Modals and Quasi-modals in English

LANGUAGE AND COMPUTERS:STUDIES IN PRACTICAL LINGUISTICS

No 67

edited by Christian Mair

Charles F. Meyer Nelleke Oostdijk

Modals and Quasi-modals in English

Peter Collins

Amsterdam - New York, NY 2009

Cover design: Pier Post

The paper on which this book is printed meets the requirements of"ISO 9706:1994, Information and documentation - Paper for documents - Requirements for permanence".

ISBN: 978-90-420-2532-5©Editions Rodopi B.V., Amsterdam - New York, NY 2009Printed in The Netherlands

Contents

Preface ix

1. Introduction 1

1.1 The data 1

1.2 An exercise in corpus linguistics 5

1.3 Previous corpus-based and corpus-informed studies 6

1.4 Diachronic studies of the modals and quasi-modals 7

1.5 Regional and stylistic variation 8

2 Theoretical preliminaries 11

2.1 Modality and mood 11

2.2 The modal auxiliaries 12

2.3 Quasi-modals 15

2.3.1 Properties of the semi-modals 16

2.3.2 Properties of the lexico-modals 17

2.3.3 Grammaticalization and idiomaticity 18

2.3.3.1 Grammaticalization 18

2.3.3.2 Idiomaticity 20

2.3.3.3 Selection of quasi-modals for analysis 21

2.4 Modal meanings: approaches and issues 21

2.4.1 Classifying modal meanings 21

2.4.2 Polysemy vs monosemy 23

2.4.3 Negation and ‘temporality’ 24

2.5 Further dimensions of modality 25

2.5.1 Modal strength 25

2.5.2 Degree of modality 27

2.5.3 Subjectivity/objectivity 28

2.6 General aspects of the relationship between modals and quasi-

modals 29

3 Necessity and obligation 33

3.1 Must 34

3.1.1 Deontic must 35

3.1.2 Epistemic must 38

3.1.3 Dynamic must 40

3.1.4 Time reference of situation 41

Contentsvi

3.1.5 Must and negation 43

3.1.6 Must: regional and stylistic variation 43

3.2 Should 44

3.2.1 Deontic should 45

3.2.2 Epistemic should 46

3.2.3 Should and temporality 47

3.2.4 Should and negation 48

3.2.5 Special ‘low-degree’ uses of should 48

3.2.6 ‘Preterite’ should 51

3.2.7 Should: regional and stylistic variation 52

3.3 Ought to 52

3.3.1 Deontic ought to 53

3.3.2 Epistemic ought to 55

3.3.3 Ought to and temporality 56

3.3.4 Ought to and negation 56

3.3.5 Ought to: regional and stylistic variation 56

3.4 Need 57

3.4.1 Meanings of need 57

3.4.2 Need: regional and stylistic variation 59

3.5 Have to 59

3.5.1 Deontic have to 60

3.5.2 Dynamic have to 62

3.5.3 Epistemic have to 63

3.5.4 Time reference of situation 64

3.5.5 Have to and negation 66

3.5.6 Have to: regional and stylistic variation 67

3.6 Have got to 68

3.6.1 Deontic have got to 69

3.6.2 Dynamic have got to 70

3.6.3 Epistemic have got to 70

3.6.4 Have got to and temporality 71

3.6.5 Have got to and negation 72

3.6.6 Have got to: regional and stylistic variation 72

3.7 Need to 73

3.7.1 Deontic need to 73

3.7.2 Epistemic need to 75

3.7.3 Dynamic need to 75

3.7.4 Need to and temporality 75

3.7.5 Need to and negation 76

3.7.6 Need to: regional and stylistic variation 76

3.8 Had better 77

3.8.1 Meanings of had better 77

3.8.2 Had better: regional and stylistic variation 79

3.9 Be supposed to 80

3.9.1 Meanings of be supposed to 80

Contents vii

3.9.2 Be supposed to: regional and stylistic variation 82

3.10 Be to 83

3.10.1 Meanings of be to 83

3.10.2 Be to: regional and stylistic variation 86

3.11 Be bound to 86

3.11.1 Meanings of be bound to 87

3.11.2 Be bound to: regional and stylistic variation 88

4 Possibility, permission and ability 91

4.1 May 92

4.1.1 Epistemic may 92

4.1.2 Deontic may 95

4.1.3 Dynamic may 95

4.1.4 May: regional and stylistic variation 96

4.2 Can 97

4.2.1 Epistemic can 98

4.2.2 Deontic can 100

4.2.3 Dynamic can 101

4.2.3.1 Theoretical possibility 101

4.2.3.2 Ability 103

4.2.3.3 Dynamic implication 104

4.2.4 Can: regional and stylistic variation 104

4.3 Might and could 105

4.3.1 Uses of might and could as preterite forms 105

4.3.1.1 Temporal uses 105

4.3.1.2 Hypothetical uses 106

4.3.2 Meanings of might and could 108

4.3.2.1 Epistemic possibility 109

4.3.2.2 Dynamic possibility 113

4.3.2.3 Deontic possibility 117

4.3.3 May and might: one lexeme or two? 117

4.3.4 Might and could: regional and stylistic variation 118

4.4 Be able to 119

4.4.1 Meanings of be able to 119

4.4.2 Be able to: regional and stylistic variation 122

5 Prediction and volition 125

5.1 Will 126

5.1.1 Epistemic will 126

5.1.2 Dynamic will 131

5.1.3 Deontic will 134

5.1.4 Will: regional and stylistic variation 135

Contentsviii

5.2 Shall 135

5.2.1 Epistemic shall 136

5.2.2 Dynamic shall 137

5.2.3 Deontic shall 137

5.2.4 Shall: regional and stylistic variation 138

5.3 Would 139

5.3.1 Temporal would 140

5.3.2 Hypothetical would 141

5.3.3 Would: regional and stylistic variation 143

5.4 Be going to 143

5.4.1 Epistemic be going to 144

5.4.2 Dynamic be going to 147

5.4.3 Deontic be going to 148

5.4.4 Be going to: regional and stylistic variation 149

5.5 Want to 150

5.5.1 Dynamic want to 152

5.5.2 Deontic want to 152

5.5.3 Epistemic want to 153

5.5.4 Want to: regional and stylistic variation 153

5.6 Be about to 155

5.6.1 Meanings of be about to 155

5.6.2 Be about to: regional and stylistic variation 156

6 Conclusion 159

Appendix 163

References 185

Index 191

Preface

This book represents the culmination of a long period of interest in modal

expressions in English. My first foray into the area was an MA(Hons) dissertation

on “Can and may in Shakespeare’s English” (1978). The second followed my

participation in the project, directed by Pam Peters of Macquarie University, to

compile the Australian Corpus of English, resulting in several publications in

which I used data from the corpus to explore the semantics of the modals in

Australian English (Collins 1988, 1991a, 1991b). My interest was rekindled yet

again by the International Conference on Modality in Contemporary English at

the University of Verona in September 2001, following which I determined to

undertake a more comprehensive corpus-based study. This book reports the

results of the research I have conducted over this period.

I wish to thank Christian Mair from the editorial committee for this

Rodopi series for his welcome encouragement, Eric van Broekhuizen for his

advice on technical matters, Maria Oujo of the University of NSW for her

assistance with editing the manuscript, and Pam Peters and Adam Smith for

facilitating access to some of the corpora. The work has benefited from

discussions with many linguists over the years, including Rodney Huddleston,

Pieter Seuren, Robert Eagleson, Edgar Schneider, Geoffrey Leech, Stig

Johansson, and Michael Halliday.

Last but not least I wish to thank my family for surrendering the dining

room table to my piles of books, papers and data. Without your support I could

never have completed this project.

Peter Collins

Sydney, August 2008

Chapter 1

Introduction

This book reports the findings of a corpus-based study of the meanings of the

modal auxiliaries (or simply ‘modals’) and a set of semantically related ‘quasi-

modals’ in three parallel corpora of contemporary British English (‘BrE’),

American English (‘AmE’) and Australian English (‘AusE’). The study is the

largest and most comprehensive yet attempted in this area, based on an analysis

of every token of the modals and quasi-modals (a total of 46,121) across the

spoken and written data. The selection of corpora was designed to facilitate the

exploration of both dialectal variation (across the three World Englishes

examined), of stylistic variation (across the spoken and written components of the

corpora and their dialogic/monologic and non-printed/printed subcategories

respectively), and – albeit more indirectly – of diachronic variation involving the

modals and quasi-modals.

1.1 The data

The three corpora used in the study were the British component of the

International Corpus of English (‘ICE-GB’), the Australian component of the

International Corpus of English (‘ICE-AUS’), and a specially assembled corpus

of American English (‘C-US’).1

While ICE-GB and ICE-AUS are members of

the collection of parallel million-word corpora of the International Corpus of

English (‘ICE’), C-US is designed to fill the gap caused by the non-availability

hitherto of an actual ICE-US corpus (see further below).

ICE is a collection (not yet complete) of million-word corpora

representing national and regional varieties of English which provides a resource

for linguists pursuing comparative research into English worldwide (see for

example the ICE-based studies reported in the special issue of World Englishes

23: 2, 2004). Prior to ICE the only parallel corpora available for such

comparative research were the Brown Corpus of American English (‘Brown’) and

the Lancaster/Oslo-Bergen Corpus of British English (‘LOB’), both consisting

exclusively of printed material. Initiating the ICE Project in 1988 (in a short

notice in World Englishes) the late Sidney Greenbaum acknowledged the

contribution of Brown and LOB, and proposed that their scope be extended by

representing standard varieties from other countries and national varieties where

English is an additional official language, and by including spoken and

manuscript English. The project resulting from this initiative has as its long-term

goal the preparation of up to twenty one million corpora (with a number of these

already complete and available for scholarly use).2

Chapter 12

Each ICE corpus samples the English of adults (aged 18 or above) who

have been educated through the medium of English to at least the end of

secondary schooling. The texts generally date from 1990 to 1994 inclusive; that

is, it is during this period that the printed texts were originally published, the

spoken texts originally recorded, and the handwritten texts composed. The

corpora are intended to be representative of the English used in each country, so a

wide range of the social variables that define the population are included (sex,

age, and regional background in particular). To ensure comparability, each ICE

corpus conforms to a common design, comprising 500 texts, each of 2,000-

words. The main division is between the primary modes of speech and writing,

with 300 spoken texts (600,000 words) and 200 written texts (400,000 words). It

should be noted that 50 of the spoken texts are scripted, and thus have a

combination of spoken and written attributes, enabling them to provide a bridge

between the two modes. The ICE text categories are shown in Table 1.1 below:

Table 1.1. Composition of the ICE corpora

S1A: Private (100)Dialogues (180)

S1B: Public (80)

S2A: Unscripted (70)

Spoken (300)

Monologues (120)

S2B: Scripted (50)

W1A: Student writing (20)Non-printed (50)

W1B: Letters (30)

W2A: Academic (40)

W2B: Popular (40)

W2C: Reportage (20)

W2D: Instructional (20)

W2E: Persuasive (10)

Written (200)

Printed (150)

W2F: Creative (20)

The spoken texts are all recorded non-surreptitiously, and in order to

eliminate the possibility of distortion of data resulting from self-consciousness

the first fifteen minutes of recorded conversations are not used. The dialogues

that are private (S1A: face-to-face conversations and telephone calls) differ from

those that are public (S1B: class lessons, parliamentary debates, business

transactions, etc.) in that the latter are intended for an audience comprising those

who are present but not participating in the exchange. Furthermore, while in the

public dialogues the topic is known in advance, the private dialogues range over

unprepared topics. The unscripted monologues (S2A: commentaries, lectures,

demonstrations, etc.) may in some cases involve an element of planning and use

of prepared notes, but the scripted monologues (S2B: broadcast news, speeches,

etc.) are required to be fully prepared. Nevertheless it is the spoken version of

these texts that is used, on the grounds that even a close reading will contain such

speech phenomena as false starts, hesitations and pauses.

Introduction 3

The chief distinction in the written component is between non-printed (or,

manuscript) texts (W1) and printed texts (W2). The two types differ in their

intended readership and mode of composition. The non-printed material (e.g.

examination scripts, letters) is typically intended for a single reader, whereas the

printed material is produced for a large and unrestricted audience unknown to the

writer. The non-printed material is usually not edited by others, whereas the

printed material normally complies with a house style and may be edited and

revised by different people. The printed texts represent a diversity of registers.

The academic, popular and press reportage categories (W2A–W2C) all have a

primarily informational function, by comparison with the instructional role of

administrative/regulatory writing and publications on skills and hobbies (W2D),

the persuasive function of press editorials (W2E), and the creative function of

novels and stories (W2F).

C-US comprises 196,458 words of spoken and written material in equal

proportions to the spoken and written components of the ICE corpora. The C-US

texts are taken from two sources. For the spoken component the Santa Barbara

Corpus (‘SBC’), which consists of texts recorded in the 1990s and was compiled

with a view to inclusion in ICE-US, was selected.3

At the time the present

analysis was conducted, only Parts 1 and 2 were available, and the transcript of

one of the texts (SBC-006) was missing. The 29 texts used contain a total of

116,458 words (this count determined by stripping out all but orthographic words

from the transcripts). Of the texts 23 are dialogic (casual conversations,

discussions, meetings, task related interactions, etc.) and six are monologic (three

lectures, one with a small amount of interaction, and three sermons). There is

unfortunately a degree of generic incomparability between the SBC data used and

the spoken ICE data: in the former monologic texts represent approximately 20%

of all spoken texts, as opposed to 40% in the ICE corpora.4

For the written

component of C-US, a selection of forty of the 2,000-word text categories

(80,000 words) were extracted from the Freiburg-Brown Corpus of Written

American English (‘Frown’). The Frown corpus, which was built to match the

Brown corpus as closely as possible in size and composition, comprises texts

published in 1991, three decades after the Brown texts. Both corpora contain one

million words in 500 text samples representing press, ‘general’, learned and

fictional writing. The selection of Frown texts for the present study was made to

match as closely as possible the ICE categories: see Table 1.2. Again there is,

inevitably, some incomparability with the ICE corpora, due mainly in this case to

the absence of non-printed texts in Frown. For instance the letters in Frown

Category G, being printed, are generally less informal than the letters in the ICE

corpora, and the texts from Category P of Frown (which contain a large amount

of dialogue) resemble, but do not perfectly parallel, the ICE manuscript texts

(with their speech-like properties).

Chapter 14

Table 1.2. Parallels between C-US and the ICE corpora

ICE C-US

Text type No. of words Text type No. of words

Dialogue 360,000

Monologue 240,000

SBCSpoken

Total 600,000 Total 116,458

Non-printed 100,000 Frown G1-3 (Belles-

lettres, biography,

etc.); P1-7 (Romance

and love stories)

20,000

Printed:

informational

200,000 Frown J1-8 (Learned

and scientific);

Frown F1-8 (Popular

lore); A1-4 (Press

reportage)

40,000

Printed:

instructional

40,000 Frown H1-2

(Government

documents, etc.); E1-

2 (Skills, trades and

hobbies)

8,000

Printed:

persuasive

20,000 Frown B1-2 (Press

editorials)

4,000

Written

Printed:

creative

40,000 Frown K1-4 (General

fiction)

8,000

Total 400,000 Total 80,000

All frequencies for C-US were normalized to tokens per one million

words, to match those for ICE-GB and ICE-AUS (by dividing the raw frequency

count by the number of words in C-US and then multiplying by 1,000,000 (i.e.

dividing by 0.196458). In addition, frequencies for the spoken and written

subcategories of ICE-GB and ICE-AUS were normalized to tokens per one

million words.5

We finish this section by presenting the modal expressions examined in

the study along with their raw frequencies (see Table 1.3). The list comprises all

the central and marginal modal auxiliaries with the exception of dare and used to

(excluded on semantic grounds), and a set of quasi-modals selected on the basis

of criteria which are discussed in the next chapter. Each of the expressions has a

number of variant forms (as noted in Chapters 3–5) and can/could, may/might,

shall/should, and will/would are usually regarded as present/preterite forms of

single lexemes.

Introduction 5

Table 1.3. Raw frequencies of the modals and quasi-modals

Modals Quasi-modals

can 7,663 be able to 889could 3,557 be about to 124may 2,261 be bound to 27might 1,499 be going to 2,721must 1,367 be supposed to 171need 56 be to 371ought to 126 had better 89shall 343 have got to 705should 2,432 have to 2,827will 8,505 need to 716would 7,775 want to 1,897

Total 35,584 Total 10,537

1.2 An exercise in corpus linguistics

The study is an exercise in corpus linguistics. The present section explores the

implications of this claim, while the next section overviews previous corpus-

based studies of the modals.

There is consensus amongst corpus linguists that the use of corpus-derived

data enables the researcher to confront the inescapable danger of subjective bias

in studies based on introspectively-derived examples. However linguists who

make use of corpus data do so in a number of ways, and these tend to be

associated with their attitudes towards the nature and status of corpus linguistics.

The work of those who use corpus data merely for exemplificatory purposes and

in order to determine grammaticality (as in the comprehensive grammars of

Quirk et al. 1985 and Huddleston and Pullum 2002, and in the work on the

modals by Palmer 1990) is merely an extension of the tradition of using textual

data that predates the modern interest in computer corpora (as in Jespersen 1909–

1949, Poutsma 1926–1929). Such ‘corpus-informed’ research may be

distinguished from ‘corpus-based’ research, in which the corpus is not simply a

source of exemplificatory data but more importantly of frequency data. The latter,

typically combined with a commitment to the notion of ‘total accountability’,

may influence hypotheses applied to the data, or formulated on the basis of it.

Within the reference grammar tradition, Biber et al. (1999) is an example and,

within the study of the modals, Coates (1983).

More recently, some corpus linguists have espoused the view that corpora

can be used to redefine linguistic categories and concepts, and to build up new

theories in linguistics. An example is the work of researchers from the University

of Birmingham (e.g. Hunston and Francis 2000) on ‘pattern grammar’ that has

prompted a reconsideration of the division between grammar and lexis.

Proponents, who sometimes refer to their approach as ‘corpus-driven’ (see Römer

Chapter 16

2006), regard corpus linguistics as a separate domain of study within linguistics,

rather than merely a methodology (e.g. Leech 1992, Kennedy 1998).

The present study is corpus-based. Corpus data are used not merely for

illustrative purposes but as a source of quantitative information relevant not only

to the semantic framework and categorization system adopted, but also to the

patterns of regional and diachronic variation examined. The study is not an

exercise in corpus-driven linguistics: it seeks to provide a fresh integration of

insights from a variety of sources – including semantic theories of modality, work

on regional variation in the ‘World Englishes’ tradition, and research on

diachronic syntax – but does not pretend to offer a new theory of modality driven

by the data.

1.3 Previous corpus-based and corpus-informed studies

Coates (1983) remains the most detailed and widely referred to corpus-based

study of the English modals. Data are taken from two British corpora, the one

million-word Lancaster corpus (before it was superseded by LOB), and 545,000

words from the Survey of English Usage corpus (representing the spoken,

written-to-be-spoken, and manuscript categories). From these Coates prepared

“[a] representative sample of each modal in each corpus (…) each sample

consisting of approximately 200 cases” (1983: 2). This method allows Coates to

examine the frequencies for the meanings and uses of particular modals but not

the relative frequencies of the modals. Two studies of the English modals which

predate Coates use data from the American Brown corpus: Ehrman (1966) is

based on one-third of Brown, Hermerén (1978) on four out of the 15 categories of

Brown. There are two studies which provide quantitative information about the

modals, the Biber et al. (1999) reference grammar, and Mindt (1995), but the

usefulness of the information presented is limited in both cases by the failure of

the authors to provide specific frequency figures.

While the studies described thus far are corpus-based, there are others that

are merely informed by corpus data. The best known of these is Palmer (1990),

which makes use of data from the Survey of English Usage corpus “for heuristic

and exemplificatory purposes only” (1990: 29). Another significant study which

uses the same corpus as a source of illustrative data is Westney (1995).

Finally, there are a number of smaller studies of individual modal

expressions, or sets thereof, that use corpus data. There is not space to describe

these in detail: a brief and selective overview follows. Berglund (1997) examines

the ‘expressions of future’ will, shall and be going to in various corpora of BrE

(LOB; and the London-Lund Corpus, or ‘LLC’), AmE (Brown), and Indian

English (the Kolhapur Corpus). Berglund’s (1999) sociolinguistic study of be

going to is based on the British National Corpus (‘BNC’), as is Verplaetse’s

(2003) functional study of want to. Facchinetti uses data from ICE-GB in her

studies of be able to (2000), can/could (2002) and may (2003). Nokkonen’s

(2006) study of need to is based on four British corpora: LOB, LLC, FLOB (the

Freiburg-LOB Corpus) and COLT (the Bergen Corpus of London Teenage

Introduction 7

Language). Further quantitative studies, with a diachronic orientation, are

described in the next section.

1.4 Diachronic studies of the modals and quasi-modals

Figures presented by Leech (2003), Smith (2003), and Mair and Leech (2006)

show that BrE and AmE have seen, in the three decades spanning the early 1960s

to the early 1990s, a rise in the frequency of the quasi-modals with a concomitant

and related decline in the frequency of the modal auxiliaries.6

Table 1.4 below

reproduces Mair and Leech’s figures for written BrE and AmE for the items that

are investigated in the present study (listed in alphabetical order), determined by

calculating the difference between the frequencies derived from their 1960s

corpora (LOB and Brown) and from their 1990s corpora (FLOB and Frown), as a

percentage of the former.7

Table 1.4. Changes in the frequency of modals and quasi-modals in recent British

and American writing (from Mair and Leech 2006)

Modals Quasi-modals

BrE AmE BrE AmE

can +2.2% –1.5%% be going to –1.2% +51.6%

could +2.4% –6.8% be to –17.2% –40.1%

may –17.4% –32.4% had better –26.0% –17.1%

might –15.1% –4.5% have got to –34.1% +15.6%

must –29.0% –34.4% have to +9.0% +1.1%

need –40.2% –12.5% need to +249.1% +123.2%

ought to –44.2% –30.0% be supposed to +113.6% +6.3%

shall –43.7% –43.8% want to +18.5% +70.9%

should –11.8% –13.5%

will –2.7% –11.1%

would –11.0% –6.1%

Mair and Leech regret that they are not in a position to provide detailed

information about spoken BrE and AmE, given the tendency for cutting edge

innovations to be associated with speech rather than writing. Nevertheless they

report that a search of spoken corpora of BrE covering a similar period of time

shows the trends found for writing to be more pronounced in speech (compare an

overall rise of 10.0% of the quasi-modals in British writing with one of 36.1% in

British speech, and an overall fall of 9.5% of the modals in British writing with

one of 17.3% in British speech). The unavailability of comparable corpora for

AmE speech deprives Mair and Leech of the opportunity to provide parallel

American figures. However they refer to the results a search of the 4-million-

word Longman Corpus of Spoken American English (from the 1990s) which

indicated that quasi-modals were 62.5% as frequent as core modals (compared

with a figure of 17% for written corpora of AmE and BrE of the same era). This

Chapter 18

finding, Mair and Leech conclude, “suggests that, as is often suspected, the

spoken American variety of the language is the main driving force of change in

this area, as presumably in others, and places the encroachment of semi-modals

on the territory of the modals in AmE speech, in frequency terms, beyond doubt”

(2006: 328).

The present study is synchronic rather than diachronic. Nevertheless a

number of the findings have diachronic implications, including the varying

frequencies across speech and writing for particular modal expressions, and for

different regional varieties. For this reason the frequencies reported in Table 1.4

will be regularly invoked throughout Chapters 3–5.

1.5 Regional and stylistic variation

The availability of matching regional corpora containing both spoken and written

material (with identical categories in the case of ICE-GB and ICE-AUS, and

similar in the case of C-US) provided the basis not only for a more detailed and

comprehensive analysis of the modals and quasi-modals than that offered in

previous quantitative studies, but also for the exploration of patterns of dialectal

and stylistic variation. The Appendix contains detailed tables for each item with

frequencies for their meanings in the spoken texts (subdivided into dialogic and

monologic in the ICE corpora) and written texts (subdivided into non-printed and

printed) of the three regional corpora.

It is widely assumed that there are only minimal grammatical differences

between the regional varieties of standard English (cf. Quirk et al. 1985: 18-19).

One aim of this study is to test the validity of this assumption and to determine –

if it view turns out to be wrong – how extensive the regional differences are and

how they are they manifested in the frequency of particular forms and their

meanings. What types of innovation or conservatism are reflected in the varying

modes of usage? Of the two long-established and influential varieties, BrE and

AmE, is one consistently ‘leading the way’ in the changes that are under way

with the modals and quasi-modals? And what of the younger Antipodean dialect,

AusE? Does it exhibit ‘colonial lag’ (cf. Trudgill 1986: 130), or is there evidence

of linguistic individualism, with patterns that are neither clearly British nor

American? This study evidenced a higher frequency of quasi-modals and a lower

frequency of modals in the American data than in the British or Australian,

justifying Leech’s identification of ‘Americanization’ (a shift towards AmE in the

frequency of linguistic categories) as a dissemination process that is driving

developments in this domain.

A second aim is to test Biber et al.’s (1999: 20) claim that “grammatical

differences across registers are more extensive than across dialects”. As noted in

the previous section, Mair and Leech (2006: 327) report a more exaggerated

pattern of change with the modals and quasi-modals in speech than in writing (a

steeper fall for the modals and rise for the quasi-modals). The database used for

the present study, with its spoken versus written subdivision (and further genre

subclasses for ICE-AUS and ICE-GB), facilitated examination of stylistic

Introduction 9

variation. Relevant here, but not testable with the present data, is the possible

influence of ‘colloquialization’ (the shift towards acceptability and use of

informal linguistic features associated with private conversation in public,

official, discourse) on the increasing use in writing of the quasi-modals.

The present study provides ample evidence that stylistic factors are at play

in developments reported, with the quasi-modals flourishing in speech, their

modal counterparts maintaining a penchant for the written word. Furthermore

there is a connection between the regional and the stylistic: it is in AmE that the

stylistic gulf between semi-modals and modals tends to be most marked, and least

in BrE.

Notes

1I wish to thank to Edgar Schneider for suggesting the label ‘C-US’, and

Pam Peters for providing me with access to ICE-AUS.

2See Nelson, Wallis and Aarts (2002) for further information on the design

of the ICE corpora, and the ICE website for the latest information on

which corpora are available and how to obtain copies:

www.ucl.ac.uk/english-usage/ice

3For more information on SBC, visit:

www.linguistics.ucsb.edu/research/sbcorpus.html

4The (eagerly anticipated) completion of ICE-US will circumvent such

problems and provide researchers in the future with the means to make

more accurate regional comparisons.

5Normalized frequencies for the spoken component of C-US were obtained

by dividing raw frequencies by 0.116458, and for the written component

by dividing raw frequencies by 0.08. For general details of the

methodology used see Biber, Conrad and Reppen (1998: 263-264).

6Another study which contains useful diachronic information, on have to,

have got to, and want to in BrE and AmE, is Krug (2000).

7The figures, from Table 14.3 on p.327 and Table 14.4 in Mair and Leech

(2006: 327-328) are based largely on those reported in Leech (2003).

Chapter 2

Theoretical preliminaries

This chapter is concerned with the categories and dimensions of modality that

inform the study. We begin by defining modality and examining the properties of

the class of modal auxiliaries, and those of the more heterogeneous set of quasi-

auxiliaries. We then move on to the classification of modal meanings, and the

dimensions of strength, degree and subjectivity.

2.1 Modality and mood

Modality embraces a range of semantic notions, including possibility, necessity,

ability, obligation, permission, and hypotheticality. What they have in common is

that they all involve some kind of non-factuality: a situation is represented not as

a straightforward fact, as not being known. Some have sought a more positive

characterization by tying modal meaning to the fundamental concepts – which

constitute the primary concern of modal logic – of necessity and possibility (e.g.

Van der Auwera and Plungian 1998, Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 173), so that it

is envisaged as involving “a speaker’s judgment that a proposition is possibly or

necessarily true or that the actualization of a situation is necessary or possible”

(Depraetere and Reed 2006: 269). The reference to “actualization” here is

important: as we shall see in Section 2.4.1 many consider there to be two

fundamentally different kinds of modality – often labelled ‘epistemic’ and ‘root’

– whose orientation is towards truth and actualization respectively (but which are

united in their mutual association with the concepts of necessity and possibility).

The grammatical realization of modality via verb inflections is known as

‘mood’. The most distinctive is the subjunctive mood, which is used to refer to a

situation in a possible world, and includes both what is traditionally called the

‘present subjunctive’ (the base form of the verb as in God save the Queen and

The chairman demanded that the motion be withdrawn) and the ‘past subjunctive’

(essentially were with a first or third person subject as in I wish I were fitter). In

English today inflectional systems have but a minor role to play in the expression

of modality. The principal means of expressing modality in English is the class of

modal auxiliaries and a set of periphrastic expressions, referred to in this book as

‘quasi-modals’, of the type have to, be going to and be to.1

It is these that form

the focus of this book. The next two sections are devoted to considering their

grammatical properties.

12 Chapter 2

2.2 The modal auxiliaries

As members of the larger class of auxiliaries (which also includes the ‘primary

auxiliaries’ be, have, and do), the modal auxiliaries exhibit a number of

inflectional and syntactic properties that distinguish them from main, or ‘lexical’,

verbs. Let us begin with a provisional list of modals: can, may, will, shall, must,

ought to, need, dare and used to.2

The first four are generally assumed to have

preterite forms (could, might, would, and should), but as noted below this

assumption raises some problematical issues with might and should. Need, dare

and used to may be auxiliaries (as in Need/Dare/Used she (to) stay away?) or

lexical verbs (as in Did she need/dare/used to stay away?). The modals are, like

all auxiliaries, set apart from lexical verbs in the availability of inflectional

negative forms with n’t (can’t, mightn’t, mustn’t etc.).3Dare and used to are

excluded from this study on the grounds of their semantic dissimilarity to other

modals and quasi-modals, dare expressing the courage of the subject-referent,

and used to expressing aspectual rather than modal meaning.

Syntactically the modals, like all auxiliaries, differ from lexical verbs in

their capacity to be used in the four so-called ‘NICE’ constructions: negation,

inversion (of subject and auxiliary), code (post-verbal ellipsis dependent for its

interpretation upon previous context), and emphasis (emphatic polarity involving

the use of contrastive stress). The constructed examples in (1) below illustrate the

use of auxiliary will in the four constructions, contrasting with the impossibility

of using the lexical verb like:

(1) a. He will not study. *He likes not study. [Negation]

b. Will he study? *Likes he study? [Inversion]

c. She will study, and so will he. *She likes to study, and so does he.

[Code]

d. They think he won’t study, *They think he doesn’t like

but he WILL. studying, but he LIKES.

[Emphasis]

The capacity to serve as ‘operator’ in the NICE constructions does not provide

sufficient grounds for defining the class of auxiliaries, insofar as there are some

lexical verbs that also have this capacity (the copula be as in Is he Malaysian?,

and ‘possessive’ have as in He hasn’t any money).4

In addition to the above-mentioned inflectional and syntactic properties of

auxiliaries, the properties listed below are distinctive to the modals.5Can, may,

will, and shall have all these properties, must, ought to, need and dare have most

but not all of them, while the quasi-modals have none.

Theoretical preliminaries 13

i. No non-tensed forms

The modals are morphologically defective, only having tensed forms (i.e. no bare

infinitival or participial forms). The examples in (2), (3) and (4) show that must,

will, and can are modals, but the semantically similar quasi-modals have to, be

able to, and be going to are not.

(2) I’d prefer to *must/have to wait another month.

(3) I resent not *canning/being able to wait another month.

(4) I had *would/been going to wait another month.

ii. No person-number agreement

The modals exhibit further morphological defectiveness in not having a separate

3rd person singular present tense form like other verbs. This enables them to

agree with any kind of subject. Compare for example the agreement restrictions

that apply to the quasi-modal have to but not the modal must: He must/has

to/*have to wait another month; You must/*has to/have to wait another month; I

must/*has to/have to wait another month.

iii. Bare infinitival

Apart from ought to, the modals take a bare infinitival. There are some lexical

verbs that can also take a bare infinitival, but in such cases the infinitive usually

follows a direct object. Compare the lexical verbs make and watch in I

make/watch them train hard with the modal must in They must train hard.

iv. Unreal conditionals

In an unreal conditional the first verb of the apodosis must be a modal. This role

is served by modal would and could in If he won the lottery, he would/could buy a

Ferrari, but cannot be served by quasi-modal was going to or was able to, as

shown by the ungrammaticality of *If he won the lottery, he was going to/was

able to buy a Ferrari.

v. Unreal preterite

As Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 107) point out: “The preterites of the modal

auxiliaries – could, might, would, should – can be used with the modal

remoteness meaning without the grammatical restrictions that apply in the case of

other verbs, where it is found in only a small set of subordinate constructions.”

Thus the preterite modal could but not the preterite quasi-modal were able to can

express non-past hypotheticality in Could/Were you able to you help her? Were

14 Chapter 2

able to can only express this meaning in subordinate clauses such as those in If

you were able to help us we would be grateful and We wish you were able to help

us.

The various properties discussed above may be used to draw a distinction

between what Quirk et al. (1985: 137) refer to as ‘central’ modals (can, will, may,

shall, must) and ‘marginal’ modals (dare, need, ought to, used to). Even within

the central modals we may suggest a distinction between can and will, whose

satisfaction of the properties is straightforward, and must, may and shall, for

which it is more patchy. In addition to the properties discussed above both can

and will have reduced forms (phonologically reduced forms when unstressed and,

in the case of will, the clitic ’ll). It is presumably the availability of such forms

that accounts in large part for the high frequency of can and will in spoken

English (see Sections 4.2.4 and 5.1.4). It is furthermore likely that their syntactic

straightforwardness is a factor in the numerical supremacy that they enjoy over

the other modals (see Section 1.1), and their diachronic success in resisting

incursions into their semantic territory (see Chapter 6).

Consider next must, may and shall. Must lacks a preterite form, so the

‘unreal preterite’ property is not applicable, and it is marginal in the apodosis of

an unreal conditional (e.g. ?If you caught the 11pm bus you must surely be home

by midnight). May is non-prototypical in its lack of a phonologically reduced

form and in the impossibility of mayn’t for most speakers, shall in the limited

currency of shan’t outside BrE. The most telling difference between may and

shall on the one hand, and can and will on the other, is the lack of a clear

temporally-based relationship with the preterite forms might and should. For

many speakers might no longer represents the preterite form of may, but rather is

the present form of a separate lexeme (one which, like must, does not have a

preterite): see Section 4.3.3 below. Should has several specialized uses which

have no counterpart in shall (see Section 3.2.5).

The marginal modals are less straightforward still. Ought to differs from

the other modals in its normal requirement of a to-infinitive (which is only rarely

relaxed, and only in non-affirmative contexts as in Ought we not apologise? and

You ought not complain so much), like must it has no preterite, and it is very

marginal in the apodosis of an unreal conditional (e.g. ?If we left at lunchtime we

ought surely to arrive before sunset).6Need and dare can be either modal

auxiliaries or lexical verbs. As modals they are restricted to non-affirmative

contexts (e.g. She needn’t/daren’t apply; Need/Dare she apply?) where their only

irregular features are an absence of reduced forms and, for auxiliary need, the

lack of a preterite counterpart: *Needed she apply?). Used to can also be either a

lexical verb or a modal auxiliary, qualifying as the latter formally but not

semantically. It is the most marginal member of the modal auxiliary class, with

many speakers finding sentences such as They usedn’t to eat meat and Used they

to eat meat? unacceptable, and morphologically very anomalous in its lack of

present tense and participial forms.

Theoretical preliminaries 15

2.3 Quasi-modals

Modern English has an abundance of periphrastic modal forms, a somewhat

loosely-defined grouping formally distinguishable from, but semantically similar

to, the modal auxiliaries, and which have been relatively neglected in the

literature on modality. The term that is widely used for these expressions is

‘quasi-modals’ (e.g. by Hakutani and Hargis 1972, Chapin 1973, Coates 1983,

Perkins 1983, andWestney 1995).

Opinions differ as to the nature of the relationship between the modals and

quasi-modals. It is generally agreed that a number of quasi-modals serve

suppletive roles in the defective morphological paradigms of the modals (e.g.

preterite had to in the absence of *musted, and infinitival to be able to in the

absence of *to can). It is also generally agreed that there is a close semantic

affiliation between a number of quasi-modals and modals, while at the same time

it is recognized that there are shades of difference between them (e.g. have to

tends to be more ‘objective’ than must; an implication of actualization

differentiates was able to from could).

Some have attempted to apply semantic distinctions to modals and quasi-

modals generally, rather than simply to individual pairings. According to Lakoff

(1972: 240), it is the presence or absence of speaker involvement that

distinguishes the modal from the quasi-modal in the pairs must: have to, may: be

allowed to, will: be to, and should: be supposed to. Her suggestion draws support

from Larkin (1976) and Palmer (1990: 81). There was no shortage in the data of

examples such as (5) and (6), which suggest that Lakoff’s distinction is at least in

need of qualification:

(5) You or your partner must be engaged in remunerative work for an average

of at least 24 hours a week. (ICE-GB W2D-005 22)

(6) You’ll have to give me the money for that ’cause I’m not going to pay for

you. (ICE-AUS S1A-017 278)

In (5) the modal must is used without speaker involvement, in the objective

statement of a rule, while in (6) quasi-modal have to is used to convey a speaker-

sourced directive.

It is furthermore difficult to see how Lakoff’s speaker-relatedness

distinction could in any way bear on the actualization implicature that

distinguishes many uses of be able to from can, as in (7), where could would not

be a suitable substitute for was able to (?Lansbury raised himself up and could

address the throng).

(7) Lansbury raised himself up and was able to address the throng through his

cell window. (ICE-GB W2B-019 85)

Westney (1995: 11) invokes three criteria for determining whether a

complex verb qualifies as a periphrastic (or ‘quasi-modal’ in our terms):

16 Chapter 2

grammaticalization (displaying features which suggest membership of a

significant grouping that lacks categorial status), idiomaticity (expressing a

meaning that transcends the meanings of its constituent parts), and semantic

relatedness to a central modal auxiliary. Semantic relatedness may be established

via various tests of equivalence. For example, the utterance in (8) would be

compatible with a reinforcing continuation such as he’s got to, and that in (9)

with she must, suggesting that they are equivalent in strength. On the other hand,

the oddity of she should or she ought to as continuations for (9) suggests that

should and ought to differ in strength from have got to.

(8) There is a crisis and he must act now (ICE-GB S1B 056 89)

(9) She’s got to get it organised before she goes to hospital for her knee (ICE-

AUS S1A-016 25)

We discuss grammaticalization and (more briefly) idiomaticity in Section 2.3.3

below, while semantic relatedness is invoked at various points in the following

discussion and explored in detail in Chapters 3–5.

Within the set of quasi-modals we can distinguish between those which

have an auxiliary as their first element, and those which do not (and are in most

cases formed with be and a lexical item). Quirk et al. (1985: 137-146) distinguish

these as respectively ‘modal idioms’ (had better, would rather, be to, have got to;

plus the ‘less common idioms’ had best, would sooner/(just) as soon, may/might

(just) as well), and ‘semi-auxiliaries’ (have to, be (un)able to, be about to, be

bound to, be going to, be obliged to, be supposed to, be (un)willing to; plus be apt

to, be due to, be likely to, be meant to). Quirk et al.’s terms are not at all

transparent, so instead of ‘modal idioms’ I shall use ‘semi-modals’ (both because

this term is more familiar in the literature and in order to suggest that this class

shares more properties in common with the modal auxiliaries than does the

second class), and instead of ‘semi-auxiliaries’ I shall use the more self-

explanatory term ‘lexico-modals’.

2.3.1 Properties of the semi-modals

The semi-modals had better, would rather, be to, and have got to all express

modal meanings. Had better (whose auxiliary element has arguably been

reanalyzed as a present tense form, as has happened historically with must and

ought) and would rather are both literally comparative idioms, expressing

respectively advisability (similar to ought to and should) and the volitional sense

of preference. Have got to, which derives from a perfect construction, is

semantically similar to the lexico-modal have to (see next section), expressing

both obligation and epistemic necessity. Be to expresses both obligation and

futurity.

The semi-modals have in common that their first element is an auxiliary,

and they are like the modals in having no non-tensed forms (compare *We will

must/have got to tidy up; *The game has should/been to start soon). They could

Theoretical preliminaries 17

only be considered ‘auxiliary-like’ if we invoked a special construal of the NICE

properties, insofar as it is the first element rather than the whole construction that

satisfies these properties (compare He hasn’t got to go/*He has gotn’t to go).

However with had better and would rather negation may or may not take the

auxiliary in its scope (compare They wouldn’t rather/would rather not intervene;

They hadn’t better/had better not intervene). The former, according to Quirk et al.

(1985: 141), is “typically used in ‘second instance’ contexts (especially in

negative questions) where an earlier statement or assumption is being

challenged”.7

All of the semi-modals except would rather display ‘voice

neutrality’ (compare I had better/am to/have got to/would rather settle the bill ~

The bill had better/is to/has got to/*would rather be settled by me).

2.3.2 Properties of the lexico-modals

The lexico-modals are a set of idiomatic expressions expressing modal (and in

some cases aspectual) meanings which – except for have to, need to and want to

– have be as their first element. The membership of the set is by no means

clearcut, and is difficult to delimit in a principled fashion. Quirk et al.’s list

(1985: 143) contains be likely to but not be certain/sure to, and be obliged to but

not be allowed to.

The lexico-modals are modal-like in displaying voice-neutrality (compare

Australia is bound to accept the refugees ~ The refugees are bound to be

accepted by Australia) and in their compatibility with the existential there-

construction (e.g. There are bound to be many refugees). A non-modal-like

feature of the lexico-modals is the availability of non-tensed forms, making

possible combinations of the type had been meant to and seems to be going to.

The availability of the non-tensed forms (in examples such as I will have

to quit; Many employees are having to quit; The company has had to fire many

employees) differentiates the lexico-modal have to from the semantically similar

semi-modal have got to (compare *I will have got to quit; *Many employees are

having got to quit; *The company has had got to fire many employees). Have to

also contrasts with have got to in the availability of a preterite form (compare The

company had to/*had got to fire many employees).

The lexical verb want to is not included in Quirk et al.’s list, but it is

evidently undergoing modalization (for instance, in its common phonological

reduction to /w�n�/, especially in AmE). For further discussion of the quasi-

modal status of want to see Section 5.5.

Need to is somewhat different from the other quasi-modals in the

closeness of its relationship to its auxiliary counterpart need. Huddleston and

Pullum (2002: 109) treat need and need to as essentially the same verb which can

“behave as” either an auxiliary or lexical verb.

18 Chapter 2

2.3.3 Grammaticalization and idiomaticity

In this section we discuss two of the criteria that, as noted above, were used to

determine the set of quasi-modals examined in the study.

2.3.3.1 Grammaticalization

Some quasi-modals have undergone a greater degree of grammaticalization than

others. Grammaticalization is the diachronic process by which a periphrastic

lexical unit is transformed into a more grammatical one, and typically involves

syntactic simplification, phonological weakening, and semantic bleaching and

generalization.

Within the class of semi-modals we may identify have got to and had

better as more grammaticalized, more auxiliarized, than be to and would rather.

The phonological evidence for this claim is the availability of reduced forms, a

distinctive feature of auxiliary verbs (Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 102). The

auxiliary components of had better and have got to may either be reduced to /d/

and /v/ respectively, or omitted altogether (/bet�/, /g�t�/), represented as better

and gotta orthographically. A consequence of the elision of the auxiliary in had

better is that some speakers reanalyze the lexical element better as an auxiliary, in

structures such as We better go, bettern’t we. In the case of gotta, the obscuring

of the infinitival in the reduction of the periphrastic form results in the semi-

modal governing a bare infinitival complement. The fact that be to and would

rather have not evolved into single morphophonemic forms suggests a lesser

degree of grammaticalization.

What is the semantic evidence for grammaticalization with the semi-

modals? The originally comparative meaning of had better has been largely

bleached, the only trace being the implication of ‘ill consequence’ present in

some instances (see Section 3.8.1). As Jacobsson (1980: 52) notes, examples of

the type in (10) “have not been attested in recent literature”.

(10) You had better murder him than marry him. (Dickens, Bleak House)

The comparative sense of would rather is still salient, however, as in (11):

(11) Simon got fairly close to it but um then he decided he’d rather have the

school holidays than spend the school holidays rehearsing. (ICE-AUS

S1A-100 273)

According to Krug (1998: 179-180) the obligative sense of have got to has

evolved through syntactic renanalysis of possessive constructions (resulting in a

fixed ordering of elements) and subsequent semantic bleaching. Less

spectacularly, the future arrangement and obligation senses of be to may be

assumed to have developed from the futurate use of be (compare There is/is to be

Theoretical preliminaries 19

a board meeting on Friday), the latter via the implication that in appropriate

contexts if a speaker refers to an addressee’s future actions s/he is in fact

requiring thair actualization.

An important aspect of the modalization of the semi-modals is their

capacity to express both ‘epistemic’ and ‘root’ meanings (see Section 2.4.1

below), such semantic duality being a hallmark of the central modal auxiliaries.

The evidence here does not provide as clear a picture of degrees of

grammaticalization as the phonological evidence. Have got to undoubtedly

expresses both root (‘obligation’) and epistemic (‘necessity’) meanings (see

Section 3.6), while would rather does not, being restricted to the specific root

sense of volitional preference. The situation with had better and be to is however

somewhat more difficult to interpret. Had better is regarded by most (e.g. Perkins

1983: 63) as expressing only deontic modality, but Mitchell (2003: 145) claims

that it can also be used epistemically, as in (12) from the British National Corpus:

(12) This had better be good, I thought grimly as I crossed the road and walked

up the cul-de-sac to the Parsonage (BNC, 410)

However Mitchell’s argument, that in such cases the speaker expresses a hope

that something is or will be the case, and “Hoping is a type of epistemic volition:

a wish that a proposition whose truth is unknown turns out to be true” (2003:

145), is unconvincing: had better in (12) is more plausibly interpreted as deontic,

with the speaker anticipating a required outcome (compare the deontic sense of

This must/will have to/will need to be good, I thought grimly as I crossed the

road). As for be to, its scheduled futurity sense is essentially temporal and it lacks

the centrally epistemic use that will has developed (compare They will/?are to be

in Paris by now).

Morphosyntactically, would rather and be to have some properties that

indicate a lesser degree of grammaticalization than have got to and had better.

Would rather retains the un-modal-like capacity to take a finite clause

complement, as in I would rather (that) you went with someone else).

Furthermore, as noted by Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 108) it is possible to

negate the would only under certain conditions (e.g. the use of They wouldn’t

rather intervene to deny a preceding positive, and of Wouldn’t they rather

intervene? to frame a positively-biased negative question). Be to is un-modal-like

in exhibiting subject agreement (compare I am/ought to go; You are/ought to go;

She is/ought to go).

In seeking to determine which members of the set of lexico-modals are the

most grammaticalized we can apply similar criteria to those we have used with

the semi-modals. We shall argue that have to and be going to are the most

advanced in this respect and furthermore that a case can be made for the

classification of want to as a quasi-modal. Also showing signs of modalization

are be bound to and be supposed to. All five of these expressions are prone to

significant phonological reduction, involving not merely the weakening of

20 Chapter 2

infinitival to, but more importantly its incorporation into the preceding word

(/hæft�, g�n�, w�n�, s�po�st�, ba�ndt�/).8

There is semantic evidence relating to root/epistemic duality for all five

items. This evidence is straightforward for have to (see Section 3.5.2) and be

supposed to (see Section 3.9.1), even though in the latter case the deontic root

sense evolves by implication from the historically prior epistemic meaning,

contrary to the well documented fact trend for epistemic meanings to develop

historically out of root ones (see, e.g., Traugott 1989). In the case of be going to

the epistemic meaning is of the non-central futurity type (and typically so in the

case of be bound to: see Section 3.11.1). With want to there is evidence of an

incipient epistemic meaning (see Section 5.5.3).

2.3.3.2 Idiomaticity

The semi-modals are all idiomatic to the extent that their primary semantic

elements (better, rather, got and be) all have non-equivalent uses in other

contexts. The question is less straightforward with the lexico-modals. Of the

items we have been discussing, have to, be bound to, be going to, be supposed to,

and be about to can be regarded as idiomatic in view of the bleaching of

possessive content with have, of any literal sense of tying or fastening with

bound, of motional meaning with going, of conjectural meaning with supposed,

and of locative meaning with about. Be able to is marginal, insofar as the

meaning of able in the lexico-modal does not differ greatly from its meaning as a

separate adjective. Want to and need to are not idiomatic.

There are various tests that are responsive to idiomaticity.9

One, suggested

by Quirk et al. (1985: 144) for identifying the idiomaticity of lexico-modals

containing be, is the inability of what follows be to stand at the beginning of a

‘supplementive’ clause. Application of this test using the frame ______ to make a

decision, Matilda agreed to stay for dessert suggests that the status of be able to,

be bound to, and be about to, as quasi-modals is less clear-cut than that of be

going to and be supposed to.

A second test is the impossibility of omitting infinitival to in final position.

Items which pass this test are be about to, have to, be supposed to, be going to

and be bound to (*He has permission to attend, but isn’t about/doesn’t have/isn’t

supposed/isn’t going/isn’t bound), while be able to is marginal (?He has

permission to attend, but isn’t able).

A third test is the resistance of adjectives in lexico-modals to degree

modification, which shows that items such as be able to, be bound to, be

supposed to and be about to are all idiomatic (*She’s very able/bound/

supposed/about to help us), as opposed to, for example, be likely to or be willing

to (She’s very likely/willing to help us).

Theoretical preliminaries 21

2.3.3.3 Selection of quasi-modals for analysis

Table 1.3 in Chapter 1 presents the list of those quasi-modals that were selected

for analysis in the study on the basis of their association with a modal auxiliary

(primarily in the sense of semantic similarity but also, in some cases, in their

serving suppletive roles: see Chapters 3–5), their degree of grammaticalization,

and their level of idiomaticity. The high frequency quasi-modals have to, have

got to, be going, want to and need to, we shall argue, are making inroads into the

‘semantic space’ occupied by their modal equivalents. Of the remaining lower-

frequency quasi-modals, be able to and be about to are less grammaticalized, and

be able to is also less idiomatic, but the closeness of their semantic relationship to

can and will respectively was considered sufficient grounds for their inclusion.

Would rather and may/might as well are discussed, but not analyzed in detail:

both have undoubtedly undergone some degree of grammaticalization and

idiomaticization, but their meanings are nevertheless largely predictable from

those of their auxiliary elements in combination with the comparative sense of the

lexical element.

2.4 Modal meanings: approaches and issues

In this section we discuss some approaches to the classification of, and issues in

the analysis of, modal meanings.

2.4.1 Classifying modal meanings

Many scholars operate with a two-way distinction between ‘epistemic’ and ‘root’

modality (e.g. Coates 1983, and many American linguists), though with

differences of terminology.10

The term ‘root’ suggests that this kind of modality

is more basic, an idea that derives support from diachronic evidence that

epistemic meanings tend to develop from root meanings via the extension of

concepts involving human interaction and properties to the domain of reasoning

and judgement (Sweetser’s 1990 ‘subjectification’). Epistemic modality is

prototypically concerned with the speaker’s attitude towards the factuality of the

situation, the speakers’s judgement of the likelihood that the proposition on

which the utterance is based is true, located along a scale ranging from weak

possibility (“It may be the case”) to strong necessity (“It must be the case”). In

non-protypical instances epistemic modality will be a matter of objective

conclusion rather than the speaker’s attitude (as in the objective algebraic

necessity expressed by must in If 2x =10, x must be 5). There is not complete

consensus on which modals and quasi-modals are exponents of epistemic

modality: for example Coates (1983: 244) describes will and shall as “marginally

epistemic”, and this in turn follows from their uncertain status, when they

indicate futurity, as markers of epistemic modality (see further Sections 5.1.1 and

5.2.1). Similar questions are then applicable to the epistemic status of the quasi-

22 Chapter 2

modals be going to, be to and be about to. In order to maximize the possibility of

identifying broad differences between epistemic and non-epistemic modality that

can be related to syntactic/semantic, regional and stylistic variables, we shall in

this study assume epistemic modality to be a broad overarching system, and

certainly one capable of subsuming the subsystems posited by some (e.g. Coates’

1983: 18-19 parallel inferential and non-inferential scales, and Palmer’s 2001: 8

distinction between epistemic and evidential modality).

It is not easy to provide a unitary definition of ‘root’ modality. Palmer

(2001: 8) endorses Jespersen’s (1924: 329-31) observation that the modal uses in

question are those “containing an element of will” (whereas those involving

epistemic modality may be regarded as “containing no element of will”. Bybee

and Pagliuca (1985: 63), who use the term ‘agent-oriented’ modalities, describe

them as “modalities that predicate conditions of either an internal or external

nature on a wilful agent: these are the notions of ability, obligation, desire and

intention”. A slightly different focus, on the conditions for actualization rather

than on the agent, occurs in Bybee and Fleischman (1995: 6), for whom agent-

oriented markers “predicate conditions on an agent with regard to the completion

of an action referred to by the main predicate”. The most common and arguably

important type of root modality is ‘deontic’, which occurs when the factors

impinging on the actualization of the situation referred to in the utterance involve

some type of authority – as when a person or a set of rules or a social convention

is responsible for the imposition of an obligation or a granting of permission (as

in You must/may leave at 3pm). However not all cases of root modality are

deontic: a possibility or necessity may arise not from an authority, or ‘deontic

source’, but rather from general circumstances (as in You can get to the island by

ferry) or from properties intrinsic to the subject-referent (as in the ability meaning

of Can he speak Chinese, and the volitional meaning of She will iron your shirt).

Some writers address the comparative heterogeneity of root modality by

recognizing subtypes. For example, Palmer (2001) distinguishes, within what he

calls ‘event’ rather than root modality, between ‘deontic’ and ‘dynamic’

modality: the former deriving from an external source and affecting a discourse-

participant, the latter deriving from and affecting an internal source (namely, the

subject referent). A slightly different distinction, between ‘participant-external’

and ‘participant-internal’ modality, is posited by Van der Auwera and Plungian

(1998). While these categories are broadly similar to Palmer’s deontic and

dynamic respectively, they differ in the exclusion of volition (which Van der

Auwera and Plungian regard as lying outside the bounds of modality) from the

participant-internal category, and in the inclusion of non-deontic root possibility

(which Palmer does not regard as a meaning distinct from ability) within the

participant-external category.

A quite different type of binary distinction, between ‘extrinsic’ and

‘intrinsic’ modality, is advocated by Quirk et al. (1985).11

Extrinsic modality

involves “human judgement of what is or is not likely to happen” (1985: 219) and

includes epistemic modality along with non-deontic root possibility/necessity,

prediction, and ability. Intrinsic modality involves “some kind of intrinsic human

Theoretical preliminaries 23

control over an action” (1985: 221), and covers deontic modality along with

volition. Quirk et al. concede that ability involves human control, but argue that

more importantly it involves a judgement about the likelihood of actualization.

Some writers adopt a tripartite scheme. The division in both Palmer’s

earlier (1990) book, and Huddleston and Pullum (2002), is between epistemic,

deontic and dynamic modality. The dynamic category includes ability, volition

and also non-deontic root (or, circumstantial) meanings. The absence of a larger

category that subsumes dynamic and deontic modality (i.e. ‘root’, or Palmer’s

2001 ‘event’ modality) leaves open the possibility that there may be relationships

between dynamic and epistemic meanings, just as there are between dynamic and

deontic meanings. It is this scheme that is adopted in the present study.

2.4.2 Polysemy vs monosemy

There has been a good deal of debate as to whether the meanings expressed by

the modals are sufficiently discrete and independent for us to acknowledge that

the modals are polysemous, or whether the relationship between the meanings is

sufficiently vague for us to assume that each modal is monosemous, with a core

meaning that is present in all their uses. The availability of ambiguous examples

provides strong evidence that modals are polysemous, as noted by many linguists

(e.g. Lyons 1977, Bybee and Fleischman 1995, Palmer 2001, Huddleston and

Pullum 2002). In cases where it is impossible to decide, out of context, whether a

root or epistemic meaning is intended, the fact that such meanings cannot co-exist

provides evidence that that they are discrete. Sometimes ambiguity occurs in

contexts where both interpretations are possible and valid, as in (13) below (“you

are permitted to receive”; “it is possible that you will receive”).

(13) If you qualify for a War Widow’s Pension you may also get full

Unemployment Benefit on your own contributions. (ICE-GB W2D-002

29)

Further support for a polysemy position comes from the association of root

and epistemic meanings with such grammatical phenomena as the scope of

negation, and from their association with different paraphrases (e.g. “it is possible

that” for epistemic possibility, and “it is possible for” for root possibility).

Supporters of the monosemy position (e.g. Ehrman 1966, Haegeman 1983,

Klinge 1993, Groefsema 1995, Papafragou 2000) point to the occurrence of

allegedly indeterminate examples where the different meanings in question are

not incompatible, and the difference between them is contextually neutralized

(referred to as ‘merger’ by Coates (1983). An example is (14) below, where can

is ambivalent between (dynamic) possibility or deontic possibility (‘permission’).

(14) But we can still be friends (ICE-AUS S1A-099 166)

24 Chapter 2

According to the monosemists the occurrence of such indeterminate cases

suggests that each modal has an invariant, core meaning, with different uses, or

interpretations, being determined by context.

The polysemy and monosemy positions are not in practice absolutely

mutually exclusive. Those who adhere to a polysemy position will not insist that

all the meanings expressed by a particular modal are distinct. Conversely, a

monosemy position does not exempt the analyst from seeking to identify different

interpretations, but the exercise will proceed from a smaller semantic base and

require richer context-dependent analysis than a polysemy one.

In the present study we assume a polysemy position, while at the same

time acknowledging that the dividing line between deontic and dynamic modality

will generally be less determinate than that between epistemic modality and either

of these root categories. Furthermore the three primary meanings have subsumed

uses which are not always clearly distinguishable.

2.4.3 Negation and ‘temporality’

A sentence with a modal expression can, it is generally accepted, be analyzed into

two parts, one representing the modal meaning and the other representing the

‘proposition’ whose truth is being judged or actualization predicated. This

division has consequences for negation and for ‘temporality’ in a modal sentence.

Negation may bear on the proposition, as in:

(15) The changes in her voice may well not be age (ICE-AUS S1A-035 310)

Here the negation falls within the scope of the modal (“It is possible that the

changes in her voice are not age”), and for this reason is described as ‘internal’ by

Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 175). By contrast in (16) the negation is

‘external’, bearing on the modal and falling outside its scope (“It is not possible

that she is much older than me”).

(16) She can’t be much older than me (ICE-AUS S1A-020 50)

The two types of negation may combine, as in (17), where but has negative force.

(17) I mean you you cannot but see that in the context of Cezanne (ICE-GB

S1B-008 157)

The scope of negation is more transparent when there is a lexical

expression of modality (as in the paraphrases provided for (15) and (16) above,

where the presence of a negative in the subordinate clause indicates internal

negation, while one in the superordinate clause indicates external negation). The

parallels between such lexical expressions and modal auxiliaries can be exploited

as a useful test for determining, in cases of negation with a modal auxiliary,

whether the negation is internal or external.

Theoretical preliminaries 25

The distinction between the modal and propositional part of a modal

utterance is also important in enabling us to provide a description of the temporal

information in the sentence. In the literature there is some inaccuracy in the

wording used to account for this. For example Coates (1983: 43) asserts that

epistemic must “refers to states and activities in the present or past”, but such

reference is made in the proposition rather than by the modal itself. Both the

modal and propositional parts are associated with temporal loci and the

relationship of the latter to the former may be distinguished as one of

‘anteriority’, ‘simultaneity’ or ‘posteriority’ (Depraetere and Reed 2006: 284).

Some of the possibilities for deontic must and have to are exemplified in (18)–

(22) (see further Sections 3.1.4 and 3.5.4 below):

(18) No you must meet her (ICE-AUS S1A-018 195)

(19) You’ll have to go down (ICE-AUS S1A-016 130)

(20) He had to be up at Asquith by six-thirty (ICE-AUS S1A-016 71)

(21) Yes, or they must have completed an apprenticeship. (ICE-AUS W2D-002

138)

(22) Managers and supervisors must be able to ensure that they will treat the

matter confidentially (ICE-AUS W2D-004 161)

In (18)–(20) the obligation is located in the present, future and past respectively.

In each case the temporal relationship between the obligation and the situation

referred to in the proposition is one of posteriority (e.g. in (18) “it is desirable that

you should meet her (at some time in the future)”). It is sometimes stated that

deontic modality cannot be associated with an anterior situation (e.g. Depraetere

and Reed 2006: 285). While this is true of subjective uses (given the pragmatic

impossibility of imposing an obligation on someone, or giving them permission,

to do something in the past) it does not apply to general rules or conditions, as

shown by (21). A relationship of simultaneity as in (22) is only possible when the

modality is of this general kind.

2.5 Further dimensions of modality

In Section 2.4.1 we examined various kinds of modal meaning. In this final

section we introduce three further dimensions of modality which are applied at

various points in the analysis presented in Chapters 3–5: strength, degree and

subjectivity.

2.5.1 Modal strength

The dimension of modal strength is defined by Huddleston and Pullum (2002:

175) as “the strength of commitment (prototypically the speaker’s commitment)

to the factuality or actualisation of the situation”. It is this concept that provides

26 Chapter 2

the basis for the distinction between the modal concepts of necessity (where the

commitment is strong) and possibility (where it is weak). They are logically

related in terms of their interaction with negation, as illustrated in (23) and (24).

The examples in (23) express epistemic modality (note that mustn’t is not

possible for all speakers), while those in (24) express non-epistemic meanings.

The abbreviation ‘Poss’ stands for ‘possible’ and ‘Nec’ for ‘necessary’.

(23) It can’t be true [not-Poss] = It mustn’t be true [Nec-not]

It may not be true [Poss-not] = It needn’t be true [not-Nec]

(24) You can’t go [not-Poss] = You mustn’t go [Nec-not]

You can not go, if you

wish [Poss-not] = You needn’t go [not-Nec]

Semantic strength may be affected by pragmatic factors. Compare for

example the different strengths of must in (25) and (26). The uncompromising

instruction in (25), which doesn’t countenance non-compliance, is consistent with

the semantic strength of must. However in (26) the speaker is merely making a

suggestion, and accordingly we may regard the strength of must as being

pragmatically weakened.

(25) If the ball rolls back onto the path or where the player has interference

from his stance or swing, you must re-drop. (ICE-AUS W2D-011 68)

(26) If you’re on holiday in France you must visit a chateau (ICE-AUS S2B-

030 98)

Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 177) identify an intermediate category on

the strength continuum which they call ‘medium modality’, associated with

should and ought, and lexical modal expressions such as likely, probably and

seem. Consider the effect of substituting epistemic should or may for must in the

following example:

(27) He must be making an absolute killing. (ICE-AUS S1A-014 158)

That should would be weaker in strength than must is suggested by the possibility

of felicitously adding a continuation such as but he may not be to the should-

version but not to the original with must, suggesting that must is stronger than

should. Should, on the other hand, is stronger than may, as suggested by the

contrast between the acceptability of He may be making an absolute killing, but

it’s not likely and the unacceptability of He should be making an absolute killing,

but it’s not likely.

Whereas there is a clear semantic difference between internal and external

negation with strong and weak modality, medium strength modality is distinctive

in the pragmatic closeness of the two negation patterns. Consider:

Theoretical preliminaries 27

(28) Well I’ll find it after I get out of here which shouldn’t be very hard (ICE-

AUS S1A-090 362)

The negation here is internal, paraphraseable as “It is not likely that it will be very

hard”, which is pragmatically equivalent to “It is likely that it will not be very

hard”.

2.5.2 Degree of modality

While the concept of modal harmony has been invoked in the literature (e.g. by

Coates 1983: 45-46, 137-138, 151-152), Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 179-180)

are the first to explain it in terms of the concept of degree of modality, which they

define as “the extent to which there is a clearly identifiable and separable element

of modal meaning” (p.179). A low degree of modality is said to occur when a

modal expression exhibits harmony with the larger construction – that is, conveys

modal meaning of a similar type and strength – such that its selection might be

considered optional. Consider the following:

(29) It must surely qualify as one of the great symbols of Australia, along with

the kangaroo and the koala. (ICE-AUS W2B-030 15)

(30) Everyone takes part just by being there so the tradition is upheld and the

two Marys are still recognised regardless of what the crowds may believe

(ICE-GB S2B-027 157)

(31) It’s odd that ah mysticism should have such a bad name (ICE-AUS S2A-

049 87)

The example in (29) represents the most common type of modal harmony, that

involving verb-adverb pairings where the verb and adverb have the same strength,

such that omission of the modal would have little impact on the meaning. If we

replaced must by may the modal harmony would disappear: the weak strength

modal may expressing a different meaning from the strong adverb surely (may

being harmonic with perhaps, possibly, and the like). In (30) may merely

reinforces the concessive meaning expressed by the larger construction, whose

meaning is not significantly different from that of regardless of what the crowds

believe. In (31) the so called ‘subjunctive’ should is harmonic with the emotive

content of the superordinate clause.

In (32) will has low modality, but not on account of modal harmony.

Rather, as noted by Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 180), the low degree of

modality in such cases is due to the “strong association between will and the

temporal concept of futurity”. While will may be omissible in (32) there are

comparable examples where it is not, as in (33).

(32) Dr John Meurig Thomas, Fullerian professor of Chemistry at the Royal

Institute of Great Britain and director of the Davy Faraday Research

Laboratory, will launch Dyfed education authority’s Spacewatch Initiative

28 Chapter 2

at Gwendraeth Valley Comprehensive School on Wednesday. (ICE-GB

W2C-017 93)

(33) He’ll be flown to the Camperdown Children’s hospital (ICE-AUS S2B-

020 133)

2.5.3 Subjectivity/objectivity

The distinction between subjectivity and objectivity, which appears in most

extended accounts of modality (e.g. Coates 1983, Perkins 1983, Palmer 1990,

Westney 1990, Huddleston and Pullum 2002) is of particular importance in this

study because, as we shall see in the following section, it is sometimes claimed to

systematically differentiate modal auxiliaries from quasi-modals. According to

this view the speaker involvement or orientation associated with deontic must in

(34) would be replaced by an external, objective orientation if must were

substituted by have to:

(34) Then we must stop somewhere for breakfast (ICE-AUS S1A-017 210)

Subjective deontic modality is often regarded as typified by ‘performative’

uses of the modals, as in (35), where must has the illocutionary force of a

speaker-initiated directive, by contrast with the objective, externally-initiated, use

exemplified in (36), where its force is that of an assertion or report.

(35) You must let me smell it (ICE-GB S1A-041 253)

(36) If you are the registered keeper of a vehicle and you change your address

or name (on marriage, for example) you must tell DVLA, using the back

of the registration document. (ICE-GB W2D-010 40)

Palmer (1990) regards deontic modality as “essentially performative”, observing

that: “By using a deontic modal, a speaker may actually give permission (may,

can), lay an obligation (must) or make a promise or threat (shall)” (1990: 69). By

contrast Coates (1983: 32-33) invokes the notion of performativity only with

must, associating it with the stereotypically subjective core of the must’s ‘cline’

of meaning.

The subjectivity/objectivity distinction applies to epistemic as well as to

deontic modality. Consider the following examples:

(37) Look at your injuries. You must have really hurt yourself. (ICE-AUS S1A-

022 140)

(38) If there’s a reasonable doubt as to whether there’s a car in front of Mr

McGregor’s vehicle that also must point in my submission to a finding of

not guilty. (ICE-AUS S2A-068 158)

(39) it is common to hear comments made suggesting that Muslims are really

clean, that all other religions are deficient or distorted in some way and

hence rejected by God, that only Muslims can lead a truly moral life while

Theoretical preliminaries 29

non-Muslims are necessarily amoral and entirely promiscuous, and that

Western societies (and indeed all societies that have undergone any

process of secularization) must inherently lack any moral foundation

whatsoever. (ICE-AUSW2A-013 91)

In (37) epistemic must represents the expression of speaker inference or judgment

that is regularly associated with epistemic modality. It is considerably weaker

than objective epistemic must as exemplified in (38) and (39) (note that there is a

greater difference between (37) and its unmodalized counterpart, You have really

hurt yourself, than there is between (38) and that also points to a finding of not

guilty, and between (39) and Western societies lack any moral foundation

whatsoever). Objective epistemic must can be dissociated from the speaker’s

opinions and attitudes in two possible ways. It may be alethic (q.v. Lyons 1977:

797, Palmer 1990: 6-7), as in (38), involving a strict semantic necessity,

determinable via quasi-mathematical deduction (“If x, then there is no other

possible conclusion than y”). Alternatively there may be a contextually

determined distancing from the speaker, as in (39): it is not the speaker’s own

assessment that is presented but rather one that arises externally and is merely

reported.

2.6 General aspects of the relationship between modals and quasi-modals

Is it possible to generalize across the differences between modals and quasi-

modals in a theoretically-principled and well-motivated fashion? According to

Palmer (1990: 10-11) the modals are inherently subjective and it is this property

that distinguishes them from quasi-modal expressions. Palmers’s arguments are

discussed in some detail by Westney (1995: 54-59), who accepts their general

plausibility but at the same time identifies “some complicating factors that may

make the whole case less straightforward than it appears” (1995: 55). For

example Palmer attributes the fact that preterite forms are either lacking for

modals or normally unavailable for expressing past time to their distinctively

performative, and hence subjective, nature. The problem here is the assumption

that quasi-modals cannot be used subjectively, one that Westney rightly questions

and that the data for the present study indicate is open to challenge. For example

’ve got to in (40) is used to impose an obligation, the subjectivity/performativity

here being no less apparent than in You must decide or the imperative You decide.

(40) ‘You’ve got to decide,’ he said. ‘I can’t tell you what to do.’ (ICE-AUS

W2F 002 37)

Palmer further asserts that quasi-modals are not, with the exception of

have to, available to express epistemic modality (following from his view that

epistemic modality is not normally objective). That this claim is disputable is

30 Chapter 2

suggested by the occurrence of examples such as (41), where the subjective

epistemic meaning of ’ve got to is parallel to that of its more formal but

apparently semantically identical alternate must in You must be kidding:

(41) Cass’s eyes go wide. “You’ve got to be kidding.” (ICE-AUS W2F-017 82)

A number of writers (e.g. Lakoff 1972, Bouma 1975) relate the

subjectivity/objectivity distinction to questions of the ‘source’ and ‘target’ of

obligations, permissions, and the like. They lead us to a distinction between

modals as carrying a default interpretation in which the speaker is assumed to be

the source, and thus associated with greater personal involvement with, or

sympathy for, the target than are the quasi-modals. A comprehensive survey of

these and other accounts is offered by Westney (1995: 59-67), who suggests that

we should exercise caution in assessing their merits in view of the often

conflicting evidence presented. Westney’s own view is that while modals are

maximally unspecified or unmarked, “the choice of a periphrastic allows a modal

predication to be more precisely specified both syntactically and semantically”

(1995: 54).

Notes

1In this book the convention followed in Huddleston and Pullum (2002) of

using bold italics to represent lexemes, in abstraction from any of their

associated word forms, is adopted in principle. However in practice the

use of bold type is restricted to cases where failure to recognize the lexeme

versus word form distinction might be a source of confusion (particularly

in the present chapter). In contexts where the distinction is of no relevance

bold type is avoided on the grounds that it would simply be distracting.

2Strictly speaking the modal auxiliary lexeme is simply ought, but we shall

take it as including the infinitival particle to. This will be consistent with

our practice with all the quasi-modals examined which, except for had

better, take a to-complement. In the case of need to our practice will serve

to distinguish the quasi-modal from the auxiliary, and in the case of have

to and be to will distinguish the quasi-modal from other uses of have and

be.

3We accept Huddleston and Pullum’s (2002: 91) analysis of can’t,

mightn’t, mustn’t etc. as inflectional forms rather than ‘contractions’.

Support for this analysis comes from the fact that they are not always

replaceable by their analytic counterparts (e.g. Can’t/*Can not she reach

Theoretical preliminaries 31

it?), and that their phonological form is not always predictable (e.g. won’t,

shan’t).

4Some grammarians (such as Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 92ff) apply the

term ‘auxiliary’ to all verbs that satisfy the NICE properties, rejecting the

traditional view of auxiliaries as dependents of the following lexical verb

in favour of one in which they are analyzed as (catenative) main verbs that

take non-finite complements. The issue is not one that that has

ramifications for the primarily semantic concerns of this book, and for that

reason is not explored in the present discussion.

5See Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 106-107) for more detailed discussion.

6There were no corpus examples of ought to used in the apodosis of an

unreal conditional or without a to-infinitive).

7There were no corpus examples of wouldn’t rather or hadn’t better.

8The last of these, /ba�ndt�/, does not appear in Huddleston and Pullum’s

(2002: 1616) list of items undergoing such reduction. It is, however,

included in Westney’s (1995: 34) list.

9For a more detailed discussion of these and other tests of idiomaticity for

the quasi-modals see Westney (1995: 18ff.).

10A lucid overview of the issues discussed in this section can be found in

Depraetere and Reed (2006).

11Bolinger (1989) also makes use of this distinction in his study of may.

Chapter 3

Necessity and obligation

This chapter deals with the modals and quasi-modals of necessity and obligation.

This grouping is smaller than those examined in Chapters 4 and 5, particularly in

the terms of the frequency of the auxiliaries, with 3981 modal auxiliary tokens as

against 14,980 for the possibility/permission/ability group and 16,623 for the

prediction/volition group. Furthermore, of the three groupings, it is the only one

for which the quasi-modals (with 4906 tokens) surpass the auxiliaries in

frequency, and may be regarded as regularly replacing their auxiliary

counterparts. Biber et al. (1999), who likewise note a smaller frequency for the

modals of obligation/necessity, suggest as a possible explanation the “general

tendency to avoid the face threatening force of expressions with an obligation

meaning” (1999: 489).

The expressions examined in this chapter are the modals must (embracing

the forms must and mustn’t), should (should and shouldn’t), ought to (ought to

and oughn’t to), and need (need and needn’t), and the quasi-modals have to

(have to, has to, and had to), have got to (have/haven’t got to and has/hasn’t got

to), need to (need to, needs to, needed to, and needing to), had better, be

supposed to (supposed to preceded by all the inflectional forms of be), be to (all

the inflectional forms of be followed by a to-infinitive where the sequence

expresses modal meaning), and be bound to (bound to preceded by all the

inflectional forms of be).1

Within the set of necessity/obligation modal expressions we may

distinguish two broad subgroups in terms of their typical modal strength: the

strong forms must, have to, have got to, need, need to, be bound to and be to;

and the medium strength forms should, ought to, be supposed to and had better.

Chapter 334

Table 3.1. Frequencies of the modal expressions of necessity and obligation

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US TOTAL

Modals must 613 675 402 (79) 1,690 (1,367)

should 1,141 1,124 850 (167) 3,115 (2,432)

ought to 36 80 51 (10) 167 (126)

need 19 34 15 (3) 68 (56)

Total 1,809 1,913 1,318 (259) 5,040 (3,981)

Quasi- have to 1,311 1,244 1,385 (272) 3,940 (2,827)modals have got to 332 339 173 (34) 844 (705)

need to 343 280 473 (93) 1,096 (716)

had better 48 33 41 (8) 122 (89)

be supposed to 47 99 127 (25) 273 (171)

be to 135 221 76 (15) 432 (371)

be bound to 9 17 5 (1) 31 (27)

Total 2,225 2,233 2,280 (448) 6,738 (4,906)

Total 4,034 4,146 3,598 (707) 11,778 (8,887)

NB In this and all subsequent tables, in columns with two sets of frequencies,

raw frequencies are bracketed and tokens per one million words are

unbracketed.

NB The figures for should include 289 tokens of specialized uses where it’s not a

necessity/obligation modal; and for be to 139 tokens of the conditional

use.

3.1 Must

While must expresses mainly deontic necessity, or ‘obligation’, it also has a well-

established epistemic necessity meaning (this being a minor, incipient, meaning

with must’s quasi-modal rivals have to and have got to). A third, minor, meaning

is dynamic necessity.

Table 3.2. Meanings of must

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US Total %

Deontic 369 391 209 (41) 969 (801) 57.3%Epistemic 185 216 153 (30) 554 (431) 32.8%Dynamic 40 41 25 (5) 106 (86) 6.3%Indeterminate 19 27 15 (3) 61 (49) 3.6%

Total 613 675 402 (79) 1,690 (1,367) 100%

Necessity and obligation 35

3.1.1 Deontic must

While deontic must has a default interpretation in which the speaker is identified

as the deontic source, as in (1), there is no necessary connection between

subjectivity and the use of must. In (2) must is objective, with the source of the

obligation (‘the world’) external to the speaker.

(1) If you’re on holiday in France you must visit a Chateau (ICE-AUS S2B-

030 98)

(2) At the United Nations the world agreed that Iraq must withdraw or be

driven out of Kuwait (ICE-GB S2B-030 19)

According to Lyons (1977: 832-833) subjective deontic must as in You

must open the door – compare the corpus example in (3) – can be used

performatively by the speaker (imposing a directive). However, despite the

strong compulsion expressed by must in (3), there is not the same degree of

directness as would be conveyed by its imperative counterpart (Stop doing that),

where the speaker requires immediate compliance.

(3) Then she said oh you must stop doing that (ICE-GB S1A-062 150)

In other cases involving must with a 2nd

person subject it would be even less

appropriate to invoke the concept of performativity. Subjective deontic must is

commonly used in cases where the speaker is not in a position to – or may not

even wish to – require actualization, as in the advice in (4), the request in (5), and

the exhortation in (6).

(4) You must only do it with your teacher, because you can so easily get into

the wrong (ICE-GB S1A-045 61)

(5) you must let me photograph your baby for my magazine (ICE-GB S1A-

039 93)

(6) You must meet Forename6 you haven’t met her at all have you (ICE-AUS

S1A-018 191)

Objective deontic must is typically found in formal documents containing

laws, rules or regulations, as in (7):

(7) A complaint procedure must therefore ensure that both parties are given

the opportunity to be heard in a fair and impartial way by a person who is

sensitive to the issues and primarily concerned with the effective

resolution of the problem. (ICE-AUS W2D-004 75)

Somewhat more abstractly, but still within the realm of human

involvement, the deontic source for objective must may be an official position or

Chapter 336

view as in (8), or simply an unspecified consideration of what may be considered

morally desirable as in (9):

(8) There is this stuffy attitude you know not just in politics but beyond, that

somebody must wait another two or three years (ICE-GB S1B-043 54)

(9) It would not be in the interests of our troops to do so and they of course

must be our prime concern (ICE-GB S2B-014 41)

Deontic must can sometimes be ambivalently subjective/objective, with

uncertainty as to the deontic source. For example in (10) it is unclear whether the

speaker is giving instructions as a person in authority, or objectively stating rules

of the company which employees must abide by.

(10) You should help callers assess the responsibilities and duties of the

position, and offer any other relevant information. Once the position has

been advertised, you must be available to accept enquiries. (ICE-AUS

W2D-001 18)

The present study confirmed the tendency noted by Coates (1983: 34-35)

for the subjectivity/objectivity of deontic must to correlate with the person of the

subject. The clearest cases of subjective deontic must are those where the subject

is you, as in (3)–(6) above. Similarly the clearest cases of objective deontic must

are those with a 3rd

person subject, as for example in (7)–(9) above. It is

important to reiterate that that the correlation between subjectivity/objectivity

and the person of the subject is merely a tendency, as examples such as the

following show:

(11) Northern Building Society has informed us that you must return the

Mercantile Mutual Insurance Policy to enable settlement to proceed on the

due date, namely 1 September, 1991. (ICE-AUS W1B 326)

(12) Depreciation on certain motor vehicles falls under the substantiation rules.

For these motor vehicles you must provide proof of cost if they were

bought after 30 June 1986. (ICE-AUS W2D-008 122)

(13) You must keep them moist (…) That uh bud must not dry out at all. (ICE-

GB S1B-025 91)

In (11) and (12) must has a 2nd

person subject but the speaker is not the

deontic source: (11) is used to report an instruction rather than to impose one,

while in (13) the 2nd

person subject is non-specific plural you (for which the

indefinite pronoun one sometimes serves as a more formal alternative) and the

obligation originates from an institution. Must in (13) has a 3rd

person subject,

but the speaker is the deontic source.

With 1st

person subjects we regularly find both subjectivity and

objectivity. The examples in (14)–(17) invite a subjective interpretation: in (14)

the speaker engages in insistent self-incitement, (15) instantiates a polite

Necessity and obligation 37

exhortation of self and addressee using inclusive we, and (16) and (17) illustrate

the formulaic use of must with a verb of communication in which the utterance

effectively realizes the act of admission or statement (a very common use which

accounts for 30% of all tokens of (deontic) must with a 1st

person subject in the

present data):

(14) It was very comfortable except for not have enough non-smoking places.

As there were families with children in the same section it seems obvious

they should do something about it. I must write & tell them. (ICE-AUS

W1B-009 25)

(15) Well Harold mentioned it to me at the time, but I think it was one of those

invitations like we must have lunch sometime (ICE-GB S1B-040 7)

(16) Yeah I must admit I went home depressed as well (ICE-AUS S1A-024

332)

(17) And I must say at the outset that I’m in complete agreement (ICE-AUS

S1B-052 91)

In other cases deontic must with a 1st

person subject expresses a requirement

which, if not externally imposed, at best has a vague source, as in:

(18) Becoming who we are and taking full possession of our own historically

conditioned cultural identities – something that we must all attempt if we

are to live responsible lives – is, then, of a piece with the practice of

anthropology (ICE-AUS W2A-013 165)

The subjective/objective dimension was found not to be reliably

quantifiable because of the large number of indeterminate instances. However in

view of the tendency for these categories to correlate with the person of the

subject, the figures presented in Table 3.3, showing that over two-thirds of

deontic musts have a 3rd

person subject and less than 10% have a 2nd

person

subject, suggest that deontic must is more commonly used objectively than

subjectively.

Table 3.3. Person of subject with deontic must

(Frequencies for C-US normalized to tokens per million words)

1st

person 2nd

person 3rd

person Total

ICE-AUS 70 (19.0%) 42 (11.4%) 257 (69.6%) 369 (100%)

ICE-GB 85 (21.7%) 37 (9.5%) 269 (68.8%) 391 (100%)

C-US 67 (32.0%) 10 (4.8%) 132 (63.2%) 209 (100%)

Total 222 (22.9%) 89 (9.2%) 658 (67.9%) 969 (100%)

Deontic must is semantically strong, but it is commonly prone to

pragmatic weakening. Its strength – what Sweetser (1990: 54) calls its

‘resistibility’, degrees thereof being determined by the severity of the

Chapter 338

consequences for non-fulfilment of the obligation – is closely associated with

subjectivity/objectivity. The present data evidenced a tendency for subjective

uses to be strong, objective uses to be weak. At the maximum end of the scale of

strength we may locate subjective examples like (3) above, where the speaker has

sole responsibility for the directive and non-compliance is not countenanced. At

the other, weak, end of the scale we may locate an example such as (19), an

agentless passive with an unspecified deontic source having no necessary

connection with the speaker, where must merely expresses what is thought to be

desirable.

(19) And I think that they must be encouraged to implement a democratic

structure to follow this and not just have yet another military regime (ICE-

GB S1B-036 72)

The correspondence is not perfect, however. For example in (20) the

modality is subjective (the obligation being self-imposed by the speaker), but

must makes a very weak statement of requirement (as reflected in the fact that, in

conventional politeness formulae of this type the degree of modality is low, with

the modal being readily omissible).

(20) Uhm I must confess that I’m unrepentant about the poll tax (ICE-GB S1B-

034 6)

As with subjectivity/objectivity, so with strength, there is predictably a

degree of correspondence with the person of the subject: compare the strength of

(3), where must has a 2nd

person subject, with the weakness of (19), where it has

a 3rd

person subject. However here the correlations are looser. For example in (2)

above, where must has a 3rd

person subject, the modality is clearly objective and

yet at the same time it is high-strength, with the severity of the consequences for

non-compliance spelt out. Again, the 2nd

person subject in (6) above is associated

with a clearly subjective use of must, but the speech act of polite exhortation is

associated with weak resistibility only.

3.1.2 Epistemic must

In discussing epistemic must both Coates (1983: 41) and Huddleston and Pullum

(2002: 181) refer to the speaker’s ‘confidence’. However it is important to be

careful here. As with deontic must, we may distinguish between subjective and

objective uses. Objective epistemic must expresses logical certainty, a logical

necessity based on what is known, as in:

(21) When you uhm therefore say that you agree with the sentence in practice

the hysteric is not infrequently a malingerer too, it must follow from the

very terms of that sentence, that sometimes there are hysterics who are

not, malingerers too (ICE-GB S1B-070 14)

Necessity and obligation 39

(22) People tend to think that because many of the problems are global, the

answer must be global. (ICE-GB W2B-013 46)

In such cases the degree of modality is low and the speaker apparently confident

that the conclusion presented is the only one possible. However, it is far more

common for epistemic must to be used subjectively (91% of all epistemic musts

were subjective) and here we find variation in the amount of confidence shown

by the speaker. There is no doubt that we can speak of the speaker’s ‘confident’

inference in many cases, especially those where the grounds for the deduction are

spelt out, as in (23) and (24), and those where a harmonic expression such as

surely in (25) indicates a low degree of modality and correspondingly strong

confidence.

(23) Kim Childs has got about 6 letters this week, her father must be the head

of Australia Post. (ICE-AUS W1B-014 85)

(24) With all the bits of work you’ve done over the years, your CV must be

pretty full? (ICE-GB W1B-001 180)

(25) It must surely qualify as one of the great symbols of Australia, along with

the kangaroo and the koala. (ICE-AUS W2B-030 15)

However in the majority of subjective cases ‘confidence’ does not seem

an appropriate term to use. Semantically strong they may be (insofar as,

logically, ‘necessarily p’ entails ‘p’), but there tends to be considerable pragmatic

weakening. The presence in the following examples of the (semantically non-

harmonic) expressions I suppose, at a guess, presumed, and ‘estimative’ oh

provides evidence in support of this claim:

(26) The shelves must be four foot wide I suppose at least and they’re just they

just go up to the roof (ICE-AUS S1A-016 262)

(27) At a guess the monkey must have been something like 5ft (1.5m) high

standing on its hind legs. (ICE-GB W2B-021 49)

(28) I always presumed the child a man has by one woman must be

temperamentally different from one he has by another woman. (ICE-GB

W2B-004 48)

(29) ‘It’s years,’ he said, ‘since I’ve sat on a high stool like this. It must be, oh,

eighteen years ago, when Natalie and I lived over in Darlinghurst.’ (ICE-

AUS W2F-003 56)

Table 3.4 compares Coates’s figures for harmonic expressions such as I’m

sure, surely and certain and for ‘hedges’ such as I suppose and I think with those

for the present study. In both studies there were more hedges than harmonic

expressions, confirming that pragmatic weakening is common with this modal. In

the present study ICE-AUS had relatively fewer hedges, perhaps indicating that

for Australians must is epistemically weaker than it is for their British and

American counterparts.

Chapter 340

Table 3.4. Harmonic expressions and hedges with epistemic must

Harmonic expressions Hedges

Coates SEU 8 23

ICE-AUS 8 7

ICE-GB 8 13

C-US 10 15

Collins

Total 26 35

Further evidence of the pragmatically weak strength of subjective epistemic

must, as noted by Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 181), is to be found in the

contrast between the negative must not/mustn’t and its semantically equivalent

but pragmatically stronger and more categorical counterpart can not/cannot/

can’t. Consider for example the effect on modal strength of substituting can for

must in (30). Rather than an inferred conclusion, the speaker would be felt to be

making a statement of what is obvious or perhaps a contradiction of a previous

claim.

(30) And secondly he must not be too far off the second person if he doesn’t

manage to get second himself (ICE-GB S2B-009 89)

As noted by Coates (1983: 44), and as for epistemic modality generally,

epistemic must regularly co-occurs with a range of syntactic features: the perfect

aspect as in (27), a stative verb as in (25) and (28), pleonastic/expletive it as in

(21), an inanimate subject as in (26), the progressive aspect as in (31) below, and

existential there as subject as in (32).2

(31) Yeah All over him I’m pretty sure he must be sniffing it or something

(ICE-AUS S1A-053 11)

(32) And there must be a tremendous temptation when you’re when you’ve

been labouring away for hours um just to sort of um mark things fairly

cursorily (ICE-AUS S1A-032 91)

3.1.3 Dynamic must

Dynamic necessity is a minor category with must, accounting for only 6.3% of all

tokens (see Table 3.2 above). The clearest cases are those in which must

expresses an internal need in the subject referent, as in (33) and (34):

(33) But this realm is arid, sterile, and, ahem, bloodless. The vampires must

feed, compulsively, endlessly. (FROWN F01 152)

(34) Dugongs are true mammals and must surface to breathe, and so they will

inevitably be war casualties (ICE-GB W2B-029 74)

Necessity and obligation 41

These are relatively rare by comparison with cases where the necessity or need

for action derives from the force of circumstances, as in the following.

(35) Axon sprouting occurs from the proximal nerve end and must penetrate

the fibrous tissue present at the nerve interface. (ICE-GB W2A-026 126)

Dynamic must may not be sharply distinct, especially with a human

subject, from deontic must. In (36) and (37) must expresses a circumstantially

derived need, involving a habitual time dynamic reading with a non-specific

subject. However in each case there is an additional possible reading – albeit one

arguably less salient – in which an obligation is understood to be imposed by a

deontic source to ensure that the activity occurs, in this case involving a habitual

or future situation with a specific subject.

(36) To get there we must negotiate some of the stormiest oceans in the world

deadly icebergs and several hundred kilometres of pack ice (ICE-AUS

S2B-035 58)

(37) It’s from this land that we must produce all the food all the minerals all

the energy and all the potable water for a rapidly increasing population

(ICE-AUS S2B-021 46)

Examples such as (36) and (37) may suggest the legitimacy of positing a single

root category, as does Coates (1983), who regards both deontic and dynamic

must as belonging to a single ‘root’ continuum dubbed ‘obligation’. The closest

to an example of dynamic modality discussed by Coates is Clay pots … must

have some protection from severe weather (1983: 35), which she describes as

having a “very weak” sense of obligation and “minimal” speaker involvement.

However examples such as (33)–(35), where there is no element of meaning that

could plausibly be associated with speaker involvement, suggest the need to

recognize a distinct dynamic category.

3.1.4 Time reference of situation

In this section we consider the temporal relationship between the modal meaning

and the situation referred to. With deontic must the possibilities differ according

to whether the meaning is subjective or objective. Posteriority is possible in both

cases (as for example with subjective must in (3) and objective in (8) above), as

is simultaneity (as for example with subjective must in (17) and objective in (7)

above). However anteriority is not possible with subjective deontic must (since it

is not possible pragmatically to oblige someone to do something in the past),

although occasional examples are found with objective deontic must used with

general requirements as in (38):

Chapter 342

(38) In order to get these credits: the course must have started before you were

21, and you must not have left the course before the beginning of the tax

year in which you were 18 (ICE-GB W2D-002 12)

With epistemic must there are no restrictions on the temporal relationship

between the modal meaning and the situation. In (39) we have simultaneity and

in (40) anteriority:

(39) But it seems to me that the subject that I teach Yiddish must be pretty high

up on the list of subjects about which misinformation abounds and where

the true facts are widely ignored (ICE-GB S2B-042 10)

(40) I was working, so it must have been a Tuesday or a Wednesday or

possibly a Thursday, those were the nights I worked downstairs. (ICE-

AUS W2F-016 34)

Palmer (1990: 54) reports no examples in his SEU data of must relating to

present habitual activity or future situations, while at the same time recognizing

that these are fortuitous omissions, given the acceptability of invented examples

such as He must travel to London regularly indicating habitual activity and

Something must happen next week indicating a future event.3

In the present data

there is no shortage of examples (6.1%) of the former, as in (41), and a small

number of the latter (1.5%), as in (42).

(41) Ah the calories that the the mother must consume in breastfeeding and

also in the tasks of gathering food while she is nursing the baby mean that

there’s nothing left there’s no nourishment left to re- establish ovulation

(ICE-AUS S2B-041 172)

(42) What with France’s torrential rains, floods and ice, California’s awful

earthquakes and our dreadful bushfires, and the wars that are going on

here and there over the world, things are not very pleasant these days, are

they? They must get better, surely! (ICE-AUS W1B-010 71)

Must itself does not have a preterite form that can locate the modal

meaning in past time. For deontic must, the semantic gap is normally filled by

had to (see Section 3.5.1 below). This does not of course prevent must from

being used in backshift, whether deontic as in (43) or epistemic as in (44), and in

contexts where an interior monologue can be hypothesized, whether deontic as in

(45) or epistemic as in (46):

(43) Apparently he had some difficulty in persuading the conservative English

monks that the ruined choir must be pulled down completely, and even so

they kept much of the wall and the eastern transepts with their Norman

towers. (ICE-GB W2B-004 48)

Necessity and obligation 43

(44) She was born on the 8th

which is Roland’s birthday and after trying all

afternoon to ring him for that from Montecalim we knew something must

be happening. (ICE-AUS W1B-009 40)

(45) By dusk I came in view of the spires. I took a room in a public house

because next morning I must present myself spruce for business. (ICE-

AUS W2F-014 49)

(46) Refuge in the US or British embassies was not worth thinking about,

when both were situated in the middle of town where patrols must surely

intercept them. (ICE-GB W2F-015 139)

3.1.5 Must and negation

Must normally takes internal negation (i.e. the negation falls within the scope of

the modal), as in the deontic example in (47) paraphraseable as “It is necessary

that applications received after the cull not be considered”, and the epistemic

example in (48) paraphraseable as “It is necessarily the case that he is not too far

off the second person”.

(47) But applications received after the cull must not be considered. (ICE-AUS

W2D-001 147)

(48) And secondly he must not be too far off the second person if he doesn’t

manage to get second himself (ICE-GB S2B-009 108)

Negation accounts for 6.0% of deontic and dynamic must tokens, but is

extremely rare with epistemic must (with merely three tokens in ICE-GB and

none in ICE-AUS or C-US, or 0.5% overall).4

3.1.6 Must: regional and stylistic variation

Mair and Leech’s (2006) findings indicate that must has been in substantial

decline since the early 1960s, with a frequency difference of 29.0% between

LOB and FLOB and 34.4% between Brown and Frown (see Table 1.4 above). A

comparison of the frequencies for the individual corpora shows must to be

conforming to the trend for AmE to be leading the way in the decline of the

modals with C-US having considerably fewer tokens (402 per million words)

than ICE-GB (675) and ICE-AUS (613). Not surprisingly, in view of its waning

fortunes, must is less popular in speech than writing in all three corpora (with an

average speech/writing ratio of 0.6:1 (see Table 3.5).

It is with the deontic meaning that the regional differences are the

sharpest. As Table 3.2 above shows, Americans have a strong distaste for deontic

must, with C-US yielding only slightly more than half as many tokens per million

words (209) as British speakers (391) and Australians (369). At the same time

the dispreference for deontic must in speech over writing is stronger in C-US

(1:3.13) than it is in ICE-GB (1:2.54) or ICE-AUS (1:2.48): see Table 1

Chapter 344

(Appendix). Furthermore, examination of the spoken and written subcategories

of ICE-AUS and ICE-GB is suggestive of conservatism in the use of deontic

must: the frequency of tokens in monologue outweighs that in dialogue by a ratio

of 616:378, or 1.6:1, while that in printed texts outweighs that in non-printed

texts by a ratio of 1,220:1,100, or 1.1:1.5

Table 3.5. Genre distribution of must

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US Avg

Dialogue 511 (184) 553 (199)Monologue 471 (113) 488 (117)

Spoken

Total 495 (297) 527 (316) 318 (37) 447

Non-printed 980 (98) 560 (56)Printed 727 (218) 1,010 (303)

Written

Total 790 (316) 898 (359) 525 (42) 738

Total 613 675 402 (79) 563

3.2 Should

Coates’s (1983: 60) ‘fuzzy set’ for should has strong obligation at its ‘core’.

However in prototypical cases its strength is weaker than that of must, and

greater than that of may, as suggested by the contrast between the harmonic

combinations must surely, should probably and may possibly. More appropriate,

then, is Huddleston and Pullum’s (2002: 177, 186) characterization of should as

expressing ‘medium strength modality’. While they distinguish should (and

ought to) from both ‘strong’ must, have (got) to and need (to) and ‘weak’

(possibility) can and may, they nevertheless concede that “intuitively it is closer

to the strong end than to the weak” (2002: 177).

Should expresses mainly deontic modality, with a secondary epistemic

meaning (see Table 3.6). No examples were found of should expressing dynamic

modality. Even in those instances where should expresses the desirability of an

action deriving not from the speaker, or from some moral or legal consideration,

but merely from circumstantial expediency, as in (49) below, we understand the

action to be recommended by the speaker or by some external body representing

the deontic source.

(49) You may need to grip down and adjust the ball position for some shots but

the basics of the swing should be the same. (ICE-AUS W2D-011 214)

In addition, should has a number of minor uses – as a ‘quasi-subjunctive’,

and as a tentative preterite 1st

person variant of would – which are examined in

Section 3.2.5.

Necessity and obligation 45

Table 3.6. Meanings of should

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US Total %

Deontic 826 721 601 (118) 2,148 (1665) 69.0%Epistemic 134 112 122 (24) 368 (270) 11.8%Subjunctive 61 104 41 (8) 206 (173) 6.6%= would 11 57 15 (3) 83 (71) 2.7%Indeterminate 109 130 71 (14) 310 (253) 10.0%

Total 1141 1124 850 (167) 3,115 (2,432) 100%

3.2.1 Deontic should

We have characterized should as having ‘medium strength modality’. However

within the section of the scale it occupies it is possible to identify differences,

even if maximally strong should does not not rival maximally strong must in

strength, and maximally weak should likewise does not rival maximally weak

may in weakness. Consider the following examples of stronger should. In (50)

the speaker makes a forceful suggestion, in (51) the speaker reports in categorical

terms a prohibition that is generally known to apply, and in (52) the speaker

makes a suggestion whose strength is clear from the implied seriousness of the

consequences of non-fulfilment.

(50) You should quit (ICE-AUS S1A-036 291)

(51) He was actually one of my students but I don’t know anything about

supplementaries and the grounds that you apply for them and stuff like

that and I from what I know about this place is that you should never talk

about something you don’t know (ICE-AUS S1A-032 14)

(52) Burmese seem to be lactose intolerant and should not be given milk. (ICE-

AUS W2D-019 18)

By contrast in (53) the weak strength of the advice offered is indicated by

the adjunct maybe, while in (54) there is no sense of obligation or duty in the

recommendation reported, merely desirability:

(53) Well maybe you should just let things let him think about what he’s doing

first (ICE-AUS S1A-093 214)

(54) folklore in Kalgoorlie has it that you should watch a certain taxi driver

(ICE-AUS W2B-017 47)

Deontic should may be subjective, indicating what the speaker considers

desirable, appropriate or right (as in (50) and (53)), or objective, where the

appropriateness or desirability of the course of action described stands

independently of the speaker’s endorsement (as in (51), (52) and (54)).

One reason for the comparative lack of strength of deontic should, as

against must, is the fact that should allows for non-actualization, as in (55)–(57).

Chapter 346

Here should is used when it is known that the situation is not or was not

actualized, and in these cases criticism is implied.

(55) Well the book’s about two hundred and fifty pages long and we’re not

really doing what we should be doing at the moment (ICE-GB S1A-008 7)

(56) I know that I probably I know that I should eat but when and I cook uh

considerable quite a large quantity of food and then find that I I don’t feel

all that hungry even though mostly uhm I usually skip breakfast and uhm

travel on cups of coffee or tea (ICE-GB S1A-059 48)

(57) He think he thinks like I should have finished it by now (ICE-GB S1A-

084 238)

As Palmer (1990: 123) observes, the implication of non-actualization may be

associated with the presence of a comparative adverb or adjective, conveying the

implication that the subject failed to reach some suggested standard, as in:

(58) And I used to think that she should have had more courage (ICE-GB S1B-

046 63)

With should referring to the future the implicature is not one of non-

actualization but rather of openness or at least neutrality with respect to

actualization. Accordingly, in (59) below a continuation such as ‘but it certainly

won’t be’ would be possible, but if must were substituted for should such a

continuation would produce an unnatural effect.

(59) The budgetary status and viability of the hospital redevelopment should

also be examined. (ICE-AUS W2E-006 166)

As Coates (1983: 60) observes, deontic should is often used idiomatically

in why-questions, as in:

(60) Why should Australians bother to learn Chinese, Japanese, Arabic or

European languages? (ICE-AUS W2E-003 28)

These can be paraphrased as ‘Is x really necessary?’, with the implicit answer

being ‘no’. Hence they may convey a tone of impatience on the part of the

speaker with respect to the supposed obligation.

3.2.2 Epistemic should

As with deontic should, so with epistemic should, a weaker meaning than that

expressed by must is normal. Epistemic should is typically subjective, with the

speaker indicating a tentative assumption, or assessment of the likelihood of the

predication, as in (61) and (62). However occasional examples of objective

Necessity and obligation 47

epistemic should are encountered in the data, as in (63), where the proposition is

deduced from known facts:

(61) Under Wayne Goss’ Labor state government, Queensland appears to have

set a sensible course towards sustainable development and controlled

foreign investment which should ensure the state’s continued economic

growth into the next century while red tape and bureaucratic intervention

remains low. (ICE-AUS W2B-015 19)

(62) You should receive notification next week some point telling you whether

or whether you haven’t got any money from the fund (ICE-GB S1A-078

12)

(63) It would be interesting to look at the Xist levels in X M O mice, if the

parental imprint is erased before random X inactivation occurs there

should be no difference between Xist expression in X P O and X M O

mice. (ICE-AUS W1A-005 48)

As with deontic should, so with epistemic should, we find rhetorical why-

questions, in this case the speaker indicating irritation with an invalid

assumption.

(64) Uhm why should the stratigraphic divisions that we’ve established in

Britain be of use in Australia or China (ICE-GB S1B-006 168)

As Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 187) observe, there is often a deontic

component of meaning in the background with epistemic should. For example

should in (64) focuses on the likelihood that British stratigraphic divisions will

be useful in Australia or China, which is presented as a false assumption, but

there is also at the same time a suggestion that it would not be appropriate or

wise to proceed with using these divisions. What Huddleston and Pullum

conclude from this is that with should the deontic meaning has primacy over the

epistemic.

3.2.3 Should and temporality

Deontic should can be associated with a situation that is simultaneous with the

time of the modality as in (51), (52) and (55) above, or posterior to it as in (50)

and (53) above. When deontic should is used with perfective have the pastness

applies to the modality rather than to the proposition. Thus we would paraphrase

(57) above as “I was under an obligation to finish it by now”, with the perfect

outside the scope of the deontic modality, rather than “I am under an obligation

to have finished it by now”, with the perfect within its scope.

With epistemic should by contrast there are no temporal restrictions on the

proposition. Thus in (65) we have an inference made with respect to a

simultaneously present situation, in (66) with respect to a future situation, and in

(67) with respect to an earlier situation. A comparison of (57) and (67) reveals

Chapter 348

that – as we shall see with auxiliary need (see Section 3.4.4) – the scope of the

perfect differs according to whether the modality is deontic or epistemic.

Whereas in (57) it is outside the scope of the deontic modality, in (67) it is within

the scope of the epistemic modality.

(65) If you’ve used the bevel correctly the marks should have your legs

pointing in that direction (ICE-AUS S2A-054 150)

(66) At least you should be able to get some to sleep (ICE-AUS S1A-023 140)

(67) My big news - I have a full-time permanent job! It’s at the university’s pr

PR dept, as Publications Officer (Academic). I’m excited - and getting a

little nervous as the day draws nearer. By the time you get this letter, I

should have started there! (ICE-AUS W1B-007 170)

3.2.4 Should and negation

Should (both deontic and epistemic) normally takes internal negation (where the

negative is within the scope of the modality), expressing the speaker’s

commitment to the wrongness or undesirability of the proposition. In (68) the

speaker urges the addressee to refrain from taking the items in question out of the

bag; and in (69) the speaker asserts the probability that no substantial effect will

occur.

(68) You shouldn’t take them out of the bag. No taking them out of the bag

(ICE-AUS S1A-067 252)

(69) Overall, there shouldn’t be any substantial effect either way. (ICE-GB

W1A-017 235)

Having said this, there is no clear pragmatic difference between internal and

external negation with should, as a medium strength modal (or, as Coates 1983:

64 suggests, as a modal which exhibits merger). (68) above could equally be

paraphrased as “It is advisable that you do not take them out of the bag” or as “It

is not advisable that you take them out of the bag”; (69) could equally be

paraphrased as “It is likely that there will be no substantial effect either way” or

as “It is not likely that there will be any substantial effect either way”.

3.2.5 Special ‘low-degree’ uses of should

Should has a number of uses which Coates (1983: 67) and Leech (2003: 233)

refer to as ‘quasi-subjunctive’, in which it occurs in certain (mainly subordinate)

constructions with low-degree modality (that is, with should contributing little

discernible modal meaning to the construction). These account for 6.6% of

tokens in the corpora. A further use of should which is distinguishable from its

major deontic and epistemic uses, is discussed in Section 3.2.6 below. As Table

Necessity and obligation 49

3.6 above shows these uses are considerably more common in ICE-GB than in

ICE-AUS and C-US.

Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 187) list five types of subordinate

construction in which low-degree should may occur. Each is discussed and

exemplified below.

i. Mandative

Here should serves as a more informal alternative to a subjunctive and, in the

majority of cases, the predicative item in the matrix clause forms a harmonic

combination with the modal, as in:

(70) It is desirable that the robot should be deflected when it is kicked so that

the cow is not harmed. (ICE-GB W2A-033 51)

(71) A Scotland Yard disciplinary tribunal has recommended that seven police

officers, who while off duty were involved in an attack on a man in a pub

three years ago should be sacked (ICE-GB S2B-019 55)

(72) Are you suggesting are you suggesting that they should carte blanche

hand you twenty three million dollars (ICE-AUS S1B-054 176)

In these cases the subjunctive use co-exists readily with the deontic meaning of

should (in (70), for example, either “It is desirable that the robot be deflected” or

“The robot ought to be deflected”).

Should can also combine with a predicative item of strong modality in the

matrix clause (insistent in (73) and important in (74)), suggesting that it has

undergone grammaticalization in the mandative construction (as noted by

Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 187-188).

(73) His task is to convince those powers, notably the Soviet Union and China

but including France, which have been most insistent that force should be

used only if specifically authorised by the UN, that their strict

interpretation of legality cannot be a pretext for inaction or appeasement.

(ICE-GB W2C-008 116)

(74) I’ve got another six days leave but I really think it’s important that I

should travel from Rome to Nice and then Duseldorf (ICE-AUS S1B-061

241)

ii. Adversative

While there are no corpus examples of should in a lest-clause (as in We were

worried lest he should feel left out), the following involves a type of adversative

clause.

Chapter 350

(75) They camp on rocky islands in case the ice should suddenly break out

(ICE-AUS S2B-029 53)

iii. Purposive

This category is exemplified in (76):

(76) There was a delib deliberate effort to make it appear surgical and almost

consequence free uh in order that that public opinion at home should not

should not be eroded (ICE-GB S1B-031 98)

iv. Emotive

In this use should occurs primarily with predicative items indicating surprise or

evaluation, as in:

(77) It’s interesting that the men should think feel like that because I think that

most women would think or look great (ICE-AUS S1A-059 30)

(78) And it didn’t strike you as anything odd in in that that the Midland Bank

as far as as you say should should just lend money half a million pounds

to R C Ward simply on the strength of the value of the property without

examining the individual accounts (ICE-GB S1B-061 58)

(79) It is perhaps not so surprising that exporters should enthuse about being

freed from the ups and downs and the extra costs of doing business in

Marks, Francs, Lira and so on, because that would make their job easier.

(ICE-GB W2E-009 11)

v. Conditional

According to Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 188), in this use should “expresses

slightly greater doubt than the non-modal counterpart” (namely, in the case of

(80) and (81) below, “if they somehow reached inside the diplomatic compound”

and “if anything is wrong with swimming pool steps”).

(80) legal representation at a rigged trial was the best they could hope for if

they should somehow reach inside the diplomatic compound. (ICE-GB

W2F-015 142)

(81) but if anything should be wrong with swimming pool steps, as we’ve seen

in this case it’s a potential source of injury isn’t it (ICE-GB S1B-067 117)

More common than if-clauses with should in the corpus data are implicit

conditional clauses featuring subject-auxiliary inversion (in which should is not

omissible), as in:

Necessity and obligation 51

(82) I can only hope that I will be able to provide the support, as selflessly as

you both have done, to you, should you ever require it. (ICE-AUS W1B-

013 20)

(83) This means that a taxpayer can now appeal to the Administrative Appeals

Tribunal should he or she disagree with the commissioner’s decision on

whether to allow a particular deduction. (ICE-AUS W2C-020 32)

3.2.6 ‘Preterite’ should

Should should be analyzed as the preterite counterpart of shall? The fact that

should cannot be used with independent past time meaning (unlike could, would

and sometimes might) would imply that the answer is ‘no’. However, as

Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 202) note, the possibility of a ‘yes’ answer is

suggested by examples such as (84) and (85) involving backshift (in the case of

(85) the resolving is located in past time by the semantics of recall), and (86) and

(87), where the modal occurs in the apodosis of an unreal conditional. The

present tense counterparts of these examples would feature shall in place of

should (for example “He is determined that as prime minister he shall have

greater control”):

(84) He was determined that as prime minister he should have greater control

over policy areas and that key policy initiatives were implemented by the

bureaucracy. (ICE-AUS W2A-012 34)

(85) I think I recall resolving with Zix that I should wear black tie, or rather,

the pink bow tie that she bought for me when we went to a ball in

Cambridge, plus the same dinner jacket & matching pants that I wore on

that occasion. (ICE-GB W1B-015 35)

(86) Had I spent it in some other hostelry, I should now be returning to Oxford

with a mind untroubled by any more disquieting burden than my

responsibilities as Tutor in Legal History at St George’s College. (ICE-

GB W2F-011 7)

(87) If he had been taught by vigilant professors as he says, the wanderings of

fancy would have been restrained, and I should have escaped the

temptations of idleness. (ICE-GB W1A-018 95)

In these examples should is substitutible by would (and in fact in (87) alternates

with would), and normally occurs with a 1st

person subject (example (84), from

the Australian corpus, being exceptional in this regard). Of the three corpora

examined it is only ICE-GB (with 57 tokens: see Table 3.6 above) that has an

appreciable number of tokens instantiating this use of should. The relative

paucity of examples in ICE-AUS and C-US suggests that should has been almost

completely reanalyzed as a form lexically distinct from shall in AmE and AusE.

Chapter 352

One semantic development from the modally remote use of should is its

politely tentative, formulaic, use – restricted to 1st

person subjects and again

substitutible by would – as exemplified in (88)–(90):

(88) Well I should think that it will be more than slightly and it will be less

than twenty or thirty years time (ICE-AUS S1B-024 29)

(89) Oysters I should imagine (ICE-GB S1A-009 296)

(90) I should like to help you as much as I can when you come, but

unfortunately our flat is too cramped to accommodate more than me and

Zix (ICE-GB W1B-015 12)

3.2.7 Should: regional and stylistic variation

The findings reported by Leech (2003), and Mair and Leech (2006), indicate that

should has undergone a mild decline in both British writing (11.8%) and

American writing (13.5%) in recent decades (see Table 1.4 above). According to

Leech (2003) this decline has occurred mainly at the expense of the epistemic

and ‘minor’ uses of should rather than its deontic meaning. In the present corpora

the frequency of the ‘minor’ uses (i.e. ‘subjunctive’ + ‘=would’ in Table 3.6) is

markedly smaller in C-US (56) and ICE-AUS (72) than in ICE-GB (161).

The frequency of should – like that of must – is substantially smaller in C-

US (850 tokens per million words) than it is in ICE-AUS (1141) and ICE-GB

(1124). Should is also distributionally similar to must in its greater degree of

representation, consistently across the corpora, in writing over speech (1.2:1).

This is no doubt one factor in the declining popularity of this modal.

Interestingly, deontic should shows a stronger tendency to be associated with the

written word (with a writing/speech ratio of 1.21:1) than does epistemic should

(1.06:1): see Table 2 (Appendix).

Table 3.7. Genre distribution of should

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US Avg

Dialogue 1,208 (435) 1,111 (400)Monologue 821 (197) 942 (226)

Spoken

Total 1,053 (632) 1,043 (626) 764 (89) 953

Non-printed 1,300 (130) 1,060 (106)Printed 1,263 (379) 1,307 (392)

Written

Total 1,273 (509) 1,245 (498) 975 (78) 1,164

Total 1,141 1,124 850 (167) 1,038

3.3 Ought to

The marginal modal ought to is generally regarded in the literature as being

semantically close to, and often interchangeable with, the central modal should.

For example Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 186) claim that “In its most frequent

Necessity and obligation 53

use should expresses medium strength deontic or epistemic modality and is

generally interchangeable with ought (+ to)”. Coates (1983: 69) states that ought

to “has a Root and an Epistemic meaning, both of which are often synonymous

with those of SHOULD.” According to Palmer (1990: 122) “It is not at all clear

that (…) English makes any distinction between SHOULD and OUGHT TO.

They seem to be largely interchangeable”. Quirk et al. (1985: 227) refer to the

“synonymous use” of should and ought to in expressing ‘necessity’ and

‘obligation’. The alternation that is sometimes encountered between should and

ought to, as in (91), lends credibility to these claims.

(91) Presumably if we’re going to distribute the students in this way according

to pro pro rata according to the student uh distribution in the uh college

we ought to be doing the same thing within the faculty should we so a big

department has more representation than a small department (ICE-GB

S1B-075 82)

While ought to and should are very similar semantically, the two modals

are anything but similar in their frequency of use, with should over nineteen

times more frequent than ought to in the present study (2432:126). According to

Harris (1986) the low frequency of ought to in contemporary English is due to

the fact that, unlike have to and need to, it has failed to develop the syntactic

properties of a lexical verb (structures such as they didn’t ought to help him are

certainly attested in some dialects, but are not found in Standard English), while

at the same time its requirement of a to-infinitive has ensured its marginal status

as a modal auxiliary.

Table 3.8. Meanings of ought to

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US Total %

Deontic 33 74 51 (10) 158 (117) 94.6%

Epistemic 1 4 0 (0) 5 (5) 3.0%

Indeterminate 2 2 0 (0) 4 (4) 2.4%

Total 36 80 51 (10) 167 (126) 100%

3.3.1 Deontic ought to

Like should, deontic ought to can never be as strong as must, but nevertheless

may convey a forceful representation of what the speaker regards as appropriate

or right, as in (92), where the speaker refers to his uncompromising position in

the matrix clause, and in (93), where it is the strongly prescriptive nature of

certain contracts that raises the ire of the speaker.

(92) it’s our belief as we’ve conveyed to the government that there is sufficient

constitutional power for the Federal Government to move to put in place

Chapter 354

ah greater protections um for people who ah are HIV affected and I’ve got

a very strong view that that ought to happen (ICE-AUS S1B-028 68)

(93) Uh and then having got that at the end of the day it’s got to be your

decision anyway because I won’t enter into a contract that says you ought

to go and do that (ICE-GB S1A-035 123)

At the weak end of the strength continuum for ought to, as for should, are

cases that merely suggest that something would be a good idea, as in:

(94) I’ve never done it before partly because all my friends thought it was a

stupid idea but following Bernadette’s experience of finding her father

and then him dying the following year I thought I ought to track mine

down. (ICE-GB W1B-003 116)

Like should, ought to is more commonly subjective than objective, but the

proportion of objective cases is higher with ought to. Subjective ought to is

exemplified in (95), where the speaker is giving advice authoritatively to the

addressee, objective ought to in (96), where generally accepted standards of

appropriate behaviour are being invoked.

(95) There were things he didn’t tell you and things he did tell you but I

suggest to you the things he didn’t tell you were stupid things and not

really things which you ought to use in your deliberations when you’re

considering his evidence (ICE-AUS S2A-063 124)

(96) Uhm B deals with failure to do what one ought to do anyway (ICE-GB

S2A-069 12)

It is probably the greater incidence of objective tokens with ought to that

has prompted claims (Aarts and Wekker 1987; Gailor 1983: 348) that ought to is

more often associated with the expression of duty than should (along with the

stronger dominance of deontic over epistemic meanings with ought to: see

below).

As with should there are no clear instances of dynamic modality: the

closest we get are deontic cases like (97) where what the speaker considers

appropriate is based more on expediency than on moral considerations.

(97) It was a bit too near in time to appreciate having it all set up as if they

were still around - dining table set for a banquet with very blue venetian

wine-glasses & plates which would not improve one's appetite; afternoon

tea tray ready in the drawing room (the only really elegant room) & all his

court robes & other uniforms standing about in a headless gathering. I

heard a lady say in a worried tone: “They ought to be behind glass or

they’ll rot.” (ICE-AUS W1B-009 10)

Necessity and obligation 55

Ought to may convey the same type of implication of non-actualization

with present and past time situations that is found with should. For example in

(97) above the implication is that the uniforms and other paraphernalia are not

behind glass, and in (98) below that the payment was not made:

(98) Your client has stated to various persons that the business has earned in

excess of $350,000.00 profit in the last year. As a 50% partner in the

business, one half of that profit ought to have been paid to our client and

disclosed in his taxation return. (ICE-AUS W1B-20 172)

The present corpus data provide some support for the suggestion of Close

(1981: 121) and Gailor (1983: 348-9) that ought to can indicate a lesser degree of

likelihood of actualization of the proposition than should.6

In (99), which carries

an implication that the obligation has not been fulfilled, and in (100) an

implication that it is not being fulfilled, should would not substitute readily for

ought to unless it were stressed:

(99) And they go public to to expatiate on what they think ought to happen and

what has happened (ICE-AUS AUS-S1B 76)

(100) and say something a a very short something I may say about teaching

itself uh what it is that teachers are or ought to be being taught to do or or

encouraged to become (ICE-GB S2A-021 8)

3.3.2 Epistemic ought to

With most epistemic tokens there is an additional deontic reading that lies in the

background. According to Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 187) this statistical fact

suggests the primacy of the deontic meaning with ought to (and should): “there

are many cases where the interpretation is purely deontic, but few where it is

purely epistemic”. Consider some examples:

(101) an alternative view which I happen to notice that Lor Lord Annan was uh

expressing the other day in the House of Lords and uh uh uh for what it’s

worth I happen to hold myself is uh as a country we we plainly are much

less well educated than we ought to be (ICE-GB S2A-021 29)

(102) As they glide past the sixty-year-old mark they’re as lively as we imagine

twenty-year-olds ought to be (ICE-GB S2A-040 38)

In (101) the epistemic meaning (“than it can safely be predicted that we are”) is

shadowed by a deontic component (“than we have a duty to be educated to that

level”), and likewise in (102) the epistemic meaning (“it is likely that twenty-

year-olds are”) is in the foreground and the deontic reading (“it is

fitting/appropriate/reasonable for them to be”) is in the background.

Chapter 356

3.3.3 Ought to and temporality

Ought to behaves like should with respect to temporality. Deontic ought to can

be associated with a simultaneous situation, as in (91) above, or a posterior

situation as in (92) above, and when it is used with perfective have the anteriority

is associated with the modality rather than with the proposition, as in (98) above

(= “one half of that profit was supposed to be paid to our client”). Epistemic

ought to is temporally unrestricted: (101) and (102) above exemplify

simultaneity, (103) below posteriority and (104) below (anteriority):

(103) And it’s that prospect of chaos in a nuclear world that ought to I believe

concentrate our minds (ICE-GB S2B-047 9)

(104) I was the bloke who ought to have been nervous. (ICE-AUS W2F-010 63)

3.3.4 Ought to and negation

Like should, ought to normally takes internal negation, though again there is no

clear distinction between internal and external negation. Thus in (105) the

speaker asserts the desirability of it not being forgotten, but could equally well be

construed as asserting the undesirability of it being forgotten:

(105) it ought not to be forgotten (ICE-GB S2A-019 103)

3.3.5 Ought to: regional and stylistic variation

Ought to is, according to Leech (2003), and Mair and Leech (2006), in severe

decline, with a frequency drop of 44.2% from LOB to FLOB, and of 30.0% from

Brown to Frown (see Table 1.4 above). Yet it may be premature to consider

ought to moribund, at least in all regional varieties. Despite its small numbers in

the present study, ought to was found to be considerably more robust in British

and American speech than writing (the speech/writing ratios for ICE-GB and C-

US respectively being 2.8:1 and 3.8:1). By contrast, the future appears to be

considerably bleaker for ought to in ICE-AUS. Not only are its numbers small

(36 tokens) but it is also strongly dispreferred in speech over writing (by a ratio

of 0.28:1). The frequency of ought to in dialogue bears this message even more

clearly: with 6 tokens per million words in ICE-AUS dialogue it is here is about

six times (6.3) less popular than it is in monologue and nearly ten times (9.7) less

popular than it is in writing.

Necessity and obligation 57

Table 3.9. Genre distribution of ought to

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US Avg

Dialogue 6 (2) 136 (49)Monologue 38 (9) 67 (16)

Spoken

Total 18 (11) 108 (65) 69 (8) 65

Non-printed 40 (4) 80 (8)Printed 70 (21) 23 (7)

Written

Total 63 (25) 38 (15) 25 (2) 42

Total 36 80 51 (10) 56

3.4 Need

3.4.1 Meanings of need

The extremely small numbers for auxiliary need (56) contrast dramatically with

those for its quasi-modal counterpart need to (716), which is discussed in Section

3.7. Semantically, the auxiliary and quasi-modal are similar, covering the same

range of meanings (even though these are not represented in quite the same

proportions: see Table 3.10 and 3.16 below). As these tables show, dynamic

necessity is the main meaning, accounting for close to two-thirds of the tokens

for both need and need to. While epistemic necessity is a major meaning for the

auxiliary, it expresses deontic necessity less commonly than the quasi-modal.

Need and need to have received less attention in the literature than other

modal expressions of obligation and necessity, a situation plausibly attributed by

Nokkonen (2006) to their relative infrequency and to the challenge presented by

their semantics: “as obligation is prototypically felt to come from a source

external to the agent and these two markers have been assumed to express

internally motivated obligation” (2006: 35).

Table 3.10. Meanings of need

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US Total %

Dynamic 12 21 10 (2) 43 (35) 63.2%

Deontic 2 3 5 (1) 10 (6) 14.7%

Epistemic 4 8 0 (0) 12 (12) 17.6%

Indeterminate 1 2 0 (0) 3 (3) 4.4%

Total 19 34 15 (3) 68 (56) 100%

Is there any semantic distinction between deontic need and need to? If we

confine ourselves to non-affirmative uses, a tendency emerges for auxiliary need

to to be subjective, as in (106) – by contrast with the typical objectivity of quasi-

modal need to (compare (174) in Section 3.7) – confirming Perkins’ (183: 63)

Chapter 358

suggestion of an analogy with the distinction between the auxiliary/quasi-modal

‘pair’ must/have to.

(106) I think if you look inside the magazine it’s Miss Kylie Minogue, uh you

you you you can see this on your, copy, needn’t turn it up now, there is a a

a sticker which uh draws particular attention to uh this uh uh article (ICE-

GB S2A-061 090)

That we dealing with tendencies, however, is evident from the occurrence of

examples of objective need as in (107) (compare the (rarer) subjective use of

deontic need to in (175) in Section 3.7).

(107) You need not notify DVLA yourself. (ICE-GB W2D-010 64)

Epistemic need expresses objective logical necessity, with the speaker

making a deduction from the available evidence, as in (108):

(108) And er just just because an accident has happened it doesn’t um mean

that the ah the person has driven without due care and attention and um

due care and attention then due care and attention need not amount to

negligence on the part of the defendant (ICE-AUS S2A-070 85)

Dynamic need expresses a need that is located in external circumstances,

as in (l09):

(109) The plate is held at the bottom by a plastic pin which need not be undone

as the plate can be flexed out of the way. (ICE-GB W2D-018 9)

Like must, have to, and have got to, deontic and dynamic need can refer to

a present requirement that is applied to the actualization of a future situation as in

(106), a present situation as in (107), or a past situation as in (192) in Section 3.7

below.

The same three possibilities are available for epistemic need: applied to a

future situation as in (110), a present situation as in (111), or a past situation as in

(112).

(110) Now it’s true that uh, the worst scenario uh need not necessarily come to

pass (ICE-GB S2A-066 48)

(111) That need not mean allied tanks and troops going all the way to Baghdad,

though if Saddam is determined to fight this war like his other hero, Adolf

Hitler, it could come to that. (ICE-GB W2E-002 44)

(112) Thus it would appear that acceptance of territory need not have implied

service. (ICE-GB W1A-003 27)

Necessity and obligation 59

Whereas with must negation is internal, with need it is external. Thus, in

(113) need not, like don’t have to in the preceding clause, is paraphraseable by

“it is not necessary for” (whereas it must not be in one lump sum would have

involved negation of the proposition: “it is necessary for it not to be”).

(113) Now let’s have the good news. You don’t have to plough in a lot of

money to make a big difference - and it need not be in one lump sum.

(ICE-AUS W2D-012 302)

3.4.2 Need: regional and stylistic variation

Table 3.11. Genre distribution of need

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US Avg

Dialogue 0 (0) 11 (4)

Monologue 25 (6) 67 (16)

Spoken

Total 10 (6) 33 (20) 0 (0) 14

Non-printed 20 (2) 20 (2)

Printed 37 (11) 40 (12)

Written

Total 33 (13) 35 (14) 38 (3) 35

Total 19 34 15 (3) 23

According to Leech (2003), Smith (2003), and Mair and Leech (2006)

need has declined in both British and American writing (while by contrast need

to has increased massively: see Section 3.7.6 below). The frequencies for the

present study suggest that AmE is leading the way in the decline of need, which

is less than half as popular in C-US (15 tokens) as in ICE-GB (34), with ICE-

AUS in-between (19). A relevant factor in the dwindling fortunes of need is its

dispreference in speech as against writing (the ratio being 43:106, or 0.4:1)

3.5 Have to

The lexico-modal have to significantly outnumbers its closest semantic ‘rivals’

must (by a ratio of 2827:1367, or 2.0:1) and have got to (2827:705, or 4.0:1): see

Table 3.1. Deontic necessity is the main meaning with have to, as it is with must,

but more dominantly so for the former. However have to does not rival must in

the popularity of the epsitemic meaning, a situation that may well change as have

to becomes increasingly grammaticalized, with the likely consequence that its

epistemic meaning becomes more established via the process of subjectification.

Chapter 360

Table 3.12. Meanings of have to

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US Total %

Deontic 998 902 1,099 (216) 2,999 (2,116) 76.1%

Dynamic 295 332 255 (50) 882 (677) 22.4%

Epistemic 5 2 20 (4) 27 (11) 0.7%

Indeterminate 13 8 10 (2) 31 (23) 0.8%

Total 1,311 1,244 1,385 (272) 3,940 (2,827) 100%

3.5.1 Deontic have to

Do deontic must and have to have the same or different senses? That there is

considerable overlap between these two items is suggested by examples where

they alternate, as in (114) and (115) (where, it may further be noted, the different

orderings undermine the possibility that a particular ordering may imply a

difference in strength between the ordered items):

(114) Would my right honourable friend not agree, that the mark of a single

currency is that all other currencies must be extinguished and not merely

extinguished but that the capacity of other institutions to issue currency

has to be extinguished and that in the case of the United Kingdom would

involve this Parliament binding its successors in a way which we have

hitherto regarded as unconstitutional (ICE-GB S1B-053 67)

(115) While a day visit for reference use will normally be granted immediately,

where a special admission ticket has to be made up, particularly for long

term use or borrowing, it may not be possible to issue it immediately, and

applicants must be prepared to accept a 24/48 hour delay, and may not be

able to borrow on their first visit. (ICE-GB W2D-006 136)

While such examples may suggest potential semantic equivalence between

deontic have to and must, there are nevertheless some differences that tend to

differentiate them. According to Westney (1995: 151) deontic have to focuses on

“an external, existent obligation that can be perceived or described independently

of the speaker”, whereas deontic must serves as a very general marker of

obligation with more specific senses such as urgency, irresistibility, and

unconditionality being attributable to pragmatic interpretation. Palmer (1990),

Coates (1983) and Perkins (1983) are all in agreement that have to contrasts with

must in that its distribution is skewed towards the objective (Palmer’s ‘external’)

end of the subjective/objective scale. In other words, deontic have to differs from

must in its preference for objective meaning, where the deontic source is external

to the speaker, as in (116), over subjective meaning, where the speaker is the

deontic source, as in (117).

(116) Yeah and if you’re a bit older I think and you have a a broader perspective

of things then when you have to do an assignment or a presentation your

Necessity and obligation 61

brain is that little bit broader and it makes it easier to do something

original and inventive just being older (ICE-AUS S1A-042 231)

(117) P.S. It’s your fault that I’m so homesick, if I hadn’t had such a good

holiday I would have been glad to get back to Uni PPS Since it’s your

fault, you have to fix it and that means lots of LETTERS and/or

PICTURES (as the case may be) xox (ICE-AUS W1B-015 97)

Admittedly the subjective/objective distinction cannot be consistently

applied to instances of deontic have to insofar as it is commonly used, as Leech

(1987: 79) observes, to express a general requirement or obligation without

specifying the deontic source. Nevertheless there were a sufficient number of

clear cases in the present study to confirm the skewed distribution noted above.

What implications might this skewing have for the strength of deontic have to? It

would appear to suggest that deontic must is stronger than have to, and this view

has certainly found support in the literature. For example Sweetser (1990: 540)

asserts that “Must has connotations of a directly applied and irresistible force,

while have to, ought and need are resistible forces …”. Alexander (1988: 228)

asserts that “must conveys more strongly than have to the idea of inescapable

obligation”. However there are some, including McCallum-Bayliss (1985), who

regard have to as stronger than must. Given such differences of opinion it would

seem that strength is a less useful concept for differentiating these items than

subjectivity/objectivity.

As with must, so with have to, the dimension of subjectivity/objectivity

shows correlations with the person of the subject. The strongest correlation is

between 3rd

person subjects and objectivity, as in (118), where the deontic source

is a legal rule.

(118) Manson will have to wait five years for another hearing. (ICE-AUS S2B-

001 208)

Even here, however, examples are found where the speaker appears to be the

source of the requirement, but they tend to lack the strong sense of compulsion

often found with must, as in (119), where the hedge I think indicates pragmatic

weakening.

(119) He moved in with her but of course that wouldn’t do. It was just a

bachelor pad. Now she’s managed to sublet it and they’ve moved into a

bigger unit. I had dinner there last week. Alone. Martha isn’t into

doordarkening yet. We’re debating the issue. I think Martha has to

support me. (ICE-AUS W2F-020 59)

With 1st

and 2nd

person subjects objective modality again predominates,

but at the same time subjective modality is relatively more common than it is

with 3rd

person subjects. Of the 1st

person examples below, (120) and (121) are

objective (an external source being implied by the speaker’s expressed reluctance

Chapter 362

and by the interrogative mood respectively), while (122) and (123) may be

analyzed as subjective in the absence of an externally identifiable source. Notice

that the use of have to in (121) resembles that of must with verbs of

communication, and in fact have to could be substituted by must without any

appreciable shift of meaning.

(120) and uhm that’s the tradition which reluctantly I have to follow (ICE-GB

S1B-047 15)

(121) What exactly do I have to wear (ICE-GB S1B-079 89)

(122) Although I would love to I have to yes I have to confess an often irking

thought of am I really really two pounds less than Kate Hamilton (ICE-

GB S1A-011 224)

(123) I think we have to be careful with the fabric cos there’s so much of it

(ICE-GB S1A-086 204)

Examples (124)–(126) occur with a 2nd

person subject. Whereas (124),

which occurs in a bureaucratic text and has non-specific you as subject, is

straightforwardly objective, in (125) the strong advice given to the addressee

emanates from the speaker. In (126) the deontic source is somewhat ambivalent:

the speaker is reporting a boating regulation while at the same time appearing to

personally endorse it.

(124) I got a a pocket guide to the law and it it explains how how to write your

will so and you have to be specific in in the way you write where what

goes like who you’re leaving what to (ICE-AUS S1A-055 346)

(125) You’ll have to see if dad’ll pick you up afterwards (ICE-AUS S1A-016

153)

(126) If you wanted to start on the opposite tack you wouldn’t ho have right of

way and if you’re in a close call situation a crossing situation you’d have

to give right of way to the other boats that’re on starboard (ICE-AUS

S2A-020 35)

3.5.2 Dynamic have to

Dynamic necessity is, as Tables 3.2 and 3.12 show, more commonly expressed

by have to (22.4%) than by must (6.3%). This meaning is exemplified in (127)–

(130), where no deontic source is identifiable, but rather the factors facilitating

the activity reside in the situation, as in (127) and (128), or in the subject

referent, as in (129) and (130).

(127) Trigger’s still at the lead of the sheep and in Australian conditions that

would be acceptable but in New Zealand conditions he has to drive (ICE-

AUS S2A-016 87)

(128) Four forty one point four six is the time Haley Lewis has to beat to break

her Commonwealth and Australia record (ICE-AUS S2B-016 43)

Necessity and obligation 63

(129) The same thing happens to those who are confined to wheelchairs, or who

have to spend long periods in bed (ICE-GB W2B-022 26)

(130) They have to keep eating however cnidarians to constantly replenish those

dinoflagellates in their tissues (ICE-AUS S2A-025 77)

3.5.3 Epistemic have to

The ascendancy of have to over must that is in evidence with root meanings does

not extend to epistemic necessity, with tokens of epistemic have to accounting

for less than 1% of all tokens (see Table 3.12).

Earlier studies of BrE regard epistemic have to as an innovation.

According to Hughes and Trudgill (1979: 23) it is used by younger speakers

inspired by AmE, and Coates (1983: 57) similarly associates it with the teenage

sub-culture. The present study indicates that while epistemic have to is more

common in AmE (with 20 tokens per million words in C-US: see Table 3.12) it

has become established in AusE and BrE as well. Examples from all three

dialects are given below:

(131) And so, the molecules are speeding up, they’re getting further and further

apart, and taking up more space inside the balloon, so the balloon goes

back to its former size and shape. So that has to be what’s happening to

the balloons, that are inside this container here. (C-US SBC 27 903-5)

(132) And it’s the nature of a new industry that if if it’s not been available in

this country before then you don’t have experience in it and we don’t we

don’t believe that ah it has to follow that the only people who are

qualified to begin a pay television service are those who’re already in

television for the last thirty years (ICE-AUS S1B-046 72)

(133) I mean another way of looking at that is that if you have a continuous

function when you apply it to an interval, it goes to an interval, and since

you can get things as big as you like, this thing has to be an interval.

(ICE-GB S1B-013 149)

One question to be considered is whether the tendency noted above for

deontic must to be subjective and have to objective, is also in evidence with

epistemic uses. Matthews (1991) presents this as a categorical difference,

claiming that:

… whereas must reflects the spontaneous performance of an

inference with respect to some new evidence, have to and have got to

are assertions of objectively or logically necessary inferences.

(Matthews 1991: 235)

The present data suggest that the situation is less clearcut than Matthews would

lead us to believe. Not only can epistemic must be objective (as noted in Section

3.1.2), but epistemic have to can be subjective. Compare the following:

Chapter 364

(134) And so, the molecules are speeding up, they’re getting further and further

apart, and taking up more space inside the balloon, so the balloon goes

back to its former size and shape. So that has to be what’s happening to

the balloons, that are inside this container here. (C-US SBC 27 903-5)

(135) It would be the largest released, the tallest bull at the Royal Easter Show

and this little chap has to be the smallest (ICE-AUS S2B-039117)

Example (134) is objective, paraphraseable as “this is the only possible

conclusion that can be drawn”, but (135) is subjective, representing a

presumption, or inference, made by the speaker.

3.5.4 Time reference of situation

Deontic must and have to tend to differ in that must is usually associated with

immediate posteriority as in (136), and have to with ‘habitual simultaneity’ as in

(137).

(136) There is a crisis and he must act now (ICE-GB S1B-056 89)

(137) I mean I do know that it does take up time and I do feel that I have to be

there for every activity that I set up and I think that’s probably right I

think (ICE-GB S1B-078 214)

These are merely tendencies. As (117) and (121) above show, have to can be

used with an immediately posterior situation and, despite Coates’s (1983: 54)

claim that must can never be associated with habitual present meaning, an

example such as (138) indicates that the present requirement expressed by must

can be applied to an indefinite number of occasions.

(138) Brake shoes must always be renewed in sets of four (ICE-GB W2D-018

67)

As with deontic must, so with present forms of have to, anteriority is

possible (a present requirement for the past fulfilment of an action) even though

this is not mentioned in the literature:

(139) And the thir And the third one which was a true exit you have to you ha

ha have to have gone with a band to get to it (ICE-GB S1A-073 48)

With epistemic have to, inferences can be readily made about a present

situation as in (135) above, or about a future situation. While there were no

corpus examples involving anteriority or posteriority, that these are merely

accidental gaps is suggested by the possibility of substituting have to for must in

examples such as (40) and (42) above.

With must, as we have seen, there are limited possibilities for the time of

the modality to be other than present. Have to by contrast has a preterite form

Necessity and obligation 65

had to, as in (140), where it is deontic, expressing a past requirement, and (141),

where it is dynamic, expressing a past circumstantial necessity.

(140) When the League of Good Men heard about the gatherings they went to

the kafeneio of Yiorgos the Apeface to put an end to all the mischief. But

when they got there they had to admit that there was no mischief, that

everyone was well behaved. (ICE-AUS W2F-018 22)

(141) And the fog the smog was so bad that we actually had to take the children

home from school. (ICE-AUS S1A-015 130)

Had to can also be used in backshift, as in:

(142) I was actually hoping to have ah one with familiarname1 as well but um

like as in the same type of lunch but ah this did not eventuate as

familiarname1 got an attack of calvinistic bad luck and decided he just

had to go and um assuage his guilty feelings (ICE-AUS S1A-099 7)

In such cases, according to Coates (1983: 57), “it seems likely that HAVE TO is

suppletive to MUST (…), functioning as Past for both MUST and HAVE TO”.

Suppletion is difficult to prove, however. It could perhaps be argued that when

had to is used in conventional formulae with verbs of communication as in (140)

(and when it expresses the dynamic ‘inner compulsion’ meaning as in (142)), that

this is more likely to be associated with must than have to in present time

contexts. Nevertheless present forms of have to are available for these uses and,

furthermore, must would itself be possible as an alternative to had to in the

indirect speech context in (142).

Deontic (and dynamic) had to can be associated with a situation that is

present (or, simultaneous) with respect to a past obligation as in (143), past as in

(144), or future as in (145):

(143) The Inuit dog was traditionally fed seal meat and had to fend for itself for

part of the year and so became a good hunter a trait that invariably causes

problems for the dog handlers in the Antarctic (ICE-AUS S2B-029 125)

(144) If the Court had held that it was an indemnity, the defendant would have

had to have paid the loss suffered. (ICE-AUS W1A-015 176)

(145) He had to be up at Asquith by six-thirty and do his little bit and then come

home again (ICE-AUS S1A-016 71)

Have to also differs from must in its capacity to express a future,

anticipated, obligation, in the case of (146) one that is associated with a

simultaneous situation, and in the case of (147) with a future situation.

(146) I think on your bike you’re going to have to wear one for a while, don’t

you (ICE-GB:S1A-022 285)

Chapter 366

(147) It’s not a good ball though and Van Den Howe will have to backtrack but

he keeps the ball in play for Tottenham (ICE-GB S2A-015 141)

Depraetere and Reed (2006) do not allow for the possibility of epistemic

modality located in the past or future:

Epistemic modality by definition entails the making of a judgement

about the likelihood that it is true that something is the case. This

means that the modality itself must be located at the time of the

judgement – either speech time or some implicitly or explicitly

evoked speech (or thought) time. (Depraetere and Reed 2006: 286)

However there are several examples in the corpora where had to does in fact

express a past epistemic judgement, as in (148).

(148) He had the worst job in the crew. Apart from being our navigator he also

became the easy target of thousands of mosquitoes. This had to be the

ultimate test for a can of Aerogard! (ICE-AUS W2F-010 58)

3.5.5 Have to and negation

Whereas, as we have seen in Section 3.1.5, when must is negated the negation

falls within the scope of the modal (e.g. He mustn’t go yet means “It is necessary

for him not to go yet”), with have to the negation is outside the scope of the

modal (He doesn’t have to go means “It is not necessary for him to”). Have to

takes external negation whether the meaning is deontic as in (149) (“It is not

required that you to tell me again”), dynamic as in (150) (“It is not necessary for

me to write much”), or epistemic (no corpus examples were found, but note that

(151) is logically equivalent to we believe that it doesn’t have to follow that …,

meaning “it is not necessarily the case that it follows”).

(149) You don’t have to tell me again (ICE-GB S1A-092 87)

(150) Maybe not, but it’s not far from it, as I’m really pissed off with writing

letters to everyone so usually send postcards instead so I don’t have to

write much! (ICE-GB W1B-002 5)

(151) And it’s the nature of a new industry that if if it’s not been available in

this country before then you don’t have experience in it and we don’t we

don’t believe that ah it has to follow that the only people who are

qualified to begin a pay television service are those who’re already in

television for the last thirty years (ICE-AUS S1B-046 72)

The effect of the scopal difference between must and have to with

negation is that the latter may serve as a suppletive for the former. Notice in

(151) that the contrast the writer desires is not one that could be achieved using

must not/mustn’t – hence the use of the lexico-modal:

Necessity and obligation 67

(152) A skilled word processor operator does not have to look at the screen

while typing, but what has been entered must be proof-read and this

requires concentration to ensure that it is done properly. (ICE-GB W2B-

033 63)

3.5.6 Have to: regional and stylistic variation

Table 3.13. Genre distribution of have to

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US Total

Dialogue 1,828 (658) 1,578 (568)

Monologue 1,579 (379) 1,108 (266)

Spoken

Total 1,728 (1037) 1,390 (834) 2,069 (241) 1,729

Non-printed 890 (89) 1,260 (126)

Printed 617 (185) 947 (284)

Written

Total 685 (274) 1,025 (410) 388 (31) 699

Total 1,311 1,244 1,385 (272) 1,313

The decline of must discussed in Section 3.1.6 is matched by an increase in the

frequency of have to (of 9.0% in British writing and 1.1% in American writing:

see Table 1.4). There are several possible reasons for the differing fortunes of the

two items. Syntactically, have to surpasses must in flexibility, occurring in

contexts where the auxiliary would be ruled out on the grounds of its defective

morphology. Semantically, the more objective obligation that have to expresses

in its (dominant) deontic sense, it has been argued by Myhill (1995) and Smith

(2003), appeals to speakers seeking a more ‘democratic’, less authoritarian,

tenor. Stylistically, as we shall see, have to is more widely attested in speech.

In view of the diachronic findings it is not surprising that the popularity of

have to should outweigh that of must in the present study. A comparison of the

figures for the three regional varieties (see Table 3.13) shows have to following

the general trend for AmE to be leading the way in the decline of the modals and

the rise of the quasi-modals (see Section 1.4 above), with a must/have to ratio of

1:3.4 in C-US. In both respects, furthermore, BrE is the most conservative (1:1.8

in ICE-GB), with AusE (1:2.1 in ICE-AUS) occupying a position mid-way

between AmE and BrE.

An examination of the frequencies of must and have to across speech and

writing provides insights into their contrasting fortunes. Must is consistently

around 40% less popular in speech than writing, in all three dialects. By contrast

have to is approximately two and a half (2.47) times more popular in speech than

writing. Furthermore the ordering of the dialects in terms of the relative

popularity of have to in speech (C-US 5.3:1, ICE-AUS 2.5:1, ICE-GB 1.4:1)

matches the ordering as determined by the frequency of have to tokens.

The preference for occurrence in speech that we find with have to is even

stronger for deontic have to (2.83:1). Similarly the robustness of have to in

speech in AmE is even more evident with deontic have to (whose speech/writing

Chapter 368

ratio in C-US is 5.5:1). Finally, deontic have to reverses the order of preference

displayed by deontic must in the four genre subcategories: deontic have to is

preferred in dialogue over monologue by a ratio of 2,506:2,267, or 1.1:1, and in

non-printed over printed texts by a ratio of 1,410:1,043, or 1.4:1.

3.6 Have got to

Have got to occurs commonly in reduced form as gotta (gotta accounting for

67.8% of all tokens in the corpora). Further variant realizations are found, such

as ’re gotta in (153) (not surprisingly, in view of the grammaticalization that

have got to is undergoing: see Krug 1998).

(153) They’re a year old now exactly and they’re gotta be two years old before

they’re old enough to breed (ICE-AUS S1B-041 200)

Have got to and have to are often treated as variants in the literature but

they differ in a number of respects, which we mention briefly here but in some

cases develop in more detail below. Syntactically, as noted in Section 2.3.1

above, the semi-modal have got to differs from the lexico-modal have to in

exhibiting most of the formal properties of the modal auxiliaries: have got to

lacks non-tensed forms (compare *to have got to with to have to, *having got to

with having to), cannot cooccur with modals (compare *may have got to with

may have to), and exhibits the properties of an operator. Furthermore, whereas

the preterite form had to is common, had got to is unattested in the present data

(see Section 3.6.4 below). Dialectally, AmE display a marked dispreference for

have got to over have to in comparison to BrE and AmE (see Section 3.6.6

below). Stylistically, have got to is rare outside of conversation in the corpus (see

Section 3.6.6), and thus contrasts with the stylistic neutrality of have to.

Semantically, have got to contrasts with have to in its typical subjectivity and in

its typical incompatibility with habitual situations (see further Sections 3.6.1–

3.6.4 below).

Table 3.14. Meanings of have got to

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US TOTAL %

Deontic 278 279 153 (30) 710 (587) 84.1%

Dynamic 42 51 15 (3) 108 (96) 12.8%

Epistemic 8 2 5 (1) 15 (11) 1.8%

Indeterminate 4 7 0 (0) 11 (11) 1.3%

Total 332 339 173 (34) 844 (705) 100%

Necessity and obligation 69

3.6.1 Deontic have got to

Deontic have got to resembles must in its capacity to be used more often

subjectively, encoding a speaker-based statement of requirement, than

objectively, encoding an external, existent obligation that is independent of the

speaker. In this respect it differs from have to, which as we have noted is

predominantly objective. In the following examples objective have got to can

readily be substituted by have to, the consequence being more a matter of a shift

towards greater formality than any change of meaning:

(154) So I’ve been told I’ve got to do a a month o o a month of reading (ICE-

GB S1A-093 40)

(155) That’s the thing you’ve gotta you’ve gotta really say spelt haven’t you

(ICE-AUS S1B-020 196)

Predictably, however, subjective deontic have got to in the following

examples is more readily substitutible by must than it is by have to. In (156) the

obligation is self-imposed by the speaker, while (157) exemplifies the

‘performative’ use that is found with must but which Coates (1983: 53) wrongly

claims is never possible with have got to.

(156) It’s her birthday so I’ve got to try and find think about what to get her

(ICE-GB S1A-025 328)

(157) “Leigh, why? Why do you keep latching on to men like that? You’ve

gotta stop” (ICE-AUS W2F-017 39)

Have got to also has in common with must that it is often used in quasi-

formulaic locutions with verbs of communication where the speaker appears to

be the deontic source, as in:

(158) Right Yeah Well I mean Well OK I can understand that but um you’ve

gotta remember that um I mean this image of the of the rolling drunk you

know the drunken yobbo is I mean it’s an it’s an extreme (ICE-AUS S1A-

053 76)

As with must and have to, so with have got to, the tendency towards

deontic subjectivity is strongest with 2nd

person subjects as in (157) and (158)

above, and weakest with 3rd

person subjects as in (159), where the deontic source

that is explicitly invoked is the constitution.

(159) Remember we we’re we’re faced with a constitution that says that it’s got

to be um prevention and settlement of um industrial disputes extending

beyond the limits of one state so we’ve got to satisfy the requirement the

requirement of interstateness um (ICE-AUS S1B-010 221)

Chapter 370

With 1st

person subjects the requirement is equally likely to be objective

or subjective. In (160) the deontic source is speaker-external, while in (161) it is

speaker-internal, with have got to expressing ‘self-compulsion’ or ‘self-

obligation’ (Leech 1987: 77):

(160) Yeah I’ve got to go to the dentist this afternoon (ICE-AUS S1A-024 61)

(161) David I’ve got to ask you this I mean with this is a brand new show for

yourself and obviously I wha the reports the reviews have been just

fantastic (ICE-AUS S1B-044 261)

According to Westney (1995: 127, 151) a further difference between have

got to and have to is that the former conveys a sense of immediacy or urgency.

However such a sense is elusive and seems not to be in evidence in an example

such as (162), where have got to and have to alternate, displaying not only

comparable modal strength but also a comparable degree of immediacy or

urgency.

(162) Oh I’ve got to I’ve got to ring up I have to find out ’cause they’re

supposed to call her back today from the interview that she went on

Monday (ICE-AUS S1A-013 137)

3.6.2 Dynamic have got to

Like deontic have got to, dynamic have got to can alternate freely with have to,

as in:

(163) and so the rest of the heat that’s got to get to back out into space to

balance this uh process uhm has to get away as heat energy (ICE-GB

S2A-043 97)

Dynamic have got to may be similar in meaning to need (to) in its capacity to

express some need that is intrinsic to the subject-referent as in (163), or it may, as

have to regularly does, express a need imposed by external circumstances as in

(164).

(164) I mean you you’ve got to have a big powerful machine to run it or plenty

of RAM (ICE-GB S1A-029 242)

3.6.3 Epistemic have got to

As Table 3.14 shows, epistemic necessity is a minor meaning for have got to, just

as it is for have to, and especially in BrE.7

Like must, epistemic have got to tends

to be subjective, as in:

Necessity and obligation 71

(165) Ah, he’s got to have some stashed away somewhere He’s gotta, with that

sort of empire he’s gotta have, name a figure, five ten twenty fifty million

dollars stashed away somewhere (ICE-AUS S1B-049 79)

(166) Loose shirts over jeans has got to be a sort of, temporary prejudice (ICE-

GB S1A-054 161)

Nowhere is this subjectivity more apparent than when have got to combines with

a progressive construction, often with an emotive overlay, as in (167). The

popularity of this combination is compatible with Melrose’s (1983) claim that

have got to is used for expressing affective, or emotionally-loaded, modality.

(167) Cass’s eyes go wide. “You’ve got to be kidding.” (ICE-AUS W2F-017 82)

3.6.4 Have got to and temporality

Temporally, have got to tends to be closer to must in its characteristic association

with immediate posteriority, as in the deontic example in (168), the dynamic in

(169) and the epistemic in (170), than it is to have to, which is more often

associated with ‘habitual simultaneity’.

(168) I’ve got to go and see to the dinner in a minute (ICE-GB S1A-007 219)

(169) They’ve got to average sixty-one point five for the last five laps to get

them near the qualifying time (ICE-GB S2A-007 66)

(170) Not much coming in. Something’s gotta give here sooner or later (ICE-

AUS S1A-014 90)

This is not to deny the possibility of have got to expressing habitual meaning,

despite the fact that Coates (1983: 54) disallows this. As with must, occasional

examples are found, as in (171):

(171) Oh they’re terrible. They’ve always got to know where you are. (ICE-

AUS S1A-093 88)

Present epistemic have got to can be used with a present situation as in

(165)–(167) above, or a future situation as in (170). While there were no

examples of anteriority, that this is an accidental gap is suggested by the

possibility of substituting have got to for must in (40) above.

Have got to is also like must, and different from have to, in having no

independent past use (had got to) in any meaning. A plausible suggestion for this

gap, with respect to epistemic have got to, is offered by Westney (1995: 148): “in

contrast to had to, it lacks any suggestion of actuality, and this would be

particularly odd for an epistemic use, which in past reference would naturally

suggest actuality”.

Chapter 372

3.6.5 Have got to and negation

Negation of have got to is rare in the corpus. As with have to, negation is

external, applying to the predication rather than the modality: the paraphrase “it

is not necessary for” is thus applicable to the following two examples.

(172) I just want somewhere where I haven’t got to worry about living, where

someone will look after me. (ICE-AUS W2F-011 75)

(173) That means we haven’t got to keep looking (ICE-AUS S1A-023 15)

3.6.6 Have got to: regional and stylistic variation

Table 3.15. Genre distribution of have got to

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US Avg

Dialogue 739 (266) 789 (284)

Monologue 217 (52) 167 (40)

Spoken

Total 530 (318) 540 (324) 266 (31) 445

Non-printed 10 (1) 80 (8)

Printed 43 (13) 23 (7)

Written

Total 35 (14) 38 (15) 38 (3) 37

Total 332 339 173 (34) 281

As we have seen in Section 3.5, the overall frequency of have got to is one

quarter that of have to and one half that of must in contemporary English. For

this quasi-modal the diachronic profile that is offered in Table 1.4 is somewhat

unrevealing. It is based on written English and thus does not reflect the most

sweeping change that is under way; namely, as Krug (2000: 63), Smith (2003),

and Leech (2003) all note, a strong increase in informal spoken usage. As Table

3.15 indicates, in the present data have got to is overwhelmingly more common

in speech than it is in writing (by a ratio of 1,366:111, or 12.3:1), and

furthermore almost four times more common in dialogue than monologue in the

British and American corpora (1,500:381, or 3.93:1). It is highly likely that the

traditional stigma attached to got, especially in more formal styles, has had a role

to play in this generic imbalance.

Have got to bucks the trend found with most of the ‘major’ ascendant

quasi-modals (compare have to, be going to, want to) for AmE to be the most

innovative of the dialects and to have the highest frequency of tokens in the

present corpora. In fact C-US lags well behind the other two corpora, with only

about half as many tokens as each (C-US 173, ICE-AUS 332, and ICE-GB 339).

Necessity and obligation 73

3.7 Need to

As noted in Section 3.4.1 above, the numbers for quasi-modal need to (716) are

significantly larger than those for auxiliary need (56). Like its auxiliary

counterpart, need to expresses mainly dynamic necessity, but differs from it in

the relative proportions of deontic tokens (28.9% for need to and 14.7% for need)

and epistemic tokens (2.5% for need to and 17.6% for need).

Table 3.16. Meanings of need to

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US Total %

Dynamic 217 158 305 (60) 680 (435) 62.0%

Deontic 99 96 122 (24) 317 (219) 28.9%

Epistemic 6 11 10 (2) 27 (19) 2.5%

Indeterminate 21 15 36 (7) 72 (43) 6.6%

Total 343 280 473 (93) 1,096 (716) 100%

3.7.1 Deontic need to

Consider the basic difference between must, have to and need to. In a sentence

with a 1st

person subject as in I must/have to/need to get ready, must would tend

to suggest self-obligation arising from a personal sense of duty, have to an

obligation arising from a source external to the speaker, and need to a

compulsion arising from within the speaker. It is from this sense of internal

compulsion that the deontic meaning of need to derives. Statements pertaining to

an addressee’s needs come – via indirect illocutionary force – to serve the role of

recommendations or exhortations. As Smith (2003: 260) observes, need to “can

acquire the force of an imposed obligation, but – something which does not apply

to the other markers – the writer or speaker can claim than the required action is

merely being recommended for the doer’s own sake”.

In Section 3.4.1 above it was suggested that in non-assertive contexts

deontic need to tends to be objective, by contrast with the typical subjectivity of

deontic need. Of the following two examples, then, that with objective need to in

(174) is more typical than that with subjective need to in (175).

(174) If your contribution is £1.20 or more you do not need to fill in ST (V)

(ICE-GB W2D-001 84)

(175) You don’t need to bother (ICE-GB S1A-057 64)

Affirmative deontic need to is not, however, resistant to subjectivity.

What we find here is the same tendency for modal strength and

subjectivity/objectivity to correlate with the person of the subject, as we have

found with deontic must and have to. Strong subjectivity is most likely when

need to occurs with a 2nd

person subject. In contexts where there is an apparent

authority structure the utterance will have the force of a directive, as in:

Chapter 374

(176) I think you need to focus now, on one aspect, whether it’s impacts

whether it’s just temperature whether it’s rainfall (ICE-GB S1B-007 216)

(177) And the rest of you need to gather around. One or two of you can lay on

the ground. (ICE-AUS S2A-060 50)

Slightly weaker are cases where the speaker is merely making a suggestion or

giving advice, as in:

(178) Maybe you need to try to do that through your GP locally (ICE-GB S1A-

062 117)

(179) then you need to have your teeth extremely thoroughly cleaned, as soon as

possible (ICE-GB S1A-087 197)

With 1st

person singular I as subject, need to far more commonly

expresses dynamic than deontic modality. When deontic, it may be objective as

in (180), where compliance with legal regulations is at issue, or subjective as in

(181), where it serves as an indirect directive.

(180) On 17 Nov I rang to ask progress and was informed by Mr Bromet that he

was preparing his report for Head Office. I asked how long it would take

to get a decision and he said it could take a year but, in any case, it would

not help me as I needed to take my own legal action. (ICE-AUS W1B-023

83)

(181) I need to know exactly where the car is going to be (ICE-GB S1B-080 71)

Instances of need to in the self-hortatory use that is found with deontic must as in

(14) above are rare. An example is (182):

(182) And worse now it appears that territorial gains made by the Serbians in

particular and to some extent I need to say the Croatians through a

through aggression will actually now be legitimized (ICE-AUS S1B-051

103)

Deontic need to can be used with 1st

person plural we to convey a speaker-

derived directive as in (183) and as a rhetorical marker as in (184):

(183) I think this is the first action that needs to be taken and we need to take it

very soon (ICE-GB S2A-031 43)

(184) And what we need to recognise is that in the in um covering some of the

options there are degrees of formality (ICE-AUS S1B-011 7)

With 3rd

person subjects deontic need to is typically objective as in (185),

where the deontic source is an institutional requirement:

Necessity and obligation 75

(185) Could you also inform me whether individual members receive the

journal or whether they need to be journal subscribers as well. (ICE-GB

W1B-028 148)

3.7.2 Epistemic need to

Clear examples of epistemic need to, as in (186), are rare, and like epistemic

need express objective logical necessity:

(186) Of course the chaos when the Supreme Being was discovered tied up and

concussed on the floor would be indescribable, but surely they would

need to be more than just lucky to win much more time out of mere

chaos? (ICE-GB W2F-015 69)

3.7.3 Dynamic need to

Dynamic need to, but not need, may express a need that is intrinsic to the subject-

referent, an ‘internal compulsion’ (Nokkonen 2006: 62), as in (187) and (188), or

one that is located in external circumstances, as in (189):

(187) They need to sort of let their hair down (ICE-GB S1A-048 138)

(188) So where we may need to have three or four meals a day the ah the

crocodiles only need to eat once or twice a week or a month um or even

go much longer than that without eating (ICE-AUS S2A-057 20)

(189) occasionally you need to crown a tooth which is perfectly, you know

perfectly sound from the <unclear word> aspect and there’s no reason for

an x-ray but, they just insist on having one (ICE-GB S1A-088 12)

3.7.4 Need to and temporality

Like must, have to, and have got to, deontic and dynamic need to can refer to a

present requirement that is applied to the actualization of a future situation as in

(176–179) above, a present situation as in (174), (185) and (187–189) above, or a

past situation as in (190) below:

(190) Non-contributory means that you don’t need to have paid National

Insurance contributions to qualify. (ICE-GB W2D-005 3)

When the modality is in the past there is a contrast between need to,

whose preterite is formed inflectionally, as in (191), and need, which has no

preterite but can express a past necessity in construction with perfect have, as in

(192) below. The meanings here are not identical, differing in their actualization

implicatures. In (192) we understand that the situation, of ‘worrying’, was

Chapter 376

actualized, but there is no such implicature in (191), as evidenced by the

possibility of a continuation such as and so she didn’t.

(191) I had taught myself strength as another man might have taught himself

ballroom-dancing, had learned strength as a way of dealing with my

weakness. But Lilian seemed to have been born with unbreakable will: it

was not something she needed to learn. (ICE-AUS W2F-012 51)

(192) However, she need not have worried. I was just a normal schoolboy with

normal schoolboy habits and a propensity for mishap, as evidenced by the

day I came a cropper in tar at Mentone. (ICE-AUS W2F-013 42)

A further temporal possibility available to need to, but not need, is the

expression of a future necessity, as in:

(193) We may need to see him. We -- we w- will need to see him again. (C-US

SBC 18 82-4)

3.7.5 Need to and negation

Need to, like need, takes external negation. Thus, in (194) do not need to is

paraphraseable as “it is not necessary for”:

(194) You do not need to show your Registration Document when relicensing

with a reminder form. (ICE-GB W2D-010 111)

3.7.6 Need to: regional and stylistic variation

According to Leech (2003), Smith (2003), and Mair and Leech (2006) while

need has declined sharply in both British and American writing, need to has

enjoyoyed a spectacular increase (of 249.1% in British writing and 123.2% in

American writing: see Table 1.4 above). According to Smith (2003), the rise of

the quasi-modal has been more pronounced in assertive than non-assertive

contexts (where it might be argued that it is entering into competition with must

and have to).

There are several possible reasons for the contrasting diachronic fortunes

of the two items. One is the greater syntactic flexibility of need to, which is not

like auxiliary need restricted to non-affirmative contexts and lacking in preterite

and non-tensed forms. Another reason may be that the trend towards increasing

informality in English, especially in public modes of discourse (Fairclough 1992)

favours the quasi-modal. Whereas need is, as noted in Section 3.4.2, strongly

disfavoured in speech over writing, need to is preferred in speech (with a

speech/writing a ratio of 1310:786, or 1.66:1. Furthermore need to is more

common – albeit marginally – in dialogue than in monologue in ICE-AUS and

ICE-GB, by a ratio of 662:608, or 1.08:1 (see Appendix Table 7).

Necessity and obligation 77

The frequencies for the present study suggest that AmE is leading the way

in the rise of need to, as it is in the decline of need. Need to is almost twice as

popular in C-US (473 tokens per million words) as in ICE-GB (280), with ICE-

AUS in-between (343).

Table 3.17. Genre distribution of need to

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US Avg

Dialogue (107) (131)

Monologue (101) (45)

Spoken

Total 347 (208) 293 (176) 670 (78) 437

Non-printed 320 (32) 240 (24)

Printed 343 (103) 267 (80)

Written

Total 338 (135) 260 (104) 188 (15) 262

Total 343 280 473 (93) 365

3.8 Had better

With its modest frequency (89 tokens in the present corpora, and its numbers

reportedly declining (Mair and Leech 2006: 328) semi-modal had better is a

minor item. As Mitchell (2003) points out, had better has in common with the

modal idioms may/might as well that their etymological background involves the

notion of comparison, and that as a result of grammaticalization and semantic

bleaching this notion has been attenuated. The extent of grammaticalization of

had better is evident in the proportion of instances where the auxiliary had is

dropped (20.2%), as in the second two instances in (195):

(195) ‘No, I’d better talk to her.’ Better face the bloody music, whatever it is,

she thought, but when she picked up the phone, her hand was shaking.

‘Listen, bitch,’ hissed the thin, hoarse voice, ‘y’ better get round ’ere

quick an’ bail out y’ precious boyfriend.’ (ICE-AUS W2F-004 127)

3.8.1 Meanings of had better

In Section 2.3.3.1 above we noted, and rejected, Mitchell’s (2003: 145) claim

that the quasi-modal had better has developed an epistemic sense. As a

consequence had better is here regarded as essentially monosemous, a deontic

expression (so the title of this subsection is admittedly slightly misleading).

It is via semantic bleaching that had better earns its place in the modal

system. It is typically used with mitigated directive force representing a type of

subjective deontic modality, with a meaning best described as ‘advisability’ (q.v.

Jacobsson 1980: 52). There was only one example of had better in the corpora

where its literally comparative sense is still salient (as reinforced by the

following comparative clause):

Chapter 378

(196) Actually today I’m nursing a very bad hangover so I decided I had better

stay at home rather than throw up on the Metro! (ICE-GB W1B-009 33)

A number of writers have suggested that the advice or warning that is

conveyed by had better is often accompanied by an implication that the speaker

has good grounds for the directive, insofar as a less desirable alternative is

understood to exist. For example Palmer (1990: 82) suggests that had better

implies an “or else” consequence as part of its basic meaning, claiming that the

speaker “is fairly firm about his advice with the implication that unpleasant

consequences may follow if it is not taken”. Similarly Perkins (1983: 64)

suggests that non-fulfilment “entails adverse consequences” and Edmonson et al.

(1977: 297) claim that the basic meaning of had better involves a threat for the

subject. This implication is in fact quite rare (accounting for only 4.5%, of tokens

in the corpora). (196) above is an example, and others are provided below. In

(197) the speaker reports the advice that she has been given to start a family on

the grounds that she is approaching the age when it may be difficult to do so. In

(198) the undesirable alternative, that “no one’ll believe her unless she’s taken a

photograph of the three sisters” is stated explicitly.

(197) My main thing ’cos we want to start a family and I know I’m I’m no

spring chicken any more and everyone keeps saying hey you’d better get

on with it you know (ICE-AUS S1A-046 231)

(198) Um well I thought we’d better go and do the touristy bit because no one’ll

believe her unless she’s taken a photograph of the three sisters (ICE-AUS

S1A-057 320)

In the majority of cases, however, there is little justification for invoking the

notion of an adverse consequence. In (199) had better merely conveys a deontic

sense that is similar to that of should (which could be readily substituted for it).

Notice that had better is harmonic, as is should, with perhaps.

(199) B: Perhaps I’d better give her a ring

A: Perhaps you’d better Yeah That’s probably a really good idea (ICE-

AUS S1A-075 120, 121)

Like should, had better typically has medium strength, as in (199), where

it would be possible for the advice to be politely declined. However it may be

pragmatically strengthened, as in (200), in which a forceful imperative is

reported, reinforced by the swear word bloody. Here the strength of had better is

stronger than that of should, approaching that of performative must, which it

resembles in not countenancing non-actualization (neither You must turn the tape

around nor You’d better turn the tape around could felicitously be followed by

but I don’t suppose you will, unlike You should turn the tape around).

(200) I said better turn the bloody tape round (ICE-AUS S1A-020 194)

Necessity and obligation 79

Perkins (1983: 63) wrongly claims that had better is objective: “it is

objective in that the deontic source is not (directly) identifiable as the speaker”.

In fact, as Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 196) observe, it is “generally

subjective, giving the speaker’s judgement as to the best course of action”.

Quantitative support for this claim comes from the high proportion of instances

(61.8%) with a 2nd

person subject, which we have seen with other modals to

correlate strongly with subjectivity, and a 1st

person subject (34.8%). Only 3.4%

of tokens have a 3rd

person subject.

Had better is consistently used in the data with reference to specific future

events, as reinforced by the temporal adjunct right now in (201), and appears

incapable of being used with the general present reference that is common with

should.8

Notice that had better could not be felicitously substituted for should in

(202):

(201) In that case you’d better switch off right now (ICE-AUS S1B-030146)

(202) You should always look carefully at your map afterwards so you can see

what’s what’s around that area (ICE-AUS S1A-056 292)

Finally, had better normally takes internal negation, whether the negative

follows better, as in (203), or whether it is it precedes it (as in You hadn’t better

let Jo get hold of this – there were no corpus examples of the latter), both more

plausibly paraphraseable as “it’s advisable that you do not let Jo get hold of this”

than “it’s not advisable that you let Jo get hold of this”.

(203) You’d better not let Jo get hold of this (ICE-GB S1A-030 282)

3.8.2 Had better: regional and stylistic variation

As Table 3.18 shows, the numbers for had better are healthiest in ICE-AUS,

perhaps a reflection of its relatively greater vitality in speech (with a

speech/writing ratio of 2.4:1, as against 1.1:1 in C-US and 1.0:1 in ICE-GB). The

much higher frequency of this quasi-modal in dialogue as against monologue

(4.3:1) and in non-printed as against printed texts (3.0:1) is predictable from the

dominance of its subjective deontic meaning.

Table 3.18. Genre distribution of had better

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US Avg

Dialogue 89 (32) 53 (19)

Monologue 29 (7) 4 (1)

Spoken

Total 56 (39) 33 (20) 43 (5) 47

Non-printed 10 (1) 100 (10)

Printed 27 (8) 10 (3)

Written

Total 23 (9) 33 (13) 38 (3) 31

Total 48 33 41 (8) 40

Chapter 380

3.9 Be supposed to

Be supposed to is a medium strength lexico-modal with semantic affinities to

should and ought to. Mair and Leech’s (2006: 328) figures show it to be on the

rise, especially in British writing: see Table 1.4 above. It may well be that its

increasing numbers are occurring at the expense of ought to, with which it is

most similar.

3.9.1 Meanings of be supposed to

Table 3.19. Meanings of be supposed to

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US Total %

Deontic 26 46 66 (13) 138 (85) 50.5%Epistemic 18 44 51 (10) 113 (72) 41.4%Dynamic 2 6 5 (1) 13 (9) 4.8%Indeterminate 1 3 5 (1) 9 (5) 3.3%

Total 47 99 127 (25) 273 (171) 100%

Whereas the typical pattern with modal expressions, certainly for the modal

auxiliaries, is for epistemic senses to derive from historically prior deontic ones,

with this lexico-modal it is the epistemic meaning that is prior. As Table 3.19

indicates, be supposed to expresses predominantly deontic and epistemic

modality, and very occasionally dynamic, these meanings being illustrated

respectively in (204) (“I’m obliged to”), (205) (“he’s thought/alleged to be”), and

(206) (“what is determined by circumstances/nature”).

(204) But you were saying I’m supposed to be encouraging you (ICE-GB S1A-

075 11)

(205) That boy, he’s supposed to be awesome. (C-US SBC 02 27-29)

(206) When they usually run, and, fish weren’t running this year, you know, it’s

like everywhere. Nothing’s doing what it’s supposed to, anymore,

anywhere. (C-US SBC 04 480-2)

The senses are not sharply distinct, and pose challenges to analysis. In (207), for

example, an epistemic reading (“it is supposedly/it is thought that it is”), and a

deontic reading (“it is under an obligation to be”) are both possible, though

arguably the former is the more salient. Similarly possible, in (208), are both the

epistemic sense of something that is alleged or assumed to be the case and the

deontic sense of something that is appropriate or required by custom.

Necessity and obligation 81

(207) Although the monarchy is supposed to be part and parcel of British life

people of all sorts can envisage Britain without a monarchy (ICE-GB

S2B-032 19)

(208) Yeah and so strange the things that people (unclear word) about religion

(unclear words) for something that’s supposed to make you behave well to

the people around you treat them with respect and dignity and caring and

kindness (ICE-GB S1A-084 191)

While be supposed to is similar to both should and ought to in strength, its

objectivity gives it a closer affinity with ought to than with the typically

subjective should. Be supposed to is consistently objective, with the expectation

or requirement arising from a source external to the speaker. Despite Edmonson

et al.’s (1977: 289-90) claim that it is possible for deontic be supposed to to be

subjective, there are no clear examples in the corpora (not surprisingly perhaps,

since, as Westney 1995: 178 notes, these might be construed as “conversationally

misleading”).

Be supposed to also resembles ought to in its conversationally-derived

implication of non-fulfilment, an implication which is clear in epistemic cases

with a past predication as in (209) and deontic cases with the modality in the past

as in (210):

(209) He’s the guy who is supposed to have left (ICE-GB S1A-008 266)

(210) The idea was you know we were supposed to do all these graphs and stuff

(ICE-GB S1A-008 52)

The temporal flexibility of be supposed to suggests that it may operate as

a suppletive to medium strength modals like should and ought to. Both the

modality and the proposition can be associated with a variety of temporal

domains. With epistemic be supposed to both the modality and proposition can

be present or past, but not future. In (205) above both the modality and the

proposition are present, while in (209) the modality is present and the proposition

past. In (211) the modality is past and the proposition present, and in (212) both

are past:

(211) Shem was the uhm (unclear word) Semitic and Ham was supposed to be

the descendant of Africans and Japeth’s the European (ICE-GB S1A-053

241)

(212) I mean, this destruction was supposed to have occurred in the eighteen

eighties (ICE-AUS S2A-035 180)

With deontic be supposed to the modality can be present or past, the

proposition, present, past or future. For example in (204) above and (213) below

both are present, while in (210) the modality is past and the proposition future

(with respect to the modality). In (214) the modality is past and the proposition

present. In (215), even though the perfect is associated syntactically with the

Chapter 382

complement of supposed, it applies semantically to the modality (“my results

were required (PAST) to come out today (FUTURE)”). With deontic be

supposed to the two syntactic options are available, but the perfect option is the

only one available for deontic should and ought to (my results should/ought to

have come out today).

(213) I’m afraid I think the I think I think the uhm that chicken is supposed to

be a bit juicier (ICE-GB S1A-022 76)

(214) The photographs came to life as she talked. (This was called a voice-

over.) They were supposed to have all the gloss and the false authority of

a soft drink commercial. (ICE-AUS W2F-020 11)

(215) And apart from that I mean my results are supposed to have come out

today (ICE-GB S1A-093 237)

Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 187) observe that should and ought to

normally take internal negation, and claim that there are no “equivalent items

taking external negation” (which they attribute to the lack of a clear pragmatic

difference between external and internal negation with medium strength

modality). Arguably, however, be supposed to fills the gap in the paradigm,

Consider:

(216) But I’m not supposed to be saying anything (ICE-GB S1A-017 337)

(217) The thing is you’re not supposed to do it without your teacher (ICE-GB

S1A-045 56)

It is certainly possible to construe (216) and (217) as having internal negation

like should and ought to (“expected/obliged not to”). However examples of this

type are often felt to express more than medium strength modality. The basis for

this is probably that they may alternatively be regarded as having a

conventionally established interpretation involving negative raising and external

negation (q.v. Westney 1995: 180).

3.9.2 Be supposed to: regional and stylistic variation

Table 3.20. Genre distribution of be supposed to

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US Avg

Dialogue 92 (33) 200 (72)

Monologue 21 (5) 42 (10)

Spoken

Total 63 (38) 137 (82) 146 (17) 115

Non-printed 30 (3) 50 (5)

Printed 20 (6) 40 (12)

Written

Total 23 (9) 43 (17) 100 (8) 55

Total 47 99 127 (25) 91

Necessity and obligation 83

As Mair and Leech’s (2006) figures in Table 1.4 indicate, be supposed to has

undergone a marked increase in recent British writing (113.6%), and a mild

increase (6.3%) in recent American writing. Be supposed to is marginally more

frequent in C-US than in ICE-GB (and quite unpopular in ICE-AUS), but at the

same time relatively more robust in spoken BrE than spoken AmE (with a

speech/writing ratio in ICE-GB of 137:43, or 3.18:1, as against 146:100, or

1.46:1, in C-US). Given the semantic similarities between be supposed to and

ought to, it may be conjectured that the increasing numbers of the lexico-modal

are occurring at the expense of the marginal modal.

3.10 Be to

Be to is a semantically strong semi-modal, like be bound to. In addition to its

deontic, epistemic and deontic meanings it has special uses in the protasis of

conditional constructions. It is on the grounds of its deontic meaning that be to is

included in the present chapter, rather than in Chapter 4 on the basis of its can-

like dynamic meaning, or Chapter 5 on the basis of its will-like temporal

meaning.

Table 3.21. Meanings/uses of be to

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US Total %

Deontic 46 26 31 (6) 103 (78) 23.8%

Epistemic 39 86 15 (3) 140 (128) 32.4%

Dynamic 5 18 5 (1) 28 (24) 6.5%

Conditional 40 79 20 (4) 139 (123) 32.2%

Indeterminate 5 12 5 (1) 22 (18) 5.1%

Total 135 221 76 (15) 432 (371) 100%

3.10.1 Meanings of be to

Be to expresses strong deontic necessity. It can be strongly subjective,

comparable to deontic must, as in (218), which reports an aggressive command:

(218) and afterward he had kicked her out of his car, telling her she was ugly,

and that he had never loved her, and that she was to remember his name,

because he was a man who was going places. (SBC Frown P04 145)

More commonly however it is objective, as in (219) and (220), where it is

semantically close to objective have to (with which it alternates in (219)), and in

(221), where the deontic source is an institutional regulation and be to is close to

deontic shall.

Chapter 384

(219) Liz and John had to get dressed and Liz was to ring the house we were

going to. John had to get the truck ready. I was to finish shutting my

cases, then wake Stuart up. (ICE-AUS W2B-004 16)

(220) We note that you are to discuss your overall condition with him upon

your next attendance. (ICE-AUS W1B-023 65)

(221) (6) The Council may appoint any other person who is neither a student nor

a member of staff of the University to be a member of the Council and the

person, on being appointed, is to be taken to be an appointed member of

the Council in addition to the members appointed under subsection(4).

(ICE-AUS W2D-005 186)

With strong deontic be to negation is internal, as in (222) (“it is stipulated

that they not be consulted”):

(222) and the peoples of Europe are not to be formally consulted at any point,

by referendum or otherwise. (ICE-GB W2E-001 29)

When deontic be to takes a passive complement as in (223), or an active

complement with a passive interpretation as in (224), its strength may be less,

comparable to that of deontic should.

(223) And I think the strength of the police authorities is something which is to

be applauded (ICE-GB S1B-033 23)

(224) Federal Environment Minister Ros Kelly says the public is not always to

blame for the country’s water problems (ICE-AUS S2B-004 248)

Even weaker in strength is the use of be to to express dynamic

(theoretical) possibility with passive complements. In (225), (226) and (227) be

to is similar in meaning and strength to dynamic can, with which it alternates in

(227).

(225) This is the dying society of “The Dead”. One of non-questioning being

replaced by another intellectual one. The evidence is to be found at

several points through the story. (ICE-AUS W1A-013 113)

(226) If there is no abrupt change, but rather a gradual transformation, in uncial

letter forms, it is perhaps in the use of uncial that a break or change is to

be observed. (ICE-GB w2A-008 031)

(227) Therefore an unconformity is to be found in the bottom of a rock unit and

can be identified by the varying dip or erosive nature between the two

beds. (ICEGB W1A-020 091)

Whereas, as we have seen, deontic be to takes internal negation, dynamic be to

takes external negation (is not to be found = “it is not possible for it to be found”:

there were no corpus examples).

Necessity and obligation 85

Be to has some further uses which are more temporal than modal. It may

refer to an event that is planned or scheduled, whether the plan/schedule is in the

present as in (228), or in the past as in (229).

(228) And fines are to be related for the first time to the offender’s income, so

that the jails will be less crowded with those who will not pay because

they cannot. (ICE-GB W2C-007 53)

(229) It appears that the network manager, which was to be sited in the Box

Office itself will now be in the general office along with the third

terminal. (ICE-GB W1B-021 48)

Here the clause containing be to does not indicate whether or not the situation

was actualized (although non-actualization can be implicated contextually as in

(229) above, or by means of the perfect aspect as in (230).

(230) The cost of the project was to have been about £9,000m, with much of the

money coming from the private sector. (ICE-GB W2E-008 046)

Actualization is, however, entailed in the “future in the past” use (Palmer 1990:

165, Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 206) referring to an event that was known to

occur subsequent to other events in the past. In this use, exemplified in (231) and

(232), be to is equivalent to would.

(231) By the time Samuel Stead came to Sydney, gold had paved the way for a

boom in the Australian economy that was to last for thirty years. (ICE-

AUS W2B-003 20)

(232) Sweetheart was then quite a local identity, although she was to be caught

by the rangers a few months later and moved to a reserve (ICE-AUS

W2F-010 51)

Finally, be to has some special uses in conditionals. In the protasis of an

open conditional, as in (233), it may carry a sense of purpose, while in the

protasis of a remote conditional, as in (234), it simply reinforces the remoteness

of the condition (compare if Done’s work broke the mould of its commercial

reputation).

(233) Here the Government has recognised that schoolteachers will have to

educate children about the environment if future generations are to solve

global problems (ICE-GB S2B-022 82 2)

(234) Still, Capon does indicate that if Done’s work was to break the mould of

its commercial reputation, he may be exhibited by leading galleries. (ICE-

AUS W2B-010 160)

Opinions differ as to whether the futurity or deontic use of be to is the

more basic. According to Quirk et al. (1985: 143) be to is to be regarded as

Chapter 386

“expressing futurity, with varied connotations of ‘compulsion’, ‘plan’, ‘destiny’,

etc, according to context”. By contrast, according to Perkins (1983: 69) is to

indicates that circumstances which involve “some conscious organization” are

disposed towards the occurrence of an event. In this account the futurity use is an

incidental consequence of the fact that determined actions necessarily take place

in subsequent time.

3.10.2 Be to: regional and stylistic variation

Table 3.22. Genre distribution of be to

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US Avg

Dialogue 33 (12) 94 (34)Monologue 83 (20) 271 (65)

Spoken

Total 53 (32) 165 (99) 52 (6) 90

Non-printed 250 (25) 180 (18)Printed 260 (78) 347 (104)

Written

Total 258 (103) 305 (122) 113 (9) 225

Total 135 221 76 (15) 144

According to Mair and Leech (2006: 328) be to is in decline in both written BrE

and written AmE, and especially the latter, where it is both less frequent, and

declining more rapidly. In the present study the difference between the two

Englishes is even more marked, with almost three times as many tokens in ICE-

GB as in C-US (221:76, or 2.90:1). The relative unpopularity of this item in

speech is most likely a factor in its declining fortunes (the ratio of tokens in

speech/writing being 270:590, or 1:2.18). One reflection of the greater vitality of

be to in BrE is the comparatively milder dispreference for this expression in

speech in that dialect (the speech/writing ratio in ICE-GB being 165:305, or

1:1.84, as against 52:113, or 1:2.17, in C-US). The relative dispreference for be

to in speech is even greater with Australian speakers, with tokens in speech

outstripped by those in writing by a ratio of 53:258, or 1:4.86.

3.11 Be bound to

The lexico-modal be bound to is a very minor item in frequency terms, but

included in the study on semantic grounds: it expresses strong deontic and

epistemic necessity and is sometimes claimed to be a suppletive for must.

Necessity and obligation 87

Table 3.23. Meanings of be bound to

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US Total %

Deontic 2 4 0 (0) 6 (6) 19.4%

Epistemic 7 12 5 (1) 24 (20) 77.4%

Indeterminate 0 1 0 (0) 1 (1) 3.2%

Total 9 17 5 (1) 31 (27) 100%

3.11.1 Meanings of be bound to

Like must, have to, have got to, need and need to, the lexico-modal be bound to

expresses strong modality. It is used both deontically and epistemically, though

the latter is considerably more common (see Table 3.23 above). Deontic be

bound to, which conveys a strong objective obligation, is exemplified in (235)

and (236):

(235) I’m bound to say there are a whole series of things that one has to consider

when one’s examining matters to do with the leadership of the

Conservative party (ICE-GB S1B-043 008)

(236) In my submission Your Worship you’re bound to act on uncontradicted

evidence if that evidence is credible (ICE-AUS S2A-068 104)

According to Palmer (1990: 55-56) epistemic be bound to operates as a

kind of suppletive for must when future time reference is involved. It is true that

substitution of must for ’s bound to in (237) would result in unacceptability.

(237) For for the shoppers so that there you know there may not be as many

spaces there but if he’s going at half past six he’s bound to get one (ICE-

AUS S1A-068 38)

However the notion that be bound to is a suppletive item is problematical. As

Coates (1983: 42-43) has noted, not only is be bound to rare, but also epistemic

must can at times be used with reference to a future situation (as we have seen in

Section 3.1.4 above). Furthermore, be bound to can be used with a present

situation, as Palmer himself (1990: 55) observes, and as the habitual present

example in (238) confirms, as well as a past situation as in (239).

(238) You’re bound to make mistakes early on and the instructor is there to help

you put them right (ICE-GB S2A-054 102)

(239) She’s bound to have lost it (ICE-GB S1A-093 230)

Epistemic be bound to is similar to must in expressing strong modality,

but whereas epistemic must has a sense of conclusion (suggesting the likelihood

that the speaker is drawing the most obvious conclusion), epistemic be bound to

carries a sense of inevitability (as reflected in the fact that epistemic will could

Chapter 388

readily serve as a substitute in (238) and (239), whereas must would be

impossible in (238) and would express conclusivity in (239).

The sense of inevitability carried by epistemic be bound to presents

problems for the view that it is a suppletive item: inevitability is not the same as

conclusivity and epistemic be bound to tends to be more readily substitutible by

epistemic will than it is by must.

3.11.2 Be bound to: regional and stylistic variation

Table 3.24. Genre distribution of be bound to

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US Avg

Dialogue 6 (2) 19 (7)

Monologue 13 (3) 13 (3)

Spoken

Total 8 (5) 17 (10) 0 (0) 8

Non-printed 10 (1) 10 (1)

Printed 10 (3) 20 (6)

Written

Total 10 (4) 18 (7) 5 (1) 11

Total 9 17 5 (1) 10

Be bound to enjoys greater representation in BrE than in the other two dialects

and greater popularity in more ‘conservative’ genres. It is preferred more in

writing than in speech (by a ratio of 33:25, or 1.32:1), marginally more in

monologue than dialogue (by a ratio of 26:25, or 1.04:1), and more in printed

than non-printed writing (by a ratio of 30:20, or 1.5:1).

Notes

1There were no tokens of oughtn’t to in the corpora.

2Pleonastic it is not listed by Coates (1983).

3Both Palmer (1990: 55) and Coates (1983: 42-43) point out that bound to

is available for expressing posteriority with epistemic necessity: see

further Section 3.11.

4Coates’s (1983: 46) claim that negative epistemic must does not exist, and

that the missing form in the must paradigm is supplied by can’t, is thus

wrong. The absence of tokens in ICE-AUS and C-US would appear to be

accidental. Collins (1991: 156) presents the following example from his

225,000-word corpus of AusE: He mustn’t have wanted the coupons

because he came up and give them to me.

Necessity and obligation 89

5It was not possible to determine if the same situation obtains in C-US,

because the Santa Barbara texts are not subclassified on the

dialogic/monologic dimension.

6Westney (1995: 170) makes the interesting point that as you should know

is natural as an opener when a speaker is giving information or advice, but

not as you ought to know, because the latter impolitely suggests, more

strongly than should, that the addressee doesn’t know something that it

would be appropriate for him/her to know.

7These figures provide some support for Palmer’s (1990: 56) suggestion

that You must be kidding is more likely in BrE than You’ve got to be

kidding.

8Westney (1995: 183) notes that past reference is possible, as in You’d

better have left by the time I get there (there were no examples in the

present corpora). However, note that even here the advised departure is (to

be) in the future with respect to the time of utterance.

Chapter 4

Possibility, permission and ability

The two modals of possibility, can and may, share a high level of semantic

overlap, so it is not surprising that there has been a good deal of attention paid to

the relationship between them in the literature (e.g. Lebrun 1965, Duffley et al.

1981, Dirven 1981, Collins 1988, Bolinger 1989, Klinge 1993, Coates 1995,

Groefsema 1995). Perhaps more than any other of the modal expressions

examined in this book, can and may raise challenging questions as to the

preferability of a polysemy or monosemy position. In analyzing their meanings,

as is the practice elsewhere in this book, we adopt a polysemy approach,

assuming that each modal has a number of independent meanings (a position

which, as noted in Section 2.4.2 above, is supported by the availability of

instances which, in abstraction from context, are ambiguous between an

epistemic and non-epistemic meaning; e.g. She may go may mean “She is

permitted to go” or “It is possible that she will go”). At the same time it must be

conceded that polysemy is less clearly in evidence with can, whose permission,

(root) possibility and ability meanings are not always readily distinguishable,

than it is with may. Despite this difference it is not necessary to infer that can is

monosemous, as do Leech and Coates (1980) who gather the various subsenses

into a single gradient unified by the notion of ‘inherency’, with one extreme

(weakest inherency) implying “the circumstances which enable p to happen are

independent of the participants in p”, and the other (strongest inherency) “the

circumstances which enable p to happen are inherent to the performer of p”

(1980: 83).

This chapter examines can and may, along with their preterite counterparts

could and might (including the negative forms can’t, cannot, mayn’t, couldn’t,

and mightn’t). Also discussed is the lexico-modal be able to (able to and unable

to preceded by all the inflectional forms of be).1

As Table 4.1 below shows, the frequency of can in the corpora is

considerably greater than that of may (7763:2261, or 3.4:1), and that of could

outstrips might (3357:1499, or 2.2:1). There are, furthermore, some striking

regional differences, may being more popular in ICE-GB than in the other two

corpora (see further Section 4.1.4), and might less popular in C-US than in the

other two corpora (see further Section 4.3.4).

Chapter 492

Table 4.1. Frequencies of the modal expressions of possibility and permission

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US Total

may 881 1,218 825 (162) 2,924 (2,261)

can 3,378 3,565 3,665 (720) 10,608 (7,663)

might 695 702 520 (102) 1,917 (1,499)

Modals

could 1,590 1,622 1,757 (345) 4,969 (3,557)

Total 6,544 7,107 6,765 (1,329) 20,417 (14,980)

Quasi-

modals

be able to 387 434 346 (68) 1,167 (889)

Total 6,931 7,541 7,111 (1,397) 21,583 (15,869)

4.1 May

As Table 4.2 shows, the epistemic possibility meaning of may is dominant

(accounting for 79.0% of tokens), with deontic and dynamic possibility being at

best minor meanings. As we shall see in Section 4.2, while can expresses similar

meanings to may, the proportions are quite different, with can being dominantly

dynamic.

Table 4.2. Meanings of may

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US Total %

Epistemic 651 1,023 636 (125) 2,310 (1,799) 79.0%Deontic 78 70 56 (11) 204 (159) 7.0%Dynamic 101 60 76 (15) 237 (176) 8.1%Indeterminate 51 65 56 (11) 172 (127) 5.9%

Total 881 1,218 825 (162) 2,924 (2,261) 100%

4.1.1 Epistemic may

Epistemic may can be either subjective or objective, though the latter possibility

is quite rare, and rarely mentioned in the literature. Coates (1983: 134) is an

exception, but she nevertheless claims not to have found any instances in her

data. The examples in (1) and (2) illustrate the subjective use, expressing the

speaker’s lack of knowledge as to whether or not the proposition is true, and

assessment of it as merely a possibility. In (1) the speaker’s lack of confidence in

the truth of the proposition is reflected in the harmonic combination with I s’pose,

and in (2) with I dunno.

(1) Ah we’re not talking about mutualism so much now except that of course

they don’t have to eat as much algae as they would normally do because

they have maintained the chloroplasts and I s’pose that may be some

Possibility, permission and ability 93

marginal significance in a mutualistic sort of way to the algae that they are

feeding on (ICE-AUS S2A-025 111)

(2) I dunno. They may have (ICE-AUS S1A-073 102)

Verstraete (2001) claims that epistemic modality cannot be objective,

invoking as an argument the resistance of epistemic modals to interrogatives (a

resistance which presumably derives from the orientation of interrogatives

towards the interlocutor rather than the speaker) and to if-clauses (the resistance

here deriving from the suspension of the speaker’s commitment to the

proposition). However instances of objective may do occur, where the estimation

is one that is entertained more generally. In (3) the impersonal extraposition with

It’s thought as matrix clause, and in (4) the existential construction there are

suggestions …, indicate that the judgement is not limited to the speaker but rather

on public record, as it were.

(3) It’s thought the man may have committed suicide (ICE-GB S2B-016 134)

(4) The nature of the mutation in sugary maize has not been characterized

biochemically, but there are suggestions that it may involve a debranching

enzyme. (ICE-AUS W2A-038 164)

Epistemic may has a concessive use, which accounts for 4.9% of all

epistemic may tokens and which, according to Coates (1983: 136), serves to

‘soften’ the speaker’s assertion. However, it is more accurately interpreted as

involving a type of pragmatic strengthening (see further Section 2.5.2 above) in

which the speaker concedes the truth of the proposition, rather than expressing a

lack of confidence in it. Thus in (5) below the clause containing concessive may

is equivalent to the unmodalized clause “although the timing is uncertain”, and

similarly in (6) to “although we believe the rulers of this period and their advisers

were misguided and deluded in …”).

(5) The timing may be uncertain but the outcome is absolutely certain (ICE-

GB S2B-005 116)

(6) However misguided and deluded we may believe the rulers of this period

and their advisers to have been in seeking to resolve conflicts by force of

arms, the relative weakness of diplomatic alternatives must always be

borne in mind. (ICE-GB W2A-010 17)

The time of the situation with epistemic may can be past, as in (7), present

as in (8) (including ‘general present’: see below), or future as in (9).

(7) Instead, it seems that relying on the free market in health may have

brought nemesis on those who deny the right of all to health and trust to

the impersonal forces of the market to protect them. (ICE-GB W2A-019

70)

Chapter 494

(8) We can’t eat beef that may be contaminated with BSE and cheese that may

be full of lysteria. (ICE-GB W2B-014 26)

(9) One person who thinks it is not, and who suspects we may be in for a flip

of the current system (and therefore the climate) into a new pattern is

Wallace Broecker. (ICE-GB W2B-025 45)

The use of may with a general present time situation as in (10) and (11)

below raises challenging issues of classification.

(10) In severe cases, the condition may seriously interfere with the child’s

schooling and special arrangements may have to be made. (ICE-GB W2B-

023 24)

(11) The aura only lasts a few moments before the convulsion begins but may

be long enough to enable the patient to get himself into a safe and

comfortable position so that he will not hurt himself by falling to the floor.

(ICE-GB W2B-023 40)

The meaning of may here is somewhat ambivalent between epistemic

modality (paraphraseable by “it is possible that”) and dynamic modality

(paraphraseable by “it is possible for”), and this has prompted some writers (e.g.

Coates 1983, Vihla 2000) to characterize cases such as those in (10) and (11) as

involving neutralization or ‘merger’. They are nevertheless here analyzed as

epistemic on the grounds that the main focus of attention is on the speaker’s

uncertainty as to whether or not, at any given moment, a situation whose potential

for occurrence is not in doubt will be actualized (and may be paraphrased by “it is

possible that … will”).

Further support for this position is to be found in the incidence of

harmonic combinations with epistemic expressions, such as the occurrence of

may in an extraposed that-clause with it is possible as matrix clause as in (12),

and with the epistemic adjunct possibly as in (13):

(12) Their primary role is likely to be in the removal of nutrients (nitrogen and

phosphorus), although in the absence of light it is possible that they may

behave heterotrophically and play a small part in BOD removal. (ICE-GB

W2A-021 22)

(13) they may possibly increase the capacity of an individual organism to track

or avoid change. (ICE-GB W1A-009 56)

Finally, the compatibility between may and intensifying adverb well, exemplified

in (14), contrasts with the resistance of can to it:

(14) The physical mechanisms governing intra-plate earthquakes are not well-

understood although they may well be associated with previous faulting

activity (Johnston and Kantor, 1990). (ICE-AUS W2A-033 25)

Possibility, permission and ability 95

As Table 4.3 indicates, the frequencies for may used with future, present

and general present situations were quite similar, with past situations less

common. C-US is slightly out of step with the other two corpora, with relatively

more present tokens and relatively fewer past and general present.

Table 4.3. Time reference with epistemic may

Future Present Past General pres Total

ICE-GB 291 (28.4%) 267 (26.1%) 120 (11.7%) 345 (33.7%) 1023 (100%)

ICE-AUS 187 (28.7%) 174 (26.7%) 66 (10.1%) 224 (34.4%) 651 (100%)

C-US 35 (28.0%) 60 (48.0%) 5 (4.0%) 25 (20.0%) 125 (100%)

Total 513 (28.0%) 501 (27.8%) 191 (10.6%) 594 (33.0%) 1,799 (100%)

4.1.2 Deontic may

Leech (2003: 232-234) notes that while epistemic may has increased in frequency

in recent decades, there has been a marked decline in the frequency of deontic

may (mainly in speech). In the present data it is the least common of the

meanings of may (see Table 4.2 above). Deontic may is prototypically, but not

more frequently, subjective, with the speaker as the deontic source as in (15), or –

more commonly – the addressee in questions as in (16) and in conditionals as in

(17). The rarity of subjective examples is reflected in the incidence of somewhat

formal, formulaic, tokens of the type in (16) and (17).

(15) You may use my desk.

Well wait a minute, it’s a royal mess, isn’t it. (C-US SBC-019 138-140)

(16) Oh who’s he meeting there may I ask (ICE-AUS S1A-058 175)

(17) Let me develop the point if I may Jonathan (ICE-GB S1B-043 119)

In the corpora, examples of this type are surpassed in frequency by those

in which the deontic possibility is objective, found predominantly in the

statement of rules and regulations in bureaucratic and administrative writing, as

in:

(18) Your local Training Officer can assist you in understanding and meeting

your obligations. Any problems that arise may be referred to the

Vocational Training Board. (ICE-AUS W2D-002 258)

4.1.3 Dynamic may

Epistemic possibility is a homogeneous semantic category, concerned with

verification, with the question of whether a situation has been, is, or will be,

actualized). By contrast, dynamic possibility is a rather heterogeneous category,

as reflected in the plethora of terms that have been proposed in attempts to

Chapter 496

generalize across its range of subsenses. None of these terms seems capable of

capturing the full range of dynamic senses. For instance the notion of

‘potentiality’, as invoked by Klinge (1993), does not encompass dynamic can as

used with verbs of perception which, we argue in Section 4.2.3.2 below, often

denotes actualization rather than merely potentiality. The further notions of

‘inherency’ (Leech and Coates 1980) and ‘intrinsicness’ (Bolinger 1989) cannot

be convincingly applied to dynamic can in its ‘circumstantially possible’ use (see

Section 4.2.3.1), since the orientation of can here is to external rather than

internal factors.

Dynamic possibility is, we have seen, a minor meaning for may but a

major one for can. Accordingly the discussion in the present section will be quite

brief, with a more detailed account reserved for dynamic can in Section 4.2.3.

May is used to express two types of dynamic possibility. The first,

‘theoretical possibility’ (a term suggested by Leech 1987), involves a potentiality

for action that resides in the external situation. In this use may is often associated

with a greater degree of formality than can. Examples follow:

(19) it’s not necessary uh for uh me to dwell at length upon, the Civil Evidence

Act uh or uh the uh Rules i in regard to, uh what evidence may be uh,

adduced (ICE-GB S2A-063 17)

(20) The role of the convenor is to direct the conduct and activities of the

Selection Committee so it may find the most efficient applicant for the

vacant position. (ICE-AUS W2D-001 67)

The second use, ‘dynamic implication’ (a term suggested by Palmer

1990), involves a potentiality for action that is the basis for an implied directive

speech act. This category differs from theoretical possibility to the extent that it

requires an expansion of the semantic framework into pragmatics. The literal

meaning of may in the following example is dynamic, but a more satisfactory

interpretation requires reference to its directive illocutionary force.

(21) And you may remember that the organisations the republics that were in

the Soviet Union competed in the recent Winter Olympics under the title

Commonwealth of Independent States (ICE-AUS S2A-027 40)

4.1.4 May: regional and stylistic variation

Figures supplied by Mair and Leech (2006) indicate that may has been

undergoing a decline in frequency in recent decades, one more marked in AmE

(32.4%) than BrE (17.4%): see Section 1.4. This regional difference is reflected,

in the present study (see Table 4.4), in the striking difference in overall

frequencies for may between ICE-GB (1218 tokens) on the one hand and C-US

(825 tokens per million words). ICE-AUS, with 881 tokens, patterns more closely

with C-US than ICE-GB.

Possibility, permission and ability 97

The comparative unpopularity of may in speech over writing (by an

overall ratio of 3.3:1 across the three corpora) reflects its declining fortunes in

Modern English. The findings presented in Table 4.4 suggest that this decline is

most advanced in C-US, where the speech vs writing gap is the greatest (3.7:1, by

comparison with 3.2:1 for ICE-AUS and 3.1:1 for ICE-GB). A comparison of the

frequencies for subvarieties in ICE-AUS and ICE-GB confirms the greater

conservatism of the latter for the written component. The printed vs non-printed

ratio for ICE-GB, based on normalized frequencies, is 2257:1420, or 1.6:1,

compared with 1427:1690, or 0.8:1 for ICE-AUS (see Appendix Table 12).

The present study provides some support for Coates’s (1995) claim that

“may is the chief exponent of epistemic possibility in British English, but is less

common in American English, where may has connotations of formality” (p.64).

Not only are there more tokens of epistemic may per million words in ICE-GB

(1023) than in C-US (636), but the notion that epistemic may has connotations of

formality in AmE is supported by the finding that the ratio of written to spoken

tokens in C-US is weighted more towards the (generally more formal) written

categories (4.2:1) than is the case for ICE-GB (2.2:1), and also for ICE-AUS

(2.7:1): see Appendix Table 12.

Table 4.4. Genre distribution of may

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US Avg

Dialogue 350 (126) 544 (196)Monologue 658 (158) 846 (203)

Spoken

Total 473 (284) 665 (399) 395 (46) 511

Non-printed 1,690 (169) 1,420 (142)Printed 1,427 (428) 2,257 (677)

Written

Total 1,493 (597) 2,048 (819) 1,450 (116) 1,664

Total 881 1,218 825 (162) 975

4.2 Can

Can contrasts with may in the dominance of the dynamic possibility meaning,

across all three dialects (see Table 4.5). The popularity of deontic can is not even

across the corpora. According to Coates (1995: 64) “can is less commonly used

to express permission in American English; may is the normal exponent of

permission” (p.64). However the findings of the present study suggest otherwise:

not only are there relatively more tokens of deontic can per million words in C-

US than in the other two corpora, but as Table 4.2 above indicates, deontic may is

relatively dispreferred in C-US.

Chapter 498

Table 4.5. Meanings of can

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US Total %

Dynamic 2,729 2,953 2,906 (571) 8,588 (6,253) 81.0%

Deontic 353 279 417 (82) 1,049 (714) 9.9%

Epistemic 24 32 56 (11) 112 (67) 1.1%

Indeterminate 272 301 285 (56) 858 (629) 8.1%

Total 3,378 3,565 3,665 (720) 10,608 (7663) 100%

4.2.1 Epistemic can

The status of can as a modal that can express epistemic possibility is a matter of

some controversy. According to some (e.g. Collins 1988, Huddleston and Pullum

2002: 180) can may serve as a marker of epistemic possibility, albeit restricted to

non-affirmative contexts, as in (22) and (23):

(22) There are plenty of funds available to educate women about osteoporosis -

thanks to an exhaustive public health campaign there can’t be a woman

alive in Australia unaware that calcium rich foods help prevent the disease

of bone deterioration. (ICE-AUS W2B-012 100)

(23) How can it be an intrusion of privacy if the newspapers are being

presented with the stories from the main participants on a silver plate

(ICE-AUS S2B-004 159)

For others (e.g. Coates 1983) can is merely a suppletive form for must which

supplies the missing non-affirmative form in the epistemic must paradigm.

Interestingly, in a subsequent publication Coates (1995) suggests that can is

beginning to develop a ‘genuinely’ affirmative epistemic use in AmE, a

development which she correctly observes is in conformity with the “historical

pattern of epistemic meanings developing from root meanings” (Coates 1995:

62). Coates quotes an example she heard at a symposium at the University of

New Mexico in 1992: we hope this coding system can be useful (to other linguists

working in the field). An example such as the following from ICE-GB shows that

the emergence of assertive epistemic can is not limited to AmE.

(24) B: If if girls have uhm I’m going to show my ignorance in front of the tape

here. If girls have black eyebrows but really blond hair is there something

odd there does that

A: I think some guys do as well

B: Oh it it’s not it doesn’t mean they’ve dyed it then does it

A: I think they can have but I’m not sure. I think they’re just darker, the

hair’s just dark. It may mean their hair is dyed actually (ICE-GB S1A-041

46)

Possibility, permission and ability 99

Like epistemic may, epistemic can is typically subjective, as in (25) and

(26), where the inferencing on which the speaker’s assessment of possibilities is

based is spelt out respectively in the because-clause and in the preceding

coordinated clause.

(25) No it can’t be hundred percent wrong ’cause the program um if you don’t

have your exact time of birth you set it to oblique orbit of zero for the time

and PM for the hour (ICE-AUS S1A-064 259)

(26) Oh I’ve only been back a few minutes anyway but the school hasn’t

phoned so he can’t be too bad (ICE-AUS S1A-096 95)

Like epistemic may, epistemic can can be used with a past situation as in

(27), present as in (28), or future as in (29). With future time situations, epistemic

may is common while can is rare, though Huddleston and Pullum’s (2002: 182)

claim that the latter is “barely possible” is an overstatement, as shown by the

naturalness of (29).

(27) No they can’t have done it (ICE-GB S1B-071 34)

(28) It’s just uh it’s just it’s so convoluted and all the rest of it that it can’t

possibly be right (ICE-GB S1A-005 32

(29) Well I waited for the weather to break and I kept looking out thinking oh

its it’s going to you know this can’t last all day (ICE-AUS S1A-100 7)

As we have noted in Section 4.1.1, the use of may with a general present

time situation (as in (10) and (11) above) presents some classificatory difficulties.

Apparently similar examples with can are found, as in (30):

(30) But it is a reminder that pain can be the one reality in one’s life. It can be

the only thing that anyone even the Son of Man can think about. (ICE-GB

S2B-028 75)

However, there is a semantic distinction, admittedly subtle, between may and can

in these cases, one determined by the boundary which separates epistemic and

dynamic modality. May falls on the epistemic side of the boundary, expressing

the speaker’s uncertainty as to the serial actualization of a situation over a period

of time (“it is possible that … will”). On the other hand can, which falls on the

dynamic side, focuses merely upon the potential for occurrence of a situation (“it

is possible for … to”). This distinction has been discussed in the literature, with a

variety of labels applied to relevant senses of may and can: ‘factual possibility’

and ‘theoretical possibility’ (Leech 1987); ‘indeterminacy’ and ‘contingency’

(Van der Auwera 1986); ‘extrinsic possibility’ and ‘intrinsic possibility’

(Bolinger 1989); and ‘possibility’ and ‘potentiality’ (Klinge 1993).

Some evidence for a ‘different meanings’ position was presented in

Section 4.1.1 above. A merger interpretation might be argued to draw support

from examples such as (31) and (32), where the alternation between may and can

Chapter 4100

is suggestive of semantic closeness between may and can. However it is not

necessary to assume that two meanings have merged into one in such cases. It is

more plausible to maintain that the meanings of may and can are in fact

distinguishable – as epistemic and dynamic respectively – and that there are

certain contexts which are compatible with both meanings. Casting further doubt

on the validity of a merger interpretation is the strong tendency for can to precede

may in alternations of the type in (31) and (32): if one were to assume that may

and can expressed the same meaning in such alternations, then it might be

expected that their relative ordering would be random.

(31) There can be a similar problem with satellite dishes, where several

“footprints” may overlap a particular geographical area. (ICE-GB W2D-

014 29)

(32) It can lead to a disproportionate preoccupation for example with esoteric

tax issues which may affect only a handful of people invariably the

already-advantaged as compared with the unattended deserts of popular

ills particularly in fields of poverty law and tribunals (ICE-GB S2A-039

90)

4.2.2 Deontic can

It has been argued that deontic may and can are semantically distinct (generally

by writers whose allegiance is to a monosemy approach, and who therefore

assume – surely counterintuitively – that the same meaning can never be

expressed by different modals). For Vanparys (1987: 232) the difference is that

may is subjective and can objective: “May is used to perform acts of granting

permission, while can is used to state that someone has permission”. Groefsema

(1995: 68) is of the view that “when I ask you May I smoke in here, I make my

smoking solely dependent on your permission, whereas when I ask Can I smoke

in here, I communicate that your permission is only one factor under

consideration”. Duffley et al. (1981) characterize may as expressing the ‘virtual’

giving of permission, involving some external permitter, whereas with can it is

intrinsically possessed by the permittee. Bolinger (1989: 7) differentiates can and

may in terms of ‘intrinsic’ and ‘extrinsic’ possibility. In his opinion “Can refers

to what a person, thing, or situation is endowed with, whether naturally in place

(physical, mental) or implanted (authorized, permitted); it invokes what is

immanent, inherent. May refers to the external, to what transcends the entity or

situation.”

It is certainly true that deontic can is more often objective than subjective,

as in (33):

(33) As a race official, John cannot place any bets on the Cup. But the rest of

Australia wagered an amazing $71.4 million with the TAB last Cup day.

(ICE-AUS W2B-002 44)

Possibility, permission and ability 101

Nevertheless there is no shortage of examples in the present data in which

deontic can and may are semantically parallel, even though they differ in their

frequency of occurrence and often in formality: (34)–(36) below match (15)–(17)

above.

(34) You can come back for a second helping (ICE-AUS S1A-004 257)

(35) Uh can I pick the boxes up please (ICE-GB S1A-068 184)

(36) If I can partly misquote John and say yes indeed it adds to the gaiety of the

country (ICE-GB S1B-024 26)

4.2.3 Dynamic can

In Section 4.1.3 above we identified two uses of dynamic may, ‘theoretical

possibility’ and ‘dynamic implication’. Both are found with can, as is a third use

that is not available for may, ‘ability’. Ability involves a potentiality for action

that lies within the capacities of the subject-referent. Table 4.6 below presents

figures for these dynamic possibility uses, not only for can but also may. The

theoretical possibility use is the most common of the three dynamic uses,

accounting for 77.2% of all dynamic tokens of may, and 65.8% of can. The

ability use, which is not found with may, is expressed by just over one quarter of

dynamic possibility (28.7%) cans, and is less popular in ICE-AUS than it is in the

British and American corpora. The dynamic implicature use is a minor one for

can (accounting for 5.6% of its dynamic uses), and relatively more common in

ICE-GB, but quite common with may (22.8%), though comparatively rare in ICE-

GB.

Table 4.6. Dynamic possibility with can and may

4.2.3.1 Theoretical possibility

In the clearest cases of theoretical possibility there is explicit mention of the

enabling circumstances, as in (37) and (38):

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US Total

Theoretical can 1,869 1,895 1,883 (370) 5,647 (4,134)

possibility may 75 52 56 (11) 183 (138)

Ability can 703 862 896 (176) 2,461 (1,741)

Dynamic can 157 196 127 (25) 480 (378)

implication may 26 8 20 (4) 54 (38)

Total can 2,729 2,953 2,906 (571) 8,588 (6,253)

may 101 60 76 (15) 237 (176)

Chapter 4102

(37) Eucalypts that grow on nutrient-poor soils, however, cannot do this

because the lack of nutrients limits their growth. (ICE-AUS W2B-024

190)

(38) It’s great to have my own bolt-hole where I can do as I like without

having to fit around anyone else (ICE-GB W1B-013 54)

There are two recognizable subtypes of theoretical possibility, ‘existential’

and ‘rational’. Existential modality (to use the term suggested by Palmer 1990

and adopted by, amongst others, Facchinetti 2002, and Huddleston and Pullum

2002) lies on the borderline between modality and aspectuality, and is found with

can but not may. Its characteristic feature is an implicit existential quantifier,

which involves either set membership as in (39) (“Some of these movements are

quite large”) or characteristic behaviour as in (40) “She sometimes acts in a

pushy way”).

(39) These movements can be quite large. Sorensen et al., (10) indicate that

movements of 50 mm are not uncommon, and in extreme cases,

movements as high as 100 mm have been recorded. (ICE-AUS W2A-034

40)

(40) She can be pushy (ICE-AUS S1A-045 181)

Harmonic combinations – particularly with the adjunct sometimes – are

common, as in (41) and (42):

(41) Construction can now begin with the usual format of resistors first,

although it can sometimes be an advantage to fit the IC sockets at an early

stage to assist in the less obvious location of other components. (ICE-GB

W2B-032 73)

(42) UUmm and you’ve got it and they don’t get it back till the Sunday and

they can really make life tough and that can sometimes tempt children to

steal it back (ICE-AUS S2A-039 184)

Existential possibility can is commonly encountered in scientific

discourse, as in (43) and (44):

(43) The interaction of an incident ultrasonic beam with a defect can cause a

number of different responses. (ICE-GB W2A-036 20)

(44) Being labelled “maternally” or “paternally derived” can affect the degree

to which the gene is expressed. (ICE-AUS W1A-005 23)

The second subtype of theoretical possibility, rational modality (to again

use Palmer’s 1990 term), is similar in some respects to objective deontic

possibility, the difference being that with the latter there is an identifiable

personal or institutional deontic source, whereas with rational modality

actualization is licensed by more abstract factors pertaining to what is generally

Possibility, permission and ability 103

considered to be reasonable, legitimate, societally/culturally acceptable, and the

like, as in (45) and (46):

(45) this will bring us to some questions about what can reasonably be

expected from organised government, operating within a framework of

nations, in which nationhood, is regarded as incomplete, unless it entails

sovereignty (ICE-GB S2B-048 13)

(46) But who can deny it’s brought entertainment and enjoyment to countless

hundreds of people (ICE-AUS S1B-036 227)

4.2.3.2 Ability

The ability meaning of can is commonly treated as distinct from its other

meanings. The justification for the present analysis of ability as a subcategory of

dynamic possibility is its association with the notion of potentiality, albeit one

which lies in the subject-referent. Ability can normally requires an animate

subject with agentive function, as in (47) and (48), but inanimate subjects can

also be found, as in (49) and (50):

(47) and uh about the age of four most children can actually speak to virtually

the same standard uh that a adult can speak (ICE-GB S1B-003 54)

(48) And he can play chess and I can’t (ICE-AUS S1A-076 147)

(49) The features for feeding paper that are built into a printer depend on the

use for which it was designed. The two types of paper these printers can

handle are cut sheet and/or continuous forms. (ICE-AUS W2B-038 31)

(50) Modern launch vehicles have more efficient engines and can launch a

heavier payload: typically as much as two per cent of their launch weight.

(ICE-GB W2B-035 71)

The ability meaning may be close to actualization, though it may not be

realized. Compare the following two examples. In (51) we understand that the

record-breaking in question is yet to be achieved, while in (52) the evidence for

the subject-referent’s ability is past actualization (there is little difference

between (52) and its unmodalized counterpart, You speak French).

(51) Can Haley Lewis break the Commonwealth record I don’t think she can

(ICE-AUS S2B-016(C):49)

(52) You you can speak French. Oh well you’ve studied French and I’m

studying German and you’re studying Japanese. (ICE-AUS S1A-037 217)

With verbs denoting perception and cognition there is an especially low

degree of modality. Thus in (53)–(56) it would make little difference if the modal

were absent (I see the Prime Minister; I hear the crowds …; I remember vividly

…; I don’t understand …).

Chapter 4104

(53) And now I can see the Prime Minister, John Major (ICE-GB S2A-019 30)

(54) Outside I can hear the crowds cheering as Her Majesty the Queen arrives

with the Duke of Edinburgh to be greeted by the Minister of Glasgow

Cathedral Dr William Morris one of her chaplains (ICE-GB S2A-020 118)

(55) I can remember vividly my first day at primary school (ICE-GB S1A-076

103)

(56) No I can’t understand any of this at all (ICE-GB W1B-003 170)

4.2.3.3 Dynamic implication

As noted in Section 4.1.3 above, with the category of dynamic implication the

modal is used in the formulation of an indirect speech act. The utterances in the

following examples are more than merely statements of dynamic possibility: the

illocutionary force of (57) is offer, request in (58), suggestion in (59), and

instruction in (60).

(57) Well I I can write on your behalf (ICE-AUS S1B-073 272)

(58) Can you pass the s the sour cream please (ICE-GB S1A-071 141)

(59) Perhaps we can talk about that on another occasion (ICE-GB S1B-055 65)

(60) Well, I’ll pour the ladies’, you can pour the men’s (ICE-AUS S1A-004

116)

As noted by Facchinetti (2002: 237), dynamic implication is common in

instructional and didactic registers, as in (61) and (62):

(61) So in fact the far side of this temple here, and there you can just make out

some, uh, stony parts which are in fact the remains of outdoor altars

because you offer sacrifices sacrifices of huge animals like oxen which

have just been, just been killed (ICE-GB S2A-024 94)

(62) OK this one has obviously got its body wall cut up so I’m not gonna do

another one now this afternoon but you can look at this one (ICE-AUS

S2A-052 10)

4.2.4 Can: regional and stylistic variation

Mair and Leech’s (2006) diachronic figures, as presented in Table 1.4 above,

indicate that, by contrast with may, can has been relatively stable in recent

decades, enjoying a small increase in British writing (2.2%) and suffering a small

decline in American writing (1.5%). However, as the figures in Table 4.7

indicate, the three corpora vary in the relative popularity of can in their spoken

and written components. The figures suggest greater vitality for this modal in

AmE (the ratio of tokens in speech to writing in C-US being 1.9:1) than in AusE

(ICE-AUS 1.5:1) and BrE (ICE-GB 1.2:1). Interestingly, closer inspection of the

figures for subvarieties of speech and writing in ICE-GB and ICE-AUS (not

Possibility, permission and ability 105

possible for C-US) suggests greater vitality for can in BrE than AusE. The extent

to which can’s popularity in dialogue exceeds that in monologue is greater in

ICE-GB (4275:3117, or 1.4:1) than in ICE-AUS (3908:3829, or 1.02:1). A

similar conclusion is suggested by a comparison of the ratio for can in non-

printed as against printed texts (ICE-GB 3780:3000, or 1.3:1; ICE-AUS

2570:2650, or 0.96:1).

Table 4.7. Genre distribution of can

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US Avg

Dialogue 3,908 (1407) 4,275 (1,539)Monologue 3,829 (919) 3,117 (748)

Spoken

Total 3,877 (2,326) 3,817 (2,287) 4,525 (527) 4,073

Non-printed 2,570 (257) 3,780 (378)Printed 2,650 (795) 3,000 (900)

Written

Total 2,630 (1,052) 3,195 (1,278) 2,413 (193) 2,746

Total 3,378 3,565 3,665 (720) 3,536

4.3 Might and could

It has been our practice thus far to devote each section to a single modal

expression. However, because as preterite modal forms could and might share

certain uses which normally differentiate them from can and may respectively, it

is preferable to treat them together.

4.3.1 Uses of might and could as preterite forms

Two broad uses may be distinuished, both of which serve to distance the situation

from the reality of the present moment: temporal and hypothetical.

4.3.1.1 Temporal uses

Temporal could and might may both serve either to identify a past time situation,

or as a backshifted preterite. Could occurs readily in the past time use, as in (63).

Might, on the other hand, has been claimed to be obsolete in this use. For

example, according to Joos (1964: 187) might “never has real-past meaning in

modern English; its remoteness is that of unreality.” This claim is wrong: might is

not obsolete, though certainly rare, and largely restricted to formal and literary

genres, as in (64).

(63) After two meals from the Small Palace Garden, Ella began to make dinner

for the film-makers. She could tolerate fish and chips once a week, but

would go no further along that path. (ICE-AUS W2F-020 9)

Chapter 4106

(64) His Honour would lightly touch the arm of a young waitress who was

passing, he would put his hand on her wrist, she would feel constrained to

bend close and listen to his whispered request, so that, with their foreheads

almost touching, for a moment the two would seem to be lovers. He might

even lift the fall of her hair from her cheek and hold it gently aside in a

manner both suggestive and dotted line well, judicious, quaintly formal,

certainly irreproachable, in order to murmur his order privately. (ICE-

AUS W2F-016 71)

Preterite could and might may also be used as backshifted counterparts of

present tense can and may, as in (65) and (66). Here they are non-deictic, the past

time reference being identified by the matrix verb.

(65) He told the C B I conference in Glasgow that Britain could protect its own

interests within the European Community without having to protest about

threats to national sovereignty (ICE-GB S2B-007 14)

(66) Virgo Lonergan had started life as Virginia. After seventeen years of being

asked if Santa Claus existed, and five of smutty puns, she decided she

might as well go the whole hog. (ICE-AUS W2F-008 26)

Backshifted could and might are not restricted to indirect reported speech

(notice that the matrix clause in (66) above expresses a reported thought), and

may be used to represent interior monologue, as in (67):

(67) How could she wait, with ever-increasing anticipation, for her dead child

to come back to her (ICE-GB W2F-020 152)

4.3.1.2 Hypothetical uses

Two subclasses may again be identified, which we shall refer to as ‘unreal’ and

‘weak’. The unreal use is found in the apodosis of unreal conditionals (with the

protasis expressed as in (68), implicit in a construction other than an if-clause as

in (69), or textually implied as in (70)), and in the complement of wish as in (71).

Hypothetical could and might are used for talking about a counterfactual situation

(for example in (68) it is presupposed that Mr Gorbachev does not have the

implied level of respect, in (70) that the discussion has not taken place, and in

(71) that the speaker cannot drive):

(68) In the meantime, Mr Gorbachev might achieve greater respect if he

dropped the pretence that his republics would enjoy equality - let alone

sovereignty. (ICE-GB W2E-008 22)

(69) An effective judicial control of the preparation of serious criminal cases

for trial could greatly reduce the opportunities of police wrongdoing at

that stage or at the very least expose such wrongdoing before trial (ICE-

GB S2B-037 113)

Possibility, permission and ability 107

(70) There are many parts of the climate system that we could discuss uhm

(ICE-GB S2A-0143 22)

(71) I felt so guilty not driving you on Frid on Saturday though I wish I could

drive (ICE-AUS S1A-094 79)

Some unreal tokens are used to express what Huddleston and Pullum

(2002: 201-202) refer to as ‘unactualized possibility’, which they regard as a

distinct use. In (72), for example, we understand that the adoption of a different

attitude did not occur, even though it was logically possible:

(72) So uh if it had been put like that you might have taken a different attitude

(ICE-GB S1B-069 158)

The weak use of could and might has arisen via pragmatic extension from

the unreal use. In the absence of an implicit condition the ‘irrealis’ meaning has

receded, enabling the modal to superimpose a component of tentativeness or

diffidence onto the meaning expressed by its present tense counterpart. In (73),

for example, the illocutionary force associated with might, a tentative marker of

dynamic possibility, is that of polite suggestion.

(73) It might be an idea if you were to spend some time with each head of

department here, let them show you their areas of work (ICE-GB S1B-053

101)

Weak might serves most frequently as a diffident marker of epistemic

possibility, a use that accounts for 59.5% of all tokens in the three corpora. AmE

leads the way in the development of this use, which accounts for 63.0% of tokens

in C-US, followed closely by AusE (62.5% in ICE-AUS) and BrE (53.8% in ICE-

GB). Moreover, as discussed in Section 4.3.2.1 below, a further development has

taken place, with the diffidence associated with might eroding to the point that it

has come to express a degree of likelihood comparable to that of epistemic may.

In addition to this, as we shall see, could appears to be undergoing a similar

semantic development, with a weak epistemic use evolving from the unreal use

via bleaching of irrealis meaning, and subsequent shedding of its tentativeness

marking.

As indicated in Table 4.8, the temporal use is less common than the

hypothetical use with both modals, in all three corpora, but relatively moreso with

might (5.3:1) than with could (1.5:1). Of the three varieties AusE evidences the

strongest relative popularity of hypothetical might over past might (6.3:1), but the

least for hypothetical could over past could (1.3:1). This finding could be

interpreted as suggesting that the process by which may and might are becoming

increasingly distinct from one another as present and past inflectional forms of a

single morpheme is more advanced in AusE than in the other two varieties (see

further Section 4.3.3).

Chapter 4108

One striking difference between might and could concerns the relative

proportions of the unreal and weak hypothetical uses. In fact there is a degree of

complementarity between the two preterite forms. With might the weak use is

almost five times more popular (4.9:1) than the unreal use. By contrast with could

it is the unreal use that is more popular than the weak use, by a broadly similar

margin (4.4:1). The contrast is more pronounced in C-US than in the other two

corpora (with a weak to unreal ratio of 5.7:1 with might, and an unreal to weak

ratio of 5:1 with could).

Table 4.8. Uses of might and could as preterite forms

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US Total

Past 93 118 87 (17) 298 (228)

Unreal 81 120 61 (12) 262 (213)

Weak 503 447 346 (68) 1,296 (1,018)Hypothetical

Total 584 567 407 (80) 1,558 (1,231)

Indeterminate 18 22 25 (5) 65 (45)

might

Total 695 702 519 (102) 1,916 (1,499)

Past 686 598 692 (136) 1,976 (1,420)

Unreal 659 691 870 (171) 2,220 (1,521)

Weak 230 320 173 (34) 723 (584)Hypothetical

Total 889 1,011 1,043 (205) 2,943 (2,105)

Indeterminate 15 13 20 (4) 48 (32)

could

Total 1,590 1,622 1,909 (345) 5,121 (3,557)

4.3.2 Meanings of might and could

The semantic profiles of might and could are broadly comparable to those of their

present tense counterparts, may and can. Like may, might is dominantly

epistemic. The main differences relate to the minor meanings of deontic

possibility (which is extremely rare with might) and dynamic possibility (which is

twice as popular with might as with may). Similarly, both could and can are

dominantly dynamic, but the minor meaning of epistemic possibility is extremely

rare with can, and that of deontic possibility with could.

Possibility, permission and ability 109

Table 4.9. Meanings of might and could

ICE-AUS

ICE-GB

C-US Total %

Dynamic 122 120 76 (15) 318 (257) 16.6%Deontic 7 5 0 (0) 12 (12) 0.6%Epistemic 534 534 412 (81) 1,480 (1,149) 77.2%Indeterminate 32 43 31 (6) 106 (81) 5.5%

might

Total 695 702 520 (102) 1,917 (1,499) 100%

Dynamic 1,197 1,220 1,430 (281) 3,847 (2,698) 77.4%Deontic 61 40 41 (8) 142 (109) 2.9%Epistemic 235 280 188 (37) 703 (552) 14.1%Indeterminate 97 82 97 (19) 276 (198) 5.6%

could

Total 1,590 1,622 1,756 (345) 4,969 (3,557) 100%

4.3.2.1 Epistemic possibility

In both their temporal and hypothetical uses might and could may express

epistemic meaning. Epistemic could is not restricted – as can is largely (see

Section 4.2.1 above) – to non-affirmative uses. Consider first the temporal uses,

the past time use of epistemic could in (74)–(76) with reference respectively to a

present situation (“it was not possible that there were”), a past situation (“it was

possible that it had been”) and a future time situation (“it was possible that it

would”) and the backshifted use of epistemic could in (77)–(79), again

respectively with a present, past and future time situation:

(74) By Jean’s calculation, there couldn’t possibly be many more left before

someone summoned sufficient daring to enter Forla’s presence. (ICE-GB

W2F-015 60)

(75) But it could as easily have been a picnic at Cedar Creek Falls that he saw,

or the railway cutting, how would I know? (ICE-AUS W2F-016 58)

(76) Another tree surgeon was unwilling to report in case he was proved wrong

as it could do anything including collapsing under its own weight. (ICE-

AUS W1B 126)

(77) In the interim Ken Jack had been busily sabotaging our efforts by

nugatorially ringing all and sundry and telling them we couldn’t possibly

have enough water in the pond, it had taken five days last time and we had

only forty-hours left. (ICE-AUS W1B-005 68)

(78) Dee reflected grimly that it was too bad that the other half of the worried

duo couldn’t have been Hal. (ICE-GB W2F-006 155)

(79) He said the Federal Government's approach could lead to reduced

investment (ICE-AUS W2C-008 38)

Chapter 4110

There are no tokens in the corpora of past time epistemic might but the full

set of possibilities occurs with backshifted might. In (80) it occurs with a present

situation, in (81) with a past situation, and in (82) with a future situation.

(80) She was terrified by her anger. It was like a tall, black wave rearing,

threatening her dotted line she could lose her footing, drown in it, and she

never knew where it might be waiting to rise. (ICE-AUS W2F-020 61)

(81) Yes I thought I might have got a chance today but there wasn't a lot of

time (ICE-AUS S1A-016 124)

(82) and uh, so, we thought we might be OK this year cos I’m sending my son

(ICE-GB S1A-087 114)

Epistemic might can also be used with general time situations, as in the

past time example in (64) above and the backshifted example in (83):

(83) Apart from creating an impression that Rajiv could not meet the American

president without straight away reporting back to Moscow, the Moscow

stop-over gave rise to worries that he might be giving Mikhail Gorbachev

advance information of an American posture at Geneva. (ICE-GB W2B-

011 26)

In this use might, like its present counterpart may, is close to the somewhat

indeterminate borderline between epistemic modality (paraphraseable by

“possible that”) and dynamic modality (paraphraseable by “possible for”).

Semantically similar examples with could are found, as in (84), but the position

adopted here – as argued above for can – is that they fall on the dynamic

(existential) side of the borderline (see Section 4.3.2.2 below).

(84) During my banking or property days August could be a very busy month

indeed (ICE-GB W2B-012 31)

Hypothetical (unreal) could and might can both express epistemic

possibility (“it is possible that NP would ...”), with reference to a present situation

in (85) and (86), a past situation in (87) and (88), and a future situation in (89)

and (90).

(85) That’s funny cos I was reading somewhere that historically if you said

someone has left his coat you could mean male or female (ICE-GB S1A-

053 319)

(86) You know Rachel you might have a chance if you if you got that accepted

that that pavilion was sacrosanct to the men most probably because they

want to be on their own (ICE-GB S1B-021 39)

Possibility, permission and ability 111

(87) It’s a photographer's paradise I could have spent the rest of my life well

the rest of my Saturdays of my life wandering around here and I I would

never have run out of material (ICE-AUS S2A-048 91)

(88) It’s an interdisciplinary field which if you if you ah occasionally read the

Higher Education Supplement in The Australian you might’ve noticed is

even now traversed by controversy and that’s exactly appropriate (ICE-

AUS S2A-037 37)

(89) Well I mean our s our corpus is could become very large indeed, if our

plans go forward for the for the raising of the funding for the language

centre ww are talking about very big money (ICE-GB S1B-076 11)

(90) Or if she was eighteen she might have a sexual relationship of her own

(ICE-GB S1A-031 57)

The weak use of epistemic might derives historically from its ‘irrealis’ use,

but insofar as there is no longer any requirement of an explicit or even implicit

condition it is preferable to regard it as real rather than unreal. It is sometimes

maintained (e.g. by Hermerén 1978, Palmer 1990) that epistemic might and may

differ in terms of the degree of likelihood they express, with might lower on the

scale. This view would seem to draw support from examples such as (91), where

the speaker’s confidence about possible market penetration appears to increase

with the switch from might to may, suggesting that might is being used as a more

diffident marker of epistemic possibility than may.

(91) It is increasingly a question of how we can penetrate market places in the

Asia Pacific region or other parts of the world where our products might,

oh oh and indeed our services um may be desired (ICE-AUS S2A-028 51)

Coates (1983: 152), however, finds epistemic may and might in her data to

express similar degrees of likelihood: “MIGHT, in my data at least, does not

seem to express a more tentative meaning than MAY”. The data in the present

study provide support for Coates’ claim, yielding numerous cases of epistemic

may and might being used alternately without any apparent difference in

diffidence, as in (92) and (93).

(92) there’s no doubt so it seems to me uh that for a considerable time, he may

well have hoped uh that uh some at least, of these uh witnesses from

Gibraltar who gave evidence at the inquest, uh might’ve been, in the case

of those whose identity is not known, identified and might have been uh

uh brought able to be brought here to give oral evidence (ICE-GB S2A-

063 68)

(93) I think Mrs Thatcher might possibly have done a lot of things uh that

would’ve been very different stimulated the private sector to a substantial

extent in the fourth term and I think sooner or later the Government may

actually have to say that (ICE-GB S1B-039 53)

Chapter 4112

Notice too that might, like may, is compatible with the strengthening adverb well:

(94) That’s some way short of it but it might well be an improvement on the

lead (ICE-GB S2A-007 18)

In fact the present data in fact suggest that, even though epistemic may

outnumbers its might counterpart (2310:1480 tokens per million words, or 1.6:1),

and even though the semantic territory of may is more strongly dominated by

present epistemic meaning (83.5%) than is that of might (60.2%), there are signs

that might is beginning to threaten may as the primary exponent of epistemic

possibility. One piece of evidence for this claim is that epistemic may and might

sometimes figure in repairs, and in such cases it is usually may that is repaired to

might, as in:

(95) I dunno Advice may be might be too harsh a word (ICE-AUS S1B-003

250)

Another is that present epistemic might has become the less stylistically

unmarked of the pair: epistemic might occurs more commonly in speech than in

writing (1721:1262, or 1.4:1), while epistemic may occurs far more commonly in

writing than speech 3856:1270, or 3.0:1). It would seem that there is a more

salient difference between present epistemic may and might in formality than in

diffidence.2

A similar historical process to that which applied to might has seen

‘irrealis’ could also develop a weak epistemic sense. In fact, according to Leech

(1987: 120-1), it is difficult to see any difference between could and might in

sentences such as: There could be trouble at the Springboks match tomorrow; The

door might be locked already; Our team might still win the race. His view is

apparently shared by Quirk et al. (1985: 233), who claim that “could and might

have the same meaning and both express the epistemic possibility associated with

may”. Coates (1983: 167), however, finds epistemic could more tentative than

might: “It does not seem implausible to suggest that, while might is becoming the

main exponent of Epistemic possibility in every day spoken language and no

longer expresses a more tentative meaning but is in most contexts synonymous

with may, could is filling the gap left by might and is the new exponent of

tentative Epistemic possibility.” Gresset (2003: 82) concedes that could is being

used increasingly in “apparently epistemic or epistemically-oriented contexts”,

but nevertheless argues that this does not necessarily entail that they are

synonymous. According to Gresset, not only does could express a higher degree

of probability than might, but it can never be purely epistemic (insofar as, in his

view, the possibility expressed invariably derives from the subject referent’s

properties or characteristics).

As persuasive as the arguments of Coates and Gresset may seem, there is

no shortage in the data of cases where epistemic could and might alternate freely,

Possibility, permission and ability 113

with no apparent difference in their meanings or in the level of likelihood

expressed, as in (96) and (97):

(96) Failures that can be traced to excessively high or low temperatures might

be beyond the scope of your maintenance contract and could result in a

bill approaching half the original cost of the damaged equipment. (ICE-

GB W2B-033 14)

(97) The market has reacted to good news but, over the period of the conflict,

something awful could happen and the market might react downwards.

(ICE-GB W2C-012 86)

In the present study only 11.7% of coulds expressed present epistemic

possibility, indicating that this meaning is as yet less established with could than

it is with might (60.2%). Curiously, while the expansion of this meaning with

might is more advanced in AmE (64.7%) and AusE (64.2%) than it is in BrE

(55.6%), the reverse is the case with could, with BrE (13.1%) ahead of AusE

(11.4%) and AmE (6.4%).

Epistemic might and could can, like epistemic may (see Section 4.1.1), be

used concessively. In such cases the degree of modality is low: in (98) and (99)

the meaning would not differ significantly if the modal were omitted (“even if he

is innocent”, “whatever that means”).

(98) He’s obviously a criminal and he should go down and and their arguments

are basically there’s too much crime in society and if we let the buggers

get away with the things even if he might be if if even if he might be

innocent if he didn’t do this he’s done something else (ICE-AUS S1A-095

195)

(99) Now, how does that fit with our observation that sometimes when we hear

people speak there are bits missing, whatever that could mean (ICE-GB

S2A-030 136)

4.3.2.2 Dynamic possibility

In both their past time and hypothetical uses could and might parallel can and

may in their dynamic uses. Given the number of uses, and in some cases subtypes

of these, associated with the dynamic meaning, we shall not attempt to provide a

full set of examples.

Consider firstly theoretical possibility. In the most central cases the

potentiality lies in the physical situation, an appropriate paraphrase being “have

an opportunity to”, expressed by past temporal could and might in (100) and

(101) respectively, by backshifted temporal could in (102), and by unreal

hypothetical might and could in (103) and (104) respectively.

Chapter 4114

(100) I realised fairly quickly what I had done and was able to get Stuart to grab

the stuff on my lap, so I could put my head behind the newspaper better

and my leg down without anything else sliding. (ICE-AUS W2B-004 63)

(101) Such a glittering vehicle as this might occasionally be seen elsewhere in

the city, but never in their lives had these ragged, undernourished people

seen a pale blue Jaguar roadster in their dirty alleys, the gold insignia of

General Forla glinting malignantly as it passed. (ICE-GB W2F-015 32)

(102) He said they didn’t have any water in wh in whi in which they could bathe

(ICE-GB S1B-038 102)

(103) This is of course we know now a a rather simplistic kind of view of how

his uh ends might have been achieved (ICE-GB S2A-026 59)

(104) If many more views of the object were available the shape could be more

easily established (ICE-GB W2A-036 57)

The rational subtype is exemplified with past temporal might in (105), and

with hypothetical could and might in (106) and (107). In (105) the adjectival

modifier reasonable, and in (107) the adverb reasonably, provide harmonic

reinforcement.

(105) It landed me in some small adventures such as no reasonable Anglo-

Prussian might expect (ICE-GB S2B-025 2)

(106) A high level of population/employment growth, high labour mobility and

successful labour market programs has ensured that Australia has avoided

the structural unemployment problems experienced in Europe. It could be

argued however that the high unemployment rate may in itself create

structural unemployment. (ICE-AUS W1A-008 62)

(107) Um what are Australia's top priorities in public expenditures which might

reasonably be directed in the next decade to research and development

(ICE-AUS S2A-028 29)

The implicitly quantificational, existential, subtype is exemplified with

past temporal could in (108) and unreal hypothetical could in (109), where the

proposition is understood to apply to a subset of members of the relevant

population (“Some Augusts were very busy”, “There are some individuals it

would not be possible to hypnotise …”).

(108) During my banking or property days August could be a very busy month

indeed (ICE-GB W2B-012 31)

(109) Some individuals couldn’t be hypnotized and you couldn’t produce that,

but to a large proportion of the population you could hypnotise them and

say to them under hypnosis, your left arm is paralysed (ICE-GB S1B-070

85)

The ability use is found almost exclusively with could: the only instances

of ability might appearing archaic, as in (110):

Possibility, permission and ability 115

(110) Frantic now, not thinking how he might control his rage, he ran from room

to room, scattering sundry possessions from the dressing-table, bathroom

shelves, kitchen cupboards (ICE-GB W2F-008 115)

As observed above, the ability use differs from the other dynamic uses we have

discussed to the extent that the potentiality in question is located within the

subject-referent. As with ability can, the basis on which such potentiality is

predicated of the subject-referent is prior actualization, as in (111).

(111) But I mean it’s it yeah it’s even at a higher level than that though because I

mean Pete could do basic things on a computer but it wasn’t enough (ICE-

GB S1A-005 189)

However this is not a necessary condition: in (112) we are led to understand that

Weary has not previously swum across lake Eacham.

(112) Weary has never been able to resist a challenge, especially one involving

extraordinary physical effort, and he accepted a bet that he couldn’t swim

across Lake Eacham and back, a distance which he calculated to be about

a kilometre and a half. (ICE-AUS W2B-005 25)

The lexical verbs in this use may denote not only acquired skills as in

(111) and (112), but also innate capacities, as in (113), in which case non-human

and even inanimate subjects are possible:

(113) The Combi couldn’t do more than about twenty miles an hour (ICE-AUS

S1A-059 149)

The potentiality sense is associated not only with temporal uses as in

(111), and (112), but also hypothetical, as in (114) and (115).

(114) For instance, the same system viewing a 60 km by 60 km area from a low

orbit could transmit data to give 10 m resolution, but used in geostationary

orbit to cover a whole hemisphere would have to be restricted to 5 km

resolution using the same data transmission rate. (ICE-GB W2A-037 58)

(115) Frantic now, not thinking how he might control his rage, he ran from room

to room, scattering sundry possessions from the dressing-table, bathroom

shelves, kitchen cupboards (ICE-GB W2F-008 115)

When ability could is used with verbs of perception as in (116), and

cognition as in (117), the degree of modality is low, as evidenced by the fact that

could could typically be readily omitted (“They heard the phone ringing”; “Dr

Hewson said he understood Mr Bradbury’s frustration”).

Chapter 4116

(116) As they drove into the garden, they could hear the phone ringing through

the empty house. (ICE-AUS W2F-004 122)

(117) Dr Hewson said he could understand Mr Bradbury’s frustration but he

must accept that he and the party organisation do not make the policies of

the parliamentary party. (ICE-AUS W2C-004 28)

The currently actualized sense may be associated not only with the temporal uses

as in (116) and (117), but also hypothetical as in (118).

(118) They’ve got all the cheeses and they’ve got ah eggs and brus bread and

bread rolls and pitta bare bread um and all the nuts of course as well as all

the beautiful fruit that you could imagine (ICE-AUS S1A-092 93)

Dynamic implication, found mainly with could, is a pragmatic extension

of the unreal hypothetical use, with the utterance being used to perform a speech

act other than mere assertion: for instance, offer as in (119), and request as in

(120):

(119) I could uhm get you that other book when I stay at Hilda’s if you’re near

U C (ICE-GB S1A-053 167)

(120) In your letter to me you say that “it is not the ownership of the NRMA that

is under review.” Could you explain that to me please? (ICE-AUS W1B-

026 86)

Might can be used to implicate a suggestion, as in (121), and is regularly used to

do so in the idiom might as well, as in (122):

(121) Now if if that is the form that your publication is is going to take um then

one of the things that you might also think about as an adjunct to your

address is the use of audio-visuals or at least visuals. (ICE-AUS S1B-003

220)

(122) I used to just always heat the house because it was always if you if your

house was cold the kids get sick and you pay it out in medical bills

anyway if so you might as well just forget about it just heat your house

(ICE-AUS S1A-046 15)

Dynamic implicature is typically found with 1st

and 2nd

person subjects,

but 3rd

person subjects are also possible, as in (123):

(123) It would be advantageous if the initial clean could occur the previous

weekend 20/21 July. (ICE-GB W1B-028 29)

Possibility, permission and ability 117

4.3.2.3 Deontic possibility

In the present corpora all tokens of deontic possibility, or ‘permission’, might

were subjective, and generally found in questions as in (124), and in conditionals

as in (125), with the addressee as the deontic source:

(124) My oh why I don’t lose sl I don’t lose sleep over it might I say (ICE-AUS

S2B-047 181)

(125) If I might just turn to that ah and just point out where I think that the the

defect is (ICE-AUS S1B-057 28)

Permission could, by contrast, yielded both subjective tokens as in (126)

and objective as in (127).

(126) Steve Kayland, could I ask you to comment here (ICE-AUS S1B-021 181)

(127) Anderson states the British imperialism was a cultural policy of

anglization anglicisation and stresses the incompatibility of empire and

nation. Australians could not become Governors-general until much later

on and these positions were held by the English English. (ICE-AUS W1A-

007 27)

4.3.3 May and might: one lexeme or two?

Could regularly serves as a temporal past form and is uncontroversially regarded

as the preterite counterpart of can. The evidence for a comparable inflectional

relationship between may and might is somewhat less compelling. As we have

seen, might is rarely temporal past (see Section 4.3.1.1). In the epistemic meaning

(see Section 4.3.2.1) the level of likelihood expressed by ‘weak’ might is no

longer systematically distinguishable from that expressed by may. Conversely,

may has assumed functions once the sole province of might, as suggested by

examples – encountered more commonly in the Australian data than in the British

or American – of the type in (128) where may is used in backshift, and in (129)

where it is used in an unreal conditional.

(128) The Sandanistas thought that the invasion of Grenada may help their

prospects for the 1990 election which resulted from a peace process

initiated by the Central American governments. (ICE-AUS W1A-014 171)

(129) Queenslanders may be much better off if there was simply a moratorium

on new Government services and programs until the economy picks up.

(ICE-AUS W2C-002 197)

It would appear that the relationship between may and might is considerably less

regular than that between can and could, supporting Huddleston and Pullum’s

(2002: 202) claim that for many speakers today “may has been reanalyzed as

Chapter 4118

lexically distinct from might: they are forms of different lexemes, both present

tense forms.”

4.3.4 Might and could: regional and stylistic variation

Mair and Leech’s (2006) findings indicate that might is in decline both in BrE

writing (with a decrease of 15.1% in the period spanning the early 1960s to the

early 1990s) and AmE writing (4.5%): see Table 1.4 above. However a

comparison of its frequencies in speech and writing suggests that might’s future

may not be as bleak as that of its present tense counterpart may. As noted in

Section 4.1.4 above, may is over three times more common in writing. By

contrast, might is more popular in speech than writing (by a ratio of 2115:1619,

or 1.3:1). There are some striking regional differences: in the Australian corpus

might is more than twice as common in speech as writing (875:425, or 2.05:1),

but in C-US marginally more common in writing (539:507, or 1.06:1). The

apparent association of might with more conservative, formal, usage in the

American corpus is consistent with its relatively smaller overall numbers.

Table 4.10. Genre distribution of might

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US Avg

Dialogue 958 (345) 872 (314)Monologue 750 (180) 525 (126)

Spoken

Total 875 (525) 733 (440) 507 (59) 705

Non-printed 240 (24) 520 (52)Printed 487 (146) 700 (210)

Written

Total 425 (170) 655 (262) 539 (43) 540

Total 695 702 520 (102) 639

By comparison with might, could is more frequent in C-US than in the

other two corpora. Mair and Leech’s (2006) finding that could has undergone a

6.8% decline in recent AmE is perhaps reflected in its more modest popularity in

speech over writing in C-US (1.02:1) than in ICE-GB (1.13:1) or ICE-AUS

(1.18:1).

Table 4.11. Genre distribution of could

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US Avg

Dialogue 1,883 (678) 1,925 (693)Monologue 1,325 (318) 1,358 (326)

Spoken

Total 1,660 (996) 1,698 (1,019) 1,767 (206) 1,708

Non-printed 1,540 (154) 1,370 (137)Printed 1,467 (440) 1,553 (466)

Written

Total 1,485 (594) 1,508 (603) 1,738 (139) 1,577

Total 1,590 1,622 1,757 (345) 1,656

Possibility, permission and ability 119

4.4 Be able to

With a total of 889 tokens in the three corpora, the lexico-modal be (un)able to

does not threaten the numerical supremacy of can/could, whose combined total is

11,220 tokens.

4.4.1 Meanings of be able to

There are conflicting opinions in the literature regarding the semantic relationship

between can and the lexico-modal be able to. According to some, be able to can

only express ability. For example Hermerén (1978: 83) claims that “be able to

will be used as a paraphrase of can (in the ability sense)”, and Facchinetti (2000:

118) that “Of the three values conveyed by can – possibility, ability, and

permission – the modal appears to be paraphrased by use of be able to only with

the value of ability”. By contrast Coates (1983: 124) is of the view that be able to

covers the range of meaning associated with can. The truth lies somewhere in-

between: be able to can certainly express more than merely ability, and yet at the

same time there are several uses of can that cannot be served by be able to. The

lexico-modal cannot be used for subjective deontic possibility, dynamic

existential possibility, present actualized ability with ‘private’ verbs of perception

and cognition, or epistemic possibility, and thus could not readily be substituted

for can in the following:

(130) She she she came to the point where she said you know you don’t have to

go you can stay al alright (ICE-AUS S1A-064 86)

(131) it’s her it’s her duty to be on the door every night but um yeah it can be a

bit of a nuisance sometimes (ICE-AUS S1A-074 125)

(132) Yes you said I can understand that (ICE-AUS S1A-006 279)

(133) It can’t possibly be faster on the back (ICE-AUS S1A-005 277)

However, as the following examples show, apart from these restrictions, be able

to can be used across the range of meanings expressed by can. With the exception

of the two dynamic uses illustrated in (131) and (132) above, all the other

dynamic uses of can are possible with be able to. Thus, the lexico-modal

expresses ability in (134), circumstantial potentiality in (135), rational possibility

in (136), and dynamic implication (here with the illocutionary force of a

suggestion) in (137). In (138) it expresses objective deontic possibility:

(134) And I’m sure even the affirmative team once they’d eventually nutted out

the on part would be able to work out how to turn the bloody thing off

(ICE-AUS S1B-036 219)

(135) I just presumed that you were able to weigh yourself at Brin’s (ICE-GB

S1A-011 183)

(136) However, not all is rosy. Jill Matthews in 1988 (1986?) was able to

complain about the far greater number of male contributions to the

Chapter 4120

Australian bicentenary project than women, and also to state that, in these

volumes, the role of women generally remained confined to childcare and

food production, and providing an audience while men got on with

whatever real business. (ICE-AUS W1A-018 92)

(137) I said on the ’phone, we have not reached any decision about this and it

would be very helpful if we were able to discuss it further. (ICE-GB

W1B-017 80)

(138) It is not clear whether a publisher is able to control the making of a

machine readable copy of the edition by exercise of the published edition

copyright. (ICE-AUS W1B-17 60)

As Table 4.12 indicates, the dynamic uses are dominant with be able to

(representing 90.4% of all tokens, compared with 81.0% for can and 77.4% for

could), with only a handful of deontic cases.

Table 4.12. Meanings of be able to

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US Total %

Ability 139 204 158 (31) 501 (374) 42.9%Theor poss 209 182 163 (32) 554 (423) 47.5%Deontic 18 23 10 (2) 51 (43) 4.4%Indeterminate 21 25 15 (3) 61 (49) 5.2%

Total 387 434 346 (68) 1,167 (889) 100%

Both Facchinetti (2000) and Aijmer (2004) attempt to distinguish can and

be able to on the basis of an implication of actuality carried by the latter, often

paraphraseable by ‘manage to’ or ‘succeed in’. Thus in (139), where could would

sound quite unnatural, was able to conveys the subject-referent’s successful

achievement of its victory (“the Labor Government managed to achieve/

succeeded in achieving its victory”).

(139) But now it’s time now it’s time for the Student Movement to ask the

Federal Government to return that favour in kind because there’s no doubt

that it was due to the support the support from groups such as the Student

Movement that the Labor Government was able to achieve its victory

(ICE-AUS S2A-040 90)

However, this claim is problematical, or at least in need of extensive

qualification. For one thing, as we have seen in Section 4.2.3.2 above there are

uses of can (most notably with verbs of perception and cognition) where we can

speak of actualization. Furthermore the difference is far more salient when we

compare the preterite forms could and was/were able to than it is when we

compare the present forms can and am/is/are able to. In (140) the present

generalizations about the abilities of the human body feature a number of relevant

expressions including not only can and be able to but also ability, able-bodied

Possibility, permission and ability 121

and capable, with no apparent difference in implied actuality.

(140) And it also makes you so aware of your own ability, and other people’s

abilities, and how the body works whereas, uhm when you’re uhm

working with a very able-bodied people you become very blasé about it I

think and you forget, how complicated the body is and how, wonderful it

is to be able to move certain parts and ways of doing it and the various

different ways you can do it and even when you can’t actually, uh you

aren’t capable of moving how you can get around these problems and

become capable of moving (ICE-GB S1A-002 45)

On the other hand, as noted by Palmer (1990: 90): “In the past tense BE

ABLE TO is used to indicate ‘actuality’ in environments in which CAN cannot

be used”. Thus be able to is virtually obligatory in assertive contexts with a single

action as in (141), and is preferred to could when habitual or repeated actions are

referred to, as in (142).

(141) Because I had been carrying the tape recorder with me, I was able to

record the authentic sounds of the of the various technicians and therapists

at work, when I went to the National Hospital for check ups. (ICE-GB

W2B-001 55)

(142) However there have been highly hierarchical society pastoralists groups

such as the Mongols who, through intense military organization were able

to conquer a huge area of land, maintaining an empire that negotiated

trade routes between the East and the West. (ICE-GB W1A-011 57)

This restriction does not apply to non-assertive contexts, however, presumably

because these carry no implication of actuality. Thus could not is possible as a

replacement for the semantically negative were unable to in (143):

(143) Done first saw The Cabin when he was 14, began renting it in the early

eighties, but was unable to buy it until 1987. (ICE-AUS W2B-010 198)

It is perhaps the availability of preterite was/were able to for indicating

actualization, where could is unable to do so, that explains the different

proportions of present/preterite forms for be able to (134 preterite tokens as

against 124 present: see Table 4.13) and can (7663 present tokens as against 3557

preterite).

Chapter 4122

Table 4.13. Be able to and tense

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US Total %

Present 49 67 41 (8) 157 (124) 13.5%

Preterite 55 67 61 (12) 183 (134) 15.7%

Non-tensed 283 300 244 (48) 827 (631) 70.9%

Total 387 434 346 (68) 1,167 (889) 100%

4.4.2 Be able to: regional and stylistic variation

Of the three corpora ICE-GB has the largest number of tokens (434) and C-US

the smallest (346), with ICE-AUS in-between (387). Interestingly, however, C-

US is the only corpus in which be able to is more frequent in speech than writing

(by a ratio of 412:250, or 1.6:1, compared to 343:453, or 0.75:1, for ICE-AUS

and 380:515, or 0.73:1, for ICE-GB), perhaps suggesting that despite its modest

numbers in C-US the lexico-modal is faring comparatively well.

Table 4.14. Genre distribution of be able to

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US Avg

Dialogue 325 (117) 381 (137)Monologue 371 (89) 379 (91)

Spoken

Total 343 (206) 380 (228) 412 (48) 378

Non-printed 650 (65) 800 (80)Printed 387 (116) 420 (126)

Written

Total 453 (181) 515 (206) 250 (20) 406

Total 387 434 346 (68) 389

Notes

1Even though, strictly speaking, able and unable are separate lexemes they

are here treated as belonging to the same lexico-modal on the grounds of

the close relationship between not able to and unable to.

2Trousdale’s (2003) study of non-standard Tyneside English reveals trends

far more advanced than in the present study. In this variety might has

become the main marker of epistemic possibility, with 91.2% of might

tokens expressing this meaning (as against 79.2% for standard BrE in the

present study). A more striking finding in the Trousdale study is that

epistemic possibility accounted for only 8.8% of may tokens (whereas in

the present study it seems to be more a matter of might catching up to may

Possibility, permission and ability 123

– 79.0% of whose tokens expressed epistemic possibility – than a case of

may declining).

Chapter 5

Prediction and volition

While necessity and possibility are firmly established domains of modality,

logically related to each other and involving clearly identifiable epistemic and

deontic meanings, by contrast the prediction/volition domain discussed in this

chapter is less central. It includes epistemic uses of a temporal nature which may

involve a minimal component of modal meaning. Furthermore, the dominant type

of non-epistemic meaning, involving the subject-referent’s volition, has received

little attention in the literature on modality, a situation explained by Krug (2000)

as follows:

Due to the progressive grammaticalization of the will future since

Middle English, no central modal has ‘desire’ as its central notional

domain any longer, even though some volitive traces can be found in

will and would. (Krug 2000: 117)

Volition has, furthermore, been associated with different types of modality: not

only dynamic, as in the present study, but also deontic (e.g. Traugott 1989: 38)

and agent-oriented (Bybee et al. 1994: Chapter 6).

The expressions examined in this chapter are the modals will (embracing

the forms will, ’ll and won’t, and the preterite forms would, ’d and wouldn’t) and

shall (shall, shan’t), and the quasi-modals be going to (going to preceded by all

the inflectional forms of be, along with gonna and gunna), want to (want to,

wants to, wanted to, wanting to, plus wanna), and be about to (about to preceded

by all the inflectional forms of be).

As Table 5.1 shows, this group is dominated by will and would, which

together account for 75.2% of all tokens across the three corpora. Shall is by

contrast a minor modal (shown by Mair and Leech 2006 to be in severe decline:

see Section 1.4 above), with an average frequency 27.4 times smaller than that of

will. The quasi-modals be going to and want to are both substantially more

popular in C-US than in the British and Australian corpora, a finding that is

compatible with Mair and Leech’s (2006) finding that they have undergone a

massive increase in AmE writing in recent decades (see Section 1.4). Although

will is not under threat from want to in terms of overall frequency, a comparison

of the volitional tokens (2,296 for will and 2,137 for want to: see Table 5.3 and

5.14 below) suggests that with respect to this meaning the quasi-modal may be

challenging the modal.

Chapter 5126

Table 5.1. Frequencies of the expressions of prediction and volition

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US Total Avg

will 3,868 3,861 3,950 (776) (8,505) 3,893

shall 100 223 102 (20) (343) 142

would 3,585 3,404 4,001 (786) (7,775) 3,663

Modals

Total 7,553 7,488 8,053 (1,582) (16,623) 7,698

be going to 1,191 1,056 2,413 (474) (2,721) 1,553

want to 1,039 858 1,425 (280) (1,897) 1,107

be about to 63 54 36 (7) (124) 51

Quasi-

modals

Total 2,293 1,968 3,874 (761) (5,022) 2,717

Total 9,846 9,456 11,926 (2,343) (21,645) 10,409

NB For C-US figures are normalized to tokens per one million words; raw figures

in parentheses.

5.1 Will

Will is primarily an exponent of epistemic modality, this meaning accounting for

59.2% of all tokens across the three corpora, approximately twice as many as for

dynamic modality (30.4%), while deontic modality was a minor meaning in the

data (1.7%).

Table 5.2. Meanings of will

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US Total %

Epistemic 2,662 2,523 2,128 (418) 6,913 (5,603) 59.2%

Dynamic 945 1,044 1,563 (307) 3,552 (2,296) 30.4%

Deontic 68 84 51 (10) 203 (162) 1.7%

Indeterminate 193 210 209 (41) 612 (444) 5.2%

Total 3,868 3,861 3,950 (776) 11,679 (8,505) 100%

5.1.1 Epistemic will

There are two main uses of epistemic will, which we shall discuss in turn. One is

the uncontroversially epistemic use in which will is found with present and past

situations, and labelled ‘central-epistemic’ by Huddleston and Pullum (2002:

188), and ‘predictability’ by Coates (1983: 169). The other use, where the status

of will as temporal or modal has been subject to debate in the literature (e.g.

Lyons 1968: 310, Palmer 1990: 163), is found with future time situations. The

use is labelled ‘futurity’ by Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 188), and ‘prediction’

by Coates (1983: 169). We shall adopt Coates’ terms ‘predictability’ and

‘prediction’.

Prediction and volition 127

In (1) and (2) predictability will conveys the speaker’s confidence in the

truth of the proposition, based on evidence and knowledge of, respectively, a

present situation and a past situation:

(1) In other words, referring to a particular instance of the the total idea, a

home truth or a a particular type of truth then it will have those properties

(ICE-AUS S2A-022 92)

(2) It has to be said that some of the reason for this is that S&P rate only the

top tier of companies in Europe, so the highly publicised troubles that

have hit smaller companies don’t show in the European statistics, while

they will have been a major factor behind the increase in the US

downgradings. (ICE-GB W2C-013 55)

Predictability will predominantly involves subjective modality, but

occasional objective examples are found, as in:

(3) However, the positive side of C3 is connected to the supply via R11.

Because its negative end is now connected to a low, C3 will charge

towards 12V. When C3 has charged sufficiently, the input to IC1c will be

a logic 1, causing its output to switch low. (ICE-AUS W2D-013 76)

In such cases there is a low degree of modality: the evidence for the factuality of

the proposition is so compelling that it would be possible to substitute is for will

be (“the input to IC1c is a logic 1”) with little change of meaning.

Predictability will is semantically strong, comparable in strength to

epistemic must. In (4) epistemic will and must alternate, and it would be possible

to substitute one for the other without altering the strength of the speaker’s

claims:

(4) Douglas Hurd will doubtless be grateful for that endorsement not least

because of the pressure he must be feeling this morning. (ICE-GB S2B-

009 87)

Nevertheless must and will are dissimilar in other ways, as Huddleston and

Pullum (2002: 189) observe:

Must conveys the idea of conclusion, and is often used in explanations:

Ed’s late – he must have overslept. With central-epistemic will it is more a

matter of assumption or expectation, very often with a suggestion of future

confirmation, as in: I can’t tell you what the word means but it will be in

the dictionary. (Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 189)

The second, ‘prediction’, use of will has prompted a good deal of debate

concerning its status as a marker of future tense or an epistemic modal (e.g.

Declerck 1991: 8-13, Huddleston 1995, Larreya 2000). It is excluded from the

Chapter 5128

epistemic category by Palmer, who nevertheless concedes that: “Where there is

reference to future action, it is difficult, and sometimes impossible, to distinguish

epistemic WILL from the WILL of futurity” (1990: 57). Palmer’s case for

maintaining a distinction between futurity will and epistemic will rests primarily

on examples such as (5) and (6) which, in his view, involve factual assertions that

lack any element of speaker judgement (Palmer 1990: 163).

(5) It’ll be Christmas soon. (ICE-GB W2F-016 115)

(6) ’Cos she’s she’ll be seventeen after August so seventeen’s normal but

most people are seventeen turning eighteen and she’s sixteen turning

seventeen (ICE-AUS S1A-036 75)

It is certainly true that the degree of modality is low here, with will seemingly

little more than a mere marker of futurity (as indicated by the fact that will could

be readily omitted: “It’s Christmas soon”; “she’ll be seventeen after August”).

While the epistemic modal component may be minimal, it is nevertheless not

completely absent: even in the case of (5) and (6) the prediction could be

prevented from coming true by an unforeseen eventuality, such as the death of the

subject-referent in the case of (6). As Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 190)

observe, there is an intimate connection between futurity and modality: “our

knowledge about the future is inevitably much more limited than our knowledge

about the past and the present, and what we say about the future will typically be

perceived as having the character of a prediction rather than an unqualified

factual assertion”. In the present study the will of ‘prediction’ is treated as

belonging to epistemic modality rather than being merely a marker of futurity.

A further indication of the low degree of modality associated with

prediction will is its compatibility with a wide range of modal adjuncts of

different strengths, such as hopefully in (7), possibly in (8), and most likely in (9),

which provide more specific modal meaning in the absence of a distinctive

epistemic component expressed by the modal.

(7) The following notes provide guidance on some of the conditions placed on

these arrangements, and hopefully will serve to avoid misunderstandings.

(ICE-GB W2D-006 118)

(8) Depending on who comes, you’ll possibly need to bring sleeping bags and

I hope you don't mind sleeping on the floor. (ICE-GB W1B-004 53)

(9) you’ll most likely strengthen your defenses (C-US Frown G03 118)

The case for regarding prediction will as expressing epistemic modality is

based not merely on the modal overlay that accompanies instances of its use, but

also on the co-occurrence patterns that it shares with predictability will. For

example, both predictability will and prediction will may collocate with the

epistemic adjunct probably, as in (10) and (11) respectively:

Prediction and volition 129

(10) The bait will probably be stored in a fridge in the same medium in which it

was supplied from the maggot farm (invariably sawdust). (ICE-GB W2D-

017 52)

(11) The sun is out, just a spasm, but by this arvo it will probably be slightly

warmer. (ICE-AUS W1B-003 21)

Predictability will and prediction will may both be used with the perfect aspect, as

in (12) and (13):

(12) Well if it’s any sort of amendment at all and the proposer doesn’t accept it

then it can’t go straight to the vote until uhm the amendment has been li

discussed because there won’t have been a speech against the motion by

by b by by by the very nature of the fact you cannot move it until there’s

been a speech against it (ICE-GB S1A-068 26)

(13) So in just three years with Richmond Jackson will’ve played just nineteen

games (ICE-AUS S2B-016 183)

In (14) and (15) both are used with the progressive aspect:

(14) Okay And the events that they’ll be talking about will be occurring in the

here and now whereas with decontextualized language the entities are

likely to be absent from the material situation or setting or they're likely to

be generic kind of entities (ICE-AUS S2A-046 64)

(15) His lead up months haven’t been too bad and he’ll be running on at the

end of the race (ICE-AUS S2A-017 131)

In (16) and (17) both are used with the passive voice:

(16) It will gradually be incorporated into the soil by earthworms and other soil

creatures. (ICE-GB W2D-016 29)

(17) At the end of the seventy five days the licence will be allocated to us I

believe (ICE-AUS S1B-046 215)

In (18) and (19) both are used with non-agentive verbs:

(18) A good quality pencil has a bonded lead, usually etched with acid, that

will not shatter inside the wood if the pencil is dropped, nor slide out in

use. (ICE-GB W2D-016 29)

(19) These are just a few of the visible benefits that will come about as

chemical farming methods are gradually abandoned. (ICE-GB W2B-027

46)

In (20) and (21) both are used with stative verbs:

Chapter 5130

(20) Even the most moderately priced unit these days will have a zoom facility,

which ideally should give a bottom picture section of about thirty metres.

(ICE-AUS W2D-015 77)

(21) They won’t like that, and if you feel like me ... you couldn’t face being

stripped by Manangans anyhow. (ICE-GB W2F-015 163)

In (22) and (23) both are used in the existential there-construction:

(22) And within any phrase there will be an internal structure consisting of the

main word, usually referred to as the head and the subordinate words or

the dependent words (ICE-AUS S2A-022 31)

(23) Don’t forget next weekend is um Anzac weekend though so there’ll be a

lot of people away (ICE-AUS S1A-023 323)

Finally, in (24) and (25) both are used in the it-extraposition construction:

(24) In other words, if you look around the languages of the world, it will

probably be true that if they have nouns and if they have verbs and if they

have adjectives, the most common sorts of roles that these words play will

be to refer to things in the case of nouns, to refer to actions in the case of

verbs, to refer to descriptions in the case of adjectives (ICE-AUS S2A-022

205)

(25) Uh it’ll probably be rather nice actually actually trying to match that up

(ICE-GB S1A-086 100)

Prediction will is semantically strong (like predictability will but unlike

other epistemic modals that may be used with reference to future time situations,

such as may, might, should, could). Note the contrast between epistemically weak

might and semantically strong will in the following example:

(26) You might be admired for your red tie, but you will be derided for your

seventies attitudes. (ICE-AUS S2A-044 34)

Epistemic will may also, as both Palmer (1990: 138) and Huddleston and Pullum

(2002: 191-192) observe, convey a conditional meaning: more precisely, it may

be used in the apodosis of conditional constructions, where it has a stronger sense

than weak epistemic may. The time of the situation may be present or past (with

the will of predictability) as in (27) and (28), or future (with the will of

prediction) as in (29). In this conditional use will is usually objective, and low in

modality (note that the will-clause in (27) is a repair for the incomplete, and

unmodalized, you actually see them in the papers).

(27) And if you keep your eyes open you actually you’ll see them in the papers

as as as facts (ICE-GB S1A-063 167)

Prediction and volition 131

(28) But if you take those patients on the weekly regimen who finish their

treatment at this point in time here they will have received a much higher

overall dose than patients on the three-weekly regimen at the same point in

time (ICE-GB S2A-035 70)

(29) The organisation ARK has said that sea-level will rise by one metre if

present pollution levels and conditions continue (ICE-GB S1B-007 199)

The figures in Table 5.3 suggest that speakers use epistemic will far more

commonly to make predictions and predictability judgements about a third party

(80.0%) than about either themselves (8.7%) or their addressee(s) (11.2%). By

contrast with epistemic will, dynamic will occurs most commonly with a 1st

person subject (72.2%), speakers presumably finding themselves more often in a

position to describe their own volition than that of others.

Table 5.3. Person of the subject with will

1st

2nd

3rd

Total

Epistemic 489 (8.7%) 630 (11.2%) 4,484 (80.0%) 5,603 (100%)

Dynamic 1,658 (72.2%) 51 (2.2%) 587 (25.6%) 2,296 (100%)

Deontic 0 (0.0%) 149 (92.0%) 13 (8.0%) 162 (100%)

Indeterminate 145 (32.7%) 30 (6.8%) 269 (60.6%) 444 (100%)

Total 2,292 (26.9%) 860 (10.1%) 5,353 (62.9%) 8,505 (100%)

Whereas modals in the other semantic groups enter into contrasts of

internal and external negation, such as that between mustn’t and needn’t (see

Section 3.4.1), epistemic will does not enter into such contrasts. In the case of

both predictability won’t as in (30) and prediction won’t as in (31) the negation is

internal (“it can be predicted that not-p”), and there are no forms available in

which the modality rather than the proposition is negated.

(30) your English guide thing is is sure to have that won’t it (ICE-AUS S2B-

032 74)

(31) Oh well ours won’t be till September as usual (ICE-GB S1A-087 123)

As Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 192) point out the behaviour of epistemic will

with respect to negation is a reflection, along with the fact that as noted above it

is compatible with modal adjuncts of differing strengths, of its status as a low-

degree modal.

5.1.2 Dynamic will

Dynamic will expresses the potential for an activity or event deriving,

characteristically, from the subject-referent’s volition. In (32) there is a contrast

between the first instance of won’t, which expresses this meaning (“I am

unwilling/reluctant to take the case”), and the second, which occurs within a

Chapter 5132

clausal complement to the noun likelihood with the non-agentive verb come (up

with) and expresses epistemic prediction (“I can be predicted not to”):

(32) I’m not saying I won’t take the case, but you’ve got to be prepared for the

likelihood that I won’t come up with anything. (ICE-AUS W2F-008 73)

A distinction may be drawn within the volitional will category, one

comparable in some respects to the temporally-determined distinction between

(future) prediction and (non-future) predictability, between ‘intention’ and

‘willingness’ (Coates 1983: 169-176). Intentional will, exemplified in (33) and

(34), focuses upon a future event that is planned, promised, threatened, etc.

(Coates’ ‘intention’), whereas with willingness will, exemplified in (35) and (36),

the focus is upon the present state of mind of the subject-referent.

(33) All right Go on Don’t be shy I won’t bite you yet but my God I will soon

(ICE-AUS S2A-056 37)

(34) We have submitted Purchasers Requisitions to the Vendor. We will

undertake the usual searches as soon as we receive your advices that

finance has been approved. (ICE-AUS W1B-021 36)

(35) Uh and then having got that at the end of the day it’s got to be your

decision anyway, because I won’t enter into a contract that says you ought

to go and do that (ICE-GB S1A-035 123)

(36) Will you please explain to me the meaning of the phrase “Currently,

NRMA’s profits are “locked up” ” used in answer to L.G. Norman’s

letter? (ICE-AUS W1B-026 78)

The strength of the volition with willingness will may be heightened, so

that it expresses determination or insistence. In the most typical cases will occurs

with a 1st

person subject, is stressed and is not contractible to ’ll, as in (37) below.

(37) I certainly will yes (ICE-GB S1A-100 37)

Willingness will may often be glossed by periphrastic expressions such as

be willing to, and be prepared to. In (38) the alternation between will and be

willing to is suggestive of semantic closeness:

(38) But there’s a lot of people you get who who won’t accept that aren’t

willing to argue (ICE-GB S1A-084 117)

However as Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 192) warn, the auxiliary differs from

the periphrastic expressions in several respects. For one thing, the auxiliary

expresses stronger modality. In (34) above, for example, We will undertake the

usual searches entails the actualization of the searches, which explains why it

would sound odd to add but we may not manage to do so. Compare the

acceptability of We are willing to/are prepared to undertake the usual searches

Prediction and volition 133

but we may not manage to. Also suggestive of a semantic difference between

dynamic will and the periphrastics is the absence of a contrast with dynamic will,

as with epistemic will, between internal and external negation. In (35) for

example the negation type is unclear (though it may be preferable to regard it as

internal, insofar as it is our non-entering into a contract that is entailed rather than

our lack of volition), by contrast with the clear difference between We are not

willing to enter into a contract and We are willing not to enter into a contract.

Finally, whereas with dynamic will the time of the volition can only be present,

with the periphrastics it can also be past (was willing to, was prepared to, etc.) or

future (will be willing to, will be prepared to, etc.).

According to Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 193) the volitional meaning

of will is to be interpreted as a futurity-related implicature, deriving from the

assumption that a future situation is subject to the will of subject-referent. They

note, furthermore, that with a 1st

person subject, as in (33) and (37) above,

volition may be associated with an additional implicature of commitment, such

that the speaker’s speech act might be thought of as a promise or an undertaking.

However, the distinctive co-occurrence patterns that we have noted above to be

displayed by epistemic will suggest that dynamic and epistemic prediction will

are in fact readily distinguishable. The difference between them is perhaps

sharpest in cases where the volitionality of dynamic will is reinforced by

negativeness, as in (35) above and (39) below, or by its use in a closed

interrogative with the illocutionary force of a request, as in (36) above and (40)

below:

(39) Those who won’t ask don’t get (ICE-GB W2E-003 57)

(40) If you cannot agree will you please telephone this office before sending

any further demands. (ICE-GB W1B-023 121)

According to Coates (1983: 176) the dynamic uses of will that we have

discussed above always occur with an animate subject. However in the present

data there were examples of will used with an inanimate subject (generally with

respect to situations concerned with the satisfaction of the speaker’s desires or

needs), as in:

(41) it won’t print because it keeps saying feed paper (ICE-GB S1A-077 6)

(42) when I go to bed at night I I have to st my arm won’t straighten you see

(ICE-GB S1A-052 73)

Dynamic will may be used with reference to an habitual or typical activity

that is ascribable to the disposition or insistence of the subject-referent.

Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 194) label this use ‘propensity’, describing it as

concerned with either “characteristic or habitual behaviour of animates” as in (43)

and (44), often with an attendant suggestion of the speaker’s disapproval or

resignation, or “general properties of inanimates” as in (45) and (46). Palmer

(1990: 136-137) distinguishes these as two different subtypes which he calls

Chapter 5134

respectively ‘habit’ (“concerned with habitual (or better, ‘typical’) behaviour”)

and ‘power’ (“volition applied to inanimate objects”).

(43) There are those who will see all this activity as a sign of chaos, but it is

absolutely the opposite. (ICE-AUS W2C-017 107)

(44) a person with co-dependent behaviour is one who either stays in

relationships they don’t want to be in and are destructive for them because

they’re too scared of getting out of them or will never allow themselves to

be close enough to have a relationship because they’re too afraid of the

pains and things involved with it. (ICE-AUS S1B-025 186)

(45) Remember too that heavy rain will raise creek and stream levels and may

render them impassable; (ICE-AUS W2D-018 32)

(46) Hand stroking will remove any loose hairs and shredding is also minimal.

(ICE-AUS W2D-019 28)

Examples of this type are to be distinguished from those involving

habituality where the speaker makes an inference about the predictability of an

activity based on its regular occurrence and the disposition of the subject-referent

is not at-issue, as in (47) and (48). These I have classified as epistemic rather than

dynamic.1

(47) Wide departures from this value will invariably lead to malfunction which

can be either (1) insidious, hidden, with the system apparently working

normally or (2) catastrophic with total hardware failure with, perhaps, disk

drives not starting, components breaking down and sometimes even

smoke! (ICE-GB W2B-033 13)

(48) With an aperture setting of f2 the plane of sharpness will be rather

shallow, in some cases only a matter of a few centimetres. (ICE-AUS

W2D-016 54)

5.1.3 Deontic will

Will is occasionally used deontically, with a 2nd

person subject and the speaker

understood to be the deontic source. Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 194) identify

this use as deriving via implicature from futurity: “if I predict your agentive

actions (or someone else’s) in a context where I have the authority to require

them, I will be understood as tacitly invoking that authority”. Examples follow:

(49) I’ll withdraw that above your right eye. You’ll say he headbutted you.

(ICE-AUS S1B-067 88)

(50) You’ll clear the bikes (ICE-GB S2A-054 35)

(51) And I said yeah and she said oh you’ll be quiet and I said yes so um um

yeah we had to go in and print in there because it just won’t feed and it

tried to do it last Tuesday (ICE-AUS S1A-021 52)

Prediction and volition 135

5.1.4 Will: regional and stylistic variation

Table 5.4. Genre distribution of will

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US Avg

Dialogue 3,942 (1,419) 3,978 (1,432)

Monologue 4,763 (1,143) 3,579 (859)

Spoken

Total 4,270 (2,562) 3,818 (2,291) 4,173 (486) 4,087

Non-printed 4,240 (424) 4,540 (454)

Printed 2,940 (882) 3,720 (1,116)

Written

Total 3,265 (1,306) 3,925 (1,570) 3,625 (290) 3,605

Total 3,868 3,861 3,950 (776) 3,893

Will has very similar frequencies across the three corpora (see Table 5.4).

On average it is marginally more common in speech than writing (by a ratio of

1.1:1, and ratios in the three corpora of 1.31:1 for ICE-AUS, 0.97:1 in ICE-GB

and 1.15:1 in C-US). As Table 5.2 shows, the dominant epistemic and dynamic

meanings are not evenly distributed across the corpora, the ratio of epistemic to

dynamic tokens being 2.4:1 in both ICE-AUS and ICE-GB, but 1.4:1 in C-US.

However, comparison of the speech vs writing frequencies for dynamic will (see

Table 17, Appendix) reveals that it is equally popular in the two modes in C-US

(1,589:1,525) in the other two dialects it is approximately twice as popular in

speech as it is in writing (1,263:492 in ICE-AUS, and 1,298:662 in ICE-GB).

This finding, viewed in conjunction with the greater popularity of want to in C-

US than in ICE-AUS and ICE-GB (see Section 5.6.2), may suggest that – at least

in speech – dynamic will is succumbing to the incursion of want to more rapidly

in AmE than it is in the other two varieties.

5.2 Shall

Shall is traditionally associated with will, but its frequency is strikingly smaller,

the ratio of tokens being 343:8,505 (or 1:24.8). While they express similar

meanings the proportions are quite different (compare Tables 5.2 and 5.5):

epistemic modality/futurity is the main meaning for will, but minor for shall; and

deontic modality is the main meaning for shall, but minor for will. The negative

form shan’t is rare, with only four tokens in the data, three of them in ICE-GB.

Table 5.5. Meanings of shall

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US Total %

Epistemic 1 14 31 (6) 46 (21) 10.8%

Dynamic 48 90 41 (8) 179 (146) 42.1%

Deontic 49 116 31 (6) 196 (171) 46.1%

Indeterminate 2 3 0 (0) 5 (5) 1.2%

Total 100 223 102 (20) 425 (343) 100%

Chapter 5136

5.2.1 Epistemic shall

Both Palmer (1990: 162-163) and Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 195) claim that

shall is never found in the central epistemic use with non-future reference, and

Palmer presents this claim as supporting evidence for his treatment of future will

and shall as non-epistemic. However examples can be found, as in (52):

(52) Like those on the home front in earlier wars we shall often be imperfectly

informed of what is happening, and this too puts our patience to the test.

(ICE-GB W2E-007 22)

Furthermore shall diplays a number of the co-occurrence patterns that we

have observed with epistemic will (Section 5.1.1). These include compatibility

with an epistemic adjunct as in (53), use with the progressive aspect as in (54),

use with a non-agentive verb as in (55), and use with a stative verb as in (56):

(53) I shall probably look in at the College once or twice during the autumn,

and hope to see you then. (ICE-GB W1B-014 69)

(54) I understand that I shall be using this under my own responsibility. (ICE-

GB W1B-017 115)

(55) As we shall discover, the concept of child abuse is an extremely elusive

one and means different things to different people. (ICE-GB W2B-017 26)

(56) He asks God to disperse these mists, which blot and fill My perspective

still as they pass Or else remove me hence unto that hill Where I shall

need no glass (ICE-GB W1A-018 60)

Like epistemic will, epistemic shall may express conditional consequence,

in the apodosis of a conditional construction, as in:

(57) And if she recommends my book after that I shall be very surprised (ICE-

GB S1B-025 127)

Contemporary speakers, the data suggest, pay little heed to the traditional

prescriptive rule, that in referring to the future shall should take a 1st person

subject and will a 2nd

or 3rd

person subject: 8.7% of epistemic will tokens in the

corpora had a 1st person subject (see Table 5.3 above), while 28.6% of epistemic

shalls had a non-1st person subject (see Table 5.6 below), as in:

2

(58) my heart’s desire is that my neighbour Ivan’s donkey shall die tomorrow

morning (ICE-GB S2B-047 77)

Prediction and volition 137

Epistemic 15 (71.4%) 1 (4.8%) 5 (23.8%) 21 (100%)

Dynamic 146 (100%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 146 (100%)

Deontic 69 (40.4%) 0 (0%) 102 (59.6%) 171 (100%)

Indeterminate 4 (80%) 1 (20%) 0 (0%) 5 (100%)

Total 234 (68.2%) 2 (0.6%) 107 (31.2%) 343 (100%)

NB Figures represent raw frequencies

5.2.2 Dynamic shall

Dynamic volitionality is the second most common meaning of shall, as it is with

will. Voltional shall always takes 1st person subject in the data, and typically

expresses intentionality as in (59), but occasionally also willingness as in (60).

(59) Everything in Turkey is very cheap - which reminds me Cath, I shall send

you some Turkish money. (ICE-AUS W1B-012 17)

(60) Well I shan’t see her. (ICE-GB S1A-090 103)

5.2.3 Deontic shall

Shall has several deontic uses, the most central to this type of modality being that

which Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 194) describe as “constitutive/regulative”,

used with a 3rd

person subject, and normally found in legal documents,

regulations, and the like, as in (61) and (62):

(61) Once an issue has been considered and appropriately addressed by

Council, relevant papers shall no longer be considered “Council-in-

Confidence” material. (ICE-AUS W2D-009 304)

(62) Pursuant to subsection 128(2) of the Act, the Commission Chairperson

may at any time, and shall wherever the Council does not have a

Chairperson, convene a meeting of the Regional Council. (ICE-AUS

W2D-009 34)

There are two further uses of shall which are appropriately identified by

Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 194) and Palmer (1990: 74) as deontic. In the first

of these the meaning may appear to be simply dynamic: however the speaker

does not merely indicate a readiness to carry out the activity, but rather

undertakes an obligation or gives a guarantee to do so (as in You shall have it

tomorrow). While there were no corpus examples with a 2nd

person subject,

formulaic addressee-oriented examples of the type in (63) were counted as

belonging to this type:

(63) We shall see (ICE-GB S1A-098 29)

Table 5.6. Person of subject with shall

1st

2nd

3rd

Total

Chapter 5138

The second non-central deontic use of shall is in ‘direction questions’ as in

(64) and (65), including interrogative tags as in (66), normally with a 1st person

subject. Such questions are used by the speaker to consult the addressee’s wishes,

prompting Coates (1983: 188) to treat this use as volitional. However the

undertaking that the speaker makes to perform the activity suggests that they are

more plausibly regarded as deontic. Notice that the most likely answer is not

declarative but rather imperative (e.g. Yes, do).

(64) Shall I do something civilized, like clear the table? (C-US SBC 03 1221)

(65) Shall I write it down for you? (ICE-GB S1B-080 21)

(66) I’ll go and get it, shall I? (ICE-GB W2F-004 198)

Sometimes the sense of obligation is less salient: the speaker may seek the

addressee’s advice, rather than consulting their wishes, as in (67).

(67) Yeah I’m I’ve been on the same position because I’ve been thinking you

know shall I push them for fulltime or shall I push them for a pay increase

you know (ICE-AUS S1A-061 99)

Like will you, shall we may be used with directive force, as in (68), where it is

used in a tag question attached to a 1st person imperative:

(68) Let’s stop for the moment, shall we? (ICE-GB S1A-001 51)

A similar kind of illocutionary force is associated with the use of shall in the

formula shall we say, used to introduce an expression that the speaker expects the

addressee to accept, even if provisionally:

(69) He did all sorts of things and he became a shall we say suburban

Australian archaeological hero. (ICE-AUS S1A-026 61)

5.2.4 Shall: regional and stylistic variation

Leech (2003) and Mair and Leech (2006) found shall to have suffered a massive

decrease in frequency between 1961 and 1991/2 in AmE and BrE writing (of

almost identical proportions: 43.8% from Brown to Frown, and 43.7% from LOB

to FLOB): see Table 1.4 above. There were some striking differences between the

dialects in the frequency of shall: the dispreference for this modal was relatively

less pronounced in ICE-GB (with 223 tokens per million words) than in ICE-

AUS (100) and C-US (102). The numbers for shall in the American corpus would

have been considerably less had it not been for their high frequency in one,

religious, text (SBC-020).

Prediction and volition 139

Table 5.7. Genre distribution of shall

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US Avg

Dialogue 72 (26) 256 (92)

Monologue 17 (4) 163 (39)

Spoken

Total 50 (30) 218 (131) 112 (13) 127

Non-printed 230 (23) 300 (30)

Printed 157 (47) 207 (62)

Written

Total 175 (70) 230 (92) 88 (7) 164

Total 100 223 102 (20) 142

A comparison of the frequencies for shall across the corpus subcategories

provides further insights into the nature of its survival in BrE and AusE, as

reflected in its degree of robustness in speech. As Table 5.7 shows, shall is

relatively more popular in speech in ICE-GB than it is in ICE-AUS (the speech-

to-writing ratio in the two corpora being 0.9:1 and 0.3:1 respectively). The

skewing in C-US noted above resulting from the high number of tokens in a

single text invalidates meaningful comparisons with C-US on this dimension.

5.3 Would

Like preterite could and might, would has both temporal and hypothetical uses,

albeit in quite different proportions. While the overall ratio of past would to

hypothetical would is 29.5%:70.5%, the proportion of past would is lower in

speech (25.2%), and higher in writing (35.9%). This is not a surprising finding in

view of the relative popularity of past tense forms generally in such written

genres as news and fiction, as against conversation (q.v. Biber et al. 1999: 456).

Table 5.8. Uses of would as a preterite

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US Avg

Past 915 (549) 787 (472) 1,374 (160) 1,025

Hypothetical 2,990 (1,794) 2,863 (1,718) 3,262 (380) 3,038

Spoken

Total 3,905 (2,343) 3,650 (2,190) 4,637 (540) 4,064

Past 1,025 (410) 970 (388) 975 (78) 990

Hypothetical 1,728 (691) 1,770 (708) 1,800 (144) 1,766

Written

Total 2,753 (1101) 2,740 (1096) 2,775 (222) 2,756

Indeterminate 141 118 122 (24) 127

Total 3,585 3,404 4,001 (786) 3,663

Apart from the absence of a deontic use, would shares with will a strong

preference for epistemic over dynamic modality (see Table 5.9).

Chapter 5140

Table 5.9. Meanings of would

ICE-

AUS

ICE-GB C-US Total %

Dynamic 1,210 702 606 (119) 2,518 (2,031) 22.9%

Epistemic 1,903 2,299 2,866 (563) 7,068 (4,765) 64.3%

Indeterminate 472 403 529 (104) 1,404 (979) 12.8%

Total 3,585 3,404 4,001 (786) 10,990 (7,775) 100%

5.3.1 Temporal would

Past time would may be dynamic, expressing volition, as in (70) and (71), and

propensity, as in (72) and (73).

(70) Since the cook would by no means of persuasion be induced to set foot

outside the house Pritchard wandered off by herself. (ICE-GB W2F-005

70)

(71) It was really funny. She like she looks around and this woman wouldn’t

help us wouldn’t serve us or anything (ICE-AUS S1A-009 97)

(72) Whenever it was put to him that India tilted towards the Soviet Union in

the great ideological divide, he would quote his mother. (ICE-GB W2B-

011 33)

(73) Occasionally he would proffer advice, I would decline it, he would insist,

and I would go off to the editor, Mr Trelford, who would almost always

support me. (ICE-GB W2B-015 50)

Like past time could, volitional would is normally restricted to non-affirmative

contexts with a single event. Thus it would not be possible to change the polarity

of (70) (*Since the cook would by means of persuasion …), or to substitute would

for wouldn’t in (71). Propensity would differs from volitional would in that it

involves an habitual situation, applying to the typical behaviour of the subject-

referent.

Epistemic modality is represented by the future in the past use, found

mainly in narrative genres, where we understand the event to have occurred

subsequent to the time referred to by would but before the time of the utterance,

as in (74).

(74) But the the area at the front here uh where in later Greek temples pieces of

sculpture will be placed that’s that’s nowhere near as useful a shape as it

would be later on (ICE-GB S2A-024 89)

The temporal use of would far more commonly involves backshifting. In

(75) and (76) backshifted would expresses respectively volition and futurity.

Prediction and volition 141

(75) One breeder said that any serious breeder would not sell a kitten like the

latter, although the former condition is controllable. (ICE-AUS W2D-019

107)

(76) Bob Hawke was still Prime Minister at that stage and I knew that Hazel

would be constrained to a certain extent in what she could write because of

that public office that she held (ICE-AUS S2A-041 55)

5.3.2 Hypothetical would

As with could and might, so with would, we may distinguish between the

hypothetical and weakened tentative uses.

Hypothetical would is found in the apodosis of unreal conditional

constructions, as in (77), but also occasionally in the clausal complement of wish,

as in (78).

(77) So it would only count if I was doing a coherent major in literature (ICE-

AUS S1A-015 267)

(78) I wish the stores would open earlier. (C-US SBC-011 698-700)

Hypothetical would typically expresses epistemic meaning, as in (77) and (78)

above, but volitional examples are also sometimes found, as in (79).

(79) If you could get them to me I would be d deeply appreciative. (C-US SBC-

021 76-8)

More often than not the protasis of the conditional construction is unexpressed,

implicit in the context, as in (80) where it might be interpreted as something like

“if I had to deal with them”, and in (81) “if you owned one”, and in the volitional

example in (82) “if I didn’t have to”.

(80) I mean I didn’t grow up with young children so I would be hopeless with

young children (ICE-AUS S1B-015 243)

(81) Feeding Breeders feed their cats a wide range of foods from commercial

cat food and biscuits to grated cheese, cottage cheese, yoghurt and lean

meat, with added calcium for kittens. It would cost about $5 to $8 a week

to feed Cornish Rex. (ICE-AUS W2D-019 68)

(82) This town stinks. I would never live here. It’s a dump. (ICE-AUS W1A-

010 233)

The tentative use of hypothetical would, like that of hypothetical could,

might and should, involves such features as diffidence, tact, politeness and

unassuredness. In (83) and (84) epistemic would is less assured or forthright than

epistemic will be or unmodalized is would be:

(83) he’d be a bit younger than Jeff wouldn’t he (ICE-AUS S1A-005 5)

Chapter 5142

(84) That ’d ’d be about it I think, cos the imaging of planetaries is (ICE-GB

S2A-058 120)

In (85) and (86) it is used to perform the indirect speech act of requesting (literal

questions of this type about a person’s wishes being conventionally interpreted as

requests). (86) is even more syntactically indirect than (86) making it even more

diffident.

(85) We refer to further demands for 1989/90 issued on the 11th

June and

would be grateful if you refer to our letter of the 17th

June and also would

you please liaise with the Inspector as I do believe there is a repayment

which is sufficient to cover any outstanding amounts for 1989/90. (ICE-

GB W1B-023 120)

(86) Would you care to elaborate (ICEAUS S1B-016 209)

Similarly, in (87) suggest is used performatively, the only difference between

would suggest and suggest being the component of diffidence introduced by

tentative would.

(87) and what I would suggest is that we make you an appointment to go and

see one and talk it through (ICE-GB S1A-078 100)

Example (88) illustrates the formulaic phrase would/’d like to, a less

abrupt and confronting expression of volition than want to insofar as it allows

that it may not be possible to actualize the event expressed in the to-complement.

(88) I’d like to answer that in a s in a slightly different way (ICE-GB S1A-001

118)

The same phrase can also be used to formulate indirect speech acts, as in the

polite request in (89).

(89) Would you like to say grace (ICE-AUS S1A-004 47)

Tentative would is often used to reduce the speaker’s level of confidence in the

truth of the proposition, as in (90) and (91).

(90) I mean I’d ra I would imagine that that’s what people from the country

would bring to cousins in the city wouldn’t you think a a a nice fat goose

(ICE-GB S1B-014 106)

(91) No I wouldn’t think the market’s so slow at the moment (ICE-AUS S1A-

008 34)

Prediction and volition 143

5.3.3 Would: regional and stylistic variation

A comparison of the frequencies for would across the three corpora (see Table

5.4) indicates that it is more robust in the American data not only in terms of its

overall frequency but also in terms of its relative popularity in speech over

writing. In all three corpora would is more frequent in speech, but proportionately

moreso in C-US (1.7:1) than in ICE-AUS (1.4:1) and ICE-GB (1.3:1). This

finding is compatible with that of Mair and Leech (2006) that would has

undergone a milder decline in written AmE (6.1%) than it has in written BrE

(11.0%) in recent decades (see Table 1.4 above).

It may also be noted that AmE differs from the other two varieties in a

further respect. As the figures in Table 5.8 above show, while the proportion of

past woulds is comparable across the written components of the three corpora

(ICE-AUS 37.2%, ICE-GB 35.4%, and C-US 35.1%), C-US has a higher

proportion of past woulds in speech (29.6%) than the others (ICE-AUS 23.4%,

ICE-GB 21.6%).

Table 5.10. Genre distribution of would

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US Avg

Dialogue 2,114 (1,761) 4,672 (1,682)

Monologue 2,800 (672) 2,408 (578)

Spoken

Total 4,055 (2,433) 3,767 (2,260) 4,809 (560) 4,210

Non-

printed

324 (324) 353 (353)

Printed 2,760 (828) 2,637 (791)

Written

Total 2,880 (1,152) 2,860 (1,144) 2,825 (226) 2,855

Total 3,585 3,404 4,001 (786) 3,663

5.4 Be going to

Be going to – a lexico-modal whose frequency (2,721 tokens) is just below that of

the most common lexico-modal in the present data, have to (2,827) – is an

idiomatic expression which derives historically from a progressive construction

with a literally motional sense, but whose motional and progressive senses have

been bleached in contemporary English. The grammaticalization of the idiom is

reflected in the incorporation, in informal varieties, of the infinitival to into a

morphological compound that is typically represented in informal writing as

gonna, sometimes gunna. There are 1,689 tokens of be going to in the three

corpora (as against 1,032 tokens of gonna/gunna). There is immense variation

across the corpora in the magnitude of the difference between the frequencies of

the full form versus the compound (1,047:9 in ICE-GB, 574:617 in ICE-AUS,

and 68:406 in C-US). While such a degree of variation is presumably indicative

of divergent transcription practices and cannot be taken as representative of the

Chapter 5144

actual occurrence of the full and reduced forms in the three varieties, it is

nevertheless suggestive of dialectal variation, with the compound favoured most

in AmE.

Semantically be going to is broadly similar to will, though favouring

dynamic meanings comparatively more and epistemic meanings comparatively

less (see Tables 5.2 and 5.11).

Table 5.11. Meanings of be going to

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US Total %

Epistemic 659 562 1,217 (239) 2,438 (1,460) 52.3%

Dynamic 446 408 957 (188) 1,811 (1,042) 38.9%

Deontic 4 11 25 (5) 40 (20) 0.9%

Indeterminate 82 75 214 (42) 371 (199) 8.0%

Total 1,191 1,056 2,412 (474) 4,659 (2,721) 100%

5.4.1 Epistemic be going to

It is generally assumed that with be going to the predication always refers to a

future event or state (Coates 1983: 198, Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 211).

However there is evidence in the corpora that be going to is not in fact restricted

to being merely a marker of futurity (a reflection of the modalization that it is

undergoing). In (92) and (93) be going to expresses general present reference, or

‘predictability’ (with always providing harmonic reinforcement in (92) and I

think in (93) compatible with the epistemic meaning). Substitution of will would

not affect the meaning in either case.

(92) Even though we’ve got this wretched document we’re talking about

there’s always going to be an Asterix book by the bedside or something

like that (ICE-GB S1A-013 188)

(93) I think that there’s going to be incompetence in every profession (ICE-GB

S1B-030 86)

There are nevertheless a number of differences between epistemic will and

be going to, which require us to qualify Westney’s (1995: 189) claim that “it is

impossible to point to any distinction between epistemic uses of will and be going

to, and it is tempting to see the periphrastic as simply a rare, markedly colloquial

alternative to the modal”. The first thing to notice is that examples such as (92)

and (93) are considerably less common with be going to than they are with will.

Secondly, when be is present tense be going to generally differs from will in

carrying an implicature of immediacy, typically being used with situations that

are on the point of occurring or are already in train. This implicature is

undoubtedly derived from the “current orientation” (Palmer 1990: 144)

associated with present tense forms of be: the future is referred to from the

Prediction and volition 145

standpoint of the present, thereby suggesting that there are features of the present

situation that are determining future events. In (94) and (95), for example, will

would not have the same implicature of immediacy that is found with be going to:

in (94) the imminence of rain is indicated by current weather conditions, while in

(95) the woman is already experiencing the symptoms which lead her to believe

that she is about to faint.

(94) No no um no it’s that it looks as if it’s gonna rain and it’s been like this for

a few days you know (ICE-AUS S1A-090 106)

(95) So we sat down and started to eat and after a minute, maybe two, she said,

“I feel really dreadful”, and I looked at her and she was ashen. … And she

said, “I think I’m going to faint.” (ICE-AUS W2C-013 81)

Sometimes an adverb such as (temporal) just or suddenly is used to reinforce this

sense of immediacy, as in (96) and (97), where will would sound extremely

unnatural:

(96) And all you do is just tip it out of its pot Okay and you can see it just

ready and it’s just gonna spill over the edge there for you (ICE-AUS S2A-

053 104)

(97) the play is going to take a sudden surprise and what they’re suddenly

going to observe is going to be slightly different from what they might

have first thought (ICE-GB S1B-019 120)

The current orientation of epistemic be going to (with present forms of be)

is most apparent when, as in (94)–(97), the future time of the infinitival

complement is close or relatively close, but is also found with situations that are

not temporally near, as in (98) and (99), where the speaker’s prediction is made

on the basis of current trends.

(98) We believe that the demand for hospice care is going to increase in the

future and we want to know more about it to help us formulate our policy.

(ICE-GB W2F-004 78)

(99) Arguably, in the next few years there is going to be a new boom period.

(ICE-GB W1A-014 49)

A third difference between epistemic be going to and will is that, unlike

epistemic will, be going to can occur readily in conditional clauses, as in (100)–

(102). Here again the present orientation is reflected in the fact that the most

likely interpretation in (100) is one where the speaker has already been

performing poorly in exercises, in (101) where the distribution of students is

already being practised, and in (102) where England’s opponents have already

experienced difficulties in the scrum feeds.

Chapter 5146

(100) So in the end I just thought this is ridiculous this is only the starting-point

and if I’m going to make such a meal out of every exercise I’ll never

complete the course (ICE-GB S1A-064 62)

(101) Presumably if we’re going to distribute the students in this way according

to pro pro rata according to the student uh distribution in the uh college we

ought to be doing the same thing within the faculty should we so a big

department has more representation than a small department (ICE-GB

S1B-075 82)

(102) If they’re going to be pushed around on England’s put-in to the scrum

they’re going to have a very uncomfortable afternoon (ICE-GB S2A-002

40)

Epistemic will could not be substituted for be going to in such cases, and in fact is

very rare in conditional protases. An example is (103) below, where the

prediction made is not one that involves the speaker’s subjective judgement but

rather one involving an objective prediction grounded in the present (“If it is the

case that you will be entitled …”). However (100)–(102) do not lend themselves

to such an objective interpretation.

(103) If you do keep on working you may be able to get Unemployment Benefit

at pension rate when you are out of work if you will be entitled to a

Retirement Pension on your own (or your late husband’s) contributions

when you do retire. (ICE-GB W2D-002 37)

A number of the familiar co-occurrence patterns that are associated with

epistemic modality occur with be going to. These include compatibility with

epistemic adjuncts as in (104), use with the progressive aspect as in (105), use

with the passive voice as in (106), use with non-agentive verbs as in (107), use

with stative verbs as in (108), use in the existential-there construction as in (109),

and use in the it-extraposition construction as in (110):

(104) Well maybe I’m going to win the football pools this weekend (ICE-GB

S1A-067 336)

(105) Well that was before he knew that he was going to be playing it at all these

places next week (ICE-AUS S1A-016 59)

(106) So so really you’re addressing a group of of practitioners who are going to

be be involved in this site that you’ve been researching (ICE-AUS S1B-

003 268)

(107) I came in from the holidays sort of wondering where I was going to get the

energy to do anything at work (ICE-AUS S1A-065 55)

(108) Well I made a big bloomer today because our school’s going to be a centre

of creative ah arts (ICE-AUS S1A-065 2)

(109) He’s pushing Doncaster all the way but Doncaster’s having none of it and

certainly there’s going to be no doubt about the winner (ICE-GB S2A-012

83)

Prediction and volition 147

(110) Um it’s going to be a bit more expensive to do that than to ah basically

here um than keeping the shower and well the basin of any bath around

would be about you know into this position. (ICE-AUS S1B-080 313)

Epistemic be going to most commonly takes a 3rd

person subject (see

Table 5.12 below), but less often than epistemic will (see Table 5.3 above), and,

by contrast, takes a first person subject twice as often as epistemic will. A more

general question that is raised by the figures in Table 5.12 is whether be going to

is as ‘personal’ as will? If we base our answer on that meaning of the two modal

expressions which has by far the highest percentage of 1st

person subjects (the

dynamic meaning), as Table 5.12 indicates dynamic be going to (for which

64.8% of tokens have a 1st person subject) is marginally less personal than

dynamic will (with 72.2%). By contrast, dynamic be going to is more comfortable

with a 2nd

person subject (15.2%) than dynamic will (2.2%).

Table 5.12. Person of subject with be going to

(Figures represent raw frequencies)

1st

2nd

3rd

Total

Epistemic 257 (17.6%) 159 (10.9%) 1,044 (71.5%) 1,460 (100%)

Dynamic 675 (64.8%) 158 (15.2%) 229 (22.0%) 1,042 (100%)

Deontic 0 (0%) 6 (30.0%) 14 (70.0%) 20 (100%)

Indeterminate 84 (42.2%) 38 (19.1%) 57 (28.6%) 199 (100%)

Total 1,016 (37.3%) 361 (13.3%) 1,344 (49.4%) 2,721 (100%)

5.4.2 Dynamic be going to

Be going to can be volitional, but it generally conveys the weaker sense of

intention rather than willingness. Thus in (111) I’m not going to post this can be

appropriately paraphrased by “I don’t intend to” whereas I won’t post this in the

same context would be paraphraseable by “I refuse to”.

(111) I am not going to post this until I get prints of my photos to send you all,

so I will update you about her then. (ICE-AUS W1B-008 36)

As Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 212) note, the contrast described here is

sharper in the preterite. Thus in (112) the refusal that would be expressed by

would not would be less appropriate than the non-intentionality expressed by was

not going to if it subsequently transpired that the speaker allowed himself to be

cheated of Lillian.

(112) NATURE HAD DEALT Lillian a nasty blow in making her a female, but

I was not going to be cheated of her. She was a chip off the old block in

Chapter 5148

every respect but one, and I was going to make sure that one flaw did not

spoil the rest of her. (ICE-AUS W2F-012 5)

When be is preterite, the focus is on the intention that obtained previously,

rather than the intended activity, and thus was/were going to do not entail

actualization of the activity. This is the case in (114) for example, where there is

no entailment that the anticipated purchase actually occurred (and the coordinated

clause in fact strongly suggests that it probably did not).

(113) Cause I was going to go and buy things for you and I but I thought no

(ICE-AUS S1A-022 74)

While be going to normally expresses intentionality it is not, as Coates

(1983: 199-200) implies, restricted to doing so. There are corpus examples which

suggest that be going to can in fact, like will (and shall), express strong

willingness, especially when negative as in (114) (where an additional factor

favouring a willingess interpretation is the multiple situation rather than singulary

future situation), and when be is preterite as in (115) (where an additional factor

is the implication conveyed by decision in the matrix clause that the speaker’s

will has been consciously exercised).

(114) But I can’t I’m not going to buy something inferior if I want something

nice to drink (ICE-GB S1A-047 68)

(115) And uhm I guess I made a decision that I wasn’t going to I wasn’t going to

be hurt again (ICE-GB S1A-072 215)

5.4.3 Deontic be going to

Coates’ (1983: 202) suggestion that the deontic meaning of be going to arises via

pragmatic specialization (compare Huddleston and Pullum’s 2002: 194 analysis

of deontic will discussed in Section 5.1.3 above) seems plausible: “the speaker

makes an assertion about the addressee’s future activities which implies he (the

speaker) intends to see they are carried out.” In the following examples the

addressee, who may be referred to not simply by 2nd

person you as in (116) but

also by 1st

person-inclusive we as in (117) and even a 3rd

person NP as in (118), is

placed under an obligation by the speaker to actualize the predicated activity.

(116) You’re going to try and be bit earlier (ICE-GB S1A-099 115)

(117) Now with your hand still on the front brake we’re going to put the bike on

its side stand (ICE-GB S2A-054 47)

(118) I gave her a look which caused her to shrivel somewhat. ‘Yes, Norah,’ I

said, with an exaggerated show of patience. ‘I am sure it was just the ticket

for you. But no daughter of mine is going to be offered mere emasculated

fragments.’ Norah did not answer this, but went on sipping her tea and

smoothing the fine hairs on her forearm. (ICE-AUS W2F-012 13)

Prediction and volition 149

In some cases we find that deontic be going to has undergone a further extension,

with a third party – rather than the addressee – as the deontic target, as in (119):

(119) The flowers were the perfect cover, so the press were unable to take

photographs of me. (We had bills to pay; they weren’t going to get useful

photographs for nothing.) I put both arms around the flowers and hid my

face behind them. (ICE-AUS W2B-004 57)

5.4.4 Be going to: regional and stylistic variation

The finding of the present study that be going to was more than twice as frequent

in the American corpus as in the Australian or British corpora (see Table 5.13) is

compatible with the diachronic findings reported by Leech (2003), and Mair and

Leech (2006): see Section 1.4 above. Both studies noted an enormous increase in

the frequency of be going to (51.6%) in American writing between 1961 and

1991/2, and by contrast a small decline in British writing.3

In the present study the distribution of be going to across speech and

writing was skewed strongly towards the former (by a ratio of 9.9:1), as Table

5.13 shows. This finding is compatible with Leech’s (2003) discovery, in a

follow-up analysis of be going to in spoken British data (based on a selection of

texts from the Survey of English Usage corpus and ICE-GB), of a sharper

increase in popularity there than in writing, prompting him to conclude: “The

hypothesis that be going to has been increasing in frequency as a consequence of

grammaticalization appears to be supported for spoken British English, though

not for written British English” (Leech 2003: 232).

Table 5.13. Genre distribution of be going to

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US Avg

Dialogue 2,261 (814) 2,161 (778)

Monologue 1,242 (298) 863 (207)

Spoken

Total 1,853 (1112) 1,642 (985) 3,821 (445) 2,439

Non-printed 200 (20) 300 (30)

Printed 197 (59) 137 (41)

Written

Total 198 (79) 178 (71) 363 (29) 246

Total 1,191 1,056 (474) 1,220

What these findings suggest is the influence of two factors in the growth

of be going to. One factor, as suggested by the findings for speech and writing, is

colloquialization, with the attested upsurge of this quasi-modal in American

writing being influenced by its robustness in speech. Note in this regard that, as

the figures in Table 5.13 indicate, be going to is more frequent in the typically

more informal manuscript genres than in the more formal printed genres. A

second factor is ‘Americanization’, with AmE leading the way in the rise of be

Chapter 5150

going to. Not only is the frequency of be going to significantly higher in C-US

than in the other two corpora, as already noted, but its relative popularity in

speech over writing is also stronger in C-US (10.5:1) than in ICE-AUS (9.4:1)

and ICE-GB (9.2:1).

5.5 Want to

It was suggested in Section 2.3.3 above that, even though want to is not

conventionally regarded as a quasi-modal, a case can be made for such a

classification. As Krug (2000: 117ff) observes, the assumption by want to of

morphological and semantic features associated with modal auxiliaries is

indicative of modalization. According to Bolinger (1980: 297): “(t)he moment a

verb is given an infinitival complement, that verb starts down the road of

auxiliariness”. This observation is especially apposite when there is

morphological incorporation of the infinitival to into a single compound form, as

found commonly found in speech with want to, and represented orthographically

in informal styles as wanna. In this respect want to (with 320/2,177, or 14.7%, of

tokens so reduced) has not progressed as far as be going to (with 1,032/2,721, or

37.9%). As is the case with be going to/gonna, the three regional varieties differ

greatly in the ratio of full form to compound tokens (855:3 in ICE-GB, 841:198

in ICE-AUS, and 161:119 in C-US). Again, while the magnitude of the

differences may indicate that the same conventions were not applied consistently

during transcription of the spoken data, it is nevertheless suggestive of dialectal

variation, with the compound favoured most in AmE.

Semantically, as noted by Krug (2000: 147-151) there is some evidence

that want to is undergoing modalization/auxiliarization in the emergence of

modal senses additional to its dominantly volitional meaning. These meanings,

deontic and epistemic, whose modest frequencies suggest that their development

may be relatively recent, are discussed in Sections 5.4.2 and 5.4.3 below.

There are, in addition to the formal and semantic arguments for counting

want to as a quasi-modal, some functional arguments. As Verplaetse (2003: 156)

observes, “convincing functional correspondence of WANT TO/WANNA and

both central modals and semi-auxiliaries in the modal field can be found in the

negotiation of referential content in spoken discourse”. In (120) want to, be going

to and will alternate within the same volitional domain, even if they differ in the

shades of meaning expressed:

(120) I’m actually going to be using the words so um, while I don’t really want

to apologise to you for doing that, ’cause I don’t think that’s um the

sensible thing to do, I’m um gonna tell you that I will be using the words

to describe what I want to talk about (ICE-AUS S2A-026 22)

Another functional argument concerns the tentative, deferential, use of the

preterite wanted to. It has been observed by many (e.g. Coates 1983: 118, Palmer

2001: 203-204) that preterite modal forms may be used to make an utterance

Prediction and volition 151

more diffident or polite than it would be with a present modal form (compare

Could I ask …? and Can I ask …?: see Sections 4.3.1.2 and 5.3.2). It has

furthermore been noted (e.g. by Bybee 1995: 503-517, Krug 2000: 155,

Veplaetse 2003: 157) that the same effect can be achieved with preterite wanted

to (compare I wanted to ask … and I want to ask …). In (121) and (122) wanted

to is used in a present context to refer to the subject-referent’s present wish.

Significantly, Palmer (2001: 204) observes that this tense usage, possible with

“notionally modal” wanted to, is “not found with other types of verb”.

(121) Now Paul we’ll get to you in a second but I wanted to ask ah you two guys

ah (ICE-AUS S1B 035 52)

(122) Oh look that’s fine. Look I knew I was too inundated this week anyway

but um you know because we did talk about it I wanted to you know let

you know I hadn’t forgotten (ICE-AUS S1A-096 49)

The final argument concerns the role of frequency evidence in the study of

grammaticalization. Krug (2000: 118-141) notes that while want to was very rare

in the Early Modern English period it has increased greatly in frequency in recent

times. This is confirmed by Mair and Leech’s (2006: 328) finding of an 18.5%

increase in written BrE and 70.9% in written AmE over the period 1961–1991

(see further Section 5.5.4 below). In a study of 1st

person volition with will, be

going to, and want to in the BNC, Verplaetse (1999) noted that will accounted for

approximately two-thirds of the expression of volition, the remaining third being

shared almost equally by want to and be going to. In the present study volitional

(‘dynamic’) want to (with 2,137 tokens across the three corpora, and for all

persons: see Table 5.14 below) is almost as frequent as volitional will (2,296

tokens), each almost twice as frequent as volitional be going to (1,980 tokens).4

These frequencies suggest that the status of will as the primary modal exponent of

volition may be under challenge from want to.

Table 5.14. Meanings of want to

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US Total %

Dynamic 1021 843 1,390 (273) 3,254 (2,137) 98.0%

Deontic 12 8 15 (3) 35 (23) 1.1%

Epistemic 4 6 15 (3) 25 (13) 0.8%

Indeterminate 2 1 5 (1) 8 (4) 0.2%

Total 1,039 858 1,425 (280) 3,322 (2,177) 100%

Finally, the figures in Table 5.15 suggest that want to is more ‘personal’

than the other expressions in the prediction/volition group. 41.9% of want to

tokens have a 1st

person subject, as against 26.9% for will and 37.3% for be going

to. If we take 1st

person and 2nd

person subjects together, the differences are

magnified (want to 68.5%, will 37.1%, and be going to 50.6%).

Chapter 5152

Table 5.15. Person of subject with want to

(Figures represent raw frequencies)

1st

2nd

3rd

Total

Dynamic 905 (42.3%) 555 (26.0%) 677 (31.7%) 2,137 (100%)

Deontic 4 (17.4%) 17 (73.9%) 2 (8.7%) 23 (100%)

Epistemic 3 (23.1%) 7 (53.8%) 3 (23.1%) 13 (100%)

Indeterminate 1 (25.0%) 0 (0%) 3 (75.0%) 4 (100%)

Total 913 (41.9%) 579 (26.6%) 685 (31.5%) 2,177 (100%)

5.5.1 Dynamic want to

In Modern English want to is the item most consistently associated with the

expression of the dynamic (more specifically, volitional) modality, with a

meaning comparable to, though arguably not as strong as, that of willingness will.

Thus in (123) there is no implication that the “making a game of it” will be

actualized, as there would be if we were to substitute ’ll for want to. Even more

pointed is the contrast between the preterite didn’t wanna and its modal auxiliary

counterpart wouldn’t in (124), the latter paraphraseable by “refused to”. The

original would allow a continuation such as “but I managed to”, but this would be

infelicitous with the stronger wouldn’t.

(123) Um I mean it depends whether you want to make a game of it or not (ICE-

AUS S1A-008 109)

(124) you know, I didn’t wanna embarrass her (C-US SBC 10 586)

5.5.2 Deontic want to

As noted above the development of a deontic use of want to provides one piece of

evidence that this catenative lexical verb is undergoing auxiliarization/

modalization. It is found most commonly with a 2nd

person subject, as in (125),

(126), and (127).

(125) A: Do you want tap water or this

B: Just normal water

A: It’s it’s Spa

B: Solpadeine is is uh

A: What You want to use the tap water then (ICE-GB S1A-043 143)

(126) So you wanna think about what’s my hypothesis and how am I gonna how

am I gonna attempt then test that hypothesis and what’s the best way to do

it (ICE-AUS S1B-019 129)

(127) Ah ere r we’re coming out of it. We’ve turned the corner and ah I believe

we don’t wanna go to a dog eat dog survival of the fittest society. (ICE-

AUS S1B-029 52)

Prediction and volition 153

It is maintained by some (e.g. Aarts and Aarts 1995: 178) that the sense is

volitional in such cases, with the speaker’s wishes being ‘projected’ onto the

addressee. However a deontic interpretation is consistent with the apparent

issuing of a directive or at least strong recommendation by the speaker in (125)

and (126) (an interpretation supported by the didactic context in (126)), and the

objective statement of an obligation in (127) (“there is an obligation on us”).

Such an obligational interpretation is motivated by implicature (as we have

argued is the case with deontic will in Section 5.1.3 and deontic be going to in

Section 5.4.3), with want to analyzed as comparable in meaning and modal

strength to deontic should and ought to.

5.5.3 Epistemic want to

Is want to in the process of developing the same type of root/epistemic semantic

duality that is characteristic of the modal class? There is some evidence that it is,

but the epistemic meaning of want to is rather more elusive than its deontic

meaning. Bolinger (1980: 297) suggests an example (Pick it up with both hands.

You wanna be careful it doesn’t fall.), but this appears to be deontic rather than

epistemic. Westney (1995: 32) concedes that it is “unclear” whether want to can

be epistemic, but nevertheless offers a plausible (constructed) example which he

describes as “perfectly possible in a colloquial context”: They want to be pretty

stupid if they believe everything he says. Krug (2000: 150) presents an example

overheard from a Californian female shop assistant (Customer: Do you have

coolers? Assistant: Coolers? They wanna be on one of the top shelves

somewhere. They only arrived this morning.). The corpora yielded a small

number of tokens: in (128) and (129) the speaker is making an inference about a

situation rather than describing the subject-referent’s willingness to actualize it.

(128) Lorraine Mullen can hardly lift her legs in third place the thirty seven year

old Kiwi. She would have been used to all these hill running. Once of New

Zealand, twenty two miles of the hardest run you’d ever wanna run. (ICE-

AUS S2A-001 127)

(129) H Well maybe th that’s the reason why they’re leav I mean hopefully if

they wanted a franchise certainly but if they’re retiring one they’re retiring

which

? Well they’d wanna they’d wanna be.

H Being being encouraged, (ICE-AUS S1B-018 199)

5.5.4 Want to: regional and stylistic variation

Two recent diachronic studies have confirmed the growing popularity of want to,

particularly in AmE. In his comparison of the press and fiction categories of

LOB/Brown and FLOB/Frown, Krug (2000: 135) notes spectacular increases in

Chapter 5154

the American corpora, leading him to conclude that “while the rise of the new

volitional modal probably did not originate in the US, the change obviously

caught on more rapidly here than in Britain”. Similarly, Mair and Leech (2006)

report a spectacular increase in the popularity of want to (of 70.9%) in American

writing between 1961 and 1991/2, with a smaller though still substantial increase

of 18.5% in British writing (see Table 1.4). As Table 5.16 shows, in the present

study want to is more than 50% more popular in the American corpus than in the

British (1.7:1), and almost 50% more popular than in the Australian corpus

(1.4:1).

Table 5.16. Genre distribution of want to

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US Avg

Dialogue 1,889 (680) 1,542 (555)

Monologue 808 (194) 542 (130)

Spoken

Total 1,457 (874) 1,142 (685) 1,966 (229) 1,522

Non-printed 430 (43) 720 (72)

Printed 407 (122) 337 (101)

Written

Total 413 (165) 433 (173) 638 (51) 495

Total 1,039 858 1,425 (280) 1,389

Want to displays stylistic as well as regional variation. In the present study

it was preferred in speech over writing (albeit less overwhelmingly than be going

to (see Section 5.4.4 above) by a ratio of 3.1:1, a finding uncannily in line with

Krug’s (2000: 136) claim that it is “approximately three times more common in

spoken English”. This finding supports the credibility of Krug’s view that

“spoken performance data are influencing the written medium towards a greater

use of this lexeme” (2000: 136); in other words, that colloquialization has played

an important role in the frequency gains experienced by want to in contemporary

English.

The findings for person (see Table 5.15 above) indicate that there is a

certain degree of complementarity between the modal and semi-modal. 2nd

person

subjects are considerably more common with dynamic want to (accounting for

26.0% of all tokens) than with dynamic will (2.2%), while dynamic want to

selects a 1st

person subject less commonly (42.3%) than does dynamic will

(72.2%). Insofar as volition is more transparently and consistently expressed by

want to than will, this difference may be explained in terms of speakers’ greater

preparedness to make overt reference to their addressee’s volition than to their

own. A further inference that may be drawn from this patterning is that the

incursion that want to seems to be making into the semantic territory of dynamic

will is not occurring haphazardly, but rather in a way that is setting up a certain

degree of distributional complementarity.

Prediction and volition 155

5.6 Be about to

5.6.1 Meanings of be about to

Be about to is a low frequency item whose semantic similarity to be going to

warrants a brief entry at this point. As Table 5.17 shows, however, its epistemic

(futurity) sense is dominant, no deontic meaning and a small number of dynamic

tokens (see further below).

Table 5.17. Meanings of be about to

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US Total %

Epistemic 59 52 36 (7) 147 (118) 96.1%

Dynamic 3 2 0 (0) 5 (5) 3.3%

Indeterminate 1 0 0 (0) 1 (1) 0.7%

Total 63 54 36 (7) 153 (124) 100%

In view of the semantic similarities between be about to and be going to it is not

surprising that they display similar behaviour in subject selection (as Table 5.18

indicates, both strongly preferring a 3rd

person subject and with 1st

person

preferred over 2nd

person).

Table 5.18. Person of subject with be about to

(Figures represent raw frequencies)

1st

2nd

3rd

Total

Epistemic 26 (22.0%) 4 (3.4%) 88 (74.6%) 118 (100%)

Dynamic 2 (40%) 1 (20%) 2 (40%) 5 (100%)

Indeterminate 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 1 (100%) 1 (100%)

Total 28 (22.6%) 5 (4.0%) 91 (73.4%) 124 (100%)

Like be going to, be about to always locates the situation in future time when be

is present tense. However the sense of immediacy carried by be about to is even

stronger than it is with be going to. For instance the use of be about to in (130)

suggests the imminence of the communication, and in (131) of the landing.

(130) Just a moment I think he was about to say something else (ICE-AUS S1B-

065 299)

(131) I think I can hear the sound of an aircraft, uh in the distance, and I think

they’re about to come into land. (ICE-GB S2A-008 103)

Collocation with temporal just is very common, as in (132) and (133):

Chapter 5156

(132) We were just about to have tea and he wanted a packet of chips (ICE-AUS

S1A-048 391)

(133) I was just about to tuck into it and I noticed this great fly soaked in tomato

sauce (ICE-GB S1A-055 222)

Be about to is less grammaticalized than be going to (whose

auxiliarization is in evidence phonologically in the appearance of gonna and

semantically in the development of its volitional sense). Nevertheless, there are

several examples which suggest that be about to may have started to undergo a

similar semantic development. In (134), for example, it expresses intentionality,

and in (135) the stronger volitional sense of refusal:

(134) He laughed. You’re not about to let me go on that tea business are you?

(ICE-AUS W2F-001 72)

(135) I wanted to tell you this because we were talking about it when I saw you

and I wanted you to realise that I was am not about to be taken for a ride

(ICE-GB W1B-005 49)

These non-epistemic senses are rare and only found with negation. In (135) there

is another possible interpretation, involving a use of be (not) about to that was

first commented on some 40 years ago as an innovation in AmE, and glossed as

“the actor is not the sort of person from whom such a deed can be expected”

(Joos 1968: 24). This development appears to be comparable to that which

resulted in the ‘propensity’ use of will (see Section 5.1.2 above), involving an

assessment of a person’s character deriving from their wilful behaviour.

5.6.2 Be about to: regional and stylistic variation

Table 5.19 indicates that be about to is less popular in C-US than in the other two

corpora, and this may be associated with its comparative unpopularity in speech,

by contrast with its greater popularity in speech in both ICE-AUS and ICE-GB.

Table 5.19. Genre distribution of be about to

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US Avg

Dialogue 47 (17) 56 (20)

Monologue 113 (27 83 (20)

Spoken

Total 73 (44) 67 (40) 60 (1) 67

Non-printed 50 (5) 40 (4)

Printed 47 (14) 33 (10)

Written

Total 48 (19) 35 (14) 75 (6) 53

Total 63 54 36 (7) 51

Prediction and volition 157

Notes

1Note, in this regard, that used to – excluded from this study on the grounds

that it expresses aspectual rather than modal meaning – is used to express

characteristic or habitual behaviour in the past, without any suggestion

that the possibility of occurrence of the situation is attributable to

properties of the subject-referent.

2These figures show that Huddleston and Pullum’s (2002: 189) claim that

shall “always has deontic meaning with 2nd

/3rd

person subjects” is

inaccurate.

3Leech’s (2003) percentage figure for British writing is 3.1%, while Mair

and Leech’s (2006) is 1.2%.

4In fact there are probably more tokens of volitional want to than will,

given that the figure of 2,296 tokens for dynamic will includes those

representing the propensity subclass.

Chapter 6

Conclusion

This book has examined the meanings of the English modal auxiliaries, and a set

of semantically-related quasi-modals, in three parallel corpora representing BrE,

AmE, and AusE. A tripartite classification scheme was adopted, distinguishing

between epistemic, deontic and dynamic modality, and the analysis enriched via

the concepts of modal strength, modal degree, and subjectivity/objectivity. Also

addressed was the interaction between modal expressions and negation, and

between modal expressions and temporality. A number of vexing issues have also

been discussed, including the questionable classification of might and should as

preterite forms, and the modal status of futurity will.

Patterns of regional and stylistic variation have been explored, and the

findings found to be compatible with Mair and Leech’s (2006) conclusion that

AmE is in the box seat of change in the rise of the quasi-modals and the decline

of the modals. The findings further suggest that BrE is the most conservative of

the three regional varieties, with AusE occupying a middle position, appearing to

distance itself from both the innovativeness of the Americans and conservativism

of the British.1

Consider firstly the quasi-modals examined. The overall frequency for the

quasi-modals examined in C-US (6,500 tokens per million words) is strikingly

larger than that for ICE-AUS (4,905) and ICE-GB (4,625). Mair and Leech

suggest that the rise of the quasi-modals has been particularly marked in spoken

English, as we might expect given the tendency for innovations to spread rapidly

in informal spoken genres before becoming more broadly established in the

language. The quasi-modals’ preference for occurrence in speech over writing is

overwhelmingly greater in the American corpus (with a speech/writing ratio of

9,505:2,196, or 4.33:1) than in ICE-AUS (6,511:2,514, or 2.59:1) and ICE-GB

(5,806:2,883, or 2.01:1). On both measures, then, it is AmE that emerges as the

most progressive, BrE as the least, with AusE in between.

Consider secondly the modals, for which, in view of the attested decline of

the class, a paucity of numbers in a particular variety may be interpretable as a

sign of advanced change. Here the regional differences are less pronounced. BrE

emerges, as the variety with the largest number of tokens (16,508 in ICE-GB), as

the most conservative. AusE has the least number of tokens (15,906 in ICE-

AUS), but is followed closely by AmE (16,136 in C-US). Interestingly if we

restrict the count to just those modals that might be regarded as being in

competition with the quasi-modal ‘big players’ (have to, need to, be going to and

want to), namely must should, need, will and shall, the ordering again mirrors that

for the quasi-modals (C-US 5,370 > ICE-GB 5,777 > ICE-GB 5,997), with AmE

the most innovative and BrE the most conservative. Speech/writing ratios reveal

further symmetries. BrE has the highest proportion of modals in writing

Chapter 6160

(16,672:16,460, or 1.01:1, in ICE-GB), AmE the least (14,279:17,439, or 0.82:1,

in C-US), and AusE in-between (14,545:16,846, or 0.86:1, in ICE-AUS).

Equipped with this broad picture of American innovativeness, British

conservativism and Australian independence from both, let us review the findings

for individual modal expressions. Consider first the expressions of necessity and

obligation, beginning with the contrasting fortunes of must and have to. Given the

declining numbers of must and increasing numbers of have to (noted in Section

1.4 above) it is not surprising that have to should outstrip must in the three

corpora. The degree of difference (and therefore the degree to which the trend

may have advanced) is considerably greater in C-US. The ordering across the

varieties (C-US 3.44:1 > AusE 2.13:1 > BrE 1.84:1) reflects the same American

domination as that determined by the frequency of have to tokens across the

varieties (C-US 1,385 >AusE 1,311 > BrE 1,244). These findings suggest that at

least one important factor driving the popularity of have to in AusE and BrE may

be ‘Americanization’.

Furthermore, as noted in Section 3.5.6, have to is considerably more

popular in speech than in writing (by a ratio of 2.47:1), contrasting strikingly with

must, which is almost twice as popular – 1.65:1 – in writing. This finding, in

combination with the evidence provided by Mair and Leech (2006) that have to

has been on the rise in recent British and American writing, suggests that another

possible factor is ‘colloquialization’ (the drift into other genres of – and

increasing acceptability of – features associated with colloquial speech). The

result for AmE is particularly notable, with the frequency of have to being more

than five times greater in speech, and the by-now-familiar ordering of dialects (C-

US 5.33:1 > ICE-AUS 2.52:1 > ICE-GB 1.35:1).

A further factor in the encroachment of have to on the semantic territory

of must is suggested by the contrast between the typically subjective deontic

meaning expressed by must and the typically objective kind expressed by have to.

Have to may thus present itself an attractive option for speakers seeking a more

‘democratic’ and less overtly authoritative modal expression than must (see

further Section 3.5.6 above). Again it is AmE that appears to be in the vanguard

of change: the deontic meaning of have to is more dominant, and that of must less

dominant, in C-US than in the other two corpora (see Tables 3.2 and 3.12).

Have got to is semantically similar to have to, but syntactically dissimilar

(compare for example to have to/*to have got to; may have to/*may have got to).

Its regional and stylistic distribution is also quite different from that of have to.

Have got to bucks the trend for quasi-modals to be most numerous in AmE (with

C-US in fact having the least number of tokens of the three corpora). It also

displays a preference for occurrence in speech over writing (12.3:1) that is more

extreme than that for any other quasi-modal examined, and probably attributable

to the likelihood that in speech it will attract less attention than in writing from

prescriptivists concerned with censuring the use of got.

While should may have sufficient numbers to compete with have to in the

semantic field of deontic necessity, it differs from the quasi-modal in its typical

subjectivity and weaker strength. Table 1.4 indicates that should has undergone a

Conclusion 161

decline in recent British and American writing. It seems likely that this decline

has occurred in speech as well, given the smaller numbers for should in speech as

against writing in the present study (see Table 3.7). Furthermore the relatively

modest number of shoulds in C-US (850 per million words) suggests that AmE

may be leading the way in its decline. Ought to is semantically very close to

should, but its numbers are both extremely small by comparison and in serious

decline. In Section 3.3 it was suggested that the main reason for the unpopularity

of ought to is that, despite continuing to require a to-infinitive like have to and

need to, it has failed to develop non-auxiliary syntactic properties in Standard

English.

Need and need to are, like should and ought to, semantically alike though

strikingly different in frequency. Mair and Leech’s (2006) figures (see Table 1.4)

reveal a recent massive rise for need to, complemented by a sharp decline for

need (the latter presumably attributable to the syntactic inflexibility of the

auxiliary, which is restricted largely to negative clauses). Once again it is AmE

leading the way and BrE the most conservative, the frequencies for need to being

C-US 473 > ICE-AUS 343 > ICE-GB 280, and for need C-US 15 > ICE-AUS 19

> ICE-GB 34. Again we find correlations with speech/writing patterns of

distribution: it is in C-US that need to has the strongest preference for occurrence

in speech (3.56:1), and need the weakest (0.0:1). Why is need to expanding so

rapidly? One possible explanation is to be found in the attractive option offered

by its deontic use (which has developed as an extension of its intrinsically

dynamic sense) of enabling the speaker to formulate a requirement that at the

same time acknowledges and endorses the subject-referent’s needs. Such a sense

is not expressed by any of the other expressions of deontic necessity.

There is less to say about the possibility/permission/ability group, given

that the only quasi-modal that we have considered is be able to (and no

diachronic figures are supplied for this item by Mair and Leech). Though

semantically similar to can in its capacity to express a range of dynamic

meanings, be able to differs from the modal in the implication of actuality that it

conveys. The large numbers for can (surpassed only by those for will/would)

along with its diachronic stability (see Table 1.4) suggest that it is not under

threat from be able to.

May expresses a similar range of meanings to can, but the proportions

differ greatly, may being dominantly epistemic, can dynamic. The findings of the

study are in line with Mair and Leech’s finding that may has suffered a stronger

decline in AmE writing than BrE writing (see Table 1.4) with C-US evidencing

the smallest number of tokens (C-US 825 < ICE-AUS 881 < ICE-GB 1218),

along with the greatest degree of unpopularity in speech (C-US 0.27:1 < ICE-

AUS 0.31:1 < ICE-GB 0.32:1).

Finally, consider the prediction/volition group, which is dominated

numerically by will/would, but also contains the two rapidly growing quasi-

modals be going to and want to. There are some subtle semantic differences

between be going to and will which should make us wary of any suggestion that

the former is intruding upon the semantic territory of the latter. While epistemic

Chapter 6162

will typically locates a situation in future time, epistemic be going to is restricted

to doing so. Furthermore epistemic be going to conveys a sense of immediacy

(albeit not as strong as that conveyed by be about to) that differentiates it from

will. While dynamic will may express willingness or intentionality, dynamic be

going to tends to restricted to the latter. Mair and Leech’s (2006) frequencies,

presented in Table 1.4, document starkly contrasting the fortunes of be going to

in AmE writing (a rise of 51.6%) and BrE writing (a small decline of 1.2%). The

findings of the present study are in keeping with this diachronic picture: be going

to is more than twice as frequent in the American corpus as it is in the others (C-

US 2,413 > ICE-AUS 1,191 > ICE-GB 1,056), with speech/writing ratios

reflecting the same ordering of the regional varieties: C-US 10.52:1 > ICE-AUS

9.35:1 > ICE-GB 9.22:1.

Want to is a predominantly volitional expression, with a meaning

comparable to that of dynamic will. Given its spectacular upsurge in popularity in

American writing, as reported by Mair and Leech (2006), it was not surprising to

find the frequency for want to in C-US outstripping that in the other corpora: C-

US 1,425 > ICE-AUS 1,039 > ICE-GB 858. Meanwhile want to in AmE

evidenced a strong preference for occurrence in speech over writing, albeit one

not quite as strong as that in the Australian corpus: ICE-AUS 3.52:1 > C-US

3.08:1 > ICE-GB 2.63:1.

Shall is traditionally associated with will, even though its primary use in

Modern English is as a deontic modal found mainly in constitutive/regulative

contexts. Its frequency is strikingly smaller than that of will, and rapidly

declining. In the present data shall was found to be considerably more robust in

the British corpus (where it is relatively popular in speech) than in ICE-AUS and

C-US.

Notes

1I am grateful to Christian Mair for pointing out that a potentially fruitful

avenue for further research would be the diachronic implications of the

pragmatic/politeness dimensions of modality (as reflected in cases such as

I would think so and This would seem to suggest). It may be, for instance,

that instead of the picture of British conservatism that emerges from the

present essentially quantitative study, we find speakers of BrE to be more

prolific users of modal hedges than speakers of AmE and AusE. In turn

such a finding might invite the conclusion that instead of having three

Englishes at different diachronic-developmental stages, what we have is a

fairly stable system of choices in which the available options are used

differently across the varieties for essentially pragmatic reasons.

Appendix

NOTE: In all tables raw frequencies are bracketed, and frequencies normalized to

tokens per one million words are unbracketed.

Table 1. Must in ICE-AUS, ICE-GB, and C-US

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US Avg

Dialogue 164 (59) 214 (77)

Spoken Monologue 333 (80) 283 (68)

Total 232 (139) 242 (145) 112 (13) 195

Non-printed 760 (76) 340 (34)

Written Printed 513 (154) 707 (212)

Total 575 (230) 615 (246) 350 (28) 513

Deontic

Total 369 (369) 391 (391) 209 (41) 323

Dialogue 17 (6) 17 (6)

Spoken Monologue 38 (9) 21 (5)

Total 25 (15) 18 (11) 9 (1) 17

Non-printed 80 (8) 50 (5)

Written Printed 57 (17) 83 (25)

Total 63 (25) 75 (30) 50 (4) 63

Dynamic

Total 40 (40) 41 (41) 25 (5) 35

Dialogue 317 (114) 297 (107)

Spoken Monologue 88 (21) 167 (40)

Total 225 (135) 245 (147) 189 (22) 220

Non-printed 120 (12) 150 (15)

Written Printed 127 (38) 180 (54)

Total 125 (50) 173 (69) 100 (8) 133

Epistemic

Total 185 (185) 216 (216) 153 (30) 185

Indeterminate 19 (19) 27 (27) 15 (3) 20

Total 613 (613) 675 (675) 402 (79) 563

Appendix164

Table 2. Should in ICE-AUS, ICE-GB, and C-US.

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US Avg

Dialogue 911 (328) 658 (237)

Spoken Monologue 521 (125) 633 (152)

Total 755 (453) 748 (389) 532 (62) 678

Non-printed 790 (79) 550 (55)

Written Printed 980 (294) 923 (277)

Total 933 (373) 830 (332) 700 (56) 918

Deontic

Total 826 (826) 721 (721) 601 (118) 821

Dialogue 158 (57) 142 (51)

Spoken Monologue 125 (30) 67 (16)

Total 145 (87) 112 (67) 103 (12) 120

Non-printed 190 (19) 200 (20)

Written Printed 93 (28) 83 (25)

Total 118 (47) 113 (45) 150 (12) 127

Epistemic

Total 134 (134) 112 (112) 122 (24) 123

Dialogue 25 (9) 67 (24)

Spoken Monologue 83 (20) 79 (19)

Total 48 (29) 72 (43) 34 (4) 51

Non-printed 190 (19) 200 (20)

Written Printed 43 (13) 137 (41)

Total 80 (32) 153 (61) 50 (4)

Subjunctive

Total 61 (61) 104 (104) 41 (8) 69

Dialogue 19 (7) 106 (38)

Spoken Monologue 8 (2) 38 (9)

Total 15 (9) 78 (47) 9 (1) 34

Non-printed 0 (0) 40 (4)

Written Printed 7 (2) 20 (6)

Total 5 (2) 25 (10) 25 (2) 18

= would

Total 11 (11) 57 (57) 15 (3) 28

Indeterminate 109 130 71 (14) 103

Total 1,141 (1,141) 1,124 (1,124) 850 (167) 1,038

Appendix 165

Table 3. Ought to in ICE-AUS, ICE-GB, and C-US

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US Avg

Dialogue 6 (2) 133 (48)

Spoken Monologue 38 (9) 54 (13)

Total 18 (11) 102 (61) 69 (8) 63

Non-printed 40 (4) 70 (7)

Written Printed 60 (18) 20 (6)

Total 55 (22) 33 (13) 25 (2) 38

Deontic

Total 33 (33) 74 (74) 51 (10) 53

Dialogue 0 (0) 0 (0)

Spoken Monologue 0 (0) 13 (3)

Total 0 (0) 5 (3) 0 (0) 2

Non-printed 0 (0) 0 (0)

Written Printed 3 (1) 3 (1)

Total 3 (1) 3 (1) 0 (0) 2

Epistemic

Total 1 (1) 4 (4) 0 (0) 2

Indeterminate 2 (2) 2 (2) 0 (0) 1

Total 36 (36) 80 (80) 51 (10) 56

Appendix166

Table 4. Need in ICE-AUS, ICE-GB, and C-US

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US Avg

Dialogue 0 (0) 6 (2)

Spoken Monologue 17 (4) 42 (10)

Total 7 (4) 20 (12) 0 (0) 9

Non-printed 10 (1) 20 (2)

Written Printed 23 (7) 23 (7)

Total 20 (8) 23 (9) 25 (2) 23

Dynamic

Total 12 (12) 21 (21) 10 (2) 14

Dialogue 0 (0) 3 (1)

Spoken Monologue 0 (0) 4 (1)

Total 0 (0) 3 (2) 0 (0) 1

Non-printed 10 (1) 0 (0)

Written Printed 3 (1) 3 (1)

Total 5 (2) 3 (1) 13 (1) 7

Deontic

Total 2 (2) 3 (3) 5 (1) 3

Dialogue 0 (0) 0 (0)

Spoken Monologue 8 (2) 21 (5)

Total 3 (2) 8 (5) 0 (0) 4

Non-printed 0 (0) 0 (0)

Written Printed 7 (2) 10 (3)

Total 5 (2) 8 (3) 0 (0) 4

Epistemic

Total 4 (4) 8 (8) 0 (0) 4

Indeterminate 1 (1) 2 (2) 0 (0) 1

Total 19 (19) 34 (34) 15 (3) 23

Appendix 167

Table 5. Have to in ICE-AUS, ICE-GB, and C-US

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US Avg

Dialogue 1,389 (500) 1,117 (402)

Spoken Monologue 1,321 (317) 946 (227)

Total 1,362 (817) 1,048 (629) 1,649 (192) 1,353

Non-printed 610 (61) 800 (80)

Written Printed 400 (120) 643 (193)

Total 453 (181) 683 (273) 300 (24) 479

Deontic

Total 998 (998) 902 (902) 1,099 (216) 1,000

Dialogue 414 (149) 442 (159)

Spoken Monologue 242 (58) 163 (39)

Total 345 (207) 330 (198) 369 (43) 348

Non-printed 280 (28) 440 (44)

Written Printed 180 (60) 300 (90)

Total 220 (88) 335 (134) 88 (7) 214

Dynamic

Total 295 (295) 332 (332) 255 (50) 294

Dialogue 6 (2) 0 (0)

Spoken Monologue 13 (3) 0 (0)

Total 8 (5) 0 (0) 34 (4) 14

Non-printed 0 (0) 3 (1)

Written Printed 0 (0) 3 (1)

Total 0 (0) 6 (2) 0 (0) 2

Epistemic

Total 5 (5) 2 (2) 20 (4) 9

Indeterminate 13 (13) 8 (8) 10 (2) 10

Total 1,311 (1,311) 1,244 (1,244) 1,385 (272) 1,313

Appendix168

Table 6. Have got to in ICE-AUS, ICE-GB, and C-US

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US Avg

Dialogue 636 (229) 672 (242)

Spoken Monologue 167 (40) 113 (27)

Total 448 (269) 448 (269) 232 (27) 382

Non-printed 10 (1) 50 (5)

Written Printed 27 (8) 17 (5)

Total 23 (9) 25 (10) 38 (3) 29

Deontic

Total 278 (278) 279 (279) 153 (30) 240

Dialogue 81 (29) 94 (34)

Spoken Monologue 38 (9) 50 (12)

Total 63 (38) 77 (46) 26 (3) 166

Non-printed 0 (0) 30 (3)

Written Printed 13 (4) 7 (2)

Total 10 (4) 13 (5) 0 (0)

Dynamic

Total 42 (42) 51 (51) 15 (3) 36

Dialogue 11 (4) 6 (2)

Spoken Monologue 13 (3) 0 (0)

Total 12 (7) 3 (2) 9 (1) 8

Non-printed 0 (0) 0 (0)

Written Printed 3 (1) 0 (0)

Total 3 (1) 0 (0) 0 (0) 1

Epistemic

Total 8 (8) 2 (2) 5 (1) 5

Indeterminate 4 (4) 7 (7) 0 (0) 4

Total 332 (332) 339 (339) 173 (34) 281

Appendix 169

Table 7. Need to in ICE-AUS, ICE-GB, and C-US

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US Avg

Dialogue 178 (64) 214 (77)

Spoken Monologue 271 (65) 75 (18)

Total 215 (129) 158 (95) 429 (50) 267

Non-printed 220 (22) 140 (14)

Written Printed 230 (66) 177 (49)

Total 230 (88) 170 (63) 125 (10) 175

Dynamic

Total 220 (217) 527 (158) 305 (60) 351

Dialogue 94 (34) 122 (44)

Spoken Monologue 108 (26) 96 (23)

Total 100 (60) 112 (67) 189 (22) 134

Non-printed 90 (9) 70 (7)

Written Printed 100 (30) 73 (22)

Total 98 (39) 73 (29) 25 (2) 65

Deontic

Total 99 (99) 96 (96) 122 (24) 106

Dialogue 3 (1) 14 (5)

Spoken Monologue 8 (2) 8 (2)

Total 5 (3) 12 (7) 0 (0) 6

Non-printed 0 (0) 10 (1)

Written Printed 10 (3) 10 (3)

Total 8 (3) 10 (4) 25 (2) 14

Epistemic

Total 6 (6) 11 (11) 10 (2) 9

Indeterminate 21 (21) 15 (15) 36 (7) 24

Total 343 (343) 280 (280) 473 (93) 365

Appendix170

Table 8. Had better in ICE-AUS, ICE-GB, and C-US

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US Avg

Dialogue 89 (32) 53 (19)

Spoken Monologue 29 (7) 4 (1)

Total 65 (39) 33 (20) 43 (5) 47

Non-printed 10 (1) 100 (10)

Written Printed 27 (8) 10 (3)

Deontic

Total 23 (9) 33 (13) 38 (3) 31

Total 48 (48) 33 (33) 41 (8) 40

Appendix 171

Table 9. Be supposed to in ICE-AUS, ICE-GB, and C-US

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US Avg

Dialogue 56 (20) 119 (43)

Spoken Monologue 8 (2) 13 (3)

Total 37 (22) 77 (46) 94 (11) 69

Non-printed 20 (2) 10 (1)

Written Printed 13 (4) 10 (3)

Total 15 (6) 10 (4) 25 (2) 17

Deontic

Total 28 (28) 50 (50) 66 (13) 48

Dialogue 36 (13) 75 (27)

Spoken Monologue 8 (2) 25 (6)

Total 25 (15) 55 (33) 43 (5) 41

Non-printed 10 (1) 40 (4)

Written Printed 7 (2) 30 (9)

Total 8 (3) 33 (13) 75 (6) 39

Epist

Total 18 (18) 46 (46) 56 (11) 40

Indeterminate 1 (1) 3 (3) 5 (1) 3

Total 36 (47) 80 (99) 51 (10) 56

Appendix172

Table 10. Be to in ICE-AUS, ICE-GB, and C-US

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US Avg

Dialogue 8 (3) 14 (5)

Spoken Monologue 0 (0) 21 (5)

Total 5 (3) 17 (10) 26 (3) 16

Non-printed 70 (7) 10 (1)

Written Printed 120 (36) 50 (15)

Total 108 (43) 40 (16) 38 (3) 62

Deontic

Total 46 (46) 26 (26) 31 (6) 34

Dialogue 3 (1) 11 (4)

Spoken Monologue 29 (7) 108 (26)

Total 13 (8) 50 (30) 0 (0) 21

Non-printed 120 (12) 100 (10)

Written Printed 63 (19) 153 (46)

Total 78 (31) 140 (56) 38 (3) 85

Epistemic

(Temporal)

Total 39 (39) 86 (86) 15 (3) 47

Dialogue 0 (0) 8 (3)

Spoken Monologue 4 (1) 25 (6)

Total 2 (1) 15 (9) 0 (0) 6

Non-printed 10 (1) 20 (2)

Written Printed 10 (3) 23 (7)

Total 10 (4) 23 (9) 13 (1) 15

Dynamic

(Possibility)

Total 5 (5) 18 (18) 5 (1) 9

Dialogue 22 (8) 61 (22)

Spoken Monologue 50 (12) 100 (24)

Total 33 (20) 77 (46) 26 (3) 45

Non-printed 50 (5) 50 (5)

Written Printed 50 (15) 93 (28)

Total 50 (20) 83 (33) 13 (1) 49

Conditional

Total 40 (40) 79 (79) 20 (4) 46

Indeterminate 5 12 5 (1)

Total 135 (135) 221 (221) 76 (15) 144

Appendix 173

Table 11. Be bound to in ICE-AUS, ICE-GB, and C-US

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US Avg

Dialogue 0 (0) 6 (2)

Spoken Monologue 8 (2) 0 (0)

Total 3 (2) 3 (2) 0 (0) 2

Non-printed 0 (0) 10 (1)

Written Printed 0 (0) 3 (1)

Total 0 (0) 5 (2) 0 (0) 2

Deontic

Total 2 (2) 4 (4) 0 (0) 2

Dialogue 6 (2) 11 (4)

Spoken Monologue 4 (1) 13 (3)

Total 6 (3) 12 (7) 0 (0) 6

Non-printed 10 (1) 0 (0)

Written Printed 10 (3) 17 (5)

Total 10 (4) 13 (5) 13 (1) 12

Epistemic

Total 7 (7) 12 (12) 5 (1) 8

Indeterminate 0 (0) 1 (1) 0 (0) 0

Total 9 (9) 17 (17) 5 (1) 10

Appendix174

Table 12. May in ICE-AUS, ICE-GB, and C-US

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US Avg

Dialogue 283 (102) 508 (183)

Spoken Monologue 542 (130) 758 (182)

Total 387 (232) 608 (365) 275 (32) 423

Non-printed 1,380 (138) 1,160 (116)

WrittenPrinted 937 (281) 1807 (542)

Total 1,048 (419) 1,355 (658) 1,163 (93) 1189

Epistemic

Total 651 (651) 1,023 (1,023) 636 (125) 770

Dialogue 39 (14) 0 (0)

Spoken Monologue 50 (12) 25 (6)

Total 43 (26) 10 (6) 17 (2) 23

Non-printed 180 (18) 50 (5)

WrittenPrinted 190 (57) 163 (49)

Total 188 (75) 180 (54) 163 (13) 177

Dynamic

Total 101 (101) 60 (60) 76 (15) 79

Dialogue 8 (3) 3 (1)

Spoken Monologue 33 (8) 25 (6)

Total 18 (11) 12 (7) 77 (9) 36

Non-printed 60 (6) 100 (10)

WrittenPrinted 203 (61) 177 (53)

Total 168 (67) 158 (63) 25 (2) 117

Deontic

Total 78 (78) 70 (70) 56 (11) 68

Indeterminate 51 (51) 65 (65) 56 (11) 57

Total 881 (881) 1,218 (1,218) 825 (162) 975

Appendix 175

Table 13. Can in ICE-AUS, ICE-GB, and C-US

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US Avg

Dialogue 3,025 (1,089) 3,503 (1,261)

Spoken Monologue 3,196 (767) 2,629 (631)

Total 3,093 (1,856) 3,153 (1,892) 3,460 (403) 3,235

Non-printed 2,080 (208) 3,300 (330)

Written Printed 2,217 (665) 2,437 (731)

Total 2,183 (873) 2,653 (1,061) 2,100 (168) 2,312

Dynamic

Total 2,729 (2,729) 2,953 (2,953) 2,906 (571) 2,863

Dialogue 578 (208) 422 (152)

Spoken Monologue 238 (57) 113 (27)

Total 442 (265) 298 (179) 653 (76) 464

Non-printed 220 (22) 130 (13)

Written Printed 220 (66) 290 (87)

Total 220 (88) 250 (100) 75 (6) 190

Deontic

Total 353 (353) 279 (279) 417 (82) 350

Dialogue 39 (14) 47 (17)

Spoken Monologue 25 (6) 38 (9)

Total 33 (20) 43 (26) 86 (10) 54

Non-printed 0 (0) 20 (2)

Written Printed 13 (4) 13 (4)

Total 10 (4) 15 (6) 13 (1) 13

Epistemic

Total 24 (24) 32 (32) 56 (11) 37

Indeterminate 272 (272) 301 (301) 285 (56) 286

Total 3,378 (3,378) 3,565 (3,565) 3,665 (720) 3,536

Appendix176

Table 14. Might in ICE-AUS, ICE-GB, and C-US

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US Avg

Dialogue 86 (31) 111 (40)

Spoken Monologue 225 (54) 113 (27)

Total 142 (85) 112 (67) 69 (8) 108

Non-printed 50 (5) 140 (14)

Written Printed 107 (32) 130 (39)

Total 93 (37) 133 (53) 88 (7) 105

Dynamic

Total 122 (122) 120 (120) 76 (15) 106

Dialogue 8 (3) 6 (2)

Spoken Monologue 4 (1) 0 (0)

Total 7 (4) 3 (2) 0 (0) 3

Non-printed 0 (0) 10 (1)

Written Printed 10 (3) 7 (2)

Total 8 (3) 8 (3) 0 (0) 5

Deontic

Total 7 (7) 5 (5) 0 (0) 4

Dialogue 817 (294) 703 (253)

Spoken Monologue 483 (116) 379 (91)

Total 683 (410) 573 (344) 404 (47) 553

Non-printed 190 (19) 350 (35)

Written Printed 350 (105) 517 (155)

Total 310 (124) 475 (190) 425 (34) 403

Epistemic

Total 534 (534) 534 (534) 412 (81) 493

Indeterminate 32 (32) 43 (43) 31 (6) 35

Total 695 (695) 702 (702) 520 (102) 639

Appendix 177

Table 15. Could in ICE-AUS, ICE-GB, and C-US

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US Avg

Dialogue 1,461 (526) 1,531 (551)

Spoken Monologue 954 (229) 900 (216)

Total 1,258 (755) 1,278 (767) 1,443 (168) 1,326

Non-printed 1,170 (117) 1,200 (120)

Written Printed 1,083 (325) 1,110 (333)

Total 1,105 (442) 1,510 (453) 1,413 (113) 1,343

Dynamic

Total 1,197 (1197) 1,220 (1,220) 1,430 (281) 1,282

Dialogue 92 (33) 61 (22)

Spoken Monologue 50 (12) 33 (8)

Total 75 (45) 50 (30) 60 (7) 62

Non-printed 70 (7) 30 (3)

Written Printed 30 (9) 23 (7)

Total 40 (16) 25 (10) 13 (1) 26

Deontic

Total 61 (61) 40 (40) 41 (8) 47

Dialogue 203 (73) 231 (83)

Spoken Monologue 250 (60) 346 (83)

Total 222 (133) 277 (166) 172 (20) 224

Non-printed 220 (22) 60 (6)

Written Printed 267 (80) 360 (108)

Total 255 (102) 285 (114) 213 (17) 251

Epistemic

Total 235 (235) 280 (280) 188 (37) 234

Indeterminate 97 (97) 82 (82) 97 (19) 92

Total 1,590 (1,590) 1,622 (1,622) 1,756 (345) 1,656

Appendix178

Table 16. Be able to in ICE-AUS, ICE-GB, and C-US

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US Avg

Dialogue 128 (46) 161 (58)

Spoken Monologue 125 (30) 238 (57)

Total 135 (76) 200 (115) 189 (21) 175

Non-printed 160 (16) 300 (29)

Written Printed 173 (47) 213 (60)

Total 170 (63) 235 (89) 125 (10) 177

Ability

Total 149 (139) 214 (204) 163 (31) 175

Dialogue 181 (63) 192 (64)

Spoken Monologue 229 (52) 125 (30)

Total 200 (115) 165 (94) 206 (23) 190

Non-printed 420 (39) 500 (45)

Written Printed 193 (55) 160 (43)

Total 250 (94) 245 (88) 125 (9) 207

Theoretical

possibility

Total 220 (209) 197 (182) 173 (32) 197

Dialogue 8 (3) 17 (6)

Spoken Monologue 8 (2) 13 (3)

Total 8 (5) 15 (9) 17 (2) 13

Non-printed 70 (7) 0 (0)

Written Printed 20 (6) 47 (14)

Total 33 (13) 47 (14) 0 (0) 17

Deontic

Total 18 (18) 23 (23) 10 (2) 17

Indeterminate 21 (21) 25 (25) 15 (3)

Total 387 (387) 434 (434) 346 (68) 389

Appendix 179

Table 17. Will in ICE-AUS, ICE-GB, and C-US

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US Avg

Dialogue 1,350 (486) 1,519 (547)

Spoken Monologue 1,133 (272) 967 (232)

Total 1,263 (758) 1,298 (779) 1,589 (185) 1,383

Non-printed 850 (85) 1,710 (171)

Written Printed 373 (112) 313 (94)

Total 493 (197) 663 (265) 1,525 (122) 894

Dynamic

Total 955 (955) 1,044 (1,044) 1,563 (307) 1,187

Dialogue 92 (33) 111 (40)

Spoken Monologue 25 (6) 63 (15)

Total 65 (39) 92 (55) 77 (9) 78

Non-printed 120 (12) 210 (21)

Written Printed 57 (17) 27 (8)

Total 73 (29) 73 (29) 13 (1) 53

Deontic

Total 68 (68) 84 (84) 51 (10) 68

Dialogue 2,278 (820) 2,125 (765)

Spoken Monologue 3,333 (800) 2,342 (562)

Total 2,700 (1,620) 2,212 (1,327) 2,267 (264) 2,393

Non-printed 3,140 (314) 2,350 (235)

Written Printed 2,427 (728) 3,203 (961)

Total 2,605 (1,042) 2,990 (1,196) 1,925 (154) 2,507

Epistemic

Total 2,662 (2,662) 2,523 (2,523) 2,128 (418) 2,438

Indeterminate 183 (183) 210 (210) 209 (41) 201

Total 3,868 (3,868) 3,861 (3,861) 3,950 (776) 3,893

Appendix180

Table 18. Shall in ICE-AUS, ICE-GB, and C-US

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US Avg

Dialogue 25 (9) 139 (50)

Spoken Monologue 4 (1) 75(18)

Total 17 (10) 113 (68) 26 (3) 52

Non-printed 120 (12) 160 (16)

Written Printed 90 (27) 107 (32)

Total 98 (39) 120 (48) 38 (3) 85

Deontic

Total 49 (49) 116 (116) 31 (6) 65

Dialogue 44 (16) 108 (39)

Spoken Monologue 13 (3) 79 (19)

Total 32 (19) 97 (58) 34 (4) 54

Non-printed 110 (11) 100 (10)

Written Printed 60 (18) 73 (22)

Total 73 (29) 80 (32) 50 (4) 68

Dynamic

Total 48 (48) 90 (90) 41 (8) 60

Dialogue 0 (0) 3 (1)

Spoken Monologue 0 (0) 8 (2)

Total 0 (0) 5 (3) 52 (6) 19

Non-printed 0 (0) 40 (4)

Written Printed 3 (1) 23 (7)

Total 3 (1) 28 (11) 0 (0) 10

Epistemic

Total 1 (1) 14 (14) 31 (6) 15

Indeterminate 2 (2) 3 (3) 0 (0)

Total 100 (100) 223 (223) 102 (20) 142

Appendix 181

Table 19. Would in ICE-AUS, ICE-GB, and C-US

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US Avg

Dialogue 1,314 (473) 1,108 (399)

Spoken Monologue 1,179 (283) 517 (124)

Total 1,260 (756) 872 (523) 618 (72) 917

Non-printed 1,470 (147) 500 (50)

Written Printed 1,023 (307) 430 (129)

Total 1,135 (454) 448 (179) 488 (47) 690

Dynamic

Total 1,210 (1,210) 702 (702) 606 (119) 839

Dialogue 3,000 (1,080) 2,817 (1,014)

Spoken Monologue 1,554 (373) 2,388 (573)

Total 2,422 (1,453) 2,645 (1,587) 3,761 (438) 2,943

Non-printed 160 (160) 2,610 (261)

Written Printed 967 (290) 1,503 (451)

Total 1,125 (450) 1,780 (712) 1,562 (125) 1,489

Epistemic

Total 1,903 (1,903) 2,299 (2,299) 2,866 (563) 2,356

Indeterminate 472 (472) 403 (403) 529 (104) 468

Total 3,585 (3,585) 3,404 (3,404) 4,001 (786) 3,663

Appendix182

Table 20. Be going to in ICE-AUS, ICE-GB, and C-US

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US Avg

Dialogue 928 (334) 872 (314)

Spoken Monologue 338 (81) 317 (76)

Total 692 (415) 650 (390) 1,537 (179) 960

Non-printed 90 (9) 90 (9)

Written Printed 73 (22) 30 (9)

Total 78 (31) 45 (18) 113 (9) 79

Dynamic

Total 446 (446) 408 (408) 957 (188) 604

Dialogue 6 (2) 17 (6)

Spoken Monologue 0 (0) 17 (4)

Total 3 (2) 17 (10) 34 (4) 18

Non-printed 0 (0) 0 (0)

Written Printed 7 (2) 3 (1)

Total 5 (2) 3 (1) 13 (1) 7

Deontic

Total 4 (4) 11 (11) 25 (5) 13

Dialogue 1,189 (428) 1,139 (410)

Spoken Monologue 800 (192) 442 (106)

Total 1,033 (620) 860 (516) 1,898 (221) 1,264

Non-printed 90 (9) 180 (18)

Written Printed 100 (30) 93 (28)

Total 98 (39) 115 (46) 225 (18) 146

Epistemic

Total 659 (659) 562 (562) 1,217 (239) 813

Indeterminate 82 (82) 75 (75) 214 (42) 124

Total 1,191 (1,191) 1,056 (1,056) 2,413 (474) 1,553

Appendix 183

Table 21. Want to in ICE-AUS, ICE-GB, and C-US

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US Avg

Dialogue 1,856 (668) 1,511 (544)

Spoken Monologue 792 (190) 533 (128)

Total 1,430 (858) 1,120 (672) 1,923 (224) 1,491

Non-printed 430 (43) 700 (70)

WrittenPrinted 500 (120) 337 (101)

Total 408 (163) 428 (171) 613 (49) 483

Dynamic

Total 1,021 (1,021) 843 (843) 1,390 (273) 1,085

Dialogue 22 (8) 19 (7)

Spoken Monologue 8 (2) 4 (1)

Total 17 (10) 13 (8) 26 (3) 19

Non-printed 0 (0) 0 (0)

WrittenPrinted 3 (2) 0 (0)

Total 5 (2) 0 (0) 0 (0) 2

Deontic

Total 12 (12) 8 (8) 15 (3) 12

Dialogue 6 (2) 8 (3)

Spoken Monologue 8 (2) 4 (1)

Total 6 (4) 6 (4) 9 (1) 7

Non-printed 0 (0) 20 (2)

WrittenPrinted 0 (0) 0 (0)

Total 0 (0) 5 (2) 25 (2) 10

Epistemic

Total 4 (4) 6 (6) 15 (3) 8

Indeterminate 2 (2) 1 (1) 5 (1) 3

Total 1,039 (1,039) 858 (858) 1,425 (280) 1,107

Appendix184

Table 22. Be about to in ICE-AUS, ICE-GB, and C-US

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US Avg

Dialogue 47 (17) 56 (20)

Spoken Monologue 104 (25) 79 (19)

Total 70 (42) 65 (39) 9 (1) 48

Non-printed 50 (5) 30 (3)

Written Printed 40 (12) 33 (10)

Total 43 (17) 33 (13) 75 (6) 50

Epistemic

Total 59 (59) 52 (52) 36 (7) 49

Dialogue 0 (0) 0 (0)

Spoken Monologue 4 (1) 4 (1)

Total 2 (1) 2 (1) 0 (0) 1

Non-printed 0 (0) 10 (1)

Written Printed 7 (2) 0 (0)

Total 5 (2) 3 (1) 0 (0) 3

Epistemic

Total 3 (3) 2 (2) 0 (0) 2

Indeterminate 1 (1) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0

Total 63 (63) 54 (54) 36 (7) 153

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Index Aarts, F. 9, 153 ability 91-123 actualization 15, 35, 103, 116, 120,

148 non-actualization 45-46, 55, 78 adversative 49-50 Aijmer, K. 121 ambiguity 23 Americanization 8, 149 auxiliary: semi-auxiliary 16 primary auxiliary 12 backshifting 106 be able to 119-122, 178 be about to 155-156, 184 be bound to 86-88, 173 be going to 143-150, 182 be supposed to 80-83, 171 be to 83-86, 172 Berglund, Y. 6 Biber, D. et al., 5, 6, 9, 33, 140 Bolinger, D. 91, 96, 100, 150, 153 British National Corpus 19 Bybee, J.L. et al., 22, 23, 125 can 97-105, 175 Chapin, P.J. 15 Coates, J. 5, 6, 15, 21, 24, 25, 27,

28, 29, 36, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 46, 48, 53, 60, 63, 64, 65, 69, 71, 88, 91, 92, 93, 94, 96, 97, 98, 112, 113, 119, 126, 132, 133, 138, 144, 148, 149, 151

Collins, P. 91, 98 colloquialization 9, 149 concessive 93, 113 conditional 50-51, 85, 117, 130, 141 Conrad, S. 9 corpus linguistics: corpus-based 5-6 corpus-driven 5-6 corpus-informed 5-6 could 105-119, 177

Depraetere, I. 11, 25, 66 diachronic change 7-8 Dirven, R. 91 Duffley, P. et al., 91, 100 dynamic implication 96, 104, 116 Edmonson, W. et al., 78, 81 Ehrman, M. 6, 24 emotive 50 Facchinetti, R. 7, 77, 102, 105, 119,

121 Fairclough, N. 77 Francis, G. 5 Freiburg-Brown Corpus 3-4 gonna 143 grammaticalization 16, 18-20, 21,

59, 68, 77, 143, 151, 157 Gresset, S. 113 Groefsema, M. 24, 91, 100 had better 77-79, 170 Haegeman, L. 24 Hakutani, Y. 15 Hargis, C.H. 15 harmonic 39, 92-93, 94 have got to 68-72, 160, 168 have to 59-68, 160, 167 hedge 39-40 Hermerén, L. 6, 112, 119 Huddleston, R. 11, 13, 17-19, 23,

24, 26-28, 30, 38, 40, 44, 47, 49, 50, 51, 53, 55, 79, 82, 85, 98, 99, 102, 107, 118, 126-128, 130, 131, 133-138, 144, 148, 149, 157

Hughes, A. 63 Hunston, S. 5 idiomaticity 16, 21 indirect speech act 104, 142 inherency 96 International Corpus of English 1-3,

9 irrealis 111-112 Jacobsson, B. 18 Jespersen, O. 5, 22

Index

192

192

Kantor, 95 Kennedy, G. 6 Klinge, A. 24, 91, 96, 100 Krug, M. 18, 68, 72, 125, 150, 151,

154, 155 Lakoff, R. 15, 30 Larkin, D. 15 Lebrun, Y. 91 Leech, G. 6-9, 43, 48, 52, 56, 59,

61, 70, 72, 76, 77, 80, 83, 86, 91, 95, 96, 97, 100, 105, 113, 118, 119, 125, 139, 143, 149, 151, 154, 157, 159, 160-162

Longman Corpus 7-8 Lyons, J. 126 Mair, C. 7-9, 43, 52, 56, 59, 76, 77,

80, 83, 86, 125, 139, 143, 149, 151, 154, 157, 159, 160-162

mandative 49 may 92-97, 161, 174 Matthews, R. 64 McCallum-Bayliss, H. 61 might 105-119, 176 Mitchell, K. 77, 78 modal harmony 27 modality 11 agent-oriented modality 22 degree of modality 27-28, 39,

127-128 deontic modality 22, 23 dynamic modality 22, 23

epistemic modality 11, 19, 20, 21, 23

root modality 11, 19, 20, 21, 22 strength of modality 25-27, 33 modalization 17, 19, 144, 150, 152 modals: central modals 14 lexico-modals 16-17 marginal modals 14 modal idioms 16 quasi-modals 11, 15-17 semi-modals 16-17 monosemy 23-24 mood 11

subjunctive mood 11, 27 must 35-44, 160, 163 Myhill, J. 67 necessity 33-89 need 57-59, 161, 166 need to 73-77, 161, 169 negation 24-25, 27-28, 43, 48, 56,

66-67, 72, 76, 79, 84, 88, 131, 133

Nelson, G. 9 ‘NICE’ constructions 12, 17, 31 Nokkonen, S. 7 non-assertive 73, 121 objectivity 28-29, 35-38 obligation 33-89 ought to 52-57, 165 Palmer, F. 5, 6, 15, 22, 23, 28-30,

42, 46, 53, 60, 71, 78, 85, 87, 88, 96, 102, 103, 112, 121, 126, 128, 130, 134, 136, 138, 145, 151

Papafragou, A. 24 paraphrase 23 performative 28, 35, 69, 142 Perkins, M. 15, 19, 28, 58, 60, 78,

79, 86 permission 91-123 Plungian, V.A. 11, 22 polysemy 23-24 possibility 91-123 existential possibility 102, 114 rational possibility 102-103, 114 theoretical possibility 96 potentiality 96, 103, 115 Poutsma, H. 5 pragmatic: pragmatic strengthening 93 pragmatic weakening 27, 37-38,

39-40 predictability 126-127 prediction 125-157 propensity 133 purposive 50 Pullum, G.K. 5, 11, 13, 17-19, 23,

24, 26-28, 30, 38, 40, 44, 47, 49, 50, 51, 53, 55, 79, 82, 85, 98, 99,

Index

193

102, 107, 118, 126-128, 130, 131, 133-138, 144, 148, 149, 157

Quirk, R. et al., 5, 8, 14, 16, 17, 20, 23, 113

reanalaysis 117-118 Reed, S. 11, 25, 66 Reppen, R. 9 resistibility 37-38 rhetorical question 47 Römer, U. 6 Santa Barbara Corpus 3-4, 9 semantic bleaching 18-19, 20, 77 shall 135-139, 162, 180 should 44-52, 160-161, 164 quasi-subjunctive should 44, 48 preterite should 51-52 Smith, N. 59, 67, 72, 73, 76 subjectification 21, 59 subjectivity 28-29, 35-38 suppletion 15, 87, 98 Sweetser, E. 21, 37, 61

temporality 24-25, 41-43, 47-48, 56, 64-66, 71, 75

Traugott, E. 125 Trudgill, P. 8, 63 unreal 106 unreal conditional 13 unreal preterite 13-14 Van der Auwera, J. 11, 22, 100 Vanparys, J. 100 Verplaetse, H. 7, 93, 151, 152 Vihla, M. 94 voice-neutrality 17 volition 125-157 Wallis, S. 9 wanna 150 want to 150-154, 162, 183 Westney, P. 6, 15, 16, 28-30, 55,

60, 70, 72, 79, 81, 83 will 126-135, 161, 179 would 139-143, 161, 181