ENGINEERINGSCIENCES INVESTIGATION

MANAGING RISK THROUGH RELIABILITY-CENTRED MAINTENANCE

Presented by:Dave Gillingham, P. Eng., CFEI, LEED AP

43rd AnnualEngineering InsuranceConferenceToronto,ONOctober6,2016

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FORENSIC ENGINEERING

Theapplicationof theartandscienceofengineering inmatterswhicharein,ormaypossibly relateto,thejurisprudence system,inclusiveofalternativedispute

resolution

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FORENSIC ENGINEER

Someonewhodoesprecisionguessworkbasedonunreliabledata

providedbythoseofquestionable knowledge.

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Union Carbide pesticide plant experiences functional failureof safety systemsExplosion releases cloud of toxic methyl isocyanate gas intoatmosphereConsequences:– 1000’s injured or dead– Environmental contamination– $470M settlement

UNION CARBIDEDecember 2, 1984: Bhopal, India

expcep.com Photo:AssociatedPress/BruceWeaver

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Space shuttle Challenger experiences functional failure of O-ring on solid rocket boosterOrbiter and launch assembly break up over Atlantic OceanConsequences:– 7 crew members dead– 32-month shutdown of space shuttle program– $1.7B to build replacement orbiter Endeavour

SPACE SHUTTLE ‘CHALLENGER’January 28, 1986: Cape Canaveral, FL

expcep.com Photos: NOAA/DefenseMeteorologicalSatelliteProgram

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FirstEnergy experiences multiple functional and hiddenfailures of distribution networkNortheastern US and Ontario experience prolongedblackout conditionConsequences:– 10+ people died from secondary causes– Communications & transportation networks failed– Water supplies compromised– >$6B economic consequences

EASTERN NORTH AMERICA BLACKOUTAugust 14, 2003: Eastern USA and Ontario

expcep.com Photo:VirginGalactic/MarkGreenberg

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Virgin Galactic SpaceShipTwo experiences hidden failurebecoming functional failureShip becomes unstable and breaks apart at 50 000 ftConsequences:– Pilot injured, Copilot dead– Delay in commercial operation date– Redesign of orbital vehicle required– Construction of new orbital vehicle at significant cost

SPACESHIPTWOOctober 31, 2014: Mojave Air and Space Port, NV

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WHAT IS RISK?

Uncertaintyarisingfromthepossible occurrenceofgivenevents

Risk=(Probability ofLossEvent)x(FrequencyofExposure)x(SeverityofLossEvent)

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WHAT IS RISK MANAGEMENT?

Thepracticeofidentifying andanalyzinglossexposuresandtakingstepstominimize thefinancial impact

oftheriskstheyimpose

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WHAT IS RISK MANAGEMENT?

Thepracticeofidentifying andanalyzinglossexposuresandtakingstepstominimize

thefinancial,environmental,operational,andsafetyimpactsof theriskstheyimpose

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QUANTIFYING RISKThe Nomograph

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QUANTIFYING RISKThe Probability-Severity Quadrants

High

SEVERITY

HighProbabilityLowImpact

MediumRisk

HighProbabilityHighImpact

HighRisk

LowProbabilityLowImpact

LowRisk

HighProbabilityLowImpact

MediumRisk

Low PROBABILITY High

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QUANTIFYING RISKThe Risk Matrix

A BriefHistory of

RCM

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1950’s: aircraft maintenance costs are soaring

1960: maintenance task force formed, consisting of airlines and FAA representatives

1968: Maintenance Steering Group publishes MSG-1;Handbook: Maintenance Evaluation and Program Development Document

1970s: Maintenance Steering Group publishes MSG-2;Airline/Manufacturer Maintenance Program Planning Document

1974: US DoD commissions United Airlines to write a report on civil aviation maintenance practices

1978: Stan Nowlan and Howard Heap publishReliability-centered Maintenance

1979: Maintenance Steering Group publishes MSG-3;Operator/Manufacturer Scheduled Maintenance Development Document

1982-1990s: Stan Nowlan and John Moubray develop RCM2 for industrial facilities

A BRIEF HISTORY OF RCM

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MAINTENANCE:ensuring thatphysicalassetscontinue todo

whattheiruserswantthemtodo.

RELIABILITY-CENTRED MAINTENANCE:aprocess

usedtodeterminethemaintenancerequirementsofanyphysicalasset

initsoperatingcontext.

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FUNCTIONAL:

Failuresthatpreventtheassetfromdoingwhatitissupposed todo

Usuallyreportedbyoperationscrew

TYPES OF FAILURES

POTENTIAL:

Hidden failuresthatmaynotbecomeimmediatelyapparent

Usuallyreportedbymaintenancecrew

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SAFETY:PossiblelossofequipmentInjuryordeath

CONSEQUENCES OF FAILURES

OPERATIONAL:DirectcostofrepairsIndirecteconomic losses

NON-OPERATIONAL:Directcostofrepairs

HIDDEN FAILURE:Resultofundetected failureofahidden functionCreatesexposuretopossiblemultiplefailures

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REACTIVE:“RunToFailure”or“DoNothing”Typically appliedtolow-severity components

TYPES OF MAINTENANCE

PREVENTATIVE:Schedule-based maintenanceDesignedtopreventage-relatedfailures

PREDICTIVE:Undertakenwhenthereisadeviationfrombaseline operatingparametersRequiresregularorcontinuousmonitoring ofasset

DETECTIVE:“TechnicalIntegrityEngineering”Isintendedtodetecthidden failures

SYSTEM MODIFICATION:LastresortUsedwhenseverityishighandnoothermethodscanreduceit

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APPLYING RCM TO THE RISK MATRIX

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APPLYING RCM TO THE RISK MATRIX

Con

sequ

ence

s (S

ever

ity)

Extreme Detective Detective System Mods

System Mods

System Mods

Very High Detective Detective Detective System Mods

System Mods

High Predictive Predictive Detective Detective Detective

Medium Preventive Preventive Predictive Predictive Predictive

Low Reactive Reactive Preventive Preventive Predictive

Rare Unlikely Even Chance Likely Almost

Certain

Likelihood (Probability x Frequency)

The RCM Process

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RELIABILITY-CENTRED MAINTENANCE:aprocessused todetermine themaintenancerequirementsofanyphysicalasset

initsoperatingcontext.

Whatmustbedonetotheassettoensureitcontinuestodowhatwewantittodo?

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RCM FacilitatorManagement PersonnelAsset OperatorsAsset MaintainersAsset SpecialistsMaintenance EngineersDesign EngineersForensic EngineersInsurance Risk Manager

STEP 1: BUILD THE RCM TEAM

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What are the functions of the asset in its operating context?In what ways does it fail to fulfill its functions?What causes each functional failure?What happens when each failure occurs?In what way does each failure matter?What can be done to prevent each failure?What should be done if a suitable proactive task can’t be found?

STEP 2: RISK ASSESSMENT

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WHAT ARE THE FUNCTIONS OF THE ASSET IN ITS OPERATING CONTEXT?PrimaryFunction:Toperformaspecificprocessatspecific setpoints undergivenconditionsSecondaryFunctions:Additionalfunctionsoftheassetthatarerelatedtotheprimaryfunction

FAILURE MODES AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS

IN WHAT WAYS DOES IT FAIL TO FULFILL ITS FUNCTIONS? – FUNCTIONAL FAILURECannotperformprimaryfunction atallCannotperformprimaryfunction asdesiredCannotperformsecondary functions

WHAT CAUSES EACH FUNCTIONAL FAILURE?– FAILURE MODE

Specificeventthatcausedthefunctional failureRequiresregularorcontinuousmonitoring ofasset

WHAT HAPPENS WHEN EACH FAILURE OCCURS?– FAILURE EFFECTSequenceofeventsthathappens followingfunctional failureuntilreturntooperation

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IN WHAT WAY DOES EACH FAILURE MATTER?SafetyConsequencesEnvironmentalConsequencesOperationalConsequencesNon-operationalConsequences

FAILURE CONSEQUENCES

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WHAT CAN BE DONE TO PREVENT EACH FAILURE?Whatproactivetasksaretechnicallyfeasible toreduce theriskoffailure?– Preventive– Predictive– Detective

FAILURE MITIGATION

Ataskistechnically feasibleifitisphysicallypossibleforthetasktoreduce,orenableaction tobetakentoreduce,theconsequencesoftheassociated failuremodetoanextentthatmightbeacceptabletotheownerofuseroftheasset

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FAILURE PROBABILITY PATTERNS

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FAILURE PROBABILITY PATTERNS

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WHAT SHOULD BE DONE IF A SUITABLE PROACTIVE TASK CANNOT BE FOUND?NoscheduledmaintenanceRedesigntheassetFormal/informalvisualinspections

FAILURE MITIGATION

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Approval of recommendations by managersDescribe routine tasks clearly & conciselyOne-off changes identified and implemented correctlyRoutine task changes incorporated into SOPsEnsure any detected faults are dealt with quickly

STEP 3: IMPLEMENTATION

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Higher plant availability and reliabilityGreater safetyMinimizes chance of catastrophic failureMinimizes potential for environmental damageLonger equipment lifeLots of data

WHAT RCM ACHIEVES

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QUANTIFYING THE NEW RISK LEVEL

Con

sequ

ence

s (S

ever

ity)

Extreme High High Severe Severe Severe

Very High High High High Severe Severe

High Significant Significant High High High

Medium Moderate Moderate Significant Significant Signif icant

Low Negligible Negligible Moderate Moderate Signif icant

Rare Unlikely Even Chance Likely Almost

Certain

Likelihood (Probability x Frequency)

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THE END GOAL

Riskistheuncertaintyarisingfromthepossible occurrenceofgivenevents

LowerProbabilityofLossEvent

LowerFrequencyofExposure

ReducedSeverityof LossEventxx

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More knowledgeable and engaged employeesFewer incidents involving MoE or MoLFewer claims submitted to insurance companyLower costs for asset owner and insurer

WHAT RCM ACHIEVES

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Increased amount of available system dataImproved employee knowledge of systemsConsequences:– Annual maintenance & energy savings >$5M– Reduced reactive maintenance– Increased asset utilisation

DOFASCO STEELHamilton, Ontario

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RCM DECISION DIAGRAM

THANK YOU

ENGINEERINGSCIENCES INVESTIGATION

DaveGillingham,P.Eng.,CFEI,LEEDAPgillingham@expcep.com

1103WentworthSt.W.,Unit3Oshawa,Ontario,CANADAL1J8P7

905404-0237 | 855404-0237

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