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    TRANSLATION OFMAIMONIDES' TREATISE ON LOGIC

    A Treatise on the art of logic, by the head of the religion ofIsrael, Musa ibn 'Obaid Allah of Cordova, may God be graciousunto him!

    In the name of God, the merciful and the compassionate!An eminent person, one of the masters of the juridical sciencesand the possessors of clarity and eloquence in the Arabic lan-guage, has asked a man who studied the art of logic to explainto him the meanings of the numerous terms frequently occurringin the art of logic, to interpret to him the technical languagecommonly adopted by the masters of this art, and to endeavorto do this with extreme brevity and not to indulge in details ofmeaning, lest the discourse become too long. For, his intention,may his glory be everlasting,I was not to learn the art I amabout to outline to him - since the introductions placed beforeone who desires to learn it are many - but only to know thosetechnical terms in most of their meanings, and nothing else.I then to the desired discussion.

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    MAIMONIDES' TREATISE ON LOGICstand' is the predicate; when you say, 'Zayd stood', or 'willstand', we say that 'Zayd' is the subject, 'stood' or 'will stand'is the predicate; and when you say 'Zayd is in the house', wesay that 'Zayd' is the subject, 'is in the house' is the predicate.Similarly, when the information is a clause or a verb with itsadjuncts, we call it all a predicate.The entire expression, composed of the information andof that about which the information is offered, whether inaffirmation or negation, i. e., the subject and the predicatetogether, is called a proposition. It is also called an enunciativesentence. The proposition always has two parts: the subjectand the predicate, even if it consists of many words. For example,when we say 'Zayd of Basra, who resided in the house of 'Amr,killed his son Abu-Bekr of Egypt', we say that the subject ofthis proposition is 'Zayd of Basra who resided in the house of'Amr', and its predicate is 'killed his son Abu-Bekr of Egypt'.Let this guide you in all other expressions.All the terms explained in this chapter are four: predicate,subject, proposition, enunciative sentence.

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    negative, and we call 'no' a universal negative sign. It maynegate the predicate of a part of the subject, e. g., 'Not everyman writes', or 'Some men do not write', or 'Not some menwrite'; and this we call a particular negative. We do not dis-criminate among these three expressions of the particular nega-tive; nevertheless, we always prefer our expression in the parti-cular negative to be 'not every', which we call the particularnegative sign. The signs then are four: 'Every', 'some', 'no',and 'not every'; and the propositions that have signs are four:universal affirmative, particular affirmative, universal negative,and particular negative.If however no sign is attached to the subject of the propo-sition, as when we say 'Men are animals' or 'Men write', wecall this proposition indesignate, that is, it is left open and notsurrounded with a wall. We regard it always as a particularproposition, whether affirmative or negative. Thus when wesay 'Men write', it has for us the same force as if we said 'Somemen write'; and when we say 'Men do not write', it is as if wesaid 'Not every man writes'. When however the subject of aproposition is a single individual, e. g., 'Zayd is an animal','Amr writes', 'Bekr is wise', we call it a singular proposition.Thus, there are necessarily six2 kinds of propositions: universal

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    tive, universal negative, particular negative, indesignate,singular, universal negative sign, particular negative sign,universal affirmative sign, particular affirmative sign, quantityof a proposition, quality of a proposition.

    CHAPTER IIIEvery proposition whose predicate is a verb, or a verbaccompanied by other words, we call binary, be it in the affir-mative or in the negative; e. g. 'Zayd stood', 'Zayd killed Abui-Bekr', 'Zayd did not stand', or 'He did not kill Abu-Bekr'. Allthese propositions, we call binary, because they require no thirdelement to connect the predicate with the subject. But whenthe predicate of the proposition is a noun, we call it a trinaryproposition. Thus, when we say 'Zayd-standing', the expressiondoes not indicate the connection of the predicate of this proposi-tion with its subject as to tense: whether Zayd is now standing,or was standing in the past, or will be standing in the future.We must therefore have a third expression which will connectthe predicate with the subject; e. g., 'Zayd is now standing'

    'Zayd was standing' or 'Zayd will be standing'; though it is

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    ISRAEL EFROS'It is probable that Zayd will so act'- all these, we call modes.And we call the verb a word,3 and verbs - words.All the terms explained in this chapter are five: binary sen-tence, trinary sentence, copulas, word, mode.

    CHAPTER IVWhen any two propositions have the very same predicatesand subjects, but one of the propositions is in the affirmativeand the other is in the negative, we call them opposites; and wecall the affirmation and the negation opposition. For example,'Zayd is wise' and 'Zayd is not wise', or 'Man writes' and 'Mandoes not write'; these two propositions, and all that are likethem, we call opposites.But when the opposition is between two propositions which

    have signs, it is designated by a specifying term. Thus, if auniversal sign is joined to either one of the two opposite proposi-tions, e. g., 'Every man is an animal', 'No man is an animal',we call these two propositions contrary, and this opposition wecall contrariety. If a particular sign is joined to either one ofthem, e. g., 'Some men write', 'Some men do not write', we call

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    MAIMONIDES' REATISEON LOGICnegative and the other a particular affirmative, e. g. 'No manflies', 'Some men fly'; these two are also contradictory.It is obvious that in every affirmation or negation, that whichyou affirm or negate of something is inevitably either necessaryor possible or impossible with reference to it. For example,when we say 'Every man is an animal', we call this propositionnecessary; when we say 'Every man is a bird' we call this prop-osition impossible; and when we say 'Some men write', wecall this proposition possible. We say that both the necessaryand the impossible are so of necessity because we say, 'Man isof necessity an animal' and 'Man is of necessity not a bird'.When we assert concerning Zayd, let us say, at the time of hisbirth, 'This Zayd is writing' or 'this Zayd is not writing', wecall this proposition truly possible;4 but when we say this con-cerning Abu-Isbak the lad,s when he is actually writing, we donot call this proposition possible but absolute or actual. For, athing can be possible only with reference to the future, beforeone of the alternatives is realized; when such a realization takesplace, the possibility is removed.6 When Zayd stands near us,his standing is no longer a possibility but resembles somethingnecessary.All the terms in this are thirteen:

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    CHAPTER VIf the predicate and the subject of any proposition have beentransposed and the proposition remains true, we call it a con-

    version of a proposition, and we say this proposition is converted;but if it does not retain its truth, we call it an inversion of a prop-osition, and we say this proposition is inverted. For example,when we say: 'No man is a bird', its converse is 'No bird is aman'. But when we say 'All men are animals', the case is asfollows: if you say 'Some animals are men', it is a right con-version, because it is true; if, however, we change it by saying'All animals are men', it is an inversion and not a conversion.All the terms explained in this chapter are four: conversionof a proposition, inversion of a proposition, converted proposi-tion, inverted proposition.

    CHAPTER VIA little reflection will make it evident that from any two dis-tinct else will ever result, as when we

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    which the two propositions have in common. Hence there arethree parts: the part common to both propositions, which wecall the middle term, and the two distinct parts which we callextremes and whose union constitutes the conclusion. Observealso the parts of the conclusion. The predicate in the conclusionis what is called in the syllogism the first and major term, andthat premise of the syllogism which contains the first term iscalled the major premise; the subject of the conclusion is whatis called the last and minor term of the syllogism, and the prem-ise of the syllogism which contains the minor term is what wecall the minor premise.Let us return to our example so as to clarify further the mean-ing of the terms. The syllogism which we used as an examplewas 'Every man is an animal', and 'Every animal is sentient',the conclusion of this syllogism being 'Every man is sentient'.The parts of this syllogism are three: 'man', 'animal', and 'sen-tient'; its middle term is 'animal' and the extremes are 'man'and 'sentient'; the minor premise is our expression 'Every manis an animal', and the major premise is our expression 'Everyanimal is sentient'. This is the explanation of the meaning ofthese most important terms which one must know in the art of

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    animal';7 and whatever is so combined, we call the second figureof the syllogism. Third, the middle term may be the subject ofboth propositions, as when we say 'Every animal is sentient','Some animals are white'; and whatever is so combined, we callthe third figure of the syllogism. It is clear then that there arethree figures of the syllogism.Know that not every pair of propositions joined by a middleterm in one of these three ways, constitutes a syllogism, butonly such as the following division will determine. In every oneof the three figures, there occur thirty-six combinations, makinga total, in the three figures, of one hundred and eight. Thosecombinations which constitute true and conclusive syllogismsare fourteen, and every one of these combinations is called mood.There are four moods in the first figure, four in the second, andsix in the third. These have been so arranged that we say, e. g.,this syllogism is the fourth mood of the first figure, this one isthe third mood of the second figure, and this one is the fifthmood of the third figure.

    INTERPOLATED COMMENT8

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    must in all cases be universal. By the difference in quality, Imean that the second figure has an advantage over the first;for, here the minor premise does not have to be affirmative. Asto the difference in the conclusion, I mean that it may be uni-versal as in the first figure but cannot be affirmative. The thirdfigure resembles the first in quality but differs from it in quantity,both in the premise and in the conclusion. It resembles it inquality, because the minor premise cannot be negative; it differsin quantity, because the major premise may be particular; andthe conclusion may be affirmative but not universal. The secondand the third are opposed to each other in quantity and inquality; i. e., the second must keep the law of universality butnot that of affirmation, and may yield a universal but not anaffirmative conclusion; whereas the third keeps the law of affir-mation but not that of universality, and therefore may yieldan affirmative but not a universal conclusion. In general, thesecond does not keep the law of affirmation and does not yieldit in the conclusion; whereas the third does not keep the law ofuniversality and does not yield it in the conclusion. The firstfigure, in which the middle term is the subject of one premiseand the predicate of another, has four moods:

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    ISRAEL EFROSThe second figure, in which the middle term is the predicateof both premises, has four moods:

    (1) Every C is BNo A is B* . No C is A

    (2) No C is BEvery A is B. No C is A(3) Some C is BNo A is B. . Some C is not A.

    (4) Some C is not BEvery A is BSome C is not AThe third figure, in which the middle term is the subject of

    both premises, has six moods:

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    (5) Some B is CNo B is A..* Some C is not A(6) Every B is C

    Some B is not A. Some C is not AHere ends the interpolation.]

    All those that are other than these fourteen moods of combin-ations, i. e., the ninety-four remaining combinations, are notsyllogisms, because nothing necessarily results from them. Butthe argument for the invalidity of the latter and the validity ofthe former, and the exposition of these moods, form a large partof the art of logic, which is beyond the scope of this discourse.These fourteen moods of the syllogism are called categoricalsyllogisms.As for hypothetical syllogisms, they are of two kinds: hypo-thetical conjunctive and hypothetical disjunctive. A hypotheti-cal conjunctive syllogism is when we say 'If the sun rises, it willnow be day'; then we exclude the condition by saying 'But the

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    proposition, we construct one of the categorical syllogismswhich yields to us as a conclusion the proposition whose truth-fulness we wanted to ascertain, we call it a straight categoricalsyllogism. But if we verify this proposition in another way,namely, by assuming hypothetically the contradictory of theproposition which we want to verify, and by forming a syllogism,proving the falsehood of that hypothetical contradictory prop-osition, so that the contradictory of that which we hypotheti-cally assumed is the true one without a doubt, and is the prop-osition we want to substantiate,- such a syllogism, demonstrat-ing to us the falsehood of a contradictory of a proposition whichwe want to verify, we call apagogic.We have another kind of syllogism which we call the induc-tive"syllogism. Thus, when there is a certain proposition whoseparticulars you have examined and some of them have beenproven inductively to be true, we may take this proposition asa universal and posit it as a premise of a syllogism. We haveanother kind of syllogism which we call the analogical syllogism;as when, in two things that resemble each other in some respect,we find a certain law which excludes" one of them and we applythis law to the other thing. Thus, if in reply to a questionwhether the heavens are created, we say: yes, and the proof of

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    We have other syllogisms which we call juridical," but weneed not discuss them in this connection.All the terms explained in this chapter are twelve: first figureof the syllogism, second figure, third figure, mood of the syllogis-tic figure, categorical syllogisms, hypothetical syllogisms, hypo-thetical conjunctive, hypothetical disjunctive, straight categori-cal syllogism, apagogic syllogism, inductive syllogism, analogicalsyllogism.CHAPTER VIII

    The propositions which are known to be true and require noproof for their truthfulness are of four kinds: perceptions, aswhen we know that this is black, this is white, this is sweet, andthis is hot; first ideas, as when we know that the whole is greaterthan the part, that two is an even number, and that thingsequal to the very same thing equal each other; conventions, aswhen we know that uncovering the privy parts is ugly, thatcompensating a benefactor generously is beautiful; and tradi-tions, i. e., whatever is received from a chosen person or from achosen assembly. For we demand proof for the trustworthinessof a transmitter of a tradition only generally and not forevery

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    many peoples its acceptability is stronger. Similarly, in thecase of traditions, a tradition among one group may be lackingin another. Now, that which is obtained from whatever is per-ceived by means of a healthy sense is undoubtedly true. Thesame applies to ideas, first and second; by second ideas I meansuch as geometric theorems and astronomic calculations, whichare all true, because they may all be demonstrated by premises,most of which come close to the first ideas. In like manner, allthe results of experience, e. g., that scammony is a catharticand gall-nut causes constipation, are also true. Whateverbecomes known through one of these three's truthful channelsthe logicians call apodictic.After these preliminaries, you must know that every syllogismboth of whose premises are apodictic, we call a demonstrativesyllogism; and the making of these syllogisms and a knowledgeof their conditions constitute what we call the art of demon-stration. When, however, one or both premises of the syllogismbelong to conventions, we call it a dialectic syllogism; and themaking of these syllogisms and a knowledge of their conditionsconstitute the art of dialectics. When one or both premises ofthe syllogism belong to traditions, we call it a rhetorical syl-logism; and the making of these syllogisms and a knowledge of

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    called sophistic, and the making thereof and the knowledge ofthe ways in which people deceive and utter falsehood constitutewhat is called sophism. Then there are some who praise andblame things in no other way than by means of imitations;17and any syllogism whose premise is used in this way of imitationwe call a poetic syllogism, and the art which deals with suchsyllogisms and explains the ways of imitations is called the artof poetry.Know that there are conditions of the demonstrative syl-logism which cannot be discussed in this treatise. In general,however, the demonstrative syllogisms do not use analogyunder any circumstances, nor do they use induction exceptunder certain conditions;i8 but the art of dialectics does usegeneral induction; and the art of rhetoric uses the analogicalsyllogism. Furthermore, sometimes in a rhetorical syllogism,one premise appears while the other is, for various reasons,suppressed; this we call an enthymeme.'9All terms explained in this chapter are seventeen: perception,first ideas, second ideas, conventions, traditions, apodicticproposition, demonstrative syllogism, the art of demonstration,the dialectical syllogism, the art of dialectics, rhetorical syl-

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    or a circle if it is circular, and its purpose is the sitting thereon.Or let us take, e. g., a sword; its matter is iron, its agent is asmith, its form is a certain length, narrowness, and sharpedged-ness, and its purpose is the killing therewith. These four causesare obvious and clear in the case of all artificial things, becauseevery craftsman embodies the form, which he conceived, in somematter, whether wood, iron, copper, wax, or glass, for the sakeof some meaning which he tries to convey by means of thisvessel. In the case of natural things one should seek the verysame causes; except that in this case, we do not apply the term'form' to the figure and outline, but only to that which consti-tutes the specific essence of a thing, so that if you could possiblyremove it, the thing would no longer be an individual of thatspecies. For example, man belongs to the natural order, hismatter is life, his form is the rational faculty, his purpose is theattainment of ideas, and his agent is the one who gave him hisform or his rational faculty, because by "agent" we mean thecreator of form in matter, and this is God, blessed be He, evenaccording to the philosophers; albeit they maintain that He isthe remote cause, and for every created thing they seek itsproximate cause.

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    that of wax to whatever is made of wax, or that of gold to what-ever is made of gold; for, it has been demonstrated that thesefour elements change into and originate from one another, sothat they have undoubtedly some common element and thisis their matter. Now, that which is common to the four elementsand which the mind necessarily affirms is what we call materiaprima, and its Greek name is hyle, and many physicians andphilosophers call it the foundation. One may follow this examplein regard to form and purpose until one can differentiate theproximate from the remote purpose, and the first from the lastform.All the terms explained in this chapter are ten: matter, agent,form, purpose, proximate causes, remote causes, elements,materia prima, hyle, foundation.

    CHAPTER XThe universal20 which includes a number of individuals andconstitutes the essence of each one of them, we call species.The universal which includes two or more species and constitutestheir essence, we call genus. The characteristic by which one

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    rationality, i. e., the faculty by which ideas are formed, consti-tutes the essence of man. It is fitting that we investigate in thismanner every species until we know its constitutive difference.Laughter we call a property of man; for it exists always in allhuman individuals and is not found in any species other thanthat of man. In like manner, the broad chest, erect stature andwide nails, each one of these we call a human property, becauseit exists only in the human species and, naturally, in all itsindividuals. Every species necessarily has one or more proper-ties. That universal which we find to be more general or morelimited than the species we call accident. Thus, movement inthe case of man is more general than the species; whereas black-ness is both more limited than the human species, which is notall black, and also more general, since it is found also outsideof man; hence blackness and motion and their like are calledaccidents. There are two kinds of accident: one inheres per-manently and inseparably in its subject, like the blackness ofpitch and the whiteness of snow and the heat of fire; and theother is a separable accident like the standing or the sitting of aperson, or the heat of iron or stone.It is evident that just as the 'animal' includes all species of

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    genus. We call man, horse, scorpion, palm-tree, iron, and theirlike, the lowest species; because lower than these there is nothingbut individuals of their respective species. We call 'animal' asubaltern genus or a subaltern species; because it is a genus withreference to the animal species that are under it, and it is aspecies with reference to nourishable matter, which is above it,and which includes both animals and plants. 'Plant' also is asubaltern genus to what is lower and a subaltern species to whatis higher in the scale. We call 'animal' and 'plant' componentspecies, for the genus of nourishable matter is completely divis-ible into animal and plant.Know that the summa genera embracing all existing things,according to Aristotle, are ten: the first is substance, the second-quantity, the third-quality, the fourth-relation, the fifth-time,the sixth-place, the seventh-posture, the eighth-possession, theninth-action, the tenth-passion. The first of these ten categoriesis substance and the rest are accidents. Each one of them hassubaltern species, infimae species, individuals, differences, andproperties. These ten summa genera are called categories; anda discussion of these categories with all that is involved in them,with examples of their subaltern genera and their species and

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    angels. But when we explain the name 'man' as denoting awide-chested, erect, or laughing animal, we call these wordsdescriptions. Sometimes we explain a name by means of genusand accidents, as when we explain the name 'man' by sayingthat it refers to an animal which can write or which can buy andsell; and this too is called a description.All the terms explained in this chapter are seventeen; genus,species, individual, difference, property, accident, permanentaccident, separable accident, summum genus, lowest species,subaltern species, component species, summa genera, categories,substance, definition, description.We have mentioned the ten categories, but we have explainedonly 'substance', because the explanation of the others is diffi-cult for a beginner and would take much time and would notbe understood except through much study and thinking; whereasthe purpose of these chapters is that any reader should under-stand the terms therein explained.

    CHAPTER XIWhatever is always connected with something, like falling

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    that quality exists potentially. Thus when we say, e. g., con-cerning a piece of iron that it is a sword, because it is preparedto become a sword, we mean that it is a sword potentially. Apiece of felt cannot be so designated; for, there is an importantdifference between the absence of the sword-nature from thepiece of iron and the absence thereof from the piece of felt.Furthermore, when we say concerning a child when he is bornthat he is a writer, it means that he is a writer by remote poten-tiality; and when we say concerning a lad before he begins tostudy that he is a potential writer, this potentiality is nearerthan the first; and when we say it concerning him during hisstudying, the potentiality is nearer than those preceeding; andwhen we say it concerning one who has been engaged in writingbut who is at present asleep, the potentiality is still nearer; andwhen we say it concerning him when he is awake and has beforehim ink, pen, and parchment, it is indeed a very near poten-tiality. But we do not call him a writer in actuality, except atthe time that he writes. It is the same with all other such cases.We have dilated on this subject because philosophers saythat any one who cannot distinguish between the potential andthe actual, between per se and per accidens, between the con-

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    cold; for the heat and cold equally partake of existence, andheat has no firmer hold on existence than cold, and vice versa,but vision and blindness are not so. This is the difference be-tween privation and habit on the one hand, and two contrarieson the other. The same is true of wisdom and folly: wisdom isa habit and the absence of this habit is folly. So also wealthand poverty, hairiness and baldness, having teeth in one'smouth and toothlessness, speaking and muteness,- they areall called habit and privation. But nothing can be described interms of privation unless it is its nature to possess that habitwhich is the opposite of that absence, for we do not speak of thewall as foolish or blind or mute. This then is the meaning ofhabit and privation in our technical language.There are words which, when you hear them, you understandwithout comparing their meanings with other things, e. g., iron,copper, food, drinking, standing, etc. But some words do notconvey their meaning except with respect to other objects, e. g.,long and short; for the mind cannot grasp the meaning of 'long'except with reference to what is shorter, nor can we form aconception of anything short until our mind grasps something

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    All the terms explained in this chapter are sixteen: per se,per accidens, essential things, accidental things, potentiality,actuality, proximate potentiality, remote potentiality, con-traries with an intermediate state, contraries with no inter-mediate state, habit, privation, correlation, correlative, correla-tives, opposites.

    CHAPTER XIIWe speak of one thing as prior to another in five modes.

    First, priority in time, e. g., Noah is prior to Abraham. Second,priority in nature, e. g., animal and man, because if you couldremove the animal, the existence of man would cease, but ifyou could remove man, the existence of the animal would notcease; hence we say that the animal is prior to man in natureand man posterior to the animal in nature. Third, priority inorder, e. g., two men one of whom sits near the ruler and theother further away; so that we say that one is prior to the otherin order. Fourth, priority in excellence i. e., the state of thebetter and more honored of two things whether of the samekind or of two different kinds. For two or

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    We speak of two things as being together in time when theyexist at the same time, and as being together in place when theyexist in the same place. When two things are equidistant fromthe same starting-point we say that they are together in rank.When two things reciprocate in necessary existence and oneis not the cause of the other, we say that they are together innature, e. g. the double and the half. The same is true of thecorrelatives from the standpoint of their correlation.All the terms explained in this chapter are nine: prior in time,prior in nature, prior in excellence, prior in order, prior in cause,together in time, together in place, together in order, togetherin nature.

    CHAPTER XIIIThe word which the Arabian grammarian calls verb we callword,25 as we have already stated.26 The particle27 is calledinstrument. As for the noun, it is sometimes what we call

    straight and at other times what we call oblique. Said AbuNa*r Alfarabi: "In Arabic, every nominative, logicians call

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    and also pronouns.28 The noun and its adjective, we call acompound expression of explanation and modification, e. g.Reuben the writer, Simon the white. The grammatical com-bination of the governing and the governed nouns, we also calla compound expression of explanation and modification. Butas for the enunciative sentence, we call it a compound expressionof information.Words are in all languages necessarily divided into threeclasses: distinct, synonyms, and homonyms. When severalwords have the same meaning they are synonyms; when oneword has several meanings, it is a homonym; and when differentwords have different meanings they are distinct. For example,in Hebrew, 'addm, 'Zsh,'enosh all meaning man, sakin, ma'akeletboth meaning knife, are synonyms; the word 'ain, meaningeye and a fountain, is a homonym; whereas mayim (water),'esh (fire), 'ilon (tree) are distinct. All words resembling theseare similarly classified.The homonyms are divided into six classes: absolute homo-nyms, univocals, amphibolous terms, terms used in general andin particular, metaphorical terms, and extended terms.The absolute homonym is one applied to two things, between

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    But the amphibolous term is a term applied to two or moreobjects because of something which they have in common butwhich does not constitute the essence of each one of them. Anexample of this is the name 'man' given to Reuben, the rationalanimal, to a certain man who is dead, and to an image of mancarved in wood or painted. This name is applied to them becauseof their having one thing in common, to wit, the figure and out-line of a man; but the figure and outline do not constitute themeaning of man. Hence it resembles a univocal term in so faras it is applied to these objects because they have somethingin common, and it also resembles the absolute homonym becausethe essence of one is different from that of the other. It is there-fore called amphibolous.A term used in general and in particular is one that desig-nates any species by the name of its genus, e. g., the word kokabapplied to any star of heaven, though it is the name of one ofthe seven planets,30and the word hashish in Arabic given to allkinds of grass and to the yellow flower used in dyeing.The metaphorical term is a name which in the original usageof the language came to denote, and to be fixed permanentlyin, a certain object, and afterwards it was given but not per-

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    MAIMONIDES' REATISEON LOGICforms',33 'pausal' and 'connective', 'quiescent', 'vocal', etc.,each one of which has in the original usage of the language ameaning different from that given to it by the grammarianswho extended the significance of these names.All terms explained in this chapter are eighteen: particle,34direct noun, oblique noun, indefinite noun, paronyms, the firstexample, hidden, pronoun, synonyms, distinct, absolute homo-nym, compound expression of explanation and modification,compound expression of information, univocal, amphibolous,noun used in general and in particular, metaphoric, extended.

    CHAPTER XIVThe term logos technically used by the thinkers of ancientpeoples,35 is a homonym having three meanings. The first is

    the faculty, peculiar to man, whereby he conceives ideas, learnsthe arts, and differentiates between the ugly and the beautiful;36it is called the rational faculty. The second is the idea itselfwhich man has conceived; it is called inner speech. The thirdis the interpretation in language of that which has been impressedon the soul; it is called external speech.

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    ment of ideas, which are the inner speech, guarding it againsterror and leading it in the right path until it acquires the truthin so far as it is in man's power to attain truth, and it also im-parts those rules, common to all languages, which lead externalspeech37 in the right path and guard it against error; so thatwhatever the tongue utters harmonizes and agrees with thehidden thought, the expression neither adding to, nor detractingfrom, the promptings of the soul,-because of these benefitsbestowed by this art, they called it the art38of logic. Indeed ithas been said: The relation of the art of logic to the mind isthat of the art of grammar to language.39The term 'art' is regarded by the ancient thinkers as a homo-nym, being applied to every theoretical science and also tomechanical workmanship. They call each one of the philosophi-cal sciences theoretical art; and such as carpentry and stone-cutting, they call productive40art.The term 'philosophy' is also a homonym, sometimes signi-fying demonstration, and sometimes the sciences. In the lattersense, it is given to the two classes of science, one of which iscalled theoretical philosophy, and the other, practical philos-ophy or human philosophy or political philosophy.

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    MAIMONIDES' TREATISE ON LOGIC

    Mathematics studies material things not as they are but asabstracted from, though always existing in, matter. The partsof this science which are its roots are four: arithmetic, geometry,astronomy, and music; and these parts constitute what is calledthe propaedeutic science.Physics studies material things existing, not as products ofhuman will, but in nature, e. g., minerals, plants, and animals.It studies these things and all that exists in them, I mean, theiraccidents, properties, causes, and also all in which they them-selves exist, like time, space, and motion.Theology is divided into two parts. One of them is the studyof every being which is not matter nor a force in matter, thatis to say, of whatever appertains to God, may His name beexalted, and also, according to the opinion of the philosophers,to angels; for they deny that angels are corporeal, and they callthem transcendent intelligences, i. e. separated from matter.

    The other part of theology studies the remote causes of thesubject matter of the other sciences, and is called both divinescience and metaphysics. These are all the sciences enumeratedby the ancient thinkers.As for logic, they do not count it among the sciences, but

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    until they become habits which manifest themselves in actions.Philosophers describe habits as virtues and vices; and they callthe worthy habits moral virtues, and the unworthy habits theycall moral vices. The acts that come from worthy habits theycall right, and the acts that come from unworthy habits, wrong.The intellect, i. e., the formation of ideas, they also describe interms of virtues and vices; so that we speak of intellectualvirtues and intellectual vices. The philosophers have numerousworks dealing with the subject of virtues. As for a rule wherebyone person governs another, it is called law.The government of the household involves the knowledge ofhow the members thereof should help each other and of whatthey need for their subsistence, so as to bring about the bestpossible improvement of their condition according to the re-quirements of time and place.The government of a city is a science imparting to its mastersa knowledge of true happiness, showing them the way44to obtainit, and a knowledge of true evil, showing them the way to avoidit. It shows them how to use their habits in abandoning illusoryhappiness so that they will not desire it nor delight in it; and itexplains to them what is illusory evil so that it will cause them

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    MAIMONIDES' TREATISE ON LOGIC 65

    All terms explained in this chapter are twenty-five: rationalfaculty, inner speech, external speech, the art of logic, theoreti-cal arts, productive arts, philosophy, theoretical philosophy,practical philosophy, human philosophy, political philosophy,mathematics, the propaedeutic sciences, physics, theology,metaphysics, habits, moral virtues, moral vices, intellectualvirtues, intellectual vices, right, wrong, laws, nomoi.All the chapters of this treatise are fourteen. All the termsexplained in these chapters are one hundred and seventy-five;and these are the most general terms used in logic. Some ofthem are technical terms used in physics, theology, and politicalscience.

    This is what I thought fit to discuss; and perhaps, God willingit will fulfill its purpose.

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    1R:3T:3 1n1:r:nn DnD n31:Dlrnnyn7ll l:;nyn:''0' 1 n3%n" - pI nnom 4 l nlnmtponl nmipDtl.tip' ~W W'~m.~t t-,', w;.nK W;,: ' nzr' .n~nnn

    p iw tnn nrvnrl nri tntp33m n3m Inr.nn3_m:"'-i .~D, nt n^-'y. npl.'71~t~ -' 13n' 13mD,:o :ninnD *n5nnn13 IDnri] :. n pr in :DDpi5

    DoVol ''2n1'OrW 6*1D o31n5v[ .1rm 9m1D' -it.0a^ nDRO 0Wma'8fmi 1 OUKU nrlD i^n i-xim-il 3 )wvin[YDn'n014*D17nD ID'3nn 12mn D;iKr11 D'LDD1 DD*m1i(8^yn 'n'nb D ^in"n11n rnoi& cim lDm n3i1 ;ND1lim.ii .,tninp i 1 nnnwnn nlmnmmrinl, DM)i1D 1o."DIp'q nir ;.D,l r,, ,lipn," 'r\1 (,DyP nl.:'lpn;'.pED HNi nofr l3DDyD;n n;n^ tiwnn 3w^wrn ^31 .n^nnnlmpDmn fin .nln1m n-3it;1 n3itvinn o 9 : nmliyion 1pi1ri nt n3vn n3i1nzr3linn;i3m mD73N nlrz3DnDl- z[nlilin ol nlmlp nnmT3p;nr [imnn 1mn ' rnDl3r DnDl

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    K:ip'nnl 'nt non nr1urlrtn -Im rrinn"-rn ' yvanwznrmnp;nnw mn,;nnvp;n ymmnnly;r;nwim innm'vp;nnwIn,i,y; .,'nv1rnwpn;-n;iNp lmn:mnu,non -'n

    ",';l;n"IW1 .nDl,n n:'.in^p ,'lb'p:N H1'nnlr, n ny'n)l 5.nlrrn nWp;nrnip nnlDD D pnnnn ' pnn ni-rpn.n1'13n nDiND l;:rTi ny,n lp; nny 1' nvr! yl.ny-opn lpnn topnn no 'o= n nilp2 n=niprt nhl

    n1p'l OnnlpDr^ nyi O'iTn nynplTap n 1i' nWoyp'pmnlD)-rU D':l7V a1w"p71 ID 'Nt

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    0w'iDn'i O'IrMIn 'nDlion 'Wpir' rpl .-'WUinMin oYIpnb? DIMnMnID7pnn3V m:;nI n i8K nlKIN IKDRD 7t16IKl .1'KMn ON '9 n-ipn-n Mi1 DIM MI1W WDVn IVy'twpnnvyn nrrSnnbiw uSnlnmvln nwynnl) ntinDimpn,nlmD1nnnmn Dnl,rn,pn Dompn,mnnm 1nl~r 7n 6.1nD31n"ynnT13z92Will nlDw V" YyrnMt n3ra3y w1n OW1Vnlnu; ^i91,nlmDD'Dn ,nr^nlinwmn.nl3ntUmni; nlwlDn ,aDQnlDnwpr; ,noiDr nzDNn ,flnvD;n wpn;n .ngNtDn ,mO=nlmpn

    rpnn,n;Irnn nD6Dn;1,nn ,pn mw n n n ,mD mn3n 10.nnD3n,tmn nDDn ,,,'t;n tmpnn;nrynn nmom ,yuony

    lywn myw 15

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    Dr'' P: I'n3 ':Nl D" lI',.i1 .1" n'rlr InrrnlmC"',, wK ;nl,:",,, mowD',i: '::: .aS,: a "nwtDn,l~y" n,",'r"t N,ly. IN" 1 .:::}m'rl :YYnlJ;l nrm:Ill:

    5,y- N:r1 ?In T'rn an:r prnrnin riKn n: rio prn

    '133:W,-T nlX,tr Zm' Ym ,ntrt n D.n,' 11D'n n1 :n

    ;m.n~mnmop .:D 'nb :: lni3V ,=1n0l'n I n,n 13l, 533

    3,'T1 t-1I.,' ll, .p3 n' D,; 1l) 1,5 .; ("y) 14 .'tl

    nilvD 1[1t . 18n 1,1,n"n [1nP3]9 17imu n (mJ3Yn.3"Y0ntpnlr *i^n lnlKmIWD w-7I1n;1 M1rn1 mIrl; :inn n lppDnDn "1nintl I mlXnn 1Un;Ol1 nDnOY 3n`Y;l 10 rn n;lt1 Inm "In K;i^wplb nliDWln naVn "InnIM 1 -iTmnl 10'5e2D2DZitK bpwn;1 py ':lnn-2Dn bH17 n n tt ;nr1 rnilt,LMICD67n ny-LN11 "NI 'n' nMI 31-m no nm-In-iypl onnD K2C39D9 lWpn pnnln Wyl9;r Kl '9 l;1Wo^ nsyny JrT-T .-pn1nD1ir nMmIp 0770 '177 nlD;n 1i ' .nllp-

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    poaDni nywx "bFK p

    ;mn JIDn- r t'Opr .innin 1 rnp ni, nmnrnM nt -mt, m"ol3nnpinrl'nwl 'm"nn'1'1;r ,nlm nmr"npnn "nll" nlrwn' ID yil'll .anIlm n 111nn3ltnw' n'lymbun n%l;l bKlU,'DIn MInID pin-i bn WNmDnnmm-Tnnnmn nam:v[; 'Krr16 13 n^T1 nTrh t oKnDw1 [n;T WNrw'lKw 5nimnl'llD pin i '1mn1 rn i,K nnml',n .nlnl-lDn oinp,'3 (IB'n{?^ mlytn onl Dn'I'KNDon^tvW' 1Ri^Pnlwn m:nrnKl;' .3n1Dit,y'm nm '1nt;n Dn,r mlytn D nWy1'2nDmnnnnnyp om ontp lin,w ' #n; nmb-;DniK' nn-On btin

    'mn n-mn:t 13: n ny 'nD m lD,fn qlnln 3:rn-mir3n-fn nr 5pnTnl ~ pDDbmnp :,l V nm :,mDrt3an

    .in risn-iir.nmIr pnnDn2t nm7i nnmnn 1:i p-nin1inxyn""D;1 ;lt $yl . Olmysm l;-llwip, Ol'K9Dn;11C'91D1i9;1Dnm rm n=pr npmnr:n wr mnm nn-imltn mvn

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    nlDYy-royD H1r,lO'W' CSDD91p CWKon1D p^3yr

    nHD1'W, L'zYnr1Nii 1rt1yD l"3 ynn'13l 'r3m lnir1o llDnlN . '1'D3 'I:lK :13m, 'nu ',:r r'1 r'l, Nn0l ,I-]n: i "nb: 5rI13ln1nlm'D -ro-.1N 1'Dm,Ml1rn Yion'VIM'ZYnl an'to.D ,16 Doln l .35:y 'uni, mn .':pD rlm-Ip,',yn .n',"

    09otDD ilz lnlri J1D nn empil tm.Kn wmnD lpDYsl p:1imD 10Otr P' 7 an; K-pl .n^n'7-i' pyDI DIDDI trnc alai

    .'ipn 11p .nno. 1 ryo'ti nl'l?orT 1'nKL' '"1

    lIWnp1=HDl1nn

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    pIlDxo nyMWN9 ntpo

    =nnmInmDlprn= nirm ntnn mnnpI .0a-N;n1 nbilb6 NtlT Olny= ONbI T91)D IrM1N73W nM iD 0C3 D-.Tn3'I .m'tmy33 itit: nnDn1m'ni rn1 mmr

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    r13m'~IvrWK y1' ji,nn'1 DoUmnKI nl:'ol 1D Hni'nnIDni l'nnnwv ;noiIrn '1D '1n n:lr nni ."1non: ,1D" l31D ' '3pnmlni ''nnxn ni; -nn inpi rlmyt nKn YDn.frtnpit ii nD91 rnmpin lpn1z'lD'll ['.nrD"p, [M '"'I, 51D ,l"1l K' r'l; t ,"l[ JrD [l7D10;71 n 'D1n l l .'l .nm'x7l E';1 071 '1nl l1 ( n-1,y.) s/'11 ,1 'l ', 1 fll I,D7l .7 'nD,''Drh ."11 . ' l [' l" llIWlU;I m111 O;nDK;1Oi'D pI r1 .kYvnwv 'riisn .rr'D ItynYv 0JiD n [N 'IfiDn1 .Dp1po Ilyw nil on11y;r .i 15OsZ1D r 17R1 .nMl )0D10 7;11 O"W'141 3131-Ml4Nvalf'Dliz1 nnrin;o 19m nyi-7l .n11-l;l'lNlPbrip O;1 t'nl'ivipTM W 12z23MM 1Db;ltf 11Vl a-17,1K8ZlDnNlslD7tr i)nv

    i^nlDnnl pnnr1"3y Irlat ap1M31 wtpnnIJ0 N1n a;nmDmO

    ln p:1: Dl:inn

    txY 'D

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    pDuD= MipD

    flD K1, '"T ID,1T Kl,'ll ', '"IDD,'1 lD .11rT,fO'1X, 'r

    liwr:: 1 ,-;tm 1"1m'al "P'5Dr 1mpnnim pnm 3mn m'FT1 Tin lrn n?Op T1K'-llDi3H l'D3n 1flO0Kn 1nsOprn IN ' 1t InI IP3 *1n~' DD3'D l'D 1 131'T'10 '.11^

    ,0mnm n1mm,qpmn';: -t, 7n~;711)t1t nm lm'n'in,D mnn nTn .3iHmi 'm mimI a"7't'win .rnaian i3n& *X Trn

    I'n "1 n DOO[ttIw 1im 13.K10' ltpol 1311;n'133t OtU.OW1I0 ;KpN3 r,1,1 m.pl ,11[0' in ln 3ln3D

    ,l D;lO?Um nl t"'yt;l n3tln3n r: nl[D" n1 n3nl;[ipD .n,o(pn;l lnpDnl'"lpD;l ,;['l:Dl,7l 7.n;1 ,'t).n ,(lDl 150D1(,n ,ly) x ne : n[pin . 1m 1n I oy.n 3ID" ,"inDi

    lpInp1N 1-nM

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    ,Dm1nU Cnan ,QOYr ,nnoNHrr ,aw189n ozl, ,o^pin,,tpSrOmDNO1 nSynirr a""ol:ni"a 1Inlonoo nnty;n1nj3nr'c6. n:98 nl:'Nm -'PI ronnnn y mwpN.-i'W D :1'-i ':1m1 7,=7un 1:ml1n=IDV1noi nMIM-nna:KID13-7'1nD1:m1.D'PT1DD n Dm,unlM73y 1sM:3Kv I: 1' a-nyV n 5

    -iy -7nNnywnli m^mnwhvynn,1nl0 1on ri "r n.r 10.n,n i y '.W3;DD1 .ml''i (l:lp) onnrin allpin 1y[nlyrsc '1ny, o-: Ir 1(inD .:"3 'nD:y fn;: ID5;nD im 1p1 .nlyzxm ;lWt byMHYn' o1yDOw D"yI nloscyn"pn; tm ailnnm irnD; lDot nlpn fnlxz3i: rinl- by HtaDw':a"Yno;.ny;1n .' j 1 .nloxym :ln13n", DI' T n; 15DynDny IlnrwwItn0D1 .on"lmoy o6D rnr by 1snoPN

    nyu s ri-pnI

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    pm331 D

    Frn 1'Y mrt flFr rnpon -r'! D14m DnFD'r n y -i1in,rl ;nm 1,3 ,r"rlni:n V1" .rnpo1ntmno 1yi niD'yHr"1 WMnnIVN1 110 "nlm'lnbl ny1 Ni"p 1f1'?n" lD1::nnny i1 nnl [m lm A 1imn m1 1inb 1W (1 3v A3inrrt1D Nl) 5 .n3t n;13n "1nn inf1 y['w 1ltri I,ID ' 1nr bKN': qvD nt rntm n nnz 13-1^nKatm .n:meznn mNnn-rmn9n:)nn 1'm nMD9"IDminnmn D ;;lnwt nulmrmrn

    11t n nT)nn6 "D r1r1] 7K1rnf 1nann W11' nlyrmnt -Tr^Ti[f -78 13-n ]D .nly;n[:nnv 91"D;Dly 17*yn'.'nn,w":n' p [y3m 138no .pini nm"mnl::' : Int" :r,y mnl: 1013-n1w1 .lW[it In mrip mnlmnM wln mn ,n::a mnnri bln -TnlD2DD13Nnp inl'rrl nDn mn nDn nnlD m;ntw ml ny3 1u.1nlnDmntw' .Nl;,W' ny3 nn(rD1)9ynnw 'n L13e-1 .1' (1'

    1y13 llt4 i a:10f 1 1 .aW1 ini* [ nIIp9lN ;ltrr1 ;1 n2D

    t31in

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    aD'lyn C1'I1 "1pDIw nD: 1'm nl2ytwDh 1'D1ii yt,nmn vD.-I 'in 1] yn 1i'l oiyan D""yn'"33"OHDKn

    73D D'nn1 ]D 1WtlDl n7nil pl oinDlk Dni'r D'Ip 'n"n]'Wt 1DO71nD1 . 'lbD:l nrl'r 'l on mlp ,'p3 KDl' o 1'W,713p3 ONi1t 01 .DD D9n c9DDa D7531 ktz 'yD'1 01rr

    .K"nN r1pn'C TnD mInn1n Ci," rN'Or ' rn')C lD'O 1nlo10

    ' "Nlpl 0r1M Df1tW2 3O''i) ONt Dn1r 10 i1 .Y"l'0nml']l''wDpnOWml, 1inn i1ntW nlr'2D3Pnpmn nipni Dlnm

    rnlK'I 1D' rlnn' D min nwxvnWRD [n 1 'il'1 13p, D 15

    llnn J1N

    'I

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    mnimpmi tiwn: -yn nsxi 'liy* n wilyn p'iz 3Dni 1Dl10p36 i: mDtm ni-7m ornymylDm Own riiNvx19nxt7 ' lmb W3 D 8O '? 1nyP W Oln'mi .tiy m1r 3pbNw;I mni3z3 i lznm ,Innmnynm bn:n Knl;l;N13;p.1a^nDmi0 n -y1Knm 1 .p3pn I9y nT? nru1n .0m m? -.1y Nl 5

    04y rml o1w 13 .y1 ) [1rDoni yIDtn iWtKO]WplD'Vi 1rl:13T13I fci^y 1"Y1' pn ifvTpmwn^D K1nn ptW6a

    7TKH~;n*nDMom-nN3 1^nm3^3;ntrpni3QM nn 1O;nprim OKI1t ;1nlynr 1"3Yw3 y'r kN mru .-Iprny2'iT y? p. 151C" Hbi103DDSp -mni nl;i1 nDOnDi1lpml 11nmi Jim DiWKDnM;rnlt mn1; 13D )TiiK finl Lih199pDnnn -nm bz nlSp3irinn 13n3m lnpi3 D;1p ;lDlntwL9mmnxnml nmonl nmyDn11i .aPisntD;n -in, mn3t imp3i 156

    pu3D1 nyE$ ;I pv

    lpn 1=m onu-

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    ]nbpw nYU3m PD37-yt p-3Up- Dllm bp'ni I'tyrI 0n1HmiC-ny i3:3vm IDCp pv 1D D'cran1 nmnlom11lmlwmn

    .Da":nDOnw D.'nDLD :~1Da,Qn .W ::331p'~plmDl nDr ' I"yt'n n133 ytilrDo nmnWui nrn

    ,a,'npn Da,a,yn,c:n)D,,n ,,ayn ,nIpDWa Dnlmony3:t-s'; D'DMnn ,pJinln n:n ,,lnpn n:n ,;y::yy ,n:: a2 nD

    -'iDn17 1" ,["l: "tJ,"1"l 6 ' l[ , 1tD";'l'Qna^non tBI'D$Dn 01:DDn tXmi32nn10

    .D',IDn 3(") nn *n"rn1, onp irW1 n:3"r ,0m '1n'oDl,'np1 'l"Wll .0n3"I -nTp m3:DK: 1tm AD'p-p D rnim 3 15

    INlwYD :2Inn piDo iZln a1 nn- .oINnil 'n y30n

    pvz^ot nyamsfIMpD

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    nr: mnp' t rn n mn:.i3'o pin ir 1'n alp mrnpmirwa,n,T1 W ::om:6,-tn rpipnn nzmn .'np ,5 noamIliD'r .In'nnr 'D lIa ia'1Rlyn "n1'nDn onor'1D irD;nrm nninn omn nnl orno nN a :p-p17 t,n 1itK o'm t nt:)nn,ID31 ' nip-nplrn Kirwonrito D3n m lni3 ' n3''.i D(i1 Dnr* nn,) Ili'mnlinn)n' ]i .n yDn-lom3 n3m nn nipnm -i-nD inm o-rN n3nznn)wD nnnnDnnm tl6n t niyDn -pnio InoDi-p -nlr mi;lWtmDni.ty (ilU.m n3D3D1 pn"1nn .n"n[12 pnn n:tR6n nn[ip

    .nfn nin onD 1nNKnXD' Ki1 nlm'.D.. O'"3)DOnt'iD ["tD 10n3oD nnc3i3n3) n3n "inmn niwxDv r\oD anD nn I niltnn.p )nlruVrnl n[y z 'nI"D1piD 1D)DU ID'-1p mil-nilUiDzo KI' WDnWutyt y :) irn, o onVs;Dyt 31l.n (1nD-WK: 1DT3nn, aonwonnl"zwn wn n 3mciio rn nluTD:i

    n -tWKo oanwe nO31 nnm rn 15

    T13 lltn 1:m:r1mn

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    -rn' D'lDDn 1p1 .'nlniDD; y3 in ,n "" ilWD. rmn. n;1.nizOD"n 072D

    Dm; n #twtD mtenmyvn DZ'ay iNann i ti niiwn i: nrz,n:nD: aripm ,nl crnipm PmIy r :pm jDr3DaIpn.Yn3rnn ,nrninDnn ,ip3m rrn 1prtrn' ,Dmno 3lnpm 5

    itpynrwtbwwv,NK:p)-rIN w'; bplvn 3iyn p-p-70D N^ip' -iv nzfnn 10o;rn 1z3D Dblml .;ln nln"1pr3 .nyrl :13 :1r1 .[:p;1n ltn:[n~3,1 DN .:n13 aDw nip 1' 7t3D1301it DW, lK:npTvit: 'itln,] [,D::inn p :v - l,"I :np 1 :::r ,':Inn pn Up Om owpr^nn nrl XnzmD Irm imlipp

    t 'nr n u,T in . 'pi:" np ' pDD T'ip .i r,iw' ,n,"r 15

    pvmmNRny=J 9 iSNpD 13

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    ~N. na1 ypnUm a.ylbl nlo :nynUp'm a,N'p.WK-p11on a'pnpn'10n ;7m np n1wi .,Qnt33nIID lnrM anp33n,^'ryi' 'p n' -1 nnY: n'nm 1p1mnmanimnnwi"''1nn NMp 21a1T3'Vn ':pn1 .aO'1nD3TpQ

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    nml 1I mnl~n' ewm a,~n awnpl a,mnneW1i mnInw oDmnnetnnroD,p3n1) lpn,1M' nnn,On mDO;ml071ilml8 Z9DN- ON l.W PD 1'PDIDD 0D.D1D'D:D1D 1.D1 7103m1n3 ~,D: ~l:D;e ODWlapn Ipmano 0nha, QmDIDh sniMn1Dan nIV Wn am .apny in anDi aWIRovnrnm,It-m :pa3mYm0an 'D! 1,7 nr 'nttDIDy 'IV,y:.iDn~il nlNn ,tin pyr=oy n 1Yn mowlnpmm Dnnsn nlmy1

    .aDn89y3byi :331D by CD^NH9Dn D01 .08D; yluDw m^^P2ytPy "yDpD ;nDpZy l;l n2DDDaEDH; DWill15, -r,yD lYnlIn n[lN V nr iD Xyn Kl 1n I'nnVwl,rm1'Dn m11-ipy;ll DmD;In N y "11DNnn OwrD: nlDy1'3Do IHbD 'K i3 KD3 trvvnnm utmmynn I' 12 nlnn lpy.nD. .Dn 'nnnllN'ol 'y .D' 1WDI DW1i .1l'oi. l

    .D3O; D3:4DAI ,'fr y1..Ifn1 1 pl 15

    pu3mDnywx to nIpo m:

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    a'DD T:,31KN IDWpM3Y37m nn, ynl n nm ttW' ymm:15'l 1"y: 30 nntDn lm3y3 Cn^y -DKN OWUt, .Mnl ntlQ111 nnW "ryv itnml 3miDnnbN mnlm Dn-n rmnnmW3 n7 1"3Yn}w nu y3 NWit) -DDnDO C KtfYOW7U n3MYlmnmn11 lnl-nm nnD'-rmm'lDD0rr'y iD3 -"rnmlnpyn 5.ps-Dn mp3 n1t 3Ym=lqnn n nnNmnrlt nifpynmt nnDrm4

    O.M Do'z'3D 1D lD .mp 'I.1b .ln"l10M],) ,-rn tmnl

    Cy DK3n3r 3lvtsn ^D3i .n31 :l31D 'rDrn' ?D H,llm.rQy:3X 13 iy3rXw:In:u n'i'nyl o3t9yn"l i:: 10

    nn3IMntnw3 nlDnmy y .nmDlnto;n 22 I' iDnopnmOnn nio2y in bvlp3 3nlN ninxyn innl.y o9p l1m plvwinio2;y inieby -rnnnmNrn mt.n op mmn m 1minynnxp3MOWTnr3Klp' DIy0 nnM-VD 1IDy n3ln nn&rNwV W7unimDn 1K li3i Dv 'an t3wip t Ii'DUi .nDUKvInni 15

    plmn tt a1mnn

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    nn)-,w3 n1 DN W1 nowN ;nni ;1 1r: nmn1Darr 0'1'7p7pWDN lry' 11i' W inyn nLit lily Lylwin*nIn 10Y3nlDtw;nripony'r

    "Ivy tDW"Cyry,tnD3T Y31DDI onlDWmDsniK ) 13"DWanyp' 'n98 anO3n atynW naOW'ow; lt'ip; n1nlm,E 5,D'DUC]UlwY) , t3W71z ,O':no Illw 11p- iUl , nt

    ,p3DlDnaU,w n sD:DUm D3n OWQfiln mnrDU ,Dr3nl m1 N.pnyz;^ptDnDrOlND D ,rnn11'il^a irn at)vr

    10

    "IY nyi-It -iytm1nnlnown niKn; ^snno ipnavp Onn rnin ov 15

    mrn;n -rnri iN nx;n ]wrn .aovvy w r y I19'nlSDOD

    pu373'lnyflx D m5m D

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    n-mnrn nDinn O'DsDwv n rpn wr'm n oDn- nnmyDn in imniDnwv -Ty 'rtwian -imn R1;1ntiDw cnmrTm:mtnv n mn nnmI 1iinr 5 ynwr'n L1ip n'm1m1b9 oQ^nnwnwDD-y n am 7nm nT Innl ,n nnemn ynrt,n:yo .n i', inn',i:tn i,n,rninn mn :'pn nDr-onp:in 520-ry 1 m;nlinwlnD3rnonI nim lli 1n -l Dnnr'r-y;.n,mnoDnn n18 . Wsl 1= 6n:3yn Y n['2Dn Di5 nftn6n ;llDminp nDzIn nri lyin -ivw on-ymn iK -lmynnm4n nr:n 0w; lr1[n 1rann n:Dim nnrm 'Tnmin:] nrl72) ID'rlprn xmH ; 1DDrnI; 0t'1 .11W; In prlp rn 10nowyn [D y p.im,nn nr.y -lnDn [z ,y .'rips%n4InD 'v1iD1m9 nDnDn rDmnn^D itip3 l twnliDmDn;0n19 ;12wU ;1D1 nluxn;ml nal-v; inK 9 iNip'li n'l3yn.nvvyD ;1n7D6n'iDn~ nDe7l 1: lK:P'P'DU9 lnrlWD aOWK'9t1D1D;I1 OW 16n#w by nrmttwnD6m ^ii'1 .nlDinn 13 iipp 0Nnypi

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    la:n lpt i -rm-n 1 i lllyn' inaDl y"3ra13'o 'l'nD t' nyln1" n'n O'V1N P' loVi l--:' 'ln fiywp a'DYDl^Dt3 D')Df irnn ninnnmn byw^l D^ a1Da"n na'nn.'a':'m '^N ',nyq ,S nplnn;n fcpun ;'ninar 1 'n1 ivnI t p cwi1 wP1 nrinnn 'ipnl nlunnn-cw.'i K1n-ii ln "1i3n 1i'KH

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    MAIMONIDES' STATEMENT ON POLITICALSCIENCE

    By LEO STRAUSSMaimonides discusses the subject matter as well as the func-tion of political science in the last chapter (ch. 14) of his Treatiseon the Art of Logic (Millot ha-higgayon). Philosophy or science,

    he says, consists of two parts: theoretical philosophy and prac-tical philosophy, the latter also being called human philosophy,political philosophy, or political science. Theoretical philosophyconsists of three parts: mathematics, physics, and theology.Practical philosophy consists of four parts: man's governanceof himself, governance of the household, governance of the city,and governance of the great [numerous] nation or of the nations.The first part of political science deals with the virtues and thevices, or with good and bad habits. "There are many books bythe philosophers on the habits." Ethics does not deal with"commands," i. e., with that form of guidance by which a man

    STRAUSS116 [2]

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    nations, each of them according to his perfection, lay downrules of governance through which their subjects are governed[through which their kings govern their multitude]; they called[call] them [sc. those rules of governance] nomoi; the nationswere governed by those nomoi. On all these subjects, the phi-losophers have many books which have already been translatedinto Arabic, but perhaps more which have not been translated.But we have no need in these times for all this, viz. for [thecommands], the laws, the nomoi, the governance by [of] [these]human beings in divine things [for the laws and the nomoi; thegovernance of human beings is now through divine things]."The meaning of this statement is not entirely clear. Theobscurities are partly due to the facts that the Arabic originalof about the second half of the Logic is lost, and that the differ-ences between the three Hebrew translations, or even betweenthe various MSS of these translations, are sufficiently great asto make doubtful the reconstruction of the-original in everyimportant point. In the preceding paragraph, the bracketedexpressions correspond to alternative translations or readingswhich seem to be as defensible as the preferred versions.Three difficulties strike us at first sight: Maimonides rejectsthe books of the philosophers on politics proper as useless for

    [3] MAIMONIDES' STATEMENT ON POLITICAL SCIENCE 117

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    Maimonides says in regard to politics proper, or a part of it,that we do not need the books of the philosophers on thissubject, he says in regard to ethics merely that the philosophershave many books on ethics: he does not say that we do not needthe books of the philosophers on ethics.3 He says nothing what-ever in this context about the books of the philosophers ontheoretical subjects. There is no need to prove that Maimonidesknew of the existence of such books and that he was very farfrom regarding them as useless for "us": the statement underdiscussion occurs in a summary of logic which is based uponthe philosophers' books on logic and on theoretical philosophy.What he suggests then is that of all genuinely philosophic books,only the books on politics proper (and perhaps on economics)have been rendered superfluous by the Torah. This impliesthat the function of the Torah is emphatically political. Thisinterpretation is confirmed by the Guide for the Perplexed. Inthat work, Maimonides says that the Torah gives only summaryindications concerning theoretical subjects, whereas regardingthe governance of the city, everything has been done to makeit precise in all its details.4Still, Maimonides adds an important qualification to his state-ment that we do not need the books of the philosophers on

    118 STRAUSS [4]

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    the political books of the philosophers will again be needed afterthe coming of the Messiah, as they were needed prior to the exile.These strange consequences force us to reconsider the assump-tion that Maimonides means by "we" "we Jews," or that his Logicis a Jewish book, i. e., a book written by a Jew as a Jew for Jewsas Jews. The author describes himself as a student of logic, andhe describes the immediate addressee as an authority on thesciences based upon divinely revealed law, as well as on Arabiceloquence: he does not describe himself and the addressee asJews. When using the first person plural in his Logic, he nor-mally means "we logicians," although he also speaks of "thelogicians" in the third person. Yet on some occasions he speaksof subjects which belong to philosophy proper as distinguishedfrom logic. Therefore, "we" might mean in some cases "wephilosophers," although Maimonides normally speaks of "thephilosophers" in the third person and even seems to indicate thathe does not belong to them.6 One would not commit a grievouserror if he understood by "we" "we men of theory," which termis more inclusive than "we philosophers" and almost approachesin comprehensiveness the present-day term "we intellectuals."Accordingly, Maimonides must be understood to say that themen who speculate about principles or roots do not "in these

    [5] MAIMONIDES' STATEMENT ON POLITICAL SCIENCE 119

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    to politics proper because of the dominance of divinely revealedlaws.7 Since Maimonides' statement as a whole implies thatthe need for the books of the philosophers on ethics and, espe-cially, on theoretical philosophy has not been affected by therise to dominance of revealed religions, he in effect suggests thatthe function of revealed religion is emphatically political. More-over, he regards as useless "in these times" only the books ofthe philosophers on "the laws, the nomoi, the governance byhuman beings in divine things." He does not deny the validityof the basic part of the political teaching of the philosophers:8the philosophers do distinguish adequately between true andimaginary happiness and the means appropriate to both, andthey have an adequate knowledge of the rules of justice. Further-more, if only the most practical part of the political teaching ofthe philosophers is superfluous "in these times" because itsfunction is at present fulfilled by revealed religions; if, therefore,the function of revealed religion is emphatically political, politicalphilosophy is as necessary "in these times" as in all other timesfor the theoretical understanding of revealed religion.The normal division of politics proper may be said to be thatwhich distinguishes governance of the city, governance of thenation, and governance of many or of all nations (i. e., govern-

    STRAUSS120 [6]

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    certainly does not substitute a new tri-partition of politicsproper for the normal one, but rather replaces the tri-partitionby a bi-partition: he assigns the governance of the city to onebranch of political philosophy, and the governance of the greatnation or of the nations to another branch. The principle under-lying the tri-partition was consideration of the difference ofsize between political communities (small, medium, and large).It is reasonable to assume that the bi-partition is based uponconsideration of another important difference between politicalcommunities.

    Maimonides' references to the nations are framed partly in thepast tense. It is possible that he even spoke explicitly of "theancient nations." Furthermore, he calls the governance of thenations nomoi. Finally, in the same context, he speaks of agovernance by human beings in divine things such as belongsto the past. With a view to these facts and to certain parallelsin the Guide, Professor H. A. Wolfson has suggested "that thenations" stands for the ancient pagan nations, and "the greatnation" stands for Israel, and therefore that Maimonides tacitlygoes over from the distinction between political communities inregard to size to their distinction in regard to religion: the citystands for the "civil state," and the pagan nations and Israel

    [7] MAIMONIDES' STATEMENT ON POLITICAL SCIENCE 121

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    which are in no way based on the teaching of the Logic. Theseinferences are in perfect agreement with Maimonides' concludingremark, which is to the effect that we have no need in thesetimes for the books of the philosophers on the laws, the nomoi,the governance by human beings in divine things: the practicaluse of books meant only for practical use is one thing; an entirelydifferent thing is the use for purely theoretical purposes of bookswhich are at least partly theoretical.Wolfson's suggestion is partly confirmed by Avicenna's divi-sion of political philosophy. Avicenna makes use of a bi-partitionwhich is based upon exactly the same principle that Wolfsondiscerned in Maimonides' statement. According to Avicenna,one branch of political philosophy deals with kingship; the classictexts on this subject are the books of Plato and Aristotle ongovernment. The other branch deals with prophecy and divinelaw; the classic texts on this subject are the books of Plato andAristotle on nomoi. This second branch considers the existenceof prophecy and the need of the human race for divine law; itconsiders the characteristics common to all divine codes as wellas those which are peculiar to individual divine codes; it dealswith the difference between genuine and spurious prophecy."There is then one point in Wolfson's suggestion which must be

    122 STRAUSS [8]that Maimonides of the nation in order

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    speaks great preciselyto exclude the small nation, i. e., Israel, and hence the Torah,from the scope of political philosophy. But this possibility iscontradicted by all the considerations which have been set forthhere, and in particular by the fact that the Logic is not a Jewishbook. We suggest then that Maimonides means by "the nations"the ancient pagan nations, and by "the great nation" any groupconstituted by a universalistic religion. In speaking of the greatnation in the singular, he refers to the universalistic and henceexclusive claim raised by each of the three great monotheisticreligions: on the premises of each, there can be only one legitimatereligious community. In speaking of the nations in the plural,he refers to the national character of the religions of the pagans:that national character explains the co-existence of many equallylegitimate religious communities.13It is true that after having divided politics proper into gov-ernance of the city and governance of the great nations at thebeginning of his statement on political science, Maimonides doesnot make explicit use of the bi-partition in the sequel: whendiscussing the function and the scope of politics proper, heidentifies the whole of politics proper with governance of thecity. This does not mean however that he drops the original

    [9] MAIMONIDES' STATEMENT ON POLITICAL SCIENCE

    of each of the the terms which he has123

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    chapter Logic explainedin the body of the chapter. In the enumeration at the end ofChapter 14, he does not mention the terms designating the fourparts of practical or political philosophy, whereas he does mentionthe terms designating the three parts of theoretical philosophy.Thus he does not even claim to have explained the meaning of"governance of the great nation or of the nations" in particular.We have seen how appropriate this silent declaration is. Thereare only two terms pertaining to politics proper and to economicswhich he mentions as having been explained in the chapter:"commands"I4and nomoi. He did define "command": commandis that guidance by which a man guides other men. But hedid not define nomos. Yet the remark at the end of the chaptershows that the definition of nomos is implicitly conveyed throughthe statement on economics and on politics proper. It is obviousthat nomos must be a species of the genus "command." Discuss-ing the governance of the household, he says that that govern-ance takes due account of time and place. He does not mentionthe consideration of time and place when discussing politicsproper. We suggest that nomos is that species of command whichis general in the sense that it does not regard time and place, orthat it does not consider the individual in his individuality.

    STRAUSSa substitute for the government of a perfect ruler who governs124 [10]

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    without written laws and who changes his ordinances in accord-ance with the change of times as he sees fit.,6 The rule of livingintelligence appears to be superior to the rule of law. There isthen a form of sound political governance which is akin to thegovernance of the household, or to paternal rule, in that it paysdue regard to time and place as well as to what is good for eachindividual - the form of political governance which Plato andAristotle had praised most highly. Maimonides mentions therule of living intelligence in the household and the rule of lawin the city; he does not mention the rule of living intelligence inthe city. He omits the central possibility. One of our firstimpressions was that he might have omitted from the normalenumeration of the kinds of political governance the governanceof the nation, i. e., the central item. We see now that this im-pression was not entirely wrong: he did omit a central item.But whereas it remained uncertain whether he had omittedthe nation or only the small nation, it is quite certain that heomitted the rule of living intelligence in the city or nation.If nomos is essentially a general command in the sense indi-cated, it is not, as we have previously assumed, essentially areligious order. Perhaps Maimonides even made an explicit

    [11] MAIMONIDES'TATEMENTON POLITICAL CIENCEis not of the intention of the nomosand

    125

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    religion part primaryof the association which is ordered by it.18Whereas the nomosentails a religion that is in the serviceof government, the divinely revealed law which is a subject ofthe same branchof politicalphilosophyas the nomosputs govern-ment in the service of religion,of the true religion,of the truth.The divinely revealed law is thereforenecessarilyfree from therelativity of the nomos, . e., it is universal as regards place andperpetualas regardstime. It is then a much loftiersocial orderthan the nomos. Hence it is exposedto dangerswhich did notthreaten the pagan nomoi. For instance, the public discussionof "the account of creation,"i. e., of physics, did not harm thepagans in the way in which it might harm the adherents ofrevealed laws. The divinely revealed laws also create dangerswhich did not exist amongthe Greeks:they openup a newsourceof disagreementamongmen.I9To summarize,Maimonidesdirects our attention first to thedifferencesbetween politicalsocieties in regardto size. He thendirects our attention to their differencesin regard to religion.He finally directs our attention to their differencesin regardto the presenceor absence of laws. He thus forcesus to considerthe effects produced upon the character of laws by the change

    -STRAUSS

    necessarily somewhat playful. But they are not so playful126 [12]

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    as to be incompatible with the seriousness of scholarship. TheLogic itself consists of 14 (= 7 x 2) chapters; the number ofterms explained in the work is 175 (=7 x 25); in Chapter 7,Maimonides discusses the 14 moods of valid syllogism. HisMishneh Torah consists of 14 books. In the Guide, he dividesthe Biblical commandments into groups in a manner whichdiffers considerably from the division underlying the MishnehTorah, yet the number of groups of commandments is again 14.In Guide III 51 (123b-124a) which happens to be the 175thchapter of that work, he assigns, in the first interpretation ofa simile, the same place to law which he assigns, in the secondinterpretation, to logic: there seems to be a certain correspond-ence between law and logic. Should there be a connectionbetween the number 14 on the one hand, and logic and law onthe other? In the 14th chapter of the Guide, he explains themeaning of "man." We suggest this explanation: Man, beingthe animal which possesses speech, is at the same time therational animal which is perfected by the art of reasoning, andthe political animal which is perfected by law. Man is a com-pound of form and matter; he has a dual nature. The number7 itself, as distinguished from its double, would then seem to

    [13] MAIMONIDES' STATEMENT ON POLITICAL SCIENCEourselves to noting that the section devoted to "the account of

    127

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    the chariot" is surrounded by two sections of 17 chapters each,and to referring the reader to the 17th chapter of the Guide.It is of the essence of devices of this kind that, while theyare helpful up to a certain point, they are never sufficient andare never meant to be sufficient: they are merely hints. Butthere are no isolated hints: the deficiency of one hint is suppliedby other hints. The suggestion stated in the preceding para-graph suffers from an obvious flaw. The same strange divisionof practical philosophy which leads to the result that philosophyor science consists of 7 parts leads to the further result thatethics occupies the central place in the order of the sciences.And, as Maimonides intimates in his statement on politicalscience, ethics does not deserve the central place.Ethics is the study of the virtues, which means primarily ofthe moral virtues; it is not the study of happiness or man's trueend; the study of man's end belongs to politics proper. Thismeans in the first place that the moral virtues and their exerciseare not man's end. It means furthermore that the moral virtuescan only be understood with a view to their political function.This does not mean of course that the true end of man is politicalor, more radically, the well-being of his body. But it does mean

    128 STRAUSS [14]sufficiently consistent for almost all practical purposes: it is doxa.

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    It is the most impressive expression of man's dual nature.2"Let us then look once more at Maimonides' division of thesciences. His division of theoretical philosophy into 3 parts andpractical philosophy into 4 parts is not final. There is a furthersubdivision of two of the parts of theoretical philosophy: ofmathematics into 4 parts (arithmetic, geometry, astronomy,music) and theology into 2 parts (speech about God and theangels, metaphysics). This might appear strange at first sight,but there is no mention of any subdivision of physics. We arejustified in regarding the subdivisions of practical philosophyas no more important than the subdivisions of mathematics:neither of them is mentioned at the end of the chapter in theenumeration of the terms explained in the body of the chapter.We arrive then at a division of philosophy or science into 11parts (arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, music, physics, speechabout God and the angels, metaphysics, ethics, economics, gov-ernance of the city, governance of the great nation or of thenations). The central part in this second division, which isslightly less noticeable than the first, is occupied by speechabout God and the angels, i. e., by a science which obviouslydeserves the central place.2 Yet the very plausibility of this

    [15] MAIMONIDES' STATEMENT ON POLITICAL SCIENCE

    "the account of the chariot" is identical with the science of God129

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    and the angels. By merely raising this question, we recognizethe error of those who hold that Maimonides' allusive treatmentof "the account of the chariot" is unreasonable because thesecret toward which that treatment points is familar to thescholars of all religions.24 And to recognize that a scholarlycriticism of Maimonides is unreasonable is equivalent to pro-gressing in the understanding of his thought. The section of theGuide which is devoted to "the account of the chariot" is mostreasonably the most mysterious section of the book.The study of Maimonides' statement on practical philosophyor political science thus leads directly into the center of thefundamental problem. This is no accident. The recovery ofwhat we are in the habit of calling classical political philosophyand of what Maimonides called simply political science orpractical philosophy is, to say the least, an indispensable con-dition for understanding his thought. Only those, he says, areable to answer the question of whether the Talmudic Sages weremen of science or not, who have trained themselves in the sciencesto the point of knowing how to address the multitude on theone hand and the elite on the other concerning divine thingsand things similar to the divine, and to the point of knowing