LITERAL CONSTRUCTION AND TECHNICAL MEANING OF TERMS

Submitted byPALLABI SENGUPTA (Roll Number 032)ADITI BHATT (Roll Number 003)Of BALLB SEMESTER VIFor INTERPRETATION OF STATUTESInstitution NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY ODISHADECLARATION The text reported in the project is an outcome of our own efforts and no part of this project assignment has been copied in any unauthorized manner and no part of it has been incorporated without due acknowledgement.

INDEX

TABLE OF CONTENTS3LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS4TABLE OF AUTHORITIES6INTRODUCTION9RESEARCH METHODOLOGY13CHAPTER I TECHNICAL NON LEGAL TERMS14What Are Technical Non Legal Terms?Foreign JudgementsIndian CasesCHAPTER II TECHNICAL LEGAL TERMS18What Are Technical Legal Terms?Judgements By Courts Accepting The Implementation of Technical Legal TermsCHAPTER III PREVALENCE OF ORDINARY MEANING OVER TECHNICAL MEANING21Terms With Both Technical As Well As Ordinary MeaningsWhere The Technical Meaning Is PreferredCases Where The Ordinary Meaning Is PreferredCONCLUSION25BIBLIOGRAPHY..26

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ABBREVIATIONFULL FORM

AARAuthority for Advanced Rulings

AIRAll India Reporter

All ERAll England Law Reports

APAndhra Pradesh

AssttAssistant

CESTATCustom Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal

CoCompany

ECCExcise and Custom Cases

ECRExcise and Custom Reports

ELTExcise Law Times

ILRIndian Law Reports

ITRIncome Tax Reporter

JrJunior

JTJudgement Today

LtdLimited

MPMadhya Pradesh

MPHTMP High Court Today

MPLJMP Law Journal

PvtPrivate

QBQueens Bench

SCSupreme Court

SCCSupreme Court Cases

SCRSupreme Court Reporter

STCSales Tax Cases

Section

TriTribunal

v.Versus

Vol.Volume

WLRWisconsin Law Review

TABLE OF AUTHORITIESCASES A G v. Bailey, (1847) 1 Ex 281..21Add v. Til Team Telecom International (P) Ltd, 2011 (12) ITR (Tri) 688 (NULL).18Akbar Badruddin Jiwani v. Collector of Customs, AIR 1990 SC 1579: 1990 (48) ELT 441 (Tri Mumbai)22Apex Steels (P) Ltd v. Collector of Central Excise (CESTAT, DELHI), 1995 (80) ELT 368 (Tri Delhi), 1995 (60) ECR 332 (Tri Delhi)..14Cemento Corporation Ltd v. Collector Central Excise, AIR 2002 SC 3680: 2002 (84) ECC 250: 2002 ECR 551 SC.15City of London v. Gibbs, [1942] AC 402..12Customs v. Warner Hindustan Ltd, 1986 (9) ECC 108, 1986 (26) ELT 367 (Tri - Delhi), 1986 (9) ECR 38 (Tri - Delhi)22Firm Ramchand Manjimal v. Firm Govardhandas Vishan Das Ratanchand, AIR 1920 PC 86: ILR 47 Cal 918.18Fisher v. Bell, [1961] 1 QB 394.21Ganesh Trading Co, Karnal v.State of Haryana and Anr, AIR 1974 SC 1362: (1974) 3 SCC 620: 1973 32 STC 623 SC.22Godrej Beverages and Food Limited v. Ramashankar Yadav, ILR (2009) MP 2027: 2009 (3) MPHT 251: 2009 (3) MPLJ 76.15GoverdhanDasHargovind Das v.MunicipalCommr, Ahmedabad, AIR 1963 SC 1742: 1964 SCR (2) 608..20In Re Bayerische Motoren Werke Aktiengesellschaft, 2005 (129) ECR 20 (Tri AAR): 2006 (193) ELT 138 (AAR)...19Jenner v Allen West & Co Ltd, [1959] 2 All ER 115: [1959] 1 WLR 554...14Laurence Arthur Adamson v.MelbourneandMetropolitan Boardof Works, AIR 1929 PC 18118Mishra (R N) v. Burn and Co Ltd Refractory and Ceramic Works, ILR (1968) MP 852: (1966) ILLJ 622 MP: 1966 JLJ 308: 1966 (11) MPLJ 601...16Prophet v. Platt Bros and Co Ltd, [1961] 2 All ER 644.14Purewal Associates Ltd v. Collector of Central Excise, 1996 (87) ELT 321 SC...16Ramavatar Budhaiprasad etc v. Assistant Sales Tax Officer, Akola, AIR 1961 SC 1325: 1962 SCR (1) 279...22Real Optical Co v. Appellate Collector of Customs and Anr, 2001 (74) ECC 281: 2001 (129) ELT 7 SC: JT 2001 (3) SC 12515Royal Hatcheries Pvt Ltd v. State of AP, AIR 1994 SC 666: 1994 SCC Supl (1) 429..22Sirpur Paper Mills Limited v. Collector of Central Excise, Hyderabad, 2002 (4) ALD 344: 2003 (159) ELT 17 (AP)16State of Madras v. Gannon Dunkerley and Co, (Madras), AIR 1958 SC 560...19State of Orissa v. M/S Dinabandhu Sahu and Sons, AIR 1976 SC 1561: 1976 SCR (3) 966..17Technical Concepts International Ltd v. Commissioner of Central Excise and Customs, 2005 (128) ECR 147 (Tri AAR).16Union of India v. Delhi Cloth and General Mills, AIR 1963 SC 791: 1963 SCR Supl (1) 586..17Unwin v. Hannon, [1891] 2 QB 115..11

ARTICLES Evans Holbrook et al, The Change in the Meaning of Consortium, Michigan Law Review, Vol. 22, pp. 1-9, published by The Michigan Law Review Association, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1276786........................................................................................9 Frank E Horack Jr et al, The Disintegration of Statutory Construction, Indiana Law Journal, Volume 24, HeinOnline (http://www.heinonline.org) .9Lawrence B Solum et al, The Interpretation Construction Distinction, HeinOnline, (http:/www./heinonline.org) ..9Rajkumar S Adukia et al., Interpretation of Statutes http://www.caaa.in/Image/Interpretation%20of%20Statutes.pdf......................................... ..11Textualism http://www.cstl-cla.semo.edu/hill/ui305/textualism.html........................................................11

BOOK WILLIAM BLACKSTONE & JAMES STEWART THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS, ACCORDING TO THE TEXT OF BLACKSTONE:INCORPORATING THE ALTERATIONS DOWN TO THE PRESENT TIME 51 (Edmund Spettigue, 1839)11

INTRODUCTION AMBIGUITY AND VAGUENESS IN FACTS, HENCE INTERPRETATIONIn the technical sense, an ambiguity refers to the multiplicity of sense: a term is ambiguous if it has more than one sense. A classic example is the word cool. In one sense cool means low temperature, as in the room was so cool we could see our breath. In another sense, cool means something like hip or stylish, as in Miles Davis was so cool that every young trumpet player imitated him. And cool has several other senses referring to temperament or self control, to certain colours, and a lack of enthusiasm (or the presence of scepticism or mild hostility).[footnoteRef:2] [2: Lawrence B Solum et al, The Interpretation Construction Distinction, HeinOnline, (http:/www./heinonline.org) (last visited on Feb 14, 2014).]

The technical sense of vagueness refers to the existence of borderline cases: a term is vague if there are cases which might not apply. A classic example is the word tall. In one sense, tall refers to height (of a person or an entity) that is higher (in some way or to some degree) than average. A given word or phrase can both vague and ambiguous. The term cool is ambiguous, and, in the temperature sense, it is also vague.[footnoteRef:3] [3: Id.]

Law is aware of the sociological needs of the society and its responsiveness to the changing conditions of the society. Many have complained and they will keep on complaining that the law has been and is slow in responding to the needs of the people, but it is amply clear that sooner or later the courts in a pursuit to respond to the needs of the society, or to adapt to the changing demands, keep necessarily interpreting the meaning and content of legal words and phrases.[footnoteRef:4] [4: Evans Holbrook et al, The Change in the Meaning of Consortium, Michigan Law Review, Vol. 22, pp. 1-9, published by The Michigan Law Review Association, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1276786 (last visited on Feb 14, 2014). ]

The determination of what constitutes the law should control the manner of its interpretation; the rules as used indicate the process is teleological rather than logical. Thus, a formalistic treatment of the rules of interpretation would scarcely reflect the realism of the judicial process that the so called rules of construction are not rules of law but rules of explanation.[footnoteRef:5] [5: Frank E Horack Jr et al, The Disintegration of Statutory Construction, Indiana Law Journal, Volume 24, HeinOnline (http://www.heinonline.org) (last visited on Feb 14, 2014). ]

Excluding decisions which deny the necessity of interpretation and those which involve constitutional issues the rules fall into three general classes[footnoteRef:6]: [6: supra note 4.]

(1) Rules which purport to derive meaning from the words of the statute itself.(2) Rules which purport to gain meaning from extrinsic sources.(3) Rules in the nature of presumptions.LITERAL INTERPRETATIONRules of the first class are generally known as rules of literal interpretation. They postulate from the meaning of the statute and from nothing more. The term literal is used as a symbol to mean words will be given their common meaning and one who uses them differently must disclose the difference or be bound by the common parlance of the society in which the words are used. Even though words have no intrinsic meaning it is fair to impose reasonable uniformity in the use of symbols or otherwise the art of communication must surely fail. Thus, unless there is disclosure of special usage, the receiver of a symbol may use it in its generally accepted sense, with confidence that it had been so understood by the giver.[footnoteRef:7] [7: Id.]

Interpretation, in mostly normal form of communication, is automatic, i.e., when the giver and the receiver achieve understanding immediately. In the field of litigation, when communicating in the language of law, the communication is a little cautioned due to addition of problems as it involves more exertion and effort of both the parties. The obligation of the statutory draftsman is not to write so that he can be understood, but to draft so that he cannot be misunderstood. The courts should recognize the disputations tendencies of Counsel and ignore the temptation to phrase opinions in terms of literal interpretation; for, sometimes the challenge to a meaning is serious and it is reasonably apparent that the meaning differs from the one normally ascribed upon the words of the statute alone.[footnoteRef:8] [8: Id.]

Literal interpretation is delusive and hollow. This is because when statements in a statute are clear and unambiguous and that they in no way disclose the source from which or the manner in which meaning is derived, such statements only end up being complicated explanations given by judges for the courts satisfaction and the result ultimately is that we read the statute the way it is read. The statute becomes more determinate when court holds any firm decision. It then gives a practical meaning to the technical terms involved; but the meaning comes from the judgement and not from the assertion that the statute is clear.[footnoteRef:9] [9: supra note 4.]

The courts frequently emphasize on the dearth or paucity of literal interpretation. The courts usually, with respect to literal interpretation, comment that, It is always a perilous and insecure way of construing a statute or contract to divide it, by a process of etymological dissection. Interpretation of single word leads inevitably to the distortion or misrepresentation of meaning.[footnoteRef:10] Considering all these factors the study of interpretation of technical terms gains its relevance. [10: Id.]

TECHNICAL WORDSSo, the question arises in our minds what is connoted by technical terms?Technical terms are not words of ordinary or plain meaning; rather they are words of special knowledge required in any specialized field, expertise or discipline. As Blackstone said these technical terms must be they must be taken according to the acceptance of the learned in each art, trade and science.[footnoteRef:11] [11: WILLIAM BLACKSTONE & JAMES STEWART THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS, ACCORDING TO THE TEXT OF BLACKSTONE:INCORPORATING THE ALTERATIONS DOWN TO THE PRESENT TIME 51 (Edmund Spettigue, 1839).]

If a word is said to have a technical meaning when used in a particular discipline, then such technical meaning is preferred while dealing with any law in that discipline, unless a contrary intention of the legislature is apparent. In the case of Unwin v. Hanson[footnoteRef:12], Lord Esher observed that if a word is used in relation to a certain trade or business, then the presumption of that word is made in the sense in which it is understood by people associated with that trade or business. [12: [1891] 2 QB 115 at 119.]

According to Prof Solum, Some laws are meant for all citizens (example - criminal statutes) and some are meant only for specialists (example - some Sections of a tax code). A text that means one thing in a legal context might mean something else if it were in a technical manual.[footnoteRef:13] [13: Rajkumar S Adukia et al., Interpretation of Statuteshttp://www.caaa.in/Image/Interpretation%20of%20Statutes.pdfsee also Textualism http://www.cstl-cla.semo.edu/hill/ui305/textualism.html.]

In the case of Commissioners for the General Purposes of the Income Tax Acts for the City of London v. Gibbs[footnoteRef:14], Lord Macmillan opined that for the purposes of the Income Tax Act, the term assessment can be seen in the light of eight different meanings. [14: [1942] AC 402 at 424.]

STATEMENT OF PROBLEM To look into the scenarios where the technical non legal meaning of terms were used by the courts while interpreting a word in a statute, rule, regulation, order etc. Also, to research into the cases where the technical legal meanings of the terms (as established by statutory use or authoritative judgements) where applied by the courts. Further, to find out the relevant cases where the ordinary, common meaning was preferred to the technical meaning of any term.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGYOBJECTIVETo examine the cases where technical non legal terms and those where technical legal terms are adhered to by the courts as well as to enquire into the cases where the plain meaning is given preference to the technical meaning.

HYPOTHESIS1. In case of interpretation of a word relating to a specialised field, the meaning of such word as is regularly used in the said field must be used.2. In case of interpreting terms of the legal field, the authoritative decisions of superior courts must be adhered to.

RESEARCH QUESTION1. When is the technical non legal meaning of a term applicable in any case?2. When does the court prefer the application of the technical legal meaning of a word to the plain meaning of a term?3. What are the circumstances under which the rule of application of technical terms deviated from i.e. the cases where the plain, ordinary meaning of the term is preferred by the courts?

COVERAGE AND SCOPEAll the above mentioned factors would be analyzed with the help of relevant judgments, applicable articles and important books.

CHAPTER I - TECHNICAL NON LEGAL TERMSIn the context or any art, science, trade, business or any other non legal field, if a word connotes a certain technical meaning then such meaning is to be preferred unless the contrary intention of the legislature is very clearly stated. In the case of Unwin v. Hannon (1891, Queens Bench decision), it was first held that If an Act is passed with respect to a particular trade, business or transaction and the words used are ones that everyone in that trade, business or transaction are conversant with, then the words are to be construed as having that particular meaning.FOREIGN JUDGEMENTS In the case of Jenner v Allen West & Co Ltd[footnoteRef:15], it was contended that the phrase crawling board used in the Building (Safety, Health and Welfare) Regulations, 1948, signified an ordinary board on which workmen could crawl. However, the Court of Appeal enquired into the matter and concluded that the phrase had a technical meaning, commonly known by persons employed in the trade (architecture). The term was interpreted to mean a piece of access equipment requiring cross battens to be attached to the boards, in orders to prevent the workers from slipping[footnoteRef:16]. [15: [1959] 2 All ER 115: [1959] 1 WLR 554.] [16: Id.]

Again, in the case of Prophet v. Platt Bros and Co Ltd[footnoteRef:17], the question was regarding the meaning of the term fettling for the purposes of Protection of Eyes Regulations, 1938. In the dictionary attributed the meaning as a lining of a furnace. However, Lord Justice Harman went into the heart of the matter and ruled that the technical meaning of the term would be used as, fettling of metal castings meant trimming up of the castings as they came from the foundry[footnoteRef:18]. [17: [1961] 2 All ER 644.] [18: Id.]

INDIAN CASES In Apex Steels (P) Ltd v. Collector of Central Excise (CESTAT, DELHI)[footnoteRef:19], tax had to be levied on the iron bars. For this purpose, there was a classification made between iron rod and bars which are hot iron bars and the cold twisted deformed bars according to their technical meanings. [19: 1995 (80) ELT 368 (Tri Delhi), 1995 (60) ECR 332 (Tri Delhi).]

In Real Optical Co v. Appellate Collector of Customs and Anr[footnoteRef:20] the question raised was whether, for the purposes of taxation, rough ophthalmic blanks fell under tariff item number 23 A (4) or under residuary tariff item number 68 of Central Excise Tariff? Item number 23 A (4) talked about other glass, glassware, including tableware. Item number 68 on the other hand dealt with all goods not specified anywhere else. The Supreme Court held that optical blanks cannot be classified as other glass, glassware and should be taxed as a residuary item. According to the words of Justice Phukan, a general merchant dealing in glass or tableware does not deal in articles like rough optical blanks with optical properties, which may be used for making spectacles. The functional character of rough optical blanks is different from glass or glassware.[footnoteRef:21] [20: 2001 (74) ECC 281: 2001 (129) ELT 7 SC: JT 2001 (3) SC 125.] [21: Id.]

In the case of Godrej Beverages and Food Limited v. Ramashankar Yadav[footnoteRef:22], the main question in issue was whether food processing industry falls within the ambit of engineering industry as provided in entry 16 of the schedule of the MP Industrial Relations Act, 1960. The court observed that the meaning of engineering could not be confined to industry which produces plants and machinery, there were plants and several mechanical and electrical engineers working in the industry, there was laboratory also, there were electricians and facilities of water treatment, food product involved engineering process, engineering was part of various process under production of foodstuff, which was well recognized part of chemical engineering, hence, food processing was also process of engineering. It was found that an industry shall be covered under engineering industry if it performs activity of engineering mentioned in relevant statute. [22: ILR (2009) MP 2027: 2009 (3) MPHT 251: 2009 (3) MPLJ 76.]

In Cemento Corporation Ltd v. Collector Central Excise[footnoteRef:23], the issue in question was whether lympo (alime pozzolana mixture) could be treated as cement for the purposes of tariff item number 23 (of Schedule I) of the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944. The supreme Court found that technically or scientifically the two (lympo and cement) were different and decided to tax lympo under residuary item number 68[footnoteRef:24], thus, upholding the prevalence of the technical meaning of a term. [23: AIR 2002 SC 3680: 2002 (84) ECC 250: 2002 ECR 551 SC.] [24: Id.]

In Technical Concepts International Ltd v. Commissioner of Central Excise and Customs[footnoteRef:25], room deodorisers and room fresheners were construed to be as medicinal and toilet preparation products under Chapter 33 of the Medicinal and Toilet Preparations (Excise Duties) Act, 1955. These were the products used in households, offices, restaurants, airport lounges and other public places. It was held that these products will be dutiable under the Act. [25: 2005 (128) ECR 147 (Tri AAR).]

In Sirpur Paper Mills Limited v. Collector of Central Excise, Hyderabad[footnoteRef:26], the appellate court, referred to the question of whether items like wire mesh and woollen felts were to be excluded from the purview of Rule 57 A. It was held that wire mesh and woollen felts were technically used in machinery in manufacture of paper and paper products, which were eligible inputs under Rule 57 A of Rules and that such inputs were not excluded by virtue of exclusion Clause (1) of Explanation to Rule 57 A. [26: 2002 (4) ALD 344: 2003 (159) ELT 17 (AP).]

In Mishra (R N) v. Burn and Co Ltd Refractory and Ceramic Works[footnoteRef:27], the Burn and Company Lt., Refractory and Ceramic Works in Niwar district of Jabalpur was admittedly engaged in the manufacture of fire bricks. The issue in this case was whether the term potteries also included refractory engaged in manufacture of fire bricks. It was held that both these terms would not be construed under a similar technical meaning. [27: ILR (1968) MP 852: 1966 (11) MPLJ 601.]

In Purewal Associates Ltd v. Collector of Central Excise[footnoteRef:28], the dispute arose regarding the question whether lid screw, barrel axle screw, bridge screw and dial key screw (components of a watch) could be classified as bolts, nuts and screws for the purposes of tariff item number 52 (for specific items) of the Central Excise Tariff. Justice Venkataswami of the supreme Court held that the phrase bolts, nuts and screws generally refer to bigger tools used to fix tyres, repair cars, hold bridges, while lid screws, barrel axle screws, bridge screws and dial key screws are highly specialised instruments, used in intricate jobs. Because of their delicate nature, lid screws, barrel axle screws, bridge screws and dial key screws should not be treated at par with bolts, nuts and screws and the former should be be taxed under residuary item number 68. [28: 1996 VIIAD SC 452: 1996 (87) ELT 321 SC.]

For the purposes of determining the technical meaning of terms reliance is frequently place upon: The testimony of the experts on the field under consideration. Documents such as Government circulars, notifications, policy documents, etc.In State of Orissa v. M/S Dinabandhu Sahu and Sons[footnoteRef:29], the Supreme Court deliberated on the construction of the term oilseeds for the purposes of Section 14 (vi) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956. The real issue in this case was whether aniseed (saunf), coriander seeds (dhania), cuminseed (safed jeera) fenugreek seeds (methi) could be construed as oilseeds. For determining the answer to this question the court referred to some non statutory documents, and came to the conclusion that the technical meanings of aniseed (saunf), coriander seeds (dhania), cuminseed (safed jeera) fenugreek seeds (methi) made it possible to include these food items under the ambit of oilseeds. [29: AIR 1976 SC 1561: 1976 SCR (3) 966.]

In the case of Union of India v. Delhi Cloth and General Mills[footnoteRef:30], the court deliberated upon the question of whether to consider Vanaspati as refined oil for the purposes of item 23 of Schedule I to the Central Excises and Salt Act. A two way process of hydrogenation (process to unsaturated fat into saturated ones) and de-odorization (process to remove the smell) was used to manufacture Vanaspati. The court found that both the processes did not involve refining. Reliance was placed on the testimony of experts. Also, the court referred to the ISI norms and came to the conclusion that the two processes did not convert Vanaspati into refined oil. [30: AIR 1963 SC 791: 1963 SCR Supl (1) 586.]

The above mentioned are some examples of how the technical meaning of words have been given importance to by both English and Indian courts.

CHAPTER II - TECHNICAL LEGAL TERMSIn case of a specific branch or stream of law, if a term connotes certain meaning then such technical legal meaning should be used unless the contrary intention of the legislature is apparent. When words acquire a technical or specialised meaning through consistent use by legislature or through authoritative construction by superior courts then those words are understood in that sense.JUDGEMENTS InLaurence Arthur Adamson v.MelbourneandMetropolitan Boardof Works[footnoteRef:31], the court took the opinion that the word charitable purpose must be taken in its technical legal sense unless the contrary intention appears. [31: AIR 1929 PC 181.]

InFirm Ramchand Manjimal v. Firm Govardhandas Vishan Das Ratanchand[footnoteRef:32], the issue in question was whether a particular order could be construed as a judgement and final order under the Code of Civil Procedure. The court found that the concept of judgement and final order have acquired a certain specific meaning through its use by courts over a period of time[footnoteRef:33]. A judgement is the declaration or final determination of the rights of the parties in the matter brought before a court in law.[footnoteRef:34] A final order is an order which finally determines the rights of the parties and brings the dispute to an end.[footnoteRef:35] In this case the court preferred to uphold the legal meaning of a term over its general, ordinary, everyday meaning. [32: AIR 1920 PC 86: ILR 47 Cal 918.] [33: Id.] [34: Id.] [35: Id.]

In the case of Add v. Til Team Telecom International (P) Ltd[footnoteRef:36], the CIT (A) held that payment amounted to payment for purchase of copyright material which did not amount to royalty within the meaning of Article 12 (3) of the India Israel DTAA. In terms of the provisions of this Article, royalty was defined, for the purposes of this tax treaty, as payments of any kind received as a consideration for the use of, or the right to use, any copyright of literary, artistic or scientific work including cinematographic films, any patent, trademark, design or model, plan, secret formula or process, or for information concerning industrial, commercial or scientific experience. The question that arose was whether a payment for computer software could not be a payment for use of or right to use of a copyright of literary, artistic or scientific work, including cinema photographic film, and, while examining this question, it was important to bear in mind the fact that there was a specific mention about the use of copyright. [36: 2011 (12) ITR (Tri) 688 (NULL).]

The issue was whether payment for supply of software could be viewed as a payment for copyright or not. The Special Bench in this case took the view that the provisions of Article 12 (3) specifically provided for what was liable to be treated as royalty was payment for use of, or the right to use, any copyright of literary, artistic or scientific work, and the connotations of use of copyright of a work are distinct from the use of a copyrighted article. The meaning of use of copyright-of a work could not be treated as extending to use of a copyrighted work as well, as it would amount to doing clear violence to the words employed by the treaty. Copyright was one thing and copyrighted article was another. When a person was using a music compact disc, that person was using the copyrighted article, i.e., the product itself, and not the copyright in that product. Thus, the difference between the technical meaning of a copyright and that of a copyrighted article was looked at in this case.In the case of In Re Bayerische Motoren Werke Aktiengesellschaft[footnoteRef:37], the court took the view that, when a notification exempts goods falling within Schedule I of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975, then the goods must be classified in the same manner both for purposes of payment of custom duty as well as for purposes of exemption/benefit under that notification. However if the wording of the notification show that an item is specifically exempted then the exemption will apply to that item even though for purposes of classification if may be considered to be something else. In other words when, in a notification, the exemption is with reference to an intern in Schedule I of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975, then the interpretative rules would equally apply to such notification. [37: 2005 (129) ECR 20 (Tri AAR): 2006 (193) ELT 138 (AAR).]

In the State of Madras v. Gannon Dunkerley and Co, (Madras)[footnoteRef:38], the Supreme Court deliberated on the question of what amounted to a sale of goods.Entry 48 of List II of ScheduleVII of the Government of IndiaAct, 1935, empowered the Provincial government to impose tax on sale of goods. The facts of the case related to a building contract between two parties, including the supply of raw materials. The issue was whether the supply of raw materials in the course of building contracts amounted to sale of goods. The court found that there are two essentials for a transaction to be essentially termed as sale of goods, which are: [38: AIR 1958 SC 560.]

Agreement to sell movable goods for a price. The goods passing hands pursuant to the sale.Since the first criterion (of supply of raw materials) was not fulfilled in this case, hence, the supply of raw materials pursuant to a building contract did not amount to a sale of goods.In the case of GoverdhanDasHargovind Das v.MunicipalCommr, Ahmedabad[footnoteRef:39], the power of a Municipal Corporation to impose rates on buildings and land was called in question. The issue was how to interpret the term rates and what was included under it. The court sided with the technical legal interpretation on the term stating that rate is a tax imposed by a local authority on the annual value of the property. The annual value was computed by one of the three methods mentioned below: [39: AIR 1963 SC 1742: 1964 SCR (2) 608.]

Upon calculation of the actual rent fixed. If the house was not rented at that time, then the rent fixed on hypothetical tenancy. If both the above methods are not applicable, valuation is done based on the capital value of the property.[footnoteRef:40] [40: Id.]

The above mentioned are some examples of how the legal meaning of words have been given relevance to by both English and Indian courts.

CHAPTER III PREVALENCE OF ORDINARY MEANING OVER TECHNICAL MEANINGTERMS WITH BOTH TECHNICAL AS WELL AS ORDINARY MEANINGSIn the case of A G v. Bailey[footnoteRef:41], the court deliberated upon the meaning of the term spirits and its use in the context of the prevalent Excise Act. The said act imposed excise duty on spirits. The main issue in this case was whether sweet spirits of nitre could be construed as spirits for the purposes on imposing duty under this act. It was found that, in the field of trade and commerce, sweet spirits of nitre do not fall within the category of spirits and hence could not be imposed on them.[footnoteRef:42] [41: (1847) 1 Ex 281.] [42: Id.]

GENERALLY THE TECHNICAL MEANING IS PREFERREDIn the case of Fisher v. Bell[footnoteRef:43], the court preferred the technical meaning to the ordinary meaning. In this case there was a dispute regarding the term offer. A shopkeeper had been charged under Section 1 (1) of the Restriction of Offensive Weapons Act, 1959 for offering for sale a flick knife. The shopkeeper had displayed the knife on the window of his shop. The court took the view that the action of the shopkeeper did not amount to an offer rather it was an invitation to an offer[footnoteRef:44]. Thus, it went along with the technical interpretation of the term offer as is construed in the case of law of contract. [43: [1961] 1 QB 394.] [44: Id.]

AND NOW FOR THE DEVIATION TO THE RULEIn Re K (Deceased) the court did not favour the application of the technical meaning of the term acquired. The facts of the case were such that a lady had killed her husband and later demanded a share in his property, which was in the possession of his representatives. The Court of Appeal ruled in favour of the widow (despite the fact that the beneficiary had caused the death of the deceased). Although, Section 2 (7) of the Forfeiture Act 1982 prevented orders affecting property acquired by third parties[footnoteRef:45] (herein the representatives of the deceased acquired the property legally), yet the court decided to apply the non technical meaning of the term acquired. [45: Forfeiture Act, 1982, 2 (7).]

In the case of Customs v. Warner Hindustan Ltd[footnoteRef:46], the definition of the term stainless steel was in question. Stainless steel is also an alloy steel (in popular terminology), although its chemical composition differs as far as the percentage of chromium used in the production process is concerned. Incoloy 800 is nickel alloy and not steel alloy. [46: 1986 (9) ECC 108, 1986 (26) ELT 367 (Tri - Delhi), 1986 (9) ECR 38 (Tri - Delhi).]

In this case it was observed that Construction of statute depends on it language, no presumption, inference or implied meaning can be drawn. Language of a later legislation cannot help interpreting an earlier act, and language is to be taken in its popular sense. Technical terms should be interpreted according to their primary meaning. Construction of a fiscal statute depends on its plain language, without any presumptions, inferences or implied meaning. One rule of construction is that one has merely to look at what is clearly said. There is no room for any intendment. Language of a statute is not to be construed in its strict technical meaning but in its popular sense.[footnoteRef:47] [47: Id.]

In the case of Akbar Badruddin Jiwani v. Collector of Customs[footnoteRef:48], entry number 25.15 of an order under the Customs Tariff Act, 1975 mentioned marble, travertine, ecaussine, alabaster, other calcareous monumental and building stones. Court interpreted that entry number 25.15 has a wide ambit. Herein, the natural, ordinary, everyday parlance of the term marble (as a monumental and building stone) must be used. On the other hand, entry number 62 of that order talked about marble only. The court interpreted entry number 62 in a narrower light, referring to the term marble in this context by its Geological and Petrological meaning. By looking at the languages of the entry number 25.15 and entry 62, the court inferred that the latter had to be given a stricter technical interpretation than the former.[footnoteRef:49] [48: AIR 1990 SC 1579: 1990 (48) ELT 441 (Tri Mumbai).] [49: supra note 47.]

In Ramavatar Budhaiprasad etc v. Assistant Sales Tax Officer, Akola[footnoteRef:50], the interpretations of item number 6 (dealing with vegetables) and item number 36 (dealing with betel leaves) of Schedule II of Section 6 (1) (2) of the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947, were called in question. The court deliberated upon the question whether betel leaf could be construed as a vegetable. The court realized that scientifically or botanically there in no difference between the two. However, the court held that being a word of everyday use a betel leaf must be construed in its popular sense meaning (that sense which people conversant with the subject matter with which the statute is dealing would attribute to it)[footnoteRef:51]. [50: AIR 1961 SC 1325: 1962 SCR (1) 279.] [51: Id.]

In the case of Royal Hatcheries Pvt Ltd v. State of AP[footnoteRef:52], a test was formulated which stated that for the purpose of taxing statutes, the meaning that is popular in commercial circles is preferable to other technical or scientific meanings. In this case, the court faced the dilemma of whether to include chicken under the head of livestock for the purposes of imposing taxes under Clause (xxvi) of Rule 5(2) of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Rules (framed under the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1957). Generally domestic animals like oxen, bulls, cows, buffaloes, goats, sheep, horses etc are referred to as livestock. Scientists may classify a chicken as a domestic animal. But chicken belongs to a separate category, that of birds to which none of the above mentioned animals belong. In trade circles a chicken is not treated as a livestock. As the court held that to do so (interpret a chicken as a livestock) would be to depart from and ignore the ordinary popular connotation of the words domestic animals[footnoteRef:53]. [52: AIR 1994 SC 666: 1994 SCC Supl (1) 429.] [53: Id.]

In the case of Ganesh Trading Co, Karnal v.State of Haryana and Anr[footnoteRef:54], the court observed that for the purposes of imposing taxes under the Punjab General Sales Tax Act, 1948, paddy and rice are to be construed as completely different things (giving precedence to the common laymans meaning to the two terms) and they must be taxed at different levels. [54: AIR 1974 SC 1362: (1974) 3 SCC 620: 1973 32 STC 623 SC.]

Thus, in all of the above mentioned cases the ordinary meaning is preferred to the technical meaning.

CONCLUSIONThus we see that using the technical meaning of a term be it legal or non legal has been a norm of the court generally in the statutes pertaining to a particular field of science, art, trade, business, commerce etc. However, sometimes, the ordinary meaning has been given a supremacy/ predominance/ preponderance over the technical meaning. Again, for the purposes of imposing taxation the meaning prevalent in the trade world has been referred to.These are all various tools or aids of interpretation of statutes. With the increase in the variety of the fact situations, the more number of methods of interpretation are coming up. As we have perceived by the in-depth research in the first three chapters of this paper, there can never be a hard and fast rule when it comes to interpretation of statutes. This makes the work of Counsels more challenging. Yet this is the same element which makes this exercise refreshing and worthwhile. Enquiring into the arena of which rule to apply when makes this subject more interesting and never dull.

BIBLIOGRAPHYCASES A G v. Bailey, (1847) 1 Ex 281 Add v. Til Team Telecom International (P) Ltd, 2011 (12) ITR (Tri) 688 (NULL) Akbar Badruddin Jiwani v. Collector of Customs, AIR 1990 SC 1579: 1990 (48) ELT 441 (Tri Mumbai) Apex Steels (P) Ltd v. Collector of Central Excise (CESTAT, DELHI), 1995 (80) ELT 368 (Tri Delhi), 1995 (60) ECR 332 (Tri Delhi) Cemento Corporation Ltd v. Collector Central Excise, AIR 2002 SC 3680: 2002 (84) ECC 250: 2002 ECR 551 SC City of London v. Gibbs, [1942] AC 402 Customs v. Warner Hindustan Ltd, 1986 (9) ECC 108, 1986 (26) ELT 367 (Tri - Delhi), 1986 (9) ECR 38 (Tri - Delhi) Firm Ramchand Manjimal v. Firm Govardhandas Vishan Das Ratanchand, AIR 1920 PC 86: ILR 47 Cal 918 Fisher v. Bell, [1961] 1 QB 394 Ganesh Trading Co, Karnal v.State of Haryana and Anr, AIR 1974 SC 1362: (1974) 3 SCC 620: 1973 32 STC 623 SC Godrej Beverages and Food Limited v. Ramashankar Yadav, ILR (2009) MP 2027: 2009 (3) MPHT 251: 2009 (3) MPLJ 76 GoverdhanDasHargovind Das v.MunicipalCommr, Ahmedabad, AIR 1963 SC 1742: 1964 SCR (2) 608 In Re Bayerische Motoren Werke Aktiengesellschaft, 2005 (129) ECR 20 (Tri AAR): 2006 (193) ELT 138 (AAR) Injenner v Allen West & Co Ltd, [1959] 2 All SER 115: [1959] 1 WLR 554 Laurence Arthur Adamson v.MelbourneandMetropolitan Boardof Works, AIR 1929 PC 181 Mishra (R N) v. Burn and Co Ltd Refractory and Ceramic Works, ILR (1968) MP 852: (1966) ILLJ 622 MP: 1966 JLJ 308: 1966 (11) MPLJ 601 Prophet v. Platt Bros and Co Ltd, [1961] 2 All ER 644 Purewal Associates Ltd v. Collector of Central Excise, 1996 (87) ELT 321 SC Ramavatar Budhaiprasad etc v. Assistant Sales Tax Officer, Akola, AIR 1961 SC 1325: 1962 SCR (1) 279 Real Optical Co v. Appellate Collector of Customs and Anr, 2001 (74) ECC 281: 2001 (129) ELT 7 SC: JT 2001 (3) SC 125 Royal Hatcheries Pvt Ltd v. State of AP, AIR 1994 SC 666: 1994 SCC Supl (1) 429 Sirpur Paper Mills Limited v. Collector of Central Excise, Hyderabad, 2002 (4) ALD 344: 2003 (159) ELT 17 (AP) State of Madras v. Gannon Dunkerley and Co, (Madras), AIR 1958 SC 560 State of Orissa v. M/S Dinabandhu Sahu and Sons, AIR 1976 SC 1561: 1976 SCR (3) 966 Technical Concepts International Ltd v. Commissioner of Central Excise and Customs, 2005 (128) ECR 147 (Tri AAR) Union of India v. Delhi Cloth and General Mills, AIR 1963 SC 791: 1963 SCR Supl (1) 586 Unwin v. Hannon, [1891] 2 QB 115

STATUTES 1. Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Rules (framed under the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1957)2. Building (Safety, Health and Welfare) Regulations, 19483. Central Excise and Salt Act, 19444. Central Excise and Salt Act, 19445. Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act, 19476. Central Sales Tax Act, 19567. Code of Civil Procedure, 19088. Customs Tariff Act, 19759. Forfeiture Act, 198210. Government of India Act, 193511. Medicinal and Toilet Preparations (Excise Duties) Act, 195512. MP Industrial Relations Act, 19613. Protection of Eyes Regulations, 193814. Punjab General Sales Tax Act, 194815. Restriction of Offensive Weapons Act, 1959

REFERRED BOOKS ABNER J MIKVA & ERIC LANE, AN INTRODUCTION TO STATUTORY INTERPRETATION AND THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 1-57 (Aspen Publishers, 1st ed., 2008) FRANCIS BENNION, BENNION ON STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 1-391 (LexisNexis, 5th ed., 2008) GERALD DWORKIN, ODGERS CONSTRUCTION OF DEEDS AND STATUTES 27-76 (Universal Law Publishing Co, 4th ed., 2008) G P SINGH, PRINCIPLES OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (LexisNexis, 13th ed., 2012) JOHN BELL & GEORGE ENGLE, CROSS STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 72 74 (LexisNexis Butterworths, 3rd ed., 2006) VEPA P SARATHI, INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES 39-116 (Eastern Book Company, 5th ed., 2010) WILLIAM BLACKSTONE & JAMES STEWART THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS, ACCORDING TO THE TEXT OF BLACKSTONE:INCORPORATING THE ALTERATIONS DOWN TO THE PRESENT TIME 51 (Edmund Spettigue, 1839) WILLIAM N ESKRIDGE JR, DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 9-13 (Universal Law Publishing Co, 2nd ed., 2009)

ARTICLES Evans Holbrook et al, The Change in the Meaning of Consortium, Michigan Law Review, Vol. 22, pp. 1-9, published by The Michigan Law Review Association, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1276786 Frank E Horack Jr et al, The Disintegration of Statutory Construction, Indiana Law Journal, Volume 24, HeinOnline (http://www.heinonline.org) Lawrence B Solum et al, The Interpretation Construction Distinction, HeinOnline, (http:/www./heinonline.org)

Rajkumar S Adukia et al., Interpretation of Statutes http://www.caaa.in/Image/Interpretation%20of%20Statutes.pdfTextualism http://www.cstl-cla.semo.edu/hill/ui305/textualism.html

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