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Major-General Sir Douglas Gracey:Peacekeeper or Peace Enforcer?T. O. SmithPublished online: 07 Jun 2010.

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Major-General Sir Douglas Gracey: Peacekeeper or Peace Enforcer?

Major-General Sir Douglas Gracey: Peacekeeper or Peace Enforcer?T. O. Smith

T. O. SMITH

Current events in Afghanistan have once again placed the politicalcontext of British forces acting in difficult circumstances underthe global microscope. This article focuses upon the high policydifficulties of administering peacekeeping duties by examining thecontroversial role of Major-General Gracey in South Vietnam andCambodia in 1945. Gracey’s British and Indian troops weredeployed in French Indo-China to oversee the surrender ofJapanese forces and the liberation of the Axis occupied territory.But they quickly became entangled in peacekeeping dutiesbetween the returning French colonial regime and the emergenceof various Vietnamese groups determined to take advantage of thepower vacuum. By examining both primary and secondarysources and scrutinising Gracey’s private papers this articleattempts to reappraise a difficult period in British history.

In the annals of the origins of the Vietnam War, one man stands out alonefor a torrent of criticism by Anglo–American historians—the British AlliedLiberation Force (ALF) commander, Major-General Sir Douglas Gracey. Hisoperational tactics have been described as “ruthless” and “overtly political,”carried out with an “alarming directness.” Criticism has attributed Gracey withthe sole responsibility for the return of the French to Indo-China through “anaked policy of suppression” that “boldly” repressed the Vietnamese.1 Theresult has created a myth that has vilified Gracey. The assumption is madethat if it were not for Gracey’s intervention in 1945, Vietnamese nationalismcould have, given the right circumstances, flourished and led the Vietnamesepeople on a more prosperous path than a further thirty years of bloodshed.This article is not an apologia for Gracey—for this he has his own defenceteam—but rather an attempt to examine some of the difficulties of hispeacekeeping duties that appear to have been too readily overlooked by hisdetractors.2 It is too simplistic just to assume that Gracey was a rabid racistand imperialist intent on returning the French at any cost. A veteran of the

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Major-General Sir Douglas Gracey: Peacekeeper or Peace Enforcer? 227

Burma campaign, a successful field commander highly respected by hiscommanding general—William Slim—for his zeal and intellect, later hewould oversee the creation of the Pakistani armed forces.3 Indeed, hisactions during the division of India and Pakistan in 1947 reveal an officerwho was astutely aware of indigenous nationalist sensitivities within hisarea of operations.4

The initial circumstances surrounding Britain’s liberation of French Indo-China in 1945 were created by the Americans. At the Potsdam Conference inJuly 1945 the United States Chiefs of Staff (COS) had decided that FrenchIndo-China, below the 16 parallel, and under Japanese occupation, shouldbe placed within the sphere of British South East Asia Command (SEAC) forthe future Far Eastern war effort. Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten, theSupreme Allied Commander of SEAC, was therefore asked to attach Frenchdivisions to his command. Mountbatten welcomed the offer and stated that“the obvious place to employ them would be in French Indo-China wherehe would be relieved of dealing with a problem which could be satisfacto-rily only handled by Frenchmen.”5

The Potsdam Conference symbolically divided the former French colony.But the conference also had not foreseen that the war in the Far East wouldend so quickly. Anglo–American planners expected the conflict to continueinto 1946 thus allowing Indo–Chinese problems gradually to be resolved. Thedropping of the atomic bombs upon Japan dramatically cut short the Asianwar long before the military planners had expected. They were not preparedto begin the task of administering a Japanese surrender or a Far Easternreconstruction. Much of Japanese occupied Southeast Asia was simply ananathema to them; they lacked accurate knowledge concerning the localdynamics of many of the areas that they were now expected to liberate.

At this critical juncture it was surprising that Mountbatten decided toreturn to Britain for a holiday.6 The French, naturally eager to commenceliberation duties in Indo-China, met Mountbatten in London to push foraction.7 Mountbatten, however, could not be manipulated and instead dis-played a cautiousness that contributed towards a delay in deploying Alliedforces.8 This cautiousness would continue to dog Mountbatten’s SEACduties—especially vis-à-vis local nationalists. The Chief of Staff to Force136—British Special Operations Executive, Far East— had warned the gov-ernment that decisive action was already required by SEAC in Malaya con-cerning indigenous nationalist movements. This was because “experiencehas shown, particularly in Greece, that resistance movements must be givenclear instructions what to do when their country is liberated. If they receiveno such instructions they will inevitably cause trouble, and may attempt toseize power in the principle towns.”9 But United States General DouglasMacArthur, Supreme Allied Commander Southwest Pacific, preventedMountbatten from landing his ALF in Indo-China until MacArthur hadformally accepted the Japanese military surrender.10

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The sudden termination of the war, the lack of organisation by militaryplanners and the decisions of Mountbatten and MacArthur prevented deci-sive action at a crucial juncture. With a Japanese ceasefire in place and thelack of ALF activity a power vacuum developed in Indo-China which theVietminh nationalist coalition in Vietnam, under the direction of Ho ChiMinh—and the pro-Japanese prime minister in Cambodia, Son NgocThanh—used to proclaim independence. French governors were para-chuted into Vietnam to organise a French return but they were arrested bythe Vietminh. Fighting broke out between the Vietminh and French colo-nists. In order to prevent a further deterioration in law and order Graceyreminded the Japanese of their surrender obligation—to maintain law andorder.

On 6 September the first British troops began to arrive in Saigon.11 Thepower vacuum—already a month old—created a dangerous set of opera-tional issues for what had been envisaged as liberation rather than offensiveduties. The British foreign secretary, Ernest Bevin, openly acknowledgedthe gravity of the situation facing British forces.12 The British ALF troopsdeployed to Saigon were from the 20 Indian Division. Therefore the IndianGovernment contacted London to clarify whether it was “His Majesty’sGovernment policy to facilitate [the] re-establishment of French influence inFrench Indo-China.” The British Secretary of State for India replied that thiswas indeed the case.13 Mountbatten contacted the French High Commis-sioner for Indo-China, Admiral Thierry D’Argenlieu, and promised “to do[my] best as an Allied commander to look after French interests.”14 Graceywas expected therefore, by both his supreme Allied commander and theBritish Government, to disarm the Japanese and to permit a French return.

The American Government likewise “fully approve[d] of the continu-ance of French sovereignty” in Indo-China.15 Indeed the United States wasactively supplying France with the transportation and materials needed tofacilitate a French return.16 But for the ALF in Saigon, British peacekeepingoperations had solely military boundaries and objectives. Esler Dening, thesenior Foreign Office adviser attached to SEAC, warned that Britain neededto proceed with caution lest it be accused of political involvement in thechaotic affairs of another nation.17 The situation in British-administeredsouthern Indo-China remained delicate. The ALF build up was slow due tothe shortage of shipping following the Second World War and, unlike inthe north, Vietnam south of the 16 parallel had not undergone a unifiedVietminh revolution. Rather, a patchwork of different Vietnamese national-ist, communist, socialist, religious, and criminal groups had a tentative holdon Saigon.18 None of these competing groups had the skills or the resourcesto unite the different factions within the city, let alone the province ofCochinchina. The Vietminh in the south had a tenuous operational abilityand lacked reliable communication with Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh. In con-trast, the Cao Dai and the Hoa Hao religious sects possessed large quantities

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Major-General Sir Douglas Gracey: Peacekeeper or Peace Enforcer? 229

of firearms and enjoyed popular support.19 British peacekeepers had to con-duct their liberation duties within this volatile situation until the French mil-itary was strong enough to return and restore full colonial rule. In thesecircumstances Saigon, with its large French population, represented a diffi-cult powder keg of ambition between the various Vietnamese groupingsand the French colonists. Gracey’s troops prevented a total breakdown oflaw and order, and the associated humanitarian disaster, which would haveoccurred if the colonists and the Vietnamese had been left alone. In thenorth, the situation was more clear-cut with Ho’s unrivalled ascendancy inHanoi.

Following the British arrival in Saigon, an uneasy peace initiallyensued. But after eleven days the Vietminh called a general strike. Britishand French troops were forced to occupy key buildings to prevent anarchy.Dening prophesied that there would be further local opposition to thereturn of the French, and demonstrations duly broke out against Britishtroops on 19 September.20 Faced with an increasingly difficult situation,Gracey liaised with the nationalists, and warned them of his intention torestore law and order. Two days later a Gracey issued a public proclama-tion. This banned public demonstrations and meetings, allowed only ALFtroops to carry arms, instated newspaper censorship, and a curfew. Britishforces operated the public utilities, and the Saigon population was fed bythe ALF. Two further days later French forces began a counter revolution,and occupied significant administration buildings in Saigon.21 Gracey’sactions were welcomed by the French Commander-in-Chief, GeneralPhilippe Leclerc, who informed his government that “General Gracey had inmy opinion taken the best possible measures in the circumstances becauseif he had shown any weakness the situation might have become critical.”22

In a tense and dangerous situation in which local circumstanceschanged hourly, decisive action was needed by the ALF commander to pro-tect the lives of his troops, and the large French and Vietnamese civilianpopulation. In Gracey’s opinion “no effective civil government exist[ed],”and Vietminh claims to the contrary in the circumstances were “childish.”23

Mountbatten, fearful of the direction that the situation in Saigon was taking,urgently cabled Gracey that the proclamation was contrary to the ordersissued to him. Despite his own misgivings Mountbatten nonetheless sup-ported Gracey’s proclamation as he was “the man on the spot.” At a subse-quent meeting with Mountbatten, Slim, and the French, Graceyacknowledged that he was “restricted” to using British troops within theSaigon vicinity but he argued that this did not absolve him from law andorder responsibilities—maintained by Japanese forces acting in accordancewith his orders—in the rest of southern Indo-China. Mountbatten believedthat Britain needed to absolve itself from the whole affair. As a result ofactions in Greece the British Government did not want British casualties inoperations which were not of a British responsibility, nor did they want to

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intervene in the politics of another country; the problem in Indo-China wasFrance’s, and they would have to resolve it “with their own troops.”24

With the continuing problems in Vietnam in mind Gracey raised thesituation in Cambodia with Mountbatten. Gracey was worried that Britishintervention in Cambodia would have similar consequences to Vietnam. Hesuggested that the best way to handle the situation in Cambodia was to“condone the past actions of the P.M. [Thanh], and to enlist his support; infact to treat him in the same manner that we had dealt with Aung San inBurma,” that is to work with the nationalist movement. Mountbatten agreedwith this political solution. It was decided that the French should settle thesituation in the Cambodian capital Phnom Penh with Thanh, and thatFrench troops could take over from the Japanese, thereby sparing Gracey’slimited resources from involvement in Cambodia.25 The plan, however, wasnot put into action. John Lawson, the British Secretary of State for War, metwith Mountbatten, Slim, and Gracey to discuss the situation. It was agreedthat Gracey’s forces would maintain law and order in southern Indo-Chinauntil French forces could relieve them26 In addition to managing the difficultcircumstances in Saigon, Gracey’s small ALF would now have to go toPhnom Penh to administer the Japanese surrender whilst maintaining a dif-ficult position of neutrality neither to endorse Thanh nor to turn him over tothe French. Once again British forces found themselves caught in a violentconfrontation between indigenous nationalists and the French.

Events were complicated even further by the arrival of a telegram fromTom Driberg, a Labour Member of Parliament on a tour of Southeast Asia,offering his services to aid reconciliation. Lawson decided that the offershould be welcomed but that no authority should be given to Driberg.27

The offer was not well received within SEAC where it was feared this politi-cal advance could be used for propaganda, and aggravate an alreadydelicate situation.28 Mountbatten, however, had other ideas about the use-fulness of Driberg, and began to develop a personal correspondence withhim. He wrote to Driberg, and flattered him that although his offer to aidreconciliation had arrived too late, Mountbatten had personally persuadedLawson to approve of it being accepted—Driberg had already returned toBritain. Mountbatten praised the reasonableness of the Vietnamese in agree-ing to the cease-fire on 1 October, and renewing this on 3 October. In con-trast he wrote: “If only the French will be reasonable, and come forwardwith an imaginative offer, the war in Indo-China can be over. If it is contin-ued through French intransigence, I hope it will be made abundantly clearthat it is nothing to do with Southeast Asia [Command].” Mountbattenlamented that if only he had been given a “free hand” in Indo-China and theNetherlands East Indies as he was in Burma, then both would have beenresolved satisfactorily. He reflected that it was difficult to leave the politicalcontrol to other nations when British forces were militarily in charge of the situ-ation. Later in their correspondence Mountbatten would use his relationship

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Major-General Sir Douglas Gracey: Peacekeeper or Peace Enforcer? 231

with Driberg for personal political purposes to raise anonymous questionsin the House of Commons concerning issues that Mountbatten regarded asimportant.29

To alleviate the situation of the ALF in Saigon it was essential now forBritain and the United States rapidly to transport French forces to Indo-China. The Joint Planning Staff (JPS) in London continued to support theBritish troop build-up, but it insisted that this was to be concentrated inSaigon and that Gracey should leave the rest of the country to the Frenchand only assist where necessary.30 In order to directly address the problemsthat it was facing in Indo-China SEAC began talks with the Vietnamese.31

H.N. Brain, the Foreign Office representative in Saigon, reiterated to theVietnamese that Britain’s position was one of neutrality and that it was notHis Majesty’s Government’s intention to use British forces for politicalpurposes. He stated that “the United Nations have decided that it will notrecognise a change of sovereignty of any territory which has taken place byforce during the war.” Brain coaxed that the United Nations was committedto the development of self-government for colonial peoples.32 With a cease-fire already agreed upon in Saigon, Mountbatten used Japanese prisoners ofwar to keep order and boost ALF troop numbers.33 He also lobbied Londonand reminded the government of the impossible situation in which Britishforces found themselves in southern Vietnam.34

In response to Mountbatten, the British Prime Minister Clement Attleeasked the Ministry of Defence for a report on the situation in Indo-China.Major-General Hollis reported that on arrival “Gracey found that the situa-tion was not beyond control but that the Annam [Vietnamese] Governmentcontributed a direct threat to law and order.”35 Attlee decided to bring theIndo-Chinese problem to the Cabinet Defence Committee for discussion.36

In the meantime, he asked Hollis for further clarification regarding theAllied movement of the French 9 Colonial Division. With the post-wardislocation of Allied shipping Hollis replied that, according to the COS, forBritain to accelerate the arrival of the French division it would have toaccept a delay of three months in the general demobilisation of Britishforces following the end of the Second World War.37

The violence in Saigon as yet had not placed a ceiling on the numberof British forces committed to Indo-China.38 In London the Cabinet DefenceCommittee debated the need for Britain to accelerate movements of Frenchtroops to Indo-China due to the imposition that this would place upon ship-ping requirements. The Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS), LordAlanbrooke, in response to a question by Attlee, believed that it was tooearly to foretell the direction of events in Indo-China. “He [Alanbrooke]recommended that the situation was not at present sufficiently serious topay the expense involved in speeding up the arrival of the extra Frenchdivision by one month only.” The Foreign Office disagreed—it was anxiousto speed up the arrival of the French division and return responsibility for

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law and order to the French. But it revealed that the French Governmenthad not as yet raised the prospect of acceleration with Britain. Attlee sidedwith Alanbrooke and concluded that the situation did not warrant a changeto the schedule of French troop movements to Indo-China.39 Thiscondemned Gracey to a further period of uncertainty regarding the role ofthe ALF.

Meanwhile the JPS argued that, although Britain remained legallyresponsible for law and order in southern Indo-China, British commitmentsshould be limited to a minimum and thereafter handed over to the French.The Foreign Office, however, believed that if Mountbatten announced onlymilitary objectives in Indo-China this might encourage further revolutionaryactivities—the JPS agreed. The Foreign Office suggested that an announce-ment should be made along the lines that Mountbatten would not tolerateactivities that threatened the implementation of tasks or security.40 Bevinbelieved that the statement was important in defining Britain’s role in Indo-China.41 The COS supported the Foreign Office statement, anxious to avoidany French reaction to events due to the need for their support in widerglobal security issues.42

On 9 October a Civil Affairs Agreement was signed in London betweenBritain and France. This passed the responsibility of administering Indo-China below the 16 parallel to France.43 The Foreign Office questioned thecontinued ability of SEAC to deal with the problems that it was facingthroughout Southeast Asia.44 Mountbatten, however, took personal chargeof the situation in Indo-China and met with Gracey and Leclerc to formulatea new policy.45 A day later the Vietnamese broke the cease-fire agreement.The British were once more caught between the aspirations of the Frenchand the Vietnamese. In this violent geopolitical climate Slim questioned thedirectives from the JPS in London to Gracey as being unworkable.46 The sit-uation was poised to deteriorate even further. Mountbatten forwarded toLondon Vietnamese demands for the immediate restoration of their author-ity in Saigon, rearmament and the disarming of the French. Aware ofVietnamese propaganda, Mountbatten urged Gracey to avoid “giving theworld the impression that we are threatening to use all weapons of war atour disposal. That is one way to lose the sympathy of public opinion inEurope and America.” Gracey was also forbidden from giving interviews tothe press.47 Mountbatten and Slim continued to lobby the Cabinet to accel-erate the arrival of the French 9 Colonial Division.48

On 24 October Bevin responded to a question from the House of Com-mons with a statement on the situation in Indo-China. The historian JohnSaville in his analysis of the statement has argued that this was a mixture of“half truths and untruths: it was a louche statement of lies.”49 Bevin’s state-ment was certainly a bland synopsis of events since August. The ForeignSecretary’s oratory side-stepped the gravity of the situation in the south, andit reiterated Attlee’s desire not to become “involved in the administration or

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Major-General Sir Douglas Gracey: Peacekeeper or Peace Enforcer? 233

the political affairs of non-British territories.” Bevin concealed the truenature of the Indo-Chinese political situation from the House by claimingthat the “liberal attitude” of the French Government was “reflected in thevery conciliatory manner in which the local French representatives havedealt with the Annamite [Vietnamese] leaders.” Bevin discharged the gov-ernment’s responsibility by concluding that “every effort is being made toexpedite the movement of French troops to Saigon.”50 But the CabinetDefence Committee meeting, at which both Attlee and Bevin were present,had already ruled otherwise. Bevin’s tardy performance was symbolic of theLabour Government’s policy towards Indo-China; it was a minor concern inan era when Britain was still unsure where its economic and political post-war role lay. The Second World War had bankrupted Britain and the finan-cial “Dunkirk” of 1945 prevented adequate resources from being allocatedto peacekeeping operations in Indo-China.51

British operations in Indo-China began to be reduced as the Frenchincreased their forces. Mountbatten was pleased to be informed by Graceythat British officers were no longer commanding Japanese forces. Mountbat-ten feared a western public backlash and the political repercussions of suchactions.52 Asian public opinion was strained already in Ceylon and Indiawhere there was strong support for Pan–Asian nationalism. In London theSecretary of State for the Colonies advised the British Governor of Ceylon toissue a statement in support of the evolution of Asian self-government. Buthe also told him that Mountbatten had “had to use force to meet violence bythe extremists.”53 Mountbatten applauded Gracey’s management of ALFduties and promised that he would instruct the CIGS, Alanbrooke, on howskilfully and tactfully Gracey had handled the situation in Indo-China.54

Mountbatten in his continued correspondence with Driberg boasted: “I amrather proud of French Indo-China since I think I have succeeded in carry-ing out the British commitment with more success than any of the prophetsforecast.”55

On Christmas Day Britain began to withdraw its forces from Indo-Chinaand, on New Year’s Day 1946, Mountbatten and D’Argenlieu issued a jointdeclaration of French responsibility for law and order south of the 16 paral-lel.56 The French, grateful at SEAC success in southern Indo-China,expressed the desire to award military decorations to the British forces.Brain’s successor E.W. Meiklereid warned that the political implication ofthe awards would be that Britain was receiving them for putting the Frenchback into Indo-China.57 Mountbatten’s secretary was advised that “suspicionof our hypocrisy and possible dishonesty in this matter would be intensifiedby the acceptance of purely military decorations on the accomplishment ofwhat has been stated to be purely pacific tasks here.”58

Mountbatten’s management of Southeast Asia was now called intoquestion. As the senior Foreign Office official in SEAC, Dening was so exas-perated with his supreme Allied commander that he had written directly to

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Bevin to complain at Mountbatten’s “mixture of fiction and malice.” He pro-tested that Mountbatten had ineptly orchestrated political policy withinSEAC. In the Netherlands East Indies, Dening asserted that Mountbatten’s“open advocacy of the Indonesian cause” and “his harmful utterancesagainst the Dutch” were responsible for the complicated situation in whichSEAC found itself—ALF liberation forces were caught up in violencebetween the returning Dutch Colonial regime and the aspirations of theIndonesian nationalists. Dening feared leaving Dutch SEAC issues in theinexpert hands of Mountbatten. Mountbatten’s command had “attained astandard of inefficiency which makes it a by-word.” Regarding Indo-China,Dening highlighted that Mountbatten had “consistently ignored” the ForeignOffice specialist—Brain. Dening concluded that Mountbatten was onlyimpressed by superior rank rather than qualification.59 Bevin, however,side-stepped the conflict and asked Dening to settle his differences withMountbatten amicably.60 In the meantime, the British handed over theguarding of the Japanese to the French and Gracey departed Indo-China on28 January.61

Only when the actions of Gracey are viewed in the light of the com-plex situation in Indo-China, and the responsibilities and restraints imposedupon him by a difficult international situation which was faced with limitedBritish resources and overwhelmed British politicians, can it be understoodhow misrepresented Gracey’s actions have been. Following the Japanesesurrender SEAC had neither the resources nor the preparation to accept theburden of administering southern Indo-China. The sudden end to the warhad surprised the military planners and this, combined with MacArthur’sdelay, resulted in a power vacuum in which the Vietnamese had attemptedto seize the initiative. Gracey did not create the power vacuum nor was heresponsible for the circumstances that he inherited in southern Indo-China.Indeed in an effort to avoid anarchy and bloodshed he had reminded theJapanese of their responsibility to continue to maintain law and order untilthe ALF arrived in Saigon.

Southern Indo-China was a vast area to have to liberate with limitedresources. For example, only one platoon of British Ghurkha rifles couldinitially be sent to Cambodia. And with this platoon—plus twocompanies of light French commandos that the French had sent to fol-low the Ghurkhas, released Allied prisoners of war, and Japanese andindigenous Cambodian forces—Gracey was expected to administer theJapanese surrender in a nation that had recently declared its indepen-dence from both Japanese and French colonial control62 In southernVietnam, independence had been proclaimed by the Vietminh but inreality no one Vietnamese grouping exercised de facto control. BothCambodia and southern Vietnam—especially the province ofCochinchina—contained a large French colonial population. The stagewas thus set for further confrontation.

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Major-General Sir Douglas Gracey: Peacekeeper or Peace Enforcer? 235

The wartime British coalition government had experienced problems inGreece concerning the relationship between resistance groups and liberat-ing forces. In Southeast Asia the new Labour Government had been warnedby SEAC Force 136 that a decisive prosecution was required concerningliberation duties and indigenous nationalist movements. Gracey was cer-tainly not aided in his ALF duties by Attlee, Bevin, and others in London.Admittedly the government was overwhelmed by the enormity of the post-surrender situation but Attlee failed to provide decisive leadership to assistBritish forces in the field despite the pleas of his senior commander—Mountbatten. Attlee had chaired the crucial Cabinet Defence Committeemeeting that debated the possibility of accelerating French troop deploy-ments to Indo-China, but he had also personally ruled against SEAC andForeign Office requests for the speeding up of the arrival of the French 9Colonial Division. Nothing could be allowed to hinder the demobilisationprogram—even by only a few months. Likewise, Bevin had deliberatelymisled parliament by claiming that every effort was being made to acceler-ate the French troop numbers despite knowing that the Cabinet DefenceCommittee, of which he was a key member, had already ruled against suchaction. The added strain for Slim and Gracey of unworkable JPS directivesfrom London was unsurprising given Bevin’s tardy parliamentary perfor-mance and the government’s disorientation as to relevant post-war strategyand priorities. Indeed, Attlee had already confused SEAC by denying a state-ment by his Secretary of State for War, Lawson, that British troops werebeing used to support French interests.63 And Bevin had failed to act uponthe serious complaint from Dening of Mountbatten’s ineptitudes and ineffi-ciencies vis-à-vis indigenous nationalists in Indo-China and the Dutch EastIndies. Attlee and Bevin were ignorant in their arrogance considering thenature of the task bestowed upon Gracey.

Neither was Gracey aided by Mountbatten, his supreme Allied com-mander. Mountbatten was on holiday at the crucial juncture when SEACwas expanded and Japan surrendered. He could have acted swiftly andresponded to French requests for action, but despite the warning fromForce 136 Mountbatten exhibited hesitancy towards his post-war responsi-bilities. On the one hand at Potsdam he was eager for French forces to bedeployed in Indo-China but on the other hand, a month later in London, heappeared cautious. He later promised D’Argenlieu that he would look afterFrench interests but following the counter-revolution sought to distancehimself from French affairs. Mountbatten groomed his relationship withDriberg for personal political purposes in parliament—revealing an interest-ing insight into his respect for authority and the chain of command—yetfailed to orchestrate a successful political policy within SEAC, losing thesupport of his political staff concerning Indo-China and the East Indies.Mountbatten may have felt that Gracey had exceeded his orders with theSeptember proclamation, but he backed his man-on-the spot and ultimately

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informed Gracey that he had carried out his duties with the utmost skill anddiplomacy. Was this false praise? Mountbatten was proud of his actions inFrench Indo-China, and he was not willing to allow his legacy and reputa-tion to be tarnished by the bloodshed in Saigon. The report that he subse-quently sent to the Combined COS firmly indicted Gracey for his actions inthe coup. Mountbatten was keen to absolve himself of all responsibility.64

He had already demonstrated that he was willing to play a double gamewith Indo-China that would serve his reputation. Mountbatten had assuredD’Argenlieu that SEAC forces were honoured to serve in close co-operationwith the French but had also instructed Gracey that all of the unsavourytasks of military necessity should be left to the French.65

One of the main charges against Gracey has been to condemn himwith his own words: “I was welcomed on arrival by the Viet Minh who said‘Welcome’ and all that sort of thing. It was a very unpleasant situation, andI promptly kicked them out.” Dennis Duncanson has argued in Gracey’sdefence that this comment at a meeting of the Royal Central Asian Society in1953 was “spontaneous and unconsidered.” This chance remark by Graceyhas continued to stalk the history of Gracey’s modus operandi in southernIndo-China.66 His critics have used such personal evidence to good effect.But Gracey administered his liberation duties within the boundaries ofBritish military rules, the Hague convention, and international law: “Theauthority of the power of the state having passed de facto into the hands ofthe occupant, the latter shall do all in his power to restore, and ensure, asfar as possible, public order and safety, respecting at the same time, unlessabsolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country.”67 Although politicalsensitivities were subordinate to international law, where the circumstancespermitted Gracey did favour a more sympathetic solution to Asian emanci-pation. In Cambodia he suggested following a similar route to Burma, thusworking alongside Son Ngoc Thanh and the nationalists. In Pakistanbetween 1947 and 1951 such sympathies were again evident in his duties.But British politicians prevented Gracey from administering any politicalsettlement in Indo-China.

Following the French counter-revolution in Saigon Gracey was certainlypraised for his actions by Leclerc, but this does not mean that he approvedof the subsequent French coup or their methods. Promises made to Graceyby the French to use a minimum of force during the coup had provedfalse.68 Gracey was deeply troubled by the morality of French operations. Ina letter to Slim, Gracey described Leclerc’s operations against the Vietminhas being pursued “with much unnecessary brutality.” He prophetically com-mented that the “French troops are leaving a pretty good trail of destructionbehind them, which will result in such resentment that it will become pro-gressively more difficult for them to implement their new policy, and, I amconvinced, will result in guerrilla warfare, increased sabotage and arson assoon as we leave the country.” Gracey was clearly troubled by the attitude

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Major-General Sir Douglas Gracey: Peacekeeper or Peace Enforcer? 237

of the French, the resentment that they were building and for the future of thepolitical process towards self-government. The Japanese troops serving as partof the ALF were likewise troubled by the actions of the French and requestedthat all orders to their forces be given by British rather than French officers asthey found it “increasingly difficult to carry out the orders resulting from their[French] schemeless plans.” Gracey agreed with the Japanese assessment: “Thelast is, alas, so true about the implementation of their plans.”69

The ALF in southern Indo-China operated in difficult circumstances.The nature of the power vacuum, the violence, the limited ALF resources,and the demographics of Indo-China made the ALF peace enforcers ratherthan peacekeepers. In such dire circumstances British troops engageddissenting forces, burned houses, and carried out other dubious counterinsurgency activities as part of their peace enforcement and managementduties: actions that have rightly produced intense scholarly debate.70 Butrather than solely condemn Gracey for the actions of his ALF it is moreappropriate for this debate to cast a wider net. Attlee, Bevin, and Mountbat-ten all had the opportunity, individually and collectively, to take decisiveaction at strategic moments but they chose—for personal expediency—notto commit to the task at hand. To vilify Gracey for the circumstances inIndo-China, the limited resources at his disposal and the subsequent reac-tions of his forces is both to ignore the context in which he operated andthe wider responsibility of his superiors for their actions.

NOTES

1. G. Rosie, The British in Vietnam (London, 1970), pp. 12, 137; M.A. Lawrence, Assuming theBurden: Europe and the American Commitment to War in Vietnam (Los Angeles, 2005), pp. 102–03, 112.

Initial criticism of Gracey stems from: E. Hammer, The Struggle for Indochina 1940–55 (Stanford,1966); J. Buttinger, A Dragon Embattled (Oxford, 1967); G.M. Kahin and J.W. Lewis, The United Statesand Vietnam (New York, 1967); T. Draper, Abuse of Power (London, 1967). J. Springhall has highlightedthe generations of American scholars who have subsequently followed this path. J. Springhall, “Kickingout the Vietminh: How Britain Allowed France to Reoccupy South Indochina,” Journal of ContemporaryHistory, 40(2005), p. 116.

2. For a robust defence of Gracey see P.M. Dunn, The First Vietnam War (London, 1985), andD. Duncanson, “General Gracey and the Vietminh,” Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society, 45(1968),pp. 288–97.

3. N. Smart, Biographical Dictionary of British Generals of the Second World War (Barnsley,2005), pp. 126–27.

4. Duncanson, “General Gracey,” p. 297.5. Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 24 July 1945, Foreign Relations of the United States:

The Conference at Berlin 1945 (The Potsdam Conference), Volume 2 (Washington DC, 1960), p. 377.6. S. Tonnesson, The Vietnamese Revolution of 1945: Roosevelt, Ho Chi Minh and De Gaulle in a

World at War (London, 1991), p. 365.7. Mountbatten minute, 9 August 1945, CAB [Cabinet Office Archives, National Archives, Kew,

London, UK] 121/741.8. S. Tonnesson, “Filling The Vacuum: 1945 in French Indochina, the Netherlands East Indies and

British Malaya,” H. Antlov and S. Tonnesson, eds., Imperial Policy and Southeast Asian Nationalism1930–1957 (Surrey, 1995), pp. 123–25.

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238 T. O. Smith

9. “Directive to Anti-Japanese United Front on conclusion of the armistice,” 13 August 1945, WO203/5642, in A.J. Stockwell ed., British Documents on the End of Empire, Series B, Volume 3 Malaya: Part1: The Malaya Union Experiment 1942–1948 (London, 1995), p. 110.

10. Tonnesson, “Filling The Vacuum,” pp. 123–25.11. Dunn, First Vietnam War, pp. 23, 123, 136.12. L.C. Gardner, Approaching Vietnam: From World War Two Through Dienbienphu (London,

1988), p. 73.13. Government of India External Affairs Department to Secretary of State for India, 1 September

1945, FO [Foreign Office Archives, National Archives, Kew, London, UK] 371/46308/F6353/11/61; Secre-tary of State for India to Government of India External Affairs Department, 3 September 1945, ibid.

14. Mountbatten to D’Argenlieu, 1 September 1945, MB [Mountbatten Archives, Southampton Uni-versity Library, Southampton, UK] 1/C10/3.

15. Balfour to Bevin, 25 August 1945, in R.D. Crockatt, ed., British Documents on Foreign Affairs:Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print: Series C, North America, Part 3: Volume 5:January 1945–December 1945 (Bethesda, MD, 1999), pp. 276–79.

16. T.O. Smith “Resurrecting the French Empire: British Military Aid to Vietnam 1945–7,” Universityof Sussex Journal of Contemporary History, 11(2007), pp. 1–13.

17. Dening to Foreign Office, 10 September 1945, CAB 122/512.18. J. Buttinger, Vietnam: A Dragon Embattled Volume 1 (London, 1967), p. 311.19. D.G. Marr, “Vietnam 1945: Some Questions,” Vietnam Forum, 6(1985), p. 171.20. N. Tarling, Britain, Southeast Asia and the Onset of the Cold War 1945–1950 (Cambridge,

1998), pp. 56, 79.21. F.S.V. Donnison, British Military Administration in the Far East 1943–1946 (London, 1956),

pp. 408–09.22. Supreme Allied Commander South East Asia [SACSEA] to Colonial Office, 24 September 1945,

CAB 120/708.23. Saigon Control Commission to SACSEA, 21 September 1945, WO [War Office Archives,

National Archives, Kew, London, UK] 203/5644.24. SACSEA to Gracey, 24 September 1945, WO 203/2173; Headquarters South East Asia 31st

Miscellaneous Meeting, 28 September 1945, ibid.25. Supreme Allied Command [hereafter SAC] 31st Miscellaneous Meeting Minutes, 28 September

1945, WO 203/5644.26. SAC 286th Meeting, 28 September 1945, WO 203/5644.27. SAC 286th Meeting, 28 September 1945, WO 203/5644.28. Control Commission to SACSEA, 25 September 1945, WO 203/5608.29. Mountbatten to Driberg, 4 October 1945, MB 1/C91; Mountbatten to Driberg, nd, ibid.30. Dunn, First Vietnam War, p. 233.31. P. Dennis, Troubled Days of Peace: Mountbatten and South-East Asia Command, 1945–46

(Manchester, 1987), p. 63.32. “Statement by Brain to the Annamites,” Saigon Control Commission to SACSEA, 1 October

1945, WO 203/2173.33. Dunn, First Vietnam War, 241; P. Ziegler, Mountbatten (Glasgow, 1985), p. 332.34. J. Saville, The Politics of Continuity: British Foreign Policy and the Labour Government 1945–1946

(London, 1993), p. 195.35. Hollis to Attlee, 28 September 1945 PREM [Prime Ministers Archives, National Archives, Kew,

London, UK] 8/63.36. “R.B.” to Hollis, 29 September 1945, PREM 8/63.37. Hollis to Attlee, 4 October 1945, FO 371/46309/F8070/11/G61.38. For the opposite argument see D.G. Marr, Vietnam 1945: The Quest For Power (Los Angeles,

1995), p. 542.39. Defence Committee, “Situation in Indo-China,” DO(45)7th Meeting 18(Revise)(Secret), 5 October

1945, PREM 8/63.40. JP(45)258(Final), Defence Committee, “Situation in Indo-China,” DO(45)7th Meeting

18(Revise)(Secret), 5 October 1945, PREM 8/63.41. Foreign Office to Secretary Chiefs of Staff, “Reoccupation of Dutch East Indies,” COS(45)598

1(0), 3 October 1945, CAB 80/97.42. COS(45)589(0), 25 September 1945, CAB 80/97.

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Major-General Sir Douglas Gracey: Peacekeeper or Peace Enforcer? 239

43. S. Bills, Empire and the Cold War: The Roots of United States–Third World Antagonism(London, 1990), p. 126.

44. “Political Organisation in the South East Asia Command,” Memorandum by Sterndale Bennett,9 October 1945, PREM 8/189, in Stockwell, Malaya Union Experiment, p. 169.

45. P. Ziegler, ed., The Personal Diaries of Admiral, the Lord Louis Mountbatten, SupremeCommander Southeast Asia 1943–1946 (London, 1988), p. 258.

46. Saville, Politics of Continuity, p. 191.47. Mountbatten to Gracey, 13 October 1945, MB 1/C113/2.48. SACSEA to Cabinet Office, 12 October 1945, CAB 120/708.49. Saville, Politics of Continuity, p. 202.50. Hansard House of Commons Parliamentary Debates, 24 October 1945, (Volume 414),

pp. 2149–50.51. “Our Overseas Financial Prospects,” Memorandum by Lord Keynes, 13 August 1945, CAB 129/1,

R. Hyam, ed., British Documents on the End of Empire. Series A. Volume 2: The Labour Government and theEnd of Empire 1945–51: Part 2 Economics and International Relations (London, 1991), p. 74.

52. Mountbatten to Gracey, 4 December 1945, MB 1/C113/12.53. Hall to Moore, 19 November 1945, CO [Colonial Office Archives, National Archives, Kew,

London, UK] 968/107/2.54. Mountbatten to Gracey, 4 December 1945, MB 1/C113/12.55. Mountbatten to Driberg, 17 December 1945, MB 1/C91.56. Dunn, First Vietnam War, 329; Saville, Politics of Continuity, p. 197.57. Dening to Foreign Office, 14 January 1946, MB 1/C130/6.58. Gibson to Brockman, 18 January 1946, MB 1/C130/10.59. Dening to Bevin, 29 January 1946, FO 800/461/FE/46/9.60. Bevin to Dening, 29 January 1946, FO 800/461/FE/46/10.61. Dunn, First Vietnam War, pp. 342–3.62. Allied Liberation Force Phnom Penh, instruction no. 1, 10 October 1945, WO 172/7009; Gracey

to Chief of the General Staff, 16 October 1945, WO 203/2178.63. Sayers to Rayner, 13 October 1945, WO 203/5476.64. SACSEA to Combined Chiefs of Staff, 30 June 1947, Documents Relating to the British Involve-

ment in the Indo–China Conflict 1945–65 (London, 1965), pp. 49–50.65. Mountbatten to D’Argenlieu, 8 November 1945, MB 1/C10/11; Mountbatten to Gracey, 31

October 1945, Gracey [Gracey Archives, Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, King’s College, Lon-don, UK] 4/13.

66. Duncanson, “General Gracey,” p. 289.67. D. Duncanson, Government and Revolution in Vietnam, p. 160; Duncanson, “General Gracey,”

p. 294, citing Article 43, under Section III (“Military Authority over the Territory of the Hostile State”)—Final Act of the Second Peace Conference held at The Hague in 1907 (London, 1914), p. 58.

68. Saigon Control Commission Political Report 13 September–9 October 1945, Gracey 4/8.69. Gracey to Slim, 5 November 1945, Gracey 4/12.70. Rosie, British in Vietnam, pp. 57–86, 138–9; Lawrence, Assuming the Burden, pp. 105, 111; G.

Hughes, “A ‘Post-war’ War: The British Occupation of French–Indochina, September 1945–March 1946,”Small Wars & Insurgencies, 17(2006), pp. 263–86; C. Bayly and T. Harper, Forgotten Wars: The End ofBritain’s Asian Empire (London, 2008), pp. 145–58.D

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