LESSONS LEARNED FROM TSUNAMI RECOVERY Key … · Building Back Better LESSONS LEARNED FROM TSUNAMI RECOVERY A Report by the UN Secretary-General’s Special Envoy for Tsunami Recovery,

L E S S O N S L E A R N E D F R O M T S U N A M I R E C O V E R Y

Key Propositions for Building Back BetterA Report by the United Nations Secretary-General’s Special Envoy for Tsunami Recovery, William J. Clinton

OFFICE OF THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL’SSPECIAL ENVOY FOR TSUNAMI RECOVERY

About the UN Special Envoy for TsunamiRecovery: In February 2005, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan appointed former UnitedStates President William J. Clinton as theSecretary-General’s Special Envoy for TsunamiRecovery to help sustain global political will in therecovery effort. President Clinton’s role hasincluded keeping the world’s attention on tsunamirecovery, supporting coordination efforts at thecountry and global levels, and promoting trans-parency and accountability measures. The SpecialEnvoy has also championed a new kind of recov-ery that not only restores what existed previously,but goes beyond, seizing the moral, political,managerial, and financial opportunities the crisishas offered governments to set communities on abetter and safer development path. The SpecialEnvoy is supported by the Office of the SpecialEnvoy at UN headquarters in New York.

Cover photo: School children in Aceh, © UNICEF

P R O P O S I T I O N 1

Governments, donors, and aid agencies must recognize that families and communities drive their own recovery.


Recovery must promote fairness and equity.


Governments must enhance preparedness for future disasters.


Local governments must be empowered to manage recovery efforts, and donors must devote greater resources to strengthening government recovery institutions, especially at the local level.


Good recovery planning and effective coordination depend on good information.


The UN, World Bank, and other multilateral agencies must clarify their roles and relationships, especially in addressing the early stage of a recovery process.


The expanding role of NGOs and the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement carries greater responsibilities for quality in recovery efforts.


From the start of recovery operations, governments and aid agencies must create the conditions for entrepreneurs to flourish.


Beneficiaries deserve the kind of agency partnerships that move beyond rivalry and unhealthy competition.

P R O P O S I T I O N 1 0

Good recovery must leave communities safer by reducing risks and building resilience.

Key Propositions for Building Back Better

L E S S O N S L E A R N E D F R O M T S U N A M I R E C O V E R Y

A Report by the UN Secretary-General’s Special Envoy for Tsunami Recovery,William J. Clinton

December 2006

Two years after the tsunami ofDecember 26, 2004, there havebeen major achievements on thelong road to recovery among thedevastated communities across the Indian Ocean region. Some150,000 houses have been built,

and most of the people who are still displaced areliving in adequate transitional shelters; large infra-structure projects are underway; children wereback in school quickly, and hundreds of newschools are under construction; most affectedfamilies have resumed a livelihood of some

kind; and in Aceh,the parties to its long running civil war haveachieved a seeminglylasting peace.

These achieve-ments are a testamentto the extraordinaryeffort by hundreds oflocal and international

organizations, governments, the private sector,and hundreds of thousands of individuals, fromthe affected countries and around the world.And their extraordinary efforts will need to continue for years to come. As we have learned in other parts of the world in the wake of massive disasters — from Kobe to New Orleans,Tangshan to Bam — rebuilding the physical,social, and human capital of shattered communi-ties takes years.

Can that time-frame be reduced? How can weimprove the underlying quality of the recoveryprocess? How can we reduce the number of casu-alties when disasters strike? Are we doing our best

to improve the safety and economic vitality ofcommunities and help them on their path todevelopment? How can we transition better andfaster from relief to reconstruction? In everyrecovery process, there will be flawed assumptionsand decisions that we regret. Hopefully, there will also be innovations worth replicating and stories of progress to highlight. It is critical thatwe pass on such lessons to actors in future recov-ery processes.

The tsunami recovery operation is no excep-tion. We have seen examples of great newapproaches, as well as decisions and programsbased on flawed assumptions that have caused usto lose time and allowed beneficiaries to sufferlonger than they had to. Aid partners and govern-ments have also perpetuated some of the systemicproblems in humanitarian and development assistance that have been identified for years buthave proven difficult to solve. Indeed, the scale of the tsunami recovery — the sheer number oforganizations involved, the physical breadth of thetheater of operations, and the vast amounts offunding available — has placed some of these systemic challenges in even sharper relief.

The aid community has not shied away fromanalyzing, documenting, and publicizing theselessons, whether good or bad. The TsunamiEvaluation Coalition was the largest such effort, with around 40 organizations joininghands to examine the first year of operations.Hundreds of organizations also have conductedtheir own evaluations.

Governments in the affected region have alsobeen monitoring progress and drawing their ownlessons. Several of the affected countries haveestablished parliamentary oversight bodies and

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How can we reduce the numberof casualties when disasters

strike? Are we doing our best to improve the safety and economic

vitality of communities?

Introduction

conducted special audits, which have — not surprisingly — revealed both good and bad news.The tsunami survivors have also been involved in this effort, through large-scale public surveys and polls in several countries, although it is widely recognized that involvement of benefi-ciaries in this and other aspects of the recovery program has been inadequate. As always, morecould have been done to enhance the transpar-ency of the tsunami aid effort, but I have beentruly impressed with the level of transparency andaccountability that has characterized this operation so far. Our tools have yet to catch up

with our aspirations, true, but the effort has been genuine and widespread.

This report attempts to capture some of thekey lessons from the tsunami recovery effort as I end my mandate as the UN Secretary-General’sSpecial Envoy for Tsunami Recovery. Its subject isrecovery in the aftermath of a natural disaster,rather than a man-made one. My goal is to helpmove the humanitarian community forward in thehope that others will learn from our experience asthey face the inevitable disasters that tomorrowwill bring.

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President Clinton in Aceh,December 2006.

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Governments, donors, and aid agenciesmust recognize that families andcommunities drive their own recovery.


This proposition may seem self-evident, but the experience of thetsunami only underscores the realitythat rhetoric in this area has yet totranslate fully into practice.

The pressure on organizations todeliver assistance quickly to the

needy and to spend donations without delay can beimmense. But if handled poorly, these pressures canconflict with the equally important imperative toconsult with those in need and to keep them up-to-date on and involved in assistance efforts on theirbehalf. The Red Cross Code of Conduct for

Disaster Relief, devel-oped in 1994, recog-nized this principlewhen its signatoriespromised to “strive toachieve full communityparticipation in ourrelief and rehabilitationprogrammes.” It is a

false trade-off to sacrifice local ownership for speedif that means short-circuiting the rights of affectedpopulations to be informed in a timely mannerabout their choices, the assistance available to them,and any delays that are being experienced.

The other side of this coin, of course, isaccountability to the families and communities ourrecovery efforts are serving. Typically, demands for accountability come loudest from donors —private and institutional — and implementingagencies are more likely to focus on this kind ofupward accountability. Too often, the less organ-ized voices of the survivors are not heard, and thisequally vital downward accountability is given second-priority at best. This is unfortunate, as a

disaster’s survivors are best placed to design therecovery strategy that best meets their needs. Andthey should be the ultimate judges of a recoveryeffort’s success or failure.

In the words of the Tsunami EvaluationCoalition, the aid community has too often been“arrogant and ignorant” in assuming that it aloneknows best what is needed by those affected by thedisaster. In the post-tsunami effort, there have beentoo many instances of relief and recovery managersdeveloping their own recovery programs with inade-quate attention given to the recovery efforts of thosedirectly impacted by the disaster. Set-piece packages,such as settlement schemes or seed distributions,have often been designed without serious analysis ofthe customs, conditions, and livelihoods of thosereceiving them. Women and men, farmers andtraders, town dwellers and villagers, all have differentpaths to recovery, but the corresponding diversity inrecovery strategies and economic opportunities hasnot always been recognized by the aid community.

We can, however, learn from some of theefforts to recognize and promote the role of localcommunities in the tsunami recovery process.For example, with the support of the UN, the Sri Lankan government empowered the NationalHuman Rights Commission to conduct a massivecampaign of “peoples’ consultations,” which pro-vided a vital channel for expression of grievances.With the support of the World Bank, theRehabilitation and Reconstruction Agency forAceh and Nias (BRR) was quick to issue guide-lines on community driven reconstruction.And throughout the region, certain aid agencieshave been farsighted in their efforts to informcommunities about their rights and about aid programs, through, for example, bulletin boards,

It is a false trade-off to sacrifice local ownership

for speed if that means short-circuiting the rights

of affected populations.

radio programs, and community meetings. Thesetypes of measures must be more widely and predictably employed in recovery operations.

A greater reliance on direct cash transfers tohouseholds has also been a positive feature of thetsunami effort, helping to empower local communi-ties and families. Shortly after the tsunami, hundredsof thousands of people were involved in cash-for-work projects, clearing rubble, repairing small infra-structure, or cleaning paddy fields. The majority ofhouses under construction in Sri Lanka are beingmanaged through an owner-built scheme underwhich beneficiaries receive cash installments torebuild their own houses. Microfinance programs arealso a potentially important tool to enable individualhouseholds to shape their own recovery strategy.

In its final report, the Tsunami EvaluationCoalition called for a “fundamental reorientationfrom supplying aid to supporting and facilitatingcommunities’ own relief and recovery priorities,”and I strongly endorse this recommendation.We must translate this long-held aspiration into

practice, by requiring international and local actorsto reorient their planning and programs to ensureactive community engagement and ownership. Thisshould start with an acknowledgement by the managers of recovery processes that communitiesare diverse and require much broader choices aboutappropriate kinds of support.

Donors, the public, and the media can play theirpart by allowing implementers the time and flexibil-ity needed to consult with affected populations.More resources should be directed to cash-for-workprograms, owner-built housing schemes, micro-finance, and other approaches that put resourcesdirectly into survivors’ hands to chart their own pathto recovery. The aid community should seek theopinion of the tsunami-affected communities moresystematically, through the kinds of surveys and pollsthat have been undertaken by organizations like theFritz Institute, Oxfam, and various UN agencies.Systematic investment in keeping beneficiaries well-informed and in grievance mechanisms shouldalso become the hallmarks of future recovery efforts.

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Women in Sri Lankaparticipate in a cash-for-work program.

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If left unaddressed, disasters and theresponse to them can exacerbate existingpatterns of vulnerability and discriminationwithin societies.

Certain vulnerable groups tend to behardest hit by disasters. The tsunami wasno exception in this regard, with evidence

that women, children, and the elderly suffered themost severe losses. Moreover, while a disaster canactually create opportunities to shift developmentpatterns — to build back better — recovery can alsoperpetuate pre-existing patterns of vulnerability anddisadvantage. Without a dedicated effort to change

historic patterns ofinequity, traditionallymarginalized or disen-franchised groups willcontinue to lack boththe political awarenessand power to demandtheir fair share ofrecovery resources.And the problem canbe compounded by a

post-disaster influx of new assistance providers whohave little knowledge of the context in which theyare operating, including structures of inequality,chronic poverty, and vulnerability.

Women who survived the tsunami were espe-cially vulnerable, confronting the challenges ofcollective living in large barracks, securing proper-ty rights in societies dominated by male-headedhouseholds, or establishing livelihoods after theloss of a husband. Children, the elderly, and thedisabled also suffered disproportionately. Minor-ity groups — the sea gypsy communities andmigrant Burmese workers living on the Thai

coast, for example — struggled to assert theirrights against encroaching property developers.Across the entire region, displaced renters andsquatters, already disadvantaged prior to thetsunami, have often found themselves excludedfrom permanent housing schemes designed toreplace the assets of homeowners.

Important questions of equity have also arisenin Sri Lanka and Aceh, where tsunami-affectedpopulations often lived alongside or among largepopulations of people affected by decades of con-flict. Many of these conflict victims have beenwaiting for housing assistance for many years andhave been provided rations far more modest thanthose available to tsunami survivors. Because different aid agencies have employed differenthousing standards in many cases, concerns aboutinequity have also arisen between neighboringcommunities of tsunami survivors.

Some governments and aid providers have rec-ognized these problems and have taken steps totry to ensure that the tsunami recovery processcounteracts historic patterns of vulnerability anddisadvantage. In India, for example, state authori-ties have implemented a special housing schemefor Dalit families to redress previously discrimi-natory policies. In Thailand, the governmentestablished a special commission to document theproperty rights of sea gypsy communities to landthey had occupied for generations but for whichthey lacked ownership documents. In Aceh, forthe first time, land titles are being issued in thenames of both husbands and wives.

It is incumbent upon governments, donors, andassistance providers to ensure that relief andrecovery efforts do not exacerbate historic patternsof vulnerability, discrimination, and disadvantage.

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If left unaddressed, disastersand the response to them

can exacerbate existingpatterns of vulnerability

and discriminationwithin societies.

Recovery must promote fairness and equity.


The financial resources, international focus, andopenness to political and policy reform that oftencharacterize a post-crisis period should allow us tobuild back better and break out of inequitabledevelopment patterns in a sustained way.

To further improve our record on these criticalquestions, governments, donors, and assistanceproviders should recognize that different parts ofthe affected population have different vulnerabilitiesand capacities and adapt their support accordingly.Donors must encourage the flexibility necessary forassistance providers to approach programming decisions in a manner that is informed, equitable,and addresses the particular needs of different

groups. Governments must capitalize on the oppor-tunity provided after a disaster to commit to policyreforms that help reverse historically inequitabledevelopment trends. Mechanisms for analysis thatcapture pre-existing patterns of vulnerability andperiodically track progress in addressing these patterns should be established early in a recoveryeffort. Grievance mechanisms can be a crucialinstrument for redress, ensuring that recoveryprocesses reflect the concerns, needs, and aspirationsof vulnerable populations. For such mechanisms towork, vulnerable groups must be aware of theiravailability, and legal education for women and marginalized groups is therefore vital.

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A Sri Lankan family onthe road to recoveryafter its brass makingbusiness was rebuilt.

The world is increasingly more vulner-able to hazards of different kinds,from admittedly rare tsunamis tomore common epidemics, floods,droughts, or storm surges. As thepast few years have shown in devas-tating detail, few governments are

sufficiently prepared to deal with them.Governments must put in place robust systems

that anticipate future disasters (and measures thatmitigate them, as discussed below). Emergencyresponse systems are a necessary but insufficientpart of the answer. Preparedness must also includeplanning and preparation for recovery processes.

For example, govern-ment officials mustconsider, ahead oftime, how best toorganize governmentagencies, institutions,laws, and finances toaddress large-scalereconstruction needswith minimal delayand maximum effec-tiveness. This includespredetermined lines of

authority among government agencies and the ability to put in place special laws and practices,such as tax incentives and short-term visa regula-tions. The aftermath of a crisis is the wrong time tocreate new institutions, establish new policies andlegal frameworks, and recruit new staff, as all of thistakes time. Confusion over responsibilities betweennew and existing institutions can also create majorbottlenecks and delays, not to mention uncertaintyamong international partners that must deal withnational, provincial, and local officials.

Although the tsunami’s scale and ferocitywould have tested the best-prepared governments— and in many places government facilities weredevastated and hundreds of staff lost their lives —the tsunami revealed gaps in preparedness. On theemergency side, for example, there was an absenceof protocols to enable military contingents tocome in quickly and in a coordinated fashion todistribute relief supplies. On the positive side,many international organizations were able to hitthe ground running with life saving suppliesthanks to major improvements in regional stock-piling of supplies and equipment.

The gaps in planning and preparedness becameeven more evident as the effort transitioned tolonger term recovery. Preparedness is not justabout relief response, but also requires predeter-mined ways of working together with a range ofstakeholders in rebuilding houses and schools,restoring income streams, training workers to participate in reconstruction, and activating procedures to allow materiel to clear ports andcustoms quickly. It means recognizing and sup-porting the central role that the private sector andlocal civil society organizations play in rebuildingcommunities and restarting economic activity.

Since the tsunami, governments throughout theregion have prepared, and in some cases enacted,laws that establish new agencies and anticipate theavailability of new resources for preparedness.Thesereforms need to be fully and rapidly implemented.The development of legal frameworks at the nation-al and international levels to facilitate preparednessand response is fundamental. Governments, NGOs,and other relevant stakeholders should support thework of the International Federation of Red Crossand Red Crescent Societies and the UN Interna-tional Law Commission in this area.

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The world is increasingly more vulnerable to hazards

of different kinds, fromadmittedly rare tsunamis to

more common epidemics,floods, droughts, or

storm surges.

Governments must enhancepreparedness for future disasters.


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Villagers participate in a government-sponsored disaster evacuation drill in Cuddalore, India.

Civil servants at the municipality,provincial, state, or district levelscan provide an effective linkbetween recovery assistance andsustainable development. Theselocal administrations have a vitalrole to play and are usually unique-

ly placed to distinguish among, and respond to,the needs of individuals, households, and com-munities. But they can only do so if their capitalsempower them to take this responsibility and make the day-to-day decisions needed tomaintain the momentum of a complex recovery

process and translatepolicies into imple-mented projects. Plansand strategies mustalso be built from thecommunity up, withlocal authorities pro-viding a vital line ofcommunication to andfrom survivors.

After the tsunami,in some cases, govern-

ments were slow to move decision-making to locallevels of government, and lines of authority amongthe different arms of government were not alwaysclearly defined, adding to confusion and complicat-ing relationships. Lack of capacity also hampered

government performance, and there has been insuf-ficient investment in building local governmentand public service capacity compared to invest-ments in rebuilding physical infrastructure. Nursesand teachers are as critical as clinics and schools.

The authority devolved to local administratorsin India was a crucial factor behind some of theearly successes of that country’s recovery effort,which emphasized a multi-sectoral approach andstrong participation at the community level. InSri Lanka, UN-provided technical assistance todistrict level governments is building capacityand facilitating coordination, planning, and oversight of the recovery effort more generally.And in Indonesia, there is now clear recognitionof the need for local governments not only to beinvolved but to lead the planning, decision-making, budgeting, and monitoring process,particularly at the district level.

Aid agencies must make capacity building oflocal government a central feature of their assis-tance packages, including setting aside dedicatedfunding for such programs. For their part,governments need to put in place decentraliza-tion measures and accompanying funding that recognize the vital role of local authorities in arecovery process. Respect for the fundamentalrole of local government should be a cornerstoneof recovery operations.

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Civil servants at themunicipality, provincial,

state, or district levels can provide an effective

link between recoveryassistance and sustainable

development.

Local governments must be empowered tomanage recovery efforts, and donors must devotegreater resources to strengthening governmentrecovery institutions, especially at the local level.


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Local authorities immunize children in Aceh.

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The need for timely and accurateinformation runs throughout a reliefand recovery process and is thefoundation for good analysis. If theright information systems are put in place at the outset, the benefits are enormous. If information — on

damages, requirements, and vulnerabilities —comes too late, it can be very difficult to catch up.

Information needs cut across all facets of anoperation, from damage and needs assessments torecovery planning and progress tracking. Accurateinformation is the basic building block to

ensuring transparencyand accountability,both to donors andbeneficiaries. It is a keyto ensuring good qual-ity analysis to identifythe opportunities thatexist for future devel-opment and to chart a

recovery strategy that goes beyond restoring whatexisted prior to the disaster. Over the past decade,there has been a sea-change in governments’willingness to invest in information systems andthe people to operate them. For example, Humani-tarian Information Centers, with people and equip-ment, are commonly deployed to a disaster site.However this commitment must be sustainedthroughout recovery and reconstruction — thisdimension is as critical in month 18 as it is inmonth one. Agreement on systems and formatsalso should be reached in advance of disasters —not in their aftermath — and the information strat-egy should consider the entire recovery process inan integrated fashion.

National governments and the internationalcommunity have reaffirmed the importance ofrapid damage and needs assessments, which focuson those reconstruction tasks that are of highestpriority to restore social and economic activity topre-disaster levels. These assessments provide abasic indicator of the scale of the task ahead, interms of both projects and finance needs.Undoubtedly, they use simple approaches to assess-ing needs, but these are robust and proven methodsthat have permitted reconstruction to start muchsooner than would otherwise be the case. In thetsunami experience, the reconstruction needsassessments were produced in a matter of monthsby a combination of national government, UN, andInternational Financial Institutions (IFI) personneloften working together, and were notable for theirquality. It is important this approach be consolidat-ed in the future, as the sheer number of agenciesinvolved in a large-scale operation increases thepotential for duplication of effort. Rapid damageand needs assessments must allow international andlocal agencies and governments to operate from ashared data set and common overall recovery plan.

Such rapid assessments should be supplement-ed with more comprehensive information, such associo-economic recovery strategies that addressmany other recovery issues beyond the re-supply ofequipment and reconstruction of infrastructureand institutions. Such strategies include long-range studies of environmental and communityimpacts, economic diversification and the sustain-ability of different sources of livelihoods, the con-tribution of remittances to the developmentprocess, and the promotion of higher levels ofhealth, education, and physical security for com-munities. While building on the needs assessments

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The need for timely andaccurate information runs

throughout a relief andrecovery process and is the

foundation for good analysis.

Good recovery planning and effective coordination depend on good information.


prepared in the early stages of post-disaster work,these studies should go well beyond them to ensurefundamental social and economic transformations.Developing this kind of analysis will require coor-dination across numerous sectors and agencies,and, while there is general acceptance of the exist-ing needs assessment methodology, there is muchless clarity and consensus for these kinds of broader recovery assessments. Current effortsunder the International Recovery Platform,launched in early 2005, to support a more coor-dinated UN system approach to recovery should beaccelerated to this end.

Accurate information is also critical to finan-cial tracking, progress monitoring, and evaluationefforts. Tracking financial flows in recovery effortsis notoriously difficult, largely because most finan-cial reporting is voluntary and funding comesfrom many sources. The tsunami experience hasnot been different in this regard. In Thailand,Maldives, Sri Lanka, and Aceh, governmentsestablished aid management platforms to providean online vehicle for a comprehensive inventory ofprojects, financial commitments, and disburse-ments. In general, such databases could play a crucial role in filling the longstanding gap onaccurate financial tracking, but to do so, they needto come online very early in a recovery effort,enjoy wide support from all the organizationsinvolved in the effort, and be tied more directly tothe needs as identified in the formal assessments.

Information is also necessary to monitor andevaluate the quality of ongoing efforts, in terms ofboth outputs (e.g., number of schools and housesbuilt) and impact on the well-being of the affectedpopulations. Measuring the underlying quality ofthe recovery effort — for example, whether it is

addressing underlying patterns of disadvantage andvulnerability — requires a long-term commitmentto data collection. In the case of the tsunami, thefive most affected governments have launched suchan effort under the auspices of the TsunamiRecovery Impact Assessment and MonitoringSystem (TRIAMS), which will be a multi-yearprocess producing comprehensive reports based oncommon and country-specific indicators to assessimpact of recovery.The goal is to generate informa-tion that will enhance capacity to steer recovery inan appropriate and sustainable direction.

The tracking of financial and physical progresscan improve aid allocation and effectiveness if it isfully integrated into policy-making and imple-mentation. Authorities responsible for coordina-tion need greater capacity support so that data canbe cross-checked, analyzed, and packaged in aform that supports government and aid agencydecision-making. Stronger linkages with district-level government and agencies are required for aidtracking tools to support better district planning,identify bottlenecks, and help accelerate the paceand quality of delivery. Where used effectively,aid tracking tools have enormous potential todirect aid to neglected sectors and locations andreduce overlap.

It is crucial that all stakeholders buy into common standards, approaches, and methodolo-gies. All recovery processes would greatly benefitfrom having a single information structure that cancollect, analyze, and disseminate information, andthat would have buy-in from local stakeholders,including the government, IFIs, NGOs, donors,and UN agencies. Aid agencies should also investin building and better utilizing national capacity tocollect, analyze, and disseminate information.

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Margareta Wahlstrom,Assistant UN Secretary-General for HumanitarianAffairs and DeputyEmergency ReliefCoordinator, meets withstakeholders in an information sharing session in Sri Lanka in early 2005.

The importance of the multilateralsystem in underpinning the work ofthe international community inrecovery can hardly be overestimat-ed. For this reason, we cannotignore that clarification is neededon key issues, divisions of labor

between agencies, responsibilities with respect tofinancing, and the nature of their partnerships.

The official multilateral system encompasses awide range of organizations. It includes IFIs andUN agencies, funds, and programs. It alsoincludes a dynamic group of regional organi-

zations. From thismultiplicity of organi-zations, governmentscan call upon myriadkinds of support, fromloans, grants and tech-nical advice, to reliefgoods, project man-agement and, crucially,assistance in coordi-nating the flow of

international aid. Donor governments often directa significant part of their contributions throughsuch multilateral channels, and private donationsto multilateral institutions are also on the rise.Many of these multilateral actors are imple-menters, distributing supplies, building houses,setting up vocational training schools, and con-ducting vaccine campaigns. They also have animportant normative role, advocating for a partic-ular issue or segment of the population whosevoice otherwise may not be heard. My ownresponsibilities as the UN Special Envoy forTsunami Recovery drew heavily on the UN’s

unique convening authority to bring actorstogether around specific tasks. Governments traditionally turn to the UN for the same kind ofsupport at the country level, where coordination ismost important.

Recent years have brought visible improve-ments in the way the multilateral system organizesitself around an emergency relief effort, and thisaspect of the tsunami response was effective.These well-honed relief systems have emergedfrom major efforts to pre-plan, pre-position, andrehearse operating procedures, negotiate commonstandards and approaches, and establish divisionsof labor. The donors that finance this system (andhave insisted on its reform) have been equallycommitted. The very existence of a GoodHumanitarian Donorship initiative where donorshave worked together to improve performance istestament to their level of engagement. As aresult, when the tsunami hit the shores of theIndian Ocean, the people, funds, and equipmentnecessary to mount emergency assessment teams,information centers, logistics hubs, communica-tions networks, and aviation assets were deployedquite rapidly where they were needed. (India andThailand had strong national relief systems inplace that were able to mobilize rapidly, requiringless intensive international engagement.)

Although there is broad agreement that plan-ning for the recovery phase must commence asearly as possible in the emergency relief phase,there is less clarity about the appropriate institu-tional and financial arrangements for the multilat-eral community, at least in the early months of arecovery process. The transition from emergencyto recovery and reconstruction is notoriously difficult in the best of circumstances. Multilateral

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The importance of themultilateral system in

underpinning the work of theinternational community

in recovery can hardly be overestimated.

The UN, World Bank, and other multilateralagencies must clarify their roles andrelationships, especially in addressing theearly stage of a recovery process.


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Seated at table from left to right: Ann Veneman,Executive Director, UNICEF;President Bill Clinton,Special Envoy for TsunamiRecovery; Eric Schwartz,Deputy Special Envoy forTsunami Recovery; and Ad Melkert, AssociateAdministrator, UNDP,at the Global Consortiumfor Tsunami Recovery.

actors must nevertheless determine how they canbetter manage this transition, which was certainlya challenge in the tsunami context.

With the active engagement of their membergovernments, these multilateral actors need to reachclear agreement on a range of issues. A commonanalytical framework and a clear institutional leaderfor assessing and costing needs for the initial recovery investments will be an important startingpoint. A new willingness to provide funding for theunglamorous but vital work of coordination —managing information, drafting strategies, develop-ing plans, even running meetings — combined withbroader consensus on divisions of labor is also essen-tial.The increasing use of multi-donor funds to poolresources is a positive development but their abilityto disburse quickly in the first year of an operationneeds to be ensured. Real progress in this area will

also depend on consistent guidance from the governments sitting on the boards and councils ofthese organizations. When different parts of thesame government encourage three or four differentagencies to specialize in the same area, it creates theconditions for unhealthy competition.

Given these concerns, I am greatly encouragedby the findings of the Secretary-General’s HighLevel Panel on System Coherence, which reportedits conclusions in November. The panel’s call for aclearer division of labor between the UN and theWorld Bank, for “more flexible UN interim fundingmechanisms that could address transition issues,”and for a clear UN institutional leader for earlyrecovery deserves wide support. Most importantly,the panel has called for an empowered UN coordi-nator at the country level and a range of measures toensure that the UN operates “as one.”

Having received over one-third oftotal funds pledged for tsunamirecovery, NGOs and the RedCross/Red Crescent Movementface new roles, responsibilities,and challenges. While manyNGOs are already engaged in

improving their policies and practices, the tsunami response highlighted some continuingchallenges.

NGOs and the Red Cross/Red CrescentMovement received over $5 billion for tsunamirecovery. Sitting at the forefront of relief and recov-

ery, they have played acritical role in a rangeof activities, such asproviding temporaryshelter, helping rebuildschools and houses,and providing micro-finance for affectedpopulations. But thisexpanded and signifi-cant role in recoverybrings an added level

of responsibility for NGOs, which are functioningboth as donors and implementing agencies.Moreover, the scope of the tsunami response hasincreased the challenges that existed in prior recov-ery efforts. In effect, both the size of the tsunamichallenge and the unprecedented resources atNGOs’ disposal have raised the stakes for them:they have gained prominence, are financed independently, and are widely trusted by the publicat large. Never before have the pressures beengreater to demonstrate they can meet the chal-lenges of sustainable recovery.

Since the Rwanda crisis, many NGOs havebeen active in scrutinizing and learning from theirown experiences. This has led to the developmentof a range of initiatives to enhance performance,including the Sphere Standards, the Humani-tarian Accountability Partnership International,and the Red Cross Code of Conduct. In thetsunami context, NGOs and the IFRC participat-ed in the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition, and individual NGOs and umbrella organizationshave issued numerous reports detailing, examin-ing, and evaluating their tsunami activities,including providing funding information. In collaboration with my UN office, many leadingU.S. NGOs, working closely with partners inEurope, Australia, and the tsunami-affectedregion, undertook the NGO Impact Initiative toanalyze and improve some of the systemic chal-lenges NGOs have faced in the tsunami and otherrecovery efforts. This added level of scrutiny hashighlighted several critical policy and operationalchallenges for NGOs in humanitarian response.

Through the initiative, NGOs put forward arange of specific recommendations for their sectorin the areas of accountability to affected popula-tions, coordination, enhancing local capacity,human rights, and professionalism. I welcometheir commitment to improve humanitarianresponse, reflected in three broad and criticalobjectives that they have identified.

First, the NGOs have called on their commu-nity to build better partnerships for sustainablerecovery. In particular, international NGOsshould accelerate and expand efforts to recognizeand promote the leadership of local communities,local aid groups, and, where appropriate, affectedgovernments in recovery from major disasters, and

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Having received over one-third of total funds

pledged for tsunami recovery,NGOs and the Red Cross/

Red Crescent Movement facenew roles, responsibilities,

and challenges.

The expanding role of NGOs and the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement carries greater responsibilities for quality in recovery efforts.


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they should make the strengthening of localcapacity in recovery from an emergency a priorityequal to that of service delivery. I support theNGOs’ call for strengthening investments in localcapacity building and reporting systematically onsuch activities; enhancing community consulta-tion mechanisms and undertaking audits to meas-ure NGO accountability to affected populations;strengthening coordination with local NGOs andcommitting greater resources to effective coordi-nation; and enhancing expertise, information-sharing, education, and policy implementation ona rights-based approach to recovery.

I also endorse the NGO call for improvedquality assurance measures, including the promo-tion of optimal standards of professional conductin their humanitarian response. This includesdevelopment of a common agreement on profes-sional standards to ensure quality management,

successful aid delivery, and effective engagementwith local communities. NGOs should also drawon existing quality assurance initiatives to devel-op a mechanism to promote and verify optimalstandards of performance by NGOs. Further-more, NGO consortia and networks should identify specific tasks and functions in relief operations that ought to be staffed by trained or certified personnel, and consider means for professional accreditation.

Through the NGO Impact Initiative, NGOsalso voiced an appeal for informed and responsiblegiving. Donors must support actions that reflectbest humanitarian and development practices,recognizing that recovery is a long-term process.International NGOs, in turn, must educate thepublic and the media on the components andnature of effective and sustainable disaster preparedness and response.

In February 2006, theInternational Federationof Red Cross and RedCrescent Societies added35 heavy-duty trucks toits fleet in Indonesia todeliver 20,000 transitionalshelters in Aceh.

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Asustainable recovery process dependson reviving and expanding privateeconomic activity and employmentand securing diverse livelihood oppor-tunities for affected populations.

After rescue and relief, livelihoodsare initially restored by re-supplying

finance, equipment, inputs, and physical infra-structure. But policies, trading relationships, andpublic institutions must also be revived andreformed to restart economic activities rapidly.

Most recovery efforts aim for a return to pre-disaster levels of household income, economic activ-

ity, and employment.This is insufficient,especially in poor andvulnerable communi-ties, and even more soin conflict areas. Thestatus quo ante hasoften been a root causeof the disaster, with the desperate search for subsistence leadingpeople to livelihoodsbased on unsafe settle-ment patterns, unsus-

tainable exploitation of natural resources, and conflicts over resources. Aid efforts can exacerbatethese vulnerabilities, for example, by distributingboats without attention to the carrying capacities offish stocks and livelihood investments that takeinsufficient account of sustainability. Recoveryefforts must be better informed by economic realitiesif they are to take advantage of genuine opportuni-ties to encourage new investment and, in turn, createmore diverse and sustainable sources of income.

Moreover, in order for aid efforts to be equitable andeffective, they should promote a range of opportuni-ties for men and women, entrepreneurs and workers,young and old, and those with differing abilities.

Both the government and the private sectorplay a role in generating equitable growth. Rapid,strong, and durable recoveries depend on theemergence of private sector-led activity and self-financed entrepreneurs, farms, and firms. Govern-ments and their supporters in the aid communityhave a responsibility to create an enabling environment for the development of competitivemarkets and competitive advantages throughoutthe affected region through appropriate policiesand investment in the infrastructure needed tostimulate trade and investment.

National governments, together with domesticand international agencies, implemented a largenumber of programs to re-establish livelihoods inthe tsunami’s aftermath. These included temporaryincome transfers for social protection (which permit households to re-focus on work after acatastrophe and facilitate risk-taking by entre-preneurs), cash-for-work programs (supporting temporary income generation), asset replacement(promoting the revival of businesses), and capaci-ty development programs. Such measures have, ata minimum, helped avoid an erosion of livingstandards in the tsunami-affected communities.

Moreover, rebuilding requirements have creat-ed thousands of new jobs in the constructionindustry and other sectors. But this alone will not yield higher longer-term growth or reduceeconomic vulnerability. Imaginative policies arerequired to stimulate risk-taking, establishcompetitive markets, and build upon the spirit ofenterprise among the affected populations.

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A sustainable recoveryprocess depends on reviving

and expanding privateeconomic activity and

employment and securingdiverse livelihood

opportunities for affectedpopulations.

From the start of recovery operations, governments and aid agencies must create the conditions for entrepreneurs to flourish.


At the broadest level, this involves creating anenabling environment for businesses. Targeted taxand subsidy arrangements for employment creationand economic diversification can play a catalyticrole in the early stages of recovery, but these shouldbe replaced as soon as feasible with policies thatsupport entrepreneurial activity, establish a levelplaying field for business in the affected areas, andencourage sustainable microfinance institutions.For example, farmers may need free seeds and agri-cultural extension services initially, but aid effortsmust become more oriented toward supporting themarkets for these services in the future.

A sustainable range of microfinance services —including remittance mechanisms, savings, credit,and insurance — has to be put in place early in arecovery effort. National governments and formalfinancial institutions need to make funding avail-able, perhaps supported by transitional guaranteesby official or private entities. Together, the rangeof services offered by such institutions can providea powerful platform to reactivate small and medi-um enterprises, catalyze entrepreneurial energy,and create new micro-enterprises.

Realistically, however, not every household willrun their own business, nor should they need to.Mostly, households find their way out of povertyand economic vulnerability through intensive use of

their own labor. Aid can jumpstart livelihood recov-ery, but programming efforts must recognize thatsustainable job creation is ultimately an outcome ofprivate sector development.To complement damageand loss assessments, affected governments andtheir national and international development part-ners should develop a parallel, but linked, strategy toidentify how best to create an enabling environmentfor promoting private economic activity. Thisshould include a plan for accelerated and reasonablystable wage employment. Partnerships with nation-al and international business actors should be established — as a source of technical inputs andfinancing and to provide access to markets for theproducts of the affected regions. Governmentsshould call on international business leaders to provide periodic advice on how best to create thecritical enabling environment for investment and forentrepreneurship more generally.

In tsunami-affected countries, we have seen anumber of efforts to promote this kind of privatesector activity, including expansion of tourism inthe Maldives linked to strategies to promote localemployment opportunities, plans for rationaliza-tion of microfinance in Sri Lanka, and investmentpromotion in Aceh. But such measures need to beexpanded and accelerated in the months and yearsto come.

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Thriving local business in Aceh.

The scale of a recovery process canrequire harnessing efforts acrossan extraordinary array of organi-zations, local and international.How well they work together candetermine the quality and out-come of the recovery process.

Different organizations will naturally bringdifferent strengths to bear, from technical expert-ise, to local knowledge, to funding, to name a few.Agencies — local and international — will bemost effective when they are committed to effec-tive partnerships. This may involve pooling

resources, sharing acommon strategy,looking for ways todivide work efficiently,and providing an inte-grated response toaffected communities.Partnerships can andshould include gov-ernments, internation-al organizations, andNGOs.

The most impor-tant partnerships maybe between local and

international actors. “Outside” organizations withlong-standing, established relationships with localpartners — or even a national sister agency — areinvariably better equipped to make good use oflocal knowledge, skills, and personnel, and thusget the job done better and faster. Establishingsuch partnerships is very difficult in a disasters’wake and should be pursued and consolidated intimes of normalcy.

There have been many good stories of extraordinary partnership and collaboration in thetsunami effort. Private companies (from theregion and from much further a-field) joinedhands with NGOs, UN agencies, or the affectedcommunities, providing shipping and truckingservices, health equipment and drugs, communi-cations equipment, and cash, to cite a few exam-ples. Within their own countries, these companiesused alliances and chambers of commerce to shareexperiences and pool resources. The military services of some 40 countries collaborated in theoperation’s early weeks, working together andwith the host governments. In the UnitedKingdom, a number of the largest NGOslaunched a single appeal through the DisastersEmergencies Committee (DEC) rather thanfundraising separately. The International Federa-tion of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societiesplayed a pivotal role in underwriting a massiveoperation to move up to 70,000 Acehnese out oftents and into quality transitional shelters in anoperation that illustrated partnership at its verybest, with government, NGOs, and the UN allworking closely to address an urgent need. Some40 or more government aid agencies and NGOsjoined together to form the Tsunami EvaluationCoalition, which has undertaken far-reachingassessments of the operation. Where partners hadpracticed working together, the results were visiblybetter and faster. My own office at the UN hasgreatly benefited from this kind of partnershipapproach, with seconded staff from a variety ofUN agencies, the World Bank, the NGO commu-nity, and the Red Cross movement.

We need more such partnerships in action:NGOs that form consortia; private companies

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The scale of a recovery processcan require harnessing effortsacross an extraordinary array

of organizations, local andinternational. How well theywork together can determine

the quality and outcome of the recovery process.

Beneficiaries deserve the kind of agency partnerships that move beyond rivalry and unhealthy competition.


that enter long-term partnerships with NGOs;civil-military cooperation; and collaborative evaluation processes. The DEC model in theUnited Kingdom is an important one and worthyof further investigation for application in othercountries. Most importantly, organizations need

to start “practicing” partnering. We should take apage from the military book and set up trainingscenarios that bring different organizationstogether to plan for recovery as teams. The UN isuniquely placed to be the primary convener ofsuch types of cooperation.

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Community cleanupon an island affected by the tsunami in theMaldives.

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Akey test of a successful recoveryeffort is whether it leaves survivorsless vulnerable to natural hazards. Itis therefore vital that recovery plansidentify the mechanisms to substan-tially reduce risk, and the resourcesfor implementing such plans must

be included from the outset. Successful risk reduc-tion pays for itself many times over in the form of disasters avoided and lives safeguarded.

The imperative of worldwide disaster reductionand prevention may be the most valuable lesson wecan learn from the tsunami. A few weeks after the

tsunami, 168 govern-ments participated inthe World Conferenceon Disaster Reduction,in Kobe, Japan, andagreed to the HyogoFramework for Action2005-2015. Thanks to

such efforts, we know what we need to do to reducerisks and vulnerabilities. Now the challenge is tomove from words to action.

Recovery efforts should, at minimum, ensurethat communities become safer than they werebefore the disaster. We must bear in mind that each brick laid in the recovery process can eithercontribute to risk reduction or become an enablerfor the next big disaster. Schools, homes, and otherbuildings and critical infrastructure should berebuilt to higher standards and on safer ground.Restoring a community physically, only to leave it just as vulnerable to hazards as it was before the disaster, is unacceptable.

The tsunami also tragically reaffirmed theimportance of early warning systems. Fortunately,

important progress has been made in developingearly warning capacities as part of the tsunamirecovery effort. Across the Indian Ocean region,29 governments are building a regional tsunamiearly warning system that is already operational,although it will need continued improvementsover the coming years. Along the coastlines ofaffected countries, governments have installedsigns for evacuation routes, siren towers, and localearly warning centers, signaling an important shiftin attitudes toward preparedness. The death tollfrom Indonesia’s most recent tsunami — in WestJava in July of this year — further underscored thecritical need to build local systems to transmitwarnings to coastlines and educate the public inhow to respond.

Education and public awareness can save lives.Many examples demonstrated that people whohad prior knowledge of natural hazards, and whoknew what to do in the case of a tsunami, weremore likely to escape and survive. Local peopleon Similue Island in Indonesia and members ofthe Moken population in Thailand survivedthanks to traditional knowledge that had beenpassed from generation to generation throughoral histories and songs. Many tourists inThailand were warned about the tsunami by ayoung British school girl who had learned abouttsunamis at school and recognized the warningsigns. Disaster reduction awareness must becomean integral part of school programs and publicawareness strategies in all countries, as world-wide travel has dramatically increased the numbers of people who could be affected by nat-ural hazards.

The tsunami revealed that healthy coastalecosystems can contribute to natural mitigation.

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A key test of a successfulrecovery effort is whether

it leaves survivors lessvulnerable to natural hazards.

Good recovery must leavecommunities safer by reducing risks and building resilience.

P R O P O S I T I O N 1 0

While not a substitute for early warning and otherrisk mitigation efforts, efforts to protect man-groves, coral reefs, and other natural vegetationmust be — and have been — part of the recoveryprocess to ensure that reconstruction does notheighten risk. In addition, in Aceh, sources oftimber for housing materials are being monitoredto ensure that shelter programs do not increasedeforestation.

Legal frameworks must be in place to ensure thatdisaster reduction becomes a priority at national andlocal levels. Several countries have made progress in this area. India has established a new disastermanagement authority and greatly expanded its

community disaster preparedness efforts, includingmulti-million dollar investments in an early warningsystem. Sri Lanka and the Maldives have passedlandmark disaster management legislation, and abill on disaster management is under considerationin the Indonesian parliament.

Still, systematic progress on risk reductionremains elusive. Time will tell whether we havelearned the key lessons about the implications ofdisaster risk for development planning. Ambitiouslegislation needs to be followed by equally ambi-tious long-term financial investment and trainingand a mainstreaming of risk reduction in recoveryand development strategies.

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The tsunami's destruction in Aceh.

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Conclusion

There is much to celebrate about thetsunami recovery process so far, fromthe extraordinary work of the thousands of first responders —neighbors, Red Cross workers, and citizens, initially from the affectedcountries and then, rapidly, from

much further a-field — to the thousands involved inrecovery today. Many tens of thousands of homes,schools, and health facilities have been rebuilt,children are back in school, economic growth hasaccelerated throughout the region, and key sectors,from tourism to fisheries to construction, are

on the rebound. Inaddition, there is a new appreciation of the critical importanceof disaster risk reduc-tion, and governmentsin the affected areashave taken measures to translate rhetoricalsupport for preventioninto action.

Progress in recon-struction does notdiminish the impor-tance of exploring the myriad challengesencountered in the

recovery process, examining gaps in performance,and considering lessons learned. Even if we sub-stantially enhance our efforts at risk reduction, thereality of climate change, settlement patterns, andpoverty suggests that natural hazards will continueto result in disasters that require well-managedrecovery efforts. I hope that the observations and

recommendations in this report help to enhancethe quality of ongoing responses in the affectedregion, as well as promote more effective recoveryin future operations across the globe.That would bethe most fitting way to honor the memory of themore than 200,000 people who lost their lives inthe Indian Ocean tsunami of 2004.

There is much to celebrateabout the tsunami recovery

process so far, from theextraordinary work of the

thousands of first responders —neighbors, Red Cross workers,and citizens, initially from the

affected countries and then,rapidly, from much further a-field — to the thousandsinvolved in recovery today.

Sri Lankan woman and child after the tsunami.

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OFFICE OF THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL’SSPECIAL ENVOY FOR TSUNAMI RECOVERY

December 2006

Documents

LESSONS LEARNED FROM TSUNAMI RECOVERY Key … · Building Back Better LESSONS LEARNED FROM TSUNAMI RECOVERY A Report by the UN Secretary-General’s Special Envoy for Tsunami Recovery,