   as   it   “escaped”   his 

mind.  The effort of Justice Bruselas “to get in touch” with Justice Roxas proved 

futile.

 

          Allegedly prompted by “the manner by which the decision x x x was arrived 

at, and how the decision was promulgated,” and that unless an “immediate and 

thorough investigation thereon be undertaken” by the Court of Appeals, “both 

the   individual   and   institutional   integrity   of   the   justices”   and  of   the  Court   of 

Appeals would “undoubtedly be tarnished,” Justice Sabio wrote on July 26, 2008 a 

letter[123] to the Presiding Justice, which precipitated the present investigation.

 

On July 28, 2008, the Philippine Daily Inquirer “carried an account” of the 

letter of Justice Dimaranan-Vidal  to the Presiding Justice, without her knowing 

how her confidential letter to the Presiding Justice leaked out.[124]

 

Before   Justice  Bruselas   delivered  his   letter   to   the   Presiding   Justice,   he 

received  a   copy  of   the   letter  of   Justice  Sabio   and,   through  a   telephone   call, 

reiterated his “full agreement with his desired investigation.”

 

The  Presiding   Justice   called   the  Court   of  Appeals   to   an   “emergency en 

banc session   at 10:00   a.m. on July   31,   2008 at   the   Session   Hall   to   elicit   the 

reaction of the Court and on the “possible effect” on the decision rendered.  The 

session was also called in order that the “predicament experienced in CA-G.R. SP 

No. 103692” could be deliberated upon by the Committee on Rules with a view to 

amending the IRCA on the reorganization of the Court of Appeals.  The Executive 

Justices of Cebu and Cagayan de Oro, Justices Antonio L. Villamor and Romulo V. 

Borja, respectively, were instructed to attend the en banc session to report to the 

other Justices in their stations what transpired at the session, and to “collect the 

personal reaction, comment or view” of the Justices on the matter.[125]

 

In its closed door en banc session on July 31, 2008, “after a torrid discussion 

of all the issues,” the Court of Appeals decided, as follows:

(1) Refer the propriety of the actions of the Justices concerned to the Supreme Court, through the Office of the Court Administrator;

 

(2)   Leave   the   matter   regarding   the   validity   of   the   decision rendered  in   the above-entitled  case   to   the parties   for   them to  take whatever legal steps they may deem appropriate in the usual course of procedure; and

 

(3) Refer the conflict in the interpretation of our Internal Rules to the Committee on Rules of the Court of Appeals in order to prevent the recurrence of a similar situation.[126]

 

After the en banc session, Justice Dimaranan-Vidal expressed in a letter for 

the   Presiding   Justice[127] her   “strong   reaction”   to   the   paper   of   Justice   Roxas 

“falsely” imputing to her “grandstanding before the media or resorting to media-

recourse instead of  just filing an administrative complaint before the Supreme 

Court,” and taking exception to “the equally outrageous, revolting and baseless 

accusation that she is allegedly clinging” to the case. She asserted that she never 

leaked a copy of her letter to the Philippine Daily Inquirer, as her letter was only 

intended to bring to the attention of the Presiding Justice “the impropriety done 

by Justice Roxas in the MERALCO case” that resulted in her having been eased out 

of   the   case   notwithstanding   that   she   “carefully   and   judiciously”   examined 

theponencia with more than 50 pages, after devoting her “precious time” to such 

study, and affixing her concurrence thereto. Justice Dimaranan-Vidal reiterated 

her prayer for an investigation of the matter.

 

Meanwhile, on that day, Mr. De Borja, executed an affidavit admitting that 

he was the businessman referred to by Justice Sabio, Jr. in his letter to Presiding 

Justice Vasquez. Mr. De Borja publicly claimed having learned “from the news” 

that Justice Sabio was “one of the justices” in the case arising from the order of 

the SEC to nullify the proxies issued in favor of the MERALCO management. He 

also alleged that Justice Sabio told him about the “blandishments coming from 

the government side,” that he was being offered a promotion to the Supreme 

Court and money to favor the GSIS position. Mr. De Borja asked Justice Sabio, Jr., 

“What  would   it   take   for  you   to   resist   the  government’s  offer?”  and   that   the 

response of Justice Sabio, Jr. was “Fifty Million.”

 

Justice Sabio asked permission from the Presiding Justice to hold a press 

conference the next day on account of the publicized affidavit of Mr. De Borja. 

The Presiding Justice told Justice Sabio that “this is a matter of self-defense on his 

part,” hence, the Presiding Justice cannot stop him from doing so.

 

Justice  Sabio   issued  a   signed   statement  as   an   “initial   response”   to   the 

affidavit of Mr. De Borja, “vehemently” denying that Mr. De Borja asked him what 

it  would   take   for  him to   inhibit   from the  case,  and that  he  “never  asked  for 

money” from him.[128] 

 

On August   1,   2008, Justice   Sabio   called   the  press   conference   to   read  a 

signed   statement   entitled   “My   Reaction   to  Mr.   Francis   De   Borja’s   Affidavit 

datedJuly 31, 2008 on the Meralco-SEC Case.”

 

Expressing anger at the “filthy lie” of Mr. De Borja, Justice Sabio decided to 

narrate “almost word for word” his “conversations” with Mr. De Borja.

 

In   an   affidavit   dated August   1,   2008,  which   Evelyn  Clavano[129] executed 

in Davao City, she stated that -

 

            Francis de Borja requested me if I have the cell phone number of Justice Jose L. Sabio Jr. He related that because he was very close to the Lopezes   of  Meralco,   he  wanted   to   call   him   regarding   his   possible inhibition in a certain Meralco case, wherein he was designated as a substitute member of the division vice a justice who was temporarily on leave by reason of sickness. He further said that the Lopezes desire that the same Justice, with whom the Lopezes are more comfortable, to sit in the division.

 

            So, I gave Francis de Borja the cell phone number of Justice Jose. L. Sabio, Jr. through business card.

 

x x x              x x x            x x x.

 

On   August   4,   2008,   the   Supreme   Court   constituted   the   Panel   of 

Investigators to investigate “(1) alleged improprieties of the actions of the Justices 

of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 103692 (Antonio V. Rosete, et al. v. SEC, 

et   al.)   and   (2)   the   alleged   rejected   offer   or   solicitation   of   bribe   disclosed 

respectively by Mr. Justice Jose Sabio and Mr. Francis de Borja.”

 

The Panel of Investigators held hearings from August 8 to 23, 2008. 

Affidavits  were   submitted   to   the   Panel   to   serve   as   the   parties’   direct 

testimonies upon which they were cross-examined by the Panel and the 

other parties.

 

On September   4,   2008,   the   Panel   of   Investigators   submitted   its 

Report of even date to the Court en banc.

 

According to the Report, “the investigation has revealed irregularities and 

improprieties committed by the Court of Appeals Justices in connection with the 

MERALCO case,  CA-G.R.   SP  No.  103692,  which  are  detrimental   to   the  proper 

administration   of   justice   and   damaging   to   the   institutional   integrity, 

independence and public respect for the Judiciary.”[130]

 

Findings regarding the conduct of Associate Justice Vicente Q. Roxas

Justice   Roxas   inexcusably   failed   to   act   on   a number   of  motions   of   the   parties   prior   to   the promulgation of the Decision.

As found by the Panel of Investigators, several motions were not resolved 

or acted upon by Justice Roxas. These were enumerated in the Report as follows:

 

(a)                The “Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Defer Action on any Incident of the  Petition Pending  Resolution  of  Re-Raffle”  filed  by  GSIS  on May   29,   2008   soon   after   this   case   was   filed   on   that   date (Rollo, pp. 185-186).

 

 b)        GSIS’  “Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Inhibit” Justice Roxas, which was filed on May 30, 2008. As the motion raised a prejudicial question, Justice Roxas should have resolved it before issuing the TRO sought by Meralco, but he never did (Rollo, pp.  220-223).

 (c)        GSIS’ Motion to Lift TRO which was filed on May 30,

2008 (Rollo, pp. 187-210) 

(d)        GSIS’ Motion filed on June 18, 2008, praying that it be allowed to use Power point at the hearing on June 23, 2008 .  On June 20, 2008,   the   SEC  filed  a   similar  motion.  Both  motions  were  not acted upon by Justice Roxas (Rollo, pp. 593-621,)

 (e)        Meralco’s   “Motion   for   Extension   of   Time   to   file   their 

Consolidated   Memorandum   of   Authorities   and   Reply   to Repondent   SEC’s  Comment”  filed  on June  25,   2008 (Rollo,   pp. 981- 987).

 

(f)         Meralco’s “Urgent Motion for Honorable Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes   to  Assume  Chairmanship  of   the  Division   in   the   Instant Case,”  which was filed on July  10,  2008 (Rollo, pp.  1262-1274).[131] (emphasis supplied)

 

          We agree with the Panel of Investigators that “by ignoring or refusing to act

on the motion for his inhibition, Justice Roxas violated Rule V, Section 3, third

paragraph of the IRCA, which provides that he should resolve such motion in

writing with copies furnished the other members of the Division, the Presiding

Justice, the Raffle Committee, and the Division Clerk of Court.” The pertinent

portion of the said provision states:

             Sec. 3. Motion to Inhibit a Division or a Justice. – x x x

x x xA motion for voluntary inhibition of a Justice shall be acted upon by him alone in writing, copy furnished the other members of the Division, the Presiding Justice, the Raffle Committee and the Division Clerk of Court.

 

          This Court cannot agree with Justice Roxas’ proposition that the issuance of 

the TRO constitutes an implied denial of the motion to inhibit since under IRCA 

the obligation of the Justice to act on such a motion is mandatory.

 

Furthermore,  the Court finds well-taken the Panel’s  finding that “Justice 

Roxas’ failure to act on the other motions of the parties violated Canon 3, Rule 

3.05 of the 1989 Code of Judicial Conduct (which applies in a suppletory  manner 

to the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary) providing that:

 

“Rule 3.05. – A judge shall dispose of the court’s business promptly and decide cases within the required periods.”

 

 

Even Section 5, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that 

“[j]udges   shall   perform   all   judicial   duties,   including   the   delivery   of   reserved 

decisions, efficiently, fairly and with reasonable promptness.” Thus, it has become 

well-settled in jurisprudence that even just undue delay in the resolving pending 

motions or incidents within the reglamentary period fixed by law is not excusable 

and   constitutes   gross   inefficiency.[132] With   more   reason,   this   Court   finds 

suspicious and reprehensible the failure of Justice Roxas to act at all on pending 

motions and  incidents in CA-G.R. SP No. 103692.

This   is   in   fact   not   the   first   time   that   Justice   Roxas   has   been   cited 

administratively for failure to resolve pending incidents in cases assigned to him. 

In Orocio v. Roxas, A.M. Nos. 07-115-CA-J and CA-08-46-J, this Court imposed a 

P15,000 fine on Justice Roxas for unwarranted delay in resolving two motions for 

reconsideration in another case and sternly warned him that future commission 

any act of impropriety will be dealt with more severely.

 

Justice Roxas is guilty of gross dishonesty.

 

 

Apart from Justice Roxas’ inexcusable inaction on pending incidents in the 

Meralco case, the Panel of Investigators found that he had been dishonest and 

untruthful in relation to the said case. The Court adopts the following findings of 

the Panel:

 

2. Justice Roxas was dishonest and untruthful.

(a) Justice Roxas admitted that the “Transcript of Final Decision,” which is supposed to be a transcript of the deliberation on July 14, 2008 of the Eighth Division on the final decision in the Meralco case was not a   true   “transcript”   of   the   minutes   of   the   meeting,   but   purely   a “transcript   from   memory”   because   no   notes   were   taken,   no stenographer was present, and no tape recorder was used. It was in fact a drama which he composed “from my recollection” to comply with Sec. 9, Rule VI of the IRCA which requires that “minutes of the meeting, i.e.,   deliberation,   shall   be   kept.” The   so-called   “transcript”   is a     fabrication      designed   to  deceive   that   there  had  been  compliance  –    when actually there was none -- with the prerequisite of the IRCA that consultation and/or deliberation among the members of the Division must precede the drafting of a decision.

 

(b) The statement in the “transcript” that it was a “recap from our previous deliberations” was another      falsehood      because there had    been no previous deliberations.

 

(c) The reference in the “transcript” to a “Final Report of Justice Roxas” was   also      false      for   Justice   Roxas   admittedly   did   not   submit   a    “report”  as      ponente   ,   as   required  by  Sec.  9,  Rule  VI  of   the   IRCA, for deliberation by the Eighth Division on July 14, 2008. The “Final Report” which  he  submitted was  admittedly   the  decision   itself which  he  and Justice Bruselas, Jr. had already signed. The “Final Report” was merely the title of the page that served as the cover of the decision. Hence, Justice B.L. Reyes’ supposed closing statement in the “transcript” that -- “We  have  covered  every  angle  of   the  Final  Report  of   Justice  Roxas extensively” is also false. Justice B.L. Reyes testified at the investigation that  he had not  seen the “transcript”  until   the copy  in the rollo was 

shown  to  him by   Justice  Callejo,   Sr.  during  his   cross-examination  of Justice B. L. Reyes on August 26, 2008.

 

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(e) Justice Roxas’ testimony that when he brought the Meralco decision to Justice Dimaranan-Vidal on      July 8, 2008, it was only a draft    for her to read, because she asked if she may read it, not for her to sign it,   is   completely false . This   testimony   was   labelled   by   Justice Dimaranan-Vidal  as a lie,  and she called Justice Roxas a liar,  because she did not ask to borrow the decision for her reading pleasure, but Justice Roxas personally  brought   it   to her  office for her  to sign as a member of the Special  Ninth Division. After poring over it the whole night, she signed it, as well as three (3) additional signature pages which were to be attached to three (3) other copies of the decision.[133]

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          Indeed, the fabrications and falsehoods that Justice Roxas blithely proferred to the Panel in explanation/justification of his questioned handling of the Meralco case demonstrated that he lacks the qualification of integrity and honesty expected of a magistrate and a member of the appellate court. 

          Under Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, dishonesty is considered a serious

offense that may warrant the penalty of dismissal from the service. Under the Rule

IV, Section 52 of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service,

dishonesty is likewise considered a grave offense and warrants the penalty of

dismissal even for the first offense. In the past, the Court has had the occasion to

rule that:

…dishonesty and falsification are considered grave offenses warranting the penalty of dismissal from service upon the commission of the first offense. On numerous occasions, the Court did not hesitate to impose such extreme punishment on employees found guilty of these offenses.

Dishonesty, being in the nature of a grave offense, carries the extreme   penalty   of   dismissal   from   the   service  with   forfeiture   of retirement   benefits   except   accrued   leave   credits,   and   perpetual disqualification   for   re-employment   in   the   government service. Dishonesty has no place in the judiciary.[134]

 Justice Roxas showed a lack of courtesy and respect for his colleagues in the Court of Appeals.

 

 

          The Panel of Investigators reported on this matter in this wise:

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(f)   Justice Roxas was thoughtlessly disrespectful to  a  colleague and a lady at that, when he unceremoniously discarded, shredded, and burned the decision that Justice Dimaranan-Vidal had signed, because he allegedly forgot that Justice Dimaranan-Vidal and Justice Sabio, Jr. had already been “reorganized out” of the Special Ninth Division as of July 4, 2008,  hence, out of the Meralco case. Out of courtesy, he should have explained to Justice Dimaranan-Vidal the reason why he was not promulgating the decision which she had signed.

 

The   truth,   it   seems,   is   that   Justice  Roxas,  who had  consulted Justice Villarama, Jr. on which Division should decide the Meralco case, may have been convinced that it should be the Special Ninth Division. That is why he brought his decision to Justice Dimaranan-Vidal for her signature.   However,   somehow,   somewhere,   during   the   night,  while Justice Dimaranan-Vidal was patiently poring over his decision, Justice Roxas was persuaded to bring his  decision to the Eighth Division (to which   he   and   Justice   B.L.   Reyes   belong   after   the   July   4,   2008 reorganization of the Court),   it  may have dawned on him that  if  the case   remained   in   the  Special  Ninth  Division,   Justice  Sabio,   Jr.  might dissent, requiring the Presiding Justice to constitute a special division of five. If he (Justice Roxas) should fail to obtain a majority of the Division on his side, he would lose his ponencia; someone else would become the ponente (perhaps Justice Sabio, Jr.).  That may be the reason why he junked   Justices   Sabio,   Jr.   and   Dimaranan-Vidal   (even   if   the   latter concurred with his decision) because he was unsure of Justice Sabio, Jr. He chose to cast his lot with his companions in the Eighth Division -- Justices B. L. Reyes and Bruselas, Jr. -- with whom he and Meralco were “comfortable”.

 

(g)   J.   Roxas   was disrespectful to Presiding Justice Vasquez, Jr. whose ruling  on his  “Interpleader  Petition” he sought  on July  21, 2008,  but he promulgated the Meralco decision two (2) days later,  on July 23, 2008, without waiting for Presiding Justice Vasquez, Jr.’s ruling which   came   out   on   July   24,   2008,   only   three   (3)   days   after  the Interpleader Petition was filed by him, and two (2) days after Justice B.L. Reyes   also   reiterated   in   writing   his   request   for   Presiding   Justice Vasquez,   Jr.   to   resolve   the   same  chairmanship   issue   raised   in   the Interpleader.   Presiding   Justice   Vasquez,   Jr.   was   embarrassed   and humiliated   by   Justices   B.L.   Reyes’   and   Roxas’ lack of courtesy and respect for his position as head of the Court.

 

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There is an old adage which says to gain respect one must learn to give it. If 

judges and justices are expected to treat litigants, counsels and subordinates with 

respect and fairness, with more reason, that judges and justices should give their 

fellow magistrates   the courtesy  and professional   regard  due to   them as   their 

colleagues in the Judiciary. Thus, in Canon 5, Section 3 of the New Code of Judicial 

Conduct,   judges   are   expected   to   “carry out judicial duties with appropriate

consideration for all persons, such as the parties, witnesses, lawyers, court staff 

and judicial colleagues,   without   differentiation   on   any   irrelevant   ground, 

immaterial to the proper performance of such duties.”

 

 

This Court cannot view lightly the discourteous manner that Justice Roxas, 

in his apparent haste to promulgate his decision in the Meralco case, treated his 

colleagues   in   the   Court   of   Appeals.   It   behooves   the   Court   to   remind   all 

magistrates  that their  high office demands compliance with the most exacting 

standards of propriety and decorum.

Justice   Roxas’   questionable   handling   of   the Meralco   case   demonstrates   his   undue   interest therein.

 

          In the Report, the Panel of Investigators observed that Justice Roxas in fact 

began drafting his decision even prior to the submission of the parties’ 

memoranda. As discussed in the Report:

 

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(d)  Although the parties were given 15 days  after  the hearing on June 23, 2008, or up to July 8, 2008, to simultaneously submit their memoranda and memoranda of authorities, and actually submitted:

On July 7, 2008 – GSIS’s 39 page- memorandum

On July  9, 2008 – SEC’s 62 page-memorandum

On July  10,   2008 –   MERALCO’s   555   page-   memorandum   (by messenger) with memorandum of authorities

 

Justice Roxas prepared the decision before the parties had filed their memoranda in the case and submitted it to Justice Dimaranan-Vidal   for  her   signature  on July  8,   2008. His   “rush   to   judgment”  was indicative   of   “ undue interest and unseemly haste, ”   according   to  J.Romero.

 

He cheated the parties’ counsel of the time, effort, and energy that they invested in the preparation of their ponderous memoranda which, as it turned out, neither he nor the other members of the Eighth Division   bothered   to   read   before   signing   his   decision.   He  made   a mockery of his own order for the parties to submit memoranda, and rendered their compliance a futile exercise.

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            (underscoring supplied)

 

          We   agree   with  Mme.   Justice   Romero’s   observation   that   the   “rush   to 

judgment” (even before the filing of the parties’ memoranda) was indicative of 

Justice   Roxas’ undue interest and   unseemly   haste,   especially   when   taken 

together with other circumstances. This inexplicable haste in resolving the case on 

the merits   is   likewise  apparent   in   Justice Roxas’   failure  to  resolve   the several 

pending incidents and instead jumping ahead to deciding the case on the merits; 

his “rushing” of Justice Dimaranan-Vidal into signing his draft Decision on July 8, 

2008 when the parties’ memoranda have not yet all been filed with the CA; his 

precipitate   transfer   of   the   case   to   the   Eighth   Division   for   promulgation   of 

decision, without notice to Justice Dimaranan-Vidal of the Special Ninth Division 

who   had   already   signed   his   draft   Decision   and   despite   the   unresolved 

Chairmanship dispute between Justice Reyes and Justice Sabio which he (Justice 

Roxas) even submitted to the Presiding Justice for appropriate action, just a few 

days before the promulgation.

 

          We reiterate here that as the visible representation of the law and justice, 

judges  are  expected   to  conduct   themselves   in  a  manner   that  would  enhance 

respect and confidence of the people in the judicial  system. The New Code of 

Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary mandates that judges must not only 

maintain their independence, integrity and impartiality; but they must also avoid 

any appearance of impropriety or partiality, which may erode the people’s faith in 

the judiciary. This standard applies not only to the decision itself, but also to the 

process by which the decision is made.[135] This Court will not hesitate to sanction 

with the highest penalty magistrates who exhibit manifest undue interest in their 

assigned cases.[136]

         

          In sum, this Court finds that Justice Roxas’ multiple violations of the canons 

of   the Code of   Judicial  Conduct  constitute  grave  misconduct,  compounded by 

dishonesty,  undue  interest  and conduct  prejudicial   to  the best   interest  of   the 

service, which warrant his DISMISSAL from the service.

 

Findings regarding the conduct of Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr.

          In   the   Report,   the   Panel   found   that   Justice   Sabio   likewise   committed 

improprieties in relation to the Meralco case.

The   circumstances   of   the   telephone   call   of Chairman   Sabio   to   his   brother   Justice   Sabio showed   that   Justice   Sabio   failed   to   uphold   the standard of independence and propriety expected of him as a magistrate of the appellate court.

 

In his testimony before the Panel, Chairman Sabio admits that he called up 

Justice Sabio on May 30, 2008 from Davao City, in response to a resquest for help 

from a member of the Board of Trustees of Meralco. Notwithstanding the fact 

that Chairman Sabio called to relay to Justice Sabio the “rightness” of the GSIS’ 

cause  and  asked  him “to  help  GSIS”  and   that   Justice  Sabio  allegedly   told  his 

brother   that   he  would   act   in   accordance  with   his   conscience,   the   same   still 

constituted a violation of Canon 13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for 

lawyers, which provides that:

“A lawyer shall x x x refrain from any impropriety which tends to influence, or gives the appearance of influencing the Court.”

As they were both members of the Bar, it is incomprehensible to this Court 

how the brothers can justify their improper conversation regarding the Meralco 

case. As the Panel observed in its Report:

 

Ironically,   both   of   them   found   nothing   wrong   with   brother Camilo’s effort to influence his younger brother’s action in the Meralco case, because both believe that our Filipino culture allows brother-to-brother  conversation,  even  if   the purpose of  one  is  to  influence the other, provided the latter does not agree to do something illegal.[137]

 

          For the Panel, Justice Sabio violated Sections 1, 4, and 5, Canon 1 of the New 

Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, which provide that –

Sec. 1. Judges shall exercise the judicial function independently x x x free from extraneous influence, inducement, pressure, threat or interference, direct or indirect, from any quarter or for any reason.

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Sec. 4. Judges shall not allow family, social, or other relationships to influence judicial conduct or judgment. The prestige of judicial office shall not be used or lent to advance the private interests of others,

nor convey or permit others to convey the impression that they are in a special position to influence the judge.

Sec. 5. Judges shall not only be free from inappropriate connections with, and influence by, the executive and legislative branches of government, but must also appear to be free therefrom to a reasonable observer.

 

In the Investigators’ mind, although Justice Sabio signed the TRO in favour 

of Meralco contrary to his brother’s advice, Justice Sabio’s “unusual interest in 

holding  on to  the Meralco  case,”  seemed to   indicate  that  he  may have been 

actually influenced by his brother “to help GSIS.” In arriving at this conclusion, the 

Panel noted the following circumstances: (1) Justice Sabio adamantly refused to 

yield   the   chairmanship   of   the   Special   Ninth   Division   although   the   regular 

chairman, Justice Reyes had returned to duty on June 10, 2008; and, (2) Justice 

Sabio officiously prepared and signed a resolution (a chore for the ponente Justice 

V. Roxas to perform), requiring the GSIS and the SEC to comment on Meralco’s 

“Motion for   Justice B.  Reyes  to  Assume the Chairmanship  of   the 9th Division,” 

which he probably intended to delay the decision on the preliminary injunction 

beyond the life of the TRO to the prejudice of Meralco and the advantage of the 

GSIS.

 

          Based on the facts on record, the Court  is  wary of  declaring that Justice 

Sabio  had  been   influenced  by  his  brother  by   speculating   that  he  would  have 

favored GSIS had he been a part of the division which rendered the decision in the 

Meralco case. However, we do find that it was improper for Justice Sabio to hold 

on to the chairmanship of the Ninth Division the despite the return of Justice 

Reyes, when Justice Sabio’s designation as acting chairman was clearly only for 

the duration of Justice Reyes’ leave of absence. We likewise note with disfavor his 

stubborn insistence on his own interpretation of the IRCA and hostile, dismissive 

attitude towards equally well-reasoned positions of his colleagues on the proper 

interpretation of their rules. Such conduct on the part of Justice Sabio did nothing 

to aid in the swift and amicable resolution of his dispute with Justice Reyes but 

rather fanned the flames of resentment between them. We deem this sort  of 

behavior unbecoming for a magistrate of his stature.

 

Justice   Sabio’s   conversations  with  Mr.  De   Borja were improper and indiscreet.

 

On this matter, the Court accepts the following findings in the Report:

 

Knowing the nature of  De Borja’s  profession,   Justice Sabio,   Jr. should have been wary of the former. He should have foreseen that De Borja had the Meralco case on his mind when he called Justice Sabio, Jr. True enough, De Borja mentioned the Meralco case and congratulated Justice Sabio, Jr. for having signed the TRO in favour of Meralco.

 

But that was not the last time Justice Sabio, Jr. would hear from De Borja.  A  month  later,  after   Justice Sabio,   Jr.  had presided at   the hearing of Meralco’s prayer for preliminary injunction on June 23, 2008, and the case was ripening for decision or resolution,  De Borja again 

called up Justice Sabio, Jr. and asked to meet him over dinner to “chit chat” about the Meralco case.

 

Instead of telling off De Borja that he could not, and would not, talk about the Meralco case, Justice Sabio, Jr. agreed to meet De Borja in the lobby-lounge of the Ateneo Law School after his evening class in Legal Ethics in said school.

 

Justice Sabio Jr.’s action of discussing the Meralco case with De Borja was  highly   inappropriate and indiscreet . First,   in   talks  with  his brother; the second time in conversation with De Borja, Justice Sabio, Jr.   broke   the   shield   of confidentiality that   covers   the   disposition   of cases in the Court in order to preserve and protect the integrity and independence of the Court itself. He ignored the injunction in Canon 1, Section   8   of   the      New   Code   of   Judicial   Conduct   for   the   Philippine    Judiciary   that:   “Judges shall exhibit and promote high standards of judicial conduct (and discretion) in order to reinforce public confidence in the judiciary which is fundamental to the maintenance of judicial independence.”

It was during that meeting with De Borja in the lobby-lounge of the Ateneo Law School, that De Borja allegedly offered him P10 million, in   behalf   of   Meralco,   to   step   out   of   the   case   and   allow   Justice Bienvenido  Reyes   to   assume   the   chairmanship  of   the   Special  Ninth Division   because  Meralco  was   “not   comfortable”  with   him   (Justice Sabio,   Jr.).   He   rejected   the   bribe   offer   because   he   “could   not   in conscience accept it.”

 

Justice Sabio, Jr. was allegedly shocked and insulted that De Borja would think that he (Justice Sabio, Jr.) could be bribed or bought. The 

Panel   is,   however,   honestly  perplexed  why   in   spite  of  his  outraged respectability, Justice Sabio, Jr. called up De Borja two (2) days later (on July 3, 2008), to tell De Borja to stop “pestering” him with his calls. The Panel is nonplussed because, normally, a person who has been insulted would never want to see, much less speak again, to the person who had disrespected  him.  He   could  have   just   shut  off  his   cell   phone   to  De Borja’s calls. De Borja denied that he reiterated his offer of P10 million to Justice Sabio, Jr. He denied saying that even if the case should go up to   the   Supreme   Court,   GSIS   would   still   lose,   hence,   “saying   lang yung P10 million; baka sisihin ka pa ng mga anak mo.” He testified that his reply to Justice Sabio, Jr.’s call was “deadma” or indifference. Justice Sabio, Jr. blamed that call of his to a “lapse in judgment” on his part.

 

Be   that  as   it  may,   the   Investigating  Panel  finds  more credible Justice   Sabio,   Jr.’s   story   about  De  Borja’s   P10  million-bribe-offer  on behalf of Meralco, than De Borja’s denial that he made such an offer. Why does the Panel believe him, and not De Borja?

 

First,  because   Justice  Sabio,   Jr.   verbally   reported   the   rejected bribe offer to CA Presiding Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. the next day – a fact admitted by Presiding Justice Vasquez, Jr.

 

Second, even though Justice Sabio, Jr. did not mention the bribe-offeror’s   name   in   both   his   verbal   and  written   reports   to   Presiding Justice Vasquez,   Jr.,  De Borja   identified himself   to   the media  as   the person alluded to.

 

Third,  De Borja’s  allegation,   that   Justice Sabio,   Jr.  wanted P50 million, not P10 million, is not believable, for, if Justice Sabio, Jr. quoted P50 million as his price, he would not have reported the P10 million 

bribe offer to Presiding Justice Vasquez, Jr. He would have waited for Meralco’s reply to his counter-offer.[138]

xxx       xxx       xxx

 

Indeed, the Court agrees with the Panel that the allegation of solicitation on 

the   part   of   Justice   Sabio   is   not   credible.   Nevertheless,   the   continued 

communications between Justice Sabio and Mr. De Borja even after the latter’s 

rejected bribery attempt is highly inappropriate and shows poor judgment on the 

part of Justice Sabio who should have acted in preservation of the dignity of his 

judicial office and the institution to which he belongs.

 

          Premises considered, this Court is of the view that Justice Sabio’s indiscreet 

and imprudent conversations regarding the Meralco case with his brother and 

Mr. De Borja and his actuations in the chairmanship dispute with Justice Reyes 

constitute simple misconduct and conduct unbecoming of a justice of the Court of 

Appeals which warrant the penalty of two (2) months suspension without pay.

 

Findings regarding the conduct of Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes.

 

As   previously   discussed,   Justice   Reyes   appealed   to   Presiding   Justice 

Vazquez in a letter dated July 22, 2008, reiterating his (Justice Reyes’) request that 

the Presiding Justice render an opinion which Division of the Court of Appeals – 

the Eighth Division with him as chairman, or the Special Ninth Division chaired by 

Justice Sabio should resolve the Meralco case.  This was in conjunction with an 

Interpleader filed by Justice Roxas on the same issue with the Presiding Justice. 

Yet, despite the fact that the Presiding Justice informed Justices Reyes and Roxas 

that he would study the matter, Justices Reyes and Justice Roxas, together with 

Justice Bruselas, promulgated the decision in the Meralco case on July 23, 2008. 

Justice Reyes and Justice Roxas did not withdraw their request for a ruling nor did 

either   of   them  advise   the   Presiding   Justice   beforehand   of   their   intention   to 

proceed with the resolution of the Meralco case. Thus, when the Presiding Justice 

issued his ruling on the chairmanship dispute on July 24, 2008, he was unaware of 

the promulgation of the Meralco decision on July 23, 2008,  under the aegis of 

Justice Reyes’ Eighth Division. As found by the Panel, “Presiding Justice Vasquez, 

Jr. was completely taken aback when he learned about it on July 24, 2008, the 

same day that he issued his opinion on the chairmanship issue which by then had 

become functus oficio. He felt belittled and humiliated by the discourtesy of the 

two justices to him.”

 

It bears repeating here that under Canon 5, Section 3 of the New Code of 

Judicial Conduct, judges are mandated to show the appropriate consideration and 

respect for their colleagues in the Judiciary.

 

Thus, we adopt the finding of the Panel on this point and find Justice Reyes 

guilty of simple misconduct,  which  is mitigated by the fact that he repeatedly 

asked Presiding Justice Vasquez to act on his request to rule on the conflicting 

interpretation of the  IRCA. However,   Justice Reyes should be reprimanded for 

taking part in the decision of the subject case without awaiting the ruling of the 

Presiding Justice.   

 

Findings regarding the conduct of Justice Myrna Dimaranan-Vidal

 

The   Court   finds   well-taken   and   adopts   the   findings   of   the   Panel   of 

Investigators, to wit:

 

Justice   Dimaranan-Vidal   deviated   from   the   IRCA  when   she allowed herself  to be rushed by Justice Roxas to sign the Meralco decision  on July  8,  2008,  without   reading   the parties’  memoranda and   without   the   deliberation   among   members   of   the   Division required   by   the   IRCA.   She   knew   that   the   TRO  would   not   expire until July 30, 2008 – some three (3) weeks away from July 8, 2008 – yet she allowed herself to believe Justice Roxas’ misrepresentation that  signing the decision was urgent.  Her compliance with certain dissembling practices of other justices of the Court, in violation of the IRCA, showed weakness and lack of independence on her part.[139]

 

The   following   sections  of  Canon  1  of   the  Code  of   Judicial  Conduct  are 

instructive in this regard:

 

SEC. 1. Judges shall exercise the judicial function independently on the basis   of   their   assessment   of   the   facts   and   in   accordance   with   a conscientious   understanding   of   the   law,   free   of   any   extraneous influence,   inducement,   pressure,   threat   or   interference,   direct   or indirect, from any quarter or for any reason.

 

SEC. 2. In performing judicial duties, judges shall be independent from judicial colleagues in respect of decisions which the judge is obliged to make independently.

 

Allowing   a   fellow   justice   to   induce   her   to   deviate   from   established 

procedure constitutes conduct unbecoming a justice for which Justice Dimaranan-

Vidal should be ADMONISHED to be more circumspect in the performance of her 

judicial duties.

 

Findings regarding the conduct of Presiding Justice Conrado M. Vasquez

 

          It   is  the view of the Panel of Investigators that Presiding Justice Vasquez 

failed to provide the leadership expected of him as head of the Court of Appeals. 

The following quote from the Report summarizes the perceived lapses on the part 

of the Presiding Justice:

 

Clearly,   Presiding   Justice  Vasquez,   Jr.   had  been indecisive in dealing   with   the   turmoil   arising   from   the   Meralco   case. He vacillated andtemporized on   resolving   the   impasse   between Justice Sabio, Jr. and Justice B. L. Reyes over the chairmanship of the Division that should hear and decide the  Meralco case. He failed to take action on the reported bribe-offer by Meralco to J.  Sabio,  Jr. He hesitated to  assert  his   leadership  of   the  Court  even  when   the parties repeatedly urged him to lay down the rule for them to follow. Was he hampered by the fact that he has relatives – two daughters – employed in the GSIS, and a sister who is a consultant thereof? He pleaded lack of authority. Was he not aware then, or did he discover 

too   late,  that   under   Section   11,   Rule   VIII   of   the   IRCA,   he   is   in fact authorized to act “on any matter” involving the Court and  its members?  That Rule provides:

 

Sec. 11. x xx the Presiding Justice or any one acting in his place is authorized to act on any matter not covered by these Rules. Such action shall, however, be reported to the Court en banc.

He should  have  convened   the  Court en  banc as   soon  as the alleged bribery attempt on Justice Sabio, Jr. was reported to him, for it was an attempt to corrupt a member of the Court, calling for the “protection   and   preservation   of   the   integrity   of   the   judicial processes” of the Court,   hence, an administrative matter cognizable by the Court en banc. Section 5 (c), Rule I of the IRCA, provides:

 

Sec. 5. Matters cognizable by the Court en banc.- The Court en banc

shall, inter alia:

(a)               x x x

(b)               Adopt uniform administrative measures, procedures, and policies for the protection and preservation of the integrity of the judicial processes, x x x.

 

Presiding Justice Vasquez admitted his “lapses in judgment.”[140]

 

          In the light of the foregoing observations of the Panel, this Court is of the 

view that much of the trouble now being faced by the Court of Appeals could 

have been averted by timely,   judicious and decisive action on the part  of   the 

Presiding Justice. Certainly, this unpleasant and trying episode in failure to act in 

the early part of his tenure as Presiding Justice has indelibly impressed upon him 

what   is   required   of   him   as   leader   of   the   second   highest   court   in   the   land. 

Nevertheless,  Presiding Justice Vasquez is  hereby severely reprimanded for his 

failure to act promptly and decisively on the controversy as required of him by the 

IRCA.

 

Findings regarding other personalities involved in the Meralco case

 

          Although  the  Presiding   Justice   in   his   letter   dated   August   1,   2008   only 

referred to this Court “the propriety of the actions of the Justices concerned” in 

the Meralco  case, we  cannot  simply turn a blind eye to the facts brought to light 

during the  investigation that relate to potential liabilities of other  personalities in 

the Meralco case.

 

          With   respect   to  Chairman  Sabio,   this   Court  has   the  power   to  discipline 

members of the Bar and his attempt to influence a member of the Judiciary, his 

brother at that, should be referred to the Bar Confidant for appropriate action.

 

          With respect to Mr. De Borja, the present investigation has given this Court 

reason to believe that Mr. De Borja may be criminally liable for his attempt to 

bribe a magistrate of the Court of Appeals. This matter should be referred to the 

Department of Justice for appropriate action.

 

          Pursuant   to   Section   13,   Article   VIII   of   the   Constitution,   this per 

curiam decision   was   reached   after   deliberation   of   the   Court en   banc. At the 

outset,  the offer of three (3) members of the Court to recuse themselves was 

denied by the Court. Except for two members of the Court who were allowed to 

inhibit themselves from the case, the Justices voted as follows: Twelve Justices 

voted for the dismissal from service of Associate Justice Vicente Q. Roxas and one 

(1) voted for his suspension from the service for six (6) months. Ten (10) Justices 

voted for two (2) month suspension from service without pay of Associate Justice 

Jose L. Sabio, one (1) voted for six-month suspension, one (1) for reprimand only 

as he should be credited for being a “whistle blower” and one (1) for his dismissal 

from   the   service.  Eight   (8)   Justices   voted   to   reprimand   Associate   Justice 

Bienvenido L. Reyes and five (5) for his suspension from the service for one (1) 

month. As to the rest, the voting was unanimous.          

 

WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES as follows:

 

(1) Associate Justice Vicente Q. Roxas is found guilty of multiple violations 

of   the  canons  of   the  Code of   Judicial  Conduct,  grave  misconduct,  dishonesty, 

undue interest and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and is 

DISMISSED  from the   service,  with  FORFEITURE of  all  benefits,  except  accrued 

leave credits if any, with prejudice to his re-employment in any branch or service 

of the government including government-owned and controlled corporations;

 

(2) Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr. is found guilty of simple misconduct 

and conduct unbecoming of a justice of the Court of Appeals and is SUSPENDED 

for two (2) months without pay, with a stern warning that a repetition of the 

same or similar acts will warrant a more severe penalty;

 

(3) Presiding Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. is SEVERELY REPRIMANDED for 

his   failure   to  act  promptly  and decisively   in  order   to  avert   the   incidents   that 

damaged the image of the Court of Appeals, with a stern warning that a repetition 

of the same or similar acts will warrant a more severe penalty;

 

 

 

(4)   Associate   Justice   Bienvenido   L.   Reyes   is   found   guilty   of   simple 

misconduct  with  mitigating   circumstance   and   is   REPRIMANDED,  with   a   stern 

warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will warrant a more severe 

penalty;

 

(5)  Associate   Justice  Myrna  Dimaranan-Vidal   is   found  guilty   of   conduct 

unbecoming a Justice of the Court of Appeals and is ADMONISHED to be more 

circumspect in the discharge of her judicial duties.

 

 (6) PCGG Chairman Camilo L. Sabio’s act to influence the judgment of a 

member of the Judiciary in a pending case is hereby referred to the Bar Confidant 

for appropriate action;

 

(7)   Justice Jose L.  Sabio,   Jr.’s  charge against  Mr.  Francis  R.  De Borja  for 

attempted   bribery   of   a  member   of   the   Judiciary   is   hereby   referred   to   the 

Department of Justice for appropriate action.

 

This Decision shall take effect immediately.

 

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

DECISION

October 18, 1957

G.R. No. L-8974APOLONIO CABANSAG, plaintiff,vs.GEMINIANA MARIA FERNANDEZ, ET AL., defendants.

APOLONIO CABANSAG, ROBERTO V. MERRERA and RUFINO V. MERRERA, respondents-appellants.Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla, Assistant Solicitor General Jose G. Bautista and Solicitor Troadio T. Quiazon, Jr., appellee., J.:This is a contempt proceeding which arose in Civil Case No. 9564 of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan wherein Apolonio Cabansag and his lawyers Roberto V. Merrera were found guilty and sentenced the first to pay a fine of P20 and the last two P50 each with the warning that a repetition of the of offense will next time be heavily dealt with.

Apolonio Cabansag filed on January 13, 1947 in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan a complaint seeking the ejectment of Geminiana Fernandez, et al. from a parcel of land. Defendants filed their answer on January 31, 1947 and a motion to dismiss on February 2, 1947 and a motion of plaintiff’s counsel, set the case for hearing on July 30, 1947. The meeting was postponed to August 8, 1947. On that day only one witness testified and the case was postponed to August 25, 1947. Thereafter, three incidents developed, namely: one regarding a claim for damages which was answered by defendants, another concerning the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction which was set for on March 23, 1948, and the third relative to an alleged contempt for violation of an agreement of the parties approved by the court. Pleadings were filed by the parties on these incidents and the court set the case for hearing on October 27, 1948. Hearing was postponed to December 10, 1948. On this date, only part of the evidence was received and the next hearing was scheduled for January 24,1949 when again only a part of the evidence was received and the case was continued to October 4, 1949.

On October 4, 1949, the court, presided over by Judge Villamor upon petition of both parties, ordered the stenographers who took down the notes during the

previous hearings to transcribe them within 15 days upon payment of their fees, and the hearing was postponed until the transcript of said notes had been submitted. Notwithstanding the failure of the stenographers to transcribe their notes, the hearing was set for March 17, 1950. Two more postponements followed for March 23, 1950 and March 27, 1950. On August 9, 1950, August 23, 1950, September 26, 1950 and November 29, 1950, hearings were had but the case was only partly tried to be postponed again to January 30, 1951 and February 19, 1951. Partial hearings were held on February 20, 1951, March 12, 1951 and June 6,1951. These hearings were followed by three more postponements and on August 15, 1951, the case was partially heard. After this partial hearing, the trial was continued on March 6, 1952 only to be postponed to May 27, 1952. No hearing took place on said date and the case was set for continuation on December 9, 1952 when the court, Judge Pasicolan presiding, issued an order suggesting to the parties to arrange with the stenographers who took down the notes to transcribe their respective notes and that the case would be set for hearing after the submission of the transcript. From December 9, 1952 to August 12, 1954, no further step was taken either by the court or any of the contending parties in the case. .

On December 30, 1953, President Magsaysay assumed office, he issued Executive Order No. I creating the Presidential Complaints and Action Commission (PCAC), which was later superseded by Executive Order 19 promulgated on March 17, 1954. And on August 12, 1954 Apolonio Cabansag, apparently irked and disappointed by the delay in the disposition of his case, wrote the PCAC, a letter copy which he furnished the Secretary of Justice and the Executive Judge of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, which reads:

We, poor people of the Philippines are very grateful for the creation of your Office. Unlike in the old days, poor people are not heard, but now the PCAC is the sword of Damocles ready to smite bureaucratic aristocracy. Poor people can now rely on PCAC to help them.

Undaunted, the undersigned begs to request the help of the PCAC in the interest of public service, as President Magsaysay has in mind to create the said PACC, to have his old case stated above be terminated once and for all. The undersigned has long since been deprived of his land thru the careful maneuvers of a tactical lawyer. The said case which had long been pending could not be decided due to the fact that the transcript of the records has not, as yet, been transcribed by the stenographers who took the stenographic notes. The new Judges could not proceed to hear the case before the transcription of the said notes. The stenographers who took the notes are now assigned in another courts. It seems that the undersigned will be deprived indefinitely of his right of possession over the land he owns. He has no

other recourse than to ask the help of the ever willing PCAC to help him solve his predicament at an early date.

Now then, Mr. Chief, the undersigned relies on you to do your utmost best to bring justice to its final destination. My confidence reposes in you. Thanks.

Most confidently yours,

(Sgd.) APOLONIO CABANSAG

Plaintiff</TD>

</TR>

Upon the receipt of the letter, the Secretary of Justice indorsed it to the Clerk of Court of First Instance of Pangasinan instructing him to require the stenographers concerned to transcribe their notes in Civil Case No. 9564. The clerk of court, upon receipt of this instruction on August 27, 1954, referred the matter to Judge Jesus P. Morfe before whom the case was then informing him that the two stenographers concerned, Miss Iluminada Abello and Juan Gaspar, have already been assigned elsewhere. On the same date, Judge Morfe wrote the Secretary of Justice informing him that under provisions of Act No. 2383 and Section 12 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, said stenographers are not obliged to transcribe their notes except in cases of appeal and that since the parties are not poor litigants, they are not entitled to transcription free of charge, aside from the fact that said stenographers were no longer under his jurisdiction.

Meanwhile, on September 1, 1954, Atty. Manuel Fernandez, counsel for defendants, filed a motion before Judge Morfe praying that Apolonio Cabansag be declared in contempt of court for an alleged scurrilous remark he made in his letter to the PCAC to the effect that he, Cabansag, has long been deprived of his land “thru the careful maneuvers of a tactical lawyer”, to which counsel for Cabansag replied with a counter-charge praying that Atty. Fernandez be in turn declared in contempt because of certain contemptuous remarks made by him in his pleading. Acting on these charges and counter- charges, on September 14, 1954, Judge Morfe dismissed both charges but ordered Cabansag to show cause in writing within 10 days why he should not be held liable for contempt for sending the above letter to the PCAC which tended to degrade the court in the eyes of the President and the people. Cabansag filed his answer stating that he did not have the idea to besmirch the dignity or belittle the respect due the court nor was he actuated with malice when he addressed the letter to the PCAC; that there is no single contemptuous word in said letter nor was it intended to give the Chief Executive a wrong impression or opinion of the court; and that if there was any inefficiency in the disposal of his case, the same was committed by the judges who previously intervened in the case.

In connection with this answer, the lawyers of Cabansag, Roberto V. Merrera and Rufino V. Merrera’ also submitted a written manifestation stating that the sending of the letter to their client to the PCAC was through their knowledge and consent because they believed that there was nothing wrong in doing so. And it appearing that said attorneys had a hand in the writing and remittance of the letter to the PCAC, Judge Morfe on, on September 29, 1954, issued another order requiring also said attorneys to show cause why they should not likewise be held for contempt for having committed acts which tend to impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of justice.

Anent the charge for contempt preferred by Judge Morfe against Apolonio Cabansag, several incidents took place touching on the right of the Special Counsel of the Department of Justice to appear as counsel for Cabansag, which were however settled when the court allowed said Special Counsel to appear as amicus curiae in his official capacity. In addition to this Special Counsel, other members of the local bar were likewise allowed to appear for respondents in view of the importance of the issues involved. After due hearing, where the counsel of respondents were allowed to argue and submit memoranda, the decision finding respondents guilty of contempt and sentencing them to pay a fine as stated in the early part of this decision. Respondents in due time appealed to this Court.The issues involved in this appeal appear well stated in the decision of the trial Court. They are: (a) Did the writing in the letter in question to the PCAC tend directly or indirectly to put the lower court into disrepute or belittle, degrade or embarrass it in its administration of justice?; and (b) Did writing of said letter tend to draw the intervention of the PCAC in the instant case which will have the effect of undermining the court’s judicial independence?

We agree that the trial court that courts have the power to preserve their integrity and maintain their dignity without which their administration of justice is bound to falter or fail (Villavicencio vs. Lukban, 39 Phil. 778; Borromeo vs. Mariano, 41 Phil. 322). This is the preservative power to punish for contempt (Rule 64, Rules of Court; Villavicencio vs. Lukban, supra). This power is inherent in all courts and essential to their right of self-preservation (Slade Perkins vs. Director of Prisons, 58 Phil. 271). In order that it may conduct its business unhampered by publications which tends to impair the impartiality of its decisions or otherwise obstruct the administration of justice, the court will not hesitate to exercise it regardless of who is affected. For, “as important as is the maintenance of unmuzzled press and the free exercise of the rights of the citizen is the maintenance of the independence of the judiciary” (In re Lozano and Quevedo, 54 Phil. 801).The reason for this is that respect of the courts guarantees the stability of their institution. Without such said institution would be resting on a very shaky foundation (Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724).

The question that now arises is: Has the lower court legitimately and justifiably exercised this power in the instant case?

The lower court tells us that it has because in its opinion the act of respondents to put it belittle or degrade or embarrass it in its administration of justice, and so it punished them for contempt to protect its judicial independence. But appellants believe otherwise, for they contend that in sending the letter in question to the PCAC, they did nothing but to exercise their right to petition the government for redress of their grievance as guaranteed by our constitution (section 1, paragraph 8, Article III).

The very idea of a government, republican in form, implies a right on the part of its citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect affairs and to petition for a redress of grievances.” The First Amendments of the Federal expressly guarantees that right against abridgement by Congress. But mention does not argue exclusion elsewhere. For the right is one that cannot be denied without violating those fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all civil and political institutions,- principles which the Fourteenth Amendment embodies in the general terms of its due process clause. (Emerson and Haber, Political and Civil Rights in the United States, p. 419.).

We are therefore confronted with a clash of two fundamental rights which lie at the bottom of our democratic institutions-the independence of the judiciary the right to petition the government for redress of grievance. How to balance and reconcile the exercise of these rights is the problem posed in the case before us.

. . . A free press is not to be judiciary, nor an independent judiciary to a free press. Neither has primacy over the other; both are indispensable to a free society.

The freedom of the press in itself presupposes an independent judiciary through which that freedom may, if necessary, be vindicated. And one of the potent means of assuring judges their independence is a free press. (Justice Frankfurter, concurring in Pennekamp vs. Florida, 328 U.S. 354-356)

Two theoretical formulas had been devised in the determination of conflicting rights of similar import in an attempt to draw the proper constitutional boundary between freedom of expression and independence of the judiciary. These are the “clear and present danger” rule and the “dangerous tendency” rule. The first as interpreted in a number of cases, means that the evil consequence of the comment or utterance must be “extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high” before the utterance can be punished. The danger to be guarded against is the “substantive evil” sought to be prevented. And this evil is primarily the “disorderly and unfair administration of justice.” This test establishes a definite rule in

constitutional law. It provides the criterion as to what words maybe published. Under this rule, the advocacy of ideas cannot constitutionally be abridged unless there is a clear and present danger that such advocacy will harm the administration of justice.

This rule had its origin in Schenck vs. U. S. (249) U. S. 47), promulgated in 1919, and ever since it has afforded a practical guidance in a great variety of cases in which the scope of the constitutional protection of freedom of expression was put in issue.1 In one of said cases, the United States Supreme Court has made the significant suggestion that this rule “is an appropriate guide in determining the constitutionality of restriction upon expression where the substantial evil sought to be prevented by the restriction is destruction of life or property or invasion of the right of privacy” Thornhill vs. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88).

Thus, speaking of the extent and scope of the application of this rule, the Supreme Court of the United States said “Clear and present danger of substantive evils as a result of indiscriminate publications regarding judicial proceedings justifies an impairment of the constitutional right of freedom of speech and press only if the evils are extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high. . . . A public utterance or publication is not to be denied the constitutional protection of freedom of speech and press merely because it concerns a judicial proceeding still pending in the courts, upon the theory that in such a case it must necessarily tend to obstruct the orderly and fair administration of justice. The possibility of engendering disrespect for the judiciary as a result of the published criticism of a judge is not such a substantive evil as will justify impairment of the constitutional right of freedom of speech and press.” (Bridges vs. California, 314 U.S. 252, syllabi)

No less important is the ruling on the power of the court to punish for contempt in relation to the freedom of speech and press. We quote; “Freedom of speech and press should not be impaired through the exercise of the punish for contempt of court unless there is no doubt that the utterances in question are a serious and imminent threat to the administration of justice. A judge may hold in contempt one who ventures to publish anything that tends to make him unpopular or to belittle him. . . . The vehemence of the language used in newspaper publications concerning a judge’s decision is not alone the measure of the power to punish for contempt. The fires which it kindles must constitute an imminent not merely a likely, threat to the administration of justice. (Craig vs. Harney, 331 U. S. 367, syllabi)

And in weighing the danger of possible interference with the courts by newspaper criticism against the right of free speech to determine whether such criticism may constitutionally be punished as contempt, it was ruled that “freedom of public

comment should in borderline instances weigh heavily against a possible tendency to influence pending cases.” (Pennekamp vs. Florida, 328 U. S. 331).

The question in every case, according to Justice Holmes, is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree (Schenck vs. U.S. supra).The “dangerous tendency” rule, on the other hand, has been adopted in cases where extreme difficulty is confronted determining where the freedom of expression ends and the right of courts to protect their independence begins. There must be a remedy to borderline cases and the basic principle of this rule lies in that the freedom of speech and of the press, as well as the right to petition for redress of grievance, while guaranteed by the constitution, are not absolute. They are subject to restrictions and limitations, one of them being the protection of the courts against contempt (Gilbert vs. Minnesota, 254 U. S. 325.)

This rule may be epitomized as follows: If the words uttered create a dangerous tendency which the state has a right to prevent, then such words are punishable. It is not necessary that some definite or immediate acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness be advocated. It is sufficient that such acts be advocated in general terms. Nor is it necessary that the language used be reasonably calculated to incite persons to acts of force, violence or unlawfulness. It is sufficient if the natural tendency and probable effect of the utterance be to bring about the substantive evil the utterance be to bring about the substantive evil which the legislative body seeks to prevent. (Gitlow vs. New York, 268 U.S. 652.).

It is a fundamental principle, long established, that the freedom of speech and of the press which is secured by the Constitution does not confer an absolute right to speak or publish, without responsibility, whatever one may choose, or an unrestricted and unbridled license that gives immunity for every possible use of language, and prevents the punishment of those who abuse this freedom. . . . Reasonably limited, it was said by story in the passage cited this freedom is an inestimable privilege in a free government; without such limitation, it might become the scourge of the Republic.

xxx xxx xxx

And, for yet more imperative reasons, a state may punish utterances endangering the foundations of organized government and threatening its overthrow by unlawful means. These imperil its own existence as a constitutional state. . . .

xxx xxx xxx

. . . And the immediate danger is none the less real and substantial because the effect of a given utterance cannot be accurately foreseen. The state cannot reasonably be required to measure the danger from every such utterance in the nice balance of a jeweler’s scale. A single revolutionary spark, may kindle a fire that, smoldering for a time, may burst into a sweeping and destructive conflagration. It cannot be said that the state is acting arbitrarily or unreasonably when, in the exercise of its judgment as to the measures necessary to protect the public peace and safety it seeks to extinguish the spark without waiting until it has enkindled the flame or blazed into the conflagration. It cannot reasonably be required to defer the adoption of measures for its own peace and safety until the revolutionary utterances lead to actual disturbances of the public peace or imminent and immediate danger of its own destruction; but it may, in the exercise of its judgment, suppress the threatened danger in its incipiency. In People vs. Lloyd, supra, p. 35 (136 N. E. 505), it was aptly said: Manifestly, the legislature has authority to forbid the advocacy of a doctrine until there is a present and imminent danger of the success of the plan advocated. If the state were compelled to wait until the apprehended danger became certain, than its right to protect itself would come into being simultaneously with the overthrow of the government, when there would be neither prosecuting officers nor courts for the enforcement of the law.” Gitlow va. New York, supra.)The question then to be determined is: Has the letter of Cabansag created a sufficient danger to a fair administration of justice? Did its remittance to the PCAC create a danger sufficiently imminent to come under the two rules mentioned above?

Even if we make a careful analysis of the letter sent by appellant Cabansag to the PCAC which has given rise to the present contempt proceedings, we would at once see that it was far from his mind to put the court in ridicule and much less to belittle or degrade it in the eyes of those to whom the letter was addressed for, undoubtedly, he was compelled to act the way he did simply because he saw no other way of obtaining the early termination of his case. This is clearly inferable from its context wherein, in respectful and courteous language, Cabansag gave vent to his feeling when he said that he “has long since been deprived of his land thru the careful maneuvers of a tactical lawyer”; that the case which had long been pending could not be decided due to the fact that the transcript of the records has not as yet, been transcribed by the stenographer who took the stenographic notes”, and that the new Judges could not proceed to hear the case before the transcription of the said notes.” Analyzing said utterances, one would see that if they ever criticize, “the criticism refers, not to the court, but to opposing counsel whose tactical maneuvers” has allegedly caused the undue delay of the case. The

grievance or complaint, if any, is addressed to the stenographers for their apparent indifference in transcribing their notes.

The only disturbing effect of the letter which perhaps has been the motivating factor of the lodging of the contempt charge by the trial judge is the fact that the letter was sent to the Office of the President asking for help because of the precarious predicament of Cabansag. While the course of action he had taken may not be a wise one for it would have been proper had he addressed his letter to the Secretary of Justice or to the Supreme Court, such act alone would not be contemptuous. To be so the danger must cause a serious imminent threat to the administration of justice. Nor can we infer that such act has “a dangerous tendency” to belittle the court or undermine the administration of justice for the writer merely exercised his constitutional right to petition the government for redress of a legitimate grievance.

The fact is that even the trial court itself has at the beginning entertained such impression when it found that the criticism was directed not against the court but against the counsel of the opposite party, and that only on second thought did it change its mind when it developed that the act of Cabansag was prompted by the advice of his lawyers. Nor can it be contended that the latter is groundless or one motivated by malice. The circumstances borne by the record which preceded the sending of that letter show that there was an apparent cause for grievance.

Thus, the record shows that on January 13, 1947, or more than 8 years ago, appellant Cabansag filed with the lower court a complaint against Geminiana Fernandez, et al. seeking to eject them from a portion of land covered by a torrens title. On October 4, 1949, or two years thereafter, the court, Judge Villamor presiding, issued an order requiring the stenographers who took down the notes to transcribe them within 15 days upon payment of their corresponding fees. On December 9, 1952, or almost 3 years thereafter, the court, Judge Pasicolan presiding, issued a similar order requiring the stenographers to transcribe their notes and decreeing that the case be set for hearing after said notes had been transcribed. No further step was taken from his last date either by the by the court or by the opposing parties. Meanwhile, the stenographers were given assignment elsewhere, and when this matter brought to the attention of the court by its own clerk of court, said court in an indorsement sent to the Secretary of Justice expressed its inability to take action in view of the fact that the stenographers were no longer under its jurisdiction. And in said indorsement nothing was said about its readiness to continue the trial even in the absence of the transcript of the notes.

Under such a state of affairs, appellant Cabansag cannot certainly be blamed for entertaining the belief that the only way by which he could obtain redress of his grievance is to address his letter to the PCAC which after all is the office created by

the late President to receive and hear all complaints against officials and employees of the government to facilitate which the assistance and cooperation of all the executive departments were enjoined (Executive Order No. 1, as amended by Executive Order No. 19). And one of the departments that come under the control of the President is the Department of Justice which under the law has administrative supervision over courts of first instance.(Section 83, Revised Administrative Code) The PCAC is part of the Office of the President. It can, therefore, be said that the letter of Cabansag though sent to the PCAC is intended for the Department of Justice where it properly belongs. Consequently, the sending of that letter may be considered as one sent to the Department of Justice and as such cannot constitute undue publication that would place him beyond the mantle of protection of our constitution.

. . . under the presidential type of government which we adopted and considering the departmental organization established and continued in force by paragraph, section 12, Article VII, of our Constitution, all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or the law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive. (Villena vs. The Secretary of the Interior, 67 Phil. 451, 463.)

We would only add one word in connection with the participation in the incident of Cabansag’s co-appellants, Attys. Roberto V. Merrera and Rufino V. Merrera. While the conduct of Cabansag may be justified considering that, being a layman, he is unaware of the technical rules of law and procedure which may place him under the protective mantle of our constitution, such does not obtain with regard to his co-appellants. Being learned in the law and officers of the court, they should have acted with more care and circumspection in advising their client to avoid undue embarrassment to the court or unnecessary interference with the normal course of its proceedings. Their duty as lawyers is always to observe utmost respect to the court and defend it against unjust criticism and clamor. Had they observed a more judicious behavior, they would have avoided the unpleasant incident that had arisen. However, the record is bereft of any proof showing improper motive on their part, much less bad faith in their actuation. But they should be warned, as we now do, that a commission of a similar misstep in the future would render them amenable to a more severe disciplinary action.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is reversed, without pronouncement as to costs.

Bengzon, Paras, C.J., Padilla, Reyes, A., Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Endencia, and Felix, JJ., concur.