34
VOL. 211,JULY16,1992 517 McKee vs. Intermediate Appellate Court G.R. No. 68102. July 16, 1992. * GEORGE MCKEE and ARACELI KOH MCKEE, petitioners, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, JAIME TAYAG and ROSALINDA MANALO, respondents. G.R. No. 68103. July 16, 1992. * CARMEN DAYRIT KOH, LETICIA KOH, JULIETA KOH TUQUERO, ARACELI KOH MCKEE, ANTONIO KOH and ELIZABETH KOH TURLA, petitioners, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, JAIME TAYAG and ROSALINDA MANALO, respondents. Civil Procedure; Actions; Consolidation of an independent civil action for the recovery of civil liability authorized under Articles 32, 33, 34 or 2176 of the Civil Code with the criminal action allowed under Rule III of the Revised Rules of Court subject to the condition that no final judgment has been rendered in the criminal case.—In the recent case of Cojuangco vs. Court of Appeals, this Court held that the present provisions of Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court allow a consolidation of an independent civil action for the recovery of civil liability authorized under Articles 32, 33, 34 or 2176 of the Civil Code with the criminal action subject, however, to the condition that no final judgment has been rendered in that criminal case. Civil Law; Negligence; The responsibility arising from fault or negligence in a quasi-delict is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code.—As We held in Dionisio vs. Alvendia, the responsibility arising from fault or negligence in a quasi-delict is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. And, as more concretely stated in the concurring opinion of Justice J.B.L. Reyes, “in the case of independent civil

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Page 1: MCkee vs IAC

VOL.211,JULY16,1992 517

McKeevs.IntermediateAppellateCourt

G.R.No.68102.July16,1992.*

GEORGE MCKEE and ARACELI KOH MCKEE,petitioners, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT,JAIMETAYAGandROSALINDAMANALO,respondents.

G.R.No.68103.July16,1992.*

CARMENDAYRITKOH,LETICIAKOH,JULIETAKOHTUQUERO,ARACELIKOHMCKEE,ANTONIOKOHandELIZABETH KOH TURLA, petitioners, vs.INTERMEDIATEAPPELLATECOURT,JAIMETAYAGandROSALINDAMANALO,respondents.

CivilProcedure;Actions;ConsolidationofanindependentcivilactionfortherecoveryofcivilliabilityauthorizedunderArticles32,33,34or2176of theCivilCodewith the criminalactionallowedunderRuleIIIoftheRevisedRulesofCourtsubjecttotheconditionthatnofinaljudgmenthasbeenrenderedinthecriminalcase.—Inthe recent case ofCojuangcovs.Court ofAppeals, thisCourt heldthat the present provisions of Rule 111 of the Revised Rules ofCourt allow a consolidation of an independent civil action for therecovery of civil liability authorized under Articles 32, 33, 34 or2176oftheCivilCodewiththecriminalactionsubject,however,tothe condition that no final judgment has been rendered in thatcriminalcase.

CivilLaw;Negligence;Theresponsibilityarisingfromfaultornegligence in a quasi­delict is entirely separate and distinct fromthe civil liability arising from negligence under the PenalCode.—As We held in Dionisio vs. Alvendia, the responsibilityarisingfromfaultornegligenceinaquasi­delictisentirelyseparateanddistinctfromthecivilliabilityarisingfromnegligenceunderthePenal Code. And, as more concretely stated in the concurringopinion of Justice J.B.L. Reyes, “in the case of independent civil

Page 2: MCkee vs IAC

action under the new Civil Code, the result of the criminal case,whetheracquittalorconviction,wouldbeentirely irrelevanttothecivilaction.

Same; Same; Same; In the absence of any collusion, thejudgmentofconvictioninthecriminalcaseagainstGalangwouldhave

________________

*THIRDDIVISION.

518

518 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED

McKeevs.IntermediateAppellateCourt

beenconclusive in thecivil cases for thesubsidiary liabilityof theprivate respondents.—What remains to be the most importantconsiderationastowhythedecisioninthecriminalcaseshouldnotbe considered in this appeal is the fact that private respondentswerenotpartiestherein.Itwouldhavebeenentirelydifferentifthepetitioners’causeofactionwasfordamagesarisingfromadelict,inwhich case private respondents’ liability could only be subsidiarypursuanttoArticle103oftheRevisedPenalCode.Intheabsenceofany collusion, the judgment of conviction in the criminal caseagainstGalangwouldhavebeenconclusiveinthecivilcasesforthesubsidiaryliabilityoftheprivaterespondents.

Same;Same;Definitionofnegligence.—NegligencewasdefinedanddescribedbythisCourt inLayuganvs.IntermediateAppellateCourt,thus:“xxxNegligenceistheomissiontodosomethingwhichareasonableman,guidedbythoseconsiderationswhichordinarilyregulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing ofsomething which a prudent and reasonable man would not do(Black’s Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, 930), or as Judge Cooleydefinesit,‘(T)hefailuretoobservefortheprotectionoftheinterestsof another person, that degree of care, precaution, and vigilancewhichthecircumstancesjustlydemand,wherebysuchotherpersonsuffersinjury.’

Same; Same; Same; Under what is known as the emergencyrule, “onewhosuddenly findshimself inaplaceofdangerand is

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requiredtoactwithouttimetoconsiderthebestmeansthatmaybeadoptedtoavoidtheimpendingdanger,isnotguiltyofnegligence,if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection mayappeartohavebeenabettermethod,unlesstheemergencyinwhichhe findshimself isbroughtaboutbyhisownnegligence.—On thebasisoftheforegoingdefinition,thetestofnegligenceandthefacts

obtaining in this case, it is manifest that no negligence could be

imputed to Jose Koh. Any reasonable and ordinary prudent man

wouldhave tried toavoid running over the twoboysby swerving

the car away from where they were even if this would mean

enteringtheoppositelane.Avoidingsuchimmediateperilwouldbe

the natural course to take particularly where the vehicle in the

opposite lane would be several meters away and could very well

slow down, move to the side of the road and give way to the

oncoming car. Moreover, under what is known as the emergency

rule, “onewhosuddenly findshimself inaplaceofdanger,and is

requiredtoactwithouttimetoconsiderthebestmeansthatmaybe

adoptedtoavoidtheimpendingdanger,isnotguiltyofnegligence,

ifhefailstoadoptwhatsubsequentlyanduponreflection

519

VOL.211,JULY16,1992 519

McKeevs.IntermediateAppellateCourt

mayappeartohavebeenabettermethod,unlesstheemergencyin

whichhefindshimselfisbroughtaboutbyhisownnegligence.”

Same;Same;Definition of proximate cause.—Proximate causehas been defined as: “x x x ‘that cause, which, in natural and

continuoussequence,unbrokenbyanyefficientinterveningcause,

produces the injury,andwithoutwhich theresultwouldnothave

occurred.’Andmore comprehensively, theproximate legal cause is

thatactingfirstandproducingtheinjury,eitherimmediatelyorby

setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and

continuous chain of events, eachhavinga close causal connection

with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain

immediatelyeffectingtheinjuryasanaturalandprobableresultof

the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the

personresponsibleforthefirsteventshould,asanordinaryprudent

and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the

moment of his act or default that an injury to somepersonmight

probablyresulttherefrom.”

Page 4: MCkee vs IAC

Same;Same; Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code, a persondrivingavehicleispresumednegligentifatthetimeofthemishap,he was violating any traffic regulation.—The truck driver’snegligenceisapparentintherecords.Hehimselfsaidthathistruckwasrunningat30miles (48kilometers)perhouralongthebridgewhile themaximum speed allowed by law on a bridge is only 30kilometersperhour.UnderArticle2185oftheCivilCode,apersondrivingavehicleispresumednegligentifatthetimeofthemishap,hewasviolatinganytrafficregulation.

Same;Same;Doctrine of last clear chance;The doctrine statesthatthecontributorynegligenceofthepartyinjuredwillnotdefeattheclaim fordamages if it is shown that thedefendantmight,bythe exercise of reasonable care and prudence, have avoided theconsequences of the negligence of the injured party.—Last clearchance is a doctrine in the law of torts which states that thecontributory negligence of the party injured will not defeat theclaim fordamages if it is shown that thedefendantmight, by theexercise of reasonable care and prudence, have avoided theconsequencesofthenegligenceoftheinjuredparty.Insuchcases,the person who had the last clear chance to avoid the mishap isconsideredinlawsolelyresponsiblefortheconsequencesthereof.

Same;Same;Same;Same;Applyingtheforegoingdoctrine,itisnot difficult to rule that it was the truck driver’s negligence infailing to exert ordinary care to avoid the collisionwhichwas inlawtheproxi­

520

520 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED

McKeevs.IntermediateAppellateCourt

matecauseofthecollision;Employersdirectlyandprimarilyliablefor the resulting damages.—Applying the foregoing doctrine, it isnotdifficult to rule,asWenowrule, that itwas the truckdriver’snegligence in failing to exert ordinary care to avoid the collisionwhich was, in law, the proximate cause of the collision. Asemployers of the truck driver, the private respondents are, underArticle2180of theCivilCode,directlyandprimarily liable for theresultingdamages.Thepresumption that theyarenegligent flowsfromthenegligenceoftheiremployee.Thatpresumption,however,isonlyjuristantum,notjurisetdejure.Theironlypossibledefense

Page 5: MCkee vs IAC

isthattheyexercisedallthediligenceofagoodfatherofafamilyto

preventthedamage.

Remedial Law; Appeal; The Supreme Court is not a trier offacts.—Theprincipleiswell­establishedthatthisCourtisnotatrieroffacts.Therefore,inanappealbycertiorariunderRule45oftheRevisedRules of Court, only questions of lawmay be raised. The

resolutionoffactualissuesisthefunctionofthelowercourtswhose

findings on thesematters are receivedwith respect and are, as a

rule,bindingonthisCourt.

Same;Same;Same;The foregoingrulehowever isnotwithoutexceptions.—Theforegoingrule,however,isnotwithoutexceptions.FindingsoffactsofthetrialcourtsandtheCourtofAppealsmaybe

setasidewhensuchfindingsarenotsupportedbytheevidenceor

when the trial court failed to consider the material facts which

wouldhaveledtoaconclusiondifferentfromwhatwasstatedinits

judgment.Thesameistruewheretheappellatecourt’sconclusions

aregroundedentirelyonconjectures,speculationsandsurmisesor

where the conclusions of the lower courts are based on a

misapprehensionoffacts.

PETITIONforreviewfromtheresolutionofthethen

IntermediateAppellateCourt.

ThefactsarestatedintheopinionoftheCourt.

DAVIDE,JR.,J.:

Petitioners urge this Court to review and reverse the

Resolution of the Court of Appeals in C.A.­G.R. CV Nos.

69040­41,promulgatedon3April1984,whichsetasideits

previous Decision dated 29 November 1983 reversing the

Decision of the trial court which dismissed petitioners’

complaintsinCivil

521

VOL.211,JULY16,1992 521

McKeevs.IntermediateAppellateCourt

CaseNo.4477andCivilCaseNo.4478ofthethenCourtof

First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Pampanga

entitled “Carmen Dayrit Koh, Leticia Koh, Julieta Koh

Tuquero,AraceliKohMcKeeandElizabethKohTurlavs.

JaimeTayagandRosalindaManalo,”and “GeorgeMcKee

and Araceli Koh McKee vs. Jaime Tayag and Rosalinda

Page 6: MCkee vs IAC

Manalo,”respectively,andgrantedtheprivaterespondents’counterclaim for moral damages, attorney’s fees andlitigationexpenses.The said civil cases for damages based on quasi­delict

werefiledasaresultofavehicularaccidentwhichledtothedeathsofJoseKoh,KimKohMcKeeandLoidaBondocandcausedphysicalinjuriestoGeorgeKohMcKee,ChristopherKohMcKeeandpetitionerAraceliKohMcKee.Petitioners in G.R. No. 68102, parents of the minors

George Koh McKee, Christopher Koh McKee and thedeceasedKimKohMcKee,weretheplaintiffsinCivilCaseNo.4478,whilepetitionerCarmenDayritKohandherco­petitionersinG.R.No.68103,whoarethewifeandchildren,respectively,ofthelateJoseKoh,weretheplaintiffsinCivilCaseNo.4477.Upon the other hand, private respondentsare the owners of the cargo truck which figured in themishap;acertainRubenGalangwasthedriverofthetruckatthetimeoftheaccident.Theantecedentfactsarenotdisputed.Between nine and ten o’clock in the morning of 8

January 1977, in Pulong Pulo Bridge along MacArthurHighway, between Angeles City and San Fernando,Pampanga, a head­on­collision took place between anInternationalcargotruck,Loadstar,withPlateNo.RF912­TPhilippines’76ownedbyprivaterespondents,anddrivenbyRubenGalang,andaFordEscortcarbearingPlateNo.S2­850 Pampanga ’76 driven by Jose Koh. The collisionresulted in the deaths of Jose Koh, Kim KohMcKee andLoidaBondoc,andphysicalinjuriestoGeorgeKohMcKee,Christopher Koh McKee and Araceli Koh McKee, allpassengersoftheFordEscort.JoseKohwasthefatherofpetitionerAraceliKohMcKee,

the mother of minors George, Christopher and Kim KohMcKee. Loida Bondoc, on the other hand, was the babysitter of one and a half year old Kim. At the time of thecollision,Kimwas seated on the lap ofLoidaBondocwhowasatthefrontpassenger’sseatofthecarwhileAraceliandhertwo(2)sonswereseatedatthe

522

522 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED

McKeevs.IntermediateAppellateCourt

Page 7: MCkee vs IAC

car’sbackseat.Immediatelybeforethecollision,thecargotruck,which

wasloadedwithtwohundred(200)cavansofriceweighingabout10,000kilos,was traveling southward fromAngelesCity to San Fernando Pampanga, and was bound forManila.TheFordEscort,ontheotherhand,wasonitswaytoAngelesCityfromSanFernando.Whenthenorthboundcarwasabout(10)metersawayfromthesouthernapproachof thebridge, two (2) boys suddenlydarted from the rightsideoftheroadandintothelaneofthecar.Theboysweremovingbackand forth,unsure ofwhether to crossall thewaytotheothersideorturnback.JoseKohblewthehornofthecar,swervedtotheleftandenteredthelaneofthetruck;he thenswitchedon theheadlightsof thecar,applied thebrakes and thereafter attempted to return to his lane.Beforehe coulddoso,his car collidedwith the truck.Thecollision occurred in the lane of the truck, whichwas theoppositelane,onthesaidbridge.The incident was immediately reported to the police

station in Angeles City; consequently, a team of policeofficerswasforthwithdispatchedtoconductanonthespotinvestigation.Inthesketch

1preparedbytheinvestigating

officers, the bridge is described to be sixty (60) “footsteps”longandfourteen(14)“footsteps”wide—seven(7)“footsteps”from the center line to the inner edgeof the sidewalkonbothsides.

2PulongPuloBridge,whichspansadrybrook,is

madeof concretewithsoft shouldersandconcrete railingsonbothsidesaboutthree(3)feethigh.Thesketchoftheinvestigatingofficerdisclosesthatthe

rightrearportionofthecargotruckwastwo(2)“footsteps”from the edge of the right sidewalk, while its left frontportionwastouchingthecenterlineofthebridge,withthesmashed front side of the car resting on its front bumper.Thetruckwasaboutsixteen(16)“footsteps”awayfromthenorthernendofthebridgewhilethecarwasaboutthirty­six(36)“footsteps”from

__________________

1Exhibit“S.”2In the sketch plan prepared by Geodetic Engr. Benito J. Caraan

[Exhibit “Y”], thebridge is estimated to be42.15meters in lengthand

7.5metersinwidth.

523

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VOL.211,JULY16,1992 523

McKeevs.IntermediateAppellateCourt

theoppositeend.Skidmarksproducedbytherightfronttireofthetruckmeasurednine(9)“footsteps,”whileskidmarksproducedbytheleftfronttiremeasuredfive(5)“footsteps.”The two (2) rear tires of the truck, however, produced noskidmarks.In his statement to the investigating police officers

immediately after the accident, Galang admitted that hewastravelingatthirty(30)miles(48kilometers)perhour.Asaconsequenceofthecollision,two(2)cases,CivilCase

No. 4477 and No. 4478, were filed on 31 January 1977before the thenCourt of First Instance of Pampanga andwereraffledtoBranchIIIandBranchVofthesaidcourt,respectively. In the first, herein petitioners in G.R. No.68103prayedfortheawardofP12,000.00asindemnityforthe death of Jose Koh, P150,000.00 as moral damages,P60,000.00asexemplarydamages,P10,000.00forlitigationexpenses,P6,000.00 for burial expenses,P3,650.00 for theburiallotandP9,500.00forthetomb,plusattorney’sfees.

3

Inthesecondcase,petitionersinG.R.No.68102prayedforthe following: (a) in connection with the death of KimMcKee, the sumofP12,000.00asdeathbenefit,P3,150.00for funeral services, P3,650.00 for the cemetery lot,P3,000.00 for the tomb, P50,000.00 as moral damages,P10,000.00 as exemplary damages and P2,000.00 asmiscellaneous damages; (b) in the case of Araceli KohMcKee, in connection with the serious physical injuriessuffered, the sum of P100,000.00 as moral damages,P20,000.00 as exemplary damages, P12,000.00 for loss ofearnings,P5,000.00 for thehospitalization expensesup tothedateofthefilingofthecomplaint;and(c)withrespecttoGeorgeMcKee,Jr., inconnectionwiththeseriousphysicalinjuriessuffered,thesumofP50,000.00asmoraldamages,P20,000.00 as exemplary damages and the followingmedical expenses: P3,400 payable to the Medical Center,P3,500.00 payable to the St. Francis Medical Center,P5,175.00 payable to the Clark Air Base Hospital, andmiscellaneousexpensesamountingtoP5,000.00.Theyalsosoughtanawardofattorney’sfeesamountingto25%ofthetotalawardplustravelingandhotelexpenses,withcosts.

4

________________

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3RecordonAppeal,220.4Id.,16­18.

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524 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED

McKeevs.IntermediateAppellateCourt

On1March1977,anInformationchargingRubenGalangwith the crime of “Reckless Imprudence Resulting to (sic)Multiple Homicide and Physical Injuries and Damage toProperty”wasfiledwiththetrialcourt.ItwasdocketedasCriminalCaseNo.3751andwasraffledtoBranchVofthecourt, the same Branch where Civil Case No. 4478 wasassigned.

5

In their Answer with Counterclaim in Civil Case No.4477, private respondents asserted that it was the FordEscortcarwhich“invadedandbumped(sic)thelaneofthetruckdrivenbyRubenGalangand,ascounterclaim,prayedfortheawardofP15,000.00asattorney’sfees,P20,000.00asactual and liquidated damages, P100,000.00 as moraldamagesandP30,000.00asbusinesslosses.

6InCivilCase

No.4478,privaterespondentsfirstfiledamotiontodismisson grounds of pendency of another action (Civil CaseNo.4477)andfailuretoimpleadanindispensableparty,RubenGalang, the truck driver; they also filed a motion toconsolidate the case with Civil Case No. 4477 pendingbeforeBranchIIIofthesamecourt,whichwasopposedbytheplaintiffs.

7BothmotionsweredeniedbyBranchV,then

presided over by Judge Ignacio Capulong. Thereupon,privaterespondents filedtheirAnswerwithCounterclaim

8

whereintheyallegedthatJoseKohwastheperson“atfaulthavingapproached the laneof the truckdrivenbyRubenGalang, x x xwhichwas on the right lane going towardsManilaandatamoderatespeedobservingalltrafficrulesand regulations applicable under the circumstances thenprevailing;”intheircounterclaim,theyprayedforanawardof damages asmay be determined by the court after duehearing,andthesumsofP10,000.00asattorney’sfeesandP5,000.00asexpensesoflitigation.Petitioners filed theirAnswers to theCounterclaims in

bothcases.Toexpeditetheproceedings,theplaintiffsinCivilCase

No. 4478 filed on 27 March 1978 a motion to adopt the

Page 10: MCkee vs IAC

testimonies

__________________

5RecordonAppeal,121­124.6Id.,226­227.7Id.,22­25;26­28;28­32;34­36.8Id.,39­43.

525

VOL.211,JULY16,1992 525

McKeevs.IntermediateAppellateCourt

ofwitnessestakenduringthehearingofCriminalCaseNo.3751, which private respondents opposed and which thecourtdenied.

9Petitionerssubsequentlymovedtoreconsider

the order denying the motion for consolidation,10 which

JudgeCapulonggrantedintheOrderof5September1978;he thendirected thatCivilCaseNo.4478 be consolidatedwithCivil CaseNo. 4477 inBranch III of the court thenpresidedoverbyJudgeMarioCastañeda,Jr.LeftthenwithBranchVofthetrialcourtwasCriminal

CaseNo.3751.In the civil cases, the plaintiffs presented as witnesses

Araceli Koh McKee, Fernando Nuñag, Col. RobertFitzgerald, Primitivo Parel, Eugenio Tanhueco, CarmenKoh and Antonio Koh,

11 and offered several documentary

exhibits. Upon the other hand, private respondentspresented as witnesses Ruben Galang, Zenaida Soliman,JaimeTayagandRomanDayrit.

12

In the criminal case, the prosecution presented aswitnessesMrs.AraceliMcKee,SaludSamia,Pfc.FernandoNuñag, Dr. Ramon Panlilio, Dr. Robert Fitzgerald, Dr.RobertoYuson,Dr.HectorUlanday,Pfc.BenignodeLeon,Marina Bolos, Primitivo Parel, Rogelio Pineda, BenitoCaraan and Eugenio Tanhueco, and offered severaldocumentaryexhibits.

13Upon the other hand, the defense

presented the accused Ruben Galang, Luciano Punzalan,Zenaida Soliman and Roman Dayrit, and offereddocumentaryexhibits.

14

On1October1980,JudgeCapulongrenderedadecisionagainsttheaccusedRubenGalangintheaforesaidcriminalcase.Thedispositiveportionofthedecisionreadsasfollows:

Page 11: MCkee vs IAC

“WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is herebyrendered finding the accused Ruben Galang guilty beyondreasonabledoubtofthecrimechargedintheinformationandafterapplyingtheprovisionsofArticle365oftheRevisedPenalCodeandindeterminate

________________

9RecordonAppeal,45­48;49­52;52­53.

10Id.,53­57.

11Id.,91,92,100,101,103,104and105.

12RecordonAppeal,107,109,111and112.

13Id.,124,etseq.

14Id.,138,etseq.

526

526 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED

McKeevs.IntermediateAppellateCourt

sentencelaw,thisCourt,imposesuponsaidaccusedRubenGalangthepenaltyof six (6)monthsofarrestomayor asminimum to two(2)years,four(4)monthsandone(1)dayofprisioncorreccionalasmaximum; the accused is further sentenced to pay and indemnifytheheirs ofLoidaBondoc theamount ofP12,000.00as indemnityforherdeath;toreimbursetheheirsofLoidaBondoctheamountofP2,000.00 representing the funeral expenses; to pay the heirs ofLoida Bondoc the amount of P20,000.00 representing her loss ofincome; to indemnify and pay the heirs of the deceased JoseKohthe value of the car in the amount ofP53,910.95, and to pay thecosts.”

15

The aforecited decision was promulgated only on 17November 1980; on the same day, counsel for petitionersfiledwithBranch III of the court—where the two (2) civilcases were pending—a manifestation to that effect andattachedtheretoacopyofthedecision.

16

Upon the other hand, Judge Mario Castañeda, Jr.dismissedthetwo(2)civilcaseson12November1980andawarded the private respondents moral damages,exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.

17 The dispositive

portionofthesaiddecisionreadsasfollows:

“WHEREFORE, finding the preponderance of evidence to be infavor of thedefendants andagainst theplaintiffs, these cases arehereby orderedDISMISSEDwith costs against the plaintiffs. The

Page 12: MCkee vs IAC

defendants had proven their counter­claim, thru evidences (sic)presentedandunrebutted.Hence, theyareherebyawardedmoraland exemplary damages in the amount of P100,000.00 plusattorney’s fee of P15,000.00 and litigation expenses for (sic)P2,000.00.Theactualdamagesclaimedfor (sic)bythedefendantsis(sic)herebydismissedforlackofprooftothateffect(sic).”

18

A copy of the decisionwas sent by registeredmail to thepetitioners on 28 November 1980 and was received on 2December1980.

19

________________

15Id.,160­161.16RecordonAppeal,120­121.17Id.,86­120.18Id.,119­120.19Id.,6.

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VOL.211,JULY16,1992 527

McKeevs.IntermediateAppellateCourt

AccusedRubenGalangappealedthejudgmentofconvictiontotheCourtofAppeals.TheappealwasdocketedasC.A.­G.R.Blg.24764­CRandwasassigned to the court’sThirdDivision. Plaintiffs in Civil Cases Nos. 4477 and 4478likewise separately appealed the 12 November 1980decision to theappellatecourt.Theappealsweredocketedas C.A.­G.R. No. 69041­R and C.A.­G.R. No. 69040­R,respectively, andwere assigned to theFourthCivilCasesDivision.On4October1982,therespondentCourtpromulgatedits

decision20 in C.A.­G.R. Blg. 24764­CR affirming the

conviction of Galang.21 The dispositive portion of the

decisionreads:

“DAHIL DITO, ang hatol na paksa ng naritong paghahabol ayAmingpinagtitibaysakanyangkabuuan.Angnaghahabolparinangpinagbabayadnggugolngpaghahabol.”

AmotionforreconsiderationofthedecisionwasdeniedbytherespondentCourtinitsKapasiyahanpromulgatedon25November1982.

22Apetitionfor itsreview

23was filedwith

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thisCourt;saidpetitionwassubsequentlydenied.Amotionfor its reconsideration was denied with finality in theResolutionof20April1983.

24

On29November1983,respondentCourt,bythenknownas the Intermediate Appellate Court, promulgated itsconsolidated decision in A.C.­G.R. CV Nos. 69040 and69041,

25thedispositiveportionofwhichreads:

“WHEREFORE,thedecisionappealedfromisherebyreversedandset aside and another one is rendered, ordering defendants­appelleestopayplaintiffs­appellantsasfollows:

__________________

20PerAssociateJusticeOnofreA.Villaluz,concurredinbyAssociateJustices

CrisolitoPascualandGuillermoP.Villasor.

21Annex“C”ofPetition;Rollo,69­77.

22Annex“C­1,”Id.;Id.,78.

23G.R.No.62713.

24Annex“D,”Petition,op.cit.;Rollo,op.cit.,79.

25PerAssociateJusticePorfirioV.Sison,concurredinbyAssociateJustices

AbdulwahidA.Bidin,MarcelinoR.VelosoandDesiderioP.Jurado.

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528 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED

McKeevs.IntermediateAppellateCourt

ForthedeathofJoseKoh:P50,000.00asmoraldamagesP12,000.00asdeathindemnityP16,000.00forthelotandtomb(Exhs.UandU­1) P4,000.00expenses forholdingawake (p.9, tsnApril19,

1979)P950.00forthecasket(Exh.M)P375.00forthevaultservices(Exhs.VandV­1)ForthedeathofKimKohMcKee:P50,000.00asmoraldamagesP12,000.00asdeathindemnityP1,000.00forthepurchaseoftheburiallot(Exh.M)P950.00forfuneralservices(Exh.M­1)P375.00forvaultservices(Exhs.VandV­1)ForthephysicalinjuriessufferedbyGeorgeKohMcKee:P25,000.00asmoraldamagesP672.00forClarkFieldHospital(Exh.E)

Page 14: MCkee vs IAC

P4,384.00paidtoAngelesMedicalClinic(Exhs.D,D­1andD­2)P1,555.00paidtoSt.FrancisMedicalCenter(Exhs.BandB­

1)ForthephysicalinjuriessufferedbyAraceliKohMcKee:P25,000.00asmoraldamagesP1,055.00paidtoSt.FrancisMedicalCenter(Exhs.GandG­

1)P75.00paidtoSt.FrancisMedicalCenter(Exhs.G­2andG­

3)P428.00toCarmeliteGeneralHospital(Exh.F)P114.20toMuñozClinic(Exh.MM)ForthephysicalinjuriessufferedbyChristopherKohMcKee:P10,000.00asmoraldamagesP1,231.10toSt.FrancisMedicalCenter(Exhs.LandL­1)P321.95toF.C.E.A.Hospital(Exhs.GandD­1)In addition,We awardP10,000.00 as counsel (sic) fees inCivil

CaseNo.4477andanotherP10,000.00ascounsel(sic)feesinCivilCaseNo.4478.Nopronouncementastocosts.SOORDERED.”

26

________________

26Rollo,88­89.

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VOL.211,JULY16,1992 529

McKeevs.IntermediateAppellateCourt

The decision is anchored principally on the respondentCourt’sfindingsthatitwasRubenGalang’sinattentivenessor reckless imprudence which caused the accident. Theappellate court further said that the law presumesnegligence on the part of the defendants (privaterespondents),asemployersofGalang, in theselectionandsupervisionofthelatter;itwasfurtherassertedthatthesedefendants did not allege in their Answers the defense ofhavingexercisedthediligenceofagoodfatherofafamilyinselecting and supervising the said employee.

27 This

conclusionofrecklessimprudenceisbasedonthefollowingfindingsoffact:

“In the face of these diametrically opposed judicial positions, the

Page 15: MCkee vs IAC

determinative issue inthisappeal isposited inthefourthassignederrorasfollows:

‘IV

THETRIALCOURTERREDWHEN ITHELDTHE (sic) DRIVEROF

THE TRUCK STOPPED HIS TRUCK BLEWHIS HORN SWITCHED

ONHISHEADLIGHTSANDCOULDNOTSWERVETOTHERIGHT.’

Supportive of plaintiffs’ version, principal witness Araceli KohMcKeetestifiedthus:

‘Q Whathappenedafterthat,asyouapproachedthebridge?

A Whenwewereapproachingthebridge,two(2)boystriedtocrosstherightlaneontherightsideofthehighwaygoingtoSanFernando.Myfather,whois(sic)thedriverofthecartriedtoavoidthetwo(2)boyswhowerecrossing,heblewhishornandswervedtothelefttoavoidhittingthetwo(2)boys.Wenoticedthetruck,heswitchedontheheadlightstowarnthetruckdriver,toslowdowntogiveustherightofwaytocomebacktoourrightlane.

Q Didthetruckslowdown?

A No,sir,itdidnot,just(sic)continuedonitsway.

Q Whathappenedafterthat?

A Afteravoidingthetwo(2)boys,thecartriedtogobacktotherightlanesincethetruckis(sic)coming,myfathersteppedonthebrakesandallwhat(sic)Iheardisthe

_________________

27Id.,88.

530

530 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED

McKeevs.IntermediateAppellateCourt

soundofimpact(sic),sir.’(tsn,pp.5­6,July22,1977);or(Exhibit‘O’intheseCivilCases).

xxx

Q Mrs.howdidyouknowthatthetruckdrivenbythehereinaccused,RubenGalangdidnotreduceitsspeedbeforetheactualimpactofcollision(sic)asyounarratedinthisExhibit‘1,’howdidyouknow(sic)?

A Itjustkeptoncoming,sir.Ifonlyhereducedhisspeed,wecouldhavegot(sic)backtoourrightlaneonside(sic)ofthehighway,sir.’(tsn.pp.33­34,July22,1977)or(Exhibit‘O’in

Page 16: MCkee vs IAC

theseCivilCases)’(pp.30­31,Appellants’Brief).

Plaintiffs’ version was successfully corroborated to Oursatisfactionbythefollowingfactsandcircumstances:1. An impartial eye­witness to themishap, Eugenio Tanhueco,

declared that the truck stopped onlywhen it had already collidedwiththecar:

xxx

Tanhueco repeated the same testimony during the hearing in the

criminalcase:

xxx

Tanhueco could (sic) not be tagged as an accommodation witness

becausehewasoneofthefirsttoarriveatthesceneoftheaccident.As

a matter of fact, he brought one of the injured passengers to the

hospital.

We are not prepared to accord faith and credit to defendants’

witnesses, Zenaida Soliman, a passenger of the truck, and Roman

Dayrit,whosupposedlylivedacrossthestreet.

Regarding Soliman, experience has shown that in the ordinary

courseofeventspeopleusuallytakethesideof thepersonwithwhom

they are associated at the time of the accident, because, as a general

rule,theydonotwishtobeidentifiedwiththepersonwhowasatfault.

Thus an imaginary bond is unconsciously created among the several

personswithinthesamegroup(Peoplevs.Vivencio,CA­G.R.No.00310­

CR,Jan.31,1962).

WithrespecttoDayrit,Wecannothelpsuspecting(sic)thatheisan

accommodation witness. He did not go to the succor of the injured

persons. He said he wanted to call the police authorities about the

mishap,buthisphonehadnodialtone.Bethis(sic)asitmay,thetrial

courtinthecriminalcaseactedcorrectlyinrefusingtobelieveDayrit.

531

VOL.211,JULY16,1992 531

McKeevs.IntermediateAppellateCourt

2. Exhibit 2, the statement of Galang, does not include the claimthat Galang stopped his truck at a safe distance from the car,according toplaintiffs (p. 25,Appellants’Brief).This contentionofappellantswascompletelypassedsub­silencioorwasnotrefutedbyappelleesintheirbrief.Exhibit2isoneoftheexhibitsnotincludedintherecord.AccordingtotheTableofContentssubmittedbythecourt below, said Exhibit 2 was not submitted by defendants­appellees.Inthislight,itisnotfar­fetchedtosurmisethatGalang’s

Page 17: MCkee vs IAC

claim that he stopped was an eleventhhour desperate attempt to

exculpatehimselffromimprisonmentanddamages.

3.Galangdivulgedthathestoppedafterseeingthecarabout10

metersaway:

‘ATTY.SOTTO:

Q DoIunderstandfromyourtestimonythatinspiteofthefact

thatyouadmittedthattheroadisstraightandyoumaybeable

to(sic)see500­1000metersawayfromyouanyvehicle,you

firstsawthatcaronlyaboutten(10)metersawayfromyoufor

thefirsttime?

xxx

A Inoticedit,sir,thatitwasaboutten(10)metersaway.

ATTY.SOTTO:

Q So,forclarification,youclarifyandstateunderyouroaththat

youhave(sic)notnoticeditbeforethatten(10)meters?(Tsn.3

to5,Sept.18,1979).’(p.16,Appellants’Brief)’

Galang’s testimonysubstantiate (sic)Tanhueco’sstatementthat

Galang stopped only because of the impact. At ten (10) meters

away,withthetruckrunningat30milesperhour,asrevealed in

Galang’saffidavit (Exh.2;p.25,Appellants’Brief), it iswell­nigh

impossibletoavoidacollisiononabridge.

5. Galang’s truck stopped because of the collision, and not

because hewaited for JoseKoh to return to his proper lane. The

police investigator, Pfc. Fernando L.Nunag, stated that he found

skid marks under the truck but there were not (sic) skid marks

behind the truck (pp. 19­20, t.s.n.,Nov. 3, 1978).Thepresence of

skidmarks show (sic) that the truckwas speeding. Since the skid

markswerefoundunderthetruckandnonewerefoundattherear

ofthetruck,thereasonableconclusionisthattheskidmarksunder

thetruckwerecausedbythetruck’s frontwheelswhenthetrucks

(sic)suddenlystoppedsecondsbeforethemishapinanendeavorto

avoidthesame.But,asaforesaid,

532

532 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED

McKeevs.IntermediateAppellateCourt

Galangsawthecaratbarely10metersaway,averyshortdistance

toavoidacollision,andinhisfutileendeavortoavoidthecollision

heabruptlysteppedonhisbrakesbutthesmashuphappened just

thesame.

For the inattentiveness or reckless imprudence of Galang, the

Page 18: MCkee vs IAC

law presumes negligence on the part of the defendants in theselectionoftheirdriverorinthesupervisionoverhim.Appelleesdidnot allege such defense of having exercised the duties of a goodfatherofafamilyintheselectionandsupervisionoftheiremployeesintheiranswers.Theydidnotevenadduceevidencethattheydidinfacthavemethodsofselectionandprogramsofsupervision.TheinattentivenessornegligenceofGalangwastheproximatecauseofthemishap. If Galang’s attention was on the highway, he wouldhavesightedthecarearlierorataverysafedistancethan(sic)10meters.Heproceededtocross thebridge,andtriedtostopwhenacollisionwasalreadyinevitable,becauseatthetimethatheenteredthebridgehisattentionwasnotrivetedtotheroadinfrontofhim.Onthequestionofdamages,theclaimsofappellantswereamply

proven,buttheitemsmustbereduced.”28

Amotionforreconsiderationallegingimproperappreciationof the factswas subsequently filedbyprivate respondentsonthebasisofwhichtherespondentCourt,initsResolutionof3April1984,

29reconsideredandsetasideits29November

1983decisionandaffirmedintotothetrialcourt’sjudgmentof 12 November 1980. A motion to reconsider thisResolutionwasdeniedby the respondentCourt on4July1984.

30

Hence,thispetition.PetitionersallegethatrespondentCourt:

“I

x x x COMMITTED A VERY SERIOUS AND GRAVE ERRORWHEN IT TOTALLY REVERSED ITS DECISION BY MERELYBASING IT FROM (sic) A MERE ‘PRESUMPTION,’ TOTALLYDISREGARDING THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS’ DRIVER’SADMISSIONS AND CONFESSIONS, WHO EXCLUSIVELYCOMMITTED

_________________

28Rollo,83­88.

29Rollo,61­65.

30Id.,67.

533

VOL.211,JULY16,1992 533

McKeevs.IntermediateAppellateCourt

Page 19: MCkee vs IAC

THEPROXIMATECAUSEOFTHEACCIDENT (sic),FURTHER,IT ALSO DISREGARDED THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED ANDFOUND IN THE RECORDS; THEREFORE, RESPONDENTCOURT’SRESOLUTIONS (ANNEXESA andB,PETITION)ARECLEARLYERRONEOUS,PURELYBASEDONSPECULATIONS,CONJECTURES ANDWITHOUT SURE FOUNDATION IN THEEVIDENCE.

II

x x x GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND ERREDWHEN IN EFFECT IT DISREGARDED A DOCTRINE LAIDDOWN BY THIS HONORABLE COURT BY STATING AMONGOTHERS, ‘IT CANNOT CATEGORICALLY ADOPT THEFINDINGS OF GUILT IN THE CRIMINAL CASEWHERE THEDRIVEROFTHETRUCK INVOLVED INTHEACCIDENTWASINDICTED.’

III

x x x PATENTLY COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OFDISCRETIONANDMADEAMISLEADINGPRONOUNCEMENT,WHEN IT HELD: ‘IT IS THUS INCUMBENT UPON THEPLAINTIFFS­APPELLANTS (APPELLEES WRONGLYMENTIONED IN THE RESOLUTION) TO PROVE THEIRALLEGATIONS THAT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THEACCIDENT WAS THE NEGLIGENCE OF PRIVATERESPONDENTS’DRIVER.’

IV

x x x COMMITTED ANOTHER GRIEVIOUS (sic) ERROR,COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND CITEDANOTHER CASE WHICH IS CLEARLY INAPPLICABLE TOTHESECASES.

V

x x x COMMITTED A PATENT ERROR AND GRAVELYABUSED ITSDISCRETION INADOPTINGTHEFINDINGSOFTHETRIALCOURTWHICHARECLEARLYERRONEOUSANDCONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE FOUND IN THE RECORDS,SPECIALLY THEY (sic) ARE CONTRARY TO THE ADMITTEDFACTSANDJUDICIALADMISSIONSMADEBYTHEPRIVATERESPONDENTS’DRIVER.

VI

Page 20: MCkee vs IAC

534

534 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED

McKeevs.IntermediateAppellateCourt

xxxEXCEEDEDITSJURISDICTION,COMMITTEDGRAVEABUSE OF DISCRETION AND GRAVELY ERRED WHEN ITAWARDED DAMAGES TO THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTSWHENSAIDAWARD ISNOT SUPPORTEDBYEVIDENCE, INTHERECORDS,ANDSAIDAWARDISNOTALLOWEDBYLAWAND THE CONSISTENT DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLECOURT.

VII

xxxEXCEEDEDITSJURISDICTION,COMMITTEDGRAVEABUSE OF DISCRETION AND GRAVELY ERRED WHEN ITERRONEOUSLY SET ASIDE ITS DECISION AWARDINGDAMAGES TO PETITIONERS WHICH IS CLEARLY INACCORDANCE WITH THE EVIDENCE, THE LAW ANDJURISPRUDENCE RELATIVE TO THE AWARD OFDAMAGES.”

31

In the Resolution of 12 September 1984, We requiredprivaterespondentstoCommentonthepetition.

32Afterthe

saidComment33 was filed, petitioners submitted a Reply

34

thereto; this Court then gave due course to the instantpetitionsandrequiredpetitionerstofiletheirBrief,

35which

theyaccordinglycompliedwith.There is merit in the petition. Before We take on the

main task of dissecting the arguments and counter­arguments, some observations on the proceduralvicissitudesofthesecasesareinorder.Civil Cases Nos. 4477 and 4478, which were for the

recoveryof civil liabilityarising fromaquasi­delict underArticle 2176 in relation toArticle 2180 of theCivilCode,werefiledaheadofCriminalCaseNo.3751.CivilCaseNo.4478waseventuallyconsolidatedwithCivilCaseNo.4477forjointtrialinBranchIIIofthetrialcourt.Therecordsdonot indicateanyattemptonthepartof theparties,and itmaythereforebereasonablycon­

_________________

31Rollo,213­214.

Page 21: MCkee vs IAC

32Rollo,150.

33Id.,157­175.34Id.,185­198.35Id.,199.

535

VOL.211,JULY16,1992 535

McKeevs.IntermediateAppellateCourt

cluded that nonewasmade, to consolidateCriminalCase

No.3751withthecivilcases,orvice­versa.Thepartiesmayhavethenbelieved,andunderstandablyso,sincebythenno

specific provision of law or ruling of this Court expressly

allowed such a consolidation, that an independent civil

action, authorized under Article 33 in relation to Article

2177oftheCivilCode,suchasthecivilcasesinthiscase,

cannotbeconsolidatedwiththecriminalcase.Indeed,such

consolidationcouldhavebeenfarthestfromtheirmindsas

Article 33 itself expressly provides that the “civil action

shallproceedindependentlyofthecriminalprosecution,and

shallrequireonlyapreponderanceofevidence.”Bethatas

itmay, therewas then no legal impediment against such

consolidation. Section 1, Rule 31 of the Rules of Court,

which seeks toavoidamultiplicity of suits, guardagainst

oppression and abuse, prevent delays, clear congested

dockets to simplify theworkof the trial court, or in short,

attain justice with the least expense to the parties

litigants,36

would have easily sustained a consolidation,

thereby preventing the unseeming, if not ludicrous,

spectacleof two (2) judgesappreciating,according to their

respective orientation, perception and perhaps even

prejudice, the same facts differently, and thereafterrenderingconflictingdecisions.Suchwaswhathappenedinthiscase.Itshouldnot,hopefully,happenanymore.Inthe

recentcaseofCojuangcovs.CourtofAppeals,37

thisCourt

heldthatthepresentprovisionsofRule111oftheRevised

RulesofCourtallowaconsolidationofanindependentcivil

action for the recovery of civil liability authorized under

Articles 32, 33, 34 or 2176 of the Civil Code with the

criminal action subject, however, to the condition that no

finaljudgmenthasbeenrenderedinthatcriminalcase.

Let it be stressed, however, that the judgment in

CriminalCaseNo. 3751 findingGalang guilty of reckless

Page 22: MCkee vs IAC

imprudence,althoughalreadyfinalbyvirtueofthedenial

bynolessthanthisCourtofhislastattempttosetasidethe

respondentCourt’s affirmance of the verdict of conviction,

hasnorelevanceor

________________

36Cañosvs.Peralta,115SCRA843[1982],citing1C.J.S.1342­1343.

37203SCRA619[1991].

536

536 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED

McKeevs.IntermediateAppellateCourt

importancetothiscase.

AsWeheldinDionisiovs.Alvendia,38

the responsibility

arisingfromfaultornegligenceinaquasi­delictisentirelyseparate and distinct from the civil liability arising from

negligenceunderthePenalCode.And,asmoreconcretely

statedintheconcurringopinionofJusticeJ.B.L.Reyes,“in

the case of independent civil actions under the newCivil

Code, the resultof the criminal case,whetheracquittalor

conviction,wouldbeentirelyirrelevanttothecivilaction.”39

InSalta vs.DeVeyra andPNBvs. Purisima,40

thisCourt

stated:

“xxxItseemsperfectlyreasonabletoconcludethatthecivilactions

mentioned inArticle 33, permitted in the samemanner tobe filed

separatelyfromthecriminalcase,mayproceedsimilarlyregardlessoftheresultofthecriminalcase.Indeed, when the law has allowed a civil case related to a

criminal case, to be filed separately and to proceed independently

evenduringthependencyofthelattercase,theintentionispatent

to make the court’s disposition of the criminal case of no effect

whatsoeverontheseparatecivilcase.Thismustbesobecausethe

offenses specified in Article 33 are of such a nature, unlike other

offenses not mentioned, that they may be made the subject of a

separate civil action because of the distinct separability of their

respectivejuridicalcauseorbasisofactionxxx.”

Whatremainstobethemostimportantconsiderationasto

why the decision in the criminal case should not be

consideredinthisappealisthefactthatprivaterespondents

were not parties therein. It would have been entirely

Page 23: MCkee vs IAC

differentifthepetitioners’causeofactionwasfordamages

arising from a delict, in which case private respondents’liabilitycouldonlybesubsidiarypursuanttoArticle103of

theRevisedPenalCode.Intheabsenceofanycollusion,the

judgmentofconvictioninthecriminalcaseagainstGalang

wouldhavebeenconclusiveinthe

_______________

38102Phil.443[1957].

39Atpage447.

40117SCRA212,218­219[1982];seealsoCastillovs.CourtofAppeals,

176 SCRA 591 [1989]; Andamo vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 191

SCRA195[1990].

537

VOL.211,JULY16,1992 537

McKeevs.IntermediateAppellateCourt

civil cases for the subsidiary liability of the private

respondents.41

Andnowtothemeritsofthepetition.

It is readily apparent from the pleadings that the

principal issue raised in this petition is whether or not

respondentCourt’sfindingsinitschallengedresolutionare

supported by evidence or are based onmere speculations,

conjecturesandpresumptions.

Theprincipleiswell­establishedthatthisCourtisnota

trier of facts. Therefore, in an appeal by certiorari underRule45oftheRevisedRulesofCourt,onlyquestionsoflaw

may be raised. The resolution of factual issues is the

functionofthelowercourtswhosefindingsonthesematters

arereceivedwithrespectandare,asarule,bindingonthis

Court.42

The foregoing rule, however, is notwithout exceptions.

FindingsoffactsofthetrialcourtsandtheCourtofAppeals

maybesetasidewhensuchfindingsarenotsupportedby

theevidenceorwhen the trial court failed to consider the

materialfactswhichwouldhaveledtoaconclusiondifferent

fromwhatwas stated in its judgment.43

The same is true

where the appellate court’s conclusions are grounded

entirely on conjectures, speculations and surmises44

or

where the conclusions of the lower courts are based on a

misapprehensionoffacts.45

Page 24: MCkee vs IAC

It isatonceobvioustothisCourtthatthe instantcase

qualifies as one of the aforementioned exceptions as the

findings and conclusions of the trial court and the

respondent Court in its challenged resolution are not

supportedbytheevidence,

_________________

41Martinezvs.Barredo,81Phil.1[1948];Mirandavs.MalateGarage

andTaxicab,Inc.,99Phil.670[1956];Manalovs.RoblesTransportation

Co.,Inc.,99Phil.729[1956].

42FNCB Finance vs. Estavillo, 192 SCRA 514 [1990]; Rañeses vs.

Intermediate Appellate Court, 187 SCRA 397 [1990]; Remalante vs.

Tibe,158SCRA138[1988].

43Capcovs.Macasaet,189SCRA561[1990].

44Orcinovs.CivilServiceCommission,190SCRA815 [1990]; Tupue

vs.Urgel,161SCRA417 [1988];Tolentino vs. De Jesus, 56 SCRA 167

[1974].

45Pajunar vs. Court of Appeals, 175 SCRA 464 [1989]; Sese vs.

IntermediateAppellateCourt,152SCRA585[1987].

538

538 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED

McKeevs.IntermediateAppellateCourt

arebasedonamisapprehensionoffactsandtheinferences

made therefrom aremanifestlymistaken. The respondent

Court’s decision of 29 November 1983 makes the correct

findingsoffact.

In the assailed resolution, the respondent Court held

thatthefactthatthecarimproperlyinvadedthelaneofthe

truckandthatthecollisionoccurredinsaidlanegaveriseto

thepresumption that thedriver of the car, JoseKoh,was

negligent. On the basis of this presumed negligence, the

appellate court immediately concluded that it was Jose

Koh’s negligence that was the immediate and proximate

causeofthecollision.Thisisanunwarranteddeductionas

theevidenceforthepetitionersconvincinglyshowsthatthe

carswervedintothetruck’s lanebecauseas itapproached

the southernendof thebridge, two (2) boysdartedacross

theroadfromtherightsidewalkintothelaneofthecar.As

testifiedtobypetitionerAraceliKohMcKee:

Q Whathappenedafterthat,asyouapproachedthe

Page 25: MCkee vs IAC

bridge?

A Whenwewereapproachingthebridge,two(2)boystriedtocrosstherightlaneontherightsideofthehighwaygoingtoSanFernando.Myfather,whois(sic)thedriverofthecartriedtoavoidthetwo(2)boyswhowerecrossing,heblewhishornandswervedtothelefttoavoidhittingthetwo(2)boys.Wenoticedthetruck,heswitchedontheheadlightstowarnthetruckdriver,toslowdowntogiveustherightofwaytocomebacktoourrightlane.

Q Didthetruckslowdown?

A Nosir,itdidnot,just(sic)continuedonitsway.

Q Whathappenedafterthat?

A Afteravoidingthetwo(2)boys,thecartriedtogobacktotherightlanesincethetruckis(sic)coming,myfathersteppedonthebrakesandallwhat(sic)Iheardisthesoundofimpact(sic),sir.”

46

Hercredibilityandtestimonyremainedintactevenduringcross examination. Jose Koh’s entry into the lane of thetruckwasnecessaryinordertoavoidwhatwas,inhismindatthattime,agreaterperil—deathorinjurytothetwo(2)boys.Such

________________

46TSN,22July1977,5­6;Exhibit“O,”Rollo,83.

539

VOL.211,JULY16,1992 539

McKeevs.IntermediateAppellateCourt

actcanhardlybeclassifiedasnegligent.Negligencewas defined and described by thisCourt in

Layuganvs.IntermediateAppellateCourt,47thus:

“x x x Negligence is the omission to do something which areasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarilyregulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing ofsomething which a prudent and reasonable man would not do(Black’s Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, 930), or as Judge Cooleydefinesit,‘(T)hefailuretoobservefortheprotectionoftheinterests

Page 26: MCkee vs IAC

of another person, that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance

whichthecircumstancesjustlydemand,wherebysuchotherperson

suffersinjury.’(CooleyonTorts,FourthEdition,vol.3,265)

In Picart vs. Smith (37 Phil. 809, 813), decided more than

seventyyearsagobutstillasoundrule,(W)eheld:

The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a

particularcasemaybestatedasfollows:Didthedefendantindoingthe

alleged negligent act use that (reasonable care and caution which an

ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation?) If

not, then he is guilty of negligence. The lawhere in effect adopts the

standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the

discreetpaterfamiliasoftheRomanlaw.xxx”

InCorlissvs.ManilaRailroadCompany,48

Weheld:

“xxx‘Negligenceiswantofthecarerequiredbythecircumstances.

It is a relative or comparative, not an absolute, term and its

applicationdependsuponthesituationofthepartiesandthedegree

of care and vigilancewhich the circumstances reasonably require.

Wherethedangerisgreat,ahighdegreeofcareisnecessary,and

the failure to observe it is a want of ordinary care under the

circumstances.(citingAhernv.OregonTelephoneCo.,35Pac.549

(1894).’”

On the basis of the foregoing definition, the test of

negligenceandthefactsobtaininginthiscase,itismanifest

that no negligence could be imputed to Jose Koh. Any

reasonableandordinaryprudentmanwouldhavetriedto

avoidrunningover

________________

47167SCRA363[1988].

4827SCRA674[1969].

540

540 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED

McKeevs.IntermediateAppellateCourt

the two boys by swerving the car away from where they

were even if this wouldmean entering the opposite lane.

Avoidingsuchimmediateperilwouldbethenaturalcourse

totakeparticularlywherethevehicle intheopposite lane

would be several meters away and could very well slow

Page 27: MCkee vs IAC

down, move to the side of the road and give way to the

oncoming car. Moreover, under what is known as the

emergencyrule,“onewhosuddenlyfindshimselfinaplace

ofdanger,andisrequiredtoactwithouttimetoconsiderthe

best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending

danger,isnotguiltyofnegligence,ifhefailstoadoptwhat

subsequentlyanduponreflectionmayappeartohavebeen

a bettermethod, unless the emergency in which he finds

himselfisbroughtaboutbyhisownnegligence.”49

Consideringthesuddenintrusionofthetwo(2)boysinto

thelaneofthecar,WefindthatJoseKohadoptedthebest

meanspossibleinthegivensituationtoavoidhittingthem.

Applyingtheabovetest,therefore,itisclearthathewasnot

guiltyofnegligence.

In any case, assuming, arguendo that Jose Koh isnegligent, it cannot be said that his negligence was the

proximatecauseofthecollision.Proximatecausehasbeen

definedas:

“x x x ‘that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence,

unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury,

andwithoutwhich the resultwouldnothaveoccurred.’Andmore

comprehensively, theproximate legalcause is thatacting firstand

producingtheinjury,eitherimmediatelyorbysettingotherevents

inmotion,allconstitutinganaturalandcontinuouschainofevents,

each having a close causal connection with its immediate

predecessor, the finalevent in the chain immediatelyeffecting the

injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first

acted,undersuchcircumstancesthatthepersonresponsibleforthe

first event should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person,

have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or

default that an injury to some person might probably result

therefrom.”50

_________________

49Gan vs. Court of Appeals, 165 SCRA 378 [1988], citing Siegl vs.

Watson,195NW867andothers.

50Vda. de Bataclan vs. Medina, 102 Phil. 181 [1957], citing 38 Am.

Jur.695­696.

541

VOL.211,JULY16,1992 541

McKeevs.IntermediateAppellateCourt

Page 28: MCkee vs IAC

Applyingtheabovedefinition,althoughitmaybesaidthat

theactofJoseKoh,ifatallnegligent,wastheinitialactin

thechainofevents,itcannotbesaidthatthesamecaused

theeventualinjuriesanddeathsbecauseoftheoccurrence

of a sufficient intervening event, the negligent act of the

truckdriver,whichwastheactualcauseofthetragedy.The

entryof thecar into the laneof the truckwouldnothave

resulted in the collision had the latter heeded the

emergency signals given by the former to slow down and

givethecaranopportunitytogobackintoitsproperlane.

Insteadofslowingdownandswervingtothefarrightofthe

road,whichwas the proper precautionarymeasure under

thegivencircumstances,thetruckdrivercontinuedatfull

speed towards the car. The truck driver’s negligence

becomesmoreapparentinviewofthefactthattheroadis

7.50meterswidewhilethecarmeasures1.598metersand

the truck, 2.286 meters, in width. This would mean that

bothcarandtruckcouldpasssidebysidewithaclearance

of 3.661meters to spare.51

Furthermore, the bridge has a

levelsidewalkwhichcouldhavepartiallyaccommodatedthe

truck. Any reasonable man finding himself in the given

situation would have tried to avoid the car instead of

meetingithead­on.

Thetruckdriver’snegligenceisapparentintherecords.

Hehimselfsaidthathistruckwasrunningat30miles(48

kilometers)perhouralongthebridgewhile themaximum

speedallowedbylawonabridge52

isonly30kilometersper

hour.UnderArticle2185oftheCivilCode,apersondriving

avehicleispresumednegligentifatthetimeofthemishap,

he was violating any traffic regulation. We cannot give

credence to private respondents’ claim that there was an

error in the translation by the investigating officer of the

truck driver’s response in Pampango as to whether the

speed citedwas in kilometers per hour ormiles per hour.

The law presumes that official duty has been regularly

performed;53

unless there is proof to the contrary, this

presumptionholds.Intheinstantcase,privaterespondents’

claimisbasedonmereconjecture.

_________________

51Rollo,148.

52Section53,MotorVehicleLaw.

53Section2(m),Rule131,RevisedRulesofCourt.

542

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542 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED

McKeevs.IntermediateAppellateCourt

Thetruckdriver’snegligencewaslikewisedulyestablished

through the earlier quoted testimony of petitionerAraceli

KohMcKeewhichwasdulycorroboratedbythetestimonyof

EugenioTanhueco,animpartialeyewitnesstothemishap.

AraceliKohMcKeetestifiedfurther,thus:

xxx

“Q Mrs.howdidyouknowthatthetruckdrivenbythe

hereinaccused,RubenGalangdidnotreduceitsspeed

beforetheactualimpactofcollisionasyounarratedin

thisExhibit‘1,’howdidyouknow?

A Itjustkeptoncoming,sir.Ifonlyhereducedhisspeed,

wecouldhavegot(sic)backtoourrightlaneonside

(sic)ofthehighway,sir.’(tsn,pp.33­34,July22,1977)

or(Exhibit‘O’intheseCivilCases)(pp.30­31,

Appellants’Brief)”54

whileEugenioTanhuecotestifiedthus:

“Q Whenyousawthetruck,howwasitmoving?

A Itwasmoving50to60kilometersperhour,sir.

Q Immediatelyafteryousawthistruck,doyouknow

whathappened?

A Isawthetruckandacarcollided(sic),sir,andIwentto

theplacetohelpthevictims.’(tsn,28,April19,1979)

xxx

Q Fromthetimeyousawthetrucktothetimeofthe

impact,willyoutellusifthesaidtruckeverstopped?

A Isawitstopped(sic)whenithas(sic)alreadycollidedwiththecaranditwasalreadymotionless.’(tsn.31,April19,1979;Italicssupplied).(p.27,Appellants’

Brief).”55

Clearly, therefore, it was the truck driver’s subsequent

negligence in failing to take the proper measures and

degreeofcarenecessarytoavoidthecollisionwhichwasthe

proximatecauseoftheresultingaccident.

Even if JoseKohwas indeednegligent, the doctrine of

Page 30: MCkee vs IAC

lastclearchancefindsapplicationhere.Lastclearchanceis

a doctrine in the law of torts which states that the

contributory

_________________

54Rollo,83­84.

55Id.,84.

543

VOL.211,JULY16,1992 543

McKeevs.IntermediateAppellateCourt

negligenceofthepartyinjuredwillnotdefeattheclaimfor

damages if it is shown that the defendant might, by the

exerciseofreasonablecareandprudence,haveavoidedthe

consequencesofthenegligenceoftheinjuredparty.Insuch

cases,thepersonwhohadthelastclearchancetoavoidthe

mishap is considered in law solely responsible for the

consequencesthereof.56

InBustamantevs.CourtofAppeals,57

Weheld:

“The respondent court adopted the doctrine of ‘last clear chance.’

Thedoctrine, statedbroadly, is that thenegligenceof theplaintiff

does not preclude a recovery for the negligence of the defendant

whereitappearsthatthedefendant,byexercisingreasonablecare

and prudence, might have avoided injurious consequences to the

plaintiffnotwithstandingtheplaintiff’snegligence.Inotherwords,

thedoctrineoflastclearchancemeansthateventhoughaperson’s

ownactsmayhaveplacedhiminapositionofperil,andaninjury

results, the injured person is entitled to recovery (sic). As the

doctrineisusuallystated,apersonwhohasthelastclearchanceor

opportunityofavoidinganaccident,notwithstandingthenegligent

acts of his opponent or that of a third person imputed to the

opponent is considered in law solely responsible for the

consequencesoftheaccident.(Sangco,TortsandDamages,4thEd.,1986,p.165).

Thepracticalimportofthedoctrineisthatanegligentdefendant

isheldliabletoanegligentplaintiff,oreventoaplaintiffwhohas

beengrosslynegligentinplacinghimselfinperil,ifhe,awareofthe

plaintiff’speril,oraccordingtosomeauthorities,shouldhavebeen

aware of it in the reasonable exercise of due care, had in fact an

opportunitylaterthanthatoftheplaintifftoavoidanaccident(57

Am.Jr.,2d,pp.798­799).”

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InPantrancoNorthExpress,Inc.,vs.Baesa,58Weruled:

“Thedoctrineof lastclearchancewasdefinedbythisCourt inthecaseofOngv.MetropolitanWaterDistrict,104Phil.397(1958),inthiswise:

__________________

56Ong vs. Metropolitan Water District, 104 Phil. 405 [1958]; Del

Pradovs.ManilaElectricCo.,52Phil.900[1929];Picart vs. Smith, 37

Phil.809[1918].57193SCRA603[1991].58179SCRA384[1989].

544

544 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED

McKeevs.IntermediateAppellateCourt

Thedoctrineofthelastclearchancesimply,meansthatthenegligence

of a claimant does not preclude a recovery for the negligence of

defendant where it appears that the latter, by exercising reasonable

care and prudence, might have avoided injurious consequences to

claimantnotwithstandinghisnegligence.

The doctrine applies only in a situation where the plaintiff wasguiltyofpriororantecedentnegligencebutthedefendant,whohadthelastfairchancetoavoidtheimpendingharmandfailedtodoso,is made liable for all the consequences of the accidentnotwithstanding the prior negligence of the plaintiff [Picart v.Smith,37Phil.809(1918);GlanPeople’sLumberandHardware,etal.v.IntermediateAppellateCourt,CeciliaAlferezVda.deCalibo,etal.,G.R.No.70493,May18,1989].Thesubsequentnegligenceofthedefendantinfailingtoexerciseordinarycaretoavoidinjurytoplaintiffbecomesthe immediateorproximatecauseof theaccidentwhich intervenes between the accident and the more remotenegligenceoftheplaintiff,thusmakingthedefendantliabletotheplaintiff[Picartv.Smithsupra].Generally, the last clear chance doctrine is invoked for the

purposeofmakingadefendant liabletoaplaintiffwhowasguiltyofpriororantecedentnegligence,althoughitmayalsoberaisedasadefensetodefeatclaim(sic)fordamages.”

Applyingtheforegoingdoctrine,itisnotdifficulttorule,asWe now rule, that it was the truck driver’s negligence in

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failing to exert ordinary care to avoid the collisionwhich

was, in law, the proximate cause of the collision. As

employersofthetruckdriver,theprivaterespondentsare,

underArticle2180oftheCivilCode,directlyandprimarily

liablefortheresultingdamages.Thepresumptionthatthey

arenegligent flows fromthenegligenceof their employee.

Thatpresumption,however, isonly juristantum,not juriset de jure.

59

Their only possible defense is that they

exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to

preventthedamage.Article2180readsasfollows:

“TheobligationimposedbyArticle2176isdemandablenotonlyfor

one’sownactsoromissions,butalsoforthoseofpersonsforwhom

_________________

59Ramosvs.Pepsi­ColaBottlingCo.,19SCRA289[1967],citingBahiavs.

Litonjua,30Phil.624[1915].

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VOL.211,JULY16,1992 545

McKeevs.IntermediateAppellateCourt

oneisresponsible.

xxx

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their

employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their

assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any

businessorindustry.

xxx

Theresponsibility treatedof in thisarticleshallceasewhenthe

personshereinmentionedprovethattheyobservedallthediligence

ofagoodfatherofafamilytopreventdamage.”

The diligence of a good father referred to means the

diligence in the selection and supervision of employees.60

TheanswersoftheprivaterespondentsinCivilCasesNos.

4477and4478didnot interpose this defense.Neitherdid

theyattempttoproveit.

TherespondentCourtwasthencorrectinitsDecisionof

29 November 1983 in reversing the decision of the trial

courtwhichdismissedCivilCasesNos.4477and4478.Its

assailedResolutionof3April1984findsnosufficientlegal

andfactualmoorings.

In the light of recent decisions of this Court,61

the

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indemnity for death must, however, be increased fromP12,000.00toP50,000.00.WHEREFORE, the instant petition isGRANTED. The

assailedResolutionoftherespondentCourtof3April1984isSETASIDEwhile itsDecisionof 29November1983 inC.A.­G.R. CV Nos. 69040­41 is REINSTATED, subject tothemodification that the indemnity fordeath is increasedfrom P12,000.00 to P50,000.00 each for the death of JoseKoh and Kim Koh McKee. Costs against privaterespondents.SOORDERED.

Gutierrez,Jr.(Chairman),FelicianoandRomero,JJ.,concur.

________________

60Ramosvs.Pepsi­ColaBottlingCo.,supra.61People vs. Sison, 189 SCRA 643 [1989]; People vs. Narit, 197

SCRA 334 [1991]; People vs. Tiozon, 198 SCRA 368 [1991]; People vs.

Lubreo, 200 SCRA 11 [1991]; Dangwa Trans., Co., Inc. vs. Court of

Appeals,202SCRA574[1991].

546

546 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED

Eudelavs.CourtofAppeals

Bidin,J.,No part. I participated in the appealeddecision.

Petitiongranted.

Note.—Doctrine of last clear chance applies in a suitbetweentheownersanddriversoftwocollidingvehicles,notwhere the passenger demands responsibility from thecarriertoenforcecontractualobligations(PhilippineRabbitBusLines,Inc.vs.IntermediateAppellateCourt,189SCRA158).

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