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P.R.C. -r", CONTROL OF AIRSfRIKES"

J A N'U A R Y 1967 0 E C E M BE R 19-68

30 J U N E. 1 9 6 9

HQ PACAF

Directorate, Tactical Evalvation CHECO Division

S P E. C I A L H AN D LIN G R E Q U I.R E D NOT RELEASABLE TO

.FOREIGN NATIONALS.

Prepared' by:

MELVIN F.PORTER The information contoined in

this document wiil not be -disclosed to foreign no tion.ols

or their representatives, Proiect CHECO 7th AF, DOAC

DOTEC-69-53

SECRET

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UNCLASSIFIED

PROJECT CHECO ~EPORTS

The counterlnsurgency and unconventional warfare environment of Southeast As 1 d has res u lted in the emp 1 oymen t Qf USAF a i rpower to mee t a ml,J It itude of requlrements The varied applications of airpower have involved the full spectrum of USAF aerospace vehicles, support ~quipment, and manpower. As a result~ there has' been an accumulation of operational d~ta and experiences ,that, as' a prlority, must be collected, documented, and analyzed as to current and future impact uponUSAF,.policies, concepts, and doctrine',

Fortunately, the value of collectin~ and documenting our SEA experiences was recognized, at an early date. ' In 1962, Hq USAF directed CIrICPACAF to establ1shan activity that would be primarily responsive to Air Staff require­ments and direction, and would provi.de timely and analytical ,studies of lJSAF combat operations in'~EA.

, Project CHECO,' an acronym for Contemporary Historical Examination of Current Operations, ,was established to meet this Air Staff requirement rlanaged by Hq PACAF, with elements at Hq 7AF and 7AFf13AF, Project CHECa provides a scholarly, lIon-goingli historical examination, documentation, and reporting on USAF policies, concepts, and doctrine in PACOM; This CHECa report is part of the overall documentation ~nd examination which is being accomplished. Along wlth the other CHECa publications s this is 'an authentic source for an assess­men t of the effect; veness of USAF ai rpower in PACOt1. .

·!Jul&4~· MIL'FaN B 'ADAMS, ~1ajor General, USAF Chlef of Staff

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SECRET DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE ..

HEADQUARTERS PACIFIC AIR FORC~'5 APO Cj/·N FRANCIScn 9",,553

'SUP-JEer Control of Airstrikes, January 1967 - December 1969

TO SEE DISTRIBUTION PAGE

1. Attached is a SECRET ~OFOR~ ,document~ It shall be tran~ported, stored, safeguarded, and accounted·for in accordance with aop1icab1e securi ty di recti ves. SPECIAL HANDLING REQUI RED, ~JOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS. The information contained in this document \.lill not be disclosep to foreign nationals or their representativ~s .

. Retain or destroy in accordance with AFR 205-1. Do not return ..

2.' This letter does not contain c1assffi~dinformation and malt be dec1assifi~d if attachment is removed from it.

'#-"'1

FOR THE Cm1t1ArIDER IN CHIEF'

...... ..,. .~--. .. ,'. ....< " # •. ,.

HARREN H. PETERSON, Co16nel,lJSAF Chief, CHECO Division Directorate, Tactical Evaluation DCS/Operati ons

1 Atch Project CHEeO Rprt, (S/rJF),

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1. SECRETARY OF TilE AIR FORCE (4) AF.OC~ (5) AFm~o a. SAFAA . · · · · . 1

b. SAFLL . · · · · . 1 j. AFPDC .c. SAFOI . · · · · 2 (1) AFPDPSS (2) AFPMDG. . 2. HEADQUARTERS ~SAF . (3) AFPDW .

a. J\FBSA . · · · 1 k. AFRDC . . . (1) AFRDD b. AFCCS (2) AFRDQ (1) AFCCSSA . 1 . (3) AFRDR , (2) AFCVC . 1 (4) AFRDF. (3) AFCI\\I 1

(4) AFCHO . . . . ~ 2 1. AFSDC (l)AFSLP . • c. AFCSA (2) AFSME (1) AFCSAG. 1 (3) AFSMS · (2) AFCSA~lI 1 (4)AFSPD . (5). AF$SS · \ d. AFGOA :. 2 (6) AFSTP ·

. e. AFIGO m . AFTAC . . · (1) AFISI 3 (2) AFISP . . . . 1 n . AFXDC

(1) AFXDO . · f. AFMSG . . 1 (2) AFXDOC. (3) AFXDOD. · . . g. AFNIN (4) AFXDOL. · . . (1) AFNIE . 1 (5) AFXOP. (2) AFNINA. . . · · · · 1 (6) AFXOSL. (3) AFNINCC . · .1 ( 7 )AFXOStl. . (4)·AFNINED . · 4 (8) AFXOSO . · (9) AFXOSS. h. AFAAC. 1 - (10) AFXOSV. . . . . . · · · (1) AFAMAI. · · · · 1 (1.1) AFXOTR.

(12) AFXOTW .. i. AFODC (13) AFXOTZ. (1) AFOAP • 1 ( 14) ·AFXOXY. (2) AFQAPS. · 1 (15) AFXPD .... ~ .... · (3) AFO'CC . . . · · · · 1 (a) AFXPPGS

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. MAJOR COMMANDS

(e) USAFSOC(nO) · .. . 1 (f) USAFAGOS(DAB-C) 1 TAC a.

b. SAC (1) HEADQUARTERS ~. (a) DO. 1 (1) HEADQUARTERS . . · · · · · · (b) DPL ..• · · · · · · 2 ' (a) DOPL. · · 1 (e) DOCC~. · · · · 1 (b) DPLF. · · · · '. · 1 (d) DORQ .. · · 1 (e) DM. · · · · · _. 1 (e) DIO . 1 .. (d) Dr. :

· 1 . · ' .. · · · (e) OA. · · . · ,,'. · · 1 (2) AIR FORCES

(.f) HI. · · . · · · · 1 (a) 12AF .. 1. DORF . . · 1 (2) AIR .FORCES 2. 01 . . · . 1 , (a) 2AF ( nICS) · ~ . . 1 (b) TqAF(OI). · 1 -( b ) 1 SI\F ( DI ) . . 1 (e) USAFSOF(DO) • · 1

(3) AIR DIVISIONS (3) WINGS (al 3AD(DO) . . . . .. 3 (a) 1 SOW (DO) . · · · 1 (b~ '4TFW(DO) .. • 1 MAC · · . e.

( e23TFW (DO I) . · · 1 (d) 27TH/(DOI). · 1 (1) HEADQUARTERS (e) 33TFW(DOI). · 1 . (a) NAOID . · 1 (f) 64TFW(DO) · · · 1 (b) ~4AOCO . · 1 (g) 67TRW·(C). · · 1 (e) MACHO '.' 1 (h) 75TRW(DO) · · 1 (d) MACOA . · 1 (i) 316TAW(DOP) · 1 (j) 317TAW(EX). · 1 (2) AIR FORCES (k) 363TRW(DOC) · 1 . (a) 21AF(OCXI). 1 (1) 464TAW(DO) ~ · 1 (b) 22AF(OCXI). 1 .. .

(m) 474TFW(TFOX).· . · 1 (n) 4.79TFW(DOF) . . · 1 (3) WINGS (0) 516TAW(DOPL). . . · 1 (a) 61MAHg(0IN) . · 1 (p} 4410CCTW(DOTR) .. · . 1 (b) 62MAWg(OCXP). · 1 (q) 4510CCTW(D016-I). · 1 (e) 436MAWg(OCXC) · 1 (r)'4554CCTW(DOI) .. · 1 (d) 437MAW9(OCXI~ · · 1 , (e) 43R~1AWg(OCXC · 1 (4) TAC CENTERS, SCHOOLS

(4) MAC SERVICES Ca) USAFTA~C(DA) .. · 2 (a) AWS(AWXW) '. · 1 · · . · (b ~ USAFTARC{ DID) . · · 2 (b) ARRS{ARXLR) · · · 1 (e USAFTALC(DCRL). · 1 (e) ACGS(AGOV). · · · 1 Cd) USAFTFWt(CRCD). · 1 (d) AAVS(AVODOD). · . · · 1

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(l) HEADQUARTERS (a) ADO DC . . • . . (b) ADOQP . . . . (e) ADLCC ....

(2) AIR FORCES (a) AF ICELAND(FICAS)

(3) AIR DIVISIONS

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(1) HEADQUARTERS (a) 'ATXDC .

f. AFLC

(l) HEADQUARTERS ( a) '·1CVSS . (b), MCOO.

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h.USAFSS

(l) HEADQUARTERS (a) ODC . . . . .. . 1 (b) 010 . • . 1

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c.

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j. US/\FSO (1) HEADQUARTERS

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k. PACAF

(1) HEADQUARTERS (a) DP. . . (b) DI. . . (c) ,DPL . . (d) C$H . . (e) OOTEC . (f) DE. (g) D~1.. . (h) OOTEC .

( 2) AI R FORCE.S (a) 5AF{OOPP) ...• (b) Det 8, ASD(D"OASD) (c) 7AF

1 . ,DO . . . '2'. DIXA . 3. 'DPL .. 4. TAce . 5. DOAC

(d) 13AF 1. CSH .. 2. DPL ....

(e) 7;13AF(CIIECO)

(3),AIR DIVISIONS (a) 3l3AD{DOI); (b) 3i4AD{DOP). (c) 327AD

1 ;" DO .. 2. DI .. .

( d ) 83 4AD ( DO )

1 1 4 1 5 1 1 l'

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(4) WINGS (a)8TFW(DCOA') ..

'. . (b) 12TFW( DCaI) . (e) 35TFW(DCOI)

(d) 37TFW(DCOI) .... (e) 56S0W( DXI). • (f) 347TFW(OCOOT) . . . . (g) 355TFW(DCOC) .. (h )366TF~I.( DCO) . . (i) 388TFW(DCO) .. (j) 405TFW(DCOA). (k) 432TRW(DCOI). ,(1) 460TRW(DCOI) ..... (m) 475TH1(DCO) . (n) 633S0W(OCOI) .. (0) '1st Test Sq(A).

(5) OTHER UN ITS (a) Task Force ALPHA(DXI) (b) 504TASG(nO) . . . ..

m. USA FE

(1) HEADQUARTERS (a) ODC/OA. . (b) ODC/OTA . (c). DOT . . . (d) XI)C • • •

(?) AIR FORCES

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· . 1 · 1 ~ 1 • 1 • 1

1-· 1 • 1 • 1 • 1 • 1

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1 1 1 1

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1. ODC .. 2. 010 ..

(3) WINGS (a) 20TFW(DCOI) . (b) 36TFt~(OCOID) .. (c) 50TFW(DcoL .. (d) 66TRW(OCOIH-T). ee) RlTH/(DCOI) .. (f) 40lTFH(DCOI). . (g) 513TAW(OID) . ~ (h) 7101I\DW(DCO-CP) (i). 7149TFW( Deo!) . '. .

· 1 · 1

. . • . . 1

· 1 • 1 • 1 · 1 · 1 · 1 · 1 • 1

vii

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4. SEPARATE OPERATHIG AGErJCIES

a. AC I C (ACot1C). . . . . . b. ARPC(RPCAS-22) c. AFRES(AFnXPL) ..... d. lJSAF/1. .

(1) CtlT, . . . (2) DFH ..•.

e. I\U

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· 1 · 1

. (1) ACSC-SI\. " . . . (2) AUL(SE)-69-1nr, . (3)' ASI(ASD-l) ...

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(4) ASI(ASHAF-A) . · 1 · 2

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a. ' b.

CO~1USJAPAN. • CINCPAC • • • • •

c. COMUSKOREA.. " d. CDr1USMACTHAI. . • • . e • COMUSf1ACV .•• , f.COMUSTDC .••• g. USCINCEUR

. . . . . ... . . . ...

1 1 ' 1 1 1 1 1 h. USCINCSO.

f. CINClANT •••••••• . • • 1

j. CHIEF, NAVAL OPERATIONS. • • " • '1 "

k. COMMANDANT,MARINE CORPS •• 1. CINCONAD •.•.•••• ~ •

• • ....J. • 1 '

m. DEPARTMENT OF THE AR~1Y. • • " • n. JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF. o. JSTPS. • • • • • • • • • • . .

. .... ...

... . . ...

. . . .. . . ... ... .. ". . . . .

p. SECRETARY OF DEFEtlSE (OASO/SA). q. 'USCHICMEAFSA. • . • • • • • • • r. CINCSTRIKE ••••••. ' •••• s. CINCAl. • • • • • • ". • • • . • .' • • • '. • • • • . t. ~1AAG-Chi na/ AF Secti on U1GAF -0). . . . . . . .. . . . . u. Hq Allied 'Forces Northern Eyrope (tl.S. nocuments Office)~

"

6. SCHOOLs

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 '

a. Senior USAF Representative, National War College. b. Senior lISAF Represe'ntative, Armed Forces Staff College. . ". 1

c. S~nior USAF Rep,Industrial College of the Armed ~orces • d. Senior USAF Representative, Naval Amphibious School,. e. Senior USAF Rep, US Marine Cbrps Education Center •.• f. Senior USAF Representative; US Naval War College •••• g. Senior USAF Representative, US Army War College ..•• h. Senfor USAF Rep, US AY'my C&G Staff Co 11 ege. '. . • . • i. Senior USAF Representative,US Army Infantry School, ••

1 . , 1

1 1 1 1-

j . 'Senior USAF Rep, US 'Army JFK Center for Special Warfare. k. Senior USAF Representative, US Army Field Artillery School ••

.. 1 1 1

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UNCLASSI·FIED .

TABLE OF CONTENTS

FOREWORD ••••••• , ...................................................... 0 x

CHAPTER I - CONTROL OVER THE BATTLE AREAS •••••••••••••••••••••••••••

ABCCC - The Battlefield Dir~ctor •••••••••••••••••••••• The Frag •••••••••••••••••••• , .... , •••••••••••••••••••••• Other'Control Agencies •••• ~ •••• o •••••••••••••••••• ; •••

The MSQs ' •••••• ;, ' •••• ;, ••• ~ .............................. . "CRCs/CRPs ••••••••••• ~ •••••••••••••••••• " •••••••••• ' •• ' ••

1

1 5

'9 10 15

CHAPTER I I THE STRIKE DIRECTORS ,,,. ",""""""'''" .. " ......... 21

FACs - Slow Mbvers and Fast Movers •••••••••••••••••••• ~ Ra vens, Na i 1 s, and Coveys - Slow r·1over Day FACs •••••••

FAC Tactics ••••••••••••••••.•••••••••••••••••••••••••• '. . Ordnance ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••.•• ~ .•••••••••••• ' ••• The Ravens •• : ~ ••••••••.•.••••••••. ~ ••••••• ' •. :~ •••••••••••• Night fACs - B1indbat and Candlestick, Nail and Covey ... Night Tactics, Target 'Marking, and Ordnance ••••••••••• Th~ Fa~t Mover FACs ••••••••••••••••• ~ ••••••••••••••••• The Biggest Problem - Airspace Saturation •••••••••••••

21-23 25 27 28 32 35 39 40

FOOTNOTES

Chapter I ••• ,." ••• " •••••••••• , •••••••.••• , ••••••• , ••••••••••••••. , '. 44 Chapter II ••••• , ...................... , ,., •••••••••••••••• " ••• ,',., •• , ••• 47

GLOSSARY, •. ,',.,." ••• ~ ••••• ,', , .•• ;, ... , •• , ••••• , •• " •• ,", ••• " •••• " •• '50

FIGURES

•

1, (S) 2, (5) 3, (S) 4, (S)

", Follows Page Typi ca 1 M.SQ Coverage a'nd Mask i ng , r. 14 Combat Skyspot 14

'Control Points for Entry into Laos 18 Raven Operat.i ng Locati ons and Mi 1 i tary Regi ons of Laos -28

)

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UNCLASS·IF.·IED .

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r,CONFIDENTIAL

FOREWORD

Evolution of the Tactical Air Control System in Southeast ASia,' its

expansion and refinement, and its relationship to Command and Control in general

'were addressed in CHECO report, IIControl of Air Strikes in SEA, 1961-1966 11 ,

" -published on 1 ~1arth 1967. Concerned especially with out-country control of

air$trikes, this, second CHECO report updates Command and Control' act,ivities , ,

and actions which directly pertain to control and dir'ect'ion of air~trikes, such as Airb~(ne Battlefield Command and Controi Center orbits, Forward Air

Controney

' c.apabilities, armed reconnaissance and--insofar as they impinge -

upoh strike control--Rules 9f Engagement. Specific pe~ipheral element~ ~nd

in-country procedures pertaining to aiy·str.ike control in Southeast Asia have,

been profiled in other CHEeD reports.

x

CONFIDENTIAL ,.

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SECRET /1

CHAPTER I

CONTROL OVER THE BATTLE AREAS

ABCCC - The Battlefield Director

- Although the concept of an Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center

(ABCCC) had been formulated, reviewed, and submitted as an operational require~ ment by 2 January 1964, _ and vari ous parti a1 answers, such as the RC-47 "Dog_

patch" tried- in SEA, the first true combat ABCCC came about in Septemb~r 1965, - - , 1/ __

when the initial &-130 was deployed to Da Nang, RVN.- -This first aircraft

took up its orbit in the southern STE,EL TIGER area, over what was to become- in

a few months the oper~tional area known as TIGER HOUND. The orbit~ basic~lly

a daytime orbi t, operated under the Call Sign Hi n sboro. - Personnel were . , 2/,-

primarily TDY and~ere attached to Headquarters, 2d Air Division.-

-The second aircY'aft to deploy took~p its orbit over STEEL TIGER North

(SL/N) to control BARREL ROLL and Route Package I, alon~ with SL/N under the - - ~

Call Sign Cricket. Dogpatch was relegated to the role of radio relay, but

other RC-47s, called "Alleycat"-, worked a night orbit in Laos opposite the

Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) to control operations throughout Laos and NVN to the ~ best of its limited communications capabilities. Following the ac~u;sition of

51. suffi-2; ent EC-130s, the All eycat orb; t was, assumed by ABCCC in June 67.- -Con-

currently, three of the aircratt were transferred to Udorn for beddown on - ~ -

15 June, because it was more convenient to the northern orbits. AroGket

attack on Da Nang,- however, destroyed_ one of the-remaining ABCCC aircraft (j,

there, afJd seriousJy. damage~ another. To insure the survivability, of the-

remaining five aircraft, the ~i11sboro'EC-130s mOVed from Da Nang-to-Udo~n., It-

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was not the iht~nt of Se~enth Air Force to have the ABCCC remain at U~orn, and

its planned return. to Da Nang was concuM'ed wi th by COMUS~1ACV. ' Seventh Air

Force pla'nners changed their minds .by March of 1968, however, and decided to ' " 6/

leave the ABCCC at Udorn, apparently for survivability reasons.---:

The ,ABCCC concept was fu l1y deve loped and estab 11 shed by 1968, a 1 though

the unit remained an'Operating Location (OL) at that time,' with airplanes and

aircrews staging to Udorn TOY from Taiwan. ' On 25 January 1968, PACAF Special

Order G-26 activated th.'e Seventh Airborne. COmmand and Control Squadron (ACCS),

effective as of 1 March, with the unit to remain pennanently at Udorn RTAFB, . , 7/ Thail and.-

In a~other major chanqe, a second night orbit.was approved in mid-December

1967, to orbit in the Hillsboro area t enabling Alleyc'at to shift farther north

for better coverage of BARREL ROLL. The orbit was named "Moonbeam il , and 8/

,actually began operations in February 1968.-:- (The orbit was suspended in May, . 9/

and resumed operations in August after modifications were perfo~ed.)-. Although .,

planning for Moonbeam had come about asa resu1t"of the MUSCLE SHOALS/IGLOO

WHITE sensor program, it actually was ~cti'vated to control the intense air lQJ

activity during the long siege of Khe Sanh, Operation NIAGARA. Its value was

demonstrated amply during this critical operation which, from its beginning on

22 january until its tennination on 31 "March, received more th.an 24,000 tactical

airstrike sorties and 2,500 ARC LIGHT sorties. These missions wereFAC directed,

MSQ and TPQ directed (USAF and USMC ground-based radar bombing), and on occasion

flight leader directed, .and comprised str.ike assets of USAF, USN, and USMC

"

11/' , forces. - The Moonb.eam ABCCC (a long wi th Hi,ll sboro in the daytime), ,'as an

2.

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extensiol1 O{7AF TACC, was to directly control all air opel"ations in NIAGARA,

with the exception of those Marine sorties used as close air support for Marine 12/ ,

ground forces. - With Moonbeam and Hi 11 sboro coordi nati ng and contro 11 i ng a i r-

strikes, some of the most impressive Battle 'Damage Assessment (BOA)' oJ, the war'

was registered. As an example, ABCCC mission reports for 15 February 1968

sh~wed one target area a~out ten miles southwest of 'Khe Sanh (XD 765227 UTM . Coords), in which strikes uncovered 200 meters of underground trenches stacked

with hundreds, of crates and boxes of ammunition which yielded II we 11 over 1,000 , 13/

seconda ry exp los ions and fi res . II~

, The question of'airborne control ~ersus ground co~tro1 came op in late

1967, when the sophisticated infiltration detection system, later to be known

as IGLOO WHITE, achieved operational capability. The COMMANDO HUNT campaign,

cov~ring the east central panhandle of Laos, was destined to have a profound

effect on ABCCC operations. The plan, based upon an electronic sensor system

to detect movers (truck traffic along the Ho Chi Minh Train, marked off an

'important segment of The Trail for sensor emplacement and also provi.dedfor a ' '14/ '

readout station 'at Nakhon Phanom RTAFB,' Thailand.-

The operation at Nakhon Phanom, ,des,ignated Task Force Alpha, raised

questions in higher circles regarding the feasibility of replacing the ABCCC

with aground control unit, at least for the area of .emplacement. Seventh Air "

Force conducted an exhaustive study which resulted in the recommendation that

the ABCCC cont1 nue, to conduct air operati ons in Laos', and in Route Package I

of North Vietnam, with Task Force Alpha (TFA) serving as a valuable additional ' 15/ '

source of target information.--

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The cOlJtroversy did not end with the 7AF recommendation, however. By

September, 1968, plans had been fonnu1 ated to turn over control ofai r resources

to TFA for those assets which would be operating in the area t~ be later

called COMMANDO HUNT--that section of STEEL TIGER between16°30'N and l80 00'N, 16/

and adj acent to the borders of North and South, Vi etnam -:- In October, a Combat

qperati~ns Center (COC) ~as s~t up in Task Force Alpha. This COC, called

Sycamore Control, was an extension of the 7AF Command Center, but was 9ivell

direct control of all air resources operating in the COMMANDO HU~ •. with

the aim of making' more rapid use of the sensor i,nformation developed by the 17/

~ IGLOO WHITE system.-

The ABCCC orbits continued to exercise control function over the other

Laotian areas, STEEL TIGER South and BARREL ROLL, as well as RP t until the

cessation of bombing over North Vfetnam. On occasion, Hillsboro and Moonbeam

were, even called upon to coordinate air action over South Vietnam, as on 12 May

1968, when the Kham Duc SpeCial Forces Camp was being overrun. At 0900H,

,Hi 11 sboro was directed to assume control of the' Kham Duc opera ti on. Twenty

minutes later, he put in his first fighter strike, and within one hour h~d controlled ten in-country and six out-country strikes. By 1900H, Hillsboro had

controlled some 102 in-country and 36 out-country strikes related to the 'Kham 18/

Duc area and its evacuation.- -The cessation of'U.S. bombing over North Vietnam caused a further reorien­

tation of ABCCC activities. The combat air operations shi,fted to the more

limited target,system within the confines of Laos,-exc1uding the special area'

of CO~1MANDO HUNT operations, which operated under Sycamore Control during the

4

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The Frag

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. The frag order, i ssved da i ly by the Hq 7AF DOCFF, was the standard 1 i n'k

between the Headquarter5 pl anners and the battl efi el d di rectors, the ABCCC: .. All

strike aircraft checked in with the appropriate controlagency--nonnally the

ABCCC~-upon entering the area, and it was up to the air-borne orbit commander,

) depending upon the battlefield situation, to divert the incoming aircraft, \" t :-.

assign them to a ~AC a5 netessary, or send them to COMBAT SKYSPOT (CSS), if

need be. However, each Hfc:aning strike aircraft Was fully fragged upon arrival

with a primary, a first a~ second alternate target, a TOT and, as close·ly as 20/

possib1e, proper ord'nance for the primary target.--

If matters were prOceeding normally; that is, if weather and visibility

were SUitable, the FAC was not overloaded. ordnance and fuel considerations

Were acceptable, then tbe ABCCC would direct the fighter to the proper FAC and

the target would be strwck u~der visual conditions and FAC control. If the

abOve conditions could not be met, then the ABCCC could direct the fighters to

a FAC over their seconda·ry target, or could direct them to a COMBAT SKYSPOT OL

fora MSQ-77 radar directed strike, often ~ai nst their fragged primary target.

Conmando Nail (internal radar bombing) orLORAN bombing, for those aircraft ill suitablYJaQuipped, could also be directed.

In additi.on· to the fighters" the Fl~ag Branch at Seventh Air Force also

fragged the gunships, AC-130 "Spectres" and NC-123 "Tritons" for night route . ,

reconnaissance, with additions or deletions to fi.t the known or forecast

situation. These.frags included a Time-en-Station and a Time-off-Station over

5

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whatever route segment they we~e fragg~d to. To avoid conflict and subseq~ent

possible area conQestion, the only ~thers frag~ed into these night gunship

sections were the FAC and the flak: suppression aircraft. Flak suppression air-

" craft accompanying the NC-123s were A-ls, whose 10Her time enabled .them to {

stay with the Tritons for extended periods. The F-4s ~overing the AC-130s

~ere fragged as three-ship missio~s, so that one could be on a tanker refuel-

ing while the others remained with the Spectre, ,thus providing constant cov.er-. 22/ '. age.-- The. Triton aircraft were not tru~ gunships but dispensed CBU-24/BLU-26

bOO1blets upon detection of vehicle traffic by IR, LLLTV, MTI radpr or Black

Crow ,vehicle ignition d~te~tbr. It was later designated the AC-123; later '. 23/

still, it was returned to CONUS for rehabilitation.-

Navy and Marine A-6s were often fragged, on a three-fold mission. Their

Airborne Moving Target Inditator (AMTI) ra~~r gave t~em the potential of ac-

quiring any vehicles moving at' five miles an hour or more, at night or in

weather conditions. This gave them an all-weather armed, route reconnaissance

capability; however, they were also fragged to seed HK-36 mine~' 'against Traffic

Control Points (TCPs)by Commando Nail, and to bomb Perishable Area Targets 24/

. (PATs) I' also by Co~ando Nail procedures.-

The fragging system was not without drawbac:ks, many of which could n.ot be

laid to the system itself but to the fluid nature of· the war. It was incumbent

upon the frag branch to pr6vide a smooth and orderly flow of aircraft into the

target .area,especially during periods of high activity. However, since the" , I

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frag was prepared 36 to 48 hours ahead o~ the missions, oftentimes it tended , i

to lag behind battlefield events or, for .. that matter, unforeseen operational

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25/ One Tactical Fighter Wing noted in a report:-

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"This is most apparent when something out of the ordinary OCOUT's~ such as special. operations or when an organization changes ordnance, The cticmges do not seem to reach the operating level. in time to be ef- . fective~ aonsequently confusion is bound to result, Enough fZexibility sho~ld-be built into the system 80 that speaial operations aan be 'conducted with effi­ciency. When frag changes oacUT'~ .. it ifJ impor.timt that a special effort be made to notify the affeated agencies at the opel~tor level~otherwise the effeat

. of the change is lost and ineffiaiency results," <)

I.

In actuality, the flexibilitY inherent in the ABCCC/FAC/CSS'control

capabilities went a long way toward making up for any possible defiCiencies in.

'the' fragging system. In any event, the system was not designed to provide real

time direct.ion, but to provide a solid and orderly baSis for continuing the

flow of st.r'ike assets to their areas of use. Inevitably, time was consumed in

the determ'ination of what assets would be available, the ordnance avai.lable,to

them, and the matching of these assets to known and' forecast t.argets. Added to

this time was the time required for rechecking to avoid conflicts, and for

pub li cation and dissemi nat; on of the frag. Upon recei pt by the operati ng bases,

~ time was necessary for uplo'ading aircraft and scheduHng the missions and crews.

In any event, the preplanning and -t~ought that preceded the actual frag~ing

was both detai led and thorough. A typi ca 1 DOC Stri ke Pl ann'i ng j~eeti ng (held

each morning at lOOOH at 7AF) consisted of the following subjects, given in . . 27/

the .form -of's ~and-up bri efi ngs to the Director of Combat Operati ons:-

• 'Ordnance allocations, expendit~res and stock~ on hand at the various bases were difcussed, with questions and answers. regarding specific munitions.

7

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. Weather briefing covering the previous day's weather arid the 'weather of the upcoming frag date, with climatology

'extending approximately a week ahead; basically target weather.

Antiai rcraft Artillery Order' of Battle (AAAOB) for BARREL ROLL and STEEL TIGER .

• BOA for previous day's strikes, BARREL ROLL, STEEL TIGER North, and STEEL TIGER South .

. Chart displays showing working areas for the next frag date, 36 to 48 h6urs ahead, along with general fragging of FACs,and armed reconnaissance route segments.

ARC LIGHT forecast for two days, under r1SQ direction. ,(This assumed importance to fragger~, since ,the ARC LIGHT strikes "froze" two MSQ sites--one primary and one backup--for approximately two hours each, during which time Tac air­strikes could not be fragged for those particular OLs.)

Report On visual aC<Jjisiti'on of vehicles in STEEL TIGER, North (SL/N) for tbe previous reportable 24-hour period. Followed by the Infiltrati,on Surveillance Center (ISC) report on sensor activations.

Report on visual sighting of enemy vehicles in STEEL TIGER South (SL/S)., "

Report on r'cent sensor emplacements~ including whether suc­cessful or unsuccessful.,

Reports on strikes (fragged versus struck} plus Mk-36 seed­ings, etc; BOA involving LaCs, storage areas, PATs in SL/N; largely Intelligence. '

Follow on of intent for SL/N for next frag date. Discussed CSS/CN/LORAN all-weather ~rops.

BOA reports, fragged versus struc'k, in STEEL 'TIGER South for previous day's strikes ... Followed with gene,ral intent for upcoming frag date.

It was 'only after, such thorough prebriefing and preplanningthat the frag.

teams got to wor:k 'on the nuts and bolts job of piecing the upcoming frag order

together. When completed, the finished product was sent to all participating

8

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agencies. late'rally to the action units and vertically to all elements of the

command chain. It was nowhere intended to be an exact template of what was

to happen 48 hours later in the battle arena; it di~, however, present a'usabie

pattern from which the ABCCCs and other controlling agencies could' fashion an 28/

effective and responsive airstrike capability.~

Other Control AgenCies

Since the bombing reduction announced on 1 April 68, and certainly after

the total halt in bombing of North Vietnam on Novembel~ 1968, the ABCCC. orbits

had out-country primacy 'as control agency under the overa 11 command di recti on 29/

of Blue Chip, the 7AF Command .Center.- For expediency, flyin~ safety, and--

in the case of COMMANDO HUNT--in an attempt to gain real time advantage of

sensor information, other' agencies and subagencies also carried varying degrees

of control responsibility.

As mentioned previously, Sycamore'was TFA's cont~oJ agency covering the

COMMANDO HUNT area. Although COMMANDO HUNT was not officially 'mpler!Je~t~d untn

15 November, Sycamore and the cot began operations on 22 October 68. To smooth

the transition, ABCCC controllers from 7th ACCS at Udorn came 'to TFA on' tempo­

rary duty to work with the 'Sycamore controllers,until theY'became proficient on 30/ their own.- .'

Sycamore was faced with foreseeable problt!ms. Although the COMMANDO HUNT

area was relatively small, the ground-:based t'adio equipment of Sycamore was'.

often attenuated when 'aircraft were working in-the southern reaches. Relays

i . through the ABCCC ·were often necessary a'nd added one 'more step in the control I

. function. This same problem tended to introduce an operational inflexib.ility,

9

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in that COMMANDO HUNT could not be moved south Qr enlarged to suit the changi.ng

tactical picture; any further extension of rang~ would make relaying through - - -- 31/ . '/ ·ABCCC necessary for a 11 communi cat ions.-

With increased familiarization, however, the Sycamore·operation did

improve within·its own limitations. It did not have radar capability as did,

Invert or the other CRCs and CRPs, and·it did not have the mobility of the

ABCCCs, but it conscientiously controlled the COHMANDO HUNT ~rea, and drew

praise from FACs and other pilots who worked under Sycamore Control. For the

<"Slow Moverll

FACs, especial1y, those who often worked at the far fringe of

radi 0 and radar coverage' arid at low a Hi tudes, Sycamore I s consc; ent.i ousness . was greatly appreciated. One IINailll FAC, from, the 23d Tactical Air Support.

Squadron (TASS) at NKP,commented upon this during a disc.ussion about airspace 32/ saturati on.:-

The MSQs

;'We were very a Zose to the Syaamore aontr-o ZZers beaause they wer-e from the same unit where we wer-e Zoaated~ and' we aou~ taZk to them about our probZems ••. Onething Syaamor-e Contr-oZ did was assign a PAC to a seator-" and . hoZdhim to his wor-d he wou~ stay in that seator-'and aontroZ that sector- to the best of his ability. When

' this lA)aS done" the 'slow mover-' FAC ••. aould fairbi weZZ aontroZ his aroea /Without fear of being 'run over-I." - -

.t:."

With .the exception of ARC LIGHTB-52 stri kes', . it was. always consi dered -\ '

preferab 1 e to have targets acqui red vi s.uqlly, and ordnance de li vered vi sua lly

under FAC contro·l. Whenever weather and visibility pennitted, this was 'the

nann. However. when target weather was inclement, the capability remained for

ordnance to be deliverea relatively ac~urately under control of the MSQ-77

10

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ground radar bombing system. Originally deve.1oped as a radar scoring system

for the Strategic Air Command (MSQ~35), it was determinedthat--by l'eversing

the p,rocess, directing the bombing rather than simply scoring the run--a

usable all-weather bombing system was feasible.

The actua 1 accuracy of the s'ys tem was dependent upon several exteri or

factors: the range and altitude of the ·aircraft being controlled, 'whether the­

aircraft were.transp~nder-equipped, and such things as target weather and winds.

If aircraft were trahsponder-equipped (as were all B-52s and most tactical

strike fighters in the-USAF inventory), then a range of 190 nautical miles was

possible with an aircraft altitude of 35,000 feet. At maxi~um range, MSQ

c'ontrollers in Southeast ASia felt they could achieve a Circular Error- Average

I (CEA) of around 1,200 fe~t. Working strike fighters at 20,000 feet within a

reasonable range (within approxiinately 125-NM for example), knowledgeable' r.1SQ

operators figured for an elect~onica1ly scored CEA of about 300 feet and an 33/

actual CEA of around 600 feet.-- .

Working with aircraft using "skin paint" 'gave accuracy figures of the' same

order but ranges were drastically reduced, Fifty nautical miles were considered

a fair fi gure. Mari ne and Navy ~ai rcraft were not transponder cOmpati b 1 e with

the Air Force MSQs and therefore'were worked in this manner. (USAF aircraft . . ~

were in the same position when being controlled by USMC TPQ-10 radar equipment.)

A factor that tended to degl"ade. COMBAT SKYSPOT accuracy was the inaccuracy

~f the m~ps 6f Southeast ASia, particularly in Laos a~d northeastern South

Vietnam. If toe coordinates cranked into the thumb wheels of the MSQ equip-

. ment were incorrect. that was where the bombs would be released, and although

11 '

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, electronic scoring could indicate a CEA of 300 feet,. the impact area. could be

on the order of 3,000 feet away from. the inte'nded target. And this' actually 35/ . occurred.-

Discussions with Lt. Col. Henry G. Hostetter, Special Assistant.to the 36/ COll1Tlander, 7AF, at TFA confirmed ~his. He said':-

"They found out that in several areas", TCPs" showed aatua'Z impaats were seVel'a Z hundl'ed' yards offset fl'om the intended impaat points--often in the same dil'eation and'often appioo:.cimateZy.the 8ame distanae off •. Other al'eas" espeaially th08e along praninent stl'eams and vaZZeys" were quite aaaUl'ate. It appeql'ed that in the mappir/fl" Bome of the more diffiault al'eas wel'e simply

. estimated.

'~8 onee~~Ze .. one TCP had been'$kyspotted l'~peatedZy" withoutapparentZy doing any good . . The·t~ffia k~pt aom­ing thl'ough. One day an F-4" aoming baak toward hane pZate" was asked to visuaUy overfZy it while one of the MSQ sites followed him through on· his !'Un. It turned out that the map aoordinates they had been Skyspotting wel'e about a miZe qr so off. FoZZowir/fl this,,' theil' ~ops in that area were. far more aaauraate.!'

Personnel of the 1st Combat Evaluation Group, Detachment 15, at Tan Son

Nhut AB, also pointed this out. They indicated that by trial and ·error, and

. help from' the Aeronautical Chart and Information Center (ACIC) people, sev'eral

areas had been updated by ACIC and the MSQ operators so that--~lthough the . . ..,

target~rs did not need to chan~e ~oordinates--the OL itself coul~ apply proper . . . W corrective factors prior to the runs.

It took an Operating Location approximately 20 minutes to accept and work

a Tat: air miSSion, from the time it was given the mission until bomb impact." '/

i In a max~mum effort, a site could ~cirk five miSSions an hour. 'This was not the

12 .; ~

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case with ARC LIGHT missions. One ARG LIGHT mission "froze" two OLs from an , .

hour and ten minutes to two hours, since all MSQ directed B-52 strikes used a . '. .' . .

back-up station which could not .then accept any other traffic during the Cburse 38/

of' the mission.-

Ordnance itself could affect the time'needed to execute a COMBAT SKYSPOT.

Each ordnance type had its own ballistic characteristics, with different rates

of· fall ,di spers i on, ··and ball i s ti c arcs. The' MSQ . operators computed actual

. r'anges CARs) from the ballistics tables for each munition andp1:ace'd AR lines

on the plot sheets. If all ordnance to be dropped on a mission were the s.ame,

no problem existed; the mission cou~ be executed in one run. If however,

ordnance loads were mi xed, such as CBUs and M-1l7 s, they C'ou 1 d not be dropped

on the same run since their lJoint~ o,f impact would differ. significantly. In.

sl!ch.a case, one type of ordnance ·was released, then the aircraft would return

to the IP for a second run. Generation of the ground radar bombing system,

the TSQ-96, was soon to electronically compute ballistics entirely, .thus making . 39/

manual computation unnecessary.-

It was mandatory for. each OL executing a COMBAT SKYSPOT to check back with

ABCCC (or some other controlling agency) five minutes before bomb release.~o insure that the target clearance remained in effect. It. was possible that

friendly troops or noncombatants could have moved into the target area or buffer

.zone •. Since it was also conceivable that radio or other communication diffi-. . .

.... culties could have prevented' this from being relayed to the MSQ locations, ~

positive' answer was necessary on this five-minute check. Silence constituted

SUfficient reason to abort the strike.· On occaSion, sorties were lost for this

13

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. iQj. reason if, for example , the ABCCC failed to come 'up on frequency.

.. '

Also, at five'minutes prior to a Tac air COMBAT SKYSPOT release, the OL

broadcast an IIArtillery Warning ll on guard frequency .. If the strike were an

,ARC L·IGHT mission, the warning was published in the Frag as a "Heavy Artillery

Warning" and bro'adcast 15 minutes before the drop. The r~dio frequencies used

Frequency Single Sideband (HF SSB) for B-52 strikes. All sites were being . ,

. b~ the OLs included VHF and UHF for th~ t~ct1ca1 fighters,~nd added~High

made Seek Silence capable (secure voice), although it had not generally been 3 '"

put into \.4se, since most fighters had not been modified with this equipniEmt.

When executing ~ac air SKYSPOT, they could discuss target and mission informa­

tion in the clear, if it were within one hour of the strike. Although the SAC

bombers flew at 30,000 to 37,000 feet, and the fighters no~al1y dropped from

20,000- feet, approximately, the secure voice equipment tended to attenuate ' 41

' . ~ transmission strength, and if not required would not ,normally Le used.

The MSQ-77 OLs in Southeast Asia, to all intents and purposes, eff~ctively blanketed all of South Vietnam, a signifi,cant portion' of North Vietnam, an of

southern Laos (STEEL TIGER), and much of ncir~hern Laos (BARREL ROLL). By number 1Y and name, at the end of 1968,' the sites were:

OL-21 Macon

OL-24 Mi lky

. Bien Hoa, RVN ", ' ..

Hue Phubai, RVN

14

Covered· all of III CTZ .-and much 'of"1V CTZ'

All of I Corps, most of RP I and, except where terrain masked, much of the STEEL TIGER

' area of Laos.

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TYPICAL MSQ COVERAGE a MASKI NG

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LAOS

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, Bongo Pleiku, RVN

Teepee Mukdahan, Thai

Gap Binh Thuy, RVN

Bromo· Nakhon Phanom, Thail and

All of STEEL TIGER south to th~ Saravane region; except for masking, much of BARREL ROLL as far north 'as Xieng Khoang~ A significant gap in the coverage was the Muang Soui! Luang Prabang .area.

All of II Corp~ Tactical Zone, ex­treme southern Laos,

Operated fr6m Qu~ng Tri, RVN, until 27 ~ov 68 when ·it was moved to Mukdahan and became operational 31 Dec 68. Essentially duplicated OLs 23 and 27's cov.rage of southern Laos, but did not extend as far north.

Coverage included all of IV CTZ and III Corps as far north as TayNi nh, Xuan Loc, and Phan Thiet.

"

Basically identical coverage as Lid, Between the two OLs, they made 13,628 drops in 1968, for a 95.3 percent

.reliability f~ctor.

The most cOmparable Marine facility to the MSQ~77'was the AN/TPQ-10,several

of ~hich were located in I Corps at ~uch places as Dong Ha, Hue Phu Bai, and

Da Nang. These Air Support Radar Teams (ASRTs) were subordinate control agencies

accomplishing the same function as the MSQs--precis;on a~l-weather bombing;

however, the TPQ-10 was far shorter in range. With aircraft equipped with.X-band

t~ansponders, the TPQ-10 c6uld reach out only to 40 NM, and to 20 NM using 43/

radar skin returns.-

CRCs/CRPs

The Control and Reporting Centers,. and Control and Reporting Posts (CRCs/

CRPs). were not in the business of controlling airstrikes; they were,. hcwever,

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an indispensable link in the chain. From the time of take-off until a strike

fli ght checked in wi th ASCCC .-.rendezvoused wi .th a FAC, or was turned over to one

of the MSQ sites for direction, it was necessary that these aircraft be accord­

ed some form of positive or near-positive traffic control, both for flying

safety and for orde'rly flow of strike and support assets.' For several years,

in-country procedures had been refined. The strike sortie rates in South

V'i~tnam remained relatively stable th.rough 1967, 1968, and .1969,' ranging between

9,000 and '11 ,000 per month (30Q .to 365 a day), and wi th the excepti o~ of key

operations' and pitched battles such as Khe Sanh, Kham Duc, and Duc Lap, these . ,44/

.s·orties were relative'ly evenly spaced throughout the Republic.-

With full radar overlap in-country, and constantly imprQv.ing interface of

communications, the eRCs and CRPs. normally found the control of tactical air

traffic fairly routine. The Control and Reporting Centers at Saigon (Parts . .

Control) and Da N~ng (Panama), and the Control and Reporting Poits (Pleikur

Pea-

cock; Ban Me Thout, Pyramid; Binh Thuy, Paddy; Hon Tre Island, Port Call; Dong

Ha, Wat.erboy) spread throughout the· country were adequate not only to control

tactical strike traffic, but to control the off-airways traffic of other support 45/ functions such as FACs,' reconnaissance, and airlift.-

A different situation existed with the eRCs/CRPs' in Thailand. Pr.ior to

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the banbing' halt, these Thai-based units were primarily engaged in twi.ce-.a-day. 'j waves of aircraft to and (rom targets in North Vietnam, with the primary service

., 46/ rendered being the control of refuel ing' rendezvous.- After 1 November '1968,

and espeCially following the intensified interdiction program"jn COMMANDO HUNT

(officially initiated on 15 November), the CRPs in Thailand found themselves

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involved with a round-the-clock flow of traffic, Refueling was no longer a'

single, massive pre-,entry/post-exit operation but a continual 24,-hour-a-day

business. The bulk of this traffic was hand1ed bi Invert at Nakhon 'Phanom,

Lion at Ubon., and Brigham at Udorn. Invert. theCRP at Nakhon Phanom, was 47/

most drastically affected by the COMMANDO HUNT operation.--

Previously, Invert' had been responsible for part-:time control of Peach

refueling anchor and radar monitoring, and rarely required more than two

controllers in operations at anyone time. By 15 November 68, Invert was in­

volved with 350 to 400 strike sorties going into COMMANDO HUNT daily~ in , '

addition to an average of 300 FAC sorties per month, the checking in and out

of ABCCCs ,', and' the refue 1 i ng tracks.' I nvert a 1 s 0 had' res pons i bi 11 ty for moni­

toring the NVN bo~der and issuing ~order warnings, and ~onstant coordination 48/'

wi th Sycamore" the command 'agency for COMMANDO HUNT.--

., As an illustrati6n of the sudden load thrust upon Invert, this Single CRP

·was controlling as many s,trikes into COMMANDO HUNT as t~o CRCs and four CRPs

were controlling in all of South Vietnam. The COMMANDO, HUNTarea, approximate­

ly 30 mil es wi de by 90 mi 1 es 'long, was' about the same 's i zeas the two northern-' , , ~/

most provinces' of I Corps--Quang Tri and Thua Thien--in SVN.-Mission statis-

tics for the'first 15 days of the COMMANDO HUNT operation ShOW~d that Invert , 50/

provided radar monitor or control for the fol.lowing:--

-Jet strike sorties 3236 Prop strike sorties 481 COMBAT SKYSPOT sorties 1421 Support sorties 98 FAC sorties 700 Reconnaissance sorties 340 TOTAL 6276

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The largest imnediate problem affecting this and other Thailand CRCs and

CRPs (Bri gham at Udo~n and Dres,sy Lady ~tGreen HH 1 w,ere CRCs;' all others

were, CRPs) was that of educating controllers 'and aircrews in the necessary

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procedures to use. While the TACS in South Vietnam had long been involved 'I

with radar monitor and control of s imil ar numbers of such sorti es, there had

never been.. as heavy a load in such a confi ned ~rea (excepti ng shorter term

operations such as' THOR. NEUTRALIZE. NIAGARA, etc.). Invert's method of handl­

ing the flow centered around three radar scopes--one tactic~l radar'monitor

scope and two area control scopes. The tactical radar monitor scope accepted

handoffsfrom adjacent units (Brigham, Lion) and monitored flights en route to

the COMMANDO HUNT area. 'The controller at this position passed target informa­

tion to the flights, then handed them off to the appropriate area control

scope. depending upon the target area. This controller then provided vectors

to FACs or target areas, providing aliitude separation and traffic advisories.

Upon completion of the strike (or other mission), flights would 'be given back

to the area controller for handoff to the tactical air controller or other ," §lI'

agencfes for exit, refueling, or recovery.

Several problems were encountered; among. them, some aircrews were not

keep; ng , Invert ; nfonned cif thei r ac;ti ons ; there was a definite confli ct between

low altitude-high speed reconnaissance aircraft traversi'1g the area and the FAC

,or'strike aircraft 'working a strike;, and there' was a complete tie-up of tactical

0, control frequencies from the large amount of target informa,tion it was neces~

sary to pass. A continuing problem was the simple saturation of airspace from, . @

so many aircraft in such a small area. Partial solutions to some of thes'e

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difficulties came early in December 1968, with the institution of control.

points for a·ircraft entering Laos from Thailand, South V·ietnam,andfrom 52/ . carri ers on Yankee Stati on, and changes in communi cati ons procedures.-

Eight control.points were initially set up. The.se were idenfified by.

TACAN channels and located on TACAN DME Radials. They were as follows and 53/

went into operation as of6 December 68:-- (Fig. 3.)

CONTROL POINT LOCATION COORDINATES· CONTROL AGENCY Nr. Channel

51 5.1 . 045R/65 NM 1601N/10940E LION· (Ubon) 99 99 045R/25 NM 1656N/10502E VIKING (Mukdahan) 89 89 005R/45 NM l807N/10443E BRIGHAM (Udorn) 69 69 265R/45 NM 1619N/10656E WATERBOY· (Dong Ha) 77 77 240R/60 NM 1532N/10720E PANAMA (Da Nang) 72 72 345R/35 N~1 1610N/10621E LION (Ubon)

·70 70 015R/75 NM ·1834~/1 0308E BRIGHAM (Udor'n) 79 79 360R/25 NM· 1934N/10254E BRIGHAM (UdornJ

All jet strike flights fragged into Laos were to be assigned a control

point· and a control pOint time,·which we~e to be listed in the daily STEEL TIGER . .

... and Alpha Frags and the 7AFSpec Ops and advisories. Each flight Was to arrive

at its cODtroL.p.Qint at an altitude a.ssigned by the appropriate CRC/CRP and as

close ·to t~e assigned time as possible •. From there, the flight was cle~red to

the ABCCC for the area being covered, or to Invert or Sycamore as appropriate.

These agencies, in turn, would clear the flights to their targets or p'rovide

a FAC when necessary; for all-weather' delivery, the flight would be turne9 ove.r

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These measures, although affecting only jet strike flights directly,'

greatly relieved the communications congestion and reduced the amount of coor­

dination between-the vf&rious control agencies. Reconnaissance, FAC, and other

non-strike aircraft were'made aware 'of the new procedures since they did affect liI overa 1 r operati ons ..

In an attempt to solve the confl i ct between high"speed recon air'craft and

strike/FAC aircraft, another procedure was instituted. It involved giving the , , ,

reconnaissance aircraft the frequencies of each FAC along his route. The recon

, aircraft would then contact the FAC prior to entering the area and coordinate

hi s passa'ge through • _The procedure was. however, totally dependent upon, the

reconnaissance pilot 'making initial tontact with the CRC/CRP before beginning ~ 57/ h"is run.- While this did ease coordination problems when properly followed,

it did not relieve the total air space saturation.

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CHAPTER II "

THE STRIKE DIRECTORS

FACs Slow·Movers and Fast Movers

Were one e,lement to' be chosen which would differentiate the l!se of air-' power in the Southeast Asia conflict from previous wars it would. most probably be the burgeoning role ,of the Forward Air Controller. The FAC, by other names and with emphasis perhaps on other functions (such as the light plane artillery spotter of WW II, and the "Mosquito" of the Korean conflict), had

'been used before but not to the extent that he was used in Southeast As.ia.

The reasons for the importance of the FAC in SEA have been amply documented in other reports. Briefly, however., extensive jungle canopy camouflaged enemy encampments, movements, and intentions, This made the role of the FAC two-fold: one, to conduct visual reGonnaissance of his assigned area; and two, to direct accurate airstrikes. The visual reconnaissance gained for the FAC intimate knowledge of.his area, so that any movement of suspicious personnel. addition or subtracti~n of structures, or, in fact, any' change in the physical makeup of his VR area'was immediately noticeable to him.

With relatively extensive loiter time in the target area,he could direct one s tr1 ke after another wi tho'ut subject; ng the fighter pil at' to the burden of locating and validating the target before striking it.' The target was not @

"lost" between stri kes, and the FAC. caul d assess bomb damage whi 1 e keepi n9 abreast of any changes' in the ground situation. When the next s.tri~e flight·, arrived, the FAC could put them on target with minimum delay and the expecta­tion of maximum effectiveness. As a philosophy, this worked the same for

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in-country or out-country operations.

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To a ver,Y large degree, the end product of the air war over Laos differed

from that in South Vietnam. Tactical air in RVN was largely committed to ~lose

and dfrect,air support of ground troops. Out-country. the accent was on inter­

diction of the LOCs; supplies. vehicles~and personnel destined for"South

Vietnam. Thi sin turn di ctated di fferent ordnance requi rements. tacti cs, and

methods of target acquisition.

, The weight· of effort between the two theatres for night versus day was . ,

a definite factor in both the application of strikes and the use, of FACs. In-

c'ountry the use of tactical air at night, with few exceptions. was defensive in

nature--in support of troops in contact or outposts under attack. This limited

the use of the in-country FAC. The 'out-country war. however. with i,ts comm'it­

ment of impeding the enemylogistic's movement during darkness, used the night

FAC to the'extent that entire'night-dedicated FAC units were fonned. ~ong

these were the Candlestick C-123 and Blindbat C-130, with their long loiter

time and flare carrying capacity. but 0-2A Nails and Cov.eys also flew night missions.

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The problem of coordinating strikes byfast ,"overs and slow movers. against the same target or in the same area paralleled 'the problems of fast and slow moving FACs, and was a continuing one. Slow movers could generally work in poorerweathe'r condi ti ons and had longer 1 oi ter time; fast mover FACs coul d range further afield, rea~,t faster, and were able to operate in a less pennis-

1/ . sive environinent. Each had a place in the s,cheme of the air war.-

Ravens, Nails. and Coveys - Slow Mover Day FACs

The bulk of airstrike control during daylight hours over Laos fell to the FACs carrying these call signs. The Nail FACs were from the 23d Tactical Air Support Squadron (TASS) at Nakhon Ph,anom, Thaiiand~,the Coveys from the 20th TASS

J at' Da Nang, RVN; and the Raven FACs (a campos i te unit des i gnated Detachment 1, ' 56th Sp,eci a 1 Operations Wi ng, Udorn, but in actua ~ i ty di spersed at several si tes throughout Laos and directly responsiv~ to the USAIRA. Vient.ane). The Ravens flew the 0-1 aircraft. The Nail and Coveys transitioned from the 0-1 into the . . .' 0-2A during 1967. The OV-10, Call Sign Snort.' wassubsequyertl~' introduced to

"co. • .;, y the out-country war operating primarily during the day1igh'tf hours.

The general areas-of operation for the day slow mover FACs covered Laos from Route 110 on the south. to those areas of BARREL ROLL which were sufficiently pennissive for the ·light planes to operate. Basic~lly. the Covey FACs operated

. . inSTEEt TIGER South (TIGER HOUND), while the Nails covered STEEL TIGER North (COt+1ANDO HUNT). The two areas contained the major portion of LOCsleading from North Vietnam through Laos and into South Vietnam or Cambodia, and it was' I' in these areas that the most lucrative BOA was reported •. Both units. the 20th and 23d Tactical A1rSupportSquadrons, flew'O-2s from Da Nang and Nakhon Phanom

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I ~ ,I", and from their Operating Locations at Pleiku and Ubon. The Raven FACs, flying

0-ls, had a dissimilar mission and'wil1 be treated separate1Y'-1 .

4/ Both Coveys and Nails had a threefold misSion, as fo11ows:-

Gather visual reconnaissance of enemy supply activity along major lines of communication.

Dfrect airstrikes 'Upon enemy s,upply activity and lines of communication in support of the overall interdicti,on effort.

Detenni ne ai rstri ke results through bomb damage' assessme,nt.

The three were far more closely 11 nked than woul d be apparent at fi rst

g,lance. Much of the success .of the direction of a tactical ~irstrike was

,dependent upon the FAC I S intimate knowl edge of the . territory he was working ~ As 5/

one report stated:--

" ••• Too often~ st,rike, airoro.ft are assigned to FACs that ' have no target and are not prepared to work.' When this

,oaoU1'S the FAC,must stop his more important jUnction of searahing for a Zuarative tal'{Jet and expend the str'ike ' airo1'aft~ usuaZly on a worthZess'target ••• It is e~tp.emely important to provide the maximum amount of loiter time to eaoh strike aircraft. Target8 oan then be allowed to, . develop~ 'multiple passes 'can. be made and the FAC oan have the opp02·tunity to assess each pass and provide refine­ments for the ne~t~ 01' to mov~ on to another target if the first is destroyed.·u _

A 20th TASS'report echoed the same feeling regarding the necessity for -1 ' §J j

,adequate visual reconnaissance of the target area.

''' •• ~Thel'e are oases When the F.AC feeZs he has'had in­sufficient time to properly VR an area pr~or to the ~enditU1'e of ordnance. A mutuaZ feeling of frustra­tion is e~erienaed by ABCCC and the fighter pilots

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when the ordnance arrivea and a proper target haa not been acquired. The parado~ e~iat~ when a good target haa been acquiroed and there ia no ordnance avai Zab Ze. "

FAC Tactics

The initial FAC/fighter rendezvous' was accomplished by use of-TACAN .or

the ground radar through the CRP/CRC and under nonnal weather conditions did

not constitute ~prob1em. The direction of airstdkes by FACs was comparable

to the in-country procedures in use; except that in the STEEL TIGER and

COMMANDO HUNT areas, strikes were conducted from higher altitudes. Several

reasons made this practical. Among them, the presence of friendly troops in

contact (therefore, the probability of a Short Round) was not usually a factor.

The ever-present'cliffs of 'near-vertical karst made flying down i,nto the valleys

a .risky undertaking 'at best, but the primary reason lay i'n the possibility of

intense enemy ground fire. This ranged from small anns, 12.7 and 14.5-nm . .

heavy machine guns in some areas, up to 23, 37, 57 and even 85-rrm (few) AAAin 7/ high threat areas around Routes.g, 92,911, and 912.-

The variance in working' altitudes between in-country and out-country FACs"

and their basic limitations, as of late December 1968, was as follows: in-

country FACs had to maintain a minimum.of 1,500 ,feet above Ground Level (AGL),

unless overriding circumstances dictated otherwise. Nail FACs worked under, •• _1

, .

the' criteri on of 3,000 feet AGL, except in ·high threat areas, where thei r mi ni-

mum was 5,500 feet. Covey'FACs worked at ,between 6,500 and 8,500 feet indicated

altitude~ whi.ch placed them' at an operating' altitude of .approximate1y 4,000 to 8/

6,000 feet AGL.-

At these altitudes, the Nails and Coveys could expect to ·be above the rang.e

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SECRET·' of small anns and .30 caliber machine guns. The, 0-2s were 'at the extreme

effecti ve range of the 12.7 (correspondi ng to .50 cal), but ,were still w1thi n

the effective envelope of the l4.5-mm gu~s and AAA .. The 20th TASS believed

there was no one point within its area of operations where ground fire was not . .

a potentia', threat. They noted occasions where a 23:"mm or 37-mm gun would

fire during a strike on vehicles where there. had never bee~ ground fire pre-- .

vious1y, and it was believed that guns were' being towed,behind trucks, being

made ready to fire by the time the first~aircraft made his strike pass. Pilots " . 9/

of the 23d TASS made the same observ~tion.-

In general, target marking procedures out-country were the same as for

South Vietnam, except for the altitude of delivery. The 2.75-inch White

Phosphorus (WP), rocket was the ~tandard marking device for. daytime operations;

in addit.ion, terrain features, prev'iously ignited fires in the target area

and, in some cases, smoke grenades were used. During reduced visibility condi­

ti~n~, such as haze, or when the FAC was not certain of the strike flight's . '

ability to pos1tively identify the target, two markers could be put in on a

specific heading. After confirmation by the strike pilot of the location and' 10/ heading of the two marks, ,the strike could be cleared in on target.-

Although much of the radio tenninology used by F.L\Cs was necessarily stan­

dard(i.e·., "Olds 01, hold high and d~.", "Gun~ighter 11, you are cleared.",

or "Rap 22, go, through dry.") to preclude Short Round incidents and insure . , ,

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better understanding b~tween FACs and fighter pilots, many Forward Air Control-

lers had, their own preferences in techniques and 1ailguageused to control' l1J 12/

strikes. One 23d TASS pilot discussed thesediffer~nces:-

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" ••• Some say give them a definite heading~ 'Run East to West~ , 01' West to East~ ana. I'7,Z be ho.Zding to the North~ out of your way; caU me in sight, ' Othei's~ myse'Zf inaZuded~ I prefer to

,say where I am and Zet the fighters pick their own !'Un in head­ing~ if it's not essentiaZ to hitting the target. If it's a tX'UCk or storage area whiah I can see~ and I put the smoke down fifty meters from it, Ie teU them where it is; I 8ay~ 'I'm moving to the North., you're cZeared'in~ choose yoU!' own

heading. Let me know what· i t is when you ro ZZ ' in. ' .•• Typwa Z answer is~ 'I'm in fram the Nopth' or 'I'm in t.rom the South. ' Sometimes they'U give it to you interminoZogy which might aonfuse~ enemy 'if they're Zistening in on the radio., such as~ 'I'm .! /l'Om CaUfornia to New York '~or 'I'm in friom Mexico to Canczda. '; things Zik,e this~ that hopefuZZy., if some­'one is Zistening in., and the gunners are on the same frequency., they wouZdn't knOlJi whiah way the gu.ys are coming in from be­aause they.wouZdn't be that famiZiar with U.S. geography."

Even the ordnance fragged and hung on fighters detennined the tactics and

techniques used by the FACs in directing airstrikes. That ordnance known as , * . IIhard

li

. ordnance (M.;.1l7, M.;.65, MK-84, etc.) , slick bombs was used to interdi'ct,'

the roads and close up the traffic conirol points (TCPs). This ordnance c6uld . ,

,be dropped from altitudes above the small arms fire range, 3,000 to 7,000 feet,

for example, and espeCially with the delayed fUZe, was excellent for cratering

roads" al'ld creati ng slides duri ng the daytime ," Soft" ordnance, with the ex-

~ ception of finned napalm and CBU 24/49, required alow-alti-tude delivery, Which,

dependin,g upon weather, terrain and enemy defenses, might or'might not be

difficult to deliver. However, this ordnance was most effective against p~r- ,

sonne 1 and vehi c 1 es. Severa 1 factors had to be cons i der,ed before detenni n1'ng

* M-117 with fuze extender is classed as "soft" ordn~nce.

27

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that could be used, 'including the type of target, the

fuel'remaining, and the type ordnance ·carried. For instance, if a

fighter were carrying r1-117 (750-lb GP) bombs, the weather conditions were

good~ and the target were a suspected truck park or storage area, a 45-degree . .

dive and a 7~000-foot release ,were acceptable. For a smalle~, more clearly

(~efin~d target, such as a short road segment or bridge, perhaps a 3D-degree

dive and a 2~500-foot release might be necessq-ry. For some ordnance and some

locations, multiple passes might be made, depending upon enemy defenses and . 13/

. upon how lucrative the target was.-

For seeding of MK-36 Destructor mines or MK-82 (500-1b) bombs with FMU- .

72 fuzes (long delay); usually a'll bombs were released on Qne pass, so that

enemy reacti on was not normally as important as the terra;'n factor. The F~C,

in addition to controlling the strikes, was used to monitor the effectiveness . 14/

of the interdicted area and to call for restrike when neede,d.-

The Ravens

A different sort of FAC was the Raven. Where Nails and, Coveys basically

were concerned with USAF fighters, the Raven FACs worked directly under the

Air Attache in Vientiane, primarily controlling Royal, Laotian Air Force (RLAF)"

T-28s. The Ravens operated ,out of five locations covering the five MilUary

Regions (MRs) of Laos. (Fig. 4.) Raven 01', at Wattay Airfield, Vientiane,'

was Chief FAC for the organization, which also flew from Pakse, MR IV; Savan­

nakhet, MR ItI; Long Tieng, MR II; and Luang Prabang, ~R I. Vientia~e, actual

hub of the government, was located in MR V; Luang Prabang,was the Royal Capitol, 15/ and as s~ch, enjoyed a degree of immunity from attack by NVA/PLforces.--

28

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,MRI

* LUANG PRABANG

L OS

THAILAND

RAVEN OPERATING LOCATIONS 8 MILITARY REGIONS OF---+

LAOS,

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Un1 ike the Nails and Coveys, whose 0-ls had been replaced by 0-2As, the

Raven FACs conti nued to fly the venerable II Bi rddog ll • The pil ot was from-the

United States Air Force, while the second man in the aircraft was Royal

Laotian Air Force, which' allowed easier and more accur.ate coovnunication with 16/ .

the ground forces. - The Raven organi zati on was, on paper, Det 1, 56th SOW,

at Udorn·. In actuality, it was a composite organization using pilots ff.1bm

several so~rces--Military Assistance Pr.ogram (MAP), 404 'being the leading one,

but bolstered by TOY FACs from several units .. The organization was under. . .

direct operational control of the AIRA, Vientiane, under Project 404, Deputy 17/

Chief, JUSMAG.-

. The Ravens varied in their operations from South to North. At Pakse,

two Ravens worked out of the joint Lao/U.S. 'Air Operations Center. They were.

briefed by CAS and USAF inte1l1ge.nce sources anc! covered most of Route 23 from

Saravane south and Route 16 to the east ~f Ban Tha Teng, but not over the main

route structure of The Trail ~ which was not permissive to. the 0-1. Although

some of thei r activiti es were di rected toward the counterinsurgency effort, m~st .

of t.heir work in the South, MR IV, was interdictive in nature .. They d'id, how­

ever, often work closely with Special Guerrilla Units (SGUs) and Forward Air

Guides (FAGs) on the ground. Th~se often provided highly lucrative targets

for air. Inasmuch as the friendly units were quite snial'-, and artillery w.as

nonexistent, airpower was the prir~r,y ordnance deliverer for these guer.rilla J.§J

bands.

On one particular instance, 20 December 1968, two of these small SGUs en':;

countered an entire NVA/PL cqmpany dug in along a stream bed below.them. Rather

29

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SECRET

than engage the enemy, the guerri 11 as ca 1,1 ed for a Raven who in turn called

in strikes. The FAC, Raven' 52, placed Zebra flight (F-1D5s) with ten 75D-1b.,

bombs and fuze, extenders on the target, along' wtth r~anual .72 and 73 (Marine)

and Galeforce and Saddleback (Navy) flights. The target was a triangular area , , , I

about one kilometer east of Route 23, mi.dway between Saravane and Ban Tha Teng.

When the smoke and dust" ha'd settl ed, the SGU troops swept the bombed area ,and , , ' reported l26'NVA soldiers killed. This is mentioned) not because it ~as such

a rare occurrence, but because it was actually typical of th~ 'close coordina~

tion between the ground units, the Raven FAC, and the strike forces. lV

Farther north, the Ravens staged out of Lima 39, Savannakhet, with an area,

of op~rations that included western Savannakhet Province,and essentially , )

provided FAC capability, for close air support, of Forces Armee Royale (FAR) in

Military Region III. Most of the defenses ringe~ the city of Muong Phalane,~

and as in MR' IV, tactical airpower was used more as artillery extensionthar. as ' 20/

true tactical air.--

'f~:". Military Region V, in whichWattay Airfield and Vientiane are located, was

,traditionally an area of very low-key insurg~ncy, and as a result required o~ly

'the one FAC. All three of the tripartite factions, Right, Left, and Neutral,

existed in IIharmony'! to a greater degree than in any of the other military . . , 21/ re~ions, with most of the action being 'politica1 ,rathe4 than military.-

To the northwest of Vientiane Province lay Luang Prabang, Sayaboury,

,Phong Sa ly and Houa Khong Provi nces, maki ng up ~1R I, the northwes't corner .of

Laos. As the western anchor to the Plaine des Jarres, Luang Prabang re~eived

30

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significant insurgent action, with North Vietnamese pressure from the North of 22/ , 0

'Luang Prabang. - In thi s porti on of BARREL" ROLL, usua lly two Ravens worked out

of the airfield at Luang Prabang, Lima 54, generally with the RLAF, but when

troops in contact or special packages were inv~lved, they could call upon USAF 23/

resources.

The most tactically significant region in Laos (outside of the interdic­

.tion areas contiguous to. South Vietnam) was Military region II, largely made

up of Xieng Khoang and Sam Neua (Houa Phan) Provinces. Historically; for the

past ,four or five years, the entire military focus was upon the control of the

Plaine des Jarres. For 'example, it was the Meo heartland. It exist.ed as the

dema'rkation line between the ethnic and cultural spheres influenced by the

'North Vietnamese on the North (Viet-Laos) and'the Thais o~ the South (Thai­

Laos). Throughout this important region, the Meos, a sub-ethnic mountain group,

fi erce in thei r 1 oya lty to thei r 1 and, if not necessari ly the government in

power" held forth. No match in a frontal confrontation with heavily armed and'

superior in number NVA troops, the Meos, under the leadership of General Vang

Pao, made up one of the most effective fighting forces in Laos. It was axiOmatic

however, that in any pitched battl e, the S,uccess of the Meo 'guerri1l as was . 24/ '

contingent upon effective and responsive tactical: a'irpower.-

This was the major operating area for the Ravens, who used LS 98/30-­

usually oall~d 20 Altjrnate--at Long Tieng (TG 8214, UTM Coordinates), Xieng

Khoang Province, for their forward staging site. The ~umber of Ravens at-Long

Tieng varied,usually ftve or six. These gave support to, FAR, SGU, andVang

Pao's troops, both guerrilla and conventional. In contrast to thepredominantely

31

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Night FACs - Blindbat and Candlestick, Nail and Cove~

It had become clear early, in the confl i ct that the best time to cut roads ..

was during the day" and that the most 1i ke ly' time to fi nd and kill trucks was

at night. The enemy did not drive ~t night of his own choOSing but for pure

survival. It became quite a contest between the truck drivers and airplane'

drivers to see who could outwit the other~ The traffic moved at night and, the

night FAC became a necessity for several reasons. By and large, the Rules of

Engagement forbade strikes without a FAC, the FAC had long ~r time, could

learn his general area, and-~just as in the daytime--could control follow-on

strikes one after ~nother without losing the target~

,.

In an environment where locating an object, or 'target 'through the tangled

. jungle canopy was difficult even during dayl'ight hours, it was irtevitable that

target acqui,sition dev1ces would become mo"re and more s,ophisticated for nigh.~

'use. This was foreshadowed as early as r·1arch 1966, when a Starlight Scope,

32

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jury-rigged in the open.door of an AC-47, was used in the defense of the FAR

post and airfield at Attopeu, Laos. With a Laotia.n officer aboard to validate

targets, the AC-47 (Spooky 41) crew eas i 1y spotted sever.a 1 hun<.ired. enemy troops n·

advancing on the friendly positi6ns, and before the night was over, had account-

ed for a minimum or 100 KBA(an estimated 250) and had saved the airfield, the ~6/ .

post, and the city itself:-

'. In the years since that time, several SoutheastAs"ia Operational Require-

ments (SEAORs) hav~ been responsible for larger, bette~ light-gathering Star~

'light Scopes, Low Light Level TV (LLLTV); and other highly sophisticated Night " . 1" Observati·on Devices. These included Black Crow (ignition detector), Forward

I ,

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Looking Infrared (FLIR), and radar with airborne moving target indicato\ (AMTI)

among others. Strike control tactics evolved throughout the same time frame to

suit the capabilities of the target acquisition equipment, the FAC aircraft. and

the various strike aircraft. Obviously some of the equipment. by reason of size

alone (also, special electrical requirements, necessity to be crew-served, etc.),

could not be acconmodatedin O-ls, 0-2s, or even in OV~lOs.

The C-l30 "Blindbats" and C-123 "Cand1estic'ks l' were configured with the ~

Starlight Scope. initially the small portable model developed for use with the "

M-16 rifle. This scope did 'have limitations. First, it was difficult or ' . ~ ..

impossible to see trucks running with their lights off on dark nights; it was . . even difficult on moonless nights to make out the road structure. The Blind-

bat ai rcraft acqui red the AN/AVG-3A S,tarl ight Scope early, but the Candlesticks.'

did not get the chance to evaluate. them until July and August 1968, when they

borrowed a few from Blindbat. They immediately noted a vast improvement over

33

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the smaller scope; truck sightings immediately climbed; and it was detennined , " I, 27/

that the ,road structure was far easier to a'cquire and keep in sight.- ,

Orders were placed for the new scope in September, and with expedited

'de1ivery,_ six were delivered in December with more to come. The bigger scope

was sti1idly'mounted, steadier, and a far more efficient light gathering and 28/

amplifying device.--

One· advantage of the large slow movers was their abi lity to carry vastly, , I

greater amounts of flares and other marking devices than the lighter FAC air-

craft. As an example, the Nail 0-2s were'limited tO,the following riight ord­

nance: seven 2.75 WP rockets (right outboard station), two,MK-6 ground marks

(one on each 'inboard station), and fou.r MK-24 f1ares--s,jx i'f Navy rack was , 29/

used (on left outboard station).-- The C-130 Blindbat, by contrast, carried . 30/ 250 MK-24 parachute fl ares and 30 MK-:6 ground marker fl ares ell ogs 11).-

NightFAC coverage (a10n~with night strtke coverage) ~eceived greatly

increaseg emphasis coincident with th'e bOfffbing halt over North Vietnam, and

the inception of the COMMANDO' HUNT interdicti,on program in Laos. As an example,'

between 16°30'N and l8°00 1 N in Laos',' night FAC coverage consisted--at that,

time--of ten Nail 0-2s, six C~123 Candlesticks, and two C-130'Blindbats. This

'gave all-night coverage by five FAC aircraft at anyone time throughout'an 31/

,area only 90 nautical miles long by roughly 30 NM wide.- (As;adequate as this

would appear, it later was determined that even more were required,both for full

coVerage and'for traffic control.)

,34

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