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FORGING A NEW NUCLEAR SAFETY CONSTRUCT WORKSHOPDecember 3-5, 2012, USA
Session 4Public Protection
Lessons learned from the Fukushima Accident
Shigeo NOMURA President
1
2
Factors to be considered for Operator’s ER Training & Exercises based on TEPCO 1F Severe Accident (SA)
[1] Emergency response training and exercises based on more realistic accident scenarios
1. External events- Catastrophic natural disasters; Multiple & Sequential
2. Internal events- Not single failure for multiple NPPS
1) Station Black Out, 2) Loss of Ultimate Heat Sink, 3) Uncontrollable operation
3.1 Early stage procedures- Detection & prevention of SA by plant diagnosis- Flexible accident management & damage control for multiple failures- On-site & off-site warning & restriction
3.2 In the progress of SA - Mitigation for core meltdown and hydrogen explosion- Adjust local resident emergency plan with environmental release of rad. materials
by leakage, bending, and hydrogen explosions
3.3 Post SA- Stabilization of SA, Radiation monitoring & control, Minimization of environmental impact, ……. 2
[2] Developing an updated technical basis for emergency planning zone size
Trend of Ambient Dose Rate within 80 km from 1F NPPsJune, 2011 to March, 2012
250.02[μSv/h]
1
‘KURAMA’ Automatic automobile radiation monitoring system with GPS
- High dose area exists in the semi-circular shape, not a concentric circle. This result is reflected to determine the emergency planning zone; PAZ, UPZ.(changed from past 8-10 km to 30 km after nuclear accident)
- Zone size depends strongly on source term, geography, & weather condition.
60 30 20100 Km 80
4
[2] Developing an updated technical basis for emergency planning zone size
Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA) released the updated‘Preparedness & Response for Nuclear Emergency’ Oct 31, 2012
1. Divide stages for emergency- Initial stage: EAL (Emergency Action Level)- Post radioactive release: OIL (Operational Intervention Level)
2. Area to be determined- PAZ (precautionary Action Zone)
3~5 km- UPZ (Urgent Protective Planning Action Zone)
5~30km, > 100 mSv for 7 days- PPA (Plume Protection Planning Zone)
> 30km, local spotLocal emergency plan will be fixed on the simulation data by using NRC-MACCS2
3. Preparedness for plant operator- Strengthen Level 4 & 5 defense-in-depth- Robustness for on-site information gathering and transfer- Drills & Training
4. Establish multiple information transfer lines for local public5. Establish robust emergency radiation monitoring, medical control, etc.6. Mid, long-term procedure for reentry, clean-up, monitoring, health check, etc. 5
2002
2009
[3] Resolving the linear no threshold (LNT) problem in radiation protection - science vs. economic and social dimensions
Japan’s Basic Policy for Emergency Response on Land Decontamination Work based on ICRP
decided by Nuclear Emergency Response HQ, Aug.26, 2011
1
5
10
100
20
200
Ann
ual D
ose
Rat
e (m
Sv/y
)
3.112011
Long term goal
Reduce < 20mSv/y
Emergency Exposure State- Deliberated evacuation areas- Restricted areas by government initiatives
for re-entry of residents
Existing Situations- Large wide area decontamination- Intensive decontamination for hot spots
(roadside drains, gutters, etc.)
by Municipal government plan with nation’s budget & expert supports
Reduce 1 mSv/y
Refer: 1) K. Moriya: Fukushima Office for Environmental Restoration, Ministry of the Environment2) MEXT monitoring of air dose rate data
11.202012 6
20km NW from 1F
30km
40km
60km & Others
10
100
1
20
50
200
2
5
(μSv/h)
[3] Resolving the linear no threshold (LNT) problem in radiation protection - science vs. economic and social dimensions
• Current radiation protection is based on resident daily life and self-check mechanism.
• To judge scientifically for low dose health effect, probability approach is difficult to understand for public.
• It is necessary to recover the confidence for specialist and science itself in Japan after Fukushima. 7
Weather integral radiation monitor
Handy type rad. monitor
Off-Site Clean-up Efforts
Whole Body Inspection All Foodstuff
Inspection
Resident Self Efforts to improve the Existing Situations- Solve concerns for long term low dose consequences -
Risk Communication with Residents
8
Off-Normal Procedures forNuclear Severe Accident in Fukushima’s case
[1] Emergency response training and exercises based on more realistic accident scenarios
- Plant operators and agency people focused to obtain on-site plant information, prevent the worst case and mitigate the sequential severe accidents.
- On-site emergency was controlled in the independent seismic, radiation proof command facility.
- Public protection was forced to judge by the limited information under the inadequate diagnosis for 1F NPP conditions.
- Several steps of evacuation (2, 3, 10, 20km) and sheltering (20-30km) were implemented for each events of loss of cooling, pressure increase, risk of multiple AS.
Factors to be considered for Off‐Site Local ’s ER Training & Exercises based on TEPCO 1F Severe Accident (SA)
- Information vacancy districts due to1) blackout for several days, supported by Emergency Generator2) difficult connection by over accessed mobile phone3) collapse of city hall, off-site center for data gathering4) Car radio,TV,etc. were the only available media sources.
- Self protection and collaboration in the unit of each communities for
1) loss of accommodations2) shortage of water, food, oil & gas 3) severe damages of supply chain & transportation system4) evacuation from NPP severe accidents
Wide range flexible rescue was key action to mitigate them.
[1] Emergency response training and exercises based on more realistic accident scenarios
The Effect of the Nuclear Disaster at Fukushima Dai-ichi NPP on Local Governments
M.Nakamura & K.Dake; J.AESJ, 647, Vol.54,2012Local Goverment Futaba
-choOkuma-
choNaraha
-choTomioka
-choMinami
soma-cityNamie-cho
Electricity supply after 3.11
EG EG EG No, move ? EG
Available TEL,FAX 1, 1 1, 1 No OK 1Satellite OKNPP Inform. from TEPCO
Nothing A few Nothing Nothing Nothing Nothing
Emergency Declaration 3/11 19PM
Not confirmed
No Not confirmed
No Not confirmed
No
Evacuation 2km byprefecture 3/11 20PM
Not confirmed
No Not confirmed
Not confirmed
Not confirmed
No
Evacuation 3kmSheltering 3-10km3/11 21PM
Not confirmed
From TV Not confirmed
Not confirmed
Not confirmed
No
Evacuation 10km3/12 5AM
FAX TEL from Gov.
Not confirmed
Not confirmed
Not confirmed
No
Evacuation 20km3/12 18PM
Not confirmed
Not confirmed
Not confirmed
Not confirmed
Not confirmed
No
Evacuation 20kmSheltering 20-30km3/15 11AM
Not confirmed
Not confirmed
Not confirmed
Not confirmed
FAX No
No indication of the direction, place, method of evacuations from Government & Prefecture.
Wide Spread of Cs Air‐borne Monitoring of Radiation Dose Rate (Nov. 2011)
1m above ground level(μSv/h,Nov.5, 2011)
1F NPPs
30km
20km
80km
9-17 mSv/y
>170 mSv/y
33- 83 mSv/y
How effect the health more than 100 mSv ?
0 100 200 3000
30
Accumulated Dose (mSv)Prob
abili
ty o
f Dea
th b
y C
ance
r (%
)
0.5% 1% 1.5%
Increase by radiation
Cancer by daily life habits (Smoking, Drinking, Virus, Germ,,,,)
Distinct results can’t be observed below 100mSv.
When 1,000 persons receive 100 mSv, death by cancer increases possibly 300 to 305 persons for their lifes.
Refer NIRS HP
System serverNTT FOMA
Internet
▲: Demo-type ( 3units )●: Proto-type ( 4units )
Fukushima prefecture
Fukushima Daiichi NPPs
●
●●
●
▲▲▲
●
- New device can measure the weather conditions and the air dose rate together in the same point.
- It works long time in any place; urban area, mountainous district. by independent solar energy.
Developed by Yamada Giken co,ltd& JAEA collaborative research .
SpecificationsWeather observationitem
Temperature, Humidity, Atmospheric pressure,Amount of rainfall, Wind, direction & velocity
Radiation measurement
Detection element:silicon semiconductorType of radioactive ray:γ-rayMeasurement range:0.01~99.99μSu/hEnergy range:60KeV~1.25MeV
Solar battery DC12V-85W
Transfer of observed data
10 minutes interval
Transfer of still picture
10 minutes interval
Position information
GPS system
Device size Height 2.8m, Weight 50kg
Weather Integrated Radiation Measurement Device