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FORGING A NEW NUCLEAR SAFETY CONSTRUCT WORKSHOP December 3-5, 2012, USA Session 4 Public Protection Lessons learned from the Fukushima Accident Shigeo NOMURA President 1

Lessons learned from the Fukushima Accident - ASMEfiles.asme.org/Events/NuclearSafetyConstructWorkshop/33664.pdfLessons learned from the Fukushima Accident ... Emergency response training

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FORGING A NEW NUCLEAR SAFETY CONSTRUCT WORKSHOPDecember 3-5, 2012, USA

Session 4Public Protection

Lessons learned from the Fukushima Accident

Shigeo NOMURA President

1

2

Factors to be considered for Operator’s ER Training & Exercises based on TEPCO 1F Severe Accident (SA)

[1] Emergency response training and exercises based on more realistic accident scenarios

1. External events- Catastrophic natural disasters; Multiple & Sequential

2. Internal events- Not single failure for multiple NPPS

1) Station Black Out, 2) Loss of Ultimate Heat Sink, 3) Uncontrollable operation

3.1 Early stage procedures- Detection & prevention of SA by plant diagnosis- Flexible accident management & damage control for multiple failures- On-site & off-site warning & restriction

3.2 In the progress of SA - Mitigation for core meltdown and hydrogen explosion- Adjust local resident emergency plan with environmental release of rad. materials

by leakage, bending, and hydrogen explosions

3.3 Post SA- Stabilization of SA, Radiation monitoring & control, Minimization of environmental impact, ……. 2

[2] Developing an updated technical basis for emergency planning zone size

Trend of Ambient Dose Rate within 80 km from 1F NPPsJune, 2011 to March, 2012

250.02[μSv/h]

1

‘KURAMA’ Automatic automobile radiation monitoring system with GPS

- High dose area exists in the semi-circular shape, not a concentric circle. This result is reflected to determine the emergency planning zone; PAZ, UPZ.(changed from past 8-10 km to 30 km after nuclear accident)

- Zone size depends strongly on source term, geography, & weather condition.

60 30 20100 Km 80

4

[2] Developing an updated technical basis for emergency planning zone size

Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA) released the updated‘Preparedness & Response for Nuclear Emergency’ Oct 31, 2012

1. Divide stages for emergency- Initial stage: EAL (Emergency Action Level)- Post radioactive release: OIL (Operational Intervention Level)

2. Area to be determined- PAZ (precautionary Action Zone)

3~5 km- UPZ (Urgent Protective Planning Action Zone)

5~30km, > 100 mSv for 7 days- PPA (Plume Protection Planning Zone)

> 30km, local spotLocal emergency plan will be fixed on the simulation data by using NRC-MACCS2

3. Preparedness for plant operator- Strengthen Level 4 & 5 defense-in-depth- Robustness for on-site information gathering and transfer- Drills & Training

4. Establish multiple information transfer lines for local public5. Establish robust emergency radiation monitoring, medical control, etc.6. Mid, long-term procedure for reentry, clean-up, monitoring, health check, etc. 5

2002

2009

[3] Resolving the linear no threshold (LNT) problem in radiation protection - science vs. economic and social dimensions

Japan’s Basic Policy for Emergency Response on Land Decontamination Work based on ICRP

decided by Nuclear Emergency Response HQ, Aug.26, 2011

1

5

10

100

20

200

Ann

ual D

ose

Rat

e (m

Sv/y

)

3.112011

Long term goal

Reduce < 20mSv/y

Emergency Exposure State- Deliberated evacuation areas- Restricted areas by government initiatives

for re-entry of residents

Existing Situations- Large wide area decontamination- Intensive decontamination for hot spots

(roadside drains, gutters, etc.)

by Municipal government plan with nation’s budget & expert supports

Reduce 1 mSv/y

Refer: 1) K. Moriya: Fukushima Office for Environmental Restoration, Ministry of the Environment2) MEXT monitoring of air dose rate data

11.202012 6

20km NW from 1F

30km

40km

60km & Others

10

100

1

20

50

200

2

5

(μSv/h)

[3] Resolving the linear no threshold (LNT) problem in radiation protection - science vs. economic and social dimensions

• Current radiation protection is based on resident daily life and self-check mechanism.

• To judge scientifically for low dose health effect, probability approach is difficult to understand for public.

• It is necessary to recover the confidence for specialist and science itself in Japan after Fukushima. 7

Weather integral radiation monitor

Handy type rad. monitor

Off-Site Clean-up Efforts

Whole Body Inspection All Foodstuff

Inspection

Resident Self Efforts to improve the Existing Situations- Solve concerns for long term low dose consequences -

Risk Communication with Residents

Appendix

8

Off-Normal Procedures forNuclear Severe Accident in Fukushima’s case

[1] Emergency response training and exercises based on more realistic accident scenarios

- Plant operators and agency people focused to obtain on-site plant information, prevent the worst case and mitigate the sequential severe accidents.

- On-site emergency was controlled in the independent seismic, radiation proof command facility.

- Public protection was forced to judge by the limited information under the inadequate diagnosis for 1F NPP conditions.

- Several steps of evacuation (2, 3, 10, 20km) and sheltering (20-30km) were implemented for each events of loss of cooling, pressure increase, risk of multiple AS.

Factors to be considered for Off‐Site Local ’s ER Training & Exercises based on TEPCO 1F Severe Accident (SA)

- Information vacancy districts due to1) blackout for several days, supported by Emergency Generator2) difficult connection by over accessed mobile phone3) collapse of city hall, off-site center for data gathering4) Car radio,TV,etc. were the only available media sources.

- Self protection and collaboration in the unit of each communities for

1) loss of accommodations2) shortage of water, food, oil & gas 3) severe damages of supply chain & transportation system4) evacuation from NPP severe accidents

Wide range flexible rescue was key action to mitigate them.

[1] Emergency response training and exercises based on more realistic accident scenarios

The Effect of the Nuclear Disaster at Fukushima Dai-ichi NPP on Local Governments

M.Nakamura & K.Dake; J.AESJ, 647, Vol.54,2012Local Goverment Futaba

-choOkuma-

choNaraha

-choTomioka

-choMinami

soma-cityNamie-cho

Electricity supply after 3.11

EG EG EG No, move ? EG

Available TEL,FAX 1, 1 1, 1 No OK 1Satellite OKNPP Inform. from TEPCO

Nothing A few Nothing Nothing Nothing Nothing

Emergency Declaration 3/11 19PM

Not confirmed

No Not confirmed

No Not confirmed

No

Evacuation 2km byprefecture 3/11 20PM

Not confirmed

No Not confirmed

Not confirmed

Not confirmed

No

Evacuation 3kmSheltering 3-10km3/11 21PM

Not confirmed

From TV Not confirmed

Not confirmed

Not confirmed

No

Evacuation 10km3/12 5AM

FAX TEL from Gov.

Not confirmed

Not confirmed

Not confirmed

No

Evacuation 20km3/12 18PM

Not confirmed

Not confirmed

Not confirmed

Not confirmed

Not confirmed

No

Evacuation 20kmSheltering 20-30km3/15 11AM

Not confirmed

Not confirmed

Not confirmed

Not confirmed

FAX No

No indication of the direction, place, method of evacuations from Government & Prefecture.

Wide Spread of Cs Air‐borne Monitoring of Radiation Dose Rate (Nov. 2011)

1m above ground level(μSv/h,Nov.5, 2011)

1F NPPs

30km

20km

80km

9-17 mSv/y

>170 mSv/y

33- 83 mSv/y

How effect the health more than 100 mSv ?

0 100 200 3000

30

Accumulated Dose (mSv)Prob

abili

ty o

f Dea

th b

y C

ance

r (%

)

0.5% 1% 1.5%

Increase by radiation

Cancer by daily life habits (Smoking, Drinking, Virus, Germ,,,,)

Distinct results can’t be observed below 100mSv.

When 1,000 persons receive 100 mSv, death by cancer increases possibly 300 to 305 persons for their lifes.

Refer NIRS HP

System serverNTT FOMA

Internet

▲: Demo-type ( 3units )●: Proto-type ( 4units )

Fukushima prefecture

Fukushima Daiichi NPPs

●●

▲▲▲

- New device can measure the weather conditions and the air dose rate together in the same point.

- It works long time in any place; urban area, mountainous district. by independent solar energy.

Developed by Yamada Giken co,ltd& JAEA collaborative research .

SpecificationsWeather observationitem

Temperature, Humidity, Atmospheric pressure,Amount of rainfall, Wind, direction & velocity

Radiation measurement

Detection element:silicon semiconductorType of radioactive ray:γ-rayMeasurement range:0.01~99.99μSu/hEnergy range:60KeV~1.25MeV

Solar battery DC12V-85W

Transfer of observed data

10 minutes interval

Transfer of still picture

10 minutes interval

Position information

GPS system

Device size Height 2.8m, Weight 50kg

Weather Integrated Radiation Measurement Device