Mitigating the Consequences ofViolent Conflict:What Worksand What Does Not?

OCTOBER 2012

The purpose of the second International Expert Forum, “Mitigating theConsequences of Violent Conflict: What Works and What Does Not?,” which washeld at IPI on June 6, 2012, was to take stock of the consequences of ongoingviolent conflict and means to prevent and reduce them, including peacekeepingoperations and special envoys. The ambition was to identify patterns andformulate lessons learned and policy implications in the short, medium, and longterm. The forum was divided into three sessions: mapping the trends and causesof violence against civilians; mapping the challenges and impact of peacekeepingoperations; and mapping the challenges and impact of special envoys.

Introduction

Identification of the causes and consequences of violence against civilians inwar, post-war, and non-war settings is a growing global preoccupation acrossadvocacy, policy, and research communities. Scholars from the public healthand social sciences are mobilizing a range of technologies to bear witness tothe consequences of armed conflict—from passive surveillance and householdsurveys to crowdsourcing and satellite mapping. These and other efforts arebeginning to give a clearer picture of the extent of human suffering in themidst of chronic violence. Moreover, a chorus of actors spanning the securityand development sectors—within and outside the United Nations—is callingfor a more concerted focus on the protection of civilians. The introductory session of the second International Expert Forum was

opened by Susana Malcorra, chef de cabinet, of the Executive Office of the UNSecretary-General. She drew attention to the critical, if changing, role of theUN in preventing and reducing organized violence in armed conflicts andpost-conflict settings. The UN lends moral consciousness and leverages wide-ranging experience in this regard; it has important convening powers; it hascapacities to exercise its Good Offices; and it has a long experience obtainedfrom setbacks and successes. It is also working with increasing coherence andcoordination. Its comparative advantages include its legitimacy in contestedspaces but also the wide range of agencies and instruments at its disposal frompeacekeepers and peacebuilders to human rights, humanitarian, and develop-ment experts.The opening presentation emphasized the importance of putting national

priorities and capacities first. The UN is attempting to rebalance the ways inwhich national and local capabilities and ownership are supported. Theorganization acknowledges the importance of reconstituting the socialcontract binding states and their citizens but also the centrality of host govern-ments and societies in organizing and managing the process. With over sixty

This meeting note was drafted by

Robert Muggah, principal at the

SecDev Group and research director

at the Igarape Institute, and Birger

Heldt, director of research at the

Folke Bernadotte Academy. It

reflects the rapporteurs' interpreta-

tion of the discussion and does not

necessarily reflect the view of all

participants.

The International Expert Forum was

originally launched at IPI in New

York on December 15, 2011. It is a

joint collaboration of the Folke

Bernadotte Academy, IPI, the

SecDev Group, and the Social

Science Research Council (SSRC).

The second International Expert

Forum was held at IPI on June 6,

2012.

2 MITIGATING THE CONSEQUENCES OF VIOLENT CONFLICT

years of experience working on issues of interna-tional and internal armed conflict, the UN hasacquired a series of insights into how theseobjectives can be achieved. These include the needto do the following:• Adopt multiple perspectives or lenses whenreading conflicts since there are many "truths" indetermining their causes and consequences.

• Privilege local ownership of the recovery agenda.The UN should not want peace more than theactors themselves, and the UN needs tounderstand that local agents have the bestinformation.

• Achieve a balance between attaining rapidstability and security and addressing underlyingcauses. If security is elevated over justice, thenreconciliation may prove more difficult andsecurity gains more fragile; meanwhile, processesto combat inpunity can generate instability.

• Promote inclusive politics. Constitution-buildingand institutional support are crucial for openingup countries’ political space.

• Avoid looking at countries with a foreignmindset. Institution-building processes need tobe adopted to local conditions and cultures;institutions cannot be built in a couple of years.

• Combine disarmament, demobilization, andreintegration (DDR) processes with reconcilia-tion (R) processes.

• Make security services the right size, and improveaccountability. Security sector governance andDDR must take place in the context of localownership, as it lays the foundation for a newsocial contract. The UN is well positioned tocarry out such tasks.

• Solve the DDR and security sector reform (SSR)challenges. DD is often more successful than R;making programs sustainable is of criticalimportance. Often program designs are based onavailable resources rather than actual needs.

• Consider the needs and aspirations of youngpeople. This is of central importance, asillustrated by the events in the Arab world. Weneed to understand this dynamic and adapt UNprograms accordingly.

• Ensure that essential quick impact projects arerooted in the needs and priorities of local

communities.• Harness knowledge and expertise of returningdiasporas, make sure they see their role in anemerging country.

• Expand and solidify regional relationships andpartnerships. There is a need to strengthen orcreate regional coordination mechanisms; trustin the region is important, and sometimes lack oftrust is an important source of conflict to beginwith. Moreover, regional cooperation can assist insuccessfully dealing with joint issues such asinfrastructure, environmental issues, etc.

• Promote the empowerment of women andprotection from discrimination. Organizedsexual violence is sometimes a tactic of war, butfew peace accords make a reference to it. We havea long way to go in this regard. Moreover, we needto improve employment opportunities forwomen.The ensuing discussion ventured into areas such

as coordination, data gathering, emerging threatsand obstacles, and how the UN is assisting nationsin transitions. For instance, while the UN has takensteps to enhance its capacity to deploy civilians, amajor gap continues to be the UN’s capacity torecruit, train, deploy, and manage civilian special-ists. Even more important, states affected bychronic organized violence lack core capacities.There is a large need to build local civilian capacityto address the needs of societies in transition. Morepositively, there is some evidence of regionalentities and south-south alliances beginning to fillthe gaps, though much more investment is neededin this regard. The example of IGAD’s work inSouth Sudan was cited as a positive case. Timor-Leste is also widely regarded as a success story, andwe need to calibrate how to retain some presence sothat Timor does not relapse. The UN is workinghard to improve this string of work and iscommitted to working on issues like this during thecoming five years. The international system is not well equipped to

manage contemporary threats. Sometimes it isstruggling with social, economic, environmental,and peace and security challenges without takinginto due consideration that they are interconnectedyet totally different threats. The internationaldiplomatic architecture is still ill-equipped toaddress contemporary transnational threats related

to global financial market shocks, climate change,and a wide range of threats to peace and security.Indeed, sometimes the UN and other internationalentities struggle to meet these challenges inisolation, not recognizing how their causes andconsequences can be related. The overall challengeis to find a way for the international community atlarge to deal with these threats, rather than relyingon unilateral responses alone.What has changed is not just the diversity and

spatial character of peace and security risks, butalso their rapid temporal manifestation and spread.Some participants noted that traditionalapproaches are fast being overtaken by events andbecoming increasingly irrelevant. There is also aneed for early warning mechanisms to deal withthese emerging threats, to allow for sufficient timeto prevent and react. For example, the Arab Springhighlights the ways in which previously marginal-ized groups—including youth and women—emerged to challenge the status quo. One importantquestion is how to create real participation for thesegroups: employment is part of the answer, but it isnot enough. What is needed are ways to meaning-fully channel these groups’ energies in the rightdirection, to rebuild the social contract. The UN is beginning to rethink its assumptions

and tool-kits and explore new ways and means ofworking in societies confronting turbulence andtransition. It acknowledges that it is contendingwith twenty-first century problems with twentiethcentury tools. It recognizes that the demands oftenoutsize its capacities to deliver and that changes areneeded to increase its coordination and effective-ness on the ground.

Mapping the Challenges ofOrganized Violence inContemporary Conflict:Data and Trends

There has been a dramatic expansion in quantita-tive and qualitative research on the costs oforganized violence over the past decade. The mostcomprehensive datasets are now used not just tomeasure the frequency and severity of deaths at thenational level on an annualized basis, but also toexamine spatial and temporal characteristics of

intentional violence and victimization at the sub-national level. This kind of diagnosis can serve atleast two purposes: providing a comprehensiverecord of mass atrocities and violations of humanrights post facto and helping to predict violencedynamics. The insights are sobering and clarifying,as they correct long-held assumptions andanecdotal evidence on the prevalence of violencethat have come to inform policy. The panelists setout a far-reaching agenda that raised a number offundamental questions about the definition ofarmed conflict and the implications of organizedviolence.The first session chaired by Dr. Robert Muggah

considered the global characteristics of organizedviolence. He discussed the main findings andinsights from the recent research mapping out theonset, duration, and intensity of conflict and non-conflict violence. What is increasingly recognized isthat a vast majority of the global burden occurs notin countries affected by armed conflict but in thosethat are ostensibly peaceful. More than 525,000persons are killed by intentional violence each yearof which 55,000 die from combat-related causes inwar. More than 395,000 persons are killed as aresult of homicide in non-war settings and another21,000 from extrajudicial killings. Most violentdeaths are concentrated in Latin America and theCaribbean, as well as central and southern Africa,and there is a worsening situation in the cities of thesouth. The panelists reflected on what is “new” and“old” about contemporary organized violence. Itwas agreed that organized violence in a range of“fragile settings” is increasingly simultaneous,overlapping, and integrated, and as a result it ischallenging our classification systems. Imputingintentionality or motive is challenging when thereis a blurring of political and economic interests.Many security, humanitarian, and developmentagencies are actively reflecting on what thischanging face of violence means legally, conceptu-ally, and operationally. Sexual violence was described by Dr. Ragnhild

Nordås as one of the most significant challenges ofour time. Indeed, the UN Secretary-General hasrepeatedly called for more data collection andanalysis of the incidence, trends, and patterns ofrape and other forms of sexual violence insituations of armed conflict. But there are difficul-

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4 MITIGATING THE CONSEQUENCES OF VIOLENT CONFLICT

ties in tracking sexual violence, and as such it tendsto be overlooked, misunderstood, and sometimesoverstated: under-reporting as well as over-reporting are common. There is also a real absenceof solid and reliable baseline data to allow for anassessment of how much sexual violence actuallyincreases in times of war instead of just an assess-ment of the absolute amount of such violence. Ifany real global assessment is to occur, moretemporal, typological, perpetrator, and environ-mental information needs to be collected, even if acaution is warranted regarding intrinsic biases. Weneed better data in order to make better policy.One promising research initiative described by

Dr. Nordås seeks to generate a comprehensivecross-national dataset mapping out global trends insexual violence. Partly financed by the FolkeBernadotte Academy, the data include event-basedinformation 1989-2010 and is designed to generateinformation and analysis to shape early-warningefforts and facilitate preventive interventions. Thedataset considers sexual violence in many of itsforms (e.g., rape, sexual slavery, forced prostitution,forced abortion, sexual mutilation, and sexualtorture) occurring in armed conflicts of varyingintensity and with multiple actors (states and rebelgroups). It also considers trends in post-conflictsettings. While preliminary, early results suggestthat only a minority of armed groups are involvedin perpetrating sexual violence and that rates areoften higher than anticipated at war’s end. This maybe because during intense armed conflicts, fightersare more preoccupied with staying alive, andtherefore have fewer opportunities to exercisesexual violence. Anticipating these trends may helpto predict when and where sexual violence is morelikely to occur.Dr. Michael Spagat discussed the distribution and

intensity of fatalities and targeting of civilians inwartime settings. New geo-referenced conflict datais becoming available and present new opportuni-ties for micro-level—instead of national level—empirical research. Examining large event-baseddatasets such as the Iraq Body Count (IBC), Dr.Spagat has developed a set of basic ratios that heand co-authors describe as “the dirty war index.” Itdivides female and child victims killed in warsettings (the numerator) by all fatalities (thedenominator) and parses them out according to thetype of weapon involved. Types of killings classified

include air attacks, mortars, vehicle bombs, suicidebombs, gunfire, execution, and execution withtorture. For instance, it was found that air attackshave the highest rates of killed women andchildren, indicating how indiscriminating suchattacks are. While such research does not allow fora determination of intentionality, it does offerinsights into the likely consequences (and determi-nation of proportionality) of particular weaponssystems. Another kind of index being developed is called

the “civilian targeting index,” which focuses on theratio of battle deaths among civilians as comparedto overall deaths. It attributes deaths arising inarmed conflicts to specific armed groups of alltypes—more than 500 worldwide. It then considersthe extent to which groups are intentionally andsystematically targeting civilians. Curiously, thedata suggest that most non-state armed groups(more than 60 percent) do not routinely targetcivilians. However, preliminary analysis suggeststhat the “duration” and “scale” of armed groupinvolvement in a given armed conflict does seemcorrelated with the likelihood of increased targetingof civilians. Another finding is that the larger thescale of organized violence, the lower the relativelevel of civilian targeting, suggesting that manygroups are in fact adhering to the GenevaConventions. Another interpretation is the onesuggested above for sexual violence: in intensearmed conflicts, fighters are more focused onsurvival and have fewer opportunities to exerciseatrocities against civilians.The discussant Dr. Chetan Kumar reflected on

the changing nature of violence and the implica-tions for programming and the considerablechallenges associated with post-conflict transitions.A key shift is a movement away from all-outwarfare and armed conflict to lower-level andrecurrent types of violence. Dr. Kumar drewattention first to so-called “transitions”—a complexprocess of political, economic, and social changethat falls between armed conflict and nonconflict.Often it entails a series of recurrent and inter -locking conflicts. In such settings, the objectivemay not be to “resolve” the conflict but rather tocontain and stabilize it. Yet, we still know littleabout the conditions for violence in transitions, andhow to prevent violence.

Dr. Kumar also singled out another type ofinsecurity he described as “turbulence,” itself rootedin a combination of economic, social, and politicalfactors. During such incidents localized socialprotests may spiral out of control and assumenational proportions.A number of operational responses and practices

are required to address these transitions andturbulences. Many of the required tools are signaledin the World Bank’s World Development Report2011—including reform and the formation ofbroad and inclusive political coalitions to managechange. Recent experience suggests that reformsand reform initiatives can be instrumental inbringing security. Dr. Kumar emphasized theimportance of supporting the formation of leadactors that can create coalitions capable ofdelivering reforms rapidly: cohesive communitiesare better at dealing with such challenges, though itis very challenging to achieve such coalitions. Hedrew attention to the need to reorient attention tothe importance of local governance, including locallaw enforcement and local knowledge networks.Along with inclusive, resilient, and responsive

governance, Dr. Kumar highlighted other factorsthat can promote protection. For example, bordercontrol remains a major priority, one that requiressmarter border management. Likewise, communitylevel mediation is critical, including interventionsthat bring public security and civil society groupstogether. Ultimately, an integrated approach mustprevail, one that is less palliative and more systemicin nature.The ensuing discussion highlighted the ways in

which the UN is beginning to recognize thatfragility, transitions, turbulence, and other forms ofinsecurity are a “new normal.” It highlighted thegood news that the UN is no longer the only actorin dealing with these challenges. An importantquestion raised concerned what the necessary nextsteps are for the UN. A reactive approach is insuffi-cient: once turbulence sets in, it is exceedinglydifficult to know where it is going to lead. As such,the UN needs to rethink its models. One partici-pant suggested that it is important to avoidpiecemeal prevention and adopt instead a morecomprehensive approach to preventing andreducing conflict and organized violence. Othersquestioned the extent to which SSR efforts can and

do prevent and reduce violence and whetheralternate approaches were needed. For instance,DDR may make conflict less likely at the nationallevel, while at the same time making violence moreprevalent at the local level.Many policy makers and researchers working on

peace and conflict issues are increasingly revisitingtheir assumptions and examining the widerdynamics of organized violence. Questions wereraised regarding the extent to which violenceagainst civilians is linked to strategic goals, and towhat extent it is ephemeral. It was also suggestedthat there is a need to look at different types oforganized violence—one-sided, interpersonal,communal—and the extent to which they overlap.There is now much more data available forexamining underlying trends and exploring causeand effect relationships. At the same time it isimportant to define what kinds of violence we aretalking about and analyzing so that we do not mixup these categories, which may have very differentcauses, dynamics, and solutions. It was also pointedout that detailed and geo-referenced data nowbeing produced can be used to name and shameperpetrators, but that it also shows that most groupsdo not carry out violence against civilians, and thatwomen and children are the groups most exposedto deaths due to explosive weapons. Campaigns ofsexual violence and mass atrocities are theexception—not the norm—in armed conflicts.

Contemporary Challengesand Evolving Roles in UN Peacekeeping

Peacekeeping and peace support mandates haveadopted an ever-expanding set of expectationsrelated to the protection of civilians. They haveshifted from being a specific set of actions advancedby the UN to monitor and enforce a ceasefire to awider set of activities entailing a range of actorsfrom the UN to regional organizations with far-reaching expectations to promote the rule of lawand justice. During the past twenty years a numberof UN-led and non-UN led peacekeepingoperations have sought to promote humanitarianobjectives, though few applied force to haltgenocide and mass atrocities. UN operations are inthat respect very different from non-UN led

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operations.This session chaired by Dr. Birger Heldt, featured

the insights of practitioners and scholars regardingthe impact of the UN’s peacekeeping operations inalleviating the consequences of war. It exploredhow UN peacekeeping has adapted to maximize itsefforts and impact, including enhanced partner-ships with regional and sub-regional organizationson the ground and through joint operations, and towhat extent these partnerships have beensuccessful.The first panelist, Ms. Erin Weir, reflected on the

evolution of the protection of civilians agenda bothin New York and in the field where peaceoperations are underway. On the one side, thereappears to be considerable dynamism and innova-tion in the use and deployment of protection toolsand concepts in the area of protection of civilians.Yet, there are important conceptual gaps. Oneconcern relates to the limits of the use of force:protection—not victory—is the objective. Forinstance, use of force may lead to regime change(i.e., victory), although it was never intended. Asecond big gap concerns harm reduction: whenforce is used, things get broken. When is thisacceptable? When is it really necessary to use force,and what steps should be taken to make amendswhen unintended consequences arise?Ms. Weir pointed to some examples of the

operationalization of the protection agenda at thefield level. Regarding military tools, there is aproactive approach being adopted by DPKO ineastern DRC and South Sudan due in part toincreased expectations and pressure generated bythe New Horizons report. Positive changes havebeen created by this, but the application has beeninconsistent across peacekeeping operations, partlyfor logistical reasons. Yet, even though advanceshave been made regarding the protection ofcivilians, military force is not the answer. It istherefore important to examine civilian tools. Oneexample is the promotion of community liaisonassistants—locally hired staff that speak the locallanguages, know all the facts on the ground, andlink civilians to peacekeepers. However, these andother actors can actually increase the vulnerabilityof civilians and both short- and long-term strate-gies are therefore needed.Next, panelist Dr. Paul Williams considered

partnership peacekeeping in terms of UN and non-UN operations, focusing on Africa. Williams notedthat the previous decade was one of good news inthis respect, and that there are encouraging signsfor the future. If partnership peacekeeping works,the international community will have moreoptions when it comes to protecting civilians. Theissue is now how one can make this partnershipwork even better. However, there is a lack ofunderstanding about how to choose betweendifferent types of partnerships. For instance, theUNAMID-UNISOM partnership has not beenideal. Williams suggested that in order for thepartnership to work, three challenges must beovercome: economic, technical, and political. Interms of the economic challenges, there is aninequity in financial arrangements, which leads toone side financing the operations. A more effectivepartnership requires more equal financial burdensharing. Turning to technical challenges, theinequality of military assets in quantitative andqualitative terms, but also logistics and bureau-cracy, hinders effective partnerships. Finally,political challenges are the most important onesand cover issues such as the following:- the indeterminate nature of Chapter 8 of the UNCharter in terms of what a strategic partnershipshould really entail;

- the diversity of the world's regions and thedifferent natures of the challenges, meaning thereis a need to reflect on how to create a partnershipsystem where all regions receive equal priority;

- the lack of shared analysis, and a consequent lackof consensus on the conclusions from suchanalyses, and therefore also a lack of consensusregarding what courses of action to pursue;

- the lack of common concepts of whatpeacekeeping operations should entail; the AUhas one concept, the UN has another, etc. Forexample, the AU deploys peacekeepingoperations in ongoing conflicts and carries outpeace enforcement, whereas the UN'speacekeeping operations have a much strongerfocus on post-conflicts.Dr. Williams also described three, positive

templates. First there are spearhead or vanguardoperations, where some type of Western coalitionpaves the way for a UN operation, such as in Haitior Timor-Leste. Second, in firefighting missions

6 MITIGATING THE CONSEQUENCES OF VIOLENT CONFLICT

Western forces play an enforcement role, examplesof which include Côte d'Ivoire, Sierra Leone, andthe DRC. Third and finally, there are the over-the-horizon operations—or out-of-area operations—inthat a region deploys troops in another region ofthe world, such as the US Joint Task Force in Liberiaand the EU force in the DRC and Chad. Yet, and inDr. William’s assessment, many of these operationsconstitute “band-aid” solutions. Dr. Williams continued to discuss what the AU

and the UN want from partnerships. On the formerquestion it was suggested that the AU wantsrecognition as an important actor. But it also wantsto become eligible for assessed economic means forpeacekeeping operations from the UN, and it wantslong-term UN support for the AU peacekeepingarchitecture. The UN, on the other hand, desirespartnerships in order to enhance its crisis response;to promote an approach that does not privilegeAfrica at the expense of other nations; and toensure good value for money while remainingsensitive to the spirit and contents of the UNCharter. These different goals—or lack of acommon vision and basic values—have resulted inan ad hoc approach.The first discussant, Mr. David Haeri, indicated

that history indicates that “success” is a politicalmatter and is only afterwards shaped by themilitary and civilian capability of troops and associ-ated technical assistance. He emphasized thecritical place of sustained and long-term commit-ment from the UN together with international,regional, and national engagement. And while UNpeacekeepers are often regarded as guarantors oftransitions and of a sustainable peace, this has onlybeen a feature since the early 1990s. Mr. Haeristressed that it is difficult to quantify what works,and what does not, when it comes to the protectionof civilians, and that there is a large need to think ofunintended consequences. He also suggested thatthere is a need to build more expertise on DDR,Rule of Law (RoL), and SSR, and more carefullyconsider natural resources as drivers of conflicts.The field-level protection of civilians was

described as a key problem for peacekeepingmissions, and it was stressed that it is important tobe honest about these issues and discuss them morebut also have reasonable expectations of what canbe achieved in these regards. Concerning partner-ships, it was stressed that there is a need to have

intensive and ongoing dialogue among partners,shared standards, and improved interoperability,but that these issues are now dealt with in an ad hocmanner. Mr. Haeri emphasized the importance ofkeeping a distinction between what constitutes AUand UN peacekeeping, as they are two differenttypes of peacekeeping.The second discussant, Ambassador Liberata

Mulamula, focused on what works instead offocusing on negatives when it comes to organizedviolence and UN response. Ambassador Mulamulahighlighted the centrality of national and local“ownership” in relation to UN peacekeeping—though noted this was easier said than done. Sheemphasized the importance of Africa, in particular,both owning its problems and owning its solutions:African solutions for African problems. And inreflecting on the ever changing and expandingmandates of UN peacekeeping, AmbassadorMulamula asked to what extent the UN is evendoing peacekeeping anymore: from a more narrowand traditional focus on enforcing ceasefires, thereis an ever more wide-ranging agenda involvingpeacemaking, peacebuilding, and peace consolida-tion. There are many practical challenges toensuring local ownership. On the one hand, itrequires much more than simple consultationsbetween the UN and AU partners. Indeed, the caseof MONUC which, over the past decade shiftedfrom a narrow mandate to enforce a ceasefire to the“protection of civilians” and “stabilization,” wasdescribed as a case in point. Ambassador Mulamulacalled for a more collaborative approach than isoften described in theory and called for anapproach that was more bottom-up and drew onlocal capabilities. Along with other panelists,Ambassador Mulamula noted emphatically thatthere were few genuine partnerships.It was noted by one participant that MONUC and

MONUSCO have been at the frontiers of R2P, andmaybe even have been experimental in terms ofprotecting civilians. Moreover, it is not uncommonfor peacekeeping operations to evolve towardsmore enforcement, more nation building, and moreconsolidation over time. From that perspectiveMONUC is not unique and, in fact, closelyresembles ONUC of the early 1960s or evenUNPROFOR of the early 1990s. In addition, thereis in practice a division of labor in that the UNfocuses on post-conflict peacekeeping with

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elements of nation building, whereas non-UNpeacekeeping is much more likely to interveneduring ongoing conflicts, while at the same timeadopting narrower, more traditional peacekeepingtasks. While this may be due to the limited financialresources of regional actors, it raises the question ofwhether there is a working division of labor amongUN and non-UN peacekeeping operations. Such adivision of labor was also suggested in the BrahimiReport some twelve years ago.Among the UN operations, two stand out in

terms of their robust methods for addressinggenocide and atrocities carried out by armedgroups. First is UNPROFOR in Bosnia thatestablished protected zones, delivered humani-tarian aid, and on occasions used force beyond selfdefense. The second prominent example isMONUC, which may be said to be at the front lineof robust proactive use of armed force by UNoperations against armed groups spoiling the peaceand/or committing atrocities. UN operations haverarely deployed for the stated primary task ofprotecting civilians from genocide or atrocities andused force beyond self defense to achieve thosegoals from the outset. Rather, the operations haveevolved. Close cases include UNAMID deployed in2007. While having a focus on protecting civiliansfrom human rights abuses, it did not develop arobust practice of using force reactively orproactively. In contrast, multilateral non-UNinterventions deployed primarily to halt ongoinggenocide/politicide and atrocities are rathercommon throughout history and includeINTERFET (Timor-Leste), EUFOR DRC/ARTEMIS (DRC), RAMSI (Solomon Islands),MIFH (Haiti), KFOR (Kosovo), among others. Apreliminary insight offered from these cases is thatmultilateral interventions have worked well whenrobust and applied to small countries or territoriesand avoided siding with any of the conflict parties.Also, some kind of division of labor between UNand non-UN missions appears to have emerged.The participants singled out some contradictions

and challenges emerging in the course of thepresentations. For example, how can the UNmaintain a consent-based approach when the stateis often a key perpetrator of organized violenceagainst civilians? What is peacekeeping when thereis no peace to keep? How can civilians be protectedwhen the UN is expected to maintain impartiality?

Has impartiality (evenhandedly implementing thepeacekeeping mandate) been confused withneutrality (doing nothing), and if so, has thisconceptual confusion hampered the discussion andclarity of thinking? Has the responsibility to protectdoctrine muddied the waters? How can troopcontributing countries be encouraged to enforcethe peace when they are not interested in doing so?At a minimum, panelists agreed that there is a needto go back to the original idea of peacekeeping asfounded in the aspiration of collective security.Indeed, its very structure is not designed to allowfor “interventionist” activities, and the protection ofcivilians mandate is without prejudice to thepeacekeeping mandate.

The Role, Challenges, andTools of Special Envoys

A critical instrument in the “protection” arsenal ofthe UN is the special envoy. There are in factmultiple types of special envoys, the mostprominent being Special Representatives of theSecretary-General. The role of these envoys variesin length of deployment, mandate, functional scopeof their activities, and, to a considerable extent,their personal attributes and leadership styles. Thefinal session, chaired by Mr. Youssef Mahmoud,considered the experiences of special envoys andsome emerging research on the scale and distribu-tion of SRSGs and the effectiveness of theirinterventions. The discussion was focused particu-larly on their practical experiences and the criticalrole of their own background and the supportsystems they operated within. The first speaker, Dr. Jamal Benomar, considered

his own experiences as a special envoy. Heemphasized that there is no handbook to guidemediation and dialogue. There are no clear resolu-tions, and there is no one single way to proceed: thescope and scale of intervention varies from place toplace. He also stressed that the UN is now startingto develop mediation capacity and working todevelop a handbook. Yet, it is occurring at a timewhen the UN role is ever more diminished inmediation.Notwithstanding decades of special envoy

activity, Benomar stressed the importance ofadopting humility and acknowledging the limitedstate of knowledge on what works and what does

8 MITIGATING THE CONSEQUENCES OF VIOLENT CONFLICT

not. He highlighted the importance of ensuringcultural continuity. He pointed to the challenges ofrecognizing local compacts, agreements that maynot always be in line with UN standards. Indiscussing the situation in Yemen, he noted themultiple and overlapping conflicts and theimportance of reading between them. But he alsostressed that the UN had certain advantages,including being regarded as an honest, or at leastimpartial, broker and could also play a role ininfluencing more progressive norms in peaceagreements. The next speaker, Dr. Manuel Fröhlich, consid-

ered the findings of recent research on the role ofSRSGs in relation to peace processes. Dr. Fröhlichtraced the evolution of special envoys and theirexpansion.1He highlighted the growth of SRSG andHLA functions since the 1950s—from an average often to fifteen between 1950 and the 1980s to ninety-five in 2011. In fact, there have been roughly 358SRSGs (1946-2011) from ninety-nine differentcountries. The steep increases were attributed toconflicts in Africa and transnational issues such asclimate change. The top contributing countries forSRSGs included the US (53), Norway (27), Sweden(24), UK (23), Algeria (18), India (18), Italy (18),Pakistan (16), France (13), Switzerland (13), andCanada (13). It should be noted that in some cases,there were multiple SRSGs in a single country.Overall, most deployments of SRSGs were toBurundi, Cambodia, Cyprus, Haiti, Iraq, Kosovo,Liberia, Middle East, Somalia, Sudan, and WesternSahara.Dr. Fröhlich also considered the particular

influence of SRSGs on the incidence of armedconflicts. Although findings are temporary, henoted a strong correlation between decliningintrastate conflict and SRSG presence though couldnot (yet) determine a causal effect. Indeed, hestressed that structural factors (i.e., the environ-ment) are the most important (75 percent), but thatSRSGs appear to play an important role. Thesestatistics suggest how little—or how much—oneshould expect SRSGs to achieve. He also noted thatthere are other critical micro factors that determinethe influence of SRSGs. These relate to the person-

ality of SRSGs, their experience, their style, and theway they work in teams and in relation to the UN. The final intervention by Mr. Giandomenico

Picco considered the central place of agency inshaping the direction of peace agreements as well asthe limitations of claims to “impartiality.” Mr. Picconoted, along with others, that the world haschanged. Mediation during the Cold War was morestraightforward. Since the 1990s, it has becomefiendishly more complex. Building on personalexperience Mr. Picco stressed the importance ofunderstanding the “narrative” of those involved inmediation and the importance of individual agencyand working relations with superiors in shaping thedirection and outcomes of mediation. He alsohighlighted the ways in which “minilateralism” hascome to shape mediation over the past two decades.In addition, Mr. Picco suggested that neutrality isnot important. Instead, the actors just need to knowwhich “camp” a mediator belongs: no actors wantneutral mediators, and no mediator can becompletely impartial anyway.The ensuing discussion touched upon the issue of

the division of labor among SRSGs, whether it istime for a new agenda for peace, and what may bethe role of mediators in the future. In addition, thechallenges caused by the fragmentation of conflictparties were discussed, in particular with regard towhether the UN is equipped to deal with fragmen-tation and whether there are relevant lessons fromcases in the past that could be applied to currentand future cases of mediation.

Concluding Reflections

This International Expert Forum featured manytakeaways and key concepts, such as “coordinationand coherence,” “social contract,” “band-aid,”“partnerships,” “local micro-level data,” “dynamicsof violence against civilians,” “influence of localconditions,” etc. For instance, research indicatesthat localized forms of violence are shaped bychanges in the military balance of power. Civiliansare often punished for perceived disloyalty. Oneimplication, then, is that no matter how challengingit may appear, the peacekeeping goal should be to

9

1 The first special envoy was Folke Bernadotte in 1948 based on a General Assembly Resolution and selected by the permanent five members of the Security Council.Next was Francesco Urrutia (1957) from Colombia in Israel/Jordan. Others in the 1960s included Adrian Pekt (Guinea),Johan Beck-Friis (Thailand), EduardZellweger (Laos), and Herbert de Ribbling (Oman). Also Pier Spinelli (Portugal) was requested to mediate in Jordan in 1964. The Secretary General came up withthe concept of UN “presence” in lieu of peacekeeping force.

create robustly defended ceasefires (even localizedones) instead of siding with any conflict parties.Historically this has decreased incentives for rebelsto commit atrocities, since government forces areno longer considered an acute threat and territoryis not at risk of being lost to the other side of theconflict. It may also provide breathing room for anunavoidable political solution to develop and forthird parties to pursue diplomatic options. The seminar highlighted how the landscapes oforganized violence are diffuse and dynamic.National-level assessments disaggregated byyear are increasingly being supplanted by sub-national assessments that offer more granularand geo-spatial assessments. What they areshowing is a heterogeneous picture. Nonstatearmed groups are not necessarily widelyinvolved in killing civilians while state-basedgroups are. Not all armed groups are involved inperpetrating sexual violence, but it appears thatsuch violence often persists well after conflictsend. It is critical that research continues to assessthese variations.The seminar raised questions about the defini-tions and classifications for “armed conflict”and signaled a new terminology to describeorganized violence. Indeed, panelists andparticipants alike raised important questionsabout what is “armed conflict,” “postconflict,”and “other forms of violence.” In some cases,other expressions seemed more appropriate tocapture the real dynamics on the ground,including “transitions,” “turbulence,” “instabi -lity,” “fragility,” and other “situations of violence.”A new nomenclature is emerging—one that hasprofound implications for how the internationalcommunity thinks about responses. The seminar drew attention to new andinnovative forms of applied research.Researchers noted the rapid evolution ofdatasets that account not just for events overtime, but also geo-spatial and environmentalunits of analysis. These datasets move beyondcounting the dead and injured to account for awider range of victimization and variablesrelated to the types of weapons used in the event.They focus not just on armed groups’ presencebut also on their motivation and intentionality.Such datasets have a potentially important role

in documenting atrocities for tribunals but alsofor developing predictive modeling for preven-tion and early warning. An outstandingquestion, however, is how we get this informa-tion into the hands of senior policy makers.There was a consensus that many of the tools torespond to organized violence need to adapt.Most participants noted how narrow approachesto minimizing violence that emphasize peacesupport and peacebuilding and enforcingceasefires are giving way to more transformativeagendas promoting not just multidimensionalpeacekeeping, but local ownership, governance,and architectures of peace. This evolving agendawill demand new forms of cooperation, acapacity to learn across different settings, and acommitment to monitoring outcomes. It willrequire partnerships that include regionalorganizations. There was agreement that local ownership,local resilience, and enhanced partnershipswere essential but challenging. Whilepeacekeeping approaches have made importantgains, it is still largely piecemeal and top down.A recurring question was how to ensure a moreemphatic “regional voice,” while also managingmajor technical, economic, political challenges.Participants agreed that reinforcing national andlocal capacities was central, and would presentone of the more important, if challenging,priorities for the UN in the coming decade.All of the presentations pointed to a major

dilemma facing contemporary efforts to preventand reduce organized violence. On the one hand,there are unprecedented opportunities for research,agency, and interventions. On the other, there areformidable transnational risks, complex interests,and old and outdated assumptions and approaches.The question facing the security and developmentestablishments is how to take advantage of thesenew opportunities while minimizing the risks. At aminimum, it will require acknowledging that theUN is not necessarily the only, much less thecentral, player. It will also require understandinghow power is more widely distributed. Finally, itwill mean working proactively with regionalpartners and building coalitions across public andprivate spheres.

10 MITIGATING THE CONSEQUENCES OF VIOLENT CONFLICT

Agenda

Mitigating the Consequences of Violent Conflict:What Works and What Does Not?

The International Expert Forum

Wednesday, June 6, 2012

09:00 – 09:15 Welcome and Introductory Remarks

Mr. Youssef Mahmoud, Senior Adviser, International Peace InstituteDr. Birger Heldt, Director of Research, Folke Bernadotte AcademyDr. Robert Muggah, Principal, SecDev Group

09:30 – 09:45 Keynote Address

Ms. Susana Malcorra, Chef de Cabinet and Under-Secretary-General, Executive Officeof the United Nations Secretary-General

09:45 – 11:15 Session 1: Mapping the Challenges of Organized Violence in Contemporary Conflict:Data and Trends

This session discusses the main findings and insights from the recent research mapping outthe onset, duration, and intensity of organized violence. Particular consideration will begiven to the spatial and temporal distribution of mortality, organized violence, and associ-ated displacement. Additional attention will be given to the risks giving rise to organizedviolence (including targeted mass atrocities and sexual violence), trends, and futurechallenges.

Chair Dr. Robert Muggah

PresentersDr. Ragnhild Nordås, Senior Researcher, Centre for the Study of War, Peace ResearchInstitute Oslo (PRIO)

Dr. Michael Spagat, Professor, Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University ofLondon

DiscussantDr. Ozonnia Ojielo, Coordinator, Conflict Prevention Team, Bureau for Crisis Preventionand Recovery (BCPR), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)

11:15 Coffee Break

11

11:30 – 13:00 Session 2: Contemporary Challenges and Evolving Roles in UN Peacekeeping

This session features the insights of practitioners and scholars regarding the impact of theUN’s peacekeeping operations in alleviating the consequences of war. A particular focus willbe put on the contemporary challenges for UN peacekeeping and the evolving roles ofcivilian, police, and military peacekeepers in confronting those challenges. In this regard, thissession will also explore how UN peacekeeping has adapted to maximize its efforts andimpact, including enhanced partnerships with regional and sub-regional organizations onthe ground and through joint operations and to what extent these partnerships have beensuccessful.

ChairDr. Birger Heldt

Presenters Ms. Erin A. Weir, Protection and Advocacy Adviser, Norwegian Refugee Council Dr. Paul D. Williams, Associate Director, Security Policy Studies Program, The ElliottSchool of International Affairs, George Washington University

DiscussantsAmbassador Liberata Mulamula, Senior Diplomatic Adviser to the President of theRepublic of TanzaniaMr. David Haeri, Chief, Peacekeeping Best Practices Section, United Nations Department ofPeacekeeping Operations

13:00 – 14:45 Working Lunch

Session 3: The Role, Challenges, and Tools of Special Envoys

This session features insights from practitioners and scholars, but with a focus on the role ofspecial envoys—appointed either by the UN Secretary-General or in collaboration withregional organizations—in alleviating the consequences of war. The role of these envoysvaries in length of deployment, mandate, functional scope of their activities, and, to aconsiderable extent, their personal attributes and leadership styles. The session will look atthe main challenges for past and present holders of these posts and how the role of specialenvoys has evolved over the years.

ChairMr. Francesco Mancini

Presenters Dr. Jamal Benomar, Special Adviser to the UN Secretary-General and UN Special Envoy toYemenDr. Manuel Fröhlich, Professor of International Organizations and Globalization, FriedrichSchiller University of JenaMr. Giandomenico Picco, Chairman and CEO, GDP Associates; former UN AssistantSecretary-General for Political Affairs and UN Special Envoy to Lebanon

14:45 Closing Remarks

Mr. Youssef MahmoudDr. Birger HeldtDr. Robert Muggah

12 AGENDA

Saiful Azam AbdullahDeputy Permanent Representative of Malaysiato the United Nations

Mireille Affa'a-MindzieResearch FellowInternational Peace Institute

Christian AltpeterResearch AssistantFolke Bernadotte Academy

Tahir Hussain AndrabiCounsellorPermanent Mission of Pakistan to theUnited Nations

Andrea BartoliDeanSchool for Conflict Analysis and ResolutionGeorge Mason University

Bernd BeberAssistant ProfessorDepartment of Political ScienceNew York University

Robert BlairPhD CandidateDepartment of Political ScienceYale University

Arthur BoutellisResearch FellowInternational Peace Institute

Christian Burckhardt Associate Policy Planning OfficerPolicy, Evaluation and Training Division United Nations Department of PeacekeepingOperations/Department of Field Support

Tatiana CarayannisDeputy DirectorConflict Prevention and Peace Forum Social Science Research Council

David CervenkaMinister CounsellorPermanent Mission of the Czech Republic to theUnited Nations

Amine ChabiCounsellor, Peacekeeping, Peacebuilding, andConflict PreventionPermanent Mission of the Kingdom of Moroccoto the United Nations

Sally ChinHead of Office, New YorkOxfam International

Alberto CutilloVisiting Senior FellowInternational Peace Institute

Martha DoggettChiefAmericas DivisionUnited Nations Department of Political Affairs

Alle DorhoutPolitical CounsellorPermanent Mission of the Kingdom of theNetherlands to the United Nations

Hugh T. DuganAdviserPermanent Mission of the United States to theUnited Nations

Mari EtelapaaCounsellor, PeacekeepingDelegation of the European Union to the United Nations

Malcolm GreenFirst Secretary, Political AffairsPermanent Mission of the United Kingdomto the United Nations

Steen Malthe HansenCounsellorPermanent Mission of Denmark to the United Nations

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Participants

Fabienne HaraVice President, Multilateral AffairsInternational Crisis Group

Elchin HuseynliFirst SecretaryPermanent Mission of the Republic of Azerbaijanto the United Nations

Esmira JafarovaFirst SecretaryPermanent Mission of the Republic of Azerbaijanto the United Nations

Ian JohnstoneProfessor of International LawFletcher School of Law and DiplomacyTufts University

Rebecca A. JovinPolicy Planning OfficerPolicy and Best Practices Service (PBPS) United Nations Department of PeacekeepingOperations/Department of Field Support

Arthur Kafeero Minister Counsellor Permanent Mission of the Republic of Ugandato the United Nations

Jehangir KhanDeputy DirectorMiddle East and West Asia DivisionUnited Nations Department of Political Affairs

Naomi KikolerDirector of Policy and AdvocacyGlobal Centre for the Responsibility to Protect

Andreas LøvoldCounsellor, Political AffairsPermanent Mission of Norway to the United Nations

Kishore Mandhyan Principal Officer Executive Office of the UN Secretary-General

Salem MatugAdviser, Political AffairsOffice of the Permanent Observer of the African Union to the United Nations

Colm Ó ConaillFirst SecretaryPermanent Mission of Ireland to the United Nations

Kelvin OngSenior Political Affairs Officer, Team LeaderMediation Support Unit, Policy and MediationDivisionUnited Nations Department of Political Affairs

Werner PuschraDirector, New YorkFriedrich Ebert Stiftung Foundation

Maureen QuinnSenior AdviserInternational Peace Institute

Alice RevellSecond Secretary/ Legal AdviserPermanent Mission of New Zealandto the United Nations

Sheri P. RosenbergAssistant Professor of Clinical LawDirector, Human Rights and Genocide ClinicBenjamin N. Cardozo School of Law

Mohamed Sarwat SelimFirst SecretaryPermanent Mission of the Arab Republic of Egyptto the United Nations

Adam SmithResearch FellowInternational Peace Institute

Nishkala SuntharalingamPolitical Affairs Officer, Office of OperationsOffice of the Assistant Secretary-GeneralUnited Nations Department of PeacekeepingOperations

14 PARTICIPANTS

Jorge TagleCounsellorPermanent Mission of Chile to the United Nations

Stefano Tomat Political Coordinator Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations

Massimo TommasoliPermanent Observer for International IDEAto the United Nations

Oliver Ulich Head, Partnerships Team United Nations Department of PeacekeepingOperations

Pim ValdreDirector of External RelationsInternational Peace Institute

Martín VidalMinister CounsellorPermanent Mission of Uruguay to the United Nations

Saúl WeislederDeputy Permanent Representative of Costa Rica to the United Nations

Pawel WierdakCounsellorPermanent Mission of the Republic of Poland to the United Nations

Hikaru YamashitaSenior Fellow, Global Security DivisionPolicy Studies DepartmentNational Institute for Defense Studies, Tokyo

Micah ZenkoFellow for Conflict PreventionCouncil on Foreign Relations

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