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U.S. Marine Corps DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. PCN 143 000145 00 Marine Corps Tank Employment MCWP 3-12

MCWP 3-12 Marine Corps Tank Employment 3-12 Marine... · MCWP 3-12 supersedes Fleet Marine Force Manual 9-1, Tank ... Headquarters and Service Company Gunnery Sergeant ... Tank Cannon

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Page 1: MCWP 3-12 Marine Corps Tank Employment 3-12 Marine... · MCWP 3-12 supersedes Fleet Marine Force Manual 9-1, Tank ... Headquarters and Service Company Gunnery Sergeant ... Tank Cannon

U.S. Marine Corps

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

PCN 143 000145 00

Marine CorpsTank Employment

MCWP 3-12

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To Our Readers

Changes: Readers of this publication are encouraged to submit suggestions and changes thatwill improve it. Recommendations may be sent directly to Commanding General, MarineCorps Combat Development Command, Doctrine Division (C 42), 3300 Russell Road, Suite318A, Quantico, VA 22134-5021 or by fax to 703-784-2917 (DSN 278-2917) or by E-mail [email protected]. Recommendations should include the following information:

● Location of changePublication number and titleCurrent page numberParagraph number (if applicable)Line numberFigure or table number (if applicable)

● Nature of changeAdd, deleteProposed new text, preferably double-spaced and typewritten

● Justification and/or source of change

Additional copies: A printed copy of this publication may be obtained from Marine CorpsLogistics Base, Albany, GA 31704-5001, by following the instructions in MCBul 5600,Marine Corps Doctrinal Publications Status. An electronic copy may be obtained from theDoctrine Division, MCCDC, world wide web home page which is found at the following uni-versal reference locator: https://www.doctrine.usmc.mil.

Unless otherwise stated, whenever the masculine gender is used, both men and women are included.

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Department of the NavyHeadquarters United States Marine Corps

Washington, DC 20380-1775

17 February 2005

FOREWORD

Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-12, Marine Corps Tank Employment,provides Marine Corps doctrine and supporting tactics, techniques, and procedures for theemployment of Marine tanks in support of the Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF).Historically, Marine tanks have played critical roles in the success of the Corps’ combatoperations. From World War II to Iraq, the commander’s ability to effectively employMarine tanks has provided him with a devastating direct fire capability. Today, theMarine Corps’ M1A1 Abrams tanks are the most lethal direct fire and survivableweapons system within the arsenal of the ground combat element.

This publication is intended for Marine Corps combat, combat support, and combat servicesupport unit commanders and their staffs operating with or supporting Marine tank units. Itdescribes how the Marine Corps employs tanks throughout the range of military operationsand focuses on preparing, planning, and conducting MAGTF operations with tanks.

MCWP 3-12 supersedes Fleet Marine Force Manual 9-1, Tank Employment/Counter-mechanized Operations, dated 1982.

BY DIRECTION OF THE COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS

J. N. MATTISLieutenant General, U.S. Marine Corps

Commanding GeneralMarine Corps Combat Development Command

Publication Control Number: 143 000145 00

Distribution Statement A: Approved for public release, distribution unlimited.

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MARINE CORPS TANK EMPLOYMENT

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter 1. Overview

Mission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-1Employment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-1

Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-1Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-2

Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-4Battalion Commander. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-4Executive Officer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-4S-1 (Adjutant) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-4S-2 (Intelligence) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-5S-3 (Operations) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-5Fire Support Coordinator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-5Air Officer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-5NBC Officer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-5S-4 (Logistics) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-6Motor Transport Officer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-6Maintenance Management Officer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-6S-6 (Communications and Electronics) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-6

Unit Command and Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-6Command Echelons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-7Combat Operations Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-8Tank Battalion Fire Support Coordination Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-9

Command Relationships. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-11

Chapter 2. Offensive Operations

Section I. Types of Offensive Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-1

Movement to Contact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-1Advance Guard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-1Flank and Rear Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-2Main Body . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-2Actions with Contact Imminent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-3Actions After Contact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-3Meeting Engagement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-4

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Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-4Spoiling Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-4Counterattack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-5Feint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-5Demonstration. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-6Reconnaissance in Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-6Raid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-6

Exploitation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-6Pursuit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-7

Direct Pressure Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-8Encircling Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-8

Section II. Tank Unit Formations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-8

Column . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-9Wedge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-10Vee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-10Line . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-10Echelon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-11Coil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-11Frontal Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-12Envelopment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-12Penetration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-13Turning Movement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-13Infiltration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-13

Chapter 3. Defensive Operations

Organization of the Battlespace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-1Security Area. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-1Main Battle Area. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-2Rear Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-2

Organization of the Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-2Security Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-2Main Battle Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-4Rear Area Forces. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-5

Preparing for the Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-5Deliberate Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-5Hasty Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-5Use of the Reserve in the Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-5

Types of Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-6Position Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-6Mobile Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-6

Defensive Maneuver . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-6Sectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-7Battle Position . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-7Strongpoints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-7Alternate and Supplementary Positions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-7

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Engagement Areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-8Identify Likely Enemy Avenues of Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-9Determine Likely Enemy Schemes of Maneuver. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-9Determine Where to Kill the Enemy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-9Plan and Integrate Obstacles to Support

Mechanized Unit Weapons Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-9Emplace Weapons Systems for Maximum Effect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-9Plan and Integrate Available Indirect Fires . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-10Plan and Integrate Available CAS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-10Rehearse the Execution of Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-10

Chapter 4. Employment with Infantry

Task Organization. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-1Mechanized Task Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-2Company Team. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-2

Coordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-2Mutual Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-2Employment Methods. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-3

Tanks and Mechanized Infantry Attack Together . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-3Tanks and AAVs Support by Fire Only . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-4Multiaxis Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-5

Mechanized Movement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-5Maneuver Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-5Dismounting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-5

Dismount Short of the Objective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-6Dismount on the Objective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-6Dismount After Passing Through the Objective. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-7

Base of Fire and Maneuver Elements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-7Assault on the Objective. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-8

Mounted Assault. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-8Dismounted Assault . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-8

Consolidation and Reorganization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-9Transporting Infantry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-9

Chapter 5. Other Tactical Operations

Section I. Security Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-1

Covering Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-2Offensive Cover . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-2Defensive Cover . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-3

Guard Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-3Advance Guard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-4Flank Guard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-4Rear Guard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-5

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Screening Force. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-5Stationary Screen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-5Moving Screen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-6Screening Operations During Limited Visibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-6Integration of Intelligence Systems. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-6

Section II. Retrograde Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-7

Delay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-7Techniques of Delay Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-7Organization of Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-8Execution of the Delay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-8Rear Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-9Concluding the Delay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-9

Withdrawal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-9Types of Withdrawals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-10Organization of Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-11

Retirement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-12

Section III. Reconnaissance Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-13

Route Reconnaissance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-13Zone Reconnaissance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-13Area Reconnaissance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-13Force-Oriented Reconnaissance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-13Reconnaissance in Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-13

Section IV. River Crossing Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-14

Hasty River Crossing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-14Deliberate River Crossing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-14Retrograde River Crossing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-14

Section V. Linkup Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-15

Linkup When One Unit is Stationary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-15Linkup Between Two Moving Units . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-15

Section VI. Passage of Lines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-16

Section VII. Relief in Place . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-16

Section VIII. Breakout From Encirclement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-17

Organization of Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-17Rupture Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-17Reserve Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-18Main Body. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-18Rear Guard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-18Diversionary or Supporting Force. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-18Conduct of the Breakout . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-19

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Exfiltration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-20Attacking Deeper . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-20

Section IX. Road March and Assembly Areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-21

Tactical Road March. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-21Assembly Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-21

Chapter 6. Tactical Logistics

Trains . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-1Combat Trains . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-2Field Trains. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-2

Organic Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-2Identify Critical Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-2Enhance Organic Capability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-3Safeguard Resources. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-3

Outside Agency Support. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-3Prioritize Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-3Rapid Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-3Redundant Requests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-3Collocation of Key Personnel. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-3

Logistic Responsibilities of Tank Battalion Personnel. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-4Battalion S-4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-4Battalion S-4 Assistant (S-4A) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-4Headquarters and Service Company Commander . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-4Motor Transport Officer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-4Battalion Maintenance Platoon Commander . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-4Tank Maintenance Officer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-5Battalion Supply Officer. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-5Battalion Maintenance Management Officer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-5Battalion Motor Transport Officer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-5Battalion Communications Maintenance Officer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-5Battalion S-4 Chief . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-5Headquarters and Service Company Gunnery Sergeant. . . . . . . . . . . . 6-5Company Maintenance Chief . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-5Tank Leader . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-5Company Supply Sergeant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-5

Resupply Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-6Prepositioning. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-6Routine Resupply . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-6Emergency Resupply . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-6Techniques of Resupply . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-7

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Maintenance Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-10Unit Maintenance—Operator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-10Unit Maintenance—Organizational . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-10CSSG Maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-10Evacuation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-11Destruction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-11

M1A1 Logistic Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-11Fuel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-11Additional POL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-12Ammunition Resupply . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-12

Chapter 7. Amphibious Operations

Staff Planning Considerations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-1Embarkation Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-1Landing Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-1Intelligence Requirements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-1

Embarkation/Debarkation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-2Environmental Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-2Equipment Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-3Planning Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-3Responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-3Operational Checks and Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-4

Chapter 8. Military Operations Other Than War

Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-1Tempo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-2Rules of Engagement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-2Force Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-3Public Affairs and the Media . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-3

Noncombatant Evacuation Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-3Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-3Clearing of Evacuation Routes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-3

Foreign Humanitarian Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-4Convoy Security Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-4

Command and Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-4Tactical Disposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-4Escort Missions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-4Large-scale Escort Missions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-4

Mounted Patrols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-6Checkpoints. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-6Reaction Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-6

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Chapter 9. Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain

Tank Units and the Infantry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-1Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-2Employment Considerations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-3Control Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-4

Boundaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-5Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-5Frontages, Formations, and Zones of Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-5Phase Lines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-5Checkpoints and Contact Points . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-5

Offensive MOUT Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-5Attacking in Urban Areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-5Attack Phases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-8

Defensive MOUT Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-10Defensive Techniques. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-11Fighting Positions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-11

Chapter 10. Scout and TOW Platoons

Scout Platoon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-1Mission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-1Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-1Employment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-1Capabilities and Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-2

TOW Platoon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-3Mission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-3Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-3Employment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-3Capabilities and Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-3

Appendices

A. Armor Vehicle Characteristics. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-1B. Operations in Extreme Environments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-1C. NBC Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C-1D. Ammunition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . D-1E. Breaching Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . E-1F. Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F-1G. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-1

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Tables

6-1. POL Capacity for a Single M1A1 Tank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-126-2. Arming Capacity for M1A1 Tank Units . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-12C-1. Decontamination Levels/Techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C-3

Figures

1-1. Marine Tank Battalion Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-42-1. Tank Battalion in Column Formation with

Dispersal for Added Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-92-2. Tank Battalion in Wedge Formation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-102-3. Tank Battalion in Vee Formation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-102-4. Tank Battalion in Line Formation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-112-5. Tank Battalion in Echelon Right Formation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-112-6. Coil Formation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-123-1. Organization of the Battlespace. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-13-2. Organization of the Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-23-3. Correct Hull-defilade and Turret-defilade

Defensive Tank Positions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-83-4. Example of Tank Company Engagement Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-114-1. Notional Positions for Infantry Riding on a Tank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-106-1. Tailgate Resupply Technique . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-76-2. Service Station Resupply Technique . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-86-3. Combination of Resupply Techniques. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-97-1. M1A1 Tank with Fording Kit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-28-1. Tanks Performing Forward Security for a Convoy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-58-2. Tanks Performing Flank Security for a Convoy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-59-1. Tank Cannon Dead Space at Street Level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-49-2. Tank Cannon Dead Space Above Street Level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-69-3. M1A1s Advancing with Infantry. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-109-4. Hull-Down Position . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-119-5. Hide Position . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-1210-1. Scout Platoon Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-110-2. TOW Platoon Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-3A-1. M1A1 Tank. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-2A-2. M88A2 Recovery Vehicle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-5A-3. AVLB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-8D-1. Example of 120mm Main Gun Ammunition Markings . . . . . . . . . . . . D-1D-2. M829A1/M829A2 APFSDS-T (120mm) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . D-3D-3. M829 APFSDS-T (120mm) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . D-4D-4. M830 HEAT-MP-T (120mm) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . D-5D-5. M830A1 HEAT-MP-T (120mm) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . D-6D-6. Link Belts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . D-7D-7. Ammunition Color Code/NATO Marking Chart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . D-7

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Figures (Continued)

D-8. L8A1 and L8A3 Smoke Grenade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . D-8D-9. M76 Smoke Grenade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . D-9D-10. M82 Smoke Grenade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . D-10D-11. XM908 HE-OR-T (120mm). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . D-11E-1. Plow Tanks Create Multiple Lanes While

the Section Leaders’ Tanks Provide Overwatch. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . E-6E-2. Plow Tanks use Staggered Movement to

Create a Wider Lane . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . E-7E-3. Track Width Mine Plow for M1Al . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . E-8

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CHAPTER 1OVERVIEW

The success of amphibious operations and subse-quent operations ashore require the coordinatedemployment of all Marine air-ground task force(MAGTF) resources: reconnaissance, infantry, avi-ation, tanks, artillery, engineers, amphibious as-sault vehicles (AAVs) and other combat supportand combat service support (CSS) units. Through-out the full range of military operations, all ele-ments of the MAGTF are employed to achieve theeffects of combined arms against enemy forces.Tank units provide the MAGTF commander theability to attack, disrupt, and destroy enemy forcesthrough firepower, shock effect, and maneuver incoordination with other elements of the MAGTF.The M1A1 tank offers the MAGTF a vast array ofcapabilities—excellent cross-country mobility, so-phisticated communications, enhanced day andnight target acquisition, lethal firepower to defeatmost enemy mechanized platforms, highly effec-tive armor protection—and all of its capabilitiesare interrelated.

Mission

The tank is designed primarily as an offensiveweapon, regardless of the type of operation (defen-sive or offensive) conducted. Tank units, as maneu-ver elements, are employed throughout the fullrange of military operations. Therefore, the tankbattalion’s mission is to close with and destroy theenemy by using armor-protected firepower, shockeffect, and maneuver and to provide antimecha-nized fire in support of the Marine division.

Employment

The tank battalion is best employed as a maneuverelement without detaching units. However, the

ground combat element (GCE) commander maycreate mechanized forces by task-organizing tank,mechanized infantry, and other combat supportand CSS units based on mission, enemy, terrainand weather, troops and support available—timeavailable (METT-T). Employment of the tank bat-talion must take advantage of the speed, mobility,and firepower of the organization.

To win in battle, leaders must have a clear under-standing of the capabilities and limitations oftheir equipment in order to employ them effec-tively. Appendix A provides a list of the specifi-cations, characteristics, and significant features ofthe M1A1 main battle tank and its supportingequipment and assists the Marine tanker and theMAGTF commander (with an attachment oftanks) in evaluating transportability, sustain-ment, and mobility considerations.

In extreme environments, tanks have their ownunique set of employment capabilities and limita-tions. A detailed discussion of operating tanks inextreme environments can be found in appendix B.

Capabilities

Tanks provide five major capabilities to the MAGTF:armor-protected firepower, mobility, shock effect,extensive communications, and flexibility.

Armor-Protected FirepowerThe tank is an integrated weapons system capableof defeating most targets on the battlefield. Theamount and type of ammunition carried aboard theM1A1 tank allows it to engage a wide variety oftargets for sustained periods of combat. The M1A1tank’s 120mm main gun is a high velocity, directfire weapon used primarily against enemy tanksand hard targets. Along with the main gun, theM1A1 tank has one heavy machine gun (.50 cal)

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and two medium machine guns (7.62mm). Thecoaxial-mounted 7.62 machine gun is integratedinto the tanks target acquisition system, which pro-vides for extremely accurate small-arms fire.

The M1A1’s armor affords protection to the tank,including its crew, from the effects of small-armsfire, shell fragments, and some direct hitsdepending on the type and range of the enemyweapon. Its armor also allows the tank to closewith the enemy and maneuver while under eitherenemy fire or friendly close supporting fires witha degree of survivability that other weapons sys-tems do not possess. The M1A1 tank also pro-vides a significant degree of protection for thecrew while operating in an environment contami-nated with chemical weapons.

MobilityTank units are capable of conducting mobileground combat over a broad area of operationsbecause they can remain dispersed, yet they canmass quickly for employment at a decisive timeand place. Tanks, by virtue of their full track andglobal positioning systems, possess a high degreeof cross-country mobility that allows them todeliver firepower against several enemy loca-tions within a short period of time. Tanks canalso quickly mass the effects of their weapon sys-tems while remaining physically dispersed inorder to limit effective enemy counteraction.

Shock EffectThe shock effect on the enemy that tank units cancreate is both physical and psychological. Shockeffect, if properly executed, can also have afavorable effect on friendly morale. Addition-ally, shock effect increases in proportion to thenumber of tanks employed. To exploit a tank’sshock effect, aggressive employment of the com-bined-arms team is essential.

Extensive CommunicationsThe radio is the primary means of communica-tions for tank units. Each M1A1 tank is capable

of transmitting/receiving on one frequency whilesimultaneously receiving on another frequency.The use of visual signals and the single-channelground and airborne radio system (SINCGARS)facilitates rapid and secure communication oforders and instructions.

FlexibilityTank units are capable of responding rapidly tothe everchanging environment of the battlefield.Units engaged with the enemy have the flexibil-ity, with the proper use of supporting arms, todisengage and receive a new mission. Therefore,tanks can group, disperse, and quickly regroupagain in response to changing tactical situations.

Limitations

A clear understanding of a tank’s employmentlimitations enables commanders to both planeffectively and fully exploit the capabilities oftank units. Limitations fall into three general cat-egories: inherent vehicle characteristics, existingobstacles, and reinforcing obstacles.

SizeThe size of a tank makes it difficult to conceal insome terrain. This limitation can be overcome bypositioning tanks in areas that minimize theirexposure to enemy observation until they areready to be employed.

WeightA tank’s weight prevents use of low capacitybridges and requires the use of special equipmentand techniques for recovery of immobilized vehi-cles. Planning for the necessary support, as wellas the careful selection of routes and areas ofoperation, reduces this limitation. Appendix Acontains M1A1 weight specifications.

NoiseThe noise created from the operation of a tankwarns of their presence. Surprise, however, may

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be achieved by moving tanks forward just prior totheir commitment and by advancing rapidlyunder the cover of supporting arms.

VisibilityTank crews enhance visibility with visiondevices; however, peripheral vision is still lim-ited. Therefore, unless a crewmember observesthe sector in which hostile actions occur, theaction may go unseen. When operating in closeterrain, the tank is susceptible to ambush. It isalso vulnerable to mechanical damage caused byterrain (e.g., brush covered gullies) or obstaclesthat are hidden from view (e.g., concealed tankditch). Conducting a detailed terrain analysis canreduce, but may not eliminate, these limitations.Infantry should accompany a tank operating inclose or broken terrain and provide visual assis-tance in order to protect the tank from ambush.

Fuel ConsumptionA tank’s fuel consumption is high in comparisonto a wheeled vehicle. The M1A1 tank crew canuse the on board external auxiliary power unitduring operational pauses to reduce the amountof fuel consumed. Careful planning and a coordi-nated logistic effort are required to ensure thattanks fuel requirements do not impose a logisticburden. Specifications for the refueling require-ments of the M1A1 tank units can be found inchapter 6.

MaintenanceA tank’s complexity requires dedicated mainte-nance time. Tank vehicle crews accomplish pre-ventive maintenance during halts, rest periods,and periods of resupply without interrupting sup-port functions. However, systematic relief ofindividual tanks or tank units is required to per-mit thorough maintenance. Failure of command-ers to recognize or plan for this relief results inunnecessary and excessive tank nonavailabilitydue to mechanical failure.

CommunicationsThe heavy reliance upon radio communicationsfor command, control, and coordination of a tankunit makes it vulnerable to enemy electronic war-fare and/or signals intelligence efforts. The tankunit commander and tank crew must be able tooperate in a hostile electronic warfare environ-ment and employ communications security pro-cedures to overcome this limitation.

Existing ObstaclesOf all the limiting factors that inhibit tank vehicleoperations, none has a more decisive effect thanterrain. The type of terrain may dictate the numberof tanks that can be employed, but it will seldomprohibit their employment entirely. The full strik-ing power of a tank is best achieved over rollingterrain that permits massing and exploitation oftheir cross-country mobility. Nevertheless,between the extremes of terrain—rolling terrain asopposed to impassable terrain—there is consider-able ground that can still be negotiated by tanks.

In addition to obstacles created by terrain,extremes in weather can also create obstacles andreduce the efficiency of tank crews. For exam-ple, tanks may have little difficulty in snow lessthan 24-inches deep, but they tend to skid or slideoff of embankments and are unable to negotiateslopes when the snow becomes packed or icy.Heavy rainfall usually reduces the trafficability ofan area and therefore imposes restrictions on tankmovements. The limiting effects of terrain andweather can be reduced by prior reconnaissanceof tank routes, proper planning, and by providingfor the reduction of existing obstacles that cannotbe bypassed.

Reinforcing ObstaclesIn past operations, the most effective reinforcingobstacle, and the one most frequently employed,was the antitank minefield. Mines, whetherarranged as a barrier or planted at random, can

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temporarily stop the forward movement of tanks.Other reinforcing obstacles that are frequentlyencountered and tend to restrict the movement oftanks are tank ditches, tank traps, and roadblocks.Many of these obstacles are temporary deterrentsthat can be overcome by proper employment oforganic weapons, equipment, and personnel. Nor-mally, engineers can reduce difficult obstacles ifgiven adequate time and resources.

Organization

A typical tank battalion consists of four tankcompanies, a headquarters and service company(H&S Co), one antitank (tube-launched, opti-cally tracked, wire-command link guided missile[TOW]) platoon, and one scout platoon (see fig.1-1). The tank companies are the basic tacticalunit with which the battalion accomplishes itsmission. The antitank platoon provides antimech-anized support to the battalion. The battalionscout platoon performs reconnaissance, provideslimited security, and assists in controlling move-ment of the battalion. Each tank battalion has 58M1A1 tanks, 26 TOW weapons systems, 4armored vehicle-launched bridges (AVLBs) with8 bridges, and 6 M88A1 tank recovery vehicles.

Battalion Commander

The battalion commander has overall responsibil-ity for the tank battalion. During operations, the

tank battalion commander positions himselfwhere he can best control the battle: he maychoose to be in the battalion combat operationscenter (COC) or he may deploy aboard the tankin order to move about the battlefield.

Executive Officer

The tank battalion’s executive officer is second incommand and must be prepared to assume theduties of the commander. He is the commander’sprincipal staff assistant and advisor and directs,coordinates, and supervises the activities of thestaff. The executive officer keeps the com-mander informed of current and developing situa-tions, issues instructions to the staff to implementthe commander’s decisions, studies all situationsto ensure preparedness for future operations, andrepresents the commander when authorized. Dur-ing operations, the executive officer is normallylocated in the main echelon, but may also bepositioned by the commander if the situation dic-tates. Typically, either the commander or theexecutive officer is present in the planning sec-tion at all times unless the executive officer isplaced in command of a force organized for aspecific mission or task. During displacement ofthe main echelon, the executive officer normallymoves with and oversees the displacement to thenext location unless the commander is present.However, if the commander is present, the execu-tive officer may move with the last element todisplace in order to supervise the overall effort.

S-1 (Adjutant)

The tank battalion’s S-1 is the principal staffofficer in matters pertaining to personnel man-agement and administration. He monitors theadministrative chain from subordinate units tohigher headquarters and keeps the commanderabreast of the personnel situation within the unit.The S-1 also recommends personnel policy andassists the commander in handling personnel andmorale factors that influence the combat effec-tiveness of the unit, including supervision of legal

Scout HQ

Figure 1-1. Marine TankBattalion Organization.

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matters and disciplinary action. During opera-tions, the S-1 is normally located within the com-bat field trains and may also have the additionalduty of graves registration officer.

S-2 (Intelligence)

The tank battalion’s S-2 is the commander’sintelligence assistant for the planning and super-vision of command intelligence functions. Hemakes recommendations for the assignment ofintelligence resources and the management andcoordination of intelligence means and activitiesof other elements of the command. The S-2 isresponsible for the production and disseminationof intelligence, counterintelligence, graphic intel-ligence aids, and intelligence training. Duringoperations, the S-2 is usually in the main echelonCOC and must be knowledgeable of enemymechanized and antiarmor capabilities and workclosely with the S-3 in operational planning.

S-3 (Operations)

The tank battalion’s S-3 is responsible for matterspertaining to the battalion’s organization, training,and tactical operations. He is responsible for plan-ning, coordinating, and supervising the tacticalemployment of units; integrating fires and maneu-ver; planning and supervising civil-military opera-tions; and determining priorities for allocation ofpersonnel, weapons, equipment, and ammunition.Within the operations section are staff assistantsdedicated to aviation and to nuclear, biological,and chemical (NBC) warfare defense and training.Tank battalion S-3s are usually one of the mostexperienced tank officers on the battalion staff andmust be very familiar with all aspects of mecha-nized operations. Therefore, during operations, theS-3 is located in the main echelon COC and worksclosely with the S-4 to ensure that the tactical planis logistically feasible.

Fire Support Coordinator

Within a tank battalion’s table of organization (T/O),an artillery officer is assigned and designated as the

fire support coordinator (FSC). The FSC is responsi-ble for developing fire support plans that support theunit’s scheme of maneuver and for making recom-mendations for priority of fire support to subordi-nate units. During operations, the FSC works closelywith the S-3 and is usually located in the main eche-lon COC.

Air Officer

The air officer is the subject matter expert onmatters pertaining to aviation. He is a naval avia-tor or naval flight officer and is under the staffcognizance of the S-3. The air officer is theofficer responsible for coordinating tactical airassets and operations (e.g., close air support[CAS]) and acts as the point of contact for thetwo forward air controllers (FACs) assigned tothe battalion. During the planning process, the airofficer provides input on aviation capabilities andavailability as they affect courses of action(COAs) and schemes of maneuver. The airofficer has the staff responsibility for coordina-tion of aviation support in the battalion’s fire sup-port coordination center (FSCC). The tankbattalion’s air officer must understand mecha-nized operations and the rapid and fluid nature ofthose operations. During operations, the airofficer is usually in the main echelon COC.

NBC Officer

The NBC officer is responsible for preparingplans, annexes, and unit standing operating pro-cedures (SOPs) on NBC defense. He developsand monitors NBC defense training of the unitand supervises and coordinates operational andtechnical activities essential to NBC early warn-ing and defense. The NBC officer is under thecognizance of the S-3. During operations, theNBC officer is usually in the field train but hisposition depends on the nature of the NBC threat/situation. If the battalion must conduct decontam-ination procedures, the NBC officer will overseethose procedures. Decontamination procedurescan be found in appendix C.

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S-4 (Logistics)

The tank battalion’s S-4 determines logistic andCSS requirements. He coordinates requirementsfor supply, transportation, health services, main-tenance, and food services with higher headquar-ters. The S-4 makes recommendations for theallocation of logistic assets, prepares computa-tion of detailed requirements for logistic support,and assists in the development of plans andorders. Within the logistic section are staff assis-tants for embarkation, supply, motor transport,and maintenance management. A detailed discus-sion regarding the personnel resident within thebattalion S-4 shop is included in chapter 6.

The S-4 constantly monitors responsiveness ofsupport. Therefore during operations, the S-4 isusually located in the field trains to ensure thatthe tank battalion is properly supported. How-ever, geographic separation of units during battal-ion operations may require the S-4 to movethroughout the area of operations to ensure thatsupport is being maintained.

Motor Transport Officer

The tank motor transport officer (MTO) isresponsible for matters concerning control oftransportation and normally operates under thestaff cognizance of the S-4. During operations,the MTO is usually located in the field trains. Thetank battalion MTO is critical to proper logisticsupport and must be familiar with the demandsplaced on equipment during tank operationsbecause he controls one of the largest motortransport units within the Marine division.

Maintenance Management Officer

Tank battalion maintenance management officer(MMO) has one of the largest units to maintainwithin the Marine division. The tank MMO isresponsible to the commander, through the S-4,for the coordination and integration of all com-mand maintenance efforts. The MMO’s dutiesinvolve the management and coordination of the

eight maintenance management functional areas.These functional areas are maintenance adminis-tration, personnel and training, records andreports, publications control, equipment availabil-ity, preventive maintenance checks and servicesand corrective maintenance, supply support, andmaintenance-related programs. In order to con-duct sustained mechanized operations in austereenvironments, the MMO’s maintenance plan iscritical. During operations, the MMO is usuallylocated with the field trains.

S-6 (Communications and Electronics)

The tank S-6 is responsible for the planning andsupervision of the installation, operation, andmaintenance of communications systems; dis-seminating communications-electronics operat-ing instructions; and managing the cryptographicmaterial systems. The S-6 coordinates with theS-3 to ensure that communications planning andtraining are compatible with the overall plan. Herecommends, in coordination with the S-3 andH&S Co, the location of key installations. Toimprove communication, the S-3 coordinateswith the higher headquarters and communica-tions officers of reinforcing, adjacent, and sup-porting/supported units. During operations, thetank battalion communications officer has a dif-ficult job because of the separation of units. Thedistance and terrain often require the communi-cations plan to have relay points/redundant com-munications to provide effective command andcontrol (C2). In addition, the large number ofradios and specialized communications equip-ment requires a tank battalion communicationsofficer to have an effective preventative mainte-nance and training program.

Unit Command and Control

To be successful, the mechanized commandermust see the battlefield and respond quickly,this can be achieved through an effective andresponsive C2 system. However, the relatively

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large size, dispersion, and mobility of mecha-nized forces can pose C2 challenges for thecommander. Key variables that determine howthe C2 system organizes and functions includeechelons of command, desires of the com-mander, and METT-T.

In order to see the battlefield, the commander posi-tions himself wherever he can best influence thebattle and gain as much situational awareness aspossible while still being able to exercise com-mand and control. During operations, the com-mander normally moves forward in order toobserve and influence the course of the battle. Dur-ing mechanized operations, the commander andhis command group must be mounted in vehiclesin order to keep up with maneuver elements.

Command Echelons

The commander establishes command echelonsto assist him in the continuous collection, pro-cessing, and dissemination of combat informa-tion and orders. Control of the battle is focusedthrough only one command echelon at a time.Command echelons must have the requisitemobility to locate where the commander wishesand should be as mobile as the rest of the unit.The echelon in which the unit or subordinatecommander is located or from which the com-mander operates is called a command post.Depending on the situation, the commander mayestablish as many as three command echelons:the tactical echelon, the main echelon, and therear echelon. Command echelons may also besplit into increments to facilitate displacementand survivability.

Tactical EchelonThe commander normally collocates with themain effort during critical events and focuses onthe current operations of committed forces.Therefore, the tactical echelon provides the com-mander freedom of movement and the informa-tion required to maintain situational awareness.The tank battalion’s table of equipment includes

a section of tanks that enable the commander toestablish the battalion’s tactical command post ortactical air coordinator (airborne) command post.These tanks allow the commander to positionhimself forward, stay mobile, and maintain thecommunications and situational awareness neces-sary to command and control his unit. His surviv-ability is directly related to their armor protectionand capability to rapidly displace.

Main EchelonThe main echelon is designed, manned, andequipped to direct the actions of all organic,attached, and supporting units. The main echelonis responsible for monitoring and directing cur-rent operations and planning future operations.The main echelon includes a COC (see the Com-bat Operations Center paragraph on page 1-8 formore information on the COC).

When the commander is located forward of themain echelon during combat, he monitors com-munications between the COC and higher andsubordinate units. He also might designate anindividual, normally the executive officer or S-3,to act in his behalf in the event that communica-tions with the COC are lost.

Rear EchelonThe principal function of the rear echelon is tosupport combat operations by providing com-mand and control of rear area operations. The S-1and S-4 are normally located in the rear echelon.The rear echelon must be capable of monitoringthe activities of the forward units and the othertwo echelons. Normally, the rear echelon is collo-cated with, or sited near, CSS units to facilitatelogistical efforts.

IncrementsIf a command element is split into increments,the commander organizes both increments withnearly identical structure. Typically, these incre-ments are referred to as alpha and bravo. Thealpha increment is usually composed of the S-2,

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S-3, FSC, and principal fire support liaison offic-ers. Normally, the primary function of the alphacommand element is to command and control theoperation that is underway. The bravo incrementis usually composed of the assistants for each ofthe functional areas: S-2A, S-3A, assistant FSC,etc. The bravo command element monitors thecurrent tactical situation and is immediately pre-pared to assume control in the event that thealpha command element becomes disabled or ifoperations become protracted. The bravo com-mand may also be tasked to conduct future plans,maintain records, and submit reports. If the forceis extended, the bravo command element may beused as a relay to higher and supporting units.The alpha and bravo command elements may beconsolidated when required by the tactical situa-tion. Consolidation allows full utilization of theentire staff for planning and the establishment ofa single watch section and provides more time torest personnel.

Combat Operations Center

The COC is the primary operational agencyrequired to control the tactical operations of acommand that employs ground and aviation com-bat, combat support, and CSS elements, or por-tions thereof. A COC is a unit headquarters wherethe commander and the staff perform their activi-ties. The COC continually monitors, records, andsupervises operations and includes all personneland communications required to perform its mis-sion. The COC also includes the FSCC.

Most units have established SOPs for COC opera-tions. Well-developed SOPs and repeated rehears-als for passing command and control betweenincrements are vital to success. When task-orga-nized as a mechanized force, these procedures mayhave to be modified to maintain the ability to eche-lon the command element, maintain a high degreeof COC mobility, and to make rapid decisionsrequired in mechanized operations.

Typically, the tank battalion COC is comprised ofan assault amphibian vehicle command model 7(AAVC7) and an assault amphibian vehicle per-sonnel model 7 (AAVP7) chase vehicle. Thelack of space in these vehicles limits the numberof personnel that can be carried on board. Thisarrangement often requires staff members andcommanders to personally monitor radios inorder to facilitate rapid decisionmaking. All staffofficers operating inside the AAVC7 must main-tain a high level of situational awareness. Stan-dard message form usage within the commandvehicle is imperative when the primary officersare operating on a number of radio nets. Occa-sionally, staff members should conduct a briefstaff meeting to coordinate efforts.

The high speed, high stress, and continuous natureof mechanized operations can create a great deal ofphysical and mental fatigue. To provide rest andallow for continuous operations, personnel assignedto the COC should be organized into work shifts.

The AAVC7 has map boards mounted in front ofthe staff stations that can be removed andmounted on the outside of the vehicle for brief-ings. Ideally, S-2, S-3, and FSC maps/chartsshould be in close proximity to allow the com-mander and principal staff officers to view thisinformation at one time and from a general loca-tion. However, consideration must be given to asystem of maintaining and changing graphicswhile the vehicles are on the move.

AAVC7 can have communication problems. Manyof these problems are caused by tank units operatingat vast distances from one another, engine noisewhen moving, located in a poor position for com-munications, and poor preventive maintenance.Some of the following considerations may alleviatethese problems:

Utilize communications personnel to positionbackup radios so they do not interfere with othervehicle radios. Do not operate strap-on radiosunless the primary radio is not functional.

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When moving and engine noise interferes withan important transmission, conduct a hasty andtemporary halt. Sometimes reducing the speedof movement will improve the transmission.Communications requirements should be con-sidered when selecting a position for a tempo-rary or extended halt. If communications ispoor, often moving to another position willgreatly improve communications.Occasionally, in the fast-paced nature of amechanized operation, time is not allowed forpreventive maintenance. During extended halts,backup radios may be used while preventivemaintenance is conducted on vehicle radios.Backup handsets and headsets should be main-tained in each command vehicle.

During a mechanized operation there are tempo-rary halts and extended halts. Temporary halts arerelatively short term and staff personnel operateoutside of the vehicle. During extended halts,chase vehicles move forward and personnel inthose vehicles are employed in the COC. Consid-eration should be given to notifying subordinateunits and all vehicles in the command group ofthe anticipated duration of the halt, which allowsthe staff to begin preparations for the COC stop-ping and becoming static.

Consideration should also be given to creatingSOPs for immediate emplacement and displace-ment. These procedures might include designatedteams that camouflage the vehicles, establish secu-rity, lay wire, remote antennas, and configure theCOC for stationary operation. These and other pro-cedures for emplacement and displacement shouldbe trained and executed as drills.

Procedures that might be included in operationsfrom a static position include the following:

Establish a standard configuration of the COC.Establish standard watch sections.Establish standard locations for resting. Adesignated sleeping position for each member

of the command groups will simplify finding aneeded member of the group in a hurry orduring periods of darkness.Establish a method of providing power to thevehicle radios. The AAVC7’s radios can operateoff the vehicle’s batteries; however, they must berecharged periodically. There will be a brief dis-ruption of all radios when the engine is started.The engine should not be started without theapproval of the watch officer. While the engine isrunning, noise may become a problem. Anothermethod is to slave another vehicle to the AAVC7to provide the required power. Any vehicle with aNorth Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) slaveadapter may provide the required power.Establish standardized force resupply systemfor the command group.

Tank Battalion FireSupport Coordination Center

The tank battalion FSCC is organized similarly tothat of an infantry battalion. The tank battalionFSCC normally consists of an air officer, an artil-lery officer FSC, and the battalion S-3. While thebattalion FSCC is built around this nucleus, the firesupport coordination cell is augmented with per-sonnel and equipment appropriate to the fire sup-port coordination functions to be conducted.Augmentation sources may include Marine Corpsand external sources; for example, watchstandersmay require individuals with specific skills such aselectronic warfare, unmanned aerial vehicles, airdefense, or proficiency in fire support coordination.

During an operation, FSCC staff members arerequired to plan fires, conduct targeting, and inte-grate fires simultaneously with maneuver ele-ments. The FSCC’s coordinating responsibilitiesinclude the requirement to disseminate timely firesupport information; to institute coordination mea-sures as required; and to integrate fire supportactivities that affect two or more fire support agen-cies, subordinate elements, or adjacent units.

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Fire Support CoordinatorThe FSC in a tank battalion is normally an artil-lery captain by T/O. His responsibilities include—

Supervising the operation of the FSCC, includ-ing organizing and training personnel.Advising the battalion commander on all firesupport matters.Developing the fire support plan based on thescheme of maneuver, the intelligence estimate,requests from subordinate units, and the firesupport available.Coordinating all fire support within the battal-ion zone of action.Processing of target information, including theshelling report.Ensuring the safety of friendly troops from ourown fire support.

Air OfficerThe air officer is a pilot or naval flight officer andis normally a captain by T/O. His responsibilitiesinclude—

Advising the battalion commander/FSC on allair support matters.Developing the air fire plan based on thescheme of maneuver, the intelligence estimate,assets available, and coordination with the FSC.Submitting air requests.Coordinating the actions of FACs.

Artillery Liaison OfficerThe artillery liaison officer is normally a lieuten-ant provided by a direct support artillery battal-ion. His responsibilities include—

Advising the battalion commander/FSC on allartillery support matters.Developing the artillery fire plan based on thescheme of maneuver, the intelligence estimate,assets available, and coordination with the FSC.

Passing requirements for support to the appro-priate artillery fire direction center for action.Coordinating artillery unit requirements withthe battalion commander/FSC.Coordinating the actions of the artillery for-ward observers.

Mortar Liaison Noncommissioned OfficerThe mortar liaison noncommissioned officer isnormally a sergeant provided by the weaponscompany of an infantry battalion if that unit istasked to support a tank battalion. He is typi-cally accompanied by two mortar forwardobservers who will travel with the tank compa-nies. His responsibilities include—

Advising the battalion commander/FSC on allmortar employment issues.Developing the mortar fire plan based on thescheme of maneuver, the intelligence estimate,assets available, and coordination with the FSC.Coordinating the actions of the mortar forwardobservers.Coordinating mortar platoon requirements withthe battalion commander/FSC.

Naval Gunfire Liaison OfficerThe naval gunfire liaison officer is normally aNavy lieutenant provided by the direct supportartillery battalion. His responsibilities include—

Advising the battalion commander/FSC on allnaval gunfire support matters.Developing the naval gunfire support planbased on the scheme of maneuver, the intelli-gence estimate, assets available, and coordina-tion with the FSC.Assisting in calling for naval gunfire support. Coordinating the actions of the naval gunfirespot team. Passing requirements for support to the appro-priate naval gunfire support ship.

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Target Information OfficerThe target information officer is normally thebattalion S-2 officer. His responsibilities concern-ing target intelligence include—

Disseminating target information and intelli-gence to the FSCC.Advising the battalion commander/FSC onenemy weapons capabilities.Keeping appropriate records of targets.

Command Relationships

Command relationships and levels of authority,although authoritative, must be adapted to meetmission requirements. Commanders must havethe flexibility to establish nonstandard relation-ships when required by the situation. Collec-tively, command relationships and levels ofauthority provide the flexibility necessary toorganize forces to respond to all situations. Com-mand relationships foster understanding and

freedom of action and establish the basis forinteraction among unit commanders.

When a Marine unit is under the command of asenior Marine unit, the subordinate Marine unit iseither organic or attached. (If organic, a unit isassigned to and forms an essential part of a mili-tary organization. If attached, a unit or personnelis temporarily placed in an organization.) When aMarine unit is in a support relationship, one ele-ment or unit of the MAGTF provides a requiredcapability to another element.

Units with tank attachments must be aware of thelogistical and tactical challenges inherent witharmor. Unless the attachment orders qualify thedegree of control involved, attachment of a tank unitto an infantry battalion or regiment implies that theinfantry battalion or regiment assumes full responsi-bility for the tank unit’s logistics, administration,training, and operations—the tank unit is under thecommand of the unit to which it is attached. How-ever, transfer and promotion responsibility nor-mally remain with the command to which the tankunit is organic.

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CHAPTER 2OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

When the MAGTF is involved in offensiveoperations, the main effort is weighted withsuperior combat power. Superior combat powerallows the MAGTF to retain the initiative, setthe tempo of operations, and achieve decisiveresults on the battlefield. Tank units—by theirinherent speed, mobility, armor-protected fire-power, and shock effect—contribute greatly to

the GCE’s combat power while operating in theoffensive. Tank units also provide the GCE withflexibility that allows the commander to rapidlyshift his main effort. The inherent flexibility of atank unit allows the commander to maintain themomentum of attack by quickly focusing thecombat power of the force at various locationson the battlefield.

SECTION I. TYPES OF OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

There are four general types of offensive opera-tions: movement to contact, attack, exploitation,and pursuit. See Marine Corps Warfighting Pub-lication (MCWP) 1-0, Marine Corps Operations,for a detailed discussion of each type of offen-sive operation.

Movement to Contact

A movement to contact develops the situationand establishes or regains contact with theenemy. It is normally employed when the enemysituation is vague or not specific enough to con-duct a deliberate attack. Most mechanized opera-t ions begin with a movement to contact ,regardless of whether or not a deliberate attack isplanned on the final objective. The movement tocontact is characterized by decentralized controland rapid commitment of forces from the march.A movement to contact ends when the com-mander has to deploy the main body to conductan attack or establish a defense.

A tank battalion executing a movement to con-tact mission is normally given a zone of action oran axis of attack and an objective. Inherent toplanning a movement to contact is the assump-tion that enemy contact will be made and actions

on contact must be immediate and successful. Aproperly executed movement to contact allowsthe tank battalion commander to make initial con-tact with minimum forces and to expedite theemployment and concentration of the force.

Key considerations of a movement to contactusing mechanized forces include:

Focusing all efforts on finding and fixing theenemy.Initiating contact with the smallest element.Maintaining freedom of action and executingactions on contact wherever the enemy isencountered.Concentrating the effects of overwhelmingcombat power at the decisive point.

A mechanized force conducting a movement tocontact normally organizes in an approach marchformation with advance, flank, and rear securityelements protecting the main body.

Advance Guard

The advance guard protects its main body againstground observation and surprise from the front. Itprevents premature deployment of the main bodyand provides adequate time and space for themain body to deploy for combat. The advance

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guard destroys the enemy’s security and combatforces and reports and breaches obstacles withinits capability. It may be directed to report andbypass small enemy forces. When the advanceguard comes in contact with a superior enemyforce, it normally attempts to seize key terrainand conduct a hasty defense to facilitate deploy-ment of the main body. It operates within sup-porting range of the main body. The advanceguard prevents unnecessary delay of the mainbody and defers the deployment of the main bodyas long as possible. Reconnaissance elementsnormally operate to the front and flanks of theadvance guard.

A tank or mechanized company usually providesthe advance guard element for a tank or mecha-nized battalion (the main body). As the companymoves along the axis of advance, it usually willhave a 3 to 5 kilometer frontage if unhindered byterrain or obstacles. Advance guard responsibili-ties include—

Providing security and early warning for themain body and facilitating its uninterruptedadvance.Conducting reconnaissance to locate enemyforces along the unit’s axis of advance.Conducting actions on contact to retain free-dom of maneuver for the main body.Calling for indirect fires and/or close air supportto impede or harass the enemy. The advanceguard for a tank battalion usually has a forwardobserver and FAC located with the companycommand to help execute these missions.Destroying enemy reconnaissance units. Tanksare well-suited to destroy enemy mechanizedreconnaissance due to their ability to acquireand kill targets at long ranges and to mass firesquickly (daylight or night).Finding, fixing, defeating, destroying, or con-taining enemy security forces in order to retainfreedom of maneuver for the main body. Atank’s ability to acquire and kill targets at longranges and to mass fires quickly allows it toprotect the main body and suppress the enemy.

Bypassing and reporting obstacles or acting asthe tank or mechanized unit’s support or breachforce during breaching operations.

Flank and Rear Security

When adjacent units do not protect the flanks of acommand it is necessary to provide protection byusing a portion of the force to conduct flank secu-rity. Flank security missions include both guardand screen missions. The purpose of flank secu-rity is to protect the main body from observation,direct fire, and surprise attack. The mission andavailable combat power of the flank security ele-ment depends on METT-T. Flank security ele-ments are subordinate to the main body. Theytravel on routes parallel to the main body, eitherby continuously marching or moving by alternat-ing bounds. Flank security for a tank or mecha-nized unit must be far enough away from themain body to provide early warning and allow themain body freedom of maneuver. However, flanksecurity should remain close enough to the mainbody to be responsive and provide mutual sup-port to the main body.

The rear security element protects the rear of themain body from attack and/or observation. Whenproperly resourced, the rear security element canbe given a screen, guard, or cover mission.

Main Body

Ideally, the main body is unhindered during themovement to contact and is well positioned to con-duct an attack against main enemy forces and seizethe final objective. Elements from the main bodymay be deployed to eliminate small pockets ofresistance bypassed by the advance guard. How-ever, the main body must not be committed piece-meal. Committing tank units piecemeal diminishestheir ability to mass effective fires and provides ashock effect. Tank battalions or mechanized forcesnormally keep the majority of its tanks within themain body and employ the main body to decisivelydefeat the enemy and/or secure the objective.

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Maximum consideration is given to attacks uponthe enemy flanks and rear before the enemy isprepared to counter these envelopments. Attacksby the main body may consist of a coordinatedattack by the entire main body or an attack from amarch column conducted while the remainder ofthe main body deploys. Piecemeal commitment isto be avoided except when rapidity of action isessential due to fleeting windows of opportunityand when local combat superiority can beachieved at a decisive point. Mechanized unitsuse all available supporting arms to suppress theenemy forces in contact, disrupt its attacking for-mations, and neutralize its indirect fire assets.

Actions with Contact Imminent

The enemy situation becomes clearer as theadvance guard conducts actions on contact. Keyactions include developing the situation and refo-cusing reconnaissance, surveillance, and targetacquisition (RSTA) assets. The mechanized forcemust remain flexible enough to rapidly exploitboth intelligence and combat information. AllRSTA assets are focused on determining theenemy’s dispositions and ensuring the commit-ment of friendly forces under optimal conditions.

As contact becomes imminent, advance guardsmove forward on a progressively broader front.Based upon the situation, the advance guardengages in accordance with the commander’s planor seizes terrain essential to the development of itsmain body that affords essential observation.

Actions After Contact

Once contact with a strong enemy is made, mea-sures are taken—hasty attack, hasty defense,report and bypass, delay and withdraw—todevelop the situation and protect the deploymentof the mechanized force. Knowledge of hostiledispositions, particularly enemy flank locations,is important to provide the essential informa-tion upon which the commander can base hisplan of attack. When the security elements of

mechanized forces lack the strength to developthe situation fully, they may be quickly rein-forced by main body elements to obtain ade-quate knowledge of hostile dispositions beforethe coordinated attack is launched.

When strong resistance is met, reconnaissanceunits are quickly withdrawn and replaced or rein-forced by the combat elements of the advanceguard. Reconnaissance units are then employedon the flanks to screen the enemy’s main force,conduct further reconnaissance, or harass the hos-tile flanks and rear. Every effort is made to retainthe initiative and to prevent the enemy from sta-bilizing the situation. Premature deployment ofthe main body is cost ly in terms of t ime,resources, and disclosure of the main effort.

While the main body is deploying for attack, theadvance guard gains contact and continues todevelop the enemy situation. Their mission is todetermine the strength and dispositions of theenemy and the location of his flanks in order toprovide the commander as complete a picture aspossible before conducting an attack.

Hasty AttackThe hasty attack is characterized by rapid recon-naissance to determine the size and location ofthe enemy force to allow a rapid attack of theenemy by available forces.

Hasty DefenseThe hasty defense is characterized by the seizureof key terrain to facilitate the deployment of themain body. The enemy reaction to such actionfrequently indicates both the strength and disposi-tion of the enemy force.

Report and BypassBypass criteria are established by the com-mander and are based on METT-T. Typically,commanders specify bypass criteria based on thesize of the unit.

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DelayUnits conduct delays when forces are insuffi-cient to either attack or defend or when thedesign of the operation dictates maneuvering theenemy into an area for subsequent attack.

WithdrawWithdrawal is normally the last option and onlyoccurs when the enemy has an overwhelmingsuperiority and the survival of the advance guardis at risk. The unit normally withdraws only afterreceiving permission and then only withdrawsback toward the main body.

Meeting Engagement

A movement to contact often results in a meetingengagement. Meeting engagements are clashesthat take place at unexpected places and timeswhen forces are not fully prepared for battle.Such encounters often occur in small-unit opera-tions and when reconnaissance has been ineffec-tive. A meeting engagement may also occur wheneach opponent is aware of the other and bothdecide to attack without delay to obtain a tacticaladvantage. A meeting engagement may result inconfusion, delay, or even in the prematureemployment of the main body before the com-mander has set conditions for decisive action.The premature employment of the main bodyslows the mechanized force’s tempo of opera-tions and may cause it to lose the initiative.

Attack

The purpose of an attack is to defeat, destroy, orneutralize the enemy. An attack emphasizes max-imum application of combat power, coupled withbold maneuver, shock effect in the assault, andprompt exploitation of success. Principal ele-ments in an attack include preventing effectiveenemy maneuver or counteraction, maneuveringto gain an advantage, delivering an overwhelm-ing assault to destroy the enemy, and exploiting

the advantages gained. Commanders conduct var-ious types of attacks to achieve different effects:spoiling attack, counterattack, feint, demonstra-tion, reconnaissance in force, and raid.

The commander conducts either a hasty or adeliberate attack based on time available. A hastyattack is an attack in which preparation time istraded for speed in order to exploit an opportu-nity. (Joint Pub [JP] 1-02, Department of DefenseDictionary of Military and Associated Terms)Typically, a hasty attack is the result of a meet-ing engagement. The goal of a hasty attack is todestroy the enemy before he is able to concen-trate or establish a defense. In order to maintainmomentum or retain initiative, minimum time isdevoted to preparation. Those forces readilyavailable are committed immediately to theattack. A hasty attack seeks to take advantage ofthe enemy’s lack of readiness and involves bold-ness, surprise, and speed to achieve success. Adeliberate attack is characterized by preplannedcoordinated employment of firepower andmaneuver to close with and destroy the enemy.The deliberate attack is a fully coordinated opera-tion that is conducted when preparation time isavailable for lengthy reconnaissance, preciseplanning, and rehearsals. Deliberate attacks nor-mally include large volumes of supporting fires,main and supporting attacks, and deception mea-sures. Tanks are best suited for either a hasty ordeliberate attack because of their speed, mobil-ity, and armor-protected firepower.

Spoiling Attack

A spoi l ing a t tack i s a tac t ica l maneuveremployed to seriously impair a hostile attackwhile the enemy is in the process of forming orassembling for an attack. It is a pre-emptive,limited objective attack aimed at preventing,disrupting, or delaying the enemy’s ability tolaunch an attack. It may be conducted like a raidwith a planned withdrawal. The circumstancesin which a spoiling attack is conducted nor-mally preclude full exploitation. All or part of

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the reserve normally conducts a spoiling attack;therefore, it may require that another reserveforce is temporarily formed.

Counterattack

Counterattacks are limited objective attacks con-ducted by part or all of a defensive force to preventthe enemy from attaining the objectives of hisattack. It may be conducted to regain lost ground,destroy enemy advance units, and wrest the initia-tive from the enemy. It may also be a precursor toresuming offensive operations. The circumstancesin which a counterattack is conducted normallypreclude full exploitation. Normally the com-mander will attempt to retain his reserve to con-duct a decisive counterattack once the enemy hascommitted his main force to the attack. All or partof the reserve normally conducts a counterattack;therefore, it may require that another reserve forceis temporarily formed. Tank units counterattack bytwo methods: counterattack by fire and movementor counterattack by fire. The intent of the counter-attack by fire and movement method is to closewith and destroy the enemy. The intent of thecounterattack by fire method is to use weaponstandoff and/or cover to full advantage and destroythe enemy by direct fires.

When tanks counterattack by fire and movementit is also referred to as support by fire. Duringconduct of the counterattack by fire and move-ment, the tank or mechanized unit commandertakes the following actions to plan and executethe attack:

Conduct a line of sight analysis to identifyadvantageous positions for tanks and otherweapon systems to support by fire.Plan to integrate both indirect and direct fires.Determine triggers for lifting and/or shiftingdirect and indirect fires.Plan and rehearse actions on contact, as well asmaneuver to support by fire positions.Plan for class V expenditures depending onthe mission.

Use infantry to support mounted platformswhenever possible. They can be used tosecure positions for vehicles, augment anti-tank fires with Javelins, and provide localsecurity for vehicles.Continually scan the area of operations toacquire, track, and destroy any enemy threaten-ing the movement of the attack. Maintain 360-degree security.Use the tank’s main guns to destroy enemyarmor while other systems engage enemy lightarmor or vehicles.Move and maneuver continually to increasesurvivability of the attacking force.

Counterattacking by fire is also referred to asattack by fire. The planning and execution con-siderations are the same as for counterattack byfire and movement; however, counterattack byfire takes advantage of long-range standoff firesinherent in tanks and other antitank systems.Counterattacking by fire most often is conductedfrom dominating terrain and is used when themission or situation does not dictate occupyingenemy positions.

Feint

A feint is a limited objective attack made at aplace other than that of the main effort with theaim of distracting the enemy’s attention awayfrom the main effort, and it involves direct, phys-ical contact with the enemy. A feint must be suf-ficiently strong to confuse the enemy as to thelocation of the main effort. Ideally, a feint causesthe enemy to shift forces to the diversion andaway from the main effort. Feints are usuallyshallow, limited objective attacks conductedbefore or during the attack of the main effort.Tanks are effective in confusing the enemy intothinking he is being attacked by the main effortwhen he is not. The appearance of tanks attackingcan cause the enemy commander to commit hisreserve forces to counter the feint; thereby leav-ing him no reserves when the main body attacks

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him from a different direction and/or place. Theemployment of a tank unit in a feint must beheavily weighed against the loss of combat powerthat is rendered unavailable to the main effort.

Demonstration

Demonstrations are operations designed to divertenemy attention, which allows MAGTF forces toexecute decisive action elsewhere. A demonstra-tion is a show of force that threatens an attack atanother location but does not make contact withthe enemy. The commander executes a demon-stration by an actual or simulated massing ofcombat power, troop movements, or some otheractivity designed to indicate the preparations foror the beginning of attack at a point other than themain effort. The employment of a tank unit in ademonstration must be weighed with the potentialloss of combat power that could be applied to themain effort.

Reconnaissance in Force

The reconnaissance in force is a deliberate attackby major forces to obtain information and to locateand test enemy dispositions, strengths, and reac-tions. While the primary purpose of a reconnais-sance in force is to gain information, thecommander must be prepared to exploit anyopportunity. The protection afforded by the tankbattalion can be used to protect the force; however,if the situation warrants, the tank battalion can alsoexploit any opportunity. A reconnaissance in forceusually develops information more rapidly and inmore detail than other reconnaissance methods.Since a reconnaissance in force is conducted whenknowledge of the enemy is vague, combined-armsforces containing tanks are often employedbecause the force is capable of disengagement ifsuperior enemy forces are encountered.

Raid

A raid is an attack, usually small-scale, involvinga penetration of hostile territory for a specific

purpose other than seizing and holding terrain. Itends with a planned withdrawal upon completionof the assigned mission. The organization andcomposition of the raid force are tailored to themission. Raids are characterized by surprise andswift, precise, and bold action. Tanks can beemployed on mechanized raids to destroy enemyinstallations and facilities, disrupt enemy com-mand and control or support activities, divertenemy attention, and secure information.

Exploitation

Exploitation is an offensive operation that usuallyfollows a successful attack and is designed to dis-organize the enemy in depth. Exploitationextends the initial success of the attack by pre-venting the enemy from disengaging, withdraw-ing, and re-establishing an effective defense. Theobjective of the exploitation is the destruction ofenemy forces to the point where they have noalternative but surrender or flight. The mecha-nized force is ideally suited for exploitation oper-ations because of its inherent speed, mobility, andshock action.

The commander must be prepared to exploitevery attack without delay. In the hasty attack,the force in contact normally continues the attack,transitioning to exploitation. In the deliberateattack, the commander’s principal tool for exploi-tation is normally the reserve. The reserve is gen-erally positioned where it can exploit the successof the main effort or supporting efforts. Typicalmissions for the exploitation force include cuttinglines of communication, isolating and destroyingenemy units, and disrupting enemy command andcontrol. The psychological effect of an exploita-tion creates confusion and apprehension through-out the enemy force, reduces the enemy’scapability to react, and may be decisive. Enemyforces, which cannot jeopardize the mission, aresuppressed, bypassed, and reported to higherheadquarters for clearing by follow-on forces.

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Opportunities for exploitation occur when—

The enemy is having difficulty maintaining hisposition.There is a significant increase in the number ofprisoners captured.Enemy units disintegrate after initial contact.The enemy lacks an organized defense.There are confirmed reports of the capture ofor absence of enemy leaders.There is an increase in abandoned material.Equipment from various units is intermixed informations or columns.Enemy fire decreases in intensity andeffectiveness.Enemy artillery, C2 facilities, and supplydumps are overrun.

Once the exploitation is begun, it is carried out tothe final objective. An exploitation continues dayand night, the enemy is given no relief fromoffensive pressure. The exploiting force retainsterrain only as necessary to accomplish its mis-sion. The exploiting force commander must becareful not to dissipate combat power in achiev-ing minor tactical successes or in reducing smallenemy forces.

Exploitation should be decentralized. The mecha-nized unit commander maintains sufficient con-trol to alter the direction of the command or toprevent its overextension. He relies on his subor-dinates to find the fastest way to their objectives,to deploy as necessary to fight, and to seize allopportunities to destroy the enemy and acceler-ate the tempo of operations. The commander usesminimum control measures, but issues clearinstructions concerning seizure of key terrain andthe size of enemy forces, which may be bypassed.The exploitation force and the follow-on supportforce must maintain direct communications.

The commander must exercise aggressive anddemanding leadership to keep units advancing.When fatigue, disorganization, or attrition hasweakened the force or when it must hold ground

or resupply, the commander should exploit with afresh force. Exploitation ends when the enemyloses his ability and will to fight; enemy resis-tance increases requiring deliberate attack; or theforce conducting the exploitation can no longerbe supported or sustained.

Pursuit

A pursuit often develops after a successfulexploitation operation, and its purpose is theannihilation of the enemy; therefore, forces areorientated on the enemy rather than the seizure ofterrain. A pursuit is an offensive operationdesigned to catch or cut off a hostile forceattempting to escape, with the aim of destroyingit. The difference between an exploitation and apursuit is the condition of the enemy. Likeexploitation, pursuit requires broad decentralizedcontrol and rapid movement; therefore, the speedand shock effect of a tank unit greatly improvesthe impact and effect of a pursuit.

The decision to conduct a pursuit operation ismade when the enemy has lost the ability todefend or delay and begins to withdraw. There-fore, the decision to execute a pursuit must bemade quickly, before the enemy can regain con-trol or organize a defense or before the opportu-nity is lost.

Unlike an exploitation, in which the attackingforce may or may not focus on the enemy force,the attacker in a pursuit focuses on catching anddestroying the fleeing enemy force. A pursuit fol-lows a successful attack or exploitation and isordered when the enemy cannot conduct an orga-nized defense and attempts to disengage. Directpressure against the retreating forces must becombined with an enveloping or encirclingmaneuver to place troops across the enemy’slines of retreat. Tanks are usually assigned as theenveloping or encircling force. If it becomesapparent that enemy resistance has broken down

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entirely and that the enemy is fleeing the battle-field, any type of offensive operation can transi-tion into a pursuit.

During the pursuit, commanders conduct air andground operations to intercept, capture, or destroythe enemy. The aviation combat element can alsointerdict fleeing enemy forces.

Unlike exploitation, commanders are rarely ableto anticipate pursuit, so they do not normally holdforces in reserve solely to accomplish this mis-sion. Therefore, commanders must be agileenough to react when the situation presents itself.During a pursuit, the commander task-organizesthe force into a direct pressure force and an encir-cling force.

Direct Pressure Force

The mission of the direct pressure force is to pre-vent enemy disengagement and subsequentreconstitution of the defense. Leading elements

of the direct pressure force move rapidly, on allavailable routes, containing or bypassing smallenemy forces that are reduced by follow-on sup-port forces. The direct pressure force must havesufficient combat power to maintain pressure onthe enemy; it attacks on a broad front and pro-vides relentless pressure on the enemy.

Encircling Force

The mission of the encircling force is to getbehind the enemy and block his escape so that hecan be destroyed between the direct pressureforce and the encircling force. If the encirclingforce cannot outrun the fleeing enemy force, itattacks the flank. The encircling force must havecontinuous fire support and greater mobility thanthe enemy, which lends it to being a mechanizedforce. The encircling force may seize deep block-ing positions to prevent the enemy’s escape. Thismay require that the encircling force move with-out flank security.

SECTION II. TANK UNIT FORMATIONS

Tank units use formations to facilitate positivecommand and control and to avoid confusion incombat. Formations also enhance speed and secu-rity and improve the ability to react to antici-pated situations. Formations are chosen based onMETT-T analysis; therefore, the commandermust continuously analyze the situation andchange formations as the situation changes—for-mations are not rigid. Subordinate commanders,down to the individual tank level, must also havethe freedom to adjust to the terrain/enemy situa-tion. The tank battalion uses formations for sev-eral purposes—

Establish the relationship of one unit to anotheron the ground.Allow tank companies to position firepowerwhere it is needed in support of the directfire plan.

Establish responsibilities for sector securityamong companies/platoons.Facilitate the execution of battle drills anddirected COAs.

Formations (like movement techniques) areplanned based on where enemy contact isexpected and how the commander expects toreact to the contact. The commander of themechanized force must evaluate the situationand determine which formation best suits themission and the situation. The battalion forma-tion establishes the relationship between the bat-talion’s companies, the actual positioning ofplatoons within each company is dictated by thecompany commanders. It is not necessary for allof the company formations to be the samewithin the battalion formation. It is critical,

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however, for company commanders to coordi-nate their formation with those of other elementsof the tank/mechanized force. In some cases, thecompany may use the same formation as the bat-talion (for example, the companies may use thecolumn formation within a battalion column). Inother situations, however, battalion and com-pany formations may be different as a result ofMETT-T factors (such as the companies mov-ing in wedge formations within a battalion vee).

An important consideration in movement plan-ning and execution is that formations are notrigid. Spacing requirements, as well as otherMETT-T considerations, will require the battal-ion commander and subordinate leaders to adaptthe basic formations as necessary. They must beready to adjust the distance between companiesand individual platoons based on terrain, visibil-ity, and mission requirements.

Column

The column is used when speed is critical, whenthe battalion is moving through restricted terrainon a specific route, and/or when enemy contact isnot likely. Each company normally followsdirectly behind the company in front of it. If thesituation dictates, however, platoons can disperselaterally to enhance security (see. fig. 2-1). Thecolumn formation has the following characteris-tics, advantages, and limitations:

Provides excellent control and fires to theflanks.Permits only limited fires to the front and rear.Is easy to control.Provides extremely limited overall security.Is normally used for traveling only.

Option

FlankScreen

TOW PLT

CO Z

CO Y

CO X

SCT PLT

CO W

Option

RECON

5-7 km

Frontage

Advance

Guard

Main

Body

Rear

Guard

Directionof

Movement

3-5 km

1-3 km

(-)

Figure 2-1. Tank Battalion in Column Formationwith Dispersal for Added Security.

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Wedge

The wedge formation, illustrated in figure 2-2,is often used when the enemy situation isunclear or contact is possible. In the battalionwedge, the lead company is in the center of theformation, with the remaining companieslocated to the rear of and outside the lead com-pany. The wedge has the following characteris-tics, advantages, and limitations:

Permits excellent fires to the front and goodfires to the flanks.Is easy to control.Provides good security to the flanks.Can be used with the traveling and travelingoverwatch techniques.Allows rapid transition to bounding overwatch.

Vee

The vee formation, illustrated in figure 2-3, isused when enemy contact is possible. In the bat-talion vee, the center company is located in the

rear of the formation, while the remaining com-panies are to the front of and outside the centercompany. The vee has the following characteris-tics, advantages, and limitations:

Permits more firepower to the front than thewedge and affords greater fires to the flanks.Is more difficult to control than the wedge andmakes it more difficult for vehicles to maintainproper orientation.Allows one unit in the formation to maintainfreedom of maneuver when contact occurs.Facilitates rapid deployment into any otherformation.Can be used with the traveling and travelingoverwatch techniques.Allows rapid transition to bounding overwatch.

Line

The line formation is primarily used when a unitor element is crossing a danger area or needs tomaximize firepower to the front (see fig. 2-4). Inthe battalion line, companies move abreast of one

TOW

CO ZCO W

CO Y

CO X

SCT PLT

Directionof

Movement

Figure 2-2. Tank Battalionin Wedge Formation.

TOW

CO Z

CO W

CO Y

CO X

SCT PLT

Directionof

Movement

Figure 2-3. Tank Battalionin Vee Formation.

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another and are dispersed laterally. The line for-mation has the following characteristics, advan-tages, and limitations:

Permits maximum fires to the front or rear, butminimum fires to the flanks.Is difficult to control.Is less secure than other formations because ofthe lack of depth.Is the most difficult formation from which tomake the transition to other formations.

The line may be used in the assault to maximizethe firepower and/or shock effect of the heavycompany. This is normally done when there is nomore intervening terrain between the unit and theenemy, when antitank systems are suppressed,and/or when the unit is exposed to artillery fireand must move rapidly.

Echelon

The echelon formation is used when the battal-ion wants to maintain security and/or observa-

tion of one flank and enemy contact is notlikely (see fig. 2-5). The battalion echelon for-mation (either echelon left or echelon right)has the lead company positioned farthest fromthe echeloned flank, with each subsequentcompany located to the rear of and outside thecompany in front of it. The echelon formationhas the following characteristics, advantages,and limitations:

Is difficult to control.Affords excellent security for the higher for-mation in the direction of the echelon.Facilitates deployment to the echeloned flank.

Coil

The coil is a battalion or below-level formationemployed when elements of the battalion are sta-tionary and must maintain 360-degree security.See figure 2-6 on page 2-12.

TOW

CO ZCO WCO Y CO X

SCT PLT

Directionof

Movement

Figure 2-4. Tank Battalionin Line Formation.

TOW

CO Z

CO W

CO Y

CO X

SCT PLT

Directionof

Movement

Figure 2-5. Tank Battalionin Echelon Right Formation.

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SECTION III. FORMS OF MANEUVER

Maneuver is the employment of forces on the battle-field through movement in combination with fire (orfire potential) to achieve a position of advantage inrespect to the enemy in order to accomplish the mis-sion. The basic forms of maneuver are frontalattack, envelopment, flanking attack, penetration,turning movement and infiltration.

Frontal Attack

A frontal attack is an offensive maneuver inwhich the main action is directed against the frontof the enemy force. This is the least desirableform of maneuver for a mechanized forcebecause it attacks into the enemy’s strength anddoes not take full advantage of a tank’s ability tomaneuver. The advantages of a tank/mechanizedforce conducting a frontal attack are—

Greater combat power than pure infantryforces.

Inherent speed reduces exposure time to enemyfire.Vehicle armor reduces effects of enemy direct/indirect fires.

Envelopment

An offensive maneuver in which the main attack-ing force passes around or over the enemy’s prin-ciple defensive positions to secure objectives tothe enemy’s rear. (JP 1-02) This is the mostdesirable form of maneuver for a tank/mecha-nized force because it utilizes maneuver andspeed to avoid enemy strengths and in doing sodestroys the enemy’s cohesion. The advantagesof a tank/mechanized force conducting an envel-opment are as follows:

Possess greater speed, which is required to sur-prise the enemy from an unexpected direction.

CO Y

CO W CO Z

CO X

Figure 2-6. Coil Formation.

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Has the required ground mobility to rapidlyseize deep objectives while providing a greaterthreat than a turning movement.

An envelopment is a form of offensive maneuverby which the attacker bypasses the enemy’s prin-cipal defensive positions to secure objectives tothe enemy’s rear. An envelopment compels thedefender to fight on the ground of the attacker’schoosing. It requires surprise and superior mobil-ity relative to the enemy. In mechanized tactics,an envelopment normally requires a base of fireelement and a bounding element. The boundingelement avoids the enemy’s strength en route tothe objective. The base of fire element fixes theenemy’s attention to his front, forcing the enemyto fight in two or more directions simultaneouslyto meet the converging efforts of the attacks.

Penetration

A penetration seeks to break through the enemy’sdefense and disrupts the defensive system. Thepurpose of a penetration is to break through theenemy’s main defenses, in effect creating anassailable flank where none had existed before. Apenetration generally occurs in three stages: rup-turing the position, widening the gap, and seizingthe objective.

A penetration’s main effort concentrates over-whelmingly superior combat power deep into anarrow front. A penetration is appropriate whenthe enemy is overextended, when his flanks aresecure, or when there is no assailable flank.Because tanks can maneuver quickly and massoverwhelming fires, they are well-suited to per-form this type of offensive maneuver. However,care must be taken to ensure that the enemy doesnot close the penetration. If this happens, it

endangers the penetration forces and subjectsthem to being cut off from follow-on forces andpossibly destroyed by an enemy counterattack.

Turning Movement

A turning movement is a form of offensivemaneuver in which the attacker passes around orover the enemy’s principal defensive positions tosecure objectives deep in the enemy’s rear. Nor-mally, the main effort executes the turning move-ment as the supporting effort fixes the enemy inposition. The main effort seizes objectives sodeep that the enemy is forced to abandon hisposition and divert major forces to meet thethreat. Unlike an envelopment, the main effortusually operates at such a distance from the sup-porting effort force that mutual support isunlikely. Therefore, the main effort must be self-sufficient and reach the objective before becom-ing decisively engaged. Seldom would a turningmovement be executed by a MAGTF smallerthan a Marine expeditionary force (MEF). Typi-cal objectives of the main effort in a turningmovement are ideally suited for mechanizedforces are as follows:

Critical logistic sites.C2 nodes.Lines of communications.

Infiltration

Infiltration is a form of maneuver in whichforces move covertly through or into an enemyarea to attack positions in the enemy’s rear.Forces move over, through, or around enemypositions without detection to assume a positionof advantage over the enemy. The commander

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orders an infiltration to move all or part of hisforce through gaps in the enemy’s defense to—

Achieve surprise.Attack enemy positions from the flank or rear.Occupy a position from which to support themain attack by fire.Secure key terrain.Conduct ambushes and raids in the enemy’srear to harass and disrupt his command andcontrol and support activities.Cut off enemy forward units.

Infiltrations normally take advantage of limitedvisibility, rough terrain, or unoccupied or unob-served areas. Theses conditions often allow unde-tected movement of small elements when themovement of the entire force would presentgreater risks. Infiltration routes must be reconnoi-tered to minimize the chance that the enemy canobserve or hear mechanized forces moving;therefore, it is difficult for tanks and mechanizedforces to perform infiltrations due to noise, dustsignatures, and the large number of vehicles usu-ally found in mechanized units.

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CHAPTER 3DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

The purpose of the defense is to force theattacker to reach his culminating point withoutachieving his objectives, to gain the initiative forfriendly forces, and to create the opportunity toshift to the offense. The essence of defensive tac-tics is to place the enemy into a position that per-mits his destruction through the intelligent use ofterrain and firepower, thereby creating favorableconditions for counterattack and resumption ofthe offense. Defensive operations achieve one ormore of the following:

Destroy the enemy.Weaken enemy forces as a prelude to theoffense.Cause an enemy attack to fail.Gain time.Concentrate forces elsewhere.Control key or decisive terrain.Retain terrain.

General planning considerations include—

Enemy’s strength and mobility.Initial disposition, assembly areas, coordina-tion measures, and routes or axis.Coordination with frontline units (key consid-erations include frontline unit obstacle plansand passage lanes).Communications/signals.The tank unit coordinating, reconnoitering,rehearsing, and preparing for the priorityreserve missions as time allows.

Organization of the Battlespace

During defensive operations, the commanderorganizes his battlespace into three areas—secu-rity area, main battle area, and rear area—in

which the defending force performs specificfunctions (see fig. 3-1.) These areas can be fur-ther divided into sectors. The size and nature of asector depends on the situation and the factors ofMETT-T. A defensive sector is an area assignedto a subordinate commander in which he is pro-vided the maximum latitude to accomplishassigned tasks in order to conduct defensive oper-ations. Commanders of defensive sectors canassign their subordinates their own sector.

Security Area

The security area is that area that begins at theforward edge of the battle area (FEBA) andextends as far to the front and flanks as securityforces are deployed, normally to the forward

SecurityArea

RearArea

Main BattleArea

Reserves

FEBA FEBA

XX

XXX

Figure 3-1. Organization of the Battlespace.

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boundary of the area of operations. Forces in thesecurity area conduct reconnaissance to furnishinformation on the enemy and delay, deceive, anddisrupt the enemy. The commander adds depth tothe defense by extending the security area as farforward as is tactically feasible.

Actions in the security area purposely cause theenemy to prematurely deploy into attack forma-tions and to disrupt his plan of attack. Slowingthe enemy’s attack enables MAGTF forces, par-ticularly Marine aviation, to strike the enemy’scritical vulnerabilities (i.e., movement, resupply,fire support, and command and control). The uti-lization of tanks in the security area provides thecommander with the long-range firepower neces-sary to engage and wear down the enemy’s for-ward elements. The tank’s speed and mobilityalso permits the security force to rapidly with-draw and fall back to the main defensive position.

Main Battle Area

The main battle area is that portion of the bat-tlespace in which the commander conducts closeoperations to defeat the enemy. Normally, themain battle area extends rearward from the FEBAto the rear boundary of the command’s subordi-nate units. The commander positions forcesthroughout the main battle area to defeat, destroy,or contain enemy assaults. Reserves may beemployed in the main battle area to destroyenemy forces, reduce penetrations, or regain ter-rain. The greater the depth of the main battle area,the greater the maneuver space for fighting themain defensive battle. Due to its range and fire-power, the tank’s various weapons systems pro-vide the commander with the capability to engagemultiple targets simultaneously and accurately.

Rear Area

The rear area is that area extending forward from acommand’s rear boundary to the rear of the opera-tional area of the command’s subordinate units.This area is provided primarily for the perfor-mance of CSS functions. Rear area operations

include those functions of security and sustainmentrequired to maintain continuity of operations bythe whole force. Rear area operations protect thesustainment effort as well as deny use of the reararea to the enemy. The rear area may not alwaysbe contiguous with the main battle area.

Organization of the Force

During defensive operations, the commanderorganizes his force as depicted in figure 3-2.

Security Forces

The commander uses security forces forward of themain battle area to delay, disrupt, and provide earlywarning of the enemy’s advance and to deceive theenemy as to the true location of the main battle area.Operations of security forces must be an integral partof the overall defensive plan. To ensure optimalunity of effort during security operations, a singlecommander is normally assigned responsibility for

xx

SecurityForces

Rear AreaForces

Main BattleForces

Reserves

Phase Line(battle

handover)

FEBAFEBA

xxx

Figure 3-2. Organization of the Force.

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the conduct of operations in the security area. Theelement of the MAGTF assigned as the securityforces depends on METT-T factors.

The commander seeks to engage the enemy as farout as possible. Suppression and obscuration firesare employed to facilitate maneuver of the secu-rity force. Maximum use may be made of all firesupport assets to disrupt and destroy enemy for-mations as they move through the security areaapproaching the main battle area. Obstacles andbarriers are positioned to delay or canalize theenemy and are covered by fires to destroy himwhile he is halted or in the process of breaching.

The commander assigns screen, guard, or covermissions to security forces:

A security element screens a stationary forceby establishing a series of positions along adesignated screen line. The positions arelocated to provide overlapping observation.Areas that cannot be observed from these posi-tions are normally patrolled. Screening forcesreport any sightings of enemy activity andengage enemy forces with fires. Maintainingcontact, the screen falls back along previouslyreconnoitered routes to subsequent positions.Screening forces should avoid becoming deci-sively engaged. A security element guards a force by establish-ing a series of mutually supporting positions.The guard may establish a screen line forwardof these positions. These positions immediatelyreport any enemy contact and engage with firesat maximum range. The guard defends inplace, attacks, or delays to rearward positions.Routes and subsequent positions should havebeen previously reconnoitered.Covering forces compel the enemy to deployprematurely, confirm the direction and strengthof the enemy attack, conduct counterreconnais-sance, destroy the enemy advance guard, cana-lize the enemy advance in accordance with thecommander’s plan, and provide the main force

time to react. A covering force should be a self-sufficient, combined-arms force that is largeenough to convince the enemy that they are themain battle force.

The security force engages the enemy first,screening, guarding, and covering as ordered.Normally, the commander designates the secu-rity force as his initial main effort. Since a tankcan withdraw rapidly to the main battle area andmaintain continuous long-range contact with theenemy, it can allow the security force to main-tain contact with the enemy while falling backunder pressure. The effectiveness and firepowerof the tank’s various weapon systems also facili-tates the engagement and attrition of the enemy’sadvance guard during the withdrawal. This actionimpedes the enemy’s momentum, forcing him todeploy his main body.

At a predetermined location, normally a phaseline designated as a handover line, control of thebattle is transferred to the main battle force. Ahandover line is a control feature; preferably fol-lowing easily defined terrain features, at whichthe responsibility for the conduct of combat oper-ations is passed from one force to another. Thetransfer of control must be carefully coordinated.The main battle force supports the disengagementof the security force as it withdraws in prepara-tion for its subsequent mission. The commandermay shift the main effort to the appropriate ele-ment of the main battle force. As the enemy’sadvance force approaches the main battle area,execution of the defensive battle becomesincreasingly decentralized.

At some point, the defending commander mustplan for the enemy force breaking through thesecurity forces and approaching the main battlearea. This requires transitioning friendly forcesand control of the battle from security forces tothe main battle force. Whenever the battle is tran-sitioned, it requires coordination from the high-est common commander.

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Main Battle Forces

Main battle forces engage the enemy to slow,canalize, disorganize, or defeat his attack. Thecommander positions these forces to counter theenemy’s attack along the most likely or mostdangerous avenue of approach. As in offensiveoperations, the commander weights his maineffort with enough combat power and the neces-sary support to ensure success. Tanks providethe commander with the fastest tactical assetsavailable, which provide a defensive maneuvercapability. Tanks also provide an effective plat-form for the destruction of other ground plat-forms (e.g., mechanized forces can successfullyeliminate lightly armored enemy vehicles). Tankplatoons are normally employed intact in orderto properly mass their fires and still distributethe effects.

Main battle forces engage the enemy as early aspossible unless fires are withheld to prevent theloss of surprise. Commanders make maximumuse of fires to destroy and disrupt enemy forma-tions as they approach the main battle area. Asthe enemy closes, he is subjected to an ever-increasing volume of fires from the main battlearea forces and all supporting arms. Again,obstacles and barriers are used to delay or cana-lize the enemy so that he is continually sub-jected to fires.

Combat power that can be quickly concentrated,such as fires, is brought to bear while maneuverunits move into position. The defender reacts tothe enemy’s main effort by reinforcing the threat-ened sector or allowing the enemy’s main effortto penetrate into engagement areas within themain battle area to cut him off and destroy himby counterattack. Main battle forces maintain anoffensive spirit throughout the battle, looking toexploit any advantageous situations.

A counterattack is an attack by part or all of adefending force against an attacking enemy force,for such specific purposes as regaining groundlost or cutting off and destroying enemy advanceunits, and with the general objective of denying

to the enemy the attainment of his purpose inattacking. In many cases, the counterattack isdecisive action in defensive operations. It is thecommander’s primary means of breaking theenemy’s attack or of regaining the initiative.Once commenced, the counterattack is the maineffort. Its success depends largely on surprise,speed, and boldness in execution. A separatecounterattack force may be established by thecommander to conduct planned counterattacksand can be made up of uncommitted or lightlyengaged forces and the reserve.

The reserve is the commander’s tool to influencethe course of the battle at the critical time andplace to exploit opportunities. It is the force thatprovides flexibility to the commander by allow-ing him to strike the enemy at the time and placeof the commander’s choosing. The commanderuses his reserve at the decisive moment in thedefense and refuses to dissipate it on local emer-gencies. It is a designated force, as robust andmobile as possible, that exploits success, con-ducts counterattacks, contains penetrations, andregains the initiative. The less that is known ofthe enemy or his intention, the greater the propor-tion of combat power that must be held inreserve. The reserve is usually located in assem-bly areas or forward operating bases in the mainbattle area. Once the reserve is committed, thecommander establishes or reconstitutes a newreserve. Reserves are organized based on the fac-tors of METT-T. The tactical mobility of mecha-nized and helicopterborne forces makes themwell-suited for use as the reserve. Mechanizedreserve forces are best employed offensively.

Timing is critical to the employment of the mecha-nized reserve. As the area of probable employmentof the mechanized reserve becomes apparent, thecommander alerts his reserve to have it more readilyavailable for action. When he commits his reserve,the commander must make his decision promptlyand with an accurate understanding of movementfactors and deployment times. If committed toosoon or too late, the mechanized or tank reservemay not have a decisive effect. The commander

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may choose to use security forces as part of or all ofhis reserve after completion of their security mis-sion. He must weigh this decision against the possi-bility that the security forces may suffer a loss ofcombat power during its security mission.

Rear Area Forces

Rear area forces protect and sustain the force’scombat power. They provide for freedom ofaction and the continuity of logistic and C2 sup-port. Rear area forces facilitate future operationsas forces are positioned and support is marshaledto enable the transition to offensive operations.When facing a threat equipped with heavyarmored vehicles, the tactical combat forcewithin the reserve area may be required to betasked-organized with tanks. Tanks can be held inthe reserve area until it can be determined wherethe enemy main attack is directed. Once that isdetermined, tanks can quickly counterattack tomeet the enemies main attack and defeat it.

Preparing for the Defense

In the defense, tank units are employed to takemaximum advantage of their inherent speed,mobility, armor-protected firepower, and shockeffect. Tank units are ideally suited to conduct-ing spoiling attacks and counterattacks, therebyproviding offensive action during a defensive bat-tle. They also provide long-range, direct firecapability into engagement areas and have thecapability to engage both ground and air targets.Tanks have considerations that should be takeninto account for both deliberate and hastydefenses and as a reserve in the defense.

Deliberate Defense

A deliberate defense is normally organized whenout of contact with the enemy or when contact is notimminent and time for organization is available. Adeliberate defense normally includes fortifications,

strongpoints, extensive use of barriers, and fullyintegrated fires. The commander normally is free tomake a detailed reconnaissance of his sector, selectthe terrain on which to defend, and decide the bestdistribution of forces. Tanks and/or mechanizedunits are given specific missions and tasks and mustbe integrated into the entire defensive plan to maxi-mize each weapons platform advantages and lessenthe disadvantages. Tanks and mechanized unitsmust prioritize deliberate defensive planning andpreparations according to the mission they are givenand the time available to complete preparationsbefore the enemy attacks.

Hasty Defense

A defense is normally organized while in contactwith the enemy or when contact is imminent andtime available for the organization is limited. It ischaracterized by improvement of the naturaldefensive strength of the terrain by utilization ofemplacements and obstacles. The hasty defensenormally allows for only a brief leader’s recon-naissance and may entail the immediate engage-ment by security forces to provide time for theestablishment of the defense. Because tanks havea high degree of survivability, mobility, and canengage at long ranges, they can keep enemy pres-sure off of other units preparing to conduct ahasty defense and buy time for friendly forces tofind suitable defensive positions.

Use of the Reserve in the Defense

The reserve is the commander’s tool to influencethe course of the battle at the critical time andplace in order to exploit opportunities. It is a des-ignated force, as robust and mobile as possible,that exploits success, conducts counterattacks,contains penetrations, and regains the initiative.Its primary purpose is to retain flexibility throughoffensive action. Reserves are organized based onthe factors of METT-T. The tactical mobility ofmechanized forces makes them well-suited foruse as the reserve.

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Types of Defense

Every defense contains two complementary charac-teristics: a static or positional element, whichanchors the defense to key terrain, and a dynamicor mobile element, which generates combat powerthrough maneuver and concentration of forces. Thepositional element is characterized by use of battlepositions, strongpoints, fortifications, and barriersto halt the enemy advance. The mobile element ischaracterized by the use of offensive action, sup-plementary positions, planned delaying actions, lat-eral shifting of forces, and commitment of thereserve. Conceptually, this results in two defensiveextremes: the position defense and the mobiledefense. However, neither type can be used exclu-sively in practice. Although these descriptions con-vey the general pattern of each type of defense, anydefense will include both positional and mobile ele-ments. Commanders may simultaneously conductposition and mobile defenses in order to takeadvantage of the strengths inherent in mechanizedorganizations. Mechanized forces possess themobility required to conduct mobile-type defensesor may be tasked to be the reserve given the situa-tion and terrain within their assigned sector.

While the positional defense is normally used toretain key terrain, the mobile defense is used todestroy the enemy force. Clearly, the positionaldefense weights its forces forward while themobile defense weights its forces toward itsreserve or counterattack force. The positiondefense normally uses its reserve to re-establishthe FEBA following penetration by the enemy. Inthe mobile defense, the reserve or counterattackforce is used to destroy the enemy. Although themobile defense has inherent risks, it stands agreater chance of inflicting a decisive defeat andcomplete destruction of the enemy force thandoes the area defense.

Position Defense

The position defense is conducted to deny theenemy access to critical terrain for a specified

period of time. It is seldom capable of achievingthe outright destruction of the attacking force dueto the position defense’s limited mobility. How-ever, once the attacker is dealt a tactical setback,the defender can take advantage of other opportu-nities to maintain the initiative. Thus, the posi-tion defense relies on other simultaneous orsubsequent operations by adjacent or reinforcingforces to achieve decisive results. A positiondefense occurs when the bulk of the defendingforce is disposed in selected tactical localitieswhere the decisive battle is to be fought. Princi-ple reliance is placed on the ability of the forcesin the defended localities to maintain their posi-tions and to control the terrain between them.

The tank battalion is typically used as the reserve ina positional defense. As a reserve, tank units arenormally employed to add depth, block penetra-tions, or restore the battle position by counterattack.

Mobile Defense

A mobile defense is an area or position in whichmaneuver is used together with fire and terrain toseize initiative from the enemy. It requires depthand focuses on the destruction of the enemy bypermitting him to advance into a position thatexposes him to counterattack by a strong mobilereserve. Tank units will not normally conduct amobile defense as a separate maneuver element;they are usually employed as part of a mecha-nized force within a MAGTF mobile defense.Mechanized pure units are normally assigned tothe main battle area while units task-organizedwith tanks (teams or task forces) are oftenassigned reserve roles.

Defensive Maneuver

Mechanized units can be given the mission todefend in sector, from battle positions or from astrong point. Regardless of the defensive mission,tanks must carefully choose their positions toproperly engage the enemy using engagementareas to defeat him.

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Sectors

Sectors are areas designated by boundaries withinwhich a unit operates and for which it is responsi-ble. Assignment of a defensive sector providestank units with maximum latitude to accomplishassigned tasks. It is the most common method ofdefending with a mechanized force and preventsthe enemy from concentrating overwhelmingfirepower on the bulk of the defending force atone time. The strength of this defense comesfrom its flexibility and focus on the enemy, ratherthan terrain. Its depth must come from the initialpositioning of units throughout the sector and aviable reserve/counterattack force. The extent ofthe sector is METT-T dependent . Forcesdeployed in depth must confront the enemy witheffective fires from multiple, mutually support-ing locations as the enemy tries to maneuver. Thesector is organized around many dispersed, smallunits, which attack the enemy throughout thedepth of his formations.

Battle Position

A battle position is a defensive location orientedon the most likely avenue of approach fromwhich a unit may defend. Battle positions shouldbe positioned to achieve depth, surprise, mutualsupport, and to allow for maneuver. They effec-tively concentrate combat power into an engage-ment area, while preventing the enemy fromisolating any one part of the unit. Units of pla-toon to battalion size may be assigned a battleposition. The use of on-order battle positionsadds flexibility and depth to the defensive plan.Tanks units are normally tasked to provide secu-rity outside of a battle position, overwatch a bat-tle position, or serve as a spoiling attack orcounterattack force.

Strongpoints

Strongpoints are heavi ly for t i f ied bat t lepositions that are tied to a natural or reinforcingobstacle to create an anchor for the defense or toblock a key piece of restricted terrain; therefore,

they are typically located on key or decisiveterrain. The tank’s survivability makes it aneffective addition to a strongpoint. They alsoretain the capacity to carry enough ammunitionfor a sustained engagement should resupplyefforts become difficult.

The strongpoint requires significant engineer sup-port. Positions are prepared for all weapons sys-tems, vehicles, Marines, and supplies. Positionsare prepared for all-around defense when theyanticipate being surrounded. Once isolated, unitmovement will be restricted within the confinesof the strongpoint position.

Alternate and Supplementary Positions

The alternate position is a position given to aweapon, unit, or individual to be occupied whenthe primary position becomes untenable orunsuitable for carrying out its task. Alternatepositions provide additional lines of sight into thesame engagement area or sector of fire and aresited to fulfill the original task. Alternate andsupplementary positions should be designatedand prepared as time permits. They increase thesurvivability of a weapons system by enabling itto engage the enemy from multiple positions.Supplementary positions provide the means toaccomplish a task that cannot be accomplishedfrom the primary or alternate positions. Theyallow a unit or weapons system to engage enemyforces approaching from another direction suchas the rear or flank.

When considering primary and alternate posi-tions, the commander must ensure that the firesfrom these positions support his obstacle array inthe engagement area. The alternate position maybe slightly to the front, flank, or rear of the pri-mary position. These positions must provideexcellent observation and fields of fire coveringthe area where the commander desires to engagethe enemy, and should also have covered andconcealed routes into and out of the positions.These positions must enable the tanks to identifyall designated target reference points (TRPs) in

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the tank units sector so that the tank unit can ade-quately cover its sector with mutually supportingand overlapping fires.

Tanks do not have an organic capability to digtheir own positions when needed and must relyon engineer assets to perform this task. Nor-mally, engineer armored combat earthmovervehicles or dozers dig these positions. Each tankposition should be constructed to provide both alevel hull-defilade firing position and a level tur-ret-defilade observation position. Hull-defiladeallows the tank to engage targets with its maingun and machine guns. The turret-defilade allowsthe tank commander to observe the engagementarea without exposing the tank to enemy fire.Figure 3-3 illustrates a correctly prepared tankdefensive position.

Digging positions for tanks and vehicles can takea considerable amount of time. Time to dig tankpositions is determined by how many diggingassets are available to the unit, other tasksassigned to engineer digging assets, and the com-position of the terrain being excavated (i.e., hardrocky soil takes longer than soft clay). Therefore,

to avoid having to dig a position for each tank,the tank/mechanized unit commander should takeadvantage of the natural terrain when selectingtank positions. Specific Marines in the tank unitshould be given the task of marking tank posi-tions for the engineers and ensuring that the posi-tions are dug correctly (i.e., they are large enoughand oriented correctly into the engagement area).

Engagement Areas

The engagement area is where the tank/mecha-nized unit commander intends to trap anddestroy the enemy force using the massed firesof all available weapons. The success of theengagement depends on how effectively thecommander can integrate the obstacle plan, theindirect fire plan, and the direct fires plan withinthe engagement area to achieve the unit’s tacti-cal purpose. Therefore, effective planning iscritical to the commander’s success. At the tank/mechanized company level, the following areasmust be considered when properly developingan effective engagement area.

Hull-defiladePosition

Berms attract attention. Dig down, not up.

Do not put spoil to the front, sides, or rear of the firingposition. Reduce spoil so that it blends into existing terrain.

Tie down all antennas and keep reflective surfaces covered.

Make sure the firing position has a covered exit route and acovered route to the next firing position.

Construct overhead cover and add camouflage to create ahide position if time and materials are available.

Turret-defiladePosition

HidePosition

Figure 3-3. Correct Hull-defilade and Turret-defiladeDefensive Tank Positions.

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Identify Likely Enemy Avenues of ApproachReconnaissance must be performed to identify alllikely enemy avenues of approach. If possible,this should be done from the enemy’s perspec-tive (direction). During reconnaissance, key landor terrain that affords positions over the enemy aswell as natural obstacles/chokepoints that restrictforward movement of the enemy are identified.After reconnaissance, planners determine whichof the avenues afford the enemy the greatestcover and concealment while allowing him tomaintain his attack tempo and evaluate lateralroutes adjoining each enemy avenue of approach.

Determine Likely Enemy Schemes of ManeuverTo determine the enemy’s most likely scheme ofmaneuver, the commander should again view theengagement area from the enemy’s perspective inorder to determine how the enemy will most likelybe structured for the attack and how he will use hisreconnaissance assets. Planners then determinehow the enemy will change formations and/orestablish firing positions within the engagementarea. For example, if the enemy is a mechanizedcompany, when will he most likely shift from acompany wedge formation to a company vee for-mation just prior to assaulting on line?

Determine Where to Kill the EnemyDetermining where to kill the enemy starts byidentifying TRPs that match the enemy’s mostlikely scheme of maneuver in the engagementarea. Each TRP is then identified and recorded bygrid. TRPs should also be marked for tank ther-mal identification. Next, the commander deter-mines how many tanks and/or weapons systemswill fire on each TRP to achieve the desired endstate. The commander may also determine whichsubordinate units will fire on each TRP. Once theTRPs are established, the outside boundaries ofthe engagement area can be determined. Finally,planners develop the direct fire plan.

Plan and Integrate Obstacles to Support Mechanized Unit Weapons Systems

Once TRPs are identified, the next step is to planand integrate obstacles into the engagement area.Initially, planners must determine the desiredintent of the obstacles with the engineer com-mander and ensure that the obstacle plan meetsthe intent of the engagement area commander.With the engineers, planners identify, site, andmark the obstacles within the obstacle group andintegrate protective obstacle types and locationswithin the unit’s defensive plan. All obstaclesneed to be covered by direct fire and responsibil-ity for guides to open and close obstacle lanesmust be assigned. The engagement area com-mander must also work with the engineer com-mander to ensure that everyone understandsdisengagement criteria, actions on contact, andsecurity requirements. Effective tank engage-ment obstacles force the enemy to slow or halthis attack or force the enemy to expose his vehi-cles’ flanks, which present easier targets for tankgunners to acquire and kill.

Emplace WeaponsSystems for Maximum Effect

The emplacement of weapons systems maxi-mizes each weapons platform’s ability to sup-port the mission. The commander selectstentative battle positions within and/or oversee-ing the engagement area and confirms that thebattle positions are tactically advantageous. Thebattle positions are marked after ensuring thatthey do not conflict with those of adjacent unitsand have mutually overlapping fires with otherbattle positions. Once the battle position is estab-lished, primary, alternate, and supplementarypositions are established for tanks, vehicles, andother weapon systems. Each position should sup-port firing on TRPs that are the responsibility ofthat battle position.

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Once the positions are chosen, commanders proofthe positions to ensure that they are correct. Thebattle positions utilizing tanks must consider theM1A1 tank gun’s standoff ranges: optimalengagement ranges are from 2,300 to 2,700meters for main gun engagements but the gunsare capable of engagements over 3,000 meters. Inaddition, tanks can be used for closer engage-ments of enemy infantry or antitank guided mis-sile (ATGM) teams using their machine gunsand/or main gun. Tanks should also have theircombat trains close by the battle position (usu-ally one terrain feature behind their battle posi-tion) in case they need to rearm and/or resupply.Antiarmor weapons (i.e., TOWs and Javelins) areusually placed in depth along the flanks of theengagement area in battle positions for longerrange flanking fires into the engagement area.

Plan and Integrate Available Indirect Fires

Planners must plan and integrate indirect firesbased on the purpose of the fire and where thatpurpose will best be achieved in the engagementarea. Planners establish an observation plan withredundancy for each target, determine firing trig-gers based on enemy movement rates, and obtainaccurate target locations using global positioningsystem devices. Target locations are then refinedto ensure coverage of obstacles and artillery andmortar targets are adjusted. Final protective firesare planned. All no-fire areas are identified andrequested for the engagement area. Indirect firesshould also be planned for all dead space in theengagement area that cannot be covered by directfire systems.

Plan and Integrate Available CAS

Planning for CAS requires knowing what CAS isavailable on station during the expected time ofthe enemy attack or knowing how long it willtake for CAS to be on station to support thedefense. Marine attack helicopters should be usedto engage and attrite the enemy deep in the

engagement area and/or even before the enemyenters the engagement area. Attack helicoptersare able to engage enemy tanks and vehicles withATGMs and chain guns and to provide theengagement area commander with enemy loca-tions and actions. Attack helicopters may also actas an airborne forward observer for deep indirectfires or as a FAC for other fixed-wing aircraftdelivering munitions. Tank fires combined withattack helicopters are very effective in slowing orstopping enemy mechanized attacks.

Rehearse the Execution of Operations

One of the most important engagement area prep-aration steps is to conduct a rehearsal. Therehearsal ensures that every Marine understandsthe defensive plan and knows what to do andwhen to do it. One effective rehearsal techniqueis to have vehicles drive through the engagementarea from the attackers avenue of approach andsimulate engaging the vehicles within the engage-ment area. A rehearsal should include the follow-ing when required:

Rearward passage of lines.Closure of lanes.Movements from hide positions into the battlepositions.Fire commands, triggers, and/or maximum en-gagement lines to initiate fires.Shifting and redistributing fires.Preparation and transmission of critical reports.Assessment of effects of enemy weaponssystems.Disengagement and/or displacement of units totheir alternate or supplemental positions or tosubsequent battle positions.Resupply of the battle positions.Evacuation of casualties.

Figure 3-4 illustrates what an engagement areamight look like for a mechanized company withtanks and a section of TOWs.

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EA YELLOW

ROU

TE

DO

G

ROUTE

DOG

EnemyAxis ofAttack

AB 001

AB 002

TRP 02

TRP 03TRP 07

TRP 06

TRP 04

TRP 01

TRP 05

Figure 3-4. Example of Tank Company Engagement Area.

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CHAPTER 4EMPLOYMENT WITH INFANTRY

Marine tank units rarely fight alone. Typically,tank units fight as part of a MAGTF where theyare task-organized with other MAGTF elementsto achieve a combined-arms effect. Combinedarms integrate the effects of various arms—infan-try, tank, artillery, and aviation—to achieve thegreatest possible effect against the enemy. Thestrengths of various arms complement and offseteach other, while the weaknesses and vulnerabili-ties of each arm are protected and offset by thecapabilities of others.

Mechanized operations are tactical operationsdesigned to maximize the ground mobility, pro-tection, shock action, and firepower of combatvehicles in order to concentrate combat powerrapidly against the enemy. Combat power is gen-erated by the massed employment of tanks and byenhancing the mobility of infantry through theuse of AAVs and other ground mobility means.

Unrestricted terrain (e.g., flat countryside, desert,plains) is conducive to the conduct of mecha-nized operations characterized by the employ-ment of massed armor formations. In suchterrain, infantry supports the forward movementof the tank units by providing local security,retaining key terrain, clearing dug-in enemy posi-tions, and enhancing direct fires with organicsmall-arms and antitank fires. Restrictive terrain(e.g., urban areas, forests, jungles) increases thevulnerability of tank units by reducing the speed,mobility, and firepower advantages of the tank.In such terrain, it is necessary for tanks to workclosely with dismounted infantry.

When infantry and tanks move together, theinfantry moves using one of three methods: dis-mounted, truck-mounted, or AAV-mounted. Thischapter examines how a tank unit is employed tosupport the advance of infantry.

Task Organization

The Marine Corps does not maintain perma-nent, mechanized infantry units; instead, itmaintains well-trained, general-purpose infan-try units capable of task organizing to execute amyriad of ground combat missions. In Marinemechanized operations, mechanized infantryrefers to a task-organized force of Marine infan-try mounted in AAVs.

Note: Outside the Marine Corps, mechanizedoperations used in conjunction with infantry(friendly or enemy) operations traditionallyrefers to the personnel riding in an armoredpersonnel carrier or infantry fighting vehiclethat are organic to infantry units.

A Marine mechanized force is a task-organized,ground combat force of combined arms builtaround an infantry or tank unit and reinforcedwith substantial assault amphibian assets. AMarine mechanized force is normally supportedby air, artillery, light armor, antitank, engineer,reconnaissance, motor transport, combat support,and CSS units. Commanders at every level ofcommand determine their best organization forcombat; typically, by cross-attaching units. Crossattachment is the exchange of subordinate unitswith other units for a temporary period. Forexample, a tank battalion detaches a tank com-pany that is subsequently attached to an infantrybattalion mechanized in AAVs, and the infantrybattalion mechanized in AAVs detaches a com-pany to the tank battalion to create two battalion-sized task forces. Mechanized forces are task-organized into mechanized task forces at the regi-mental and battalion level and company teams atthe company level.

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Mechanized Task Force

Mechanized task forces are organized as follows:

A tank-heavy force has more subordinate tankthan infantry units. The headquarters of atank-heavy task force is usually that of a tankbattalion.A mechanized-heavy force has more subordi-nate infantry units mounted in tracked vehiclesthan subordinate tank units. The headquartersof a mechanized-heavy task force is usuallythat of an infantry battalion or regiment.A balanced task force is organized with anequal number of subordinate tank and infantryunits. The headquarters for a balanced taskforce can be either that of a tank battalion orinfantry battalion/regiment.A pure tank/infantry task force has either tankor infantry units, but not both.

Company Team

A company team is organized by the cross attach-ment of one or more tank platoons and/ormounted or dismounted infantry platoons. Basedon METT-T, an infantry or tank battalion com-mander who is receiving tank or mechanizedinfantry companies may increase the effective-ness of his units by forming company teams. Thisis done by cross-attaching tank platoons andmechanized infantry platoons. Company teamsare organized as follows:

Tank-heavy teams.Mechanized-heavy teams.Balanced teams.

The tank company is normally the smallest task-organized mechanized element. The tank platoonis normally the smallest unit that is attached/detached. When tanks are task-organized at thecompany team level, logistic support is normallyobtained from the infantry battalion S-4. If theplatoon’s parent company is in the vicinity, itmay be able to coordinate some assistancethrough the parent unit. Habitual assignment is

the routine task organization of one unit toanother; although it may not always be practical,it is highly desirable for the following reasons:

Attached units become familiar with unit SOPsof the units to which they are attached.Teamwork is built between units, which is keyto achieving unity of effort.Unit commanders joining an attached unitbecome familiar with unit capabilities.

Coordination

Mechanized operations demand effective coordi-nation between the tank unit and the infantry unitit is supporting. The tank platoon/company com-mander must have a thorough tactical and techni-cal knowledge of his tank’s systems andlogistical needs in order to advise the infantryunit commander and/or the S-3 with respect totank employment. Plans should maximize use ofa tank’s lethal firepower, enhanced target acquisi-tion (including thermal sights), and effectivearmor protection capabilities. In addition tounderstanding a tank’s capabilities and limita-tions, the tank unit leader must also understandthe disparate capabilities of the mechanizedforce. For example, infantry mounted in AAVshas less firepower and armor protection and nor-mally moves slower than tanks over certain typesof terrain. Another specific example is that sabotammunition cannot be fired over the heads orflanks of unprotected infantry because of the dan-ger created by the discarding sabot petals and theconcussion of the main gun.

Mutual Support

Based on METT-T, the mechanized force’s com-bination of tanks, AAVs, and infantry providesthe commander with several options:

Mounted maneuver with tanks.Mounted maneuver with AAVs.

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Mounted maneuver with tanks and AAVs.Dismounted maneuver alone.Dismounted maneuver combined with any ofthe mounted maneuver options.

To best exploit the mechanized force’s offensivecapabilities, tanks and mechanized infantry mustwork together in pursuit of a common goal. Eachelement of the mechanized force provides adegree of mutual support to the other element.Tanks support mechanized infantry by—

Providing mobile protected firepower.Neutralizing or destroying hostile weapons byfire and movement.Clearing paths for dismounted infantry throughobstacles.Neutralizing fortified positions with direct fire.Supporting dismounted infantry by direct fire.Assisting in the consolidation of the objective

Mechanized infantry assists tanks and AAVs by—

Breaching or removing antiarmor obstacles.Assisting in the neutralization or destruction ofenemy antiarmor weapons.Designating targets for tanks and AAVs.Protecting tanks and AAVs from enemy infan-try and antiarmor weapons.Clearing bridges and fording areas.Clearing restrictive terrain such as urban,swamp, or woodland areas.Conducting dismounted security patrols.

Employment Methods

There are two general methods to employ tanksand mechanized infantry together in an attack:

Tank and mechanized infantry (mounted inAAVs or dismounted) attack together.Tanks and AAVs support by fire only.

Based on METT-T, a combination of the twomethods (called a multiaxis attack) may also beemployed.

Tanks and Mechanized Infantry Attack Together

This method of attack allows tanks and mecha-nized infantry to advance together within mutu-ally supporting distances of each other. Tanksnormally lead the formation. Ideally, the infantryremains mounted in AAVs to close with theenemy. However, the infantry remains mountedin AAVs only when the enemy presents a lowantiarmor threat. Advantages of tanks and infan-try attacking together are as follows:

Exploits the complete mobility, speed, armorprotected firepower, and shock action of themechanized force.Reduces enemy reaction time. Disorganizes the enemy’s defense since hispositions have been breached before the infan-try dismounts.Conserves the energy of the mechanized infan-try since they are carried by AAVs to dismountpoints short of, on, or behind the objective.Reduces the amount of time that the infantry isexposed to enemy fires.

Disadvantages of tanks and infantry attackingtogether are as follows:

Greater potential for casualties among ele-ments of the mechanized force if enemy antiar-mor fires cannot be bypassed or effectivelyreduced by suppressive fires.AAVs with light armor protection are vulnera-b le to an t ia rmor weapons and may bedestroyed if employed like a tank. AAV armorcan provide protection against hand grenades,shell fragments, and some small-arms fire.However, even when enhanced appliqué armorkits are installed, the AAV can be vulnerable tothe fires of tank and antitank guns, ATGMs,and rockets.

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The entire mechanized force can become vul-nerable to enemy fires if obstacles are notbreached quickly or bypassed.

Tanks and AAVs Support by Fire Only

During planning, the commander of the mecha-nized force may decide to attack using the tanksand AAVs support by fire only method. However,if during a mounted assault, surprise antiarmor fireis received in such volume that it cannot be sup-pressed by all immediately available fire supportresources, and to continue would result in unac-ceptable casualties, the infantry dismounts in defi-lade locations if possible. Tanks and AAVs thenadopt the tanks and AAVs support by fire onlymethod. Therefore, commanders must developplans that provide multiple COAs. Specifically, aplan that incorporates the tanks and mechanizedinfantry attack together method should also havethe flexibility to incorporate the tanks and AAVssupport by fire only method if the situationchanges unexpectedly. The following are examplesof situations in which the infantry should plan todismount from the AAVs and use the tanks andAAVs support by fire only method:

Obstacles prevent mounted movement andcannot be quickly breached or bypassed.Enemy antiarmor capability poses significantthreat to both tanks and AAVs.Terrain canalizes mounted movement intolikely enemy ambush sites and minefields(e.g., close terrain such as urban or woodland,restrictive terrain such as defiles).Visibility is limited.

Key considerations are as follows:

Prior planning to ensure communications canbe maintained between the base of fire ele-ment(s) and dismounted infantry during theattack (e.g., prepositioned retransmission sitesand preplanned radio relay procedures that canovercome a potential loss of communicationsduring the attack).

The scheme of maneuver and fire support plan(direct fire, indirect fire, and aviation deliveredfires) are developed concurrently and under-stood by all elements of the mechanized force.Fires are primarily used to engage targets on theobjective. Fires are also planned to isolate theobjective by engaging targets on adjacent posi-tions or likely enemy avenues of approach. Illu-mination and obscuration fires are plannedregardless or not the mechanized forces intendto employ these fires in the attack. Positive control of supporting fires between thedismounted infantry and base of fire element(s)must be maintained throughout the attack.Radio communications, pre-arranged visual sig-nals (e.g., pyrotechnic), and/or messengers areused by the infantry to designate targets andcoordinate supporting fires. AAVs, tanks, and other available direct firesupport assets normally displace forward tonew support by fire positions as they becomeavailable.A sustained, heavy volume of fires helps thedismounted infantry maintain the momentumof the attack. Suppressive fire helps compen-sate for the infantry’s lack of armor protectionand decreased mobility. Long-range accuratefires (e.g. TOWs) are employed against enemyvehicles, protected antitank guns and ATGMs,and other priority hard targets. Ideally, the base of fire element supports fromcovered and concealed positions. Units compris-ing the base of fire element should regularlyreposition themselves to avoid presenting theenemy with easily acquired stationary targets.Dismounted infantry advances on a route thatprovides cover and concealment and preventsor minimizes masking of the fires of the base offire element. If available, engineers accompanythe dismounted infantry to breach obstacles anddestroy fortified positions.

A disadvantage of the tanks and AAVs support byfire only method is that the infantry loses the mobil-ity, shock action, and close support of the tanks and

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AAVs. The infantry is unsupported on the objectivewhen the tanks and AAVs shift or cease fires. Also,tanks and AAVs are not initially available on theobjective to cover the consolidation.

Multiaxis Attack

A multiaxis attack is a combination of the twoemployment methods: tanks and mechanizedinfantry attack together and tanks and AAVs sup-port by fire only. The adoption of this method isbased on METT-T. A primary consideration inchoosing to use a multi-axis attack is the avail-ability of suitable avenues of approach for tanks,AAVs, and the infantry. The multiaxis attack isused to exploit the amphibious capability of theAAV in crossing streams, rivers, lakes, andmarshes. Another application is when a singleavenue of approach is too narrow to accommo-date the entire mechanized force and tanks fol-low the more open terrain, while the infantryadvance follows an axis offering cover and con-cealment. Tanks initially support the infantryadvance by fire and join the infantry as soon aspracticable. Tank movement is normally timed sothat the tanks assault the objective slightly inadvance of the infantry to take maximum advan-tage of their shock effect. The greatest challengeto employing this method is to achieve propertiming among the various elements and the coor-dination of fires during the attack.

Mechanized Movement

Tanks normally lead the mechanized formationdue to the tanks relative advantage over the AAVin terms of armor protection and main gun fire-power. When the situation permits, AAVs cansupport the mechanized force by following thetanks close enough to fire around the tanks anddeliver suppressive fire against enemy infantryand antiarmor weapons encountered on exposedflanks. Movement of tanks with AAVs is gener-ally based on the following criteria:

Tanks lead in open areas or when faced with asignificant armor threat.Mechanized infantry leads mounted only ifenemy infantry is pure with no antiarmor rein-forcements or capabilities.

The desired distance between tanks and AAVsshould be determined before starting the attack.This distance is based on METT-T.

Maneuver Considerations

The critical decision of whether the infantryattacks mounted or dismounted is based on thefollowing considerations.

Tanks lead and infantry remains mountedwhen—

Enemy antiarmor fires can be effectively by-passed or suppressed by fire.Terrain is relatively open or manmade andnatural obstacles can be easily overcome. Terrain and weather affords good trafficabil-ity and visibility.

Infantry leads dismounted when—Terrain and vegetation are restrictive. Forexample, when terrain and vegetation cana-lizes movement into likely enemy ambushsites and minefields (e.g., urban areas andwoodland terrain).Visibility is limited.Antiarmor fire cannot be bypassed or sup-pressed by fire.Significant obstacles or fortified positionsare encountered that may prevent mountedmovement and cannot be bypassed.

Dismounting

Note: The decision to dismount must bemade prior to committing the force to thefinal assault.

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Once the commander of the mechanized forcedecides to dismount his infantry, he chooseswhen and where (the dismount point) to dis-mount the infantry. Commanders normally staywell forward to personally judge the situationand make an appropriate decision of whether ornot to change the dismount point. Timing iscritical because dismounting too early slowsthe force’s momentum and unnecessari lyexposes the infantry to hostile fire. The com-mander should also take into account thatspeed can provide for the security of a mecha-nized force already committed to the finalassault. Ideally, the infantry is dismountedafter forward defensive positions have beenbreached. The following are some dismountpoint considerations:

The dismount point should provide good coverand concealment, yet be as near to the objec-tive as possible to reduce the amount of timethat the dismounted infantry is exposed to fireswhile closing with the enemy.Rapid dismount and good vehicle dispersionreduces the mechanized force’s vulnerability toenemy fires.

Dismount points may be short of the objective, onthe objective, or after passing through the objective.

Dismount Short of the Objective

Tactical conditions may require seeking a dis-mount point short of the objective. Infantry dis-mounted short of the objective is usually notwithin range of small-arms and handheld antiar-mor weapons. Ideally, the dismount point shouldbe located on easily recognizable terrain that pro-vides cover from enemy direct fires. Advantagesof dismounting short of the objective include—

Dismounted infantry are protected fromsmall-arms and observed indirect fires whiledismounting.Infantry can be oriented as they approach theobjective.

Control can be established in the dismountpoint.Organic and supporting fires can suppress theenemy while the infantry is dismounting.

Disadvantages of dismounting short of the objec-tive include—

Dismounted infantry are exposed longer toenemy small-arms and indirect fire as theymove forward in the assault.Suitable dismount points that are forward ofenemy positions may be targeted by enemydirect and indirect fires.

Dismount on the Objective

Dismount on the objective is a technique usedwhen the mechanized force has achieved sur-prise or when the enemy’s antiarmor defense isweak. The following are advantages of dismount-ing on the objective:

Greater speed and shock effect.Mechanized infantry remains protected byAAV light armor longer from the fires ofenemy small arms.Supporting fires can continue while the mecha-nized force approaches its objective sincemounted infantry have greater protection againstshell fragments and other small projectiles.

Disadvantages of dismounting on the objectiveinclude—

Difficulty orienting mechanized infantry tospecific objectives.Difficulty establishing control at the dismountpoint due to potentially close enemy fires.Difficulty in directing supporting fires againstenemy positions in close proximity to friendlydismounted infantry.Vulnerability of AAVs to short-range antiar-mor weapons.High volume of suppressive fire is required tosupport dismounted infantry.

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Dismount After Passing Through the Objective

Dismounting after passing through the objec-tive is employed when a mounted attack is moreeffective. The capabilities of the enemy antiar-mor defense dictate if this is feasible. Advan-tages of dismounting after passing through theobjective include—

Dismounted infantry fights from an area anddirection unexpected from the enemy.Control is usually more easily establishedwhen not on the objective.Shock effect on the enemy caused by a mecha-nized force moving through its position is likelyto be considerable.

Disadvantages of dismounting after passingthrough the objective are as follows:

This method may run afoul of enemy positionsin depth.Enemy indirect and direct fires might still tar-get suitable dismount points.Facing the AAV toward the objective before dis-mounting is desirable from the viewpoint of lim-ited armored protection and the AAV crewemployment of the upgunned weapons station.However, the act of turning AAVs around inclose proximity to enemy fires can make theAAVs more vulnerable to flank shots. Also, turn-ing AAVs and dismounting infantry may reversethe relative positions of the tanks, AAVs, andinfantry. The dismounted infantry may initiallymask direct fires from AAVs and tanks until theAAVs and tanks can maneuver around the infan-try to new support by fire positions.

Base of Fire and Maneuver Elements

To facilitate fire and maneuver, mechanizedforces normally organize into a maneuver ele-ment and base of fire element. Fires are prima-rily employed to suppress, neutralize, destroy,and demoralize enemy forces. Maneuver, which

is movement supported by fire, brings firepowerinto positions from which it extends and com-pletes the destruction of the enemy force. Thecomposition of base of fire and maneuver ele-ment is determined by the commander’s taskorganization of the mechanized force.

The base of fire element covers the maneuver ele-ment’s advance toward the enemy position byengaging all known or suspected targets. Uponopening fire, the base of fire seeks to gain firesuperiority over the enemy. Fire superiority isgained by subjecting the enemy to fire of suchaccuracy and volume that the enemy fire ceasesor becomes ineffective.

The mission of the maneuver element is to closewith and destroy or capture the enemy. It advancesand assaults under covering fire of the base of fireelement. The maneuver element uses availablecover and concealment to the maximum. Firesuperiority is maintained throughout the attack inorder to ensure the success of any maneuver.

When mechanized units conduct attacks, they willutilize one or more of the following techniques:

Fire and maneuver is the process of one ormore elements establishing a base of fire toengage the enemy, while the other element(s)maneuvers to an advantageous position fromwhich to close with and destroy or capture theenemy. Supporting fires may consist of direct,indirect, and aviation-delivered fires, which areintegrated to achieve the effects of combinedarms. Supporting fires should be followedclosely by the maneuver element so that theshock effect of fire upon the enemy is not lost.Fire and movement is employed once themaneuver element meets enemy opposition andcan no longer advance under the cover of thebase of fire. It allows forward movement to aposition from which units can continue toassault the enemy position. Fire and movementis primarily used in the assault wherein a unitor element advances by bounds or rushes, withsubelements alternately moving and providing

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covering fire for other moving subelements.Fire and movement may be done by individuals(personnel or vehicles) or units. Usually, fireand movement is used only when under effec-tive fire from the enemy because it is relativelyslow and difficult to control.

There are situations when maneuvering to closerange of the enemy is not required. Attack by fireis fires employed to destroy the enemy from adistance. This task is usually given to the sup-porting element during offensive operations andas a counterattack option for the reserve duringdefensive operations. An attack by fire is notdone in conjunction with a maneuvering force.When assigning this task, the commander of themechanized force specifies the intent of fires—either to destroy, fix, or suppress.

Assault on the Objective

The purpose of the assault is to place violent andintensive firepower on the objective and moverapidly across it to destroy or capture the enemyas quickly as possible. The term assault refersonly to that phase of an attack when the attack-ing force actually closes with the enemy. Mecha-nized forces assault the objective either mountedor dismounted.

Mounted Assault

The decision to make a mounted assault is basedupon METT-T. A mounted assault is best usedwhen the enemy is occupying a hasty fightingposition, antiarmor fires can be suppressed, andwhen the terrain in the vicinity of the objectiveallows for rapid movement onto and across theobjective. The assault must be carried out rapidly.Normally, tanks lead and are followed closely byAAVs. As the assault force approaches the objec-tive, the AAVs should move closer to the tanksfor added protection from enemy, short-rangeantiarmor weapons.

Movement across the objective must be fast andcontinuous. A heavy volume of suppressive firesis maintained to keep enemy soldiers down intheir positions. Stabilized turrets allow tanks tocontinue moving while conducting fire andmovement. AAVs normally stay as close to thetanks as possible to provide protection to theflanks and rear of the tank.

Once the tanks and AAVs reach the far side ofthe objective, they occupy hull-down positions (ifpossible). From support by fire positions, thetanks and AAVs can engage any retreatingenemy forces, continue the attack, or defendagainst counterattack. If it is necessary to seizethe objective, the dismounted infantry is used toclear remaining pockets of enemy resistance andto secure prisoners.

A mechanized pure force assaults mounted with-out tanks in essentially the same way it assaultswith them.

Dismounted Assault

If the enemy is in well-prepared, defensive posi-tions, antiarmor fires cannot be suppressed, or theterrain restricts vehicle movement onto the objec-tive then the assault is normally conducted dis-mounted. If the attack starts as mounted, theinfantry should be dismounted in a covered andconcealed position that is as close to the objectiveas possible. The base of fire element delivers sup-porting fires while the dismounted infantrydeploys. Dismounted infantry uses radios, pre-arranged visual signals (e.g., pyrotechnic), and/ormessengers to direct the base of fire element toshift and cease supporting fires. The dismountedinfantry then employs fire and movement throughthe objective. Elements of the base of fire ele-ment normally displace to subsequent support byfire positions just before their fires are masked bythe dismount element. When the tanks and AAVsfrom the base of fire element rejoin the dis-mounted infantry, the infantry—

Suppresses any remaining enemy position asthe tanks and AAVs move to the objective.

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Reconnoiters initial support by fire positionsand guides tanks and AAVs into the positionswhen necessary. Provides flank and rear security for the AAVsand tanks.

Based on METT-T, the tanks may be employedto continue through the objective, engage resis-tance, and pursue by fire until the infantry hasconsolidated the position.

Consolidation and Reorganization

The mechanized force consolidates and reorga-nizes as soon as it takes the objective. This isdone so the force can either repel a counterattackor continue the attack. The mechanized forceconsolidates the objective by—

Tanks and AAVs are positioned in support byfire positions and assigned sectors of firewhile antiarmor weapons are being posi-tioned. Tanks and AAVs are normally posi-tioned on terrain that both provides cover andconcealment and permits the vehicles to over-watch the infantry in the event of enemycounterattack. If possible, tanks and AAVsare placed in hull-down positions.All elements of the mechanized force establishlocal security and mutual support betweenunits.The dismounted infantry eliminates anyremaining pockets of enemy resistance andsecures prisoners of war. Dismounted infantry

normally designates targets for the overwatch-ing vehicles and uses organic and supportingfires to destroy any enemy resistance.After consolidation, the infantry eitherremounts the AAVs to continue the attack orsets up a hasty or deliberate defense.

Reorganization consists of the following:

Replacing key leaders who became casualties.Redistributing ammunition.Arranging for medical evacuation of casualties.Safeguarding prisoners of war to collectionpoints or to the rear.

During mechanized operations in unrestricted ter-rain, tanks should always lead in offensive move-ment formations. Speed, mobility, firepower, andsurvivability are otherwise reduced. The surviv-ability, superior target acquisition, range ofweapon systems, and lethality of tank units pro-vide the unit commander with time to develop thesituation and choose an appropriate COA.

Transporting Infantry

On very rare occasions, the platoon leader maybe required to transport infantrymen on tanks (seefig. 4-1 on page 4-10). This occurs only whencontact is not expected. If the platoon is movingas part of a larger force and is tasked to providesecurity, the lead section or element should notcarry infantry.

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Platoon

Leader

Rifleman

Rifleman

Rifleman

Rifleman

SAW

M203

Grenadier

M203

Grenadier

Team

Leader

Figure 4-1. Notional Positions for Infantry Riding on a Tank.

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CHAPTER 5OTHER TACTICAL OPERATIONS

SECTION I. SECURITY OPERATIONS

Security operations are designed to provide reac-tion time, maneuver space, and protection for theforce as a whole. The primary mission of thesecurity force is the protection of the main bodyas opposed to a terrain or enemy objective.

At the tactical level, security forces protectagainst surprise attack and observation by hostileair and ground forces by ensuring the enemy isnot able to see or engage the main force. Theymaintain freedom of maneuver for the main forceby providing reaction time and maneuver space.Forces conducting security missions focus theirmovements on the main force or facility that theyare assigned to secure.

Security forces may operate at varying distancesfrom the main body based on conditions ofMETT-T. They employ the minimum combatpower necessary to cover extended frontages inorder to provide the main body commander earlywarning. This allows the commander to retain thebulk of his combat power to be committed at thedecisive place and time to engage the enemy.

Security forces report enemy activities to themain body commander and to other affectedsecurity forces. The main body commanderensures that the security force commander hasaccess to all pertinent intelligence and combatinformation obtained by the main body to supple-ment the security force’s capabilities. Throughthe continuous exchange of information, both thesecurity force and main body commander havethe time to choose a COA suitable to the situa-tion. When tanks are employed as a securityforce, they are usually augmented with other

forces that help provide intelligence and quickanalysis in order to develop the situation asquickly as possible once contact is made. Tankunits usually focus on avenues of approach largeenough for enemy mechanized units to utilizesince they can be the largest threat to a mecha-nized main force.

To help tank units conduct security operations,aviation assets work in concert with ground secu-rity forces to create a synergism that facilitatesrapid mission execution. Aviation assets can alerttanks of the approaching enemy, and they mayalso help to attrite the enemy forces beforeengagement with ground security forces.

Tank units conducting security operations mustalso take into account that the enemy may haveassets that are employed to detect them. Carefulplanning before the security mission should bedone to determine the enemy’s ability to employits air and RSTA assets, likely enemy locationsand/or routes, enemy surveillance devices, indi-rect fire capabilities, and both mounted and dis-mounted antitank platform capabilities.

Regardless of the type of security mission, atank’s ability to perform a successful securityoperation depends on the proper application ofthe following fundamentals:

Providing early warning and reaction time.The security force provides early warning bydetecting the enemy force quickly and alertingthe main body. It provides reaction time for themain body by taking actions within its capabil-ity and mission constraints to delay theenemy’s advance.

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Orienting on the force to secure. The securityforce orients all its actions to protect and pro-vide early warning to the force that it is tosecure. It aggressively seeks out the enemy andonly occupies terrain in order to enhance itsability to protect the main body.Performing continuous reconnaissance. Thesecurity force conducts its operations byaggressively seeking out the enemy and recon-noitering key terrain. Security forces continu-ously employ a combination of observationposts, mounted/dismounted patrols, sensors,and defensive positions.Maintaining enemy contact. The security forcecommander arrays his available assets toensure continuous contact with the enemy. Atthe same time, the security force must notbecome decisively engaged and fixed in place.It must retain its flexibility to stay in front ofthe enemy and ability to report. Contact withthe enemy is maintained both physically andwith technical assets.

There are three types of security operations:cover, guard, and screen. Each type of operationprovides an increased measure of security andreaction time to the force; however, the morecombat power allocated to the security force, theless will be available for the main effort. A coverallocates considerable combat power to engagean enemy force at a considerable distance fromthe main force if provided the maximum earlywarning and reaction time. A guard contains suf-ficient combat power to defeat or contain leadelements of an enemy force. A screen allocatesminimal combat power to cover an extendedflank, yet only provides early warning.

Covering Force

Typically, a covering force operates forward of themain force; however, it may operate to the rear or

on either flank. Although a covering force aggres-sively develops the situation independent of themain force, its main role is to prevent the surpriseand untimely engagement of the main force.

A covering force differs from a screening orguarding force in that it is normally a self-suffi-cient, combined-arms force equipped withenough combat power to develop a situation at aconsiderable distance away from the main force.While the covering force provides the most secu-rity to the main force, it generally requires a con-siderable amount of dedicated logistic support.Therefore, a commander only assigns a coveringforce mission whenever the enemy possesses astrong mobile force that is capable of rapid anddecisive action and there are sufficient assets toresource both the covering force and the mainforce. A rear covering force normally protects aforce moving away from the enemy. The cover-ing force deploys behind the forward maneuverunits of the main force, accepts battle handoverand passes the main force through it, and thendefends or delays. Alternatively, the coveringforce may conduct a relief in place as part of adeception plan or to take advantage of the bestdefensive terrain. The covering force establishespassage points and assists the rearward passageof the main force if necessary. As the main forcemoves, the covering force displaces to subse-quent phase lines in depth.

Offensive Cover

During offensive operations, a covering forcemay operate to the front or flanks of the mainbody. An offensive covering force may accom-plish the following:

Perform reconnaissance along the main body’saxis of advance. Deny the enemy information about the size,strength, composition, and objective of themain body.

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Destroy or repel enemy reconnaissance andsecurity zone forces.Penetrate enemy defense in order to developthe situation to determine enemy strengths,weaknesses, and dispositions.Defeat, repel, or fix enemy forces as directedby the higher commander.Exploit opportunities.

The covering force should clear the zone of enemysecurity and small combat elements and penetratethe leading elements of the enemy’s defensivepositions. When it can advance no further, it pre-pares for the main body to conduct a forward pas-sage of lines. It continues to perform closereconnaissance of enemy positions to locate gapsor vulnerable flanks. A good covering force allowsthe commander of the main force the ability toattack the enemy’s weak point at the time of hischoosing with previously uncommitted forces.

Defensive Cover

A defensive covering force operates to the front,flanks, or rear of a main force. The primary mis-sion of a defensive covering force is to strip awayenemy reconnaissance, force the enemy to revealhis main effort, disrupt his attack, and deny himthe initiative. Defensive covering forces—

Maintain continuous surveillance of high-speed avenues of approach.Destroy or repel enemy reconnaissance andsecurity forces.Determine the size, strength, composition, anddirection of the enemy’s main effort.Defeat the lead enemy echelons if possible.Force the enemy to deploy repeatedly in orderto fight through the covering force and com-mit his reserve or follow-on forces to sustainmomentum.Create ambiguity as to location and dispositionof the main force.

The covering force screens, defends, delays, andcounterattacks to execute a defensive cover. If the

covering force area is not yet occupied, the cover-ing force may have to reconnoiter and clear thearea or route. As in offensive operations, aerialreconnaissance is critical to extending the bat-tlespace. It can screen less threatened sectors andrapidly reinforce fires when other elements of thecovering force are heavily engaged. Duringdefensive operations, the commander of the mainforce designates the forward and rear boundariesof the security force with phase lines. The lateralboundaries of the security area are normallyextensions of main body boundaries. The rearboundary of the covering force area is the FEBA.

Guard Force

A guard force protects the main force by prevent-ing the enemy from being able to engage mainforces with direct fire weapons. The guard forceaccomplishes its task by reconnoitering, attack-ing, defending, and delaying enemy forces inorder to provide time for the main force tocounter enemy actions.

A guard differs from a screening force in that itcontains greater combat power and is employedto engage enemy forces within its capability asopposed to a screen that only provides earlywarning and destroys enemy reconnaissance. Ascreening mission may transition to a guard mis-sion upon the approach of a sizable enemy force.For example, a tank company conducting ascreen may be reinforced with the remaining tankbattalion if it is determined that a sizeable enemymechanized force is approaching and may needto be destroyed before reaching follow-on forces.

A guard force is normally task-organized fromelements of the main force; therefore, it operateswithin supporting range of the main body. If unitsneed both protection and early warning, the com-mander of the main force assigns a guard mis-sion to subordinate units when there are little orno other security forces between the main forceand probable enemy forces. The commander mayuse a guard to the front of his main forces

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(advance guard), to the rear (rear guard) espe-cially during retrograde operations, or to the flank(flank guard) when there is a threat of significantenemy contact.

The commander may designate a tank unit as aguard force for protection from enemy groundobservation, direct fire, and surprise attack for agiven period of time. A guard force allows thecommander to extend the defense in time andspace to prevent interruption of the organizationof the main battle area.

Advance Guard

The advance guard is the lead element of anadvancing formation or column. The advanceguard’s mission is to clear the axis or zone ofenemy elements and to allow the unimpededmovement of the main force. If an advance guardoperates behind the security force of a higherechelon, then the higher echelon security forceinitially develops the situation. The advanceguard may then reinforce the higher echelonsecurity force or expand the area of contact withthe enemy force.

Flank Guard

The flank guard has the responsibility to clear thearea between the main force and the flank guard’sposition. Typically, the flank guard operates on asmaller frontage than a screen. The commanderof the flank guard considers the axis taken by themain force, enemy’s capabilities, and avenues ofapproach in order to determine his initial disposi-tions. Sectors should be sufficiently deep to pro-vide early warning and reaction time, yet remainwithin supporting range of the main force.

Should an enemy attack appear imminent fromthe flank, the flank guard normally occupiespreplanned or hasty defensive posi t ions.Should the enemy prove too strong for theflank guard, the flank guard will normallydelay in sector. Flank guard operations can beemployed while the main force is stationary ormoving. Whichever technique is used, the

flank guard must remain in contact with theleading elements of the main body.

A stationary flank guard reconnoiters out to itsinitial security positions. This allows the flankguard to clear the zone and become familiar withthe terrain that may subsequently be defended.Upon reaching its initial positions, the flankguard establishes a defense. The commanderplans the defense or delay in depth from the ini-tial positions. The following critical tasks applyduring a stationary flank guard mission:

Maintain continuous surveillance of enemyavenues of approach.Maintain contact with the main body.Provide early warning and defeat, repel, or fixenemy ground forces, within capabilities,before they can engage the main body withdirect fire.

The techniques for movement and establishmentof a moving flank guard force are similar the totechniques used during flank screening opera-tions. Whichever technique is used, the flankguard must remain in contact with the leadingelements of the main body.

Based on the speed of the main body, the likeli-hood of the enemy attack, and the distance to theobjective, the guard force uses one or a combina-tion of the following movement techniques:

Successive bounds is used when the enemyaction against the flank is light and the move-ment of the main force is expected to includefrequent short halts.Alternate bounds is used when strong enemyaction is anticipated against the flank, thistechnique requires slow movement by the mainforce. Alternate bounds are the most secure,yet the slowest technique.Continuous movement is used when enemyactivity on the flank is unlikely and the mainforce is moving with all possible speed. Travel-ing in column with an on-order defensive mis-sion is the quickest but least secure technique.

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Rear Guard

The rear guard protects the exposed rear of themain force during offensive operations or retro-grade operations. Rear guards are normally estab-lished during a withdrawal, during a retirement, orwhen conducting deep maneuver forward of theforward line of own troops when there is signifi-cant enemy threat to the rear of the main force.

Establishing a rear guard during a retrogradeoperation may be done in two ways. The rearguard may relieve other units in place along theforward line of own troops as they move to therear. Alternatively, the rear guard may establish aposition in depth behind the main force and passthose forces through.

The rear guard employs both sector and battlepositions while executing its mission. The com-mander of the main force prescribes the dis-tance that the rear guard must maintain betweenitself and the main force. The rear guard for amoving force displaces to successive, in-depthbattle positions as the main force moves. Thenature of enemy contact determines the methodof displacement.

Screening Force

A screening force primarily provides early warn-ing. It observes, identifies, and reports informa-tion. It generally fights only in self-defense, butdoes engage enemy reconnaissance elementswithin its capabilities. Commanders generallyestablish screens on an extended flank, to therear, or to the front of a stationary force. A screenis often executed as a series of observation postswith patrolling between them.

The GCE commander may establish a screeningforce utilizing tank units to gain and maintaincontact with the enemy, to observe enemy activ-ity, to identify the enemy main effort, and toreport information. In most situations, the mini-mum security force, normally organized by the

GCE, is a screening force. Normally, the screen-ing force only fights in self-defense, but it may betasked to—

Repel enemy reconnaissance units as part ofthe GCE’s counterreconnaissance effort.Prevent enemy artillery from acquiring terrainthat enables a front line unit to be engaged.Provide early warning.Attack the enemy with supporting arms.

A screen is not conducted forward of a movingforce. The security element forward of a movingforce must conduct either a guard or cover. Thesenior commander determines the general loca-tion at which he wants the screening force tooperate. Screens for a moving force must remainphysically tied into the main force. The initialscreen line must be within supporting range ofthe main force, yet far enough away to providesufficient early warning. Normally, there is littleor no depth along the screen, except along high-speed avenues of approach. This depth allowscommanders to maintain continuous contactwhile observation posts along the initial screenline are displacing.

The screening force commander controls move-ment in sector by designating subsequent screenlines. Subsequent screen lines are essentiallyphase lines. Displacement to a subsequent screenline is event driven. The approach of an enemyforce, relief of a friendly unit, or movement ofthe protected force dictate screen movements.

A screening force provides security for a mainforce that is either stationary or moving. Theterms stationary and moving describe the actionsof the protected force, not the screening force.

Stationary Screen

A security force conducts a screen to the front,flank, and rear of a stationary force in a similarmanner. The tasks associated with a stationaryscreen normally consist of movement to the ini-tial screen line, establishment of the screen, and

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displacement to subsequent screen lines. Addi-tionally, the screening force commander coordi-nates battle handover lines (BHLs) and passageof lines with the main force commander.

Moving Screen

A screen is maintained along the flanks and/orthe rear of the main force. Responsibilities for amoving flank screen begin at the front of the leadcombat element in the main force and end at therear of the protected force.

A moving screen may be placed to the rear of themain force conducting an attack or a retrogradeoperation. In this situation, the screen line dis-places to a subsequent screen line based onmovements of the main body or enemy force.Movement along the screen line is determined bythe speed of the main force, the distance to theobjective, and the enemy situation. There are fourbasic methods of controlling movement along thescreen line:

Alternate bound by individual observationposts from rear to front.Alternate bound by subordinate units from rearto front.Successive bound by units along the screen line.Continuous march along the route of advance.

The movement of the screen is keyed to themovement of the main force. There are threetechniques of performing this type of screen:

Screening force crosses the line of departureseparate from the main force when the mainforce is moving quickly or the line of departureis uncontested. This is the fastest but leastsecure technique.Screening force’s lead element reconnoiters thezone when the main force is moving slow or

the line of departure is uncontested. This tech-nique is slower than the previous technique,but provides better security.Screening force crosses line of departure withthe main force when the main force is movingslowly, the line of departure is also the line ofcontact, or the enemy situation is vague. Thistechnique provides security for the screeningforce and the main force, but it is the most timeconsuming.

Screening Operations During Limited Visibility

Limited visibility caused by weather conditionsoften affects the screening force’s ground and airobservation capabilities. While technical intelli-gence assets can be employed to offset limitedvisibility, the screening force should adjust itstechniques and procedures (e.g., observationposts should be adjusted; night and thermalobservation devices employed; electronic surveil-lance devices, trip flares, and observation postsplaced along dismounted avenues of approach).Depth in the screen can facilitate acquisition ofenemy forces that may elude forward elements.Patrols are closely coordinated to prevent misi-dentification and engagement by friendly ele-ments. Indirect illumination is planned and usedas necessary.

Integration of Intelligence Systems

In addition to aviation, technical assets cangreatly expand the area covered by screeningforces. Remote sensors, unmanned aerial vehi-cles, and downlinks from theater and nationalassets can all greatly expand the area covered bya screening force, thereby providing the mainforce and the screening force commanders timeto adjust to situations if necessary.

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SECTION II. RETROGRADE OPERATIONS

Retrograde operations are organized movementsto the rear or away from the enemy. The enemymay force these operations or a commander mayexecute them voluntarily. Retrograde operationsare transitional operations, and they are not con-sidered in isolation. They are conducted eitherbefore or after defensive or offensive operations.They are part of a larger scheme of maneuver toregain the initiative and defeat the enemy. In anyretrograde, consideration must be given to possi-ble refugee traffic that will both clog high-speedavenues of approach and also require displace-ment assistance/humanitarian aid, which will beexacerbated in the highly populated regions ofthe world. Commanders execute retrogrades to—

Wear down the enemy, trading space for timein situations that do not favor a defense.Disengage from combat.Avoid combat under undesirable conditionssuch as continuing an operation that no longerpromises success.Draw the enemy into an unfavorable situation.Place forces in a more favorable position.Allow the use of a portion or all of the forceelsewhere.Conform to the movement of other forces.

The forms of retrograde include delay, with-drawal, and retirement operations.

Delay

In the delay, the destruction of the enemy force issecondary to slowing his advance in order to gaintime for friendly forces. Mechanized units areideally suited for delay operations because theirlong-range weapons and mobility allow theenemy advance to be slowed and/or attrited while

forces conduct the delay and gain time. Delaysare conducted—

When the force’s strength is insufficient todefend or attack.To reduce the enemy’s offensive capability byinflicting casualties.To gain time by forcing the enemy to deploy.To determine the strength and location of theenemy’s main effort.When the enemy intent is not clear and thecommander desires intelligence.To protect and provide early warning for themain battle area forces.To allow time to re-establish the defense.

The delay succeeds by forcing the enemy torepeatedly concentrate his forces to fight throughdelay positions. Delaying forces displace oncethe enemy concentrates sufficient resources todecisively engage and defeat friendly forces.

Tanks are well-suited for delay operations dueto their high rate of fire, armor protectionagainst enemy artillery, and mobility. Tanksmay also be retained in a reserve to extricateforces that have been decisively engaged or toconduct counterattacks.

Techniques of Delay Operations

There are two main techniques of delay opera-tions: delay from alternate positions and delayfrom successive positions. In the execution ofeither technique, it is crucial that the delayforce main ta ins con tac t wi th the enemybetween delay positions.

Alternate PositionsDelay from alternate positions involves two ormore units in a single sector that occupy delaying

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positions in depth. As the first unit engages theenemy, the second occupies the next position indepth and prepares to assume responsibility for theoperation. The first force disengages and passesaround the second. It then prepares to re-engagethe enemy from a position in greater depth, whilethe second force takes up the fight.

Delay from alternate positions is useful on partic-ularly dangerous avenues of approach because itoffers greater security than delay from succes-sive positions. However, it requires more forcesand continuous maneuver coordination. Addition-ally, there is the risk of losing contact with theenemy between delay positions.

Successive PositionsDelaying from successive positions occurs whenthe sector is so wide that available forces cannotoccupy more than a single tier of positions.Delaying units are positioned forward in a singleechelon. Maneuver units delay continuously onand between positions throughout their sectors.As a result, this technique is simpler to coordi-nate than the delay from alternate positions.

Delaying from successive positions is easier topenetrate than a delay from alternate positionsbecause the force has less depth and less time tooccupy subsequent positions. To facilitate therapid occupation of positions, units normally per-form reconnaissance on subsequent positionsbefore occupation and post guides on one or twosubsequent positions.

In restrictive terrain, where infantry conducts theprimary action, successive positions may be closetogether. In more open terrain, delay positions areoften further apart. In the selection of positions,commanders consider the location of natural andartificial obstacles, particularly when the enemypossesses sufficient armored combat systems.

Organization of Forces

As in defensive operations, commanders assigntheir delaying force a sector with flank and rearboundaries and the commander selects delaypositions on key terrain astride likely enemy ave-nues of approach. Delay positions are normallybattle positions that commanders plan through-out the depth of the delay sector. Phase lines aredesignated along identifiable terrain features tocontrol the displacement of friendly forces.Selected phase lines may be designated as delaylines. Delay lines require the delaying force toprevent the enemy from crossing the line until aspecified time or the occurrence of an event.

Coordination is critical during a delay. To ensurecoordination, commanders designate contactpoints at the boundaries along delay lines to ensureunits coordinate each series of delay positions.

In the delay, reconnaissance and surveillanceassets are focused on named and target areas ofinterest. It is essential that the delaying com-mander identify the enemy’s advance earlyenough to adjust his scheme of maneuver andconcentrate sufficient combat power to effec-tively delay the enemy.

Commanders normally retain a reserve to containenemy penetrations between delay positions, rein-force fires into an engagement area, or help a unitdisengaging from the enemy. The size of the reservedepends on the situation and forces available.

Execution of the Delay

A mechanized force will normally be assignedsectors in which to delay and the initial delaypositions. Phase lines may be employed to con-trol the timing of the delay. The tank should beemployed as the primary weapon to engageenemy tanks.

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Rear Operations

Rear operations in a delay are similar to rear oper-ations in the defense. However, the echeloning ofCSS organizations required to maintain continu-ous support during the delay, coupled with theadditional dispersion inherent to the delay, compli-cates the conduct of these operations. Critical tothe success of the delay is the ability of the rear toprovide class III and V to the force.

Concluding the Delay

A delay operation terminates when one of the fol-lowing three conditions exist:

The advancing enemy force reaches a culmina-tion point. The delaying force then has threechoices: they maintain contact in current posi-tions, they withdraw, or the delaying forcetransitions to the offense.The delaying force passes through anotherforce. Typically, the delaying force will con-duct a rearward passage of lines, which may beunder enemy pressure, at the BHL and moveinto the assembly areas. Smooth transferrequires coordinating passage points, establish-ing recognition signals, and determining sup-porting fires and routes through the defendedposition. The BHL should be in front of theFEBA. It is preferable to pass delaying unitsto the rear in sectors not under direct attack.The delaying force reaches defensible terrainand transitions to the defense.

Withdrawal

A withdrawal occurs when a force in contact dis-engages from an enemy force. It is a type of ret-rograde operation in which a force in contactplans to disengage from the enemy and movesaway from the enemy. The tank battalion’smobility makes it ideally suited to perform rearguard duties for a withdrawing force. Withdrawsmay be executed at any time and during any type

of operation. Units undertake a withdrawal forthe following reasons:

If the unit achieves its objective and there is nofurther requirement to maintain contact.To avoid baffle under unfavorable tactical con-ditions (e.g., if a force cannot achieve the objectof its operation and defeat threatens the force).To draw the enemy into an unfavorable position.To extend the enemy’s lines of communication.To conform to the movements of adjacentfriendly forces.As an economy of force measure that allows theuse of the force or parts of the force elsewhere.As a prelude to a retirement operation.For logistical reasons.

Withdrawals are inherently dangerous since theyinvolve moving units to the rear away from whatis usually a stronger enemy force. An aggressiveenemy will attempt to prevent or delay a unit’swithdrawal. In all withdrawals, the commandershould attempt to conceal from the enemy theforce’s intention to withdraw. Since the force isthe most vulnerable if the enemy attacks, com-mander’s plan for a withdrawal under pressure.Commanders then develop contingencies for awithdrawal without pressure. In both cases, thecommander’s primary concerns will be to:

Break contact with the enemy.Displace the main body rapidly, free of enemyinterference.Safeguard the withdrawal routes.Retain sufficient combat, combat support, andCSS capabilities throughout the operation.

A withdrawal normally occurs in three overlap-ping phases. The preparatory phase occurs whenall nonessential personnel, including combattrains, are relocated to the rear. Next, the disen-gagement phase has units begin sequenced move-ment to the rear. When contact is broken, atactical march is conducted to an assembly area.During the security phase, a detachment left in

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contact assists disengagement of other elements,it assumes responsibility for the battalion sector,deceives the enemy, and protects the movementof disengaging elements with maneuver and fires.This phase is completed when the detachment leftin contact breaks contact with the enemy andcompletes its movement to the rear.

Types of Withdrawals

Withdrawal Under Enemy PressureA withdrawal under enemy pressure depends onmaneuver and firepower to break contact as theenemy attacks the withdrawing unit. The goal isto preserve the unit and prevent the enemy fromforcing the withdrawal into a disorganizedretreat. In a withdrawal under pressure, you con-duct fire and movement to disengage from theenemy. The withdrawal begins with the with-drawing unit (not the security force) engaging theenemy along all avenues of approach. The with-drawing unit disengages, conducts a rearwardpassage through the security force, assembles,and moves to the next position. The securityforce assumes the fight from the forward ele-ments. This includes delaying the enemy advancewhile the bulk of the withdrawing unit conducts amovement to the rear. On order or when predeter-mined criteria are met, the security force disen-gages itself and moves to the rear as a rearguard.The rearguard may be required to maintain con-tact with the enemy throughout the operation.

Withdrawal Not Under Enemy PressureIf the unit is not under actual attack, the with-drawal is not under pressure. A withdrawal notunder pressure depends on deception and speedof execution. The enemy must not be awarethat the withdrawal is taking place. Deceptionand operations security are essential to the suc-cess of the operation. Two things can be doneto deceive the enemy: leave a detachment leftin contact (DLIC) to make the enemy believethat forces are still in position or use limited

visibility to cover the withdrawal. If a tank bat-talion must form its own DLIC, it is normallyorganized from elements of each tank com-pany in contact with the enemy. The DLICwould normally be commanded by the battal-ion executive officer or operations officer. Thecompany DLICs would normally be com-manded by the company executive officers.Another option is for the tank battalion com-mander to leave a single company as the DLIC.If enemy contact is just in one company’s sec-tor, this approach is preferred. The DLICshould be able to engage the enemy on all ave-nues of approach with both direct and indirectfire. The main body and combat support ele-ments displace using stealth along designatedroutes to a new assembly area. Reserve forcesmay be positioned along the withdrawal routesand be given on-order missions to defend,delay, or counterattack during the withdrawal.

Assisted WithdrawalIn an assisted withdrawal, the assisting force mayprovide:

The security force through which the with-drawing force will pass.Reconnaissance of withdrawal routes.Forces to secure chokepoints or key terrainalong withdrawal routes.Elements to assist in movement control such asthe establishment of traffic control points.Required combat, combat support, and CSS.This can involve conducting a counterattack toassist the withdrawing unit disengage from theenemy.

Unassisted WithdrawalIn an unassisted withdrawal, the withdrawingunit must do everything by itself. It must estab-lish its own security force, perform reconnais-sance and secure routes to the rear , anddisengage from the enemy.

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Organization of Forces

Units avoid changing their task organization,unless they have sufficient planning time.However, circumstances may dictate rapid taskorganization changes immediately before thewithdrawal. A commander typically organizeshis force into security forces, a main body, anda reserve.

Security ForcesIf the security force cannot prevent the enemyfrom closing on the main body, it must either bereinforced by the reserve or the overall com-mander must commit some or all of the mainbody to restore the situation. The greater thestand-off advantage that the security force has,the easier it will be for the security force to suc-cessfully cover the main body’s withdrawal. Thesecurity force maintains contact with the enemyuntil ordered to disengage or until another forcetakes over this task.

When a security zone exists between the twomain opposing forces, the existing security forcescan transition on order to a rear guard. They thenconduct delay operations until ordered to disen-gage and break contact with the enemy.

Sometimes the withdrawing force is in close con-tact with an enemy and a security zone does notexist. Withdrawals under these conditions requiredifferent techniques by security forces. If a secu-rity zone is not possible, a DLIC provides themeans to sequentially break contact with theenemy. The DLICs attempt to deceive the enemyby giving the impression that the original defend-ing unit continues to hold the position in strength.The detachments left in contact simulate, asnearly as possible, continued presence of themain body until it is too late for the enemy toreact. This force must have specific instructionsabout what to do when the enemy attacks, andwhen and under what circumstances to with-

draw. If required, these detachments receive addi-tional recovery, evacuation, and transportationassets for use after disengagement to speed uptheir rearward movement.

Often when a detachment is left in contact, addi-tional security forces set up behind the existingmain defensive positions to assist the withdrawalprocess. These additional forces can be part ofthe withdrawing unit or an assisting unit may pro-vide them. The DLIC can then delay back onthese additional security forces and join them.Alternatively the detachment delays back to theadditional security force, conducts battle han-dover, and conducts a rearward passage of lines.In either case, the security force then becomes therear guard.

Main Body ForcesOn order, the main body moves rapidly on multi-ple routes to reconnoitered positions (having pre-viously dispatched quartering parties). It mayoccupy a series of intermediate positions beforecompleting the withdrawal. Usually CSS andcombat support units (with their convoy escorts)precede combat units in the withdrawal move-ment formation. The main body itself delays ordefends if the security force fails to slow theenemy. If the enemy blocks movement to therear, the main force shifts to alternate routes tobypass the interdicted area or the main force canchoose to attack through the enemy.

ReserveWhen the complete formation withdraws underpressure, the task of the reserve may be to takelimited offensive action, such as spoiling attacks,to disorganize, disrupt, and delay the enemy. Itcan counter penetrations between delay posi-tions, reinforce threatened areas, and protectwithdrawal routes. Reserves may also extricateencircled or heavily engaged forces.

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Retirement

A retirement is a retrograde operation in which aforce, out of contact with the enemy, moves awayfrom the enemy (usually to the rear). Retiringunits organize for combat, but do not anticipateinterference by enemy ground forces. Typically,another unit’s security force covers the move-ment of one formation as it conducts a retirement.Mobile enemy forces, unconventional forces, airstrikes, air assaults, or long-range fires mayattempt to interdict the retiring unit and com-manders must plan accordingly. A unit conductsa retirement to:

Extend the distance from the enemy.Reduce the support distance from other friendlyforces.Secure more favorable terrain.Conform to the dispositions of the largercommand.Allow its employment in another area.

When a withdrawal from action precedes a retire-ment, the actual retirement begins upon comple-tion of the organization of march formations.

In a retirement there will normally be designatedsecurity elements and the main body. The initialaction is to move logistical and administrativeunits and supplies to the rear. The formation andnumber of columns employed by the retiring unitdepends upon the number of available routes andpotential enemy interference. If there is a threat ofenemy interference, the column may designate anadvance guard that is augmented with engineers.

At the designated time, troops execute a with-drawal from action, move into assembly areas (ifnecessary), and form into march formation. Dur-ing the initial phase, the force retires in multiple

small columns. As the distance from the enemyincreases, smaller columns consolidate into largerones. Road nets and the potential for hostile inter-ference influence the time and manner in whichthis occurs.

The commander designates flank security respon-sibilities to guard against potential enemy inter-ference against the retiring force and a surpriseflanking attack against the retirement’s extendedcolumns. Flank guard responsibilities may bedesignated to subordinate march units. Flankguards must be mobile. Light armor reconnais-sance, mechanized infantry, armor, artillery, andengineer forces usually form part of the flank andrear guards.

Terrain and the enemy threat dictate if the retiringforce establishes a single rear guard or if eachcolumn forms a separate rear guard. The rearguard is normally the principal security elementof each retiring column. It protects the columnfrom surprise, harassment, and attack by any pur-suing enemy force. Its size and compositiondepend upon the strength and imminence of theenemy threat. The rear guard generally remains inmarch columns unless there is a potential forenemy interference. Should the enemy establishcontact, the rear guard conducts a delay.

The main body organizes in a manner inverse tothat for an approach march. The movement ofCSS and combat support units should precedethe movement of combat forces. When neces-sary, elements of the main body can reinforcethe rear guard or any other security element.Fire support and attack helicopter elements ofthe main body are usually the first elementstasked for this mission because they are capableof rapid respond. If the retiring formation canresource a reserve, it performs the same func-tions as discussed in the withdrawal.

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SECTION III. RECONNAISSANCE OPERATIONS

Reconnaissance is continuous and intrinsic toall Marine operations. Reconnaissance is adirected effort to collect information about theenemy and the friendly commander’s opera-t ional area . Reconnaissance informat ionincludes information relating to the activitiesand resources of an enemy, or about the meteo-rological, hydrographic, or geographic charac-teristics of the particular area of operation.Reconnaissance is a focused collection effort,accomplished by observation or mechanicaldetection method. There are five forms ofreconnaissance operations: route, zone, area,force-oriented, and reconnaissance in force.Tank units are rarely assigned reconnaissanceoperations but the tank battalion can utilize itsscout and TOW platoons to conduct limitedreconnaissance operations for its own tacticalmissions. For a more detailed discussion on thecapabilities of the scout and TOW platoonsrefer to chapter 10.

Route Reconnaissance

The route reconnaissance effort occurs along aspecific line of communications, such as a road,railway, or waterway. It provides new or updatedinformation on route conditions and activitiesalong a specific route.

Zone Reconnaissance

A zone reconnaissance is a directed effort toobtain detailed information within a zonedefined by boundaries. A zone reconnaissanceprovides data concerning all routes, obstacles(to include chemical or radiological contamina-tion), terrain, and enemy forces within the zoneof action.

Area Reconnaissance

An area reconnaissance provides detailed informa-tion concerning the terrain or enemy activity withina prescribed area, such as a town, ridgeline, woods,or other feature critical to operations. Areas aresmaller than zones, and a zone reconnaissance mayinclude several areas. At its most basic level, anarea reconnaissance could be made of a singlepoint, such as a bridge or an installation.

Force-Oriented Reconnaissance

Force-oriented reconnaissance differs significantlyfrom the previous forms of reconnaissance. Theobjective of force-oriented reconnaissance is toquickly find a specific enemy force and stay with itwherever it moves on the battlefield. Units perform-ing this mission provide timely, accurate, first-handinformation on the enemy force’s disposition and itsdepth. Units conducting force-oriented reconnais-sance may sift through the enemy to reconnoiter indepth. They may also guide attacking friendlyforces to the preferred point of attack. Very littletime is spent on detailed terrain reconnaissance andterrain-related reports and terrain-oriented controlmeasures are minimal.

Reconnaissance in Force

Reconnaissance in force is a limited purpose formof reconnaissance conducted by a considerableforce to obtain information and test enemy disposi-tions, strengths, and reactions. It is conducted byreconnaissance and general-purpose forces toaggressively develop the situation. The size andstrength of the force must be sufficient to cause theenemy to respond in some manner, and it must ableto protect itself.

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SECTION IV. RIVER CROSSING OPERATIONS

The purpose of a river crossing, whether in theoffensive or in a retrograde operation, is toproject combat power across a water obstacle inorder to accomplish a mission. River crossingsrequire specific procedures for success becausethe water obstacle prevents normal groundmaneuver. Inherent within the tank battalion T/Ois four AVLBs and their compliment of sixbridges. Typically organized as a bridging pla-toon within the tank battalion, the AVLB enablesthe tank battalion to traverse 40-foot water obsta-cles without the assistance of MEF bridgingassets. Refer to appendix A for vehicle character-istics of the AVLB.

There are three basic river crossing types: hasty,deliberate, and retrograde. For a more in-depthdiscussion on river crossing operations refer toMCWP 3-17.1, River-Crossing Operations.

Hasty River Crossing

A hasty river crossing is a task conducted as partof a larger operation, typically an attack, with nointentional pause at the water line to prepare. Itcapitalizes on speed while suppressing theenemy. A hasty crossing is possible with appro-priately equipped forces when the enemy is notdefending the river line in strength at the cross-ing and the characteristics of the river do notexceed the capabilities of the engineer systemsaccompanying the force. A hasty crossing is thepreferred option. Characteristics of a hasty rivercrossing include: speed and surprise, minimumloss of momentum at the river, minimal concen-tration of forces, and well-understood unit SOPsand detailed prior planning.

The hasty crossing uses all possible organic,existing, or expedient means to get across the

obstacle in stride. Clearance of enemy forcesfrom the near bank is not a prerequisite to ahasty river crossing. Air assault and airborneforces can simplify the crossing of a river lineby use of vertical envelopment. Most combatsystems organic to armor and mechanizedinfantry units cannot swim. Therefore, theseunits must rely on accompanying engineers forthe means to conduct the hasty river crossing.Although success of a hasty crossing is notpredicated on the seizure of intact bridges, arapid advance to the river may allow seizure ofbridges before the enemy can destroy them. Aforce crossing a river should prepare to takemaximum advantage of any bridges seized.

Deliberate River Crossing

When a hasty river crossing is not feasible, ahasty crossing attempt fails, or friendly offensiveoperations resume at a river line after a pause, theforce conducts a deliberate river crossing opera-tion. The deliberate river crossing requires uniqueplanning, control, and specialized support mea-sures. Detailed planning, deliberate buildup andpreparation, deception, and clearance of enemyforces from the near bank characterize this typeof crossing. Commanders conduct extensivereconnaissance, full-scale rehearsals, and ensureall necessary logistic preparations.

Retrograde River Crossing

A retrograde crossing is a movement to the rearacross a water obstacle while in contact with theenemy. The retrograding force may re-establishits defense.

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SECTION V. LINKUP OPERATIONS

Linkup operations are conducted to join twoforces. Linkup operations may occur in a varietyof circumstances. They are most often conducted:

To join two forces regardless of where they areon the battlefield. To join an attacking force with a force insertedinto the enemy’s rear; e.g., a helicopterborneforce or an infiltration force.To complete the encirclement of an enemy force. To assist the breakout or come to the relief ofan encircled friendly force.

The headquarters ordering the linkup estab-lishes the command relationship between theforces and the responsibili t ies of each. Itshould also establish control measures, such ascontact points and boundaries between con-verging forces, restrictive fire lines, and othermeasures to control maneuver and fires. Suchcontrol measures may be adjusted during theoperation to provide for freedom of action aswell as positive control.

A linkup involves a stationary force and amoving force. If both units are moving, one isdesignated the stationary force and shouldoccupy the linkup point at least temporarily toeffect the linkup. The commanders involvedmust coordinate their schemes of maneuver.They agree on primary and alternate linkuppoints where physical contact between theadvance elements of the two units will occur.Linkup points must be easily recognizable toboth units and are located where the routes ofthe moving force intersect the security ele-ments of the stationary force. Whenever possi-b l e , j o i n i n g f o r c e s e x c h a n g e a s m u c hinformation as possible prior to the operation.

There are two methods of linkup: linkup whenone unit is stationary and linkup between twomoving units.

Linkup When One Unit is Stationary

Linkup when one unit is stationary is the preferredlinkup method when the moving force(s) has anassigned limit of advance near the other force.When one of the units involved is stationary, linkuppoints are usually located near the limit of advance.It is also near the stationary force’s security ele-ments. Alternate linkup points are also designatedsince enemy action may interfere with linkup at pri-mary points. Stationary forces assist in the linkup byopening lanes in minefields, breaching or removingselected obstacles, furnishing guides, and designat-ing assembly areas. A restrictive fire line is estab-lished between the two forces and a restrictive firearea may be established around one or both forceslinking up. A fire support coordination line is estab-lished beyond the area where the two forces arelinking up. When a moving force is coming torelieve an encircled force, it brings the additionallogistical assets required to restore the encircledunit’s combat effectiveness to the desired level.

Linkup Between Two Moving Units

Linkup between two moving units is used duringhighly fluid, mobile operations when an enemyforce is escaping from a potential encirclement orwhen one of the forces affecting the linkup is atrisk and requires reinforcement immediately. Inthis method, the moving force or forces continueto move and conduct long-range recognition viaradios or other communications means, stoppingonly when they make physical contact.

Linkup between two moving or converging unitsis one of the most difficult operations. Limits ofadvance are established to prevent fratricide. Pri-mary and alternate linkup points for two movingforces are established in the vicinity of the limitof advance. Fire support considerations are simi-lar to when a stationary and moving force linkup.Leading elements of each force should exchangeliaison teams and be on a common radio net.

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SECTION VI. PASSAGE OF LINES

A passage of lines is an operation in which aforce moves forward or rearward through anotherforce’s combat position with the intention ofmoving into or out of contact with the enemy. Itis always conducted in conjunction with anothermission, such as to begin an attack or to conductan exploitation or security force mission. Pas-sage of lines operations are conducted to—

Sustain the tempo of an offensive operationwith fresh forces.Maintain the viability of the defense by intro-ducing fresh forces.Free a unit for another mission, reconstitution,routine rest, resupply, refresher/specializedtraining, or maintenance.

The conduct of a passage of lines involves twoforces: the stationary force and the moving force.In the offense, the moving force is normally the

attacking force and is organized to assume itsassigned mission after the passage. The stationaryforce facilitates the passage and provides maxi-mum support to the moving force. Normally, theplans and requirements of the moving force havepriority. The time or circumstances at whichresponsibility for the zone of action transfersfrom the stationary force to the moving forcemust be agreed upon by the two commanders orspecified by higher authority. Normally, theattacking commander assumes responsibility at orbefore the time of attack. Responsibility may betransferred before the time of attack to allow theattacking commander to control any preparationfires. In this latter case, elements of the station-ary force that are in contact at the time of thetransfer must be placed under the operationalcontrol of the attacking commander. Liaisonbetween the forces involved should be estab-lished as early as possible.

SECTION VII. RELIEF IN PLACE

A relief in place is an operation where one unitwith a tactical mission is replaced by another. Itis conducted as part of a larger operation prima-rily to maintain the combat effectiveness of com-mitted units. The higher headquarters directswhen and where to conduct the relief and estab-lishes the appropriate control measures. Thedirecting authority transfers responsibility for themission and the assigned sector or zone of opera-tions of the replaced unit to the incoming unit.Normally, the unit relieved is defending. How-ever, a relief may set the stage for a resumptionof offensive operations. A relief during an offen-sive operation will most likely occur during anoperational pause. Otherwise, during an offense,the two forces concerned in the relief conduct aforward passage of lines. A relief may also serveto free the relieved unit for decontamination,

reconstitution, routine rest, resupply, mainte-nance, specialized training, or another mission.

There are two types of reliefs: a deliberate anda hasty relief in place. The major differencesbetween them are the depth and detail of theplanning and, potentially, the execution time.In a deliberate relief, units exchange plans andliaison personnel, conduct briefings, performdetailed reconnaissance, and publish orderswith detailed instructions. In a hasty relief,commanders use an abbreviated planning pro-cess and direct the execution using oral or frag-mentary orders. In both cases, the relieved unitdesignates liaison personnel from its combat,combat support, and CSS elements that remainwith the relieving unit until completion of thenecessary plans.

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SECTION VIII. BREAKOUT FROM ENCIRCLEMENT

Units normally attempt to conduct breakout oper-ations when—

They are specifically directed by the seniorcommander or if it falls within commander’sintent.They do not have sufficient, relative combatpower to defend themselves if encircled.There is not adequate defensible terrain available.They are not able to sustain themselves for asufficient period of time.

Generally, the best opportunity for a breakoutattempt comes in the early stages of enemyencirclement because the enemy does not havesufficient combat power to encircle the friendlyforce in strength and weak points exist in theenemy force.

An encircled force may be operating underadverse conditions and may not have all of itstechnical intelligence systems operating. Thecommander may be forced to operate with lowlevels of in te l l igence concerning enemystrengths, weaknesses, and intentions. Within thisenvironment, aggressive reconnaissance isrequired in order to ascertain information on theenemy. The commander should also obtain infor-mation from available reconnaissance and sur-veillance assets. If the enemy is in close contact,the commander may be forced to conduct recon-naissance in force to ascertain information onenemy strengths.

The unit must re-organize to conduct the break-out based on available resources. Without resup-ply, tank and mechanized infantry units may notbe able to move all their vehicles in the breakoutattack. Priority of support may be limited to therupture force and rear guard, with the remainderof the force keeping only sufficient transporta-tion assets to move them. The breakout planshould outline destruction criteria, identify allvehicles and equipment that cannot be moved,and destroy unmovable items as soon as possible.

Organization of Forces

The encircled force normally conducts a breakoutby task-organizing with a rupture force, a mainbody, and a rear guard. If the commander hasenough forces, he may organize separate reserve,diversionary, and supporting elements. The forcesmay consist of aviation or ground combat units(one or both as individual elements or as task-organized, combined-arms teams) and appropriateCSS organizations based on METT-T.

Rupture Force

The encircled forces attack as soon as possible byemploying one or more rupture forces to pene-trate the enemy defensive positions. The com-mander must produce overwhelming combatpower at the breakout point. The rupture force,which may vary in size from one-third to two-thirds of the total encircled force, is assigned themission of penetrating the enemy-encircling posi-tion, widening the gap, and holding the shoulderof the gap until all other encircled forces canmove through. The rupture force must be of suffi-cient strength to penetrate the enemy line. Afavorable combat power ratio must be achieved atthe point of attack by means of surprise, troopstrength, mobility, and firepower.

Initially, the rupture force is the main effort.The rupture force commander will probablyhave additional assets attached to his unit. Theseassets might include air defense or additionalengineer personnel from any encircled engineerunit. The commander should integrate theseassets properly for maximum combat power toachieve the rupture.

Tanks are well-suited to be all or part of the rup-ture force because their speed and mobilityallow them to quickly engage targets and clear agap through the enemy for other follow-onforces to exploit.

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Reserve Force

The reserve follows the rupture attack in orderto maintain the attack’s momentum and secureobjectives past the rupture. After the ruptureforce secures the gap, the reserve normallybecomes the lead element. When a unit receivesthe reserve force mission, the commander mustcoordinate closely with the rupture force com-mander on the gap’s location, the enemy situa-tion at the rupture, and the enemy situation (ifknown) along the direction of attack past therupture point.

Initially, the reserve passes through the gap cre-ated by the rupture force. It is essential that thereserve continue a rapid movement from theencircled area toward the final objective (proba-bly a linkup). If the reserve makes secondaryattacks, it is important that it does not becomebogged down. Artillery preparation may assistthe reserve force in maintaining momentum outof the encircled area.

Main Body

The main body consists of the main commandpost, the bulk of the CSS, and some combat sup-port assets. It contains those combat forces notrequired for other missions and should contain suf-ficient combat power to protect itself. It movesrapidly as a single group on multiple routes imme-diately behind the reserve. Security elements pro-tect the flanks of the main body during movement.One commander should have sole command ofthis element to ensure orderly movement.

Rear Guard

The rear guard consists of the personnel andequipment left on the perimeter to provide pro-tection for the rupture and diversionary attacks (ifa diversionary attack force exists). Forces left incontact must fight a vigorous delaying action onthe perimeter so that no portion of the force is cut

off. Under a single commander, the rear guardacts as a covering force to protect the main bodyfrom attack while it is moving from the area. Inaddition to providing security, it deceives theenemy as to the encircled force’s intentions. Itsimulates the activities of the encircled force untilthey clear the gap. Once the breakout com-mences, the rear guard and any diversionaryforces disengage or delay toward the rupture.Perimeter forces integrate smoothly into the rearof the breakout column. Upon achieving the brea-kout, priority of fires may be shifted to the rearguard action. Above all else, the force must main-tain the momentum of the attack or the force willbe more vulnerable to destruction than it wasprior to the breakout.

As other units support or follow the breakout, therear guard commander must spread his forcesover an extended area. This requires flexibilityand mobility on the part of the rear guard. Therear guard must also ensure that the perimeterwithstands enemy pressure.

Diversionary or Supporting Force

The encircled force should divert enemy attentionfrom the location of the rupture. A supporting ordiversionary attack can assist the breakout attackby diverting enemy attention and resources awayfrom the rupture effort. The forces conducting asupporting or diversionary effort may be fromeither inside or outside the encirclement area. Thecommander should direct their efforts to a pointwhere the enemy might expect a breakout or wherea relief effort might occur. The forces participat-ing in these efforts are as mobile as available vehi-cles and trafficability will allow. Mobile, self-propelled weapons systems ideally suit the needsof a diversionary or supporting force.

Success of the diversionary force is important tothe success of any breakout operation. If theforce fails to deceive the enemy of the encircledforce’s intentions, the full combat power of the

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enemy could be directed at the rupture point. Onthe other hand, the diversionary force may rup-ture the enemy’s lines. If a rupture occurs, thediversionary force commander must know thecommander’s intent. He may exploit this suc-cess, or he may have to disengage and followand support the reserve force.

Conduct of the Breakout

Detailed planning for a breakout attack may not bepossible because the attack must be initiated soquickly after a friendly force is encircled. Unitswill conduct aggressive reconnaissance to confirmthe enemy disposition. If the enemy-encirclingforce occupies strong positions in close proximity,the encircled unit may be required to conduct areconnaissance in force at selected locations toascertain enemy strengths and reactions. The unitinitiates its breakout attack as soon as it developssufficient intelligence concerning enemy disposi-tions. Its attack exploits conditions of limited visi-bility and gaps or weaknesses in the enemy’spositions. If friendly forces enjoy air superiority,the breakout attack may be initiated during day-light hours to fully exploit the capabilities of closeair support. Additionally, the probability of a suc-cessful breakout increases measurably if anotherfriendly force attacks toward the encircled force asit attempts to breakout.

The unit takes all possible precautions to deceivethe enemy as to the location of the main attack.The rupture force minimizes occupation of attackpositions prior to the main attack. A supportingattack may be required to assist the rupture forcein penetrating enemy positions and expanding theshoulders. Feints and demonstrations may also beemployed to deceive the enemy as to the mainattack. However, diversionary attacks need notalways occur first.

The commander organizes and controls his rup-ture force as he would a deliberate attack or move-ment to contact. The rupture force generatesoverwhelming combat power at the point of the

main attack and attempts to rapidly penetrateenemy positions and expand the penetration. If thecommander is hard-pressed to generate sufficientcombat power with the rupture force and stillmaintain the perimeter defense, he may have toinitiate a withdrawal in certain sectors, prior to themain attack, to generate combat power. If enemyforces are in strength at the point of penetration,the rupture force will likely hold the shoulders. Ifthe enemy is not in strength, the commander mayhave the rupture force continue its attack as themain effort. If there are no identified enemy for-mations beyond the penetration, the rupture forcemay transition to a movement to contact. The fol-low and assume force is prepared to assume themain effort if the rupture force becomes deci-sively engaged short of its objectives.

The reserve moves in the approach march forma-tion and is prepared to react to enemy counterat-tacks or exploit the success of the rupture force.The main body follows the reserve. It moves onmultiple routes in either the approach or roadmarch formation. It contains sufficient combatpower to protect itself and reinforce the flank orrear security forces should they come underattack. Typically, flank security forces conduct ascreen or guard mission.

Initially, the rear guard conducts a withdrawal tobreak contact with enemy forces around theperimeter and then diminish the perimeter as itdelays back behind the main body. If the enemyclosely pursues the breakout force, the rear guardmay become the main effort. The reserve shouldthen be positioned where it can also support therear guard.

The priority for fire support is initially with therupture force. Fire support assets must also movewith the main body and rear guard so that secu-rity forces have adequate fires.

Engineers with the rupture force focus on mobilityoperations. Engineers with a follow and assume

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force or reserve improve routes and replaceAVLBs with other bridging assets. Engineers arealso task-organized with the flank security ele-ments whose focus is countermobility operations.The rear guard must also have adequate engineersto conduct countermobility operations.

Air defense assets are prioritized to protect the rup-ture force, rear guard, and then the main body.Sufficient medium- and short-range air defensesystems must be dedicated to cover all criticalpoints through which the encircled force will pass.

All units and vehicles will carry the maximumsupplies possible, with emphasis on classes IIIand V. The encircled force will only take thosevehicles it can support. It may be possible for theencircled force’s higher headquarters to establishan intermediate support base as the breakoutattack moves toward a linkup.

Exfiltration

If success of a breakout attack appears question-able and a relief operation is not planned, oneway to preserve a portion of the force might bethrough organized exfiltration. Exfiltration is theact of passing stealthily out of enemy-held terri-tory. An exfiltration effort is preferable to cap-ture and can distract the enemy from his maineffort. It may produce intelligence for the mainforce. Exfiltration by the encircled force isemployed only as a last resort by the encircledforce after destroying or incapacitating allequipment (less medical) not accompanying thebreakout force. Casualties may have to be left inplace by exfiltrating forces with supplies andmedical attendants.

Exfiltration is most feasible over rough or diffi-cult terrain, through areas unoccupied by theenemy, or through areas not covered by enemyobservation and fire. These conditions often

allow undetected movement of small elementswhen movement of the entire force would presentmore risk. It is unlikely that the entire force willbe able to exfiltrate since there may be a require-ment to create a diversion.

Based on reconnaissance, the exfiltrating unitsubdivides into small groups and exfiltrates dur-ing periods of limited visibility by passingthrough and around enemy defensive positions. Ifdetected, they seek to bypass. Units use prepara-tory fires to cover their movement as well as toget rid of stockpiled ammunition. Rally points,routes, and linkup plans all must be coordinated.

Exfiltration may be more difficult to accomplishin tanks and/or mechanized vehicles. This is dueto the limitations they impose upon exfiltrationroutes and the increased noise involved in theiroperation that makes their detection by the enemymore likely.

Attacking Deeper

A COA that the enemy is not likely to expectfrom an encircled force is that the force attacksdeeper. This involves great risk, but may offer theonly feasible COA under some circumstances. Itis only feasible if a unit can sustain itself whileisolated. When the enemy is attacking, attackingdeeper into the enemy rear may disrupt theenemy’s offense and provide an opportunity forlinkup from another direction. If the enemy isdefending and the attacking force finds itself iso-lated through its own offensive action, it maycontinue the attack toward its assigned objective.

Logistical shortfalls can be relieved somewhat byaerial resupply, external forces establishing inter-mediate support bases, and possibly by using cap-tured supplies. Close air support will have greaterdifficulty in providing support due to the enemysituation around the encircled force.

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SECTION IX. ROAD MARCH AND ASSEMBLY AREAS

Tactical Road March

A tactical road march is a tactical movement usedto relocate units within the combat zone in order toprepare for combat operations. Typically, mecha-nized units travel long distances, via a road march,in order to position themselves to perform theirnext assigned mission. The primary considerationof the march is rapid movement, but security isalso required even though contact with enemyground forces in not expected. During tactical roadmarches, the commander is always prepared toexecute maneuver. A mechanized unit, when exe-cuting its tactical mission, moves across the ter-rain using the formations and techniques ofmovement appropriate to the situation.

Prior to the execution of the road march, the tankbattalion plans and issues a march order thatincludes the following:

Routes to the release point and start point.Route strip map.Order of march. Start point and reference point locations and times.Maximum catch-up speed. Designation of quartering parties. Intervals between vehicles and march units.How routes will be marked and by whom.Road restrictions. Actions on enemy contact.Actions at halt or for disabled vehicles.Actions in assembly area. Resupply, maintenance, and feeding procedures.Scheduled halts. Fire support plan.

The tank battalion scout platoon conducts a routereconnaissance that identifies the following:

Availability and conditions of routes.Start point/release point confirmation.Location of critical points.

Location and suitability of holding/assemblyarea and areas for maintenance/refueling.Distances between critical points and total dis-tance between start point and release point.Location of obstacles.NBC monitoring of assemble area.Information on the enemy positioned along theroutes.Alternate routes, if required.

The tank battalion conducts the road march ensuringthat it maintains security during the march. Desig-nated security elements eliminate enemy elements,allowing uninterrupted movement of the main body.

Assembly Area

An assembly area is an area in which a commandassembles in order to prepare for further action.The tank battalion’s assembly area typicallyrequires a minimum of a four square kilometerarea. In the assembly area, the tank unit reviewsand issues orders, services and repairs vehicles,receives and issues supplies, and feeds person-nel. The assembly area, when used to prepare foran attack, is usually well forward. If possible, itshould be out of range of enemy artillery.

The tank battalion selects an assembly area withthe following characteristics: cover from directfire, good exits and entrances, adequate internalroads, and space for dispersion of vehicles andequipment. Overhead concealment is important ifthe unit is to remain in the area for any length oftime. Vehicles, equipment, entrances, and exitsshould be camouflaged to keep the enemy fromdetecting the location of the unit.

As the battalion occupies the assembly area, themain body moves into position without halting orblocking routes. Security is established immedi-ately and radio listening silence or minimum radiotransmissions is maintained. All units are resup-plied and operation orders (OPORDs) are issued.

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CHAPTER 6TACTICAL LOGISTICS

Logistics is the science of planning and carryingout the movement and maintenance of forces.Logistics provides the resources of combat powerand limits what tank units can do on the battle-field. Marine tank units strive to use precisionlogistics that seeks to maximize its logistic assetcapabilities. To improve efficiency, precisionlogistics applies a “just-in-time” inventory man-agement mindset, which ensures that the rightlogistics are forecasted for and delivered on thebattlefield in an effective and efficient manner.

During operations and training, tank units typi-cally consume tremendous amounts of resources.Therefore, it is imperative that thorough logisticalplanning be conducted in order to sustain tankunits. The tank battalion is capable of self-admin-istration, organic supply support, food servicesupport, and medical services that provide routineand emergency medical care. The battalion hassignificant, organic logistic capabilities for short-term self-sufficiency, but it requires extensiveCSS (especially fuel and ammunition) for sus-tained operations. The battalion’s tank compa-n i e s conduc t f i r s t and s econd eche lonmaintenance of all organic equipment. The battal-ion provides second echelon maintenance onmotor transport equipment and third echelonmaintenance on tanks, tank-mounted weapons,and TOW systems.

Distribution procedures of logistical resourcesgenerally fall into one of two categories: demandpull or supply push. In the pull method, the sup-ported unit directly controls the orders for resup-ply and other support services. The push methodrelies on precalculated logistic requirements toposition/deliver resources when and where theyare likely to be needed. Marine logistics tradition-ally employ a combination of both methods. Rou-tine support, such as resupply of food, water, andfuel, are planned on a standard schedule, or

pushed, based on consumption rates and employ-ment. The pull method means the supported unitrequests specific kinds of resupply (such as main-tenance, medical support, and ammunition) on anas-required basis.

Trains

A train is a means of internally task-organizingand employing the organic CSS assets of the tac-tical unit. They are the link between the forward/subordinate elements of the tactical units and thesupporting combat service support element(CSSE). The organization and capabilities of thetrains vary with the mission and the tactical situa-tion. Trains predominately provide supply, evac-uation, and maintenance services. At tankbattalion and company levels, trains increaseresponsiveness to the tactical situation.

Unit trains centralize CSS assets of the supportedunit at a single location under the control of theunit commander. Unit trains are most appropriatein either the defense or during periods of lowoperational tempo. The commander uses thisoption when the tactical situation dictates self-contained train operations or when the terrainmay require this configuration. Unit trains pro-vide simplicity, economy, and survivabilityagainst ground attack.

The most important criterion for trains is respon-siveness. However, seldom will the commanderfind a site that provides all the desired characteris-tics to provide maximum responsiveness. There-fore, the commander must prioritize and weigh thecharacteristics based on METT-T and the associ-ated risk. Good train locations should have—

Defensible terrain that allows the best use oflimited personnel.

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Enough space to permit dispersion of bothvehicles and activities.Concealment from hostile ground and airobservation.Firm ground to support materials handling;heavy equipment operations; and ammunitionand petroleum, oils, and lubricants (POL)activities.A helicopter landing site for helicopter resup-ply and medical evacuation.An adequate road network between the trainand forward elements and between the trainand the CSSE supporting the tank battalion.Good communications with forward elementsand the supporting CSSE.A source of water.No terrain features that are obstacles to CSSoperations or that give the enemy targetingsources.

Built-up areas are often good locations for trainsbecause they provide cover and concealment forvehicles and sheltered areas for maintenance atnight. When located in built-up areas, trains nor-mally occupy buildings near the edge of the areafor better security and to reduce the chances ofbeing cut off and trapped.

Proper positioning of trains minimizes displace-ments and increases the quantity and quality ofCSS. The tactical situation determines themethod of displacement. Trains may be dis-placed in their entirety concurrently with themaneuver of the tank unit or by echelon.

To increase responsiveness of CSS assets, thetank battalion will often task-organize and ech-elon its CSS assets into combat trains and fieldtrains. Echelonment of the trains providesimmediate responsive support, flexibility inusage, and may increase survivability of assets.When trains are echeloned into combat andfield trains, the S-4 normally controls the com-bat trains and designates the commander of thefield trains.

Combat Trains

Combat trains are organic elements that providecritical CSS in forward areas, and they are tailoredfor the tactical situation. They normally containPOL; ammunition and other ordnance items; main-tenance contact teams with a recovery and limitedrepair capability; and medical support. However,their exact composition depends on METT-T. Thecombat trains area must not take up space neededby the forward units, and supply and maintenancevehicle traffic must not impede the freedom ofmovement of combat and combat support units.Combat trains at the tank battalion level normallyinclude the battalion aid station.

Field Trains

Field trains consist of the remaining organic andattached CSS elements that are located further tothe rear. The commander selects this option toimprove responsiveness, flexibility, and surviv-ability against air attack. This option is prefera-ble when the unit is in the offense.

Organic Capabilities

The nature of mechanized warfare demands thattank units be self-sufficient to a certain degree. Inorder to maximize the tank unit’s organic logisti-cal capabilities, the unit must identify criticalrequirements, enhance its organic logisticsthrough other sources when possible, and ensureits logistics are safeguarded.

Identify Critical Requirements

Many logistic requirements cannot be predictedwith satisfactory accuracy. High-use repair itemscan be identified and stockpiled prior to a deliber-ate operation. The CSSE of the MAGTF buildsand maintains a class IX repair parts block basedon empirical data. Repair items that are low-demand, but critical, may not have been planned

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for by the CSSE so the tank unit should alwaysplan for alternative sources when possible (e.g.,Army logistic units operating close by). The classIX block should be reviewed by the tank unitcommander, or his representative, to identify anycombat deadlining components that may be over-looked. Critical logistic requirements should beforecasted to the CSSE.

Enhance Organic Capability

Mechanized forces tend to operate over great dis-tances throughout the battlespace. The mobilityof the M1A1 tank provides for a nonlinear arrayof forces with considerable separation betweenunits, including CSSE units. Tank units shouldenhance their organic CSS capability wheneverpossible. For instance, qualifying several crew-men as helicopter support teams allows forgreater flexibility in vertical resupply.

Safeguard Resources

Tank units require certain organic CSS capabili-ties. These organic capabilities are vital to thesuccess of most tank operations and need to beprotected. Protection of these resources is nor-mally afforded by locating them at safe distancesfrom direct combat, which reduces responsive-ness, or by allocating sufficient forces fordefense, which reduces forces available for otheroperations. However, these safeguards are neces-sary because failure to protect the tank unit com-bat trains from enemy destruction could quicklyrender the tanks ineffective in combat, hinder orhalt the operational tempo, and make the tanksvulnerable to a mechanized counter attack.

Outside Agency Support

Because tanks require such a large degree oflogistics, they will usually have to interface with

outside agencies if operations are of a lengthyduration. To ensure that tank logistic operationsare carried out correctly with outside agencies,requirements must be prioritized, resupply mustbe responsive, a redundant request policy is used,and key personnel should be collocated.

Prioritize Requirements

Resupply requests must be prioritized. The estab-lishment of priorities and the allocation ofresources in accordance with those priorities is afunction of command, not logistics. The priori-ties are determined by the commander.

Rapid Response

Anticipated future resupply, not identified as pre-planned support, must be prepared for immediateshipment. Resupply items identified but not car-ried by the maneuver forces should be packagedfor rapid resupply.

Redundant Requests

Requests for logistic resupply should be concur-rently routed through higher headquarters to thesupporting unit and to the supported unit. Cur-rent communications systems, such as the dataautomated communications terminal, supportredundant and immediate requests. Preformattedmessages allow users to quickly compose andtransmit logistic requests to higher headquartersand the supporting unit.

Collocation of Key Personnel

Positioning key personnel, where they can bemost effective in the relay and transfer of infor-mation, can be tremendously beneficial. Forinstance, a maintenance representative from theGCE cross-decked to the operations section ofthe CSSE would be able to interpret and forecastmaintenance requirements.

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Logistic Responsibilities ofTank Battalion Personnel

Battalion S-4

The battalion S-4 is responsible to the com-manding officer for the battalion’s CSS. Whentrains are echeloned into combat and fieldtrains, the S-4 normally controls the combattrains and designates a commander for the fieldtrains. The battalion S-4 is responsible for theimmediate logistical needs of the supportedunits and the logistical needs of the field trainsfor future resupply. The S-4 must keep abreastof the tactical situation at all times in order toanticipate the battalion’s needs. He also keepsthe S-4A informed of the current situation andcoordinates any special logistical requirementswith him.

Battalion S-4 Assistant (S-4A)

The S-4A is positioned by the S-4. He mustwork in unison with the S-4 to deconflict logis-t ical requirements, ensuring that logist icrequests have not been duplicated by mistakeand that logistics are consolidated for trans-port whenever possible. He works with theH&S Co for security requirements, the supplyofficer for resupply, and the MTO for deliveryof logis t ics packages (LOGPACs). He isresponsible to the S-4 for organizing anddirecting resupply forward from the field trainsto the combat trains. The S-4A directs the for-mation of LOGPACs for any special or nightlyresupply. He works closely with the MTO informing the composition of the LOGPACs. Hekeeps the S-4 informed of the current situationand anticipates any special logistical require-ments that may exist.

Headquarters and Service Company Commander

The H&S Co commander normally serves as theheadquarters commandant in the field. In addi-tion to his duties in planning for the security and

displacement of the COC, the H&S Co com-mander has responsibility for the layout, physi-cal security, and movement of the battalion’strains. He works closely with the S-4A andadvises him of all security matters. He is alsoresponsible for coordinating fire support withthe FSC for the field trains. Additionally, henormally leads the quartering party to locatenew sites prior to displacement of the COC andtrains or acts at the convoy commander whenmoving the COC and/or battalion trains.

Motor Transport Officer

The MTO is normally positioned in the field trains.During the planning stages of the operation, theMTO is tasked with consolidating all wheeledvehicle requirements and organizing convoys. TheMTO must be aware of what supplies and equip-ment will be sent forward so that an adequatenumber of vehicles are available. He assemblesany special LOGPACs and the nightly LOGPACas directed by the S-4A. The MTO will workclosely with the S-4A to ensure all convoys areprepared to move in a timely manner. The MTOmay lead delivery of the LOGPACs forward per-sonally or task one of his subordinate. When thefield trains must move, the MTO assists the H&SCo in preparing all movement orders and maybecome the convoy commander when moving.Once at the new field trains location, the MTOassists in the initial layout of the field trains.

Battalion Maintenance Platoon Commander

The battalion maintenance platoon commander isnormally positioned in the field trains with thetank maintenance platoon. He advises the S-4Aas to what maintenance assets should be sent tothe combat trains when needed. The battalionmaintenance platoon commander coordinateswith the H&S Co commander concerning secu-rity and is responsible for the security of hisassigned sector within the field trains perimeter.He establishes maintenance operations and makesliaison with CSSE maintenance elements forrequested support.

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Tank Maintenance OfficerThe tank maintenance officer (TMO) is normallypositioned in the combat trains and coordinates theforward maintenance and evacuation effort. TheTMO acts as the officer in charge of the mainte-nance contact teams located in the combat trains.When called forward to assist the company/team,the TMO, in conjunction with company person-nel, decides whether the tank can be fixed in place,taken to the unit maintenance collection point(UMCP), or evacuated to the field trains.

Battalion Supply OfficerThe battalion supply officer is located in the fieldtrains. He is responsible for the requisition,receipt, maintenance, and disposition of suppliesnecessary to the operation. The battalion supplyofficer is normally the officer in charge and isresponsible for logistics operations center opera-tions and setting up a logistics operations centerwatch. He is the primary point of contact with theCSSE for classes I, III, and V resupply.

Battalion Maintenance Management OfficerThe battalion MMO serves as the battalion liai-son officer at the CSSE. He is the primary pointof contact for the coordination of logistical sup-port for all elements, including detachments andattachments. The MMO monitors the CSS nets,and he is linked, by wire, to the field trains whenpossible. If the MMO is not with the force servicesupport group, he is responsible to the H&S Cofor the security of his assigned sector within thefield trains perimeter.

Battalion Motor Transport OfficerThe battalion MTO is normally located in the fieldtrains. He normally works under the supervision ofthe battalion MTO and coordinates repair/recov-ery/evacuation of all wheeled assets.

Battalion Communications Maintenance OfficerThe battalion communications maintenanceofficer is normally located in the field trains. He

normally works under the supervision of the bat-talion communications officer and coordinatesrepair/evacuation of communications assets.

Battalion S-4 ChiefThe battalion S-4 chief is normally located in thecombat trains and assists the S-4 with the operationand movement of the combat trains. He assists thebattalion S-1 (located with the S-4) with securityfor the combat trains and personnel accountability.Additionally, the battalion S-4 chief is responsibleto the H&S Co for the security of his assigned sec-tor within the field trains perimeter.

Headquarters and ServiceCompany Gunnery SergeantThe H&S Co gunnery sergeant assists the H&SCo commander with his duties. He normallyworks in the logistics operations center andassists the H&S Co commander with security. Healso provides logistical support for all personnelin the field trains.

Company Maintenance ChiefThe maintenance chiefs of the tank companiesorganize and supervise company mechanics.They supervise engine running onload/offloadpreparation, distribute class IX supplies, andcoordinate with platoon sergeants on platoonmaintenance status and recovery of vehicles tothe UMCP.

Tank LeaderTank leaders normally receive LOGPACs andguide service support elements to and from theirtank company positions.

Company Supply SergeantThe company supply sergeant is normallylocated in the field trains. During the day, hecoordinates the company resupply needs andensures that all items are placed in the companyLOGPAC for the night resupply. At night, thecompany supply sergeant usually accompanies

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the resupply convoy forward to the combattrains and checks in with the S-4, and/or thetank leader, and leads the appointed vehicles totheir respective resupply. Once resupply hastaken place, the supply sergeant returns to thecombat trains that are en route to the field trains.

Resupply Operations

The Marine tank unit uses three methods whileconducting supply operations: prepositioning,routine resupply, and emergency resupply. Themethod to be used is determined after an analysisof METT-T factors.

Prepositioning

Prepositioning of supplies may be required in somedefensive operations. Normally, only class V itemsare prepositioned, but class I and class III suppliesmay be included. The location and amount of prep-ositioned assets must be carefully planned and thenverified through reconnaissance and rehearsals.Each tank commander must be informed of prepo-sitioning locations. The following considerationsinfluence selection of prepositioned sites and exe-cution of the resupply operation:

Availability of overhead cover for the prestocklocation.Cover and concealment of the location androutes used by vehicles.Security procedures required to safeguard theresupply operation.Procedures for protecting friendly personneland vehicles in the event prestocked ammuni-tion is ignited.

There are several techniques for accomplishingprepositioned resupply in the defense. Normally,class V (ammunition) is positioned next to orwithin a vehicle's fighting position, enabling thetank crew to resupply during an engagementwithout displacing. Another technique is tolocate class V supplies en route to or within a

subsequent battle position. Use of this methodrequires consideration of security procedures tosafeguard the prepositioned assets. Resupply ofclass III (specifically fuel) is usually accom-plished behind a unit’s current battle position oren route to a subsequent battle position. In thedefense, the tank unit may rotate vehicles orsections through prestock positions based on theenemy situation and shortages within the unit.

Routine Resupply

Routine resupply operations include regularresupply of items in classes I, III, V, and IX andof any other items requested by the tank unit.Routine resupply is planned at the battalion leveland occurs whenever possible. The companyLOGPAC is a mixture of company and battalionassets that transport supplies to the company.

LOGPACs are normally assembled in the battalionfield trains area under the supervision of the S-4 (ordesignated representatives) and the tank companycommander (or designated representatives).Replacements and hospital returnees normallytravel to company/platoon locations on LOGPACvehicles as required. Once the LOGPAC is pre-pared for movement, the tank leader moves thevehicles forward from the field trains as part of thetask force resupply convoy to the logistic releasepoint (LRP). The company first sergeant or his rep-resentative meets the LOGPAC and guides it to thecompany resupply point. The company then exe-cutes tailgate or service station.

Emergency Resupply

Emergency resupply, normally involving classesIII and V, is executed when the tank unit hassuch an urgent need for resupply that it cannotwait for the routine LOGPAC. Emergencyresupply procedures start with immediate redis-tribution of ammunition in individual vehicles,followed by cross leveling of ammunition. Oncerequested through the commander, first ser-geant, or tank leader, the battalion brings emer-gency supplies forward. The tank unit may have

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to conduct resupply while in contact with theenemy. To resupply the unit in contact:

Limited supplies are brought forward to theclosest concealed position, where the tailgatetechnique of resupply is used.Individual vehicles or sections disengage andmove to a resupply point, obtain their supplies,and then return to the fight. This is a version ofthe service station technique.

Techniques of ResupplyThe tactical situation dictates which technique ofresupply the tank unit will use: tailgate, service

station, a variation of one type, or a combinationof both types. The situation also dictates when toresupply. Generally, the unit should attempt toavoid resupply during the execution of offensiveoperations and resupply should be done duringmission transition. Resupply is unavoidable dur-ing defensive missions of long duration.

Tailgate ResupplyIn the tailgate technique, fuel and ammunition arebrought to individual tanks by the tank leader orhis assistant (see fig. 6-1). This technique is usedwhen routes leading to vehicle positions areavailable and the unit is not under direct enemy

LOGPAC

From LRP

Led By

PlSgt/1st Sgt Back To LRP

1st Platoon 2d Platoon Mechanized

Platoon

Figure 6-1. Tailgate Resupply Technique.

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observation and fire. It is time-consuming, but itis useful in maintaining stealth during defensivemissions because tanks do not have to move.

Service Station ResupplyIn the service station technique, vehicles moveto a centrally-located point for re-arming andrefueling, either by section or as an entire pla-toon (see fig. 6-2). Service station resupply isinherently faster than tailgate resupply becausevehicles must move and concentrate; however,it can create security problems. During defen-sive missions, the platoon must be careful notto compromise the location of fighting posi-

tions. A company being resupplied using thistechnique can maintain security by having onlyone platoon move at a time; a platoon can dothe same by moving a section to the resupplypoint at a time.

Combination ResupplyA platoon leader can use the two basic tech-niques in combination. For example, during adefensive mission, a platoon leader may use thetailgate technique for a mounted forward obser-vation post and the service station method forthe remainder of the platoon located in hidepositions (see fig. 6-3).

Mortuary

Affairs

Fuel Fuel

Inspection

Area

Maintenance

Holding Area

Maintenance

Area

Medic

1st Sgt

EPW

Holding

Area

Supply

Truck

AmmunitionTruck

AmmunitionTruck

M 88

Figure 6-2. Service Station Resupply Technique.

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Mounted OP

Tailgate to Forward Mounted OP

Platoon HidePosition

ServiceStation

LOGPACLed ByPlSgt

Back to LRP

Figure 6-3. Combination of Resupply Techniques.

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Maintenance Operations

Proper maintenance keeps equipment and materielin serviceable condition. It includes preventivemaintenance checks and services, as well as thefunctions of inspecting, testing, servicing, repair-ing, requisitioning, recovering, and evacuatingequipment and materiel whenever necessary.

Maintenance tasks are divided into levels: unit(which includes both operator and organizationalmaintenance), combat service support group(CSSG) (direct support and general support), anddepot. The tank company commander and tankplatoon leader are concerned primarily withsupervising operator maintenance, ensuringscheduled services are performed as part of orga-nizational maintenance, and providing support fordirect support maintenance elements when equip-ment must be evacuated.

Repair and recovery are accomplished as far for-ward as possible. When equipment cannot berepaired on site within 2 hours, it is moved tothe rear (but only as far as necessary for repair)to a UMCP.

Unit Maintenance—Operator

Operator maintenance includes proper care, use,and maintenance of assigned vehicles and crewequipment such as weapons, NBC equipment,and night vision devices. The driver and othercrewmembers perform daily services on the vehi-cle and equipment, to include inspecting, servic-ing, tightening, performing minor lubrication,cleaning, preserving, and adjusting. The driverand gunner are required to record the checks andservices, as well as all equipment faults that theycannot immediately correct, on the equipmentinspection and maintenance worksheet. The

worksheet is the primary means of reportingequipment faults through the tank commander tothe platoon sergeant and platoon leader and ulti-mately to organizational maintenance personnel.

Checks and services prescribed for the automotivesystem, weapon systems, and turret are dividedinto three groups: before-operation, during-opera-tion, and after-operation. These checks and ser-vices are explained in every operator’s manual andshould be conducted as stated in the manual.

Unit Maintenance—Organizational

Organizational maintenance is the responsibilityof the operators and unit mechanics whose unit isassigned the equipment. Organizational mainte-nance has become quicker for tank units becausethe M1A1’s design allows rapid modular replace-ment of parts. Many equipment failures can becorrected without evacuating the tank for repairsand the vehicle is returned to combat with mini-mum delay.

When the operator identifies a problem that isbeyond his level of maintenance capability, henotifies his chain of command so the problem canbe corrected. The company maintenance team hastrained mechanics who are authorized to performunit maintenance tasks as prescribed in the tank’stechnical manuals. If the company or battalionmaintenance team is not authorized to make arepair, arrangements are made for CSSG mainte-nance assets to perform the repair.

CSSG Maintenance

Personnel from the CSSG maintenance com-pany, which normally supports a battalion orregiment, perform this level of maintenance.CSSG maintenance consists of repair and/orreplacement of parts, assemblies, and compo-nents. Maintenance support teams from CSSG

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units are usually located forward with the bat-talion field trains. These support teams may goforward to fix disabled equipment on site, butthey are limited in what they can fix and wherethey can go.

Evacuation

Evacuation is necessary when a damaged tank/vehicle cannot be repaired on site within 2 hoursor when evacuation is the only means (besidesfriendly destruction) available to prevent captureor destruction by the enemy. When a tank/vehi-cle needs to be evacuated, the platoon leader orplatoon sergeant reports its exact location, thevehicle type, and the extent of damage, if known,on the company net to the company maintenancechief. The crew remains with the vehicle to assistin evacuation and repair, to provide security, andto return the repaired vehicle to the platoon assoon as possible.

A recovery vehicle from the company or battalionmaintenance team evacuates the damaged vehicle.The tank/vehicle is evacuated to an LRP, the mainsupply route, or the UMCP as necessary. Therecovery team normally employs a M88A2 Her-cules recovery vehicle. This vehicle travels withthe company maintenance team under the directionof the maintenance chief. The location of the com-pany maintenance team during operations is desig-nated in the company OPORD.

If a recovery vehicle is not available or if time iscritical, other platoon vehicles can evacuate thedamaged vehicle for short distances—this deci-sion is made by the platoon leader. Towing pro-cedures are listed in the operator’s manual. Self-evacuation by the platoon is a last resort that

should be considered only to prevent losing thedamaged tank/vehicle to the enemy.

Destruction

When damaged or inoperable equipment cannotbe evacuated and it becomes apparent that enemycapture is imminent, the equipment must bedestroyed. Platoon leaders must ensure that crewsare trained to destroy their vehicles rather thanallow them to fall into enemy hands. Instructionsfor destroying equipment are included in theoperator’s manual for each item.

The platoon leader should obtain the com-mander’s permission before destroying anyequipment. However, if the ability to communi-cate with the commander fails, the platoon leadermust use his judgment to decide whether or notevacuation is possible. Every reasonable effortmust be made to evacuate secure equipment, clas-sified materials, and all weapons.

M1A1 Logistic Requirements

Fuel

Tanks require a large amount of fuel. To refuel atank company, heavy expanded mobile tacticaltrucks are required to conduct refueling opera-tions quickly and efficiently. The M1A1 tankengine can run on a variety of fuels: DF-1, DF-2,DF-A, JP-4, JP-5, or JP-8. JP-8 is the preferredfuel. Fuel requirements are as follows:

One M1A1 tank: 504.4 gallons.Tank platoon (4 tanks): 2,107.6 gallons.Tank company (4 tanks): 7,061.6 gallons.

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Additional POLIn addition to fuel, the M1A1 requires other lubri-cants to keep the tanks functioning properly. Table6-1 shows the type of lubricants and amountsneeded in each M1A1 tank. This table should beused as a guide for logistic planning.

Ammunition ResupplyTanks carry a large amount of ammunition andcan carry several different types of main gun

rounds depending on the mission. For a discus-sion of the types of rounds and their specifica-tions see appendix D. Table 6-2 is a matrix tohelp logisticians properly re-arm tank units. Notonly must the main gun rounds be resupplied, butalso the on board machine guns, the small armsof the tank crews, and the tank smoke dischargerrounds must also be replenished. The frequencyof resupply depends on the type of mission beingconducted and the types of targets engaged by thetank units.

Table 6-1. POL Capacity for a Single M1A1 Tank.POL Placement Type of POL Amount per Tank

Engine Turbo shaft 25 qtTransmission 30 weight (OEA/HDO) 45 galFinal drives 30 weight (OEA/HDO) 5.5 qtSuspension/shocks 30 weight (OEA/HDO) 30.6 qtSuspension/hubs 30 weight (OEA/HDO) 20 qtHydraulic system FRH 20 galRecoil mechanism FRH 10.3 galFire extinguisher Halon 225 psiAccumulator/LRU Nitrogen 1000 lb bottle

Table 6-2. Arming Capacity for M1A1 Tank Units.

Type Ammunition One M1A1Tank Platoon

(4 tanks)Tank Company

(14 tanks)Main gun, 120mm 40 160 560M2, .50 cal 1,000 4,000 14,000Coax, 7.62mm 10,000 40,000 140,000Loaders, 7.62mm 1,400 5,600 19,600M16A2, 5.56mm 210 840 2,940Pistol, 9mm 400 1,600 5,600Phosphorous smoke 24 96 336

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CHAPTER 7AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS

An amphibious operation is launched from thesea by naval and landing forces with the primarypurpose of introducing the landing force ashore toaccomplish the assigned mission. Marine tankunits normally participate in amphibious opera-tions as part of an amphibious task force, mari-time prepositioning force, or marine expeditionaryunit (special operations capable). There are fourtypes of amphibious operations, each designed tohave a specific impact on the adversary: amphibi-ous assault, raid, demonstration, and withdrawal.

Planning for the employment of tanks during thefour types of amphibious operations differs littlefrom planning for tank operations ashore. Theoperation plan provides basic information for abuildup of tanks ashore, their initial employ-ment, and logistical support in combat operationsashore. Amphibious planning for tanks is con-ducted concurrently and in coordination with theplanning of other units of the landing force.

Staff Planning Considerations

After receipt of planning guidance, the landingforce’s senior tank officer and his staff prepareestimates of supportability that are based on—

Mission and concept of operations of the land-ing force.Enemy situation with particular attention to theenemy antitank defenses. Terrain, weather, and beach conditions. Shipping and landing craft availability.Tank strength available to the landing force.

Embarkation Plan

Upon receipt of the shipping allocation, the tankbattalion begins planning. A listing of personneland equipment to be assigned to each ship is cre-ated. During embarkation planning, it is deter-mined whether tanks will be preboated prior tocompleting the embarkation plan. Final embarka-tion plans are developed after studying theassigned ships’ characteristics pamphlets anddirect liaison with the ships’ officers.

Landing Plan

The landing plan is the basis upon which anorderly ship-to-shore movement is conducted bythe landing force. The ship-to-shore movementplan includes the detailed plans, tables, dia-grams, and schedules prepared by both Navyand landing force commanders, and the plansestablish priorities for landing units of the land-ing force. Based on the method of landing, thetank battalion prepares all necessary forms.When subordinate units of the tank battalion areattached to infantry units, their plan for landingis reflected in the landing document of the unitsthey are supporting. Plans for the landing of tac-tical units are found in the landing plan appen-dix to the amphibious operations annex of theoperation plan.

Intelligence Requirements

The timely and continuous receipt of intelligenceis critical to the employment of tanks. Duringamphibious planning, every effort is made to gainextensive information and intelligence relative to

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terrain, weather, and enemy situation. Intelligencefor the employment of tanks during an amphibi-ous operation should focus on what and whereenemy antitank systems could be employed andthe enemy’s most likely COA to stop tanks fromcoming ashore and moving inland.

TerrainTank intelligence requires terrain information onbeaches and terrain inland from the beaches.Required information about the beaches includes:

Location, length, width, gradient, and compo-sition of the beach and land adjacent to thebeach.Trafficability of the land.Existing and reinforcing tank obstacles on andadjacent to the beach.Suitable exits.Sea approaches including underwater gradientand offshore obstacles.Surf, tide, and current conditions.

WeatherWeather affects the surf conditions and condi-tions of the sea, which are critical to the use oflanding craft and landing ships attempting toplace tanks on the shore. Winds and visibilityinfluence control and coordination of tank unitsduring landing. Rough seas have an adverseeffect on the offloading of tanks. Precipitationaffects not only visibility, but also trafficability.Extremes in temperature give added importanceto the logistic requirement.

Enemy SituationAmphibious planning requires current intelli-gence on the enemy at all stages of the planningprocess. However, the difficulty to alter plansonce the assault has begun and the need of thetank battalion and its subordinate units to bewell informed demands accurate and detailed

intelligence. The following information isimportant to tank battalion planning:

Beach antitank defenses.Enemy’s overall countermechanized capabil-ity (including location of enemy armored unitsand reaction time against the landing force).Enemy air capability.Enemy electronic warfare capability.Enemy NBC capabilities.

Embarkation/Debarkation

Amphibious operations involving Marine Corpstank personnel and assets are normally character-ized by movement from ship to shore via landingcraft, utility (LCU) or landing craft air cushion(LCAC). Every tank has a fording kit that needsto be applied before conducting amphibious oper-ations (see fig. 7-1).

Environmental Characteristics

Environmental characteristics that affect embar-kation/debarkation are as follows:

Fording depth: 78 inches (2 m).Additional wave action: 12 inches (30.48 cm).

FordingStacks

Figure 7-1. M1A1 Tank with Fording Kit.

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Fording depth capability: maintained on slopesup to 40 percent.Crosscurrent: 20 miles per hour (32 kph).Sea state: condition 2.Water: fresh or salt.

Equipment Characteristics

Equipment characteristics that affect embarka-tion/debarkation are as follows:

Fording duration: 10 minutes.Automotive power performance degradation ofM1Al: not more than 30 percent (accelerationand speed).Dimensions: not more than 24 inches (60.96 cm)(length increases with fording kit installed).Weight: 350 pounds (159 kg) (weight increaseswith fording kit installed).Installation or removal: 2 hours with three-mancrew.M1Al operating speed: 4 to 6 miles per hour (6to 10 kph) at 78 inches (2 m) of water depth.

Planning Considerations

Planning considerations are as follow:

BeachReview the beach survey prior to embarkationor debarkation from landing craft. It is thebeachmaster’s responsibility to provide a copyof the survey to the craftmaster.Ensure the beach gradient is 40 percent or less.Ensure the path to and from the craft is void ofobstacles.LCU LoadsWhen loading two M1Al tanks, utilize rear andamidship spots and reposition LCU after firsttank is off loaded.

AVLBs and tanks with track-width mine plowsmust be loaded in the forward spot due to thewidth of the vehicles.Griping vehicles down is performed by theembarked crewman. It is the LCU craftmas-ter’s decision when to gripe down.When practical, keep LCU loads tank-pure.LCAC LoadsOne MlAl can be loaded on an LCAC.Vehicles are always griped down.The tank crew rides in the crafts crew compart-ment, but the tank driver rides in the tank.Tank With Mine Plows on LCUs The M1A1 with an attached plow must bepositioned in the forward spot on an LCU.The tank must be on loaded and off loadedwith a negative ramp (ramp angle below hor-izontal) on the LCU to prevent damage tothe LCU.Dunnage must be placed parallel along the pathof the track, under the craft ramp and perpen-dicular to the path of the tank with the plow(creating a speed bump), in order to raise theheight of the mine plow to prevent damage tothe ship when off loading vehicles from land-ing craft into the well deck.

Responsibilities

It is the responsibility of the tank commander todetermine if the tank’s embarkation/debarkationprocedures are safe. The tank commander mustensure that there is a coordinated effort betweenthe tank crews and Navy personnel. Theseresponsibilities include:

Embarked Tank CrewsGriping down.Remaining on the tank (LCU)/crew compart-ment (LCAC).

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Ensuring that the gun tube does not interferewith movement of the landing craft into or outof the ship.CraftmasterProvides gripes.Provides depth soundings along the end of theramp (3 feet is considered a good ramp) and atthe hinge and aft of the wingwall.Grounds the craft prior to off loading.BeachmasterProvides modified surf index and hydrographicsurvey to craftmaster.Salvages grounded equipment.ShipProvides life jackets.Provides dunnage.

Operational Checks and ProceduresPre-amphibious Operations ChecksThe following must be coordinated prior to theamphibious operation:

Complete installation of fording gear.Ensure that all communications cords are taped up.Ensure positive communication between thetank commander and driver.Use battery vice vehicle power when using thedriver’s night sight to prevent arching fromleakage through the driver’s hatch. Ensure that no gear is attached to the left turretsponson box that will interfere with fording stacksand not allow the turret to traverse to front. Thegun should be at maximum elevation during onload and then leveled once it is griped down.

CautionOnce fording stacks are in place the tank can be runfor approximately 10 minutes before overheating.

Before Embarking on an LCU

Ensure that the following are completed beforeembarking on an LCU:

Turret seal is inflated.Loader’s hatch is closed.Turret power is in the manual position at theloader station.Driver’s hatch is correctly locked.Positive communications between the tank com-mander and driver.Hand-and-arm signals have been reviewedwith naval personnel to ensure that there is acommon understanding.Proper positioning of naval personnel to pre-clude them from being caught between the tankand a bulkhead.Loading instructions are taken from the boatcommander.

Predisembarkation of the LCU

Ensure that the following is completed beforepredisembarkation of the LCU:

Turret seal is inflated.Loader hatch is closed.Turret power is in the manual position at theloader station.Driver hatch is correctly locked.Positive communications between the tankcommander and driver.The boat commander checks the depth in frontof the entire ramp.The depth of the water from the bow ramp tothe end of the wingwall is no more than 5 feet.Tank commander checks the depth of thewater. If he feels that the water is too deep,tanks will not exit the landing craft.

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Disembarkation of LCU

The following occurs during disembarkation ofthe LCU:

Driver takes all commands from the tankcommander.When disembarking from the LCU, the tankcommander should time the movement of thetank to coincide with a lull in the wave swells.The tank moves forward slowly. Once two-thirdsof the vehicle is off the ramp, the tank com-mander has the driver gradually increase speed tofull throttle until the vehicle is out of the water.Drivers need to remember to listen to the tankcommander and to expect some leakagethrough the driver’s hatch as water comes overthe front slope of the tank.

Procedures to Abandon the Tank

If the tank has aborted and will not restart, the tankis taking water in through the tank commander’shatch, and the tank commander feels that the crewis in danger of being trapped inside the tank, thetank commander gives the signal to abandon thetank. If the signal to abandon the tank is given, thefollowing procedures are executed:

Commander orders the crew to start emergencydrill and exit the tank when flooding cannot becontrolled by the bilge pump.Driver verifies that the parking brake is releasedand the engine is shut down.Driver unscrews the turret seal valve to deflateturret seal.Loader unlocks the turret lock.Commander positions AUX HYDR POWERswitch to ON.

WARNINGBefore traversing turret, alert crew and makesure a l l personnel are c lear of turret .Crewman can be injured or killed if turret istraversed while body parts are extendedbetween turret and hull.

Gunner traverses the turret counterclockwiseuntil turret opening is aligned with driver’s sta-tion. If turret cannot be traversed with hydrau-lic power, traverse and align turret manually. Ifturret cannot be traversed, inform driver to exitthrough driver’s hatch.Loader locks the turret lock.Commander turns off the VEHICLE MASTERPOWER switch.Loader opens the driver’s station access screen.Driver lowers the seat and headrest and discon-nects helmet leads.

WARNINGDo not extend any part of the body from theturret into the driver’s station unless theturret lock is set to LOCKED. A crewmanmay be killed if the turret is traversed whilehe is between the turret and the driver’sstation.

Driver exits the driver’s station to the turretthrough the turret opening.Crew exits the tank if flooding becomes exces-sive. If flooding is not excessive, wait in thetank until the tank is towed ashore or emer-gency personnel arrive.

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The following steps are performed only afterdetermining that the turret cannot be traversed:

Driver disconnects the leads to the helmet atthe quick-disconnect. Driver’s hatch may bedifficult to open until water has completelyfilled compartment. Once hatch is open, exit asquickly as possible.Gunner elevates the main gun tube to its maxi-mum height.

In shallow water where only the hull is sub-merged, the following procedures apply:

Driver lifts drain valve handle to open drainvalves.Driver unscrews two wing nuts and removesmiddle periscope.Driver presses button on hatch, lifts handle, andpushes up on handle all the way, then releases.Driver turns crank clockwise to open driver’shatch.Driver assumes a safe position on hull or turretuntil tank is towed ashore or emergency per-sonnel arrive.Remaining crew exits through the turret hatch.

Embarkation/Debarkation Communications

While backing onto the LCU, the driver stops andthe crew attempts to re-establish communica-tions. If communications cannot be re-estab-lished, and if the entire tank is on the boat, thecrew with assistance from members of the boatcrew will ground guide the tank onto the boat. Ifthe tank is still partially in the water, the tankcommander informs (the best way he can, SOPsshould be established before the operation) thedriver to move the tank straight off the ramp uponto shore and attempts to fix the communica-tion problem.

While driving off the LCU, the driver stops andthe tank crew attempts to re-establish communi-cations. If communications cannot be re-estab-lished and if the entire tank is on the boat, thecrew will stand fast until communication can bere-established. If the tank is partially on the rampand the boat, the crew with assistance from mem-bers of the boat crew will ground guide the tankback onto the boat and stand fast until communi-cations can be re-established. If the tank hasalready started to leave the ramp, the driver con-tinues to drive straight until he is out of the water.

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CHAPTER 8MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR

Military operations other than war (MOOTW)focus on deterring war, resolving conflict, promot-ing peace, and giving support to civil authorities inresponse to domestic crises. MOOTW mayinvolve elements of both combat and noncombat.Tanks are employed in both offensive and defen-sive missions during MOOTW. Task-organized aspart of a MAGTF, Marine tank units may be calledupon to support a wide range of operations in vari-ous political and geographical environments.Because of the large amount of resources neces-sary to deploy, operate, and sustain mechanizedforces, tank units are usually used to executeMOOTW activities that take maximum advantageof their inherent capabilities: armor protected fire-power, cross-terrain mobility, and shock effect.Recently, Marine tank units have participated inMOOTW operations in Somalia and Haiti. Duringthese operations, tanks were effective deterrents inlessening attacks towards Marines conductingpeacekeeping operations. In addition, tanks servedas powerful security escorts for food relief con-voys carrying food to the local population, keepingthem safe from convoy hijackers.

In MOOTW, tank units may be assigned missionstraditionally handled by infantry or military policeforces. For example, a tank unit could be tasked as areaction force to support crowd and riot control;however, potential casualties to noncombatants andcollateral damage of local infrastructure can occur iftank units are used in this type of role. To performeffectively and efficiently, tank crewmen shouldreceive special equipment and training (e.g., theoperational environment, rules of engagement[ROE], force protection, and civil affairs) beforeexecuting such operations. Disciplined, well-trained, combat-ready commanders and crewmencan adapt to the specialized demands of MOOTW.Flexibility and situational awareness are paramountrequirements, especially for unit commanders.

The M1A1 tank’s armor protection is well-suitedto take the impact of small-arms fire and therocks and bottles that might be encountered dur-ing a MOOTW operation. Tank units provide theMAGTF with a highly effective graduatedresponse. Tanks can provide a graduated escala-tion in the use of force while providing a highlevel of protection to the tank crews. Graduatedresponse options include using the tank’s physi-cal presence for crowd control or the use of thetank’s main gun and machine guns to destroy bar-ricades or engage snipers.

Environment

Note: In the following discussion of MOOTW,the term environment refers to both the cultur-al, political, and military context in whichthese operations take place and to the terrainand weather of the area of operation.

Tank units involved in MOOTW emphasizetheir psychological effects more than the offen-sive capabilities of the tank. Tanks can beviewed as a positive symbol of power and politi-cal resolve but they can also be viewed nega-tively and can insight violence if not carefullyemployed. Since MOOTW is often conducted ina politically sensitive environment, tank crew-men should realize that every individual actioncould have a significant political or operationalimpact. Tank commanders need to ensure con-sistent discipline, decentralized execution oflawful orders, cultural training, and, if neces-sary, the use of a language interpreter. One actof civil disturbance or intolerant treatment ofcivilians can turn a supportive populace againstthe force and can be exploited by potential

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adversaries. Marines should understand the mili-tary situation, especially the doctrine, tactics,and equipment that are employed by belliger-ent, guerrilla, terrorist, militant, or paramilitaryforces. Orientation training should also clarifythe following environmental conditions: thetempo of operations, local news media, and theUnited States’ role in the operation.

The tank/mechanized commander must considerhis activities in relation to similar activities car-ried out by agencies of the United States, itsallies, and the host nation, as well as nongovern-mental organizations. The presence of tanks orheavy mechanized forces in certain areas or situa-tions could be counter to what other organiza-t ions are trying to achieve with the localpopulation. MOOTW considerations for usingtanks include the following:

Media scrutiny may be extensive and tanks canbe represented negatively.ROE may be more restrictive thereby limitingthe tanks full offensive capabilities.Identification of hostile parties may be more diffi-cult making security of tanks more difficult (e.g.,concealed antitank weapons in large crowds).Tanks and other military assets may be rou-tinely used to support noncombat functions(e.g., protection of civilian food, fuel convoys).Interaction with civilian noncombatants will beroutine at every level of command.

Tempo

Although ex t reme tens ion may under l ieMOOTW, the tempo of operations is generallyslow. Therefore, the key to creating a secure tankenvironment is not only maintaining operationalsecurity but also varying security techniques andprocedures to avoid predictability.

Rules of Engagement

ROE are directives issued by the militaryauthority that delineate the circumstances andlimitations under which United States’ forces

initiate and/or continue combat engagementwith other encountered forces. ROE dictatewhen, where, against whom, and how force—especially lethal force—may be used. Key con-siderations in the design of ROE for tankemployment include the following:

United States policy.International law.Host nation law.The threat.Commander’s intent.Operational considerations.Tactical capabilities.

Specific aspects of ROE may be intended toaddress force protection issues like combat iden-tification, fratricide, or the use of a particular typeof weapon in certain situations. Culture may bean important factor as well. ROE may forbidengagements in the vicinity of cultural or artisticsites, because such sites are often irreplaceable.For these reasons, tank crews must understandthe lethality of the tank’s weapon systems anddestructive capabilities with regard to potentialcollateral damage to noncombatants, property,and local infrastructure (e.g., buildings, roads,rails, and bridges).

ROE issues are also greatly complicated by theurban environment. ROE designed for use in onearea of a city may be irrelevant or counterproduc-tive in another because of differences in the urbangeometry, structural materials, and in the natureof the mission. For instance, the use of tank maingun rounds and coaxial machine rounds in ashantytown may pose more danger to adjacentfriendly forces and to noncombatants than to theenemy. In other sections of the city, the use oftank high explosive rounds may threaten to dis-perse hazardous materials or contaminants intothe air or water. The presence of adversary fight-ers dressed in civilian clothes, common in urbanconflicts, will further complicate operations.

In all circumstances, ROE for tanks should betactically sound, flexible, understandable, and

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enforceable. They must be disseminated andunderstood at all levels. Inappropriate or poorlyenforced tank ROE may result in friendly casu-alties (including fratricide), collateral damage,and the deaths of noncombatants, all of whichseriously hamper an operation. ROE CANN E V E R N E G A T E T H E R I G H T A N DRESPONSIBILITY OF FRIENDLY FORCESTO SELF-PROTECTION.

Force Protection

Force protection is a primary responsibility forevery commander involved in MOOTW. Thearmor protected firepower and automotive capa-bilities of the tank allow it to be employed in anumber of MOOTW missions that provide thecommander with options for minimal risk of per-sonnel, equipment, and supplies because of thetank’s inherent self-protection and security that itcan provide to supported forces.

Antiterrorism protective measures training shouldinclude operational security, physical security,and personal security measures to protect tanksand their crews. Examples include avoidingemploying tanks in patterns and routines; strictnoise and light discipline; and use of cover andconcealment, obstacles, observation posts, andearly warning devices. Tanks can be viewed byterrorists or insurgents as powerful symbolic tar-gets if they are able to destroy them and/or injurethe crew. Commanders must protect armoredvehicles and secure locations for eating, resting,and conducting maintenance while providingadequate force protection measures. For moreinformation, see Marine Corps Reference Publi-cation (MCRP) 3-02D, Combating Terrorism,and MCRP 3-02E, The Individual’s Guide forUnderstanding and Surviving Terrorism.

Public Affairs and the Media

In many MOOTW environments, the local popu-lace may view the presence of tank units as ahighly visible and potentially intimidating mili-tary presence. Therefore, the employment of

tanks infers a firm commitment and demonstra-tion of American resolve in the respective crisisand often draws media attention. Consequently,the tank crew’s actions may be highly visible,scrutinized and questioned by the media. SeeMCWP 3-33.3, Marine Corps Public Affairs, formore information.

Noncombatant Evacuation Operations

The tank unit in MOOTW can be used in a non-combatant evacuation operation scenario as anelement of a security force or reaction force (seepage 8-6 for details on the reaction force).

Security

The tank unit can establish a battle position orconduct a relief in place of a battle position aspart of a MAGTF perimeter or strongpointdefense. (See chap. 3 for detailed information ondefensive operations.) Dismounted infantry mayor may not be integrated with the tank unit. Coor-dination with dismounted patrols and observa-tion posts outside the perimeter is critical forsituational awareness. See chapter 4 for detailedinformation on employment of tanks with infan-try. In restricted terrain, commanders must under-stand that with each application of a tank in astatic position, the danger and vulnerabilities ofthat tank are maximized. A team of four Marinesis optimum to provide security for a tank in adefensive or overwatch position. The tank com-mander should be responsible for the team andtheir emplacement. In open terrain, such a teammay not be required.

Clearing of Evacuation Routes

A tank unit can proof routes to detect and neutralizemines or improvised explosive devises (IEDs).Based on METT-T factors, the unit may use tacticalmovement techniques to provide overwatch for theproofing vehicle, which can be a tank (equipped witha mine roller, if available) or an engineer vehicle. Ifmines and/or IEDs are detected, the unit conducts

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breach force operations or bypasses within its capa-bility. Whenever possible, the unit should beequipped with a mine plow and a breaching kit con-taining wire and bolt cutters, grappling hooks, anddemolitions. If the mines and/or obstacles are notwithin the unit’s breaching capability, engineers arecalled forward. While the breaching is occurring, theproofing and overwatch vehicles should take noticeof anything that is out of the ordinary, such as newconstruction, repairs to damaged buildings, plants ortrees that seem new or out of place, and freshly dugearth. These conditions may indicate the presence ofnewly emplaced or command-detonated mines orIEDs. The tank unit conducts tactical movementbreaching operations as discussed in appendix E.

Foreign Humanitarian Operations

The tank’s intimidation factor is always present;therefore, the tank unit is normally positioned asfar away as possible from those who are benefit-ing from foreign humanitarian efforts. Tanks canbe used to man a battle position as part of aMAGTF foreign humanitarian supply site provid-ing security from insurgents who wish to confis-cate the supplies or destroy them. (See chap. 3 fordetailed information on defensive operations.)When tanks are used for this purpose, coordina-tion with dismounted patrols and observation postsoutside the perimeter is critical for security. Signs,in the local language, should be posted as neces-sary around the supply site to identify movementrestrictions for the local populace.

Convoy Security Operations

Because of the tank’s mobility, firepower, andarmor protection, tank units can provide convoysecurity and close-in protection from direct fireto convoys while they are on the move. Depend-ing on a variety of factors (e.g., size of the con-voy, escort assets available, METT-T), convoyescort missions are normally conducted byMarine tank units at the platoon level, either

independently or as part of a larger unit’s con-voy security mission. See MCRP 4-11.3F, Con-voy Operations Handbook, for detailed tactics,techniques, and procedures.

Command and Control

The relationship between the tank platoon and theconvoy commander must provide for unity ofcommand. In most cases, the tank unit com-mander may serve as the security element or sup-port the security force commander.

Tactical Disposition

During escort missions, the tank unit leader supportsthe convoy commander by positioning his tanks toprovide security in all directions and throughout thelength of the convoy. The convoy commanderadjusts the disposition of the tank unit, either as aunit or dispersed, to fit the security requirements ofeach particular situation.

Escort Missions

When the tank unit is deployed during an escortoperation, it can provide forward, flank, rear, orclose-in security. In such situations, it executestactical movement based on the factors ofMETT-T. Figures 8-1 and 8-2 show the platoonusing various formations while performingescort duties as a unit. These formations canalso be used by the platoon while part of a large-scale escort mission.

Large-scale Escort Missions

If sufficient escort assets are available, the con-voy commander usually organizes the convoyinto three distinct elements: advance guard,close-in protective group, and rear guard.

The tank unit is normally best employed as anelement of the close-in protective group. Thisgroup provides immediate, close-in protection forthe main body of the vehicle column with escortvehicles positioned either within the column or

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on the flanks. The convoy commander’s vehicleis located within this group.

The advance guard reconnoiters and proofs theconvoy route and searches for signs of enemyactivity, such as ambushes and obstacles.Within its capabilities, it attempts to clear theroute and provide the convoy commander withearly warning before the arrival of the vehiclecolumn. A tank section or the entire platoonmay be designated as part of the advanceguard. The platoon commander may also berequired to attach a mine plow or mine roller tothe tank unit.

The rear guard follows the convoy and providessecurity in the area behind the main body of thevehicle column, often moving with medical andrecovery assets. A tank section or the entire tankplatoon may be part of this element.

Note: The convoy commander may also des-ignate the tank as part of a reserve (quick re-action) force for additional firepower in theevent of enemy contact. The reserve will ei-ther move with the convoy or be located at astaging area close enough to provide imme-diate interdiction against the enemy.

Convoy

Convoy Escort Using Platoon Wedge Formation

Convoy

Convoy Escort Using Column Formation

Figure 8-1. Tanks Performing Forward Security for a Convoy.

Figure 8-2. Tanks Performing Flank Security for a Convoy.

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Mounted Patrols

Mounted patrols should be carefully planned toensure that chosen routes do not canalize tanks(i.e., tanks unable to maneuver without backingup or waiting for vehicles behind them to move).Choosing such routes makes a tank an easy tar-get for insurgents armed with antitank weapons.When selecting a route, tanks should avoid areasthat are culturally sensitive or that their presencewould escalate the level of violence.

The tank unit, when patrolling urban areas orclose terrain, normally overwatches and/or fol-lows in support of dismounted infantry. Proce-dures for operating with infantry are discussed inchapter 4 and are very similar for operating in aMOOTW environment.

Checkpoints

A tank unit can overwatch an infantry or militarypolice traffic control point. Additionally, theoverwatch element must ensure it coordinates forits own local security; it usually does this bycoordinating with dismounted infantry for obser-vation posts and dismounted patrols. See chapter3 for more information on overwatch and occupa-tion of a defensive position.

The tank unit (supported by infantry) can beemployed to occupy a perimeter defense to pro-tect traffic and facilitate movement through achokepoint along the main supply route. Infantryis normally integrated into the perimeter defenseto augment the tank unit’s firepower and to pro-vide security by means of dismounted patrols andobservation posts.

The tank unit can be employed to overwatch ablockade or roadblock. The blockade or road-block can either be a manned position or a rein-forcing obstacle covered by fires only. I tcoordinates with dismounted infantry for localsecurity (observation posts and dismountedpatrols). Positions are improved using proce-dures for deliberate occupation of a battle posi-tion (see chap. 3).

Reaction Force

Tank units can be employed as an element of theMAGTF reserve (sometimes referred to as thequick reaction force) during tactical recovery ofaircraft and personnel (TRAP) missions. Typicalmissions include reinforcement and relief ofencircled friendly forces that are conducting theTRAP mission or securing an objective in anoperation to rescue a downed aircraft or strandedvehicle. In all these scenarios, the tank unit con-ducts a movement to contact and, if required,actions on contact. See chapter 2 for more infor-mation on offensive operations.

Tank units can be employed with infantry to con-duct a cordon and search mission. During the cor-don and search, the tank unit normally occupiesoverwatch and/or hasty defensive positions to iso-late a search area. Close coordination and commu-nication with the dismounted elements conductingthe search is critical. Dismounted forces are alsoemployed in observation posts and patrols to main-tain surveillance of dead space and gaps in the cor-doned area. The tank unit must be prepared to takeimmediate action if the search team or observationposts identify enemy elements. Enemy contactmay require the unit to execute tactical maneuverand deliver fires directed by the dismounted ele-ments (see chap. 4).

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CHAPTER 9MILITARY OPERATIONS ON URBANIZED TERRAIN

The powerful, high-velocity cannon mounted onthe M1A1 tank provides Marines with a keyrequirement—a highly survivable direct-fireasset—for victory in urban areas. Although theinfantry assumes the lead role during combat inurban areas, tanks and infantry work as a closeteam. Tanks move down streets after the infantryhas cleared the street of any suspected ATGMpositions. Tanks, in turn, support the infantrywith fires. The tank is one of the most effectiveweapons for heavy fire against structures. Theprimary role of the tank cannon during combat inurban areas is to provide heavy direct fire againstbuildings and strongpoints that are identified astargets by the infantry. The quick, accurate, anddevastating effects of the 120mm tank cannon,coaxial 7.62mm machine gun, and .50 calibermachine gun are major assets to Marines fightingin urban areas.

The tank provides an all-weather, direct-fire plat-form. Crewmen have the ability to utilize thetank’s thermal viewer to engage targets in lowillumination and limited visibility conditions,which often accompanies urban fighting environ-ments. Precision engagement systems enable ourforces to locate the objective or target withenhanced optics, engage with desired effect, andretain the flexibility to re-engage when required.Even from extended ranges, a tank unit’s preci-sion engagement capability provides a degree offorce protection for the GCE and can limit collat-eral damage to noncombatants (such as civiliansin adjoining buildings from being engaged) andlocal infrastructure. The wide arrays of respon-sive and accurate weapons on the tank providethe commander with flexible options.

Tank Units and the Infantry

Tanks have been the primary fire and maneuverforce on the armor heavy battlefield, but theyhave also begun to play a major role in the lowerend of the range of military operations. In themilitary operations in urban terrain (MOUT)environment, the tank clearly is in a support rolefor infantry. If properly integrated in the schemeof maneuver, the tank is also a great combat mul-tiplier and can provide a tremendous advantage tocombined-arms forces engaged in urban combat.

Some key considerations for tanks and infantryworking together in urban areas are as follows:

Situational awareness must exist between thetanker and the infantry. Crosstalk betweentankers and the infantry fosters a good workingteam. Communications between elements cantake many forms (e.g., radio communication,use of field phones externally mounted on theright rear fender of the tank, visual signals suchas hand-and-arm signals and pyrotechnics).Both the infantry and tankers must exercise tacti-cal patience. Tanks, indoctrinated in movingquickly from one position to another, mustremember that they are in a support role to theinfantry and that they also depend on infantrymenfor support and protection against close ambush.Terrain can create mobility restrictions for atank and the terrain that is easily trafficable bythe infantry may be impassable by a tank.The use of tanks does not negate the need to usesmoke, obscurants, and indirect fire when movingup to an obstacle and support-by fire positions.

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It is essential that tankers attached to the infan-try unit be involved in every step of theOPORD development, especially rehearsals.To be effective, the tank and infantry units areorganized as a combined-arms team.

When the mechanized Marine force is employedin an urban area that is very restricted, tank unitsmay have to be task-organized into sections.Marine tank units support Marine infantry inurban areas by—

Providing overwhelming firepower and shockeffect using both its main gun and/or machineguns.Isolating objectives with direct fire to pre-vent enemy withdrawal, reinforcement, orcounterattack.Neutralizing or suppressing enemy positionswith smoke, high explosive, and automaticweapon fire as infantry closes with anddestroys the enemy.Assisting opposed entry of infantry into build-ings when debris, obstacles, or enemy fireblocks doorways by firing breaching holes intobuildings.Breaking through street barricades or reducingbarricades by fires.Using fires to reduce enemy strongpoints inbuildings.Holding cleared portions of the objective bycovering avenues of approach.Attacking by fire any other targets designatedby the infantry.Establishing roadblocks.Suppressing identified sniper positions.

Marine infantry facilitates tank employment inurban terrain by—

Locating targets for engagement by the tank.Suppressing and destroying antiarmor weaponswith mortars, automatic weapons, and grenades.

Assaulting positions and clearing buildings.Providing local security for tanks.

Planning

Compared to combat in open terrain, urban oper-ations are compressed in space and time. Thiscompression limits observation distances;engagement ranges; weapons effectiveness;mobility; and time to maneuver, generate morefires, anticipate enemy actions, plan and conductoperations, and, if necessary, respond to enemyactions. These limitations tend to force extremelyclose combat with troops fighting from buildingto building and from room to room. Commandand control is difficult because small-unit leaderscannot see their troops and radio communica-tions is subject to interference caused by the pres-ence of structures. Historically, urban combat hasrequired a high degree of initiative by small-unitleaders who were directing the employment oftask-organized special assault teams, of whichtanks were a part.

When tanks are to be task-organized for MOUT,it is vital that tank unit representatives be inte-grated into the planning process as early as possi-ble. Familiarity with unit SOPs must be achieveddown to infantry squad and tank section levels foreffective tank-infantry employment in MOUToperations. Additionally, the tank unit leadermust keep the infantry commander informedregarding his units; supply, crew, and weaponsstatus; and any special equipment available (e.g.,mine plows and rollers).

When planning a mission, commanders must con-sider the capabilities, limitations, and likely COAsavailable to the enemy. The commander and staffmust consider the strength, composition, disposi-tion, and activities of the enemy forces. Enemy tac-tics may range from ambushes, snipers, and urbanterrorism to large-scale conventional operations.

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Therefore, the tactics and techniques utilized bytanks and infantry may require different tactics,techniques, and procedures. The addition of armorcreates the following planning considerations for theinfantry commander:

Conducting full dress rehearsals utilizing tankswhenever possible.Standardizing reporting formats for both tanksand the infantry.Establishing SOPs for tanks working withinfantry emphasizing safety of friendly infan-try maneuvering with tanks, signals betweentanks and infantry, marking of cleared build-ings/areas, ROEs, and mutual security betweentanks and the infantry.Determining tank maintenance and logisticalsupport requirements to the supported unit.Considering battle damage assessment andrecovery, resupply, and casualty evacuation oftank crew personnel.

Employment Considerations

Marine infantry and/or tank commanders shouldconsider the following when employing theM1A1 in urban terrain:

Tank main gun fire is an effective method foreliminating a sniper in a building or creating apsychological effect that destroys the enemy’swill to continue, but this method creates ahigher degree of collateral damage.Streets and alleys constitute ready-made firelanes and firing zones that can greatly restrictand canalize vehicular traffic.Tanks should be employed by section. All fun-damental fire and movement techniques areconducted at the section level, so tanks shouldnever be employed individually. In extremecases, tanks can work separately, but it is notrecommended.Typically, a tank and an infantry squad work inintimate support of each other. The infantry

furnishes local security and designates targetsfor the tank.SINCGARS radios are utilized for intervehicu-lar communications and should be the primarymeans of communications between the infantryand the vehicle commander. If SINCGARSradios are unavailable, a rigged external TA-1phone or hand-and-arm signals can be used.The tank should use multipurpose antitank(MPAT) ammunition to create holes in thewalls of buildings so the infantry can enter.High explosive antitank (HEAT) ammunitionmay also be used but is less effective in creat-ing holes.The tank should use MPAT ammunitionagainst barricades. MPAT rounds can be usedto demolish towers, steeples, chimneys, andother tall structures likely to contain enemyartillery observers. This technique depends onestablished ROEs.Tank sabot ammunition has limited utilityagainst most nonvehicular targets and the dis-carding sabot petals can endanger friendlyinfantry or civilians nearby. The hazard areaextends 70 meters to each side of the tank gunout to 1 kilometer.The tank main gun has an overpressure that,when fired, can kill friendly troops. The dangerto dismounted troops is a 90-degree arc out to200 meters from the end of the tank main gun.Tanks should avoid stopping or moving slowlynear nonsecure buildings due to the threat ofpossible enemy close range ATGM fires.Tanks should mount the fording kit elbowexhaust plenum pipe attachment or the heatdeflector to allow Marine infantry to safelyapproach the rear of the M1A1 tank withoutbeing burned by the tank’s hot exhaust.Units should check all bridges and overpassesfor mines and determine the bridge’s weight-carrying capacity.Tanks should stay near buildings held byfriendly troops. Crewmembers should watchfor signals from the infantry inside the build-ings on their flanks.

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Tank crewmembers should keep their personalweapons ready for close-in combat.Tanks should be used to destroy enemy strong-points with main gun fire:

Firing armor-piercing ammunition to pene-trate the reinforced wall of a building fol-lowed by MPAT or HEAT rounds to kill orneutralize the enemy.Firing into the ground floor to drive the ene-my into the basement, where infantry can at-tack them, or to higher floors, where thewing tank can destroy them.

Tanks are sometimes at a disadvantage becausetheir main guns cannot depress or elevate suffi-ciently to fire into basements and upper floorsat close range (see fig. 9-1). The M1A1 candepress to –10 degrees or elevate to a height of+20 degrees.The M1A1 has a coaxial M240 machine gunand can use it to engage enemy troops andenemy positions behind light cover while thetank crew remains protected. The coaxialmachine gun has the same elevation anddepression restrictions as the main gun.

Tanks can use the tank commander’s .50 cali-ber machine gun but it can only elevate to+36 degrees.When buttoned up, tank crews have limited vis-ibility. Security infantry for the tank must helpthe tank crew “see” by communicating to thetank crew possible targets relative to the tanksposition and orientation.

Control Measures

Combat in urban areas requires control measureswith which all troops must be familiar. One of thekeys to ensuring ease of coordination of fires, linkuppoints, and patrol routes is the use of an effectivemap system. Intelligence sections should provide anaccurate map, down to exact buildings if possible.Buildings and roads can be sectioned off andlabeled alpha-numerically. Without an effective anduniversally used map, MOUT operations verge onimpossible. MOUT control measures includeboundaries; objectives; frontages, formations, andzones of actions; and phase lines.

Weapon Dead Space

16 Meters

Figure 9-1. Tank Cannon Dead Space at Street Level.

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BoundariesIn dense urban areas, units should place bound-aries along one side of the street to provideeasy and definite identification. In areas whereobservation and movement are less restricted,they may place boundaries in alleys or withinblocks so that one unit’s zone includes bothsides of the street.

ObjectivesObjectives are specific and limited. Choosingmajor intersections, choosing and numberingprincipal buildings, and choosing other readilyidentifiable physical features along the route ofattack improve control. As the unit moves for-ward through an area, unit commanders shoulddesignate the near side of the street as the objec-tive. If they choose the far side of the street, theunit will have to secure buildings on both sides ofthe street to take the objective. Units mustpromptly report seizure of objectives.

Frontages, Formations, and Zones of ActionAttacking battalions normally operate withinrelatively narrow zones of action. The front-ages depend on the enemy’s strength, the sizeof the buildings, and the anticipated resis-tance. Normally, a battalion-sized unit has afrontage of three to six blocks and companiesone to two blocks.

Frontages and zones of action influence tankemployment. The tanks should be well forward toadd momentum to the attack, exploit success,repel counterattacks, and protect the flanks andrear against enemy action.

Phase LinesPhase lines increase control by regulating theadvance of attacking forces. Phase lines are lessrestrictive than objectives, and they encouragethe rapid exploitation of success without halting.Principal streets, rivers, and trolley or railroadlines make good phase lines.

Checkpoints and Contact PointsStreet corners, buildings, railway crossings,bridges, and easily identifiable features can becheckpoints or contact points, and they facilitatethe reporting of locations. The commander canuse them as specific points where he desires unitsto make physical contact.

Offensive MOUT Operations

Because of the nature of the terrain, offensiveurban area operations are typically conducted bydismounted infantry. Tanks should be employed asmuch as possible in close support of dismountedinfantry in order to secure locations and providedirect fire support. Formations depend on the com-position of the combined-arms force. The best for-mation for command and control for securitypurposes is a column. The column must be flexibleand provide 360 degrees of spherical security. Thecombined-arms column travels within the securitybubble, with dismounted infantry clearing build-ings and providing security along the route. Onceenemy contact is made, expedient coordination isdone to use the proper weapons system to engagethe enemy. Buildings and terrain will most likelynot permit an on-line formation.

Attacking in Urban AreasA detailed study of the city and the enemy’s dispo-sitions in and around it forms the basis for plan-ning the attack and seizure of an urban area.Planning may include tanks for both maneuver andfire support. The attacking force is normally sepa-rated into two forces: the enveloping force (tank-heavy) and the direct assault force (infantry-heavy). Follow the procedures and considerationslisted below when attacking in an urban area:

Dissipate the enemy’s strength by causing himto react to demonstrations, feints, or ruses. Concentrate overwhelming combat power toforce a quick and violent disruption of thedefenses, envelop the urban area, and moverapidly to the enemy’s rear.

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Reduce strongpoints with fires only (if possi-ble), secure them with follow-on forces, andmaintain the momentum of the attack.Cut lines of communications and defeat theenemy through isolation.Attack at night to gain surprise or to takeobjectives whose assault during daylight wouldbe too costly.Attack continuously once the momentum hasbeen gained and continue to attack untildefenses have been splintered.

ObliquityThe tank cannon produces its best urban targeteffects when fired perpendicular to the hardsurface (zero obliquity). However, during com-bat in built-up areas, finding a covered firingposition that permits low-oblique firing isunlikely. Most shots strike the target at an anglethat normally reduces penetration. With tankcannon armor-piercing, fin-stabilized, discard-ing sabot (APFSDS) rounds, oblique angles of

up to 25 degrees have little effect in reducingpenetration, but angles greater than 45 degreesgreatly reduce penetration.

AmmunitionAPFSDS rounds are the most commonly carriedtank ammunition. These rounds work best againstarmored vehicles. However, the 120mm cannonalso fires an effective HEAT round. Tank units con-ducting MOUT should carry a HEAT/MPAT heavymix. A detailed discussion of each round’s compo-sition and capabilities can be found in appendix D.

M1A1 Tank Fires Dead Space CharacteristicsThe M1A1 tank has limited elevation in an urbanenvironment; it can elevate its cannon 20 degreesand depress it 10 degrees. This lower depressionlimit creates a 35-foot dead space around a tank(see fig. 9-1). There is also a zone overhead inwhich the tank cannot fire (see fig. 9-2). Thisdead space offers ideal locations for short-rangeantiarmor weapons and allows hidden enemy

Housetop

6-7th Story

9-10th Story

20o 20o 20o

30m 60m 90m

Dead Space

Figure 9-2. Tank Cannon Dead Space Above Street Level.

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gunners to fire at the tank when the tank cannotfire back. It also exposes the tank’s most vulnera-ble areas: the flanks, rear, and top. Infantry mustmove ahead, alongside, and to the rear of tanks toprovide close protection. The M1A1 tank also hasa blind spot caused by the zero-degree depres-sion available over part of the back deck. Toengage any target in this area, the tank must pivotto convert the rear target to a flank target.

The 120mm MPAT has a short arming range; itarms a round at about 60 feet. This arming dis-tance allows the tank to engage targets from shortranges. The armor of the tank protects the crewfrom both the blowback effects of the round andenemy return fire. The APFSDS round does notneed to arm and can; therefore, it can be fired atvery close targets at almost any range. The dis-carding portions of the round can be lethal toexposed infantry forward of the tank.

When the tank main gun fires, it creates a largefireball and smoke cloud. In the confines of abuilt-up area, dirt and masonry dust are alsopicked up and added to the cloud and the target isfurther obscured by the smoke and dust of theexplosion. Depending on the conditions, thisobscuration could last as long as 2 or 3 minutes.Marines can use this period to reposition oradvance unseen by the enemy.

A tank cannon creates an overpressure and noisehazard to exposed Marines. All dismountedMarines working near tanks should wear Kevlarhelmets and protective vests, as well as ballisticeye protection. If possible, they should also wearearplugs and avoid the tank’s frontal 60-degreearc during firing. The overpressure can also causeglass in surrounding buildings to shatter. Fallingglass can cause injury to Marines if they are notwarned to stay clear of windows.

WARNINGThe overpressure from the tank’s 120mmcannon can kill a Marine within a 90-degreearc that extends from the muzzle of the guntube out to 200 meters. From 200 to 1,000meters along the line of fire and on a frontageof about 400 meters, dismounted Marinesmust be aware of the danger from discardingsabot petals, which can kill or seriously injurepersonnel. Personnel outside the tank shouldremain at least 50 meters from the tank in alldirections as they may receive damagingeffects from firing noise and overpressure.Personnel must also wear hearing protectionwhen operating within 704 meters of a tankthat is firing its main gun.

Tanks are equipped with powerful thermal sightsthat can be used to detect enemy personnel andweapons that are hidden in shadows and behindopenings. Dust, fires, and thick smoke candegrade this sight capability.

Tanks have turret-mounted grenade launchersthat project screening smoke grenades. The gre-nades use a bursting charge and burning redphosphorous particles to create the screen. Burn-ing particles can easily start uncontrolled firesand are hazardous to dismounted Marines nearthe tank. The tank commander and the infantrysmall-unit leader must coordinate when andunder what conditions these launchers can beused. Grenade launchers are a useful feature forprotecting the tank, but can cause problems ifunwisely used.

The tank’s size and armor can provide dis-mounted Marines with cover from direct-fireweapons and fragments. With coordination, tankscan provide moving cover for Marines as they

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advance across small open areas. However,enemy fire that strikes but does not penetrate atank is a major threat to nearby Marines. Frag-mentation generated by antitank rounds and rico-chets off of a tank’s armor have been a primecause of casualties while infantry were workingwith tanks in built-up areas.

Target EffectsMPAT rounds are most effective against masonrywalls. The APFSDS round can penetrate deeplyinto a structure but does not create as large a holeor displace as much spall behind the target. Incontrast, tank MPAT or HEAT rounds are largeenough to displace enough spall to inflict casual-ties inside a building. One MPAT round normallycreates a breach hole in all but the thickestmasonry construction—a single round demol-ishes brick veneer and wood-framed construc-tions. Even the 120mm MPAT round cannot cutall of the building’s reinforcing rods, which areusually left in place, often hindering entrythrough the breach hole. MPAT, HEAT, andAPFSDS rounds are effective against field fortifi-cations. Only large earth berms and heavy mass-construction buildings can provide protectionagainst tank fire.

SecurityTanks need infantry to provide security in built-up areas and to designate targets. If targets areprotected by structures, tanks should be escortedforward to the most covered location that pro-vides a clear shot. On-the-spot instructions byinfantry commanders ensure that the tank’s fire isaccurate and its exposure is limited. The tankcommander may have to halt in a covered posi-tion, dismount, and reconnoiter his forward routeinto a firing position.

Attack PhasesReconnoiter the ObjectiveIntelligence gathering and reconnaissance andsurveillance are critical to the planning pro-cess. Whenever possible, leaders should make a

personal reconnaissance of the objective area tocollect first-hand information regarding the areato be attacked. Avenues of approach for bothinfantry and the tanks, observation posts, sup-ply routes, and the emplacement positions ofdirect and indirect fire weapons systems forboth tanks and/or infantry are all examples ofinformation that can be obtained during recon-naissance. Likely enemy ATGM positions canalso be determined as danger areas for tanks.Composition and structure of buildings androadbeds, cover and concealment opportuni-ties, and other information not apparent in amap study may have a significant impact on theplan. For example, determining that the build-ings that are to be attacked are made of brickmeans tanks will have an easier time makingbuilding breach holes for infantry then if thebuilding walls contained reinforced rebar.

Isolate the ObjectiveSeizing natural and manmade features that domi-nate the area can isolate the objective. Isolationmay also be accomplished by coordinated use ofsupporting arms to seal off enemy lines of com-munication. This phase may be conducted simul-taneously with the third phase, which is securinga foothold.

To isolate an urban objective, tanks can be usedtwo ways. Tanks can be used to isolate an enemyobjective by becoming a support element or theycan be employed as part of the attack. By usingtanks as a support element they can be held inreserve or given a mission to keep enemy rein-forcements from moving into the isolated attackobjective (such as a main avenue of approach intoa town). When tanks are used in the attack forcethey may be employed to directly support theattacking infantry to help clear buildings and/orareas. They can also engage enemy forces tryingto hinder the attack. Tanks should always beaware of enemy mounted avenues of approach.

Once the attacker has isolated the city, he caneither continue the attack or fix the defender andforce him to capitulate. If necessary, the unit then

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secures positions outside the urban area fromwhich to support entrance into the city itself. Iftanks are of limited use within a town due to theinability to maneuver, they can be employ justoutside the urban area to restrict further enemyforces from entering. The tactics and techniquesfor this phase of the operation are similar to thoseused in an attack against an enemy strongpoint.

Secure a FootholdOnce the objective is isolated, a foothold should besecured as soon as possible in order to maintaintempo. Dismounted forces can be employed toattack from any direction. If infantry is workingwith tanks, areas above, at, and below the streetlevel (e.g., cellars, building, sewers, subways)must be cleared before tanks move through thearea in order to ensure that enemy antitank teamsare not able to move around the attacker andengage the tanks. Both tanks and infantry shouldensure that areas are cleared for possible minesand/or IEDs. The attacking force uses the footholdarea to reorganize, regain control, and emplaceunits to supporting positions. After seizing a foot-hold, the attacking force continues the attackthrough the objective area. Normally, the attack-ing force penetrates the enemy defenses on a nar-row front. The assault is supported by all availablesupporting arms and usually maximizes use ofsmoke to screen the attacking forces movement.

The tank or mechanized unit commander mayemploy variations of the column formation tobetter maneuver into urban areas. For example, atank battalion may use a column, with each of itscompanies in a line, wedge, or echelon. Theseformations tend to shorten the length of the col-umn, reducing the time necessary to move intothe urban area. The leading tank elements nor-mally use a formation that speeds the delivery ofmaximum fire on the point of penetration. Air-bursting artillery and mortar fires are usually

placed over the entry point to prevent the enemyfrom manning crew-served or individual antitankweapons. The infantry moves as close to theobjective as possible. When the infantry attacks astrongly defended area, it provides close-in pro-tection for the tanks. Unit leaders may assign fireteams or squads to work with each tank. If radiosare not available, visual signals and TA-1 phonesexternal to the tank may help maintain directcommunication between the infantry leaders andthe tank commanders. The infantry maneuvers tosuppress or destroy the enemy, and tanks moveforward as soon as possible to support them.Suppressive tank fires can be used to cover theattacking forces exposed flanks.

Seizing the ObjectiveOnce a foothold is seized and consolidated, sup-porting forces move to the built-up area to sup-port the seizing of the objective area. To maintaintempo, the transition between the phases shouldbe seamless. Once the foothold has been estab-lished, forward units continue the attack throughthe objective area. The attack can vary from asystematic block-by-block, house-to-house reduc-tion of the urban area to a rapid advance withclearance of critical areas and buildings. Clear-ance and seizure techniques depend on the mis-sion; the size of the town, construction andbuilding arrangement; and the enemy’s disposi-tion, strength, and objective. The momentum ofthe assault is continued until the objective area iscleared or controlled.

When the urban area is small or lightly defended,the attacking force should drive through or into itas rapidly as possible. Marine armor should leadthe column in this instance, closely followed andsupported by infantry. It will rarely be possible toemploy more than two tanks at the head of thecolumn except when advancing on a wide street.Tanks continuously concentrate main gun and

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automatic weapons fire on windows and the roof-tops of buildings (see fig. 9-3). The infantry pro-tects the tank from close-in enemy fire. Whenrequired to protect tanks from fire from nearbybuildings, an infantry squad moves along eachside of the street, keeping abreast of the leadvehicles. Depending on the resistance, the infan-try may challenge every doorway or ground floorwindow by throwing in hand grenades and spray-ing the interior with small-arms fire. Unit leaderswill usually assign Marines in each squad tolocate and engage targets on the upper floors androoftops of the buildings. The infantry may alsoassist in the removal of obstacles or barriers halt-ing the advance. Lead tank crews must continu-ally be aware of where the infantry is in order toavoid possible fratricide or moving forward oftheir infantry security and being engaged byenemy antitank teams.

The assault force should establish limited objec-tives to ensure that the attacking forces do notbecome strung out along the axis of advance.Gaps give the enemy the opportunity to infiltratealong the line of advance or make isolatedfriendly forces vulnerable to attack.

Defensive MOUT Operations

In urban combat, the defender possesses keyadvantages over the attacker. The defender canshape the battlespace to his advantage by maxi-mizing the natural restrictions and obstaclesfound in the urban environment. Knowledge ofthe terrain and time available for preparing defen-sive positions are advantages that may enable thedefender to successfully resist a numericallysuperior force. Defensive operations in a built-up

Direction Of Travel

Figure 9-3. M1A1s Advancing with Infantry.

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area require thorough planning and precise exe-cution based on METT-T. This discussion exam-ines MOUT considerations that affect the tankunit in the defense.

Defensive Techniques

In the defense, Marine tanks provide the MOUTcommander with a mobile force that can respondquickly to enemy threats. They should be locatedon likely enemy avenues of approach in posi-tions that allow them to take advantage of theirlong-range fires. Effective positioning allows thecommander to employ the armored vehicles in anumber of ways:

On the edge of the city in mutually supportingpositions.On key terrain on the flanks of towns and villages.In positions from which they can cover barri-cades and obstacles by fire.As part of the reserve.

The commander may also employ sections orindividual armored vehicles with infantry pla-toons and squads; this allows the tank crew totake advantage of the close security provided bythe infantry.

Fighting Positions

Fighting positions for tanks are an essential com-ponent of a complete and effective defensive planin built-up areas. Vehicle positions must beselected and developed to afford the best possi-ble cover, concealment, observation, and fields offire; at the same time, they must not restrict thevehicle’s ability to move when necessary.

If fields of fire are restricted to the street area, hull-down positions should be used to provide coverand to enable tanks to fire directly down the streets(see fig. 9-4). From these positions, the armoredvehicles are protected while retaining their abilityto rapidly move to alternate positions. Buildings

Top View

Side View

Figure 9-4. Hull-Down Position.

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collapsing from enemy fires are a minimal hazardto the armored vehicles and their crews.

Before moving into position to engage theenemy, a tank can occupy a hide position forcover and concealment. Hide positions forarmored vehicles may be located inside build-ings or underground garages, adjacent to build-ings (using the bui ldings to mask enemyobservation), or in large ditches.

Since the crew will not be able to see the advanc-ing enemy from the hide position, an observerfrom the vehicle or a nearby infantry unit must be

concealed in an adjacent building to alert thecrew (see fig. 9-5). When the observer acquires atarget, he signals the armored vehicle to move tothe firing position and firing at the proper time.After firing, the tank moves to an alternate posi-tion to avoid compromising its location.

Infantry are usually employed abreast of thetanks so that they can fire toward the expecteddirection of attack. Too much separation betweenthe tanks and infantry does not allow them to eas-ily support one another. However, in a companyteam battle position, the limited number of avail-able infantrymen may require infantry fighting

Hide

Position

Fire

Direction

Observer

(inside building)

Figure 9-5. Hide Position.

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positions to be interspersed with vehicle posi-tions. In urban areas, rooms within a buildingmay separate small units such as platoons,squads, and fire teams, or they may be posi-tioned in different buildings. Infantry positionsmust be mutually supporting and allow for over-lapping sectors of fire, even when they are in sep-arate buildings or are divided by walls.

The commander’s defensive scheme of maneu-ver in MOUT must always include the employ-

ment of a reserve force. This force should beprepared to counterattack to regain key positions,block enemy penetrations, protect the flanks ofthe friendly force, or provide a base of fire fordisengaging elements. For combat in urban areas,the reserve force has these characteristics:

Normally consists of infantry elements.Must be as mobile as possible.May be supported by tanks, light armored vehi-cles (LAVs) and/or AAVs.

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CHAPTER 10SCOUT AND TOW PLATOONS

The scout and TOW platoons found in Marinetank battalions are unique and provide the tankunits with organic reconnaissance, security, andcountermechanized capabilities while operating.These capabilities are an integral part of MarineCorps tank battalion operations and they performa number of important roles in helping to shapethe battlefield.

Scout Platoon

Mission

The tank battalion’s scout platoon performsreconnaissance, provides limited security, andassists in controlling the battalion’s movements.The platoon is not organized or equipped to con-duct independent offensive, defensive, or retro-grade operations. It operates as part of the tankbattalion and should be assigned missions thatcapitalize on its reconnaissance capabilities. Thescout platoon is one of the battalion commander’sprimary sources of organic combat intelligenceboth before and during the battle. Although theplatoon has an antitank capability, it cannot per-form its scouting roles when employed as an anti-tank force.

Organization

The scout platoon is organized into a headquarterssection and two other sections. The headquarterssection consists of the platoon commander andplatoon sergeant and their vehicles. Each sectioncontains a section leader and two other vehicles.See figure 10-1.

Employment

There are six fundamentals required for the suc-cessful employment of the tank battalion scoutplatoon:

Use maximum reconnaissance force forward.Orient on the reconnaissance objective.Report all information rapidly and accurately.Retain freedom of maneuver.Gain and maintain enemy contact.Develop the situation rapidly.

Use Maximum Reconnaissance Force ForwardDo not keep scouts in reserve. This does not meanscouts must be on line and oriented forward;rather, all available scouts must be employed exe-cuting reconnaissance tasks.

Orient on the Reconnaissance ObjectiveThe platoon’s scheme of maneuver is focusedtoward a specific objective or set of objectivesbased on the OPORD and the battalion com-mander’s intent.

Scout

HQ

4 MK19 or M2 Carriers

2 TOW Carriers

1 AN/MRC-145

1 M998

1 TOW Carrier

1 M2 Carrier

1 MK 19 Carrier

1 AN/MRC-145

1 M998

2 TOW Carriers

4 MK 19 or M2 Carriers

Figure 10-1. Scout Platoon Organization.

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Report all Information Rapidly and AccuratelyCommanders base their decisions and plans on thebattlefield information that scouts provide duringreconnaissance. Since information loses value overtime, scouts must report all information exactly asit is seen and as fast as possible. They must neverassume, distort, or exaggerate information—inac-curate information is dangerous.

Retain Freedom to ManeuverScouts must be able to maneuver on the battle-field. If the enemy fixes them, scouts must freethemselves; otherwise, they can no longer accom-plish their mission. Scouts must continuallymaintain an awareness of tactical developments.They must employ the proper tactical movementand react appropriately to unexpected situations.If contact is made, the platoon commander devel-ops the situation at the lowest possible levelwhile retaining the initiative, the ability to con-tinue the mission, and the ability to maneuver hisother elements.

Gain and Maintain Enemy ContactScouts seek visual contact with the enemy onfavorable terms. They employ sound tacticalmovement, target acquisition methods, andappropriate actions in order to see the enemyfirst, thereby retaining the initiative and controlof the situation. Once scouts find the enemy, theyuse all available means to maintain contact untildirected to do otherwise.

Develop the SituationWhether scouts encounter an obstacle or theenemy, they must quickly assess the situation. Ifscouts encounter the enemy, they—

Determine the enemy’s size, composition, andactivity.Find the enemy’s flanks.Find any barriers or obstacles surrounding theenemy position and determine if any otherenemy forces can support the position.

If the scouts encounter an obstacle, they find andmark a bypass or, if appropriate, execute or assistin a breach. This must be accomplished with min-imum guidance from higher headquarters.

Capabilities and Limitations

In addition to its primary missions, the scout pla-toon can conduct other missions such as:

Conduct liaison between units.Perform quartering party duties.Provide traffic control.Conduct chemical detection and radiological sur-vey and monitoring operations as part of a NBCdefense.Conduct limited pioneer and demolition work.Participate in area security.

The following identifies some of the scout pla-toon’s limitations:

The scout platoon depends on its parent unitfor combat support and CSS augmentation.The high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehi-cle (HMMWV) scout platoon can reconnoiteronly two routes simultaneously (reconnoiteringfor trafficability only).The scout platoon reconnoiters a zone 3 to 5kilometers wide. METT-T conditions mayincrease or decrease the size of the zone.During screening operations, all scout pla-toons are limited in their ability to destroy orrepel enemy reconnaissance units.The HMMWV scout platoon can man up to sixobservation posts for short durations or up tothree observation posts for long durations.When properly organized, scouts can conducteffective reconnaissance and security patrols.The HMMWV scout platoon has a very limiteddismounted capability. It must be properly task-organized to conduct dismounted operations.The distance the scouts can operate awayfrom the main body is restricted to the rangeof communications and the range of support-ing indirect fire.

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The scout platoon has limited obstacle creationability and carries a basic load of demolitions.The scout platoon has a very limited obstaclebreaching capability (limited to hasty pointobstacles).

TOW Platoon

Mission

The primary mission of the antitank TOW pla-toon is to provide countermechanized supportthat utilizes the TOW to engage and destroyenemy armored vehicles, particularly tanks.When not performing its primary mission, theantitank TOW platoon may assume a secondarymission of engaging other point targets or provid-ing limited security to the commander in the formof a screen or observation posts.

Organization

The TOW platoon has three squads and a head-quarters section. See figure 10-2.

Employment

The TOW platoon may be employed as anorganic unit for a specific mission such as setting

a screen or a blocking position; but it will typi-cally be broken down into sections that are thenattached in direct or general support to individualtank or infantry companies. The TOW’s longstandoff range allows it to cover likely avenues ofapproach for armored vehicles, which allowstanks to conduct offensive missions.

Capabilities and Limitations

Some advantages of the TOW weapon systemsare as follows:

Can be manpacked to obtain an advantageousfiring position not accessible while mounted,but only for short distances due to the heavyweight of the system.Engagement of the maximum effective rangedoes not significantly decrease its accuracy.Has a fire down munition that can penetrate avehicle’s armor at its thinnest point (on the top).Contains a thermal sight that provides enhancedcapability at night and during limited visibility.Does not lose power in direct proportion to theengagement range.

The TOW’s limitations are as follows:

Employed in squads with two launchers at aminimum so that the crews can provide mutualsupport. Vulnerable to both direct and indirect fire; there-fore, cover and concealment are extremelyimportant. Large amount of backblast are produced,which must be taken into consideration whenplanning firing positions. Clearing the back-blast area of loose debris or watering the areadown can help reduce the signature. Reduced range when firing over water obstacles.Cannot fire on the move and the gunner mustkeep his sights on the target throughout thetime of flight (14 to16 seconds to reach maxi-mum range).

TOW

HQ

24 TOWs

3 M2 or MK 19 Carriers

2 M998s

1 AN/MRC-145

2 TOW Vehicles

Per Squad

1 AN/MRC-145

2 M998s

8 TOWs

1 M2 or MK 19 Carriers

Figure 10-2. TOW Platoon Organization.

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APPENDIX AARMOR VEHICLE CHARACTERISTICS

1. M1A1 Tank

The M1A1 combat (main battle) tank uses high speed, maneuverability, and a va-riety of weapons to attack and destroy enemy tanks, equipment, and forces. Seefigure A-1 on pages A-2 and A-3. The M1A1 combat tank consists of the hull andturret assemblies. The turret can rotate a full 360 degrees.

The tank is equipped with a laser rangefinder. The laser rangefinder can range ontargets 200 to 7,990 meters from the tank with an accuracy of plus/minus 10 meters.It is also equipped with a thermal imaging system. The thermal imaging system pro-vides the M1A1’s fire control system with a night vision capability by presenting athermal scene in the gunner’s primary sight eyepiece. The thermal imaging systempicture can be viewed at 3- or 10-times magnification.

Crew: 4 (commander, gunner, loader, and driver)

Armament:Main gun, M256, 120mmAmmunition, 120mm combustible cartridge

Machine Guns: Coaxial machine gun, M240, 7.62mmLoader’s machine gun, M240, 7.62mm

Maximum effective range: 900 meters (tracer burnout)Maximum range: 3,725 meters

Commander’s machine gun: M2 heavy-barrel, caliber .50Maximum effective range: 1,200 to 1,600 meters (tracer burnout)Maximum range: 6,700 m

M16 A2, 5.56mm rifleGrenade launcher, M250

Ammunition Quantity:120mm (main gun), 40 roundsM240, 7.62mm (coaxial machine gun), 10,000 roundsM240, 7.62mm (loader’s machine gun), 1,400 rounds.50 cal (commander’s machine gun), 900 roundsUKL8 series (smoke grenades for grenade launcher), 24 grenades5.56mm rifle, M-16, 210 rounds

Engine: Turbine engine

Transmission:Model X1100-3BRange: four speeds forward, two reverse, with pivot and neutral selections

Performance and Specifications:Forward speed, maximum (paved level surface): 42 mphReverse speed, maximum (paved level surface): 25 mphRange (dry level secondary roads without refueling): 273 to 298 miForward climb of a vertical obstacle: 49 in

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Maximum width of forward crossable ditch: 108 inFording depth:

Without kit: 48 inWith kit: turret roof

Weight:Combat loaded: 67.6 tonsMilitary load classification (MLC): 68 tons

Dimensions:Length (overall, main gun rearward): 356 inLength (gun forward): 387 inWidth: 144 inHeight (ground to turret roof): 96 inHeight (maximum overall): 114 inGround clearance (center portion of the hull): 19 inGround clearance (other portion of hull structure): 16.5 inGround pressure: 15.00 psi

Fuels and Oils: Fuel tanks (total in tank): 504.4 galTransmission, initial fill: 40 to 45 galTransmission, refill approximate: 30 to 35 galEngine lubrication oil tank (refill, approximate): 17 qtRecommended fuel types: DF-1

DF-2JP-8DF-AJP-4 may be used in an emergency

For more information concerning the M1A1 tank refer to technical manual (TM) 08953A-10, TankM1A1 (120mm Gun).

Figure A-1. M1A1 Tank.

312 Inches

Side View

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387 Inches

Top View

144 Inches

Front View

113.60

Inches

Maximum

137 Inches

Back View

68

Inches

93.5

Inches

Figure A-1. M1A1 Tank (Continued).

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2. M88A2 Recovery Vehicle, Fully Tracked: Heavy

The M88A2 heavy recovery vehicle is an armored, full-tracked, low silhouette vehi-cle (see fig. A-2). It is used for hoisting, winching, and towing operations for all ve-hicles up to 70 tons (63.49 metric tons). It is equipped to assist in repairing disabledvehicles under field conditions. The vehicle has a crew of three: commander, opera-tor, and mechanic/rigger. Specific vehicle capabilities and features are as follows:

Combination transmission, differential, steering, and braking unit.Hydraulic power-assisted braking.Main winch, a hoist winch, and an auxiliary winch.Hull and cab armor protect vehicle from 30 millimeter direct fire.10.8 horsepower, diesel auxiliary power unit.Gas-particulate filter unit.M239 smoke grenade system.Exhaust smoke generating system.Deep water fording kit.M2 heavy-barrel, caliber. 50 machine gun.Two M16A2, 5.56mm rifle.

Refer to Field Manual (FM) 4-30.3, Maintenance Operations and Procedures,for recovery methods using the vehicle’s equipment.

Crew: 3 (commander, operator, and mechanic)

Armament:M2 heavy-barrel, caliber .50 machine gunTwo M16A2, 5.56mm rifle10 light antiarmor weapon rockets

Ammunitions Quantity:M2 heavy-barrel, caliber .50 machine gun, 900 roundsM16A2, 5.56mm rifle, 300 rounds

Engine:12-cylinder diesel engine4-cycle, air-cooled model AVDS-1790-8CR

Transmission:Twin disc, XT-1410-5A

Performance and Specifications:Speed, maximum (without towed load): 25 mphCruising range, maximum: 300 miGrade ascending ability, maximum: 60 percentGrade descending ability, maximum: 60 percentSide slope grade, maximum: 30 percentMaximum vertical wall: 42 inMaximum trench crossing width: 8.5 ftMinimum turning radius: pivots in one vehicle length

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Draw bar pull: 107,000 lbBoom lift height:

At 8-ft reach: 22.5 ftAt 4-ft reach: 25.0 ft

Hoist winch capacity, (four-part line): 70,000 lbBoom capacity:

Spade up, 4 part line, with lockout blocks installed: 50,000 lbSpade down: 70,000 lb

Main winch capacity, single line, continuous pull: 140,000 lbAuxiliary winch capacity, single line: 6,000 lbFording depth:

Without fording kit: 56 inWith fording kit: 90 in

Weight, Combat Loaded: 139,000 lb

Dimensions:Length: 28.33 ftWidth: 12 ftHeight: 9.75 ftGround pressure: 13.7 psi

Fuels and Oils:Fuel tanks: 413 galMain engine crankcase (refill): 18.5 galTransmission (refill): 17 galMain winch: 9.5 galHoist winch: 9 ptAuxiliary winch: 6 ptHydraulic system: 80 galElectromagnetic clutch: 5.2 qts

14

71 2 3 4 5 6 8

9

10

11

1. M2 heavy-barrel, caliber .50, machine gun 8. Tow bar2. Machine gun mount 9. Left side stowage compartment door3. Commander's cupola 10. Bumper sprint (4)4. Personnel door, left side 11. Crow bar (2)5. Boom 12. Roadwheel (12)6. Tarpaulin and 100 ft rope 13. Shock absorber (6)7. Snatch block, 90-ton 14. Snatch block, 10-ton

1213

Figure A-2. M88A2 Recovery Vehicle.

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3. Armored Vehicle-Launched Bridge

The M60A1 AVLB is primarily employed to cross short gaps (e.g., narrowstreams), antitank ditches, craters, canals, or partially-blown bridges. It providesheavy armor protection for personnel and can provide a limited smoke screen fromeither the smoke grenade launcher or engine smoke generator (if equipped). TheAVLB can operate in an NBC environment and on rough ground. See figure A-3on page A-8.

The M60A1 AVLB is divided into two sections: hull and launching mechanism.The hull contains the following:

Crew compartment with all controls for operating the launching mechanism.Engine compartment with engine and transmission that supplies power foroperating hull and launching mechanism.Operator and commander cupolas to enter crew compartment.Cupola vision blocks and periscopes for visual operation when hatches areclosed.Bridge seat on which bridge rests during transporting.

The launcher mechanism contains the following:

Hydraulic system (pump, fluid, cylinders, hoses, and other parts for movingthe bridge, outrigger, and tongue during launch and retrieval).Outrigger (steadies vehicle during bridge launch and retrieval).Tongue (connects vehicle to bridge).

Crew: 2 (commander, operator)

Armament: unarmed

Engine: Model AVOS-1790-20, type V-12, turbo-supercharged

Transmission: Type CD-850-6ARange: two speeds forward, one reverse

Performance and Specifications:Land performance speeds (maximum):

Low: 10 mphHigh: 30 mph (governed)Reverse: 5 mph

Launch or retrieve bridgeUphill or downhill slope: 15 pctSide slope: 8 pct

Fording depth: up to 4 ft without special equipment

Weight:Vehicle (without bridge): 92,200 lb (46.1 tons)Vehicle (with bridge): 121,700 lb (61 tons)

Dimensions (travel position):Length:

Without bridge: 28.3 ft

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With bridge: 37.0 ftHeight:

Without bridge: 10.0 ftWith bridge 12.8 ft

Width:Without bridge: 12.0 ftWith bridge: 13.2 ft

Ground clearance: 14 inGround pressure, vehicle:

Without bridge: 9.0 psiWith bridge: 12.2 psi

Brakes: hydraulic, mechanical foot pedalSteering:

Type: hydraulic mechanicalTurning capability: 360-degree pivot

Fuels and Oils:Fuel: diesel oilFuel consumption: 1.13 gpm (gal per mile)Fuel tanks (total): 375 galHydraulic system:

Without bridge: 115 galWith bridge: 135 gal

Bridge:Length:

Extended: 63 ftFolded: 32 ft

Bridge span:60 ft with prepared abutments17 ft with unprepared abutments

Height: unfolded, 3.1 ftWeight: 14.65 tonsWeight capacity: one MLC 60 vehicle (waived for M1 series tank during combat operations)Launching time: 2 to 5 minutes using only the two-man AVLB crew

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Figure A-3. AVLB.

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APPENDIX BOPERATIONS IN EXTREME ENVIRONMENTS

Tank employment in changing operational con-ditions and environments presents special prob-lems, challenges, and situations. Planners mustconsider the tank’s capabilities and limitations,the principles of tank employment, and the envi-ronmental conditions. Each operation mayrequire modification in tactics and augmentationin equipment in order to support the environmen-tal conditions. For detailed discussions on operat-ing tanks in varying environmental conditionsrefer to the M1A1’s technical manuals.

Jungle Operations

MCWP 3-35.5, Jungle Operations, addresses jun-gle operations in depth. Jungle combat involvesoperations with such impediments as swamps,undulating terrain, extreme heat, heavy rains, andareas largely overgrown with thick tropical foli-age. Marine tank crews need to be acclimated tolive and fight in the jungle because tank mainte-nance and operations are exhausting in jungleoperations. The basics of successful jungle opera-tions are decentralized control, flexibility, secu-rity, and intelligence.

Cover and concealment are excellent in this typeof terrain and increase the possibility of achiev-ing surprise. As a result, both the attacker and thedefender usually commit large portions of avail-able forces to security missions. However, therestrictive nature of a jungle environmentimpedes typical tank operations.

In the offense, security elements prevent surpriseand protect the MAGTF. In jungles, successfulsecurity force operations depend on proper imple-mentation of security elements. Units find theirdirection of movement hard to maintain withoutnavigation aids such as global positioning system

receivers. The thick foliage and rugged terrain ofmost jungles limit fields of fire ground movementspeed and the range of combat net radios andautomated command information systems.Restrictions on observation and fields of fire mayreduce the capabilities of tanks to acquire targetsand deliver accurate direct fires. Additionally, thedifficulties associated with jungle operationsincrease in proportion to the size of the forceinvolved. These limitations drive the conduct ofoperations to the company, platoon, and individ-ual tank crew level.

Despite their limitations, tank employment canstill be effective in jungle operations. Althoughtanks must move slower in the jungle due to diffi-cult trafficability, they are one of the few vehiclescapable of traversing through thick foliage andundergrowth where wheeled vehicles could neveroperate. In addition, tanks can provide effectivereconnaissance by fire and suppressive fires forsupported infantry. The tank’s ability to producea large volume of fire from its machine guns andmain gun antipersonnel rounds can be devastatingto the enemy as long as the tank is protected by agood infantry security element.

The critical aspect of a defensive operation in ajungle environment is the security of the line ofcommunications sustaining the MAGTF. Toguard against surprise, the defending commanderorganizes his forces in depth. He secures or pro-vides alternative routes around chokepoints andprovides for the security of resupply convoys.He also ensures the all-around defense of unitsand installations operating in jungles and installa-tions. The commander establishes a mobilereserve to counter unanticipated enemy actions,to block enemy penetrations of his defensiveperimeter, to counterattack, or to pursue adetected enemy. Tanks are best suited as a mobilereserve in most situations.

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Tank considerations during a jungle operationinclude the following:

The dense foliage and weather alter the effec-tive range of a weapon system. Engagementsfor tanks are usually at close ranges requiringquick target recognition by the tank crews.Units must allow for slower movement andrestricted fire support. The jungle’s limited vis-ibility may make the observation and adjust-ment of indirect fires difficult.Heat, thick vegetation, and rugged terrain willtire Marines rapidly. Supported infantry maywant to ride on the back of the tanks if enemycontact is not expected.Lack of roads hinder resupply and evacuationin the absence of helicopter support.

Desert Operations

Desert terrain varies considerably from place toplace. Certain environmental characteristics (e.g.,extreme temperature ranges, lack of water,absence of vegetation, dust /sandstorms) are com-mon to all deserts, and their adverse effect mustbe considered during planning. Highly mobileforces play a dominant role in operations indesert regions. Tanks provide the freedom ofmaneuver in the vastness of these regions thatfavor a fluid type of warfare characterized by dis-persed formations on extended frontages withconsiderable depth. Properly employed and main-tained, the tank can be the most decisive support-ing arm available to the MAGTF commanderduring desert operations.

Desert topography may consist of loose sandand sand dunes that greatly impede the move-ment of vehicles or it may have a hard surfacethat facilitates large mechanized formations.Successful desert operations require adaptationto the environment and to the limitations of itsterrain and climate. Units must modify andadapt their equipment and tactics to a dusty and

rugged landscape. See MCWP 3-35.6, DesertOperations, for detailed information.

Desert offensive operations tend to favor wideenvelopments and fast and wide flanking move-ments by armored formations because of the free-dom of maneuver. Because of the l imitedconcealment offered by the bare terrain, units mustattain surprise by use of deception, appropriatesecurity measures, and rapid movement and com-manders must exploit periods of limited visibility.

Defensive operations in desert regions empha-size mobility and flexibility. Commanders shouldmake provisions for long-range direct fire weap-ons, construction of extensive obstacle systems tocanalize or slow the enemy, a high degree ofmobility, and secure communications. The orga-nization of the defense should emphasize mea-sures against both air and armored attack.

The following additional considerations are nec-essary when planning tactical operations:

Long-range direct fire capability makes thetank an ideal weapon in desert terrain. Thelong-range fields of fire common to desertareas tend to allow all weapons systems toengage at their maximum range. However,these same extended engagement ranges hinderpositive target identification.Dust is an observational, control, and mainte-nance hazard to a maneuvering force.Land navigation may be difficult in the absenceof navigation aids and current maps due tochanging terrain features and minimal keylandmarks.

Mountain Operations

Rugged, compartmented terrain with steep slopesand few natural or manmade lines of communica-tions generally characterize military-significantmountains. The compartmented terrain causes acorresponding compartmentalization of military

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operations. Successful mountain operationsrequire special equipment, training, acclimatingpersonnel to altitude conditions, self-discipline,and modifications of standard tactics and proce-dures. MCWP 3-35.2, Mountain Operations,provides additional information.

The focal point of mountain operations is to con-trol the heights. Key terrain features normallyinclude those heights that dominate lines of com-munications, mountain passes, roads, bridges,and railroads. Fighting from higher ground givesthe possessor distinct tactical advantages. Tanksare best used in this environment to control keyterrain. Restricted mechanized routes in themountains do not lend themselves to maneuverwarfare of mechanized units. Tightly channel-ized routes should be anticipated by mechanizedunits and recognized as danger areas that requiregood infantry security until the units are clear ofthe area. Inherent in mountain operations are thedifficulties that the terrain offers to movement.Operations in mountainous regions take longerthan normal to plan and execute. Key mountainoperational characteristics include the following:

Communications and sustainment are increas-ing difficult to execute in rugged terrain. Ingeneral, operations in mountainous terrainretard and restrict maneuver and make commu-nications and resupply of tanks difficult.Defenses may have to locate on the militarycrest to fire into an engagement area. Moun-tainous terrain can be either a dangerous obsta-cle to operations or a valuable aid, according tohow well it is understood and to what extentthe tank commander takes advantage of itspeculiar characteristics.Night and periods of limited visibility are thebest movement times due to the extended rangeof observation from enemy positions. Move-ment times are slower due to terrain and alti-tude effects. Any differences in elevation overthe march route also have an impact on unitmovement times. The terrain reduces the effectiveness of fire-power. The M1A1 tank has only a limited abil-

ity to depress its main gun. The ability toelevate its main gun should also be consideredwhen employing the tanks. Centralized planning and decentralized smallunit execution characterize operations becausethe terrain limits the commander’s capability todirectly control operations. Command and con-trol of tanks is therefore decentralized withsmall units often operating independently.

Operations in Deep Snow and Extreme Cold

Deep snow and extreme cold weather presentemployment problems in operations involvingtanks, which increases engineer support require-ments and may require the extensive use of linesof communications. Combat operations in deepsnow or extreme cold weather present two oppo-nents: the enemy (who must be defeated) andnature (who must be made an ally). Planning andtraining can reduce the effect of the climatic con-ditions, but commanders and their staffs mustunderstand the impact that these severe condi-tions impose on tank operations. Many of themissions assigned to tanks are the same as thoseassigned in normal operations and the tactics andtechniques employed in offensive and defensiveoperations are also similar. See MCWP 3-35.1,Cold Weather Operations, for detailed informa-tion on cold weather operations.

Tactical employment is modified to offset thecharacteristics of the area and its weather. Whenplanning tactical operations for execution duringrigorous winter weather, commanders must care-fully consider the probable effects of weather uponoperations, the health of Marines, supply, evacua-tion, and also the maintenance of lines of commu-nication. Ice, deep snow, and extreme cold weathermodify the normal use of terrain features. Planningconsiderations during operations in snow orextreme cold weather are as follows:

Operations take longer than normal to plan andexecute.

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Tanks are mostly metal which can become dif-ficult to work around in extreme cold. Gloveshave to be worn at all times by the crews andthis in turn slows the ability to operate/main-tain the tank. Cold weather impacts a weapons’ reliability;therefore the M1A1’s machine guns require thesame cold weather considerations as groundmounted machine guns. Tanks can generally negotiate deep snow betterthan wheeled vehicles. However, packed snowand ice will often cause tracked vehicles to

slide and possibly lose control. This is particu-larly true on hills or roads with steep inclines.Tank drivers must be trained how to properlysteer, brake, and accelerate under these condi-tions. Infantry on roads should stay clear ofheavy tracked vehicles in these conditionswhile they are moving. Concealment and camouflage is more difficultdue to the white snow. Depending of the mis-sion and environment, tanks may need to bepainted white for better camouflaging.Increased requirements for CSS.

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APPENDIX CNBC OPERATIONS

Planning

Planning is critical to the success of any operation;therefore, all staff sections must make NBC an inte-gral part of their operational planning process. Onemajor factor that must be considered is the NBCeffect on individuals and operations once the unitenters a mission-oriented protective posture(MOPP): the operational tempo will slow, Marineswill require more rest and hydration to recover fromphysical exertion, and the possibility of heat casual-ties will increase. Proper planning must addressthreat analysis, vulnerability analysis, MOPP analy-sis, and the decontamination site.

Threat AnalysisA threat analysis focuses on the enemy’s capabil-ities and willingness to use NBC weapons andincludes the following:

History of NBC weapons use.Availability of NBC weapons and supportequipment.Production and stockpile of NBC weapons.Delivery systems.Doctrine and training.

Vulnerability AnalysisA vulnerability analysis focuses on UnitedStates forces and our weaknesses and includesthe following:

Effects of weapons on personnel and equipment.Type and size of weapons within range.Detection/warning systems available.Unit protection available.Personnel training levels.Unit location in relationship to the battlefield.

Weather, climate, terrain.Medical supplies and services available.

For more information on NBC vulnerabilityassessments, see MCRP 3-37.1A, Nuclear, Biolog-ical, and Chemical (NBC) Vulnerability Analysis.

MOPP Analysis

A MOPP analysis focuses on the effects ofplacing the unit into MOPP and includes thefollowing:

The mission.Likelihood of a follow-on mission.Commander’s acceptable degree of risk/per-cent of casualties.Likelihood and types of agents to be employed.Additional protection afforded/required.Expected warning time.Mental demands of work.Physical demands of work.Duration of mission.

See MCWP 3-37.2, Multiservice Tactics,Techniques, and Procedures for Nuclear, Bio-logical, and Chemical (NBC) Protection, fordetailed information on performing a MOPPanalysis.

Decontamination Site

The battalion scout platoon can be tasked to locate adecontamination site. The following are characteris-tics of a good decontamination site:

Easy to find.Located on or along a hard stance road network.

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Access to a potable water source.Removed from the main battle area.Good cover and concealment.Access to a clean route out for decontaminatedunits.

For further information on decontamination seeMCWP 3-37.1, Multiservice Tactics, Tech-niques, and Procedures for Nuclear, Biological,and Chemical Defense Operations, and MCWP3-37.3, NBC Decontamination.

React to a Nuclear Attack

When a tank crew observes a brilliant flash oflight and a mushroom-shaped cloud, crewmenmust act quickly to minimize the effects of anuclear detonation. The nuclear attack drillinvolves four steps:

Step 1. Take immediate protective actions, includ-ing the following:

If mounted, button up and close the breech andballistic doors. If time permits, position thevehicle behind a protective terrain feature andturn off the master power until the effects ofthe blast have passed.Dismounted crewmen drop to the ground andcover exposed skin until blast effects have passed.

Step 2. Implement SOPs and accomplish relatedactions in the following areas:

Re-establish communications.Prepare and forward an NBC-1 report.Implement continuous monitoring.Submit a situation report to the commander.

Step 3. Re-organize the platoon:

Evacuate casualties and fatalities.Redistribute personnel as needed.Conduct essential maintenance.

Step 4. Continue the mission that is given at theend of the monitoring phase.

React to a Chemical/Biological Attack

During an operation, the tank crew initiates thefollowing steps whenever an automatic maskingevent occurs, the chemical agent alarm sounds,M8 and M9 detection paper indicates the pres-ence of chemical agents, or a Marine suspects thepresence of chemical or biological agents:

Step 1. Crewmen recognize and then react to thehazard:

Put on protective mask (and hood) within 15seconds.Alert remainder of the platoon and company.Within 8 minutes, assume MOPP 4, then buttonup/activate the tank over pressurization system.Perform immediate decontamination of anypossibly contaminated, exposed skin using theM291 individual decontamination kit.

Step 2. Implement SOPs in these areas:

Administer self-aid and buddy-aid to platoonmembers with symptoms of chemical/biologi-cal agent poisoning.Conduct operator’s spray-down and decontam-ination of equipment as necessary.Submit NBC-1 and follow-up reports as needed.

Step 3. Continue the mission.

Step 4. Monitor for chemical/biological agentsand, as the situation warrants, initiate actionsto reduce MOPP levels and discontinue agentmonitoring.

Note: If the M256 detection kit records anegative reading inside an over pressurizedM1A1 tank, the crew can initiate unmaskingprocedures.

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Decontamination

Successful avoidance and protection may preventthe need for decontamination; however, due to thelarge area of coverage of NBC weapons, the unitmust be prepared to conduct decontamination oper-ations. The primary purpose of decontamination isto restore the unit’s combat power and reduce thenumber of casualties caused by NBC weapons.When planning and conducting decontaminationoperations, the following decontamination princi-ples will be the controlling factor:

Decontaminate as soon as possible. This limitsthe effects of NBC agents by reducing expo-sure time and concentration on personnel andequipment.Decontaminate as far forward as possible. Thislimits the spread of contamination, thus reducingthe possibility of contaminating units and person-nel that have not been affected previously.Decontaminate only what is necessary. Decon-taminate only those items, or areas of equip-ment, that are considered essential for missionaccomplishment. Do not attempt to decontami-nate personal items or equipment that is notnormally used.

Decontaminate by priority. Set priorities fordecontamination according to the unit’s mis-sion and the threat.

Decontamination operations are conducted onfour levels based upon decontamination principalsand METT-T. The four levels of decontamina-tion are immediate/operational and thorough/clearance (see table C-1). Immediate and opera-tional decontamination are time-critical anddesigned to remove life-threatening contamina-tion on personnel and equipment as quickly aspossible in order to save lives and regeneratecombat power. Thorough and clearance decon-tamination are time and resource intensive,designed to remove virtually all of the contamina-tion and are usually conducted as part of a recon-sti tution effort . Decontamination is not asequential process that requires the conduct (inorder) of immediate, operational, and thoroughdecontamination. For example, conducting opera-tional decontamination to remove gross contami-nation in order to continue the mission, combinedwith the natural weathering process may alleviatethe requirement to conduct thorough decontami-nation. The detailed procedures and techniquesfor the following decontamination operations arecontained in MCWP 3-37.3.

Table C-1. Decontamination Levels/Techniques.Levels Techniques1 Purpose Best Start Time Performed By

Immediate Skin decontaminationPersonal wipedownOperator spraydown

Saves lives and stops agent from penetrating

Before 1 minWithin 15 minWithin 15 min

IndividualIndividual or crewIndividual or crew

Operational MOPP gear exchange2

Vehicle washdown3

Provides temporary MOPP4 and limits agent spread

Within 6 hr UnitBattalion crew ordecontamination platoon

Thorough Detailed equipmentdecontamination and detailedaircraft decontaminationDetailed troop decontamination

Provides probability long-term MOPP reduction with less risk

When mission allows reconstitution

Decontamination platoon

UnitClearance Unrestricted use of resources METT-T depending on type of

equipment contaminatedWhen mission permits Supporting strategic resources

1. The techniques become less effective the longer they are delayed.2. Performance degradation and risk assessment must be considered when exceeding 6 hours.3. Vehicle washdown is most effective if started within 1 hour.

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Immediate

Immediately upon becoming contaminated, indi-viduals must carry out immediate decontamina-tion. This may include decontamination of somepersonnel, clothing, and equipment. Immediatedecontamination consists of skin decontaminationand personal and operator wipe down. It isdesigned to prevent casualties and permit the useof individual equipment and key systems.

Operational

Operational decontamination is carried out by anindividual and/or a unit and is restricted to spe-cific parts of operationally essential equipment,materiel, and/or work areas in order to minimizecontact and transfer hazards and to sustain opera-tions. Operational decontamination reduces thespread and the level of contamination. In somecases, when combined with weathering, MOPPlevels may be reduced without further decontami-nation, depending on the surface or materialbeing decontaminated. Operational decontamina-tion consists of MOPP gear exchange and vehi-cle washdown.

A MOPP gear exchange should be performedwithin 6 hours of being contaminated due to theinherent performance degradation that occurs thelonger a unit is in MOPP 4. MOPP gear exchangeallows a unit to remove the gross contaminationfrom personnel and equipment and provides tem-porary relief from MOPP 4 and a return to anincreased operational tempo in pursuit of mis-sion accomplishment.

Vehicle washdown should be performed within6 hours of being contaminated if the missiondoes not permit a thorough decontamination.This process removes gross contamination andlimits its spread.

Thorough

Thorough decontamination operations reduce andsometimes eliminate contamination. They restore

combat power by reducing or removing nearly allof the contamination on personnel, equipment,and materiel; permitting the partial or totalremoval of individual protection equipment; andallowing units to maintain operations with mini-mum degradation. Detailed troop and detailedequipment decontamination are conducted as partof a reconstitution effort during breaks in combatoperations. These operations require immenselogistical support and are manpower intensive.Thorough decontamination removes the unit fromperforming its primary mission but allows it toreturn with restored effectiveness.

Clearance

Clearance decontamination of equipment and/orpersonnel accomplishes the decontamination pro-cess to a standard that allows unrestricted trans-portation, maintenance, employment, anddisposal. Clearance decontamination consists of acombination of all of the techniques and proce-dures known to reduce contamination to levelsbelow that which can be detected using currentdetection suites

Unmasking Procedures

Once the unit goes into MOPP 4, unmasking willnot be conducted unless approved by the battalioncommander. Once approval to unmask is received,the following procedures will be executed:

Selective Unmasking with a Chemical Detector:At least two separate detection samples aretaken from different locations within unit posi-tion. All results must be negative.The senior man present selects two/threeMarines of different size/weight/ethnic back-grounds and checks their physical condition.The Marines disarm and are placed in a shadedarea. Ensure a corpsman is present if available.The Marines remove their mask for 5 minutes.Keep a close and constant watch for chemicalagent symptoms while Marines are unmasked.

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After 5 minutes, have the Marines don and cleartheir masks. Monitor them for 10 minutes.After 10 minutes, if no symptoms appear,begin selective unmasking within the unit.If at any time symptoms appear, stop theunmasking process and treat as appropriate.Selective Unmasking Without a ChemicalDetector:The senior man present selects two/three Marinesof different size/weight/ethnic backgrounds.The Marines disarm and are placed in a shadedarea. Ensure a corpsman is present if available.The Marines break the seal of their masks for15 seconds, keeping their eyes open and hold-ing their breath.After 15 seconds, have the Marines don andclear their masks. Monitor these Marines for

10 minutes. If no symptoms appear, continue.If symptoms appear, stop selective unmasking.Have the Marines break the seal of their masksonce again and take two to three normal breaths.After taking two to three breaths, they will donand clear their masks. Monitor these Marines for10 minutes. If no symptoms appear, continue. Ifsymptoms appear, stop selective unmasking.Have the Marines remove their masks for 5minutes.After 5 minutes they will don and clear theirmasks. Monitor these Marines for 10 minutes.After 10 minutes, if no symptoms appear,continue. If symptoms appear, stop selectiveunmasking.Selective unmasking within the unit can begin.

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APPENDIX DAMMUNITION

Main Gun Ammunition

ClassificationConventional main gun ammunition is classifiedaccording to type and use:

Armor-defeating ammunition:Kinetic energy ammunition (sabot) is the pri-mary round used against tank and tank-liketargets.Chemical energy ammunition (HEAT andMPAT) is the primary round used againstlightly armored targets, field fortifications,and personnel. It is also used against tankand tank-like targets. MPAT is also usedagainst helicopters.

Beehive and high explosive plastic ammunitionare used against troops or field fortifications.White phosphorus ammunition is used formarking, screening, and incendiary purposes.Target practice ammunition is used for gun-nery training. These rounds have ballistic char-acteristics similar to service ammunition.Dummy ammunition is used for practicing gun-nery-related tasks and has no propellant orexplosive charge.

IdentificationMain gun ammunition can be identified by shapeand the projectile’s color code and markings. Astandard NATO color code is used for main gunammunition (see fig. D-1 for example of 120mm

CaseBase

PropellingCharge

Projectile

Penetrator

CartridgeCase

DiscardingSABOT

IgniterTube

Point InitatingBase-DetonatingFuze

Figure D-1. Example of 120mm Main Gun Ammunition Markings.

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main gun ammunition markings). The projectile andthe cartridge case have markings that provide addi-tional information about the ammunition and the fir-ing weapon. Marking information is as follows:

Tracer.Caliber and type of weapon.Type of filler.Type of projectile (round).Model of projectile (round).Ammunition lot number.

Components of a Main Gun Round

A complete round of main gun ammunition isusually composed of the following basic parts:

Note: Not every type of round will have all theparts listed, and every possible part is listed.

Cartridge case: the brass, steel, or combustiblecasing that contains the propellant and primer.When the round is fired, the cartridge caseexpands to seal the rear of the gun tube. (Onthe 120mm round, the obturator on the basestub seals the rear of the gun tube.)Case base: the rear portion of the 120mmammunition that houses the primer and isejected after firing.Propellant: the composition that burns, pro-ducing gas pressure that forces the projectilefrom the cartridge case toward the target.Primer: the cap in the base of the cartridgecase that ignites the propellant charge.Projectile: the part of the round that travelsthrough the gun tube.Subprojectile: the part of the projectile thattravels to the target.Fuze: the part of the projectile that causes it tofunction upon impact or at a specific time (notused in kinetic-energy rounds).Ogive: the forward portion of the projectile.The ogive is designed to reduce air resistanceand provide aerodynamic stability.

Bourrelet: a raised metal or plastic ring aroundthe outer forward surface of the projectile. Itspurpose is to center the forward part of the pro-jectile as it travels through the bore.Body: the part of the projectile between thebourrelet and the rotating bands. It containseither a subprojectile or an explosive chemicalfiller and fuze; it can also contain all three.Rotating band: the hard plastic or metallicring(s) around the base of the projectile. Itseals the propellant gas behind the base of theprojectile and imparts spin (for rifled guns) to aspin-stabilized round or absorbs spin on fin-stabilized rounds.

● Obturator: the rubber seal that helps the rotatingband seal the propellant gas behind the projectile.Tracer: an element inserted in the base of pro-jectiles that, when ignited, burns and allowsboth the projectile’s trajectory and the impactto be observed during flight.

Armor-Defeating Ammunition

Sabot Rounds

Sabot rounds are the primary, armor-defeatinground for the 120mm main gun and the mostaccurate of all tank ammunition. Currently theM1A1 can fire the M829A1/M829A2 armor-piercing, fin-stabilized, discarding sabot-tracer(APFSDS-T) (120mm). Sabot rounds use kineticenergy (the combined mass [weight] and veloc-ity [speed] of the projectile) to penetrate the tar-get, no explosives are needed. The effectivenessof sabot rounds depends on the density of the tar-get surface; therefore, target armor thicknessmust be considered when selecting the appropri-ate armor-defeating round for a specific target.Also, when possible, tanks should maneuver toengage armored targets from the flank or rearwhere the armor is less dense. See figure D-2 andD-3 on page D-4.

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Figure D-2. M829A1/M829A2 APFSDS-T (120mm).

SteelCase Base

PropellantAluminumFin

Projectile

Composite (M829A2) Sabotor

Aluminum (M829A1) SabotDepletedUraniumPenetrator

CombustibleCartridge Case

Muzzle Velocity: 1,575 m/s (M829A1)1,680 m/s (M829A2)

Penetrator Composition: Depleted uranium

Announced in Fire Command as: Sabot (pronounced SAY-BO)

Fuze: None

Employment: Primary armor-defeating round against tanks or tank-like targets

Projectile Color Code: Black with white letters

Weight: 46.2 lb (M829A1)44.9 lb (M829A2)

Length: 38.7 in

Storage Temperature Limits: -50°F to 145°F

Safe-to-Fire Temperature Limits: -25°F to 125°F

Performance Temperature Limits:

-25°F to 125°F

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Figure D-3. M829 APFSDS-T (120mm).

HEAT Rounds

HEAT rounds are the secondary armor-defeatingammunition. The HEAT round is used primarilyagainst lightly armored targets, field fortifica-tions, and personnel. Each round consists of asteel body that contains a high explosive shapedcharge, formed by a copper shaped charge liner;the M830 (high explosive antitank, multipurpose-tracer [HEAT-MP-T] includes a wave shaper (seefig. D-4). The projectile embodies a steel spikewith a shoulder and nose switching mechanismfor full frontal area functioning. Upon impact,one of the fuze sensors is activated. The fuze then

detonates the high-explosive shaped charge,which collapses the cone assembly creating ahigh-velocity focused shock wave and a jet ofmetal particles that penetrate the target. Fragmen-tation of the projectile body sidewall provides anantipersonnel capability.

Due to i ts slower muzzle velocity, HEATrounds are not as accurate as sabot rounds atranges beyond 2,000 meters. However, thisround depends on chemical energy and notstriking velocity; therefore, its ability to pene-trate armor is as effective at 4,000 meters as itis at 200 meters.

SteelCaseBase

PropellantAluminumFin

Projectile

AluminumSabot

DepletedUraniumPenetrator

CombustibleCartridge Case

Muzzle Velocity: 1.670 m/s

Penetrator Composition: Depleted uranium

Announced in Fire Command as: Sabot (pronounced SAY-BO)

Fuze: None

Employment: Primary armor-defeating round against tanks or tank-like targets

Projectile Color Code: Black with white letters

Weight: 41.2 lb

Length: 38.8 in

Storage Temperature Limits: -50°F to 145°F

Safe-to-Fire Temperature Limits: -50°F to 145°F

Performance Temperature Limits: -25°F to 125°F

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Figure D-4. M830 HEAT-MP-T (120mm).

MPAT AmmunitionThe 120mm M830A1 MPAT round contains ahigh explosive warhead equipped with a proxim-ity fuze that allows it to be fired in either an air orground mode (see fig. D-5 on page D-6). Its pri-mary targets are light armored ground targets,which are engaged with the fuze set to groundmode. MPAT ammunition may also be usedagainst bunkers, buildings, the side and rear ofenemy tanks, and enemy personnel. When thefuze is set in the air mode, the round can be usedin a self-defense role against enemy helicopters.When fired in the air mode, a black puff of smokeis produced when the proximity sensor and fuzefunction. This permits the crew to observe when

and where the round functions in relation to thetarget. M830A1 cartridges are shipped to unitswith the fuze set in the ground mode. The MPATround is a fin-stabilized round with a three-piecediscarding sabot and is used in the 120mmM256A1 smooth-bore cannon.

WARNINGThe nose of the M830A1 contains the air/ground sensor. This sensor can be damagedif it is struck on hard surfaces inside the turret(turret strut, breech, etc.) with moderate force.Loaders must take precaution to avoid strik-ing the nose during the loading process.

Muzzle Velocity: 1,410 m/s

Announced in Fire Command as: HEATFuze: Point-initiating, base-detonating and

full frontal area impact switch.Employment: Light-armored targets and field fortifications.

Secondary round for tanks or tank-like targets.Projectile Color Code: Black with yellow lettersWeight: 53.4 lbLength: 38.6 inStorage Temperature Limits: -50°F to 145°FSafe-to-Fire Temperature Limits: -50°F to 145°FPerformance Temperature Limits: -25°F to 125°F

Steel CaseBase Propellant

Full FrontalImpact SwitchAssembly

CombustibleCartridge Case

StandoffSpike

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Figure D-5. M830A1 HEAT-MP-T (120mm).

Ammunition Stowage Plan

The ammunition stowage plan for all tanks withina battalion-size unit is part of the unit SOP. Thestowage plan should include the location of allammunition, by type and number of rounds,authorized for the basic load. During darkness,when lights inside the turret reduce the crew’snight vision or give away the tank’s position, astandardized stowage plan helps the loader rap-

idly locate the ammunition announced in the ini-tial fire command. The stowage plan also helpsthe crew keep track of the number of rounds (bytype) that have been fired.

When loading the M1A1, the loader shouldplace sabot rounds along the sides and acrossthe top in the turret and hull compartments.HEAT rounds should be loaded in the centerracks of the compartments.

Muzzle Velocity: 1,410 m/s

Announced in Fire Command as: MPAT (ground mode)

MPAT AIR (air mode)

Fuze: Point-initiating, base-detonating (ground mode)

Proximity or point-initiating, base-detonating (air mode)

Employment MPAT GROUND: LAVs, buildings, bunkers, ATGM platforms, and personnel.

Secondary round for tanks or tank-like targets.

Employment MPAT AIR: Helicopters

Projectile Color Code: Black with yellow letters

Weight: 50.1 lb

Length: 38.7 in

Storage Temperature Limits: -50°F to 145°F

Safe-to-Fire Temperature Limits: -25°F to 120°F

Performance Temperature Limits: -25°F to 120°F

SteelCase Base

Propelling Charge

CombustibleCartridge Case

Base-DetonatingFuze

Sabot

Shaped ChargeLiner

Air/GroundSwitch

ExplosiveTracer

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Machine Gun Ammunition

Link Belts

Machine gun ammunition is belted in disintegrat-ing metallic link belts. The .50 caliber machinegun ammunition is linked with the M9 closedlink. Both the 7.62mm coax machine gun and theloader’s machine gun use the M13 clip-type openlink. See figure D-6.

Color Code Identification

Machine gun ammunition is identified by type,caliber, model, and lot number. A color code onthe bullet tip or band identifies the type. Mark-ings are also located on packing containers. Seefigure D-7.

Smoke Grenade Ammunition

The L8A1, L8A3, and M76 infrared smoke gre-nades are fired from the M250 grenade launchermounted on the M1A1 to provide screening pro-tection for the tank and crew. The M82 smokegrenade is designed to simulate the L8A3 andM76 smoke grenade. The M250 grenade launcher

consists of two dischargers (one on either side ofthe turret), mounting hardware, arming and fir-ing switches on the tank commander panel, andwiring. Six smoke grenades are loaded in eachdischarger.

CautionSmoke grenades contain fire-producing chemi-cals and are dangerous to exposed personnel out-side the vehicle.

L8A1 and L8A3 Grenades

The L8A1 and L8A3 red phosphorus screeningsmoke grenades are identified by the markings atthe base of the casing (see fig. D-8 on page D-8).

Caliber .50( Closed Link ) 7.62mm

( Open Link )

Figure D-6. Link Belts.

NATO TYPE OFMARKING CARTRIDGE

COLOR OF TIP ORBAND ON BULLET

Black Armor-Piercing

Silver Armor-PiercingIncendiary Tracer

Red and Silver Armor-PiercingIncendiary Tracer

Red Tracer

Not Painted

Green and White

Ball

Frangible

IncendiaryBlue

Notes: Dummy ammunition is identified by a corrugated orperforated cartridge case. It is used to train clearing,loading, and immediate action on the machine gun.

Blank ammunition is identified by a colored plug orcrimped forward end in place of the projectile forcaliber .50 ammunition and an elongated case andplug for 7.62mm ammunition.

Figure D-7. Ammunition ColorCode/NATO Marking Chart.

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The grenade is propelled from the discharger bypressure build-up in the metal base when electri-cal current at the electrical firing clip ignites thesquib-type electric fuze and propellant charge.The propellant charge simultaneously ignites thedelay composition within the delay holder. Dur-ing flight, the delay composition burns throughand ignites the black powder bursting charge. Thebursting charge ignites the red phosphorus andbutyl rubber composition and bursts the rubberbody, dispensing the burning red phosphorus andbutyl rubber pellets to produce a smoke cloud.

M76 GrenadeThe M76 infrared screening smoke grenade isidentified by the markings at the base of the

casing. The grenade is propelled from the dis-charger when an electrical current at the firingcontact activates the electrical match. The elec-trical match ignites the propellant, which bothlaunches the grenade and ignites the pyrotech-nic time delay detonator. Launch accelerationcauses the setback lock to displace aft, out ofengagement with the safe and arm slider/borerider. When the slider/bore rider clears thelaunch tube, it moves into the armed position,which aligns the transfer lead with the timedelay detonator and the booster lead. When thetime delay detonator ignites the transfer lead,booster lead, and central burster, the grenadebursts, creating an infrared obscuring cloud.See figure D-9.

GRENDSCHGR

SMKSCR

RubberBody

PlasticBursterTube

DelayAssemblyWith DelayComposition

GasPropulsionHolesWithMetal FoilDiaphragm

RedPhosphorus/ButylRubber SmokeComposition

Black PowderBurster Charge

Adapter

PropellantCharge andElectricFuze

Grounding/SecuringClip

ElectricalFiring Clip

66.3 mm(2.61 in)

185 mm(7.28 in)

Figure D-8. L8A1 and L8A3 Smoke Grenade.

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Marine Corps Tank Employment _______________________________________________________________________________ D-9

M82 Grenade

The M82 smoke grenade is identified by the mark-ings at the base of the casing. The M82 is an elec-tronically-initiated, propellant-launched grenadethat functions to disseminate a screening cloud 30meters forward of the firing vehicle. The environ-mentally acceptable smoke composition consistsof 1.8 pounds of titanium dioxide. The grenade’splastic body houses the launch system, the safe andarming mechanism, the explosive booster andburster, and the smoke composition. The M82 isdesigned to simulate the L8A3 and M76 smokegrenade and can be used during gunnery or force-on-force training. See figure D-10 on page D-10.

Limited-Issue 120mm Ammunition

The XM908 is a highly explosive, obstaclereducing round with tracer (see fig. D-11 onpage D-11). It is a full-service, tactical, 120mmround fired from the M256 cannon system. The

round is similar in appearance to the M830A1MPAT round. Major differences include:

A steel nose cap painted yellow in place of theproximity sensor.Markings on the projectile.Markings on the case base that identify theround as the HE-OR-T XM908.

The weight of the round and center of gravity arenearly identical to the M830A1 MPAT round.

Loading and firing procedures for the XM908 arebasically the same as those used for all 120mmtank rounds. The XM908 contains a high-explo-sive filler with a three-part fusing system. Thisfusing system consists of the M774 base ele-ment, flexible communications circuit, and fron-tal impact switch assembly. Upon impact, thesteel nose penetrates the target, and a firing signalis sent to the M774 fuze. This initiates the firingsequence and full detonation occurs. The steel

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CenterBurster

BoosterLead

Slider/BoreRider

Setback Lock

Transfer Lead

Pyrotechnic TimeDelay/Detonator

Propellant

Electrical Match

Firing Contact

CasingBase

Figure D-9. M76 Smoke Grenade.

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D-10 ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-12

nose penetration allows the munition to explodeinside the target. When firing at concrete obsta-cles, this penetration will reduce the obstaclemore efficiently.

The XM908 round is primarily used to reduceconcrete obstacles into rubble that is smallenough to be cleared by either unit organic

equipment or external support. Live-fire testresults have shown that this round is also effec-tive against concrete bridge pylons. Units nowhave the capability to destroy bridges or damagethem enough to greatly hinder their carryingcapacities. This action could be used to create anobstacle that would greatly restrict or impedeenemy movement.

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CenterBurster

BoosterLead

Slider/BoreRider

Setback Lock

Transfer Lead

Pyrotechnic TimeDelay/Detonator

Propellant

Electrical Match

Firing Contact

CasingBase

Figure D-10. M82 Smoke Grenade.

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Marine Corps Tank Employment _____________________________________________________________________________ D-11

Figure D-11. XM908 HE-OR-T (120mm).

SteelCase Base

Propelling Charge

CombustibleCartridge Case

Base-DetonatingFuze

Sabot

Shaped ChargeLiner

Steel Nose

ExplosiveTracer

Muzzle Velocity: 1,410 m/s

Announced in Fire Command as: OR (pronounced Oh Are)

Fuze: Point-initiating, base-detonating

Employment: To reduce concrete structures

Projectile Color Code: Black with yellow letters and a yellow steel nose

Weight: 50.1 lb

Length: 38.7 in

Storage Temperature Limits: -50°F to 145°F

Safe-to-Fire Temperature Limits: -25°F to 120°F

Performance Temperature Limits: -25°F to 120°F

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APPENDIX EBREACHING OPERATIONS

Obstacle breaching is conducted during offen-sive operations with the goal of projecting com-bat power to the far side of an obstacle. Keyconsiderations for the commander include anunderstanding of the various types of obstaclesand the capabilities and limitations of availablemobility assets.

Fundamentals

Breaching fundamentals are suppress, obscure,secure, reduce, and reconstitute:

Sufficient support elements are employed tosuppress enemy elements that are overwatch-ing the obstacle.The support force requests smoke to obscurebreach force operations.The breach force creates and proofs a lanethrough the obstacle, allowing the assault forceto secure the far side of the obstacle.The required actions are taken to further reduceand mark obstacles in order to allow the assaultforce, main attack force, and any follow-onforces to continue the attack.The reconstitution of personnel and assets areexecuted as necessary in order to conduct sub-sequent breaches.

These fundamentals are the same for all breaches,but they may vary in degree based on the situa-tion. Tanks have the capability to be the supportforce, part of the breach force or the assault force.

Suppress

Suppression is focusing all available fire onenemy personnel, weapons, or equipment in order

to prevent the enemy from prohibitively interfer-ing with friendly forces during breaching opera-tions. It includes the full range of lethal andnonlethal fires from direct and indirect fire weap-ons, aviation, and electronic warfare. Suppressionhelps to isolate the breaching site and fix theenemy in position thus providing protection toforces reducing and maneuvering through theobstacles. Suppression is primarily the responsi-bility of the support force; therefore, tanks andtheir ability to mass fires quickly and to engagetargets at long ranges using sophisticated sightsand thermal targeting are effective suppressiontools. Tanks in the support force make it difficultfor the enemy to engage the breach force becausehe must expose himself, making him vulnerable toaccurate and effective tank fire. (See the breach-ing elements paragraph on page E-4 for a discus-sion of forces.)

Obscure

The most effective obstacles are those covered byfire and observation and obscured during breach-ing. While the primary obscuration means issmoke, electronic warfare is also a way toobscure breaching activities by providing protec-tion from direction finding and jamming. Obsta-cle reduction efforts should be hidden fromenemy observation as much as possible. Consid-eration is always given to selecting a breachingsite where the terrain provides natural conceal-ment from enemy observation. Obscuring smokeplaced on the breaching area and screeningsmoke placed between the breaching area and theenemy conceals friendly activities, intentions,and obstacle reduction activities. Smoke shouldbe employed across a wide front in order todeceive the enemy as to the actual breach site(s)Tanks can use their smoke dischargers to help

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obscure their movement but this capability is lim-ited and designed as a defensive measure. Oncethe smoke rounds are discharged, they must bemanually reloaded, which is time-consuming.Therefore, smoke rounds from artillery units pro-vide a higher volume of smoke for obscuration,builds up quickly, is thicker, and lasts longer thanusing smoke from a vehicle.

Secure

The breaching site is secured to prevent the enemyfrom interfering with obstacle reduction andexploitation of the breach force. A friendly forcemust control the breaching site, to include enemylistening/observation posts, before it can reducethe obstacle. This is accomplished by suppressivefire and/or physical occupation. Generally, tacticalobstacles are secured by fires and protective obsta-cles are secured by force. The support force isresponsible for securing the nearside of the obsta-cle. The breach force creates and proofs a lanethrough the obstacle, allowing the assault force tosecure the far side of the obstacle. The breachforce must also contain sufficient assets to providelocal security against forces that the support forcecannot sufficiently engage due to terrain or othercover. Tanks contribute to the breach force byusing plows attached to the front of the tank toeither plow and/or proof a breach lane. They alsoprovide effective armor-protected firepower to thebreach force by engaging the enemy with theirmain guns and/or machine guns while beingimpervious to small-arms and indirect firesdirected at the breach force. Tanks in the assaultforce are effective for the same reasons.

Reduce

Reduction is the creation and marking of lanesthrough a minefield or obstacle to allow passageof the attacking ground force. The number and

width of lanes created varies with the situationand type of breaching operation. Lanes must bewide enough to allow a force to pass through theobstacle rapidly and continue the attack. The unitreducing the obstacle marks and reports obstacleand lane locations and conditions to higher head-quarters. Lanes are normally handed over to fol-low-on forces that will further reduce or clear theobstacle when possible, but they will not reduceor clear the obstacle when under enemy fire.

Reconstitute

Upon completion of the breach, the breachingtask force normally has seriously depleted, yetessential, class V and possibly personnel andbreaching equipment. The commander is nor-mally faced with two options: reconstitute forcesfor continued breaching operations or release theelements back to their respective commands. Ifthe commander intends to continue breachingoperations, resupply of critical materiel must beconducted and assets redistributed for futurebreaching operations. See appendix A for theM1A1 tank’s class V requirements.

Types of Breaching Operations

The following paragraphs cover the major typesof breaching operations: hasty, deliberate andcovert. Amphibious breaches are covered inMCWP 3-17.3, MAGTF Breaching Operations.Also included is a discussion of the bypass opera-tion, which the commander must consider as analternative to conducting an actual breach.

Bypass

When a unit bypasses an obstacle, it physicallychanges direction, moving along a route thatavoids the obstacle . Obstacles should be

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bypassed whenever possible to maintain themomentum of the operation. Commanders, how-ever, must ensure that conducting the bypass pro-vides a tactical advantage without exposing theunit to unnecessary danger. Previously unre-ported obstacles and bypassed enemy forcesshould be reported to higher headquarters. If pos-sible, they should conduct a reconnaissance toevaluate tactical considerations such as—

The limits of the obstacle.Physical aspects of the bypass route, includinglocation, availability of cover and conceal-ment, and key terrain influencing the route.Confirmation that the bypass route will take theunit where it needs to go while avoiding possi-ble enemy ambush sites and engagement areas(also known as kill sacks).

Tank units should expect to be engaged by enemyantitank weapons while trying to find an obstaclebypass. The enemy obstacle may have beendesigned to stop, slow, or turn the tanks anddirect them into his kill sacks.

Hasty Breach

A hasty breach or in-stride breach is the rapidcreation of a route through a minefield, barrier, orfortification by any expedient method. A hastybreach is used against a weak defender when theenemy situation is vague or changes rapidly oragainst very simple obstacles. Little or no timemay be available in which to plan or prepare forthis type of breach, particularly during the con-duct phase of an attack; therefore, well-rehearsed,pre-planned standard battle drills must be used.To maintain momentum and take advantage ofthe enemy situation, the hasty breach is normallyconducted with the resources that are immedi-ately available. Because tanks can carry mineplows or mine rollers, tank units have the abilityto conduct hasty breaches without the assistanceof engineers. When tanks are attached to otherunits, SOPs and rehearsals for breaching areessential to ensure quick and effective breachingwhen confronting obstacles.

Deliberate Breach

A deliberate or assault breach is used against astrong defense or complex obstacle system. It issimilar to a deliberate attack, requiring detailedknowledge of both the defense and the obstaclesystems. With this knowledge, forces conductingthe deliberate breach can develop detailed plans,task-organize to accomplish the mission, and exe-cute rehearsals. A deliberate breach is furthercharacterized by a buildup of combat power onthe near side of obstacles. The term deliberatebreach does not apply to the speed or tempo withwhich the attack is executed. Deliberate breach-ing operations require significant planning, coor-dination, and preparation.

In a battalion deliberate breach, the tank companyis most likely to be part of the support or assaultforce. The engineer company, task-organizedwith plow and roller tanks, serves as the breachforce. The battalion commander may also formthe breach force by task-organizing a tank ormounted infantry company with one or moreengineer platoons.

Overt and Clandestine Breaching

Breaches can be conducted either overtly or clan-destinely. Overt operations are conducted in theopen without concealment. Clandestine opera-tions are conducted in secret or under limited vis-ibility. Thorough reconnaissance and detailedintelligence assists the commander in determin-ing the best location to breach, concealed routesto the obstacle, and the type of breaching equip-ment and number of personnel required. Thecovert breach relies on stealth and dismountedmaneuver, with the breach force employing quiet,manual lane reduction techniques. Coordinationis of the utmost importance. All forces mustknow what event triggers the shift from clandes-tine to overt breaching, without this informationthey may be prematurely exposed to the enemy orto friendly fire. Because surprise is critical, thekey to conducting a breach clandestinely mayrequire delaying suppression of the enemy until

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the last possible moment (depending on theenemy situation). For example, suppression of theenemy may be delayed until:

The breach force is detected by enemy forces.The breach force is close to the obstacle andmust expose itself in order to reduce the obstacle.Lanes are open and the assault force attacks. The breach force completes lane reduction anddetonates charges to clear obstacles, signalingdirect and indirect suppressive fire to supportthe assault force.

Clandestine breaching also requires withholdingthe use of obscuring smoke. Weather and dark-ness are the best concealment for clandestineoperations. Security is achieved through stealth,which outweighs the need for speed. Silentlyeliminating enemy outposts provides additionalsecurity, but may give away friendly activity.Obstacle reduction must be conducted as silentlyas possible by using manual techniques vicemechanical equipment.

Breaching Elements

Support Force

The support force’s mission is to suppress theenemy’s ability to interfere with the actions of thebreach force. The support force usually leadsmovement of the breach elements. After identify-ing the obstacle, the support force moves to cov-ered and concealed areas and establishes supportby fire positions. The support force leader sends aspot report to the commander. This reportdescribes the location and complexity of theobstacle, the composition of enemy forces thatare overwatching the obstacle, and the location ofpossible bypasses. The commander decideswhether to bypass or to breach the obstacle and

must keep in mind that a bypass may lead to anenemy kill zone.

Whether the decision is made to breach orbypass, the support force suppresses any enemyelements that are overwatching the obstacle toallow the breach force to breach or bypass theobstacle. All available assets, including artillery,air, electronic warfare, naval surface fire support,and direct fire weapon systems should be used tosuppress and obscure the enemy. As the breachand assault forces execute their missions, the sup-port force lifts or shifts supporting fires. Becausethe enemy is likely to engage the support forcewith artillery, the support force must be preparedto move to alternate positions while maintainingsuppressive fires. The support force may havereserve breaching and assault assets (e.g., linecharges, track width mine plows, AVLBs,armored combat earthmovers) that are intendedfor use only in the event the breach and assaultforces become ineffective and to expedite recon-stitution where multiple obstacles must bebreached in quick succession.

The M1A1’s range, armor protection, and magni-fied sights allow it to carry out the support forcerole very efficiently.

Breach Force

The mission of the breach force is to create andmark lanes that enable the main attack force topass through an obstacle in order to continue theattack. It is normally a combined-arms force thatmay include engineers, infantry, tanks, AAVs,LAVs, and AVLBs. The breach force must becapable of overcoming an enemy counterattack.Assets are allocated based on the number of lanesrequired. Two breached lanes per each battalion-sized task force are highly recommended. Thecommander of the breaching force should alsoplan for at least 50 percent redundancy in breach-ing equipment due to expected losses during

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opposed breaching operations. The breach forceis organized into an engineer reconnaissanceteam, security team, obstacle reduction team, anda lane marking team:

The engineer reconnaissance team verifiesintelligence about the obstacles, locates the for-ward edge of obstacle zones so the rest of thebreach force does not inadvertently enter theobstacle, and marks the standoff distance forexplosive reduction.If the support force cannot provide local secu-rity to the breach force, the security force willprovide local security. Infantry, LAVs, tanks,and AAVs normally provide security while theengineers are reducing obstacles.The obstacle reduction team physically createsthe lanes and proofs the lanes for mines, ifrequired.The lane marking team initially marks thenewly created lanes for passage of the assaultforce, the main attack force, and follow-onforces. The lane marking team is also ready toassume the mission of obstacle reduction if theobstacle reduction team is rendered ineffective.

Once the breach force has reduced the obstacleand the assault force has passed through thelanes, guides are employed to conduct the han-dover to follow-on units. At a minimum, lanesmust be marked and their locations and condi-tions reported to higher headquarters and follow-on units.

Proofing is verifying that a breached lane is freeof live mines. This can be accomplished bychecking the breached lane with a secondarybreaching means other than explosives, such asprobing, mine detectors, mine plows, or minerollers. Proofing is done only when the potentialrisk of live mines remaining in the lane exceedsthe risk of loss to enemy fire while a lane is beingproofed. It is important to remember, obstaclereduction is the physical creation of a lanethrough or over obstacles.

Tank units may be some of the first units to movethrough the lane to provide security for theassault force on the far side of the obstacle. Insome instances, the breach force may move to ahull-down firing position that allows it to sup-press enemy elements overwatching the obstacle.At other times, it may assault the enemy withsuppressive fires provided by the support force.

A tank platoon can create a lane by itself if it isequipped with the assets required to breach thetype of obstacle encountered. If the tank unit doesnot have this capability, it may be required toprovide close-in protection for attached engi-neers with breaching assets. Three breachingmethods are available to the platoon:

Mechanical breaching, usually with mineplows.Explosive breaching, employing such means asthe mine-clearing line charge (MICLIC), M173line charge, or 1/4-pound blocks of TNT. Manual breaching, with Marines probing byhand or using such items as grappling hooks,shovels, picks, axes, and chain saws. Manualbreaching is the least preferred method for thetank platoon.

In extreme cases, the commander may order thetank platoon to force through an obstacle. Thistechnique requires the breach force to move incolumn formation through the obstacle location.If available, a disabled vehicle can be pushedahead of the lead breach vehicle in an attempt todetonate mines.

The mine plow is the breaching device most com-monly employed by the tank platoon. The battal-ion or company commander may allocate one tothree plows per platoon. When properly equippedand supported, the platoon can create up to twolanes through an obstacle.

Plow tanks lead the breach force. Immediatelyfollowing them are vehicles that proof the lanes;

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these are usually tanks equipped with mine roll-ers. This process ensures that the lane is clear.

Note: If the location and/or dimensions of theobstacle are unknown, the platoon leader maychoose to lead with tanks equipped with minerollers to identify the beginning of the obstacle.

If the platoon is allocated one plow, the platoonsergeant’s wingman normally serves as thebreach tank. The platoon sergeant follows imme-diately behind to proof the lane and provide over-watch. The platoon leader’s section follows theplatoon sergeant.

If the platoon has two or more plows, it can createmultiple lanes, usually 75 to 100 meters apart. Thewingman tanks are normally equipped with theplows and the section leaders’ tanks follow to proofthe lanes and provide overwatch (see fig. E-1).

To create a wider lane, two plow tanks can staggertheir movement along a single lane (see fig. E-2).This technique is also used in order to clear a lanethat HMMWVs and other wheeled vehicles can gothrough without a center lane of mine-ridden spoil.Using figure E-2 as a literal example, a wide lanewith no center lane would be created on the rightside of the double proofed lane.

Minefield

75-100

Meters

Figure E-1. Plow Tanks Create Multiple LanesWhile the Section Leaders’ Tanks Provide Overwatch.

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Marine Corps Tank Employment _______________________________________________________________________________ E-7

Note: The lanes created on the left sidewould not be doubled proofed, and spoilfrom the second tank through would be putinto the first tank’s right lane.

After a lane is created and proofed, it is normallyturned over to attached engineers for marking.The platoon leader reports the location of the laneand the method of marking to higher headquar-ters in order to expedite the movement of theassault force. If no engineers are available, anattempt should be made to at least mark theentrance and exit of the breach using NATOmarking procedures. Unit SOPs will dictatemarking methods and materials, which com-monly include engineer stakes with tape, guides,and chemical lights.

Throughout the operation, the platoon leader pro-vides continuous updates of the breach force’sprogress to higher headquarters and other ele-

ments involved in the breach. He also coordinateswith the support force for suppressive fires.

The assault force will often move behind thebreach force and closely follow the breach vehi-cles through the new lane.

Assault Force

The mission of the assault force is to destroy ordislodge the enemy on the far side of the obsta-cle, or in between obstacle belts, in order to allowother combat forces to continue the attack. Whilethe breach is in progress, the assault force assiststhe support force or follows the breach forcewhile maintaining cover and dispersion. Once alane is cleared through the obstacle, the assaultforce moves through the breach. It secures the farside of the obstacle by physical occupation and/orcontinues the attack in accordance with the

Minefield

Figure E-2. Plow Tanks use StaggeredMovement to Create a Wider Lane.

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E-8 ______________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-12

scheme of maneuver. The assault force must beof sufficient size to eliminate the enemy andshould be a combined-arms force consisting ofelements such as infantry, LAVs, AAVs, tanks,and engineers. Fire control measures must becoordinated so support force and breach forcefires are lifted and shifted as the assault forcemaneuvers into the enemy position.

Tank units are ideally suited for assault forceoperations against mobile enemy defenses inopen terrain. Tanks also work well with mecha-nized infantry as an assault force attacking dug-inenemy positions in close terrain.

Mobility Assets

Mine PlowThe mine plow, also known as the mine-clearingblade, is used to breach and proof minefields andaffords good survivability (see fig. E-3). Whenfully operational, a tank equipped with a mineplow can quickly clear two, 58-inch wide lanes,one in front of each track.

Note: The plow’s dogbone assembly will deto-nate the tilt rods of mines in the area betweenthe two plowed lanes; however, only plowsequipped with the improved dogbone assembly(IDA) will defeat magnetically activated mines.

The plow must be dropped at least 100 metersbefore the tank reaches the minefield, and it is notlifted until the tank is at least 100 meters past thefar edge of the minefield. The plow must have 18inches of spoil to be effective, which limits thetank’s speed to 10 miles per hour or less in thelane. The mine plow should be used only in astraight line; it does not work well on hard, rocky,or uneven ground where it cannot maintain ade-quate spoil. Mine detonation can cause violentupward movement of the blade; therefore, the crewtraverses the tank’s main gun to the side duringplowing to prevent damage to the gun tube. Thecrew must also ensure the plow’s lifting strapsdon’t become entangled in wire obstacles.

Figure E-3. Track Width Mine Plow for M1Al.

Mine Roller

The mine roller is used to identify the forwardedges of a minefield and to proof lanes. Theroller sweeps a 44-inch path in front of eachtrack and is also equipped with a dogboneassembly. It is also effective at breaching wireobstacles. The roller, however, is not effectiveon broken or uneven ground. The mine roller,like the mine plow, will not defeat magneticallyfuzed mines unless equipped with the IDA. Themain gun must be traversed to the side or rearwhen contact with a mine is possible or immi-nent; detonation can throw the roller (or piecesof it) violently upward, possibly damaging the120mm main gun. The mine roller can usuallywithstand two mine explosions before needingrepairs or replacement.

Weight: 3 tons

Speed when mounted and lowered: <10 kph

Primary use: Clearing path through minefield

Width of path: Creates 58-in cleared path in front of each track

Depth of path: Lifts and pushes surface-laid mines or buried mines up to 4 in deep in front of its path.

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AVLB

The AVLB is primarily employed to cross shortgaps (such as narrow streams), antitank ditches,craters, canals, or partially blown bridges. Itsspan is 18 meters (60 feet) using prepared abut-ments and 17 meters with unprepared abutments.The capacity of the bridge is one MLC 60 vehicle(this is waived for M1-series tanks during com-bat operations). The AVLB launcher, whichrequires 10 meters of overhead clearance fortransportation and operation, is most visible andvulnerable during launching of the bridge. Anexperienced crew can launch the bridge in 2 to 5minutes. Technical characteristics of the AVLBare provided in appendix A.

MICLIC

Used to breach wire and mine obstacles, the MICLICclears a lane 100 meters deep and 14 meters wide.

Note: The MICLIC must be fired 62 metersfrom the obstacle to get the full 100 meters ofdepth.

The charge may create two skip zones, wherethe mines are not detonated, on the right and leftside of the centerline of the cleared lane. Theskip zones, which are about 1.5 meters wide,require all MICLIC lanes to be proofed. TheMICLIC is effective against pressure-activatedantitank mines and against mechanically acti-vated antipersonnel mines. Effectiveness is lim-ited against magnetically activated mines,including scatterable mines and those with

multi-impulse (double-impact) or time-delayfuzes. The MICLIC is not effective on severelybroken ground where the line charge cannot layflat. When detonated, the MICLIC has a dangerarea with a radius of 1,600 meters.

Armored Combat EarthmoverThe armored combat earthmover uses its blade todefeat berms and antitank ditches. It can alsoskim a minefield with its blade; however, it isslow and vulnerable in this role and should beemployed this way only as a last resort. Its one-man crew further limits the vehicle’s capability.

Engineer AttachmentThe engineer attachment is the most versatile ofall breaching assets. It can be used to conductexplosive or manual breaches and proofs and tomark lanes through an obstacle. However, whileit is conducting these breaching and proofingoperations, the attachment is extremely vulnera-ble to enemy direct and indirect fires.

If other breaching assets are unavailable, aninfantry or tank platoon can conduct explosivebreaches (with hand-emplaced charges) and/oruse manual breaching kits (normally consisting ofgrappling hooks, gloves, and wire cutters). At thesame time, however, employment of either typeof platoon organization in breaching operationshas distinct disadvantages. The pace of the breachwill be slow, and the operation will leave the pla-toon vulnerable to enemy attack.

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APPENDIX FGLOSSARY

Section I. Acronyms

AAV . . . . . . . . . . . . . amphibious assault vehicleAAVC7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .assault amphibian

vehicle command model 7AAVP7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .assault amphibian

vehicle personnel model 7APFSDS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .armor-piercing,

fin-stabilized, discarding sabotAPFSDS-T . . . . . . armor-piercing, fin-stabilized,

discarding sabot-tracerATGM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . antitank guided missileAVLB . . . . . . . .armored vehicle-launched bridge

BHL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . battle handover line

C2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .command and controlcal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .caliberCAS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . close air supportcm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .centimeterCO. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .companyCOA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . course of actionCOC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . combat operations centerCSS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . combat service supportCSSE. . . . . . . . . .combat service support elementCSSG . . . . . . . . . . combat service support group

DLIC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . detachment left in contact

EA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .engagement areaEPW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . enemy prisoner of war

oF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .degree FahrenheitFAC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . forward air controllerFEBA . . . . . . . . . .forward edge of the battle areaFM. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . field manualFPF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . final protective firesFRH. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . fire resistant hydraulicFSC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . fire support coordinatorFSCC. . . . . . . . . . fire support coordination centerft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . feet

gal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . gallon(s)GCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ground combat element

GPM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . gallons per minute

HEAT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . high explosive antitankHEAT-MP-T . . . . . . . . . high explosive antitank,

multipurpose-tracerHMMWV . . . . . . . . . high mobility multipurpose

wheeled vehiclehp . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . horsepowerHQ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . headquartershr . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . hourH&S CO . . . . headquarters and service company

IDA . . . . . . . . . . . . . improved dogbone assemblyIED . . . . . . . . . . . . . improvised explosive devicein . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .inch

JP. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . joint publication

kg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . kilogramkm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . kilometerkph . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . kilometers per hour

LAV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . light armored vehiclelb . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . poundLCAC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .landing craft air cushionLCU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . landing craft, utilityLOGPAC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . logistics packageLRP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . logistic resupply pointLRU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . line replaceable unit

m . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . meterMAGTF . . . . . . . . . Marine air-ground task forceMCRP . . . . . .Marine Corps reference publicationMCWP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Marine Corps

warfighting publicationMEF . . . . . . . . . . . . . Marine expeditionary forceMETT-T . . . . . . . . . . mission, enemy, terrain and

weather, troops and supportavailable—time available

mi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .milesMICLIC . . . . . . . . . . . .mine-clearing line chargemin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . minute

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MLC . . . . . . . . . . . . . .military load classificationmm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .millimeterMMO . . . . . . . maintenance management officerMOOTW. . . . . military operations other than warMOPP . . . . . .mission-oriented protective postureMOUT. . . . . . military operations in urban terrainMPAT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .multipurpose antitankmph . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . miles per hourm/s. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .meters per secondMTO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . motor transport officer

NATO . . . . .North Atlantic Treaty OrganizationNBC . . . . . . . . .nuclear, biological, and chemical

OP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . observation postOPORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . operation order

pct . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . percentPlSgt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . platoon sergeantplt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . platoonPOL . . . . . . . . . . . petroleum, oils, and lubricantspsi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .pounds per square inchpt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . pint

qt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . quart

RECON. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . reconnaissanceROE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . rules of engagementRSTA . . . . . . . . . . . reconnaissance, surveillance,

and target acquisition

S1 . . . . . . . . . . . personnel staff officer (adjutant)S1A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . personnel staff officer

(adjutant) assistantS2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . intelligence staff officerS2A . . . . . . . . .intelligence staff officer assistantS3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . operations staff officerS3A . . . . . . . . . .operations staff officer assistantS4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . logistics staff officerS4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . logistics staff officer assistantS6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . communications staff officerSAW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .surface-to-air weaponsct . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . scoutSgt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . sergeantSINCGARS. . . . . . . . . . . . single-channel ground

and airborne radio systemSOP . . . . . . . . . . . . . standing operating procedure

TM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . technical manualTMO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . tank maintenance officerTNT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .trinitrotolueneT/O . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . table of organizationTOW . . . . . . . . tube-launched, optically tracked,

wire-command linkguided missile

TRAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .tactical recovery ofaircraft and personnel

TRP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . target reference point

UMCP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . unit maintenancecollection point

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Section II. Definitions

armor—Steel, iron, or other materials used as aprotective covering on tanks.

avenue of approach—An air or ground route ofan attacking force of a given size leading to itsobjective or to key terrain in its path. (JP 1-02)

axis of advance—A line of advance assigned forpurposes of control; often a road or a group ofroads, or a designated series of locations, extend-ing in the direction of the enemy. (JP 1-02)

basic load (ammunition) —That quantity ofammunition authorized to be on hand in a unitto meet combat needs until resupply can beaccompl i shed . S i ze o f the bas ic load i snormally determined by corps or the majoroverseas commander.

battle position—1. In ground operations, adefensive location oriented on an enemy avenueof approach from which a unit may defend. 2. Inair operations, an airspace coordination areacontaining firing points for attack helicopters.Also called BP. (MCRP 5-12C)

Beehive—A term associated with antipersonnelprojectiles, loaded with flechettes.

bounding overwatch—A tactical movementtechnique used when contact with enemy groundforces is expected. The unit moves by bounds.One element is in position to overwatch the otherelement’s move. The overwatching element isalways positioned to support the moving unit byfire or fire and maneuver. This is the slowest butmost secure movement technique. (MCRP 5-12A)

caliber—1. The diameter of the bore of a gun. Inrifled gun barrels, the caliber is obtained bymeasuring between opposite lands. 2. The diame-ter of a projectile. Also called cal.

cartridge case—A container that holds theprimer, propellant, and projectile.

coax machine gun—A machine gun mounted inthe turret of a tank in a way that its line of fire isparallel (coaxial) to that of the cannon set on thesame mounting.

command post—A unit’s or subunit’s headquar-ters where the commander and the staff performtheir activities. In combat, a unit’s or subunit’sheadquarters is often divided into echelons; theechelon in which the unit or subunit commander islocated or from which such commander operates iscalled a command post. Also called CP. (JP 1-02)

company team—A combined arms organizationformed by attaching one or more nonorganictank, mechanized infantry, or light infantryplatoons to a tank, mechanized infantry, or lightinfantry company either in exchange for or inaddition to organic platoons. (MCRP 5-12A)

concealment—The protection from observation orsurveillance. (JP 1-02, part 4 of a 6 part definition)

cover—Shelter or protection, either natural orartificial. (JP 1-02, part 4 of a 6 part definition)

covering force—1. A force operating apart fromthe main force for the purpose of intercepting,engaging, delaying, disorganizing, and deceivingthe enemy before the enemy can attack the forcecovered. 2. Any body or detachment of troopswhich provides security for a larger force byobservation, reconnaissance, attack, or defense, orby any combination of these methods. (JP 1-02)

dead space—1. An area within the maximumrange of a weapon, radar, or observer, whichcannot be covered by fire or observation from aparticular position because of intervening obsta-cles, the nature of the ground, or the characteristics

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of the trajectory, or the limitations of the pointingcapabilities of the weapon. 2. An area or zonewhich is within range of a radio transmitter, but inwhich a signal is not received. 3. The volume ofspace above and around a gun or guided missilesystem into which it cannot fire because ofmechanical or electronic limitations. (JP 1-02)

defilade—Protection from hostile observation andfire provided by an obstacle such as a hill, ridge,or bank. (JP 1-02, part 1 of a 3 part definition)

direct fire—Gunfire delivered on a target usingthe target itself as a point of aim for either theweapon or the director. (JP 1-02)

dummy ammunition—Ammunition that is usedfor practicing gunnery-related tasks; it has nopropellant or explosive charge.

elevation—The degree above the horizon towhich a gun is aimed. Also called EL.

fire control system—A group of interrelated firecontrol equipments and/or instruments designed foruse with a weapon or group of weapons. (JP 1-02)

fire support—In Marine Corps usage, assistanceto elements of the Marine air-ground task forceengaged with the enemy rendered by other firingunits, including (but not limited to) artillery,mortars, naval surface fire support, and offensiveair support. (MCRP 5-12C)

fuze—A device that initiates an explosive train.(MCRP 5-12A)

hide—The positioning of a vehicle, individual, orunit so that no part is exposed to observation ordirect fire. (MCRP 5-12A)

hull down—The positioning of an armored vehi-cle so that the muzzle of the gun or launcher isthe lowest part of the vehicle exposed to thefront. Hull-down positions afford maximumprotection for vehicles that are engaging targetswith direct fire. (MCRP 5-12A)

identification—The process of determining thefriendly or hostile character of an unknowndetected contact. (JP 1-02, part 1 of a 3 partdefinition)

incendiary—A compound that generates suffi-cient heat to cause the target to catch fire or causesmelting or burning of equipment. (MCRP 5-12A)

indirect fire—Fire delivered on a target that isnot itself used as a point of aim for the weaponsor the director. (JP 1-02)

kinetic energy ammunition—The primaryarmor-defeating round for the 120-mm main gunand the most accurate of all tank ammunition.Kinetic energy is a combination of mass (weight)and velocity (speed) of the projectile; no explo-sives are needed to penetrate the target.

laser—Any device that can produce or amplifyoptical radiation primarily by the process ofcontrolled stimulated emission. A laser may emitelectromagnetic radiation from the ultravioletportion of the spectrum through the infraredportion. Also, an acronym for “light amplificationby stimulated emission of radiation.” (JP 1-02)

laser rangefinder —A device which uses laserenergy for determining the distance from the deviceto a place or object. Also called LRF. (JP 1-02)

line of contact—A general trace delineating thelocation where two opposing forces are engaged.(MCRP 5-12C)

line of departure—1. In land warfare, a linedesignated to coordinate the departure of attackelements. 2. In amphibious warfare, a suitablymarked offshore coordinating line to assistassault craft to land on designated beaches atscheduled times. (JP 1-02)

line of sight—The unobstructed path from a[Marine], weapon, weapon sight, electronic-send-ing and -receiving antennas, or piece of recon-naissance equipment to another point. Also calledLOS. (MCRP 5-12A)

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lot number—An identification number assignedto a particular quantity or lot of materiel, such asammunition, from a single manufacturer.

muzzle velocity—The velocity of a projectilewith respect to the muzzle at the instant theprojectile leaves the weapon.

obscuration—The effects of weather, battlefielddust, and debris, or the use of smoke munitions tohamper observation and target-acquisition capa-bility or to conceal activities or movement.(MCRP 5-12A)

obstacle—Any obstruction designed or employedto disrupt, fix, turn, or block the movement of anopposing force, and to impose additional losses inpersonnel, time, and equipment on the opposingforce. Obstacles can be natural, manmade, or acombination of both. (JP 1-02)

phase line—A line utilized for control and coor-dination of military operations, usually an easilyidentified feature in the operational area. (JP 1-02) A line utilized for control and coordination ofmilitary operations, usually an easily identifiedfeature in the operational area. (NATO) A lineutilized for control and coordination of militaryoperations, usually a terrain feature extendingacross the zone of action. Also called PL .(MCRP 5-12A)

point target—A target of such a small dimen-sion that it requires the accurate placement ofordnance in order to neutralize or destroy it.

primer—The cap in the base of the cartridgecase that ignites the propellant charge. It may beactuated by friction, blow, pressure, or electricity.

projectile—That part of the round that travelsthrough the gun tube.

propellant—An explosive charge for propellinga projectile.

pyrotechnic—A mixture of chemicals which,when ignited, is capable of reacting exothermi-cally to produce light, heat, smoke, sound, or gasand may also be used to introduce a delay into anexplosive train because of its known burningtime. The term excludes propellants and explo-sives. (MCRP 5-12A)

reconnaissance—A mission undertaken toobtain, by visual observation or other detectionmethods, information about the activities andresources of an enemy or potential enemy, or tosecure data concerning the meteorological,hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of aparticular area. Also called RECON. (JP 1-02)

reconnaissance by fire—A method of reconnais-sance in which fire is placed on a suspectedenemy position to cause the enemy to disclose apresence by movement or return of fire. (JP 1-02)

sabot—A lightweight carrier in which a subcali-ber projectile is centered to permit firing theprojectile in the larger caliber weapon. Thecarrier fills the bore of the weapon from whichthe projectile is fired; it is normally discarded ashort distance from the muzzle.

shaped charge—An explosive charge shaped sothe explosive energy is focused and concentratedto move in one direction.

shock effect—The combined destructive (physi-cal and psychological) effect on the enemyproduced by the violent impact of mounted andmobile armor protected firepower of tanks andsupporting troops.

signature—The visible or audible effects, suchas noise, smoke, flame, heat, or debris, produced

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when a weapon is fired or a piece of equipmentoperated; also, an electronic emission subject todetection and traceable to the equipment produc-ing it. Also called footprint.

situation report—A report giving the situationin the area of a reporting unit or formation. Alsocalled SITREP. (JP 1-02)

spall—Fragments torn from either the outer orinner surface of armor plate as the result of acomplete or partial penetration of the armor, orby dynamic effects of an explosive charge.

spot report—A concise narrative report of essen-tial information covering events or conditionsthat may have an immediate and significant effecton current planning and operations that isafforded the most expeditious means of transmis-sion consistent with requisite security. Alsocalled SPOTREP. (Note: In reconnaissance andsurveillance usage, spot report is not to be used.)(JP 1-02).

suppressive fire—Fires on or about a weaponssystem to degrade its performance below thelevel needed to fulfill its mission objectives,during the conduct of the fire mission. (JP 1-02)

target acquisition—The detection, identifica-tion, and location of a target in sufficient detail topermit the effective employment of weapons.Also called TA. (JP 1-02)

target location—The determination of where apotential target is on the battlefield.

target reference point—An easily recognizablepoint on the ground (either natural or man-made)used to initiate, distribute, and control fires.Target reference points (TRPs) can also desig-nate the center of an area where the commanderplans to distribute or converge the fires of all hisweapons rapidly. They are used by task force andbelow, and can further delineate sectors of firewithin an engagement area. TRPs are designatedusing the standard target symbol and numbersissued by the fire support officer. Once desig-nated, TRPs also constitute indirect fire targets.Also called TRP. (MCRP 5-12A)

thermal imaging system—The system thatprovides the Abrams fire control system withnight-vision capability by presenting a thermalscene in the gunner’s primary sight. It operateson emitted thermal radiation rather than visiblelight. Also called TIS.

tracer—A powder element inserted in the baseof some projectiles that, when ignited, burns andallows the projectile to be observed during flight.

trajectory—The flight path of a projectile fromthe point of fire to impact.

white phosphorus—A yellow, waxy chemicalthat ignites spontaneously when exposed to air;used as a filling for various projectiles; a smoke-producing agent with an incendiary effect. Alsocalled WP.

wingman—One of two tanks in a section,normally the other tank in the platoon leader’s orplatoon sergeant’s section.

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APPENDIX GREFERENCES

Marine Corps Warfighting Publications (MCWPs)

1-0 Marine Corps Operations3-17.1 River-Crossing Opeations3-17.3 MAGTF Breaching Operations (currently FMFM 13-7)3-25.2 Mountain Operations (currently FMFM 7-29)3-33.3 Marine Corps Public Affairs3-35.1 Cold Weather Operations (under development)3-35.5 Jungle Operations (currently FMFM 7-28)3-35.6 Desert Operations (currently FMFM 7-27)3-37.1 Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Nuclear, Biological,

and Chemical Defense Operations3-37.1A Nuclear, Biological, Chemical (NBC) Vulnerability Analysis3-37.2 Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Nuclear, Biological,

and Chemical (NBC) Protection3-37.3 NBC Decontamination

Marine Corps Reference Publications (MCRPs)

3-02D Combating Terrorism3-02E The Individual’s Guide for Understanding and Surviving Terrorism4-11.3F Convoy Operations Handbook5-12A Operational Terms and Graphics

Army Technical Manual (TM)

08953A-10 Tank M1A1 (120mm Gun)

Army Field Manual (FM)

4-30.3 Maintenance Operations and Procedures