Science, Technology and Society in Seventeenth Century England
Robert K. Merton Osiris, Vol. 4. (1938), pp. 360-632.Stable URL:
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Science, Technology and Society in Seventeenth Century
England
PREFACE This study might be more exactly entitled "' some
sociologically relevant aspects of certain phases of the
development of science in seventeenth century England." For it is
not a history of science, technology and society during this
period. I t does not touch on all phases of the subject but deals
only with the more elementary of them. Many of the historical
details which it contains are indeed widely known, although their
sociological implications are less widely recognized. T o be sure,
the view that the science of any period is not divorced from its
social and cultural context has become, properly enough, a
commonplace, but there are few empirical studies of the relations
which do obtain. Many persons in our own day view the extended
investigations of science as comprising an activity natural to man;
hence, as neither requiring nor being susceptible to further
analysis. This study is concerned above all with some of the
cultural roots of the modem acclaim and patronage of science. In
more general terms, it is an empirical examination of the genesis
and development of some of the cultural values which underlie the
large-scale pursuit of science. Much has been omitted which would
require inclusion in a more comprehensive study. Perhaps the most
striking lacuna is the absence of any special treatment of the
connections between science in England and on the Continent.
Important as these undoubtedly were in many respects, they are not
of immediate relevance for the central purpose of this study.
Rather they introduce further complications which leave the picture
materially unaltered. For a similar reason, little account has been
taken of contemporary philosophical developments, which have only
an oblique bearing on the subject in hand.
SCIENCE I N SEVENTEENTH CENTURY ENGLAND
361
,4cknowledgment is due the editors of The Scientijic Monthly,
The Sociological Review and Scientia (Rivista di Scienza) for
permission to use sections of my articles which appeared in these
journals. I am indebted to the Harvar.' University Cor- .ittee on
Research in the Social Sciences for its generous assistance. I n
the following pages I have attempted to acknowledge my chief
obligations to other writers, recognizing that their studies may
have influenced this one in points of difference as well as
agreement, There are less obvious forms of indebtedness for which
specific acknowledgment is not as easily made-the guidance of
teachers, the discernment of colleagues and the stimulation
afforded by frequent discussions. I am indebted to Professor
EDWINF. GAY for the stimulus which initially led me to the study of
science and technology. My thanks are likewise due to Professor
CARLE C. ZIMMERMAS for his helpful suggestions and to Professor
TALCOTT PARSONS, whose incisive criticism rectified errors of
emphasis and inference. SILVERSTEIN has generously given me the
benefit Dr. THEODORE of a perspective gained from his experience in
a related sphere of study. I am grateful to Dr. GEORGE SARTON for
his kindly encouragement and guidance in a field where my equipment
is but that of the neophyte. I have a deep sense of obligation for
his continued direction. to Professor PITIRIM A. SOROKIN My debt to
him is undoubtedly greater than occasional citations may
suggest.
Cambridge, Massachusetts 4 April 1937.
ROBERTK . MERTON.
R. Iophiwl sense as the theory that reason is a source of
knowledge in itself, superior to and independent of sense
perceptions, i.u., as opposed to empiricism; nor entirely in the
theokrgical sense as the doctrine which holds that religious
opinions should be based on reason rather than on revelation,
though it does include this latter meaning as a specific case.
(Thus, BAXTERholds : The Holy Spirit, by immediate inspiration,
revealed to the apostles the doctrines of Christ, and caused them
infallibly to indite the Scriptures. But this iv not the way of
ordinary illumination now." C . D . , Vol. I, p . 104. And again :
Though your religion must not be taken upon trust, there are many
controverted smaller opinions that you must take on trust, until
you are capable of discerning them in their proper evidence." C.
D., Vol. I , p. 100). It means rather reasonableness. conformity to
reason and experience; it is a combination of rationalism and
empiricism, as is quite evident from Puritan writings. This
attitude of empiricorationalism is of moment, as shall be
indicated, for the relation between Protestantism and science. (38)
C. D., Vol. I, p. 1 1 . Reason is accorded a carefully
circumscribed place. God is " irrational " in the sense that He
cannot be measured by human reason. Rather, reason is one of the
tools to be used in our tasks in this world. T h e intellect is to
be used to aid action, the ultimate purpose of which is beyond our
Sochl Teachings, Vol. I , p. 585. grasp. C f . TROELTSCH," "
SCIENCE I N SEVENTEENTH CENTURY ENGLAND
427
justifiable criterion of the validity of various religious
beliefs introduced the opening wedge for later processes of
secularization (39). I t may also be suggested that the emphasis
upon reason-in the sense in which the term is used here-is no less
related to the beginnings of biblical criticism (40) than to
rationalization in industry and in science. Had the seventeenth
century Puritan foreseen some of the consequences of his espousal
of reason, he would have punctuated his repudiation of it with
pious shudders.
Profitable E(iucatiotrAllied with this emphasis on rationalism
is the widely recognized interest of the Puritan in education. "
Education and converse [conversation] have so great a power on the
mind that they come next to grace, and are often the means of it."
(41) But this education must he directed in specific channels;
certainly not in literature or art or other similar " unprofitable
studies " which are simply time-wasting self-indulgences (42).(39)
HENRY WORE, tn his Brief Dzs~ozrrsroj the Trrre (Jrortnds of the
Crrtainty of Faith in Point of Religion (London, 1688), pp. j78-80,
reflects thls tendency. " ... to take anay all the certainty of
sense rightly circumstantiated, is to take away all the certainty
of belief in the main points of our religion." " ... no revelation
is from God that is repugnant to sense rightly circumstantiated."
(40) Cf. CMILE B&FIIER," The Formation of our his to^ of
Philosophy," and J. H. P.%ToN, pp. 159 ff. in Philosophy and
Histor?., ed. by K. KLIBANSKY (Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1936).
(41) C . D.. Vol. I, p. 86. The attitude of the Quakers is quite
the same as remarked by J. S. FLYNN, op. ( i t . , p. 159. " ...
the whole Society [of Friends] placed the cultivation of the
intellect next to the knowledge of God." See also BARCLAY, amiably
announces that " it is a very good op. a t . , p. 323. BAXTER work
to set up free-schools in populous and in ignorant places,
rspeciall~in Wales [!I; that all may be taught to read, and some
mav be prepared for the Universities." C . D.. Vol. V, p. 481. (42)
C.D., V01. I, p. I50 ff; Val. 11, p. 167; VO~. 111, p. 2 0 2 ; V O
~Iv, . p. 484. Cf.BAXTER'S Book of Self-Demal, passim. This hostile
attitude toward certaln types of literature did actually result in
Purrtans largely eschewing this field save as it was related to
expressions of Puritan sentiments. Cf. FFRANS DIRK DE Sam, Puritan
and Royalist Literature in the Seventeenth Century (Delft : J .
WALTMAN, 1933). Introduction. HERBERT SCH~FFLER remarks, in
connection with this antipathy, that there was not a single Quaker
poet of significance until ate in the Enlightenment. C f . his
Protestantismuc und Zditeratur.
428
R. K . MERTON
Flights of fancy could scarcely be condoned unless they carried
moral implications. ?'he cleric ALEXANDER HOME warned youth against
the reading of " profane sonnets and vain ballads of love, the
fabulous feats of PALMERINE and such like reveries." This attitude
is correlated with the decline of interest in certain of the arts
which was noted in Chapter I1 Nor is the pursuit of the scholastic
philosophy approvable, for it is full of false teachings which seem
to lead away from God rather than toward Him (43). Especially
pernicious is this pseudo-Aristotelian philosophy because it
induces error and confusion which is verisimilar by virtue of the
rigorous syllogistic reasoning employed. But starting frequently
from false premises it must needs come to false conclusions. Hence,
in outlining a course of study for one who intends the ministry,
BAXTER deliberately refrains from including any such philosophy
(44). This careful direction of intellectual interests into
definite fields and away from others is of moment when one
considers the contemporary power of such religiously-founded
attitudes. Having eliminated certain studies as inappropriate,
BAXTER continues by designating those which are to be preferred.
The primary emphasis in education should be, of course, religious;
but since all who seek instruction are not equally suited for the
clergy one can best serve the public good by following one's
individual inclination in the choice of other lawful, desirable
callings (45). AS already indicated, the other learned professions
are next in point of desirability. In the educational curriculum,
Mathematics, a part of " organical knowledge " since its uses are
so fundamental and diverse, takes a prominent place. Physics,
understood always as the study of God in his works, is the favorite
Puritan scientific discipline (46). This selection illustrates the
correlated aspects of Puritan thought : mathematics representing
the rationalistic aspect and physics the empirical (47). T h eCf.
observation of M A X WEBER,Protestant Ethic, p. 249. WEBER, R
eligiomso~iologie,Vol. I , p. 5 6 4 (44)C. D., Vol. IV, pp. 577-8.
Cf. " Nicht selten betrachtete daher die Religiositat die rein
empirische, auch naturwissenschaftliche Forschung als besser mit
ihren Interessen vereinbar als die Philosophie. So vor allern der
asketische Protestantismus." (45) C. D., Vol. 11, p. 2 1 2 ff. (46)
C. D., Vol. IV, p. 577. (47) I t is this same convergence which
charactrriaes the growth of modern(43)
SCIENCE IN SEVENTEENTH CENTURY ENGLAND
P C )
emphasis upon these studies is significant when one remembers
that the advance in these fields was more pronounced than in any
other. knowledge of many languages is also desirable since it
facilitates the acquisition of further learning-it is esteemed not
as an attainment desirable in itself, but as a means for attaining
a further knowledge of things. T h e pure linguist, who did not
apply his faculties to increasing man's knowledge, was too close to
the inadmissible status of the contemplative monk. This attitude
was also repeatedly maintained by the scientists of the period. In
his " directions for young Students, for the most profitable
ordering of their studying Thoughts," the Reverend Mr. RAXTER
skillfully steers a safe course, twixt the Scylla of utter
conformity to intellectual tradition and the Charybdis of radical
divergence from antecedent scientific conceptions (48). T h e test
for the acceptance or rejection of theories is to be empirical :
submission of the theses to the relevant sensory experience, " for
it is not science, but human belief, else, whoever you take it
from." (49) RAXTER would not dismiss rationalism beyond recall, but
he ivould subordinate it; it is not to be preferable, but rather
ancillary, to the study of irreducible and stubborn facts. Here is
evidenced the revolt against scholasticism, against rationalism (in
the philosophical sense) which is so characteristic of two of the
major movements of the century : the Protestant-Reformist and the
scientific.science. The unrelieved rationalism of the Scholastics
was insuficient; the unimaginative and incomplete empiricism of
FRANCIS BACONcould prove no better. But the interactton of abstract
reasoning with experiment and observation, typified by the
conjunction of mathematics and physics, \vas the fruitful key to
the problem. Now while this development may have been largely an
intra-scientihc one, ~t \\as not wholly unrelated to the society in
\\.hich it occurred. T h e coincidence of these converging
movements in the realms of both religion and science \\as not
fortuitous, as we shall see. (48) T h e follow in^ quotation
differs significantly from the rigidity of traditionalism manifest
in the writings of medieval theologians and, in great part of
CALVIN himself. " Avoid both extremes, of them that study no more,
but to know what others have written and held before them; and of
them that little regard the discoveries of others : learn all of
your teachers and authors that they can teach you; but make all
your own, and see things in their proper evidence..." C. D., Vol.
11, p. 246-7. The context emphasizes the empiricist bent. (49) C.
D., Vol. IV, p. 579.
43O R. K. M E R T O N At this point a distinction must be drawn
between medievaland seventeenth century rationalism. T h e impress
of rationalism was marked throughout the latter Middle Ages; it was
an essential of scholasticism. As Professor WHITEHEAD has shown
(so), this engendered a habit of orderly thought which remained
long after the scholastic philosophy had been repudiated. HOOKER,
in his Ecclesiastical Polity, however, criticised the Puritans for
their failure to subordinate themselves completely to such
rationalism. With the Puritans, who so fully exemplify a mercantile
and scientific age, the term reason takes on a new connotation :
the rational consideration of empirical data. Logic is reduced to a
subsidiary r81e. I t is occasionally a useful element in thought,
but the test of reality comes not from scholastic logic, which adds
nothing to knowledge and may perpetuate falsehood, but from the
observation of facts. I t was this accent, coupled with an "
irrational " faith in the efficacy and utility of science, which
characterizes both Puritanism and modern science ( 5 1 ) .
Physics : God in His U'orks Education in general having been
deemed a good work, the logically-minded BAXTERgoes on to provide a
rationale for the emphasis on scientific and empirical studies.
.\gain, there is the reversion to the fundamental aim of all life
as the basis for sanction : the study of natural phenomena is an
effective means for promoting the glory of God ( 5 2 ) . T h e
study of Nature in a(50) A. N. WHITLWEAD, Science nnd the Modern
World (New York : MACMILLAS Co., 1931)~ PP. 17 ff. (51)C f .WALTER
PAGEL, " Religious Motives in the Medical Biology of the XVIIth
Century," Bulletin of the Institute of the History of Medicine,
Vol. 111 (1935)~ pp. 97-I 28, who contrasts the preponderance of
rationalism in medieval science with the " empirical implications "
of seventeenth century science and religion. (52) " The great means
of promoting love to God is duly to behold Him in His appearances
to man, in the ways of Nature, Grace and Glory. First, therefore,
learn tcl understand and improve his appearances in Nature, and to
see the Creator in all His works, and by the knowledge and love of
them to be raised to the knowledge and love of Him." C. D., Vol. I
, p. 375. This argument for the justification of science is
characteristic of all the Protestant sects. Thus GILBERT, Lord
Bishop of Sarum [GILBERT BURNET] in A Sermon Prrached at
SCIENCE I N SEVENTEENTH CENTURY ENGLAND6'
43'
convincing, scientifical way " furthers a full appreciation of
the Creator's power, so that the natural scientist must needs be
better equipped than the casual observer to glorify Him. I n this
direct fashion, religion sanctioned science and raised the social
estimation of those who pursued scientific investigation, with the
associated intensification and spread of interest in such pursuits.
A further basis for the sanctification of science was found in the
second major tenet of the Puritan ethos : the utilitariun
principle. The linkage is apparent. " Knowledge is to be valued
according to its usefulness," (53) since anything which tends " to
sweeten the lives of mortals," to facilitate their material
well-being, is good in the sight of God (54). T h e
religiouslyassigned value of science is hence immeasurably
increased in view of the fact that the scientific study of nature
tends to enlarge
the Funrral of the Honorable ROBERT BOYLE (London : 1692),p. 14,
repeats : " ... the viewing of the works of God even in a general
survey, gives insensiblya greatness to the Soul. But the more
extended and exact, the more minute and severe, the Enquiry be, the
Soul grows to be thereby the more inlarged by the variety of
Observation that is made, either on the great Orbs and Wheels that
have their first motion, as well as their Law of Moving, from the
Author of all; or on the Composition of Bodies, ..." It is of
course true that this same view-that the study of natural phenomena
discovers the glory of God revealed in His handiwork-became fairly
common toward the latter part of the Middle held that .lges. In
Islam, the same notion was also widespread. AVERROES the noblest
worship which can be paid to God lies in the knowledge of His
works. But the experimental method, while faintly present, was not
sufficiently cultivated to make for what is called modem science.
In medieval Europe this neoPlatonic conception of God revealed in
Nature was coupled with the doctrine of the complete subservience
of these studies to the infallible teachings of the Bible (which
were not interpreted by the individual in the light of his reason
and experience but by the Church). Moreover, since this idea was
then not allied with a similarly sanctioned emphasis on observation
and experiment, it could at best lead to fruitless rationalistic
discussions, largely divorced from empirical study. Seldom did
religious leaders carry this point further and suggest that the
scientist was better able to glonfy God than were others; and hence
the complete sanction of scientific work was in no wise comparable
to that of the later Puritan teachings. It was the conjunction of
these prerequisite factors, empiricism, rationalism and positive
evaluation of science, in the postReformist teachings which was
associated with the spread, and indirectly, with the advance of
science. (53) C . D.,Vol. I, p. 1 3 . ( j q j GILBERT BURNET, op.
n't., pp. 15-18.
432
R.
K . MERTON
man's dominion over it. Science is thought of as a powerful
technologic tool and as such deserves to be highly esteemed. Now,
as has been indicated, there was a constant tendency for the
to-the-greater-glory-of-God principle to recede as a guiding tenet
of actual behavior and for utilitarian considerations to become
ever more prominent. Or, to put it in another way, activity which
was clearly useful in a practical sense, was increasingly held to
glorify God most .effectively. In view of this process, it may
readily be seen that the social utilitv of both science and
technology proved to be one of the most effective arguments for the
positive estimation of such pursuits, an argument which was
irrelevant to the medieval religious leaders who felt the futility
of worldly interests of this sort. Indeed, considerations of
mundane utility were simply foreign to medieval teachings. In
contrast, Puritanism tends ever more and more to emphasize the
value of reshaping this world. Consequently, science, as at least
in part the handmaid of socio-economic utility, is positi~ ely
sanctioned ( j s ) .
The ,Wedie.nal ContrastT h e monastic asceticism and the feeling
of the impermanence and relative worthlessness of matter which was
characteristic of the Middle Ages could obviously not lead to an
interest in disciplines which were primarily concerned with this
world of sense. T h e early Church Fathers, such as EUSEBIOS, ST. A
l and LACTANTIUS, consistently proposed the chiliastic doctrine of
the New Testament that this earth was soon to be destroyed, that
there were to be new heavens and a new earth, and treated the
physical sciences with contumely and contempt (j6). T h e~
~
-
(55) Cf. A. C. MCC;IFFERT, The Rise of Modern Religious Ideas
(New York : The MACMILLAN Company, ~ g z z ) Chapter , 3. (56) A.
D. WHITE, A Histor-v of the Warfare of Science with Theology, 2
volumes (New York : APPI.ETON, 1901), Vo1. I , pp. 375 ff. This
attitude exemplifies called the bas~cprinciple of patristic faith :
that the will what H . 0. T.4yr.o~ of God is the one cause of all
things and that this will is unsearchable, is " secret." Religious
Thought Cf.The Medieval Mind. Vol. I , p. 74. See also F. W.
BUSSELL, and Heresy in the Middle Ages (London : ROBERT SCOTT,I ~ I
R )pp. , 715-17. CALVIN'S point of view, which closely resembled
this, was submerged by the implications of his other tenets, which
led to directly opposed developments.
SCIENCE I N SEVENTEENTH CENTURY ENGLAND
43 3
investigation of natural phenomena seemed purposeless. ;is
=\MBROSE held in his Hexaemeron [Vol. I, p. 61, " T o discuss the
nature and position of the earth does not help us in our hope of
life to come. It is enough to know what Scripture says, that ' He
hung up the earth upon nothing.' " When this belief had lost
something of its force, when the conviction of the imminent end of
the earth was not so intense, science came to be regarded with
dread since it was " black magic," representing an unlawful
alliance with Satan (57). Writing in the late twelfth century,
RICHARD OF ST. \-ICTOR, asks rhetorically : " What is all science
but a picture without life, a phantom without movement or feeling ?
" And BONAVENTURA in the following century, warns that " the tree
of science cheats many of the tree of life or exposes them to the
severest pains of purgatory." It is quite true that some of the
great Reformers, in particular, LUTHER,were similarly antagonistic
to natural science and humanist art, but the religious movements
which stemmed from these charismatic leaders, grew away from this
antagonism and vigorously espoused a favorable attitude (58). One
essential difference between the medieval and postReformation type
of personality in which religion was the focal element, is clearly
brought out by SPRANGER'S ideal-types of the " transcendental
mystic " and the " immanent mystic." T h e tirst finds rest only in
a super-sensuous world. For such a being science is without value
since it does not answer the ultimate questions; all his energies
are concentrated on preparing his soul for inner vision. T h e
immanent mystic, on the other hand, applies his religious beliefs
in a totally different fashion. Life and action become positively
valued precisely because they are indications of God. This type of
individual possesses a sort of cosmic enthusiasm, for since God is
present in every
(57) WHITE, o p. cit., Voi. I, p. 383. (58) For this reason, it
is necessary to insist upon the distinction between
the teachings of the Reformers themselves and their subsequent
dmelopnrent in the Puritan and similar movements. Of course, this
does not deny that occasi~nally principles were adopted without any
pronounced change. Cf. F. VON BEZOLD," Staat und Gesellschaft des
Reformations-Zeitalters " in Staar und Cesellschnft der netterm
Zeit (Berlin : B. G. TEURNER, 1908), p. XI, ot passim.
434
R. K. MERTON
aspect of life, none should be slighted. Science as the study of
His works thus becomes highly regarded (59). This type of attitude
so characteristic of Post-Reformation religious leaders during a
period when religion was still a singularly powerful social force
may well have been congenial to the development of science. This is
not to imply that the discoveries of NEWTON,BOYLE or other
scientists can be directly attributed to the sanction of science by
religion. Specific discoveries and inventions belong to the
internal history of science and are largely independent of factors
other than the purely scientific. But the fact that science became
socially acceptable, in short, that it became a laudable rather
than an unsavory occupation, could not but help direct talents into
scientific pursuits which at other times would have found
expression in other fields. Nor is there any implication that
religion was the primary factor, the independent variable, so to
speak, and science the dependent. Religious conceptions were, as we
shall see more clearly, definitely integrated with sentiments basic
to the contemporary science and philosophy : there was throughout a
reciprocal interaction. Hut the fact is that religion still
constituted a most effective social force and as such it exerted a
considerable influence upon contemporary action and the allocation
of contemporary interests. I n the values of that society, the
ideals and goals of religion loomed large and science was regarded
as an efficient means for the attainment of these aims. As SPRANGER
has indicated, values from other zones-in this instance, the realm
of science-become religious when they are related to the final
meaning of life, and consequently they embody a religious emphasis
over and above their original value accent (60). This statement,
however, should not be generalized for it applies only when
religion is clearly a preeminent social value. T h e realization of
the fact provides definite limits on the generalizabilit~ of the
processes noted in this study, for obviously the influence of
religion upon science necessarily varies with the degree of social
control which religion manifests in a(59) EDUARD SPRANGER, -Types
3f Men, trans. by P. J . W . P I G O R ~ (Halle , M. NIEMEYER,
19283,pp. 2 1 3 - 1 6 . (60) Ibid., p. 285.
.
SCIENCE I N SEVENTEENTH CENTURY ENGLAND
43 5
given society. T h e picture which our study has thus far
afforded is characteristic of an historical epoch; it cannot be
extended, without appropriate modifications, to a period such as
the present where religious ideals are in a sense subordinated to
others, particularly those of science and the industrial world. But
all these are considerations which may best be dealt with in other
connections.
Science : Handmaid of' UtilitySocial utility, an aim prescribed
by religion, has been used to sanction science, viewed, in this
case, as a handmaid of points out, further, that scientific and
technology (61). BAXTER technologic discoveries and inventions
increase man's felicity signally, for they enable their originators
to arrive at an abundant conviction of their state of grace.Grace
will become more notable and discernible [if you persevere and
succeed in your labours] ... For the very exercise of love to God
and man, and of a heavenly mind and holy life, hath a sensible
pleasure in itself, and delighteth the person who is so employed :
as if a man were to take the comfort of his learning and wisdom,
one way is by the discerning his learning and wisdom which he hath,
in reading and meditating on some excellent books, and making
discoveries of some mysterious excellencies in arts and sciences,
which delight him more by the very acting, than a bare conclusion
of his own learning in the general, would do. What delight had the
inventors of the sea-chart and magnetic attraction, and of
printing, and of guns, in their inventions ! What pleasure had
GALILEO in his telescopes, in finding out the inequalities and
shady parts of the moon, the Medicean planets, the 62 adjuncts of
Saturn, the changes of Venus, the stars of the Milky Way, etc
...
'The sentiments basic to these views would have been simply
unthinkable in the medieval period, save as referring, at best, to
the intellectual amalgam of science and theology presented by an
AQUINAS. TOregard with high esteem scientific discoveries attained
empirically and without reference to Scriptural or other(61) We do
not wish to confuse the developmbnt of sciena and of technology
-they are not identical though they coincided at many points. But
the fact is that the religious evaluations were generally concerned
with both, and in much the same fashion. At this point, then, they
may be considered jointly. (62) C. D., Vo1. V, p. 5 3 5
436
R. K. MERTON
sacred authority would have been almost as heretical as makin;
has the disc.overies themselves (63). -4s Professor HASKINS
observed, the scientific spirit of Christian Europe in the Middle
,Ages was not liberated from the respect for authority which was
characteristic of that epoch (641, whereas Puritan authority was
enunciating the very doctrines which furthered interest in science
and, ultimately, lack of concern with religion itself. statement
and, say, that of T h e contrast between BAXTER'S PETER D A M I A N
the , noted chancellor of POPE GREGORY 1-11, who declared that all
worldly sciences are absurdities and fooleries is perhaps
sufficient to account significantly for the social interest in
science in the seventeenth century and, relatively speaking, its
almost complete absence in the eleventh. ?'his does not imply a
complete cessation of interest in science during the eleventh or
any other century of the period so popularly and erroneously called
the Dark Ages. T h e continuity of scientific development was
unbroken, but it was a most tenuous thread in Western Europe until
at least the twelfth century. ?'hereafter, science, as a phase of
social activity, became increasingly significant, but it could not
bloom and prosper for two reasons : the first, intrinsic to the
nature of science, and the other, social in character. T o a
certain degree, a fixed order must prevail in the appearance of
scientific discoveries; each discovery must await certain
prerequisite developments (65).(63) Contrast the attitude of Pope
.~I.ESASDER 111, who in r 163, In connection ~vith the Council o f
Tours, forbade the study of physics to all ecclesiastics, which In
that ape meant the p r o h ~ h ~ t i oof n scient~ficstudies to the
only persons who were even moderately equipped to pursut them. "
What the Pope expressly forbade j+.as, in the u.ords of the papal
bull, ' the studv of physrcs or the la-s of the \\.orld ' ..."
WHITE, n p. ' i t . , Vol. !, 11. 386. T h e condemnation of ROGER
BACON who dared suggest a scientific explanation of natural
phenomena may have been simply an application of Franciscan
discipline, but it seems also to have been animated by a dislike of
his originality of theory. In 1278, the Franciscans condemned
BACON'S teachings as containing " suspected novelties." Likewise,
the Dominicans interdicted the study of medicine, natural
philosophy and chemistry. Such attitudes of religious authorities
could scarce have provided a fruitful social soil for the
development of sclence. C f . I,ECKY, History of ... Rationalism,
Vol. I , p. 301. (64) CHARLES H . HASKINS, Tlze Ret~aissance of the
Tzvelfth Century (Cambridge : Harvard University Press, I 928), pp.
336-37. S ocial Change (New York : Viking Press, 1932); (65) CJ. W.
F. OGBURN, S. C. GILFILLAN, Sociolog~ of Inqlention (Chicago :
FOI.LETT Pub. Co.. 1935
SCIENCE I N SEVENTEENTH CENTURY ENGLAND
437
( T h e converse of this does not follow with the ineluctability
which some cultural sociologists would have us believe-a discovery
does not necessarily follow upon the existence of its " constituent
elements " as is well attested by the history of science.) In this
sense, we may talk of the time not being ripe for a far-reaching,
swift-moving, wide-sweeping development until the seventeenth
century (66). T h e other factor was the absence of the requisite
cultural animus of regarding scientific activity as highly
desirable. Occasional " great intellectual sky-rockets " there were
to light the u-orld of science, but little in the way of concerted
scientific effort viewed with favor by the chief agents of social
control; the tendency was, rather, to look benevolently at
theological activity and to turn one's back to scientific
endeavors. Of course, this statement is but approximate. T h e
tenets of medieval Europe were never as consistently applied and
unchallenged as one is at times prone to believe. There were
divergences from the dominant tendencies, but those few of the
intellectual klite who ran counter to the trend were too much the
exception to direct social attention into scientific channels. T h
e seventeenth century brought the prerequisite factors to
convergence : an adequate accumulation of scientific knowledge to
cope with the initial problems at hand, the maturation of the
experimental method, a consistent provision of " intellectual
genius adequate for the greatness of its occasions " and a complex
of social attitudes which, for varying reasons, religious,
economically utilitarian and idealistic, was favorable to
scientific interests. T h e specific developments, it should again
be emphasi~ed, were not directly dependent upon this social
evaluation of science 3s a focus of social interest, but it is
manifest that an!. field of activity which is regarded with favor
will, particularly if like science, it possesses an ongoing dynamic
of its own, advance more rapidly than when derogated (67). These
social attitudes. positive or negative, are a function of a complex
of social trends. which are more or less interdependent : economic,
political,(66) .\I.FRED VIERKANDT, Die Stetigkeit im Kultunuancirl
(Leipziy : DI'NCKEH & HU~~RI.O 1908), T , p p 123-4 c't
passinr. (67) As BACONobserved, " it is nothing strange if a thing
[scirnce] not held in honour does not prosper." lVmnr Or,~nmrm.
Vol. I , .\ph. XCI.
43 8
R.. K. MERTON
religious, philosophic, scientific and the like. At various
times, the dominant ideals and sentiments of a society are chiefly
expressed in one or another of these fields, and it is they which
largely determine the social attitudes toward other spheres (68).
When, as was apparently the case during the seventeenth century,
utilitarian norms are dominant, other activities are evaluated in
respect of their apparent accordance with these ideals and, in this
sense, may be said to be dependent upon theni. Generalizations
concerning these social processes are, then, relative to the
specific social context; they are not timeless, universal,
irrespective of social values and social structure. 'The social
values inherent in the Puritan ethos here such as to lead to an
approbation of science because of a basically utilitarian
orientation, couched in religious terms and furthered by religious
authority. Scientific investigation, viewed from the rationalized
Puritan system of ethics, seemed to possess those qualities
characteristic of activities which are effective rneans for the
attainment of the accepted goals. T h e possibility that science,
as a means toward a religious end, would later break away from such
religious supports and in a measure tend to delimit the realm of
theologic control, was seemingly unrealized (69). 'The apparent
conflicts between theology and science which arose when scientific
findings seemed to disprove various contentions of orthodox
theologians occurred later with each extension of scientific
inquiry tb realms which were hitherto regarded as " sacred." Rut
this is simply another example of the frequently observed fact that
the Reformers did not anticipate the full actual consequences of
their teachings, consequences which did not coincide with their
expectations (70).
(68) Cf. MAX SCHELER, Versuhe zu einn. Soziologie d ~ sWissens
(Miinchen und Leipzig : DUNCKER & HUMRLOT, 19241, pp. 3 1 A.
(69) There were. a few far-sighted exceptions, foremost among whom
was JOSEPH GLANVILL. (70) Cj. R. I ( . MERTON, " The. Unanticipated
Consequences of Purposive Social Action," Amffiton Soczological
Rm'm, Vol. 1 (1936), 894-9041.
SCIENCE IN SEVENTEENTH CENTURY ENGLAND
439
CHAPTER V
What we call the Protestant ethic was at once a direct
expression of dominant values and an independent source of new
motivation. I t not only led men into particular paths of activity;
it exerted a constant pressure for unswerving devotion to this
activity. Its ascetic imperatives established a broad base for
scientific inquiry, dignifying, exalting, consecrating such
inquiry. If the scientist had hitherto found the search for truth
its own reward, he now had further grounds for disinterested zeal
in this pursuit. And society, once dubious of the merits of those
who devoted themselves to the " petty, insignificant details of a
boundless Nature," largelv relinquished its doubts.
The Puritan Spur to Science.Is we have seen, the capital
elements of the Puritan ethic were related to the general climate
of sentiment and belief. I n a sense, these tenets and convictions
have been accentuated through a biassed selection, but this sort of
bias is common to all positive inquiries. Theories which attempt to
account for certain phenomena require facts, but not all facts are
equally pertinent to the problem in hand. " Selection," determined
by the limits of the problem, is necessary. .\mong the cultural
kariables which invariably influence the development of science are
the dominant values and sentiments. ,It least, this is our working
hypothesis. In this particular period, religion in large part made
articulate much of the prevailing value-complex. For this reason,
we must consider the scope and bearing of the contemporary
religious convictions, since these may have been related, in one
way or another, to the upsurge of science. But not all of these
convictions were relevant. A certain degree of selection is
there-
44O
R. K. MERTON
fore necessary for the purpose of abstracting those elements
which had such a perceivable relation. Puritanism attests to the
theorem that non-logical notioils with a transcendental reference
may nevertheless exercise a considerable influence upon practical
behavior. If the fancies of an inscrutable deity do not lend
themselves to scientific investigation, human action predicated
upon a particular conception of this deity does. I t &as
precisely Puritanism which built a new bridge between the
transcendental and human action, thus supplying a motive force for
the new science. T o be sure, Puritan doctrines rested ultimately
upon an esoteric theological base but these were translated into
the familiar and cogent language of the laity. Puritan principles
undoubtedly represent to some extent an accommodation to the
current scientific and intellectual advance. Puritans had to find
some meaningful place for these activities within their view of
life. But to dismiss the relationship between Puritanism and
science with this formula would indeed be superficial. Clearly, the
psychological implications of the Puritan system of values
independently conduced to an espousal of science, and we would
grossly simplify the facts to accord with a preestablished thesis
if we failed to note the convergence of these two movements.
Moreover, the changing class structure of the time reinforced the
Puritan sentiments favoring science since a large proportion of
Puritans came from the rising class of bourgeoisie, of merchants
(I). They manifested their increasing power in at least three ways.
First, in their positive regard for both science and technology
which reflected and promised to enhance this power. Equally notable
was their increasingly fervent belief in progress, a profession of
faith which stemmed from their growing social and economic
importance. A third manifestation was their hostility toward the
existing class structure which limited and hampered their
participation in political control ; an antagonism which found its
climax in the Revolution. Yet we cannot readily assume that the
bourgeoisie were Puritans solely because the Puritan ethic appealed
to bourgeois sentiments.-
---- ..
C j . T'RoEI.T~~:H, Social Teachings, Vol. 11, p. 681 ; ROLAND
USHER, T he Reconstruction of the English Church, especially Vol. I
1 which contains a statistical study of the social origins of
Puritan ministers.(I)
SCIENCE I N SEVENTEENTH CENTURY ENGLAND
44I
T h e converse was perhaps even more important, as WEBER has
shown. Puritan sentiments and beliefs prompting rational, tireless
industry were such as to aid economic success. The same
considerations apply equally to the close connection between
Puritanism and science : the religious movement partly " adapted "
itself to the growing prestige of science but it initially involved
deep-seated sentiments which inspired its followers to a profound
and consistent interest in the'pursuit of science. The Puritan
doctrines were nothing if not lucid. If they provided motivation
for the contemporary scientists, this should be evident from their
words and deeds. Not that scientists, any more than other mortals,
are necessarily aware of the sentiments which invest with meaning
their way of life. None the less, the observer may often, though
not too readily perhaps, uncover these tacit valuations and bring
them to light. Such a procedure should enable us to determine
whether the putative consequences of the Puritan ethic truly proved
effective. Moreover, it will disclose the extent to which all this
was perceived by the very persons whom it most concerned.
Accordingly, we shall examine the works of the natural philosopher
who " undoubtedly did more than any one of his time to make Science
a part of the intellectual equipment of educated men," ROBERT
BOYLE(2). His investigations in physics, chemistry and physiology,
to mention only the chief fields of achievement of this omnifarious
experimentalist, were epochal. .Add to this the fact that he was
one of the individuals who attempted explicitly to establish the
place of science in the scale of cultural values and his importance
for our particular problem becomes manifest. But BOYLE was not
alone. Equally RAY,whom HALLER termed, a bit effusively,
significant were JOHN the greatest botanist in the history of man;
FRANCIS WILLUGHBY, who was perhaps as eminent in zoology as was RAY
in botany; JOHN WILKINS, one of the leading spirits in the "
invisible college " which developed into the Royal Society;
OUGHTRED, BARROW, GREW,WALLIS,NEWTON;-but a complete list would
comprise a Scientific Register of the time. Further materials for
our purpose are provided by the Royal Society which, arising
about(2) J. F. FULTON," ROBERT BOYLE and his Influence on Thought
in the Seventeenth Century," Isk, XVIII (1932),pp. 77-102. The
range of BOYLE'S prolific writinqs is shown in Professor F~TLTON'S
exemplarv bibliopphv.
44"
R. K. MERTON
the middle of the century, provoked and stimulated scientific
advance more than any other immediate factor. In this instance we
are particularly fortunate in possessing a contemporary account,
written under the constant supervision of the members of the
Society in order that it might be representative of the motives
SPRAT'Swidely-read and aims of that group. This is THOMAS History
of the Royal-Society of London, published in 1667, after it had
been examined by WILKINS and other representatives of the Society
(3). From these works, then, and from the writings of other
scientists of the period, we may glean the chief motive forces of
the new science.
To the " Glory of the Great Author of Nature "
Once science has become firmly institutionalized, its
attractions, quite apart from any economic benefits it may bestow,
are those of all elaborated and established social activities.
These attractions are essentially twofold : generally prized
opportunities of engaging in socially approved patterns of
association with one's fellows and the consequent creation of
cultural products which are esteemed by the group. Such
group-sanctioned conduct usually continues unchallenged, with
little questioning of its reason for being. Institutionalized
values are conceived as self evident and require no vindication.
But all this is changed in periods of sharp transition. New
patterns of conducts must be justified if they are to take hold and
become the foci of social sentiments. A new social order
presupposes a new scheme of values. And so it was with the new
science. Unaided by forces which had already gripped man's will,
science could claim only a bare modicum of attention and loyalty.
But in partnership with a powerful social movement( 3 ) Cf.
CXARL.ES L . SONNICHSEN, The Life and Works of Thomas Sprat
(Harvard University unpublished doctoral dissertation, 193I ) , p.
I 3 I ff., h e r e substantial evidence of the fact that the
History was lepresentative of the views of the Society is
presented. As we shall see, the statements in SPRAT'S book
con&rning the aims of the Society bear distinct similarity on
every score to BOYLE'Scharacterizations of the motives and aims of
scientists in general. Ibid., p. 167. This similarity is evidence
of the dominance of the ethoc nhich included these attitudes.
SCIENCE I N SEVENTEENTH CENTURY ENGLAND
443
which induced an intense devotion to the active exercise of
designated functions, science was launched in full career. A clear
manifestation of this process is not wanting. The Protestant ethic
had pervaded the realm of science and had left its indelible stamp
upon the attitude of scientists toward their work. Expressing his
motives, anticipating possible objections, facing actual censure,
the scientist found motive, sanction and authbrity alike in the
Puritah teachings. Such a dominant force as religion in those days
was not, and perhaps could not be compartmentalized and delimited.
Thus in BOYLE'S highlycommended apologia of science, we read :...
it will be no venture to suppose that at least in the Creating of
the Sublunary World, and the more conspicuous Stars, two of God's
principal ends were, the Manifestation of His own Glory, and the
Good of Men (4).
... it will not be perhaps difficult for vou [PYROPHILUS] : to
discern, that those who labour to deter men from sedulous Enquiries
into Naturt, do (though I grant, desipnlessly) take a Course which
tends to defeat God of both those rnention'd Ends ( 5 ) .-
(4) ROBERT B OYLE, Some Considerations To~tchingthe Usefulness
of Experimental Natural Philosophy (Oxford, 1664. 2nd ed.), p. 22.
( 5 ) Ibid., p. 27. This allusion to contemporary opposition to
science refers to that of some zealous divines. Generally speaking,
strictures on science arose from four primary sources. First, there
were disgruntled individuals such as ROBERT CROSSE, an upholder of
pseudo-Aristotelianism, who held that the Royal Society was a
Jesuitical conspiracy against society and religion, and HENRY
STUBBE, a professional literary bravo and Galenical physician who
entered the fray for reasons of personal and professional
ag~randizement. These exaggerated gestures of antagonism had little
influence and are not at all indicative of-the place held by
science and men of science in the latter part of the century. See
A. E. SHIPLEY, The Revival of Science in the Seventeenth Century"
in Vanutem Lectures (Princeton University Press : 1914); F.
GREENSLET, Yoseph G l a m i l l (Columbia University Press : g
goo), p. 78. The second source of opposition was literary. For
example, SHADWELI. In his Comedy, " The in his " Elephant in the
Moon " and " Hudibras " Virtuoso " (1676) and BUTLER, ridiculed the
pursuits of certain " scientists," but these literary satires were
criticism of exaggerated scientism and dilletantism, rather than of
the significant scientific works of the day. Cf. The Record o f the
Royal Society (Oxford University Press, 1912), pp. 45 ff. A third
source of opposition, and by far the most important, was found
among those churchmen who felt that the theologic foundations of
their beliefs were being undermined by scientific investigations.
But theology and religion must not be confused. Orthodox, dogmatic
th~ologians then, as ever, opposed any activity which might lead to
the contravention of their dogmas. But the implications of
religion, particularly of the religious ethic, were quite
contrariwise. It is this ethic, following with equal ineluctability
from diverse theologic bases, which in its consequences was of far
greater socialI'
4.4-4
R. K. MERTON
This is the motif which recurs in constant measure in the very
writings which often contain considerable scientific contributions
: these worldly activities and scientific achievements manifest the
Glory of God and enhance the Good of Man. T h e juxtaposition of
the spiritual and the material is characteristic and significant.
This culture rested securely on a substratum of utilitarian norms
which identified the useful and the true. Puritanism itself had
imputed a threefold utility to science. Natural philosophy was
instrumental first, in establishing practical proofs of the
scientist's state of grace; second, in enlarging control of nature
and third, in glorifying God. Science was enlisted in the service
of individual, society and deity. That these were adequate grounds
could not be denied. They comprised not merely a claim to
legitimacy, they afforded incentives which can, not be readily
overestimated. One need but look through the personal
correspondence of seventeenth century scientists to realize this
(6). JOHN WILKINS proclaiqed the experimental study of Nature to be
a most effective means of begetting in men a veneration WILLUGHBY,
probably the most eminent for God (7). FRANCIS zoologist of the
time, was prevailed upon to publish his works -which, his excessive
modesty led him to deem unworthy of publication-only when RAY
insisted that it was a means of glorifying God (8). And
RAY'Spanegyric of those who honor Him by studying His works was so
well received that five large editions were issued in some twenty
years (9).significance than the abstruse theologic doctrines which
rarely penetrated to the life of the people. Professor R. F. JONES
suggests a fourth source. After the restoration, ardent royalists
impugned science, and particularly the Royal Society, because of
the close connection between these, Baconianisrn and Puritanism.
This suggests that contemporaries recognized the strong Puritan
espousal of the new experimental science, as indeed they did. See
JONES' excellent study, '4ncients and Moderns ( S t . 1,ouis :
Washington University Studies, 1936), pp. 191-92, 224. (6) See, for
cxamplt, the letters of WILLIAM OUGHTRED in Correspondence of
Scientific Men of the Seventeenth Centitry, S . J . RIGAUD, ed.,
pp. XXXIV, et passim. Or see the letters of JOHN RAY in the
Correspondence of John R a y , EDWINLANKESTER, ed. (London, 1848),
pp. 389, 395, 402, et passim. ( 7 ) Principles and Duties of
Natural Religion (London, 1710, 6th ed.), pp. 236 ff. (8) See EDWIN
LANKESTER, (ed.) Memorials of John Ray (London, 1846), p 14 n. (9)
JOHNRAY,Wisdom o f God (1,ondon : 1691),pp. 126-29, et passim.
Striking
SCIENCE I N SEVENTEENTH CENTURY ENGLAND
445
Many " emancipated souls " of the present day, accustomed to a
radical cleavage between religion and science and largely convinced
of the relative social unimportance of religion for the modern
Western world, are apt to generalize this state of affairs. T o
them, these recurrent pious phrases signify Machiavellian tactics
or calculating hypocrisy or at best merely customary usage, but
nothing of deep-rooted motivating convictions. This evidence of
extreme piety leads to the charge that p i nimium probat nihil'
probat. But such an interpretation is possible only upon the basis
of an unwarranted extension of twentieth century beliefs and
attitudes to seventeenth century society. Though it always serves
to inflate the ego of the iconoclast and sometimes to extol the
social images of his own day, " debunking " may often supplant
truth with error. As a case in point, it is difficult to believe
that BOYLE who manifested his piety by expending considerable sums
to have the Bible translated into foreign tongues as well as in
less material ways, was simply rendering lip service to Protestant
beliefs. -1s Professor G. N. CLARKproperly notes in this connection
:There is ... always a difficulty in estimating the degree to which
what we call religion enters into anything which was said in the
seventeenth century in religious language. It is not solved by
discounting all theological terms and treating them merely as
common form. On the contrary, it is more often necessary to remind
ourselves that these words were then seldom used without their
accompaniment of meaning, and that their use did generally imply a
heightened intensity of feeling. This sense of the closeness of God
and the Devil to every act and fact of daily life is an integral
part of the character of the century ( I 0 ) .
In various ways, then, general religious ideas were translated
into concrete policy. This was no mere intellectual exercise.
Puritanism transfused ascetic vigor into activities which, in their
own right, could not as yet achieve self-sufficiency. It so
redefinedillustrations of the extent to which &Y had
assimilated the Puritan sentiments are to be found throughout his
correspondence. For cxample, he writes in a (April 4, 1701) : " I
am glad your business increases so letter to JAMES PETIVER as to
require more attendance, and take up more of your time, which
cannot be better employed than in the works of your proper
callings. What time you have to spare you will do well to spend, as
you are doing, in the inquisition and contemplation of the works of
God and nature." The Correspondence of John Ray, P. 390. (10) The
Seventeenth Centurv, p. 323.
446
R. K. MERTON
the relations between the divine and. the mundane as to move
science to the front rank of social values. As it happened, this
was at the immediate expense of literary, and ultimately, of
religious pursuits. For if the Calvinist God is irrational in the
sense that he cannot be directly grasped by the cultivated
intellect, He can yet be glorified by a clear-sighted, meticulous
study of His natural works ( 1 1 ) . Nor was this simply a
compromise with science. Puritanism differed from Catholicism which
had gradually come to tolerate science, in demanding, not merely
condoning, its pursuit. An " elastic concept," ( 1 2 ) the Catholic
and Protestant definitions of which differed so fundamentally as to
produce entirely opposed consequences, the " glorification of God "
thus came to be, in Puritan hands, the " fructification of
science."
"
Comfort o f Mankind "
But Protestantism had afforded further grounds for the
cultivation of science. T h e second dominant tenet in the Puritan
ethos, it will be remembered, designated social welfare, the good
of the many, as a goal ever to be held in mind. Here again, the
contemporary scientists adopted an objective which carried with it,
in addition to its own obvious merits, a cluster of religious
sentiments. Science was to be fostered and nurtured as leading to
the improvement of man's lot on earth by facilitating technologic
invention. T h e Royal Society, we are told by its worthy
historian, " does not intend to stop at some particular benefit,
but goes to the root of all noble inventions." ( 1 3 ) Further,
those experiments which do not bring with them immediate gain are
not to be contemned, for as the noble BACONhad declared,
experiments of Light ultimately conduce to a whole troop of
nventions useful to the life and state of man (14). This power( X I
)Cf.TROELTSCH, Social Teachings, Vol. 11, p. 585. ( 1 2 ) The
changing definitions of nominally identical concepts comprise a
fruitful field for sociological research. Such students of the
sociology of knowledge and historians of ideas (L~VEJOY, BOAS,
CRANE) have contributed as MANNHEIM significant studies of such
developments. (13) THOMAS SPRAT, The History of the Ro.val-Society
of London, pp. 78-79. ( 1 4 j Ibid., pp. 245, 351 ff.
SCIENCE I N SEVENTEENTH CENTURY ENGLAND
447
of science to better the material cmdition of man, he continues,
is, apart from its purely mundane value, a good in the light of the
Evangelical Doctrine of Salvation by Jesus Christ. Boyle, in his
last will and testament, echoes the same attitude, petitioning the
Fellows of the Society in this wise : " Wishing them also a happy
success in their laudable Attempts, to discover the true Nature of
the Works of God; and praying that they and all other Searchers
into Physical Truths, may Cordially refer their Attainments to the
Glory of the Great Author of Nature, and to the Comfort of
NIankind." (15)
