MODULE: ABDUCTION AND HOSTAGE TAKINGAbduction and Hostage Taking 5 is the abduction, torture and assassination of NGO staff and social activists by right wing death squads in Central

MODULE: ABDUCTION AND HOSTAGE TAKING By Koenraad van Brabant; Overseas Development Institute, Portland House, Stag Place,

London SW1E 5DP, UK; +44-171-393-1674; fax: +44-171-393-1699; e-mail:

[email protected]

GOAL: To outline key aspects of a comprehensive agency approach towards

abduction and hostage taking.

OBJECTIVE: This module will enable participants to

• identify three measures to reduce vulnerability to abduction/hostage taking;

• identify five measures to increase preparedness for abduction/hostage taking;

• list three possible actors to lead negotiations, and discuss their relative

advantages/disadvantages;

• identify four key personal characteristics of a good negotiator;

• describe the general direction of a negotiation strategy;

• describe and comment on the dual aspect of a siege strategy;

• state the priority upon the return of an abducted person;

• argue an approach to the family and relatives of an abducted person; and

• identify two risks of high press exposure.

Abduction and Hostage Taking

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KEY LEARNING POINTS

a. Aid workers get abducted for a variety of motives, ranging from grievances over

aid programs, to politics, criminality and terror. Different situations may require

different approaches, but sometimes the motives will be mixed, may change or

will be unknown.

b. A frequent approach to reduce the risk level of abduction/hostage taking is the

adoption of protective measures. Vulnerability can be reduced through reducing

exposure, controlling movements, increasing numbers and surveillance

recognition.

c. Organizations can improve their preparedness to abduction/hostage taking

through various measures: improved risk assessment, establishing contacts

with potential allies and clarifying terms of cooperation, policy development,

better staff preparation and increased organizational capacity.

d. The lead in negotiations can be taken by various actors: the agency itself, local

people, the national authorities, governmental or private special negotiation

teams or another aid agency. Each has strengths and weaknesses.

e. The aid agency should consider who might be the best placed negotiator, but

should argue that, on the grounds that it retains the ultimate responsibility for

the safety and well-being of its staff, it should remain closely involved in the

negotiations conducted by third parties. This is to ensure that the safety of the

abductee both is and remains the primary criterion and concern.

f. Beware of and avoid conflicting strategies by different actors, parallel and

potentially-conflicting channels of communication with the captors and

conflicting messages reaching the captors.

g. Intermediaries acting as a channel of communication for the agency should be

very clear that they cannot commit the agency to any action without prior and

explicit approval.

h. A basic negotiation strategy seeks to stabilize the situation, establish rapport

and create a climate of problem-solving through compromise.

i. A rescue operation with or without siege involves high risk for the abducted. A

siege situation is an approach whereby persuasive dialogue and the threat of

the use of force need to be finely balanced and coordinated. Failure to do so can

lead to catastrophe.

j. The physical and mental needs of a person released from captivity take priority

over any other demands.

k. Close interaction with the family and relatives of the abducted is required to

establish and retain a constructive relationship of trust and mutual support.

l. An active press strategy is better than a passive one or none. Intensive press

coverage can be useful under certain circumstances. Often, however,

discreteness and confidentiality are essential.


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ABDUCTION AND HOSTAGE TAKING

A. THREAT AND RISK ASSESSMENT

1. Risk Areas

Aid agency staff appear to be increasingly exposed to abduction. In some

situations they may get specifically targeted. In other situations wealthy people,

including "foreigners" may generally be at risk.

Some areas of current high risk are the northern Caucasus, Tajikistan, Somalia,

Sierra Leone, Colombia and Yemen. Better interagency security monitoring, as

being piloted for example by the Humanitarian Security Network project (under the

umbrella of VOICE in Brussels), could be a mechanism for ongoing risk

assessment of countries and regions.

2. Motives for Abduction and/or Hostage Taking

Abduction of aid personnel takes place for a variety of motives, and the

management of the incident will vary according to the "logic" of the abduction.

• In the course of circumstance and for no clear purpose, aid workers may be

taken "hostage" or restricted in their freedom of movement. In such an instance,

no specific demands are made and there does not appear to be a clear reason.

The aid workers may simply be told that their perceived "abduction" is for their

own security.

Some years ago, four aid workers were "kidnapped" by a small group of soldiers of the Sudanese

People's Liberation Army (SPLA). The motive given was to ensure their own safety in the face of an

imminent attack in the area. The four were eventually released seven weeks later, close to the

Kenyan border, after having trekked over 175 miles through the bush with their captors.

During the civil war in Sierra Leone, two Red Cross workers on a field trip to a provincial town found

themselves under the control of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), when after a short exchange

of fire they took the town. Subsequently, they were prevented from returning to their main office by

the RUF who stated that crossing the lines was too dangerous. RUF officers referred them to higher

levels of command, which took them deeper into RUF-controlled territory. Altogether they stayed

under RUF control for five weeks. The rebels insisted that they did not hold them against their will,

but restricted their movements for their own safety. No demands were made, and the Red Cross

workers noticed that the rebels stopped taking interest in their presence. One day they simply

started walking, and talked themselves through RUF checkposts, until, after 27 miles, they reached

a village controlled by government troops.


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• It is not unusual for aid workers to be abducted or temporarily detained,

sometimes as "reluctant guests," to signal a complaint about the aid work. This

can be a grievance over perceived neglect of a certain group or area, over

perceived empty promises or a perceived breach of the project agreement. The

abduction or "hostage" taking is then a mechanism to force the aid agencies to

pay attention to these grievances. A variation on this theme is the abduction of

an aid worker by a former employee or contractor who wants to express a

grievance or obtain revenge.

In the mid-1990s, an aid worker stayed hostage for 37 days in Somalia. He had been kidnapped at

gunpoint on his way to Mogadishu airport and a ransom was demanded. It transpired that the

kidnapping had been arranged by a businessperson from whom the agency had been renting cars.

Scaling down its operation, the agency had prematurely terminated the contract. It transpired that

the kidnapping was not only motivated by financial motives, but also by a desire to save face and

restore or increase the businessperson's social standing.

In the early 1990s, an international aid agency was working in a province in Cambodia. Their

largest program was one of well-drilling, which they also carried out on the fluctuating "borderline"

between Khmer Rouge- and government-controlled areas. While the UN Transitional Authority in

Cambodia was still been present, another international organization apparently had had contact

with the local Khmer Rouge group and talked about wells, a school and a clinic. Subsequently,

however, they withdrew from the area without informing the Khmer Rouge. The Khmer Rouge then

captured a well-drilling team of more than 10 local staff of the first agency; resentful over the

"broken promise," they had confused the two agencies. They kept the vehicle and driver and

demanded to speak to a foreigner or they would kill the driver. The one foreigner of the agency in

the area went. She was not aware of any foreigners targeted or killed by the Khmer Rouge at the

time, and felt she could not play guessing games with the life of the driver at risk. She and two staff

members were kept under Khmer Rouge control until negotiations secured their release, six weeks

later.

• Aid workers can get abducted for political or ideological motives. This may be

because of the international political position of the home country of the aid

agency or the particular staff member. It may also be because of the perceived

bias and partiality of the aid agency in a conflict. The abduction then can

become a hostage situation, whereby the perpetrators seek certain

concessions from the aid agency, the agency's government of origin or its staff

member in return for the release of the latter. Abduction, especially that of

international staff members, can also be a way of seeking international publicity

and attention for one's cause or of drawing attention to the existence and

apparent strength and seriousness of a particular group. In some cases the

abduction may be committed by a terrorist group, which might be prepared to kill

the hostage to maximize its own threat. Some well known examples are the

abductions of Westerners by the "Hezbollah" in Lebanon, hijackings of

airplanes by radical Palestinian groups or the occupation of the Japanese

embassy in Lima, Peru, by a guerrilla group. Another less well-known example


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is the abduction, torture and assassination of NGO staff and social activists by

right wing death squads in Central America.

In the late 1980s, a Belgian medical doctor started working as a volunteer for an international

organization in a Palestinian refugee camp in Lebanon. He was kidnapped by a Lebanese militia.

The tentative explanation for the kidnapping appears to have been the militiamen's hope to

exchange the aid worker for two of their group being held in Belgian jails after a terrorist attack on a

Jewish synagogue in that country. No official concessions appear ever to have been made, and the

hostage was released after 13 months. According to the captors, this was following an intervention

by Col. Khaddafi from Libya.

• Aid workers may get abducted for primarily economic motives, i.e. for ransom.

Criminal gangs, but also some groups who claim a political objective for their

violence, may thus seek to finance themselves. In Colombia, for example, but

also in the Spanish Basque country, business people get kidnapped for ransom.

International staff are likely to be more at risk here than national staff members.

UN statistics show that expatriate staff are at a higher risk from abduction.

Preliminary inquiry reveals a changing pattern of kidnapping in the northern Caucasus.

The kidnapping of foreigners is part of a larger pattern of kidnapping in Chechnya, which is part of

its historical social traditions. Chechen society has a clan structure, and there are traditional

patterns and procedures whereby local people with the right social status and personal qualities act

as negotiators between rivaling kin groups to resolve tensions which have been heightened by an

act of kidnapping.

During the Chechen war (1994-1996) foreigners were at times held by either side, apparently for

"political reasons," but sometimes for robbery. Typically, they were released after a few days.

The kidnapping of expatriates for ransom is a phenomenon that dates from after the withdrawal of

Russian troops from Chechnya and the elections in early 1997 that installed Maskhadov as

president. There were several groups in Chechnya who had reasons for not seeing the elections

take place. For these groups, expatriates were a valuable political commodity. Other kidnappings

are carried out by well-organized and well-armed criminal gangs. Not only aid workers have been

kidnapped, but also journalists. Foreign businesspeople have also been the subject of kidnappings.

They tend to pay ransom, thereby stimulating the "market." Ransoms for kidnapped local people

may reach US$100,000 and for expatriates on the order of US$1 million. The fact that ransoms are

being paid makes it very difficult to follow a policy not to pay money to obtain their release.

Over time, developments seem to have taken place in the pattern of criminal kidnappings.

Initially, the highest risk of kidnapping existed for expatriates in Chechnya and while traveling. The

kidnapping of an NGO worker from his bedroom at an agency base in Nazran, in neighboring

Ingushetia, suddenly spread the risk to agency locations and to a neighboring republic. In January

1998, the head of UNHCR was kidnapped from his flat in Valdikavkaz, in North Ossetia.


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The indications are that criminal gangs are now doing a regional business in kidnapping for

ransom. One gang can contract another in another republic to kidnap an expatriate on their behalf.

Less strong and less experienced gangs may also decide to sell off their captive to another gang,

particularly when they feel under threat from the authorities. Hostages, therefore, are not only

changing location, but are also handed over from one captor to another.

• Aid workers or UN peacekeepers may be taken hostage as a "security" strategy

of an armed group. At times, Serb forces in Bosnia took several hundred UN

peacekeepers hostage to deter potential NATO airstrikes.

• Aid workers may get abducted in the course of a developing dispute between

local social groups in which foreign actors do not necessarily play a role.

National staff may then be most at risk. Abduction, for example, is a

long-standing, "traditional" practice in social conflicts in Chechnya. Although

much attention has been paid to the kidnapping of foreigners, locals also get

kidnapped.

• In Western countries, hostage taking, more than kidnapping, may also occur as

an act of desperation (e.g. during a failed bank robbery) or be the act of a

mentally-unbalanced person. Although such "motives" should not be ruled out,

they appear not to be the most common ones in the contexts where aid

personnel operate in.

• Aid workers can get abducted for sexual abuse. For example, in the wars in

Algeria, Sierra Leone or Liberia armed men have abducted women and young

girls for sexual abuse. Both national and international female staff may be at risk.

The situation is then not one of a rape, but abduction with possibly prolonged

sexual abuse.

• In certain contexts, people are abducted not to obtain a strong negotiating

position, but as part of a political strategy of repression and terror. This is the

politics of "disappearances." Those made to disappear are usually tortured and

often killed; their bodies may or may not be found. Whereas in many other

cases, discreteness may be the recommended strategy, here international

publicity and pressure may be considered as the best approach.

• It is useful to bear in mind that the "motivations" of the captors may change over

time. Whereas the initial motive may appear to have been one of protest or

politically inspired, after a while the captors may only seek to obtain a ransom

for the release of the person. An abduction, therefore, may turn into a clearer

hostage scenario.

The "capture" of the aid workers in Cambodia, referred to in the box above, had been fairly

opportunistic and originally inspired by a demand for humanitarian aid. After a while, however, the

Khmer Rouge group started asking for a large amount of money.


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The motives of the captors may not always be clear. Were the abductions of

several tourists by a shadowy group in Kashmir a political or a criminally motivated

act?

3. Risk Level Assessment

Risk level assessment would consider

• countries or regions where abduction and/or hostage taking appears frequent;

and

• the categories of people most at risk, e.g. foreigners as a whole, foreign

businesspeople more than aid workers, certain nationalities more than others,

categories of local people.

Successful abductions or hostage episodes, from the viewpoint of the perpetrators,

may motivate more abductions/hostage scenes. Kidnapping can be a "copy-cat"

crime. Monitoring kidnap/hostage incidents and their outcomes may lead to the

expectation that there is an increased risk of such incidents occurring. Policies that

state that governments or organizations will not pay ransom, make concessions to

or negotiate with kidnappers are intended to discourage those who see kidnapping

or hostage taking as an "effective" strategy to gain a strong bargaining position.

Pattern analysis shows that about half of the kidnappings occur during movement,

i.e. when someone is traveling e.g. between two work stations or between home

and office. But abductions also occur from homes.

Abduction episodes are often seen as involving four phases: capture, transport

and consolidation, and holding and termination. The moment of capture and

transport to the initial place of detention and the moment of termination are seen as

those of highest risk. The captors themselves are stressed, nervous and

suspicious and more likely to act violently and in unpremeditated ways. There are

particular risks if the kidnapping or hostage situation is terminated by a forceful

rescue operation. Sometimes more complex patterns may occur: the captors may

discover that the police are closing in on them and hurriedly move their hostage to

another holding place. Negotiations may break down to the frustration and anger of

the captors. The abducted person may cause anger and outbursts from the

captors in an escape attempt.

B. RISK MANAGEMENT

Having assessed the risk level of kidnapping or hostage taking, several strategies

can be adopted to reduce the risk or threat.


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Where "hostage taking" appears motivated by grievances about the aid work or the

lack of aid input, increasing acceptance is a possible strategy to reduce or remove

the threat. This would mean at least broadening the network of contacts, and

possibly spreading project work to include more groups or areas.

Governments may announce severe penalties for kidnappers or hostage takers as

deterrents. Much then may depend on the perceived effectiveness of the national

security forces to arrest the captors. Bodyguards, usually armed, are another

deterrent strategy often used by political figures, but also by some wealthy

business people.

Aid agencies have mostly been paying attention to protective strategies.

• The first is to reduce vulnerability by reducing exposure. This can mean not

going into, or withdrawing from, high risk areas. Chechnya is a case in point. It

can also mean withdrawing expatriate staff, if these are perceived to be at

highest risk, and continuing program work through local staff. Or, if particular

nationalities or ethnic identities are at higher risk, it can mean not deploying staff

of that nationality or identity. It can also mean changing residence and not

staying in a ground floor flat or an unfriendly neighborhood.

• The second is to reduce vulnerability by controlling movements. Expatriate staff

arriving at the airport are then collected by the agency, rather than made to rely

on local transport or "taxis." Staff movements take place only in agency vehicles,

not in taxis. As much as possible, movements are "randomized," i.e. one avoids

routine movements. This is easier for movements between work stations than

between home and the office. Movements may be restricted with no-go zones

and times. Movements are closely monitored and no staff moves without prior

announcements of destination and trajectory. Upon arrival, there is a regular

reporting of progress. For maximum safety this system requires radio

communications, perhaps continuous communications monitoring, and code

signs to avoid giving away one's movements and trajectory. A log is kept of staff

movements. Close monitoring of staff whereabouts may prevent an abduction

that has taken place from becoming known until several hours, if not a day,

later.

• The third is to reduce vulnerability by increasing numbers. It may be a policy that

at-risk staff never move alone. They may have to be permanently accompanied

by a national staff member, who is not necessarily armed. It may be decided

that at-risk staff must never travel in one vehicle, but will be accompanied by an

"escort" vehicle. At-risk staff may not be allowed to live in separate locations,

but brought together in one compound or adjacent apartments. Moving in

numbers means accompanying people to their private residence and waiting

until it is clear that no abductors are awaiting the return of their target in the

residence.


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When the risk of abduction of international staff significantly increased in a particular area, an aid

agency adopted a range of risk reduction measures. One was to increase the investment in the

training of local staff and to strengthen their involvement in the overall management and, therefore,

"ownership" of the program. International staff were withdrawn to a base in a neighboring country,

and could only travel into the risk area on monitoring missions.

No international staff member was allowed to move outside or travel without being accompanied by

a local person. The agency also moved to a practice whereby vehicles would always be driven by a

local driver. For normal travel, two vehicles would go together, one with a monitoring brief in case of

an incident. Movements of money, or of the administrator who might be carrying money, involved

avoiding routines and traveling with two escort vehicles, also between the bank and the office.

Agreements were made with other agencies to ensure that radio contact could be maintained while

traveling. To that effect, NGOs collaborated with the UN so that they could use their radio

transmitters in certain areas. Becoming aware that radio communications also contributed to risk,

the agency adapted its practices. Since radios had been stolen during the war in the country now

constituting a risk area, and could still be bought on the market there, the agency assumed that

criminal gangs could monitor their radio traffic. It became aware of the fact that some agency staff

were careless about the content of radio communications. But even when that was not the case, it

was easy to know when expatriates were traveling as they spoke in English and generally

generated a higher volume of radio traffic. As a result, the agency implemented new instructions

whereby only local staff would report, in the local language, on the radio; just as they did when not

traveling with an expatriate.

National staff members were not normally kidnapped with international staff members. Hence they

had to maximize their witnessing role. The agency instructed them what to pay attention to should a

kidnapping take place. The task of the accompanying "monitoring" vehicle was not to intervene

when a kidnapping took place, but to observe and follow the kidnappers as long as possible. All

expatriates carried a wallet with essential documents on them.

• Surveillance recognition is a strategy of looking for more immediate indicators.

Kidnappings may be planned in advance, in which case the perpetrators will

observe the movements of their target for a while. Surveillance recognition

consists of being alert to individuals or vehicles hanging around in the

neighborhood that do not seem to belong there, to strangers stepping into the

elevator who do not belong the building and to being followed. Good knowledge

of the immediate neighborhood and good contacts with local shopkeepers or

street vendors may be of value in this regard. During a period of tension in

Peshawar, Pakistan, an aid agency had some of its own staff, with former police

background, monitor the neighborhood for such unusual presences.

Surveillance recognition also includes being attentive to signs that someone

may have entered or tried to enter one's apartment, that an unknown person

has been asking the neighbors questions about you or that the telephone may

be monitored. A "sixth sense" feeling that one is being watched and/or followed

may have to be taken seriously, even if there are no tangible indicators. If


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surveillance is suspected or detected, do not try to shake off those following you,

unless there is no safe place nearby from which to contact the office and/or the

authorities.

C. PREPAREDNESS FOR ABDUCTION AND HOSTAGE TAKING

There are several things that aid agencies can do to better prepare themselves.

1. Improved Risk Assessment

On several occasions, this course has stressed the importance of improved threat

and risk level assessment. This can be done by an agency on its own, but there

seems to be significant cost-benefits to be had from more collective efforts in this

regard. International agencies of the same nationality could also inform

themselves better about what they can expect from their own national specialized

security forces, such as the FBI or Scotland Yard, in terms of help with an

abduction abroad.

In country, international agencies could contact the national police and the Ministry

of Interior to obtain information. During such contacts, one may also inquire about

specialized national security forces that deal with kidnapping/hostage situations

and about national legislation. Some countries, such as Colombia or Chechnya,

have outlawed not only kidnapping and hostage taking, but also any contact with

kidnappers/hostage takers!

Embassies tend to monitor the security situation, not only for aid workers but also

for business. The embassy will have its own advice on procedures.

There exists private companies that conduct, for an international business clientele,

ongoing risk assessments of many countries.

2. Contacts and Cooperation

The consultation exercise for risk assessment can easily also be made to yield a

list of people, in the home country and country of operations, to contact in case of

an incident. During the exploratory discussions, clarification can be sought about

the likely approach of other actors to a kidnap/hostage situation, and the terms of

cooperation they expect or demand from or with the aid agency.

3. Policy Development

Reference has been made to publicly-stated policies that an organization will not

pay ransom or even negotiate with abductors. There have been so many


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diversions from these stated policies that they are unlikely to discourage

determined or "professional" kidnappers.

Especially important is the development of internal policy. This will spell out and

clarify the obligations that the agency assumes with regard to staff abducted or

held hostage, and their relatives. These obligations are of concern not only for

international, but also for national, staff. The policy statement may also spell out

what resources and expertise the agency is prepared to invest in and develop, in

order to professionally manage the kidnapping of staff. Such a policy not only

clarifies responsibilities, but legitimizes internal resource allocations and skill

developments and will ensure accountability when an incident occurs.

A number of agencies have collaborative arrangements of operation. Under those,

staff can be seconded from one agency to another. The secondment agreements

should clearly spell out who is responsible for the safety and well-being of the staff

member.

4. Kidnap Insurance

Many multinationals take out insurance against kidnapping, at least for their

executives. The insurance companies have their own negotiators and crisis

intervention teams. Examples are Lloyds of London syndicates in the UK and

Chubb and AIG in the US. The insurance is expensive. The measure may mean

that the responsibility for managing the situation is taken over by a team, under

contract to the insurance company, that the agency neither knows nor has any

influence with. The ability of such a team to handle kidnap and hostage situations

in the contextually and culturally very diverse environments that aid agencies

operate in would need to be ascertained. Kidnap insurance policy is totally

confidential. If information gets out that a person is covered by kidnap insurance,

the insurance may be considered void.

5. Organizational Capacity

A kidnap or hostage-taking situation needs to be managed. This requires human

resources and appropriate skills. Some of the management will take place at

headquarter level, some at field level, in-country and/or in a neighboring country. A

crisis management team, therefore, that may have members in different locations

will have to be constituted. There are both internal and external matters to be

managed. Among the external ones are communications with other agencies, with

the home- and host-government authorities and with the press. Among the internal

matters, there is the conduct of the negotiations, and the liaison with and support to

the relatives of the abductee. Upon termination of the episode, the abductee, but

also the negotiators and the crisis management team, may need stress debriefing


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and further support. It may be that programs continue in certain parts of the country,

and that other staff feels threatened or questions the agency about its

management of the situation.

It seems that agencies consider a kidnap/hostage taking scenario and rehearse

their responses to them. What needs to be clear are

• lines of communication and of authority;

• the (re-) allocation of tasks; and

• the skills required.

There is a sufficient incidence of kidnap/hostage incidents to develop, through

training, some in-house expertise in aid agencies on how to manage such

situations. This may involve people from different specialized departments:

operational management, personnel, the press office, and the legal and

administrative departments. Rehearsals can be undertaken through simulation

exercises around different scenarios. Note that many of the skills in kidnap

negotiation/facilitation are applicable to conflict mediation situations and personnel

management. Investing in this type of skills training, therefore, can have multiple

benefits.

Kidnap and hostage-situations can be very protracted, lasting several days to an

average estimate of 18 months. Relying on a few key individuals with no back-up

and substitutes is, therefore, perhaps not the best approach.

Field managers with or without designated security officers can be issued with

guidelines. The guidelines may specify

• risk level assessment;

• strategies for risk management;

• what to do and who to immediately communicate when an abduction has taken

place;

• what to include in a serious incident report (a format can be given); and

• what to and not to do when the abductors make contact and/or express

demands before a critical management team has been established and/or

negotiators identified.

The manager or person dealing with the situation at the outset is advised to

immediately start a detailed log, recording every detail. This record will be useful

for those who may subsequently take over the lead in the management of the

situation.


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It is good practice for staff going to any danger zone to have made their records

easily accessible to a close relative: birth certificate, insurance policies,

medical/dental records, naturalization papers, marriage/divorce records,

adoption/guardianship records, military record, power of attorney, key financial

papers, list of names and contact details of doctors, lawyers and other key

professionals.

6. Staff Preparation

There are conflicting views about the degree to which staff members deployed in

danger zones should be prepared for a kidnap/hostage situation. Organizational

managers may worry about recruitment and not being able to find applicants for

particularly dangerous areas. Personnel and field managers may worry that too

explicit preparation instills unnecessary fear and stress in staff. Ethically and

operationally, however, aid agencies operating not at the fringes, but close to the

center of conflict zones must face the fact that they work in violent environments

and that their staff needs to be clearly aware of this. Aid workers who have been

abducted or held hostage do report that some advance preparation was/could

have been of tremendous help in overcoming the initial shock, keeping a cool head

and remaining confident that they were not forgotten and that the organization was

doing everything it could to obtain their release.

At the very least, staff to be deployed in risk areas should be fully briefed about the

restrictions on movements they may have to accept for their own safety, and to

prepare them for the frustrations and stress that result from these.

In Annex 1 a list is included of recommendations for those who find themselves

abducted.

Staff operating in high risk areas can also carry out a number of practical

preparations:

• Know the specific and the wider environment you are moving in, carry a map but

ALSO try to have some mental map.

• Learn by heart some key telephone numbers and, where appropriate, radio

channels.

• Always carry legal identity papers, including an organizational ID.

• Carry a blood group card.

• For those on medication, carry a small supply.

• Carry any family pictures, including of related children.

These should be carried on their person, not kept in the car or in the drawer at

home; there will likely no opportunity to take them once abducted.


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D. NEGOTIATION AND NEGOTIATORS

1. Who Negotiates

There are various actors that potentially can take a lead in conducting the

negotiations:

• the agency itself, possibly deploying an experienced staff member from

headquarters;

• respected and influential local people, on behalf of the agency;

• a specialist negotiation team from a private company or from the national

security services of one's home-country;

• the national authorities; or

• another aid agency.

Particularly where abductions or "hostage" situations have been prompted by

grievances, in the course of a local dispute, or have happened for no clear reasons,

aid agencies have often themselves conducted the negotiations directly or with the

help of locally-influential people. In cases of abductions for ransom, aid agencies

have also sometimes directly negotiated. Especially important and relevant, in

these instances, is knowledge of the local context.

It is not possible a priori to determine the suitability of a specialist negotiation team

from the home-country. There have been situations, such as in the hostage

negotiations in Irian Jaya, or around the Japanese embassy in Lima, Peru, where

they have been involved. That involvement can be in an advisory function to

national authorities. When the kidnapping is motivated by strong political demands

that bypass the remit of the aid agency, such involvement may be more likely.

Knowledge of the social dynamics and cultural styles remains relevant, but insight

into to the finer details of national and perhaps international politics and the

available room for maneuvering becomes important. The pressure of political

demands may, however, stimulate an approach that seeks to trace the abductors

and then release the hostages through a siege and/or rescue operation. This

involves considerable risks for the abductee.

A specialist negotiation team from a private company appears not an immediate

choice. Inasmuch as the commercial sector wants business executives released

safely and quickly against ransom, private company teams may be suitable. The

role and projected image of aid agencies in a country is different, however, from

that of business companies. Private company teams may not understand the local

social dynamics and cultural styles, and may not even seek to conduct its

negotiations totally officially and legally in a country, as its main motive is a fee for

a service and its accountability is only to its contractor. There are private security


15

companies, however, with good knowledge of and contacts in a number of

countries where violence is prevalent, that have been helpful in obtaining the

release of abducted people.

The national authorities are per definition responsible for the safety of all those

who are legally on their territory. The national authorities may have access to

information and networks that are not available to foreigners and even to many

nationals. They may be in the best possible position to obtain the release of the

abductee. On the other hand, national authorities are not only concerned with

obtaining the safe release of the abductee and maintaining a positive international

image, but also with maintaining their domestic audience's image of being in

charge and in control of law and order. Since a prolonged abduction episode may

undermine their credibility, they can also be driven to seek a solution through a

risky siege/rescue operation. Note that some countries make contact with

kidnappers/hostage takers illegal and punishable by law. That leaves only the

authorities to legally conduct the negotiations. Note also that in situations where

someone was abducted by a rebel group in part of the country outside its control,

the national government may resent the agency negotiating with the rebel

movement.

In the case of the aid workers abducted in southern Sudan, it took three weeks before confirmation

was obtained that they were under control of soldiers of the SPLA. Everything indicated that these

had acted on their own initiative, and not on orders from their central command. Communications in

southern Sudan were very problematic, however, and limited to radios and runners. Managing the

situation also involved avoiding embarrassment for the SPLA command. They had not ordered the

abductions, had not known about them and could not be seen as not in control of their own troops.

Managing the situation also involved handling the sensitivities of the Khartoum government, which

was weary about foreign actors directly negotiating with the SPLA on its territory. This required

contacts in Khartoum, but also with the Sudanese embassies in London and Kenya.

Whereas greater involvement of the authorities is welcome in principle, its unintended effects can

lead to greater communication difficulties with the captors. In Chechnya, for example, the

authorities have undertaken a number of attempts to try and release hostages by force. In some

instances they arrived too late on a spot, when the hostage had already been moved elsewhere. In

another, a shoot-out had to be stopped when the captors threatened to kill the hostages. It is not

inconceivable that such failed attempts, and the perceived greater risk by the gangs, lead to a

worse treatment of the hostages, an increase in the ransoms demanded and the death of a

hostage. Similarly, as part of the clamp down of Maskhadov's government on the spate of

kidnappings for ransom, the death penalty was decreed for convicted kidnappers and life

imprisonment for anyone involved with hostage takers. This has discouraged local people to

discreetly act as facilitators and intermediaries. One such intermediary was arrested by the

authorities after his name was leaked by aid agency sources. Since then it has become much more

difficult to get information, let alone to get someone involved and to act as intermediary.

There have been instances where another aid agency conducts the negotiations.

In Afghanistan, NGOs that were established and well connected in a particular


16

area have, on occasion, actively supported negotiation efforts by local people to

obtain the release of UN personnel taken hostage. In Sierra Leone, International

Alert negotiated for the release of kidnapped foreigners with the RUF with whom it

had developed contacts in the pursuit of conflict mediation. On other occasions the

ICRC or the UN has acted as intermediary and facilitator.

The above examples indicate that there may not be a negotiator that is a priori the

best. Much depends on the motivations of the captors, on their demands, on the

need for various channels of contact and influence, on the attitude of the national

authorities and on the relative requirement of intimate political or social and cultural

knowledge.

A number of points can be highlighted here:

• Consider the legal status of negotiations in which the national government does

not take the lead.

• Consider who would be the best negotiating actor in terms of the specifics of the

case, and in terms of your goals i.e. the safe release of the abductee.

• Consider the degree of control you wish to retain over the negotiation process. If

others than the agency conduct the negotiations, how closely do you wish to

and can you realistically hope to be involved, for example, in the choice of

negotiator and the strategy pursued? The agency can argue that, as employer,

it retains responsibility for the well-being of its staff and, therefore, needs to be

closely involved.

Additional problems may arise when those abducted are of different nationalities.

In that case, a multitude of actors may come forward, all of whom have a stake in

the resolution of the situation and, therefore, want to be involved in the

management of the response. They may, however, choose different strategies.

Imagine the complexity of a situation whereby an interagency assessment team is

taken hostage. It involves a Finnish national working for UNICEF, a Turkish

national working for UNHCR, a Belgian working for MSF-Holland, an Australian

working for CARE International and a French woman, seconded by the French

Red Cross through the International Federation of the Red Cross to the national

Red Cross society. The different stakeholders involved will have to agree on a

common crisis management team in country, on who will lead the negotiations and

what strategy to follow.

Again in the Sudan case, one of the foreign aid workers had nationality X, the three other nationality

Y. The aid worker with nationality X had been recruited by an agency OXO, but worked as a

secondment to its sister agency OPS. The representatives of OXO and OPS essentially dealt with

the embassy of their own country in Kenya. They were, however, concerned about the approach of

the government of the aid workers with nationality Y. They did not directly approach the embassy of


17

government Y, this coordination was handled by the embassy of government X. At one point OXO

headquarters was approached by a private security company, which offered its services for a cost.

That cost included arming its two proposed negotiators. The offer was not accepted.

The situation and communications can get further complicated when the captors

themselves send an "intermediary" or "representative" or can only be approached

through a third party e.g. the political office of a resistance group. That makes the

communications all the more difficult, and extra care will have to be given that

messages are passed on correctly.

The contact of the negotiator with the captors needs to be carefully thought

through. Both in Lebanon and in Chechnya foreigners who went as negotiators

ended up being taken hostage themselves.

2. Negotiators and Intermediaries

Whereas the crisis management group consists of several people, one may take

on the role of negotiator. Skillful negotiations involve developing a relationship with

the captors, which is hard if negotiators change. The implication is that the

negotiator needs to be available for a possibly prolonged period of time, and will

need physical and sometimes mental back-up support.

Irrespective of whether a negotiator is an agency staff member, a locally respected

person, a government official, a trained outside expert, etc., there are a number of

personality traits that are essential:

• good interpersonal sensitivity;

• good listener, mediator, conciliator, inspires trust;

• calm and with positive self-concept, but not arrogant;

• excellent verbal skills;

• belief in the power of persuasion; and

• tolerance of ambiguity.

Ideally the negotiator has command of the captor’s language. Only a truly excellent

translator, which may be available, could capture and adequately transmit, in both

directions, the nuance in expression that may be fundamental in moving the

negotiations forward. This is more than a question of language skill. You may need

a "worldview translator."

The negotiator must not be a decisionmaker. The ability to refer to an authority

elsewhere is crucial for the negotiator to play for time and seek room for maneuver

and compromise. It may be more appropriate to talk about a facilitator.


18

Don't expect the negotiator to be endlessly strong. S/he will feel the stress of the

responsibility. If negotiations appear to stall or break down, or a hostage dies in

captivity or is killed, the negotiator may blame him/herself and will need support.

In many cases, someone may act as intermediary rather than as negotiator.

However, when local respected and influential people play that role, their

discussions will have aspects of both roles. It is crucial for intermediaries to be well

briefed and very clear that they cannot commit an agency to an action without its

explicit and prior approval.

3. Negotiation Strategies and Styles

A first requirement in the negotiations is to obtain proof that those who contact you

actually hold the abductees and that those abductees are alive. The negotiator,

therefore, may ask for proof. A way of ascertaining that the abductees are alive is

to inquire about a detail that only they can know, e.g. the name of the dog someone

had as a child.

If the contact is irregular, proof that those who contact you are the captors may

become necessary. A code word can be agreed upon that identifies both parties.

In many cases, expect the perpetrators to present their demands in absolute

terms:

• not open to negotiation;

• all must be met, and in full;

• within a specific time limit;

• with a threat of specific consequences if all demands are not fully met in time.

Some will suggest, as a useful strategy, that preconditions are set before

negotiations can take place e.g. the release of women and children, the provision

of medical care to the hostages. The aim is to quickly establish control of the

situation. It is probably more applicable in a siege situation than in a situation

where there is no real control over the captors.

In general, the negotiator will try to produce a process that goes from stabilizing the

situation towards rapport, towards compromise. The process, and skills required,

are very much the same as those for conflict mediation and good personnel

management.

Stabilizing the situation means calming the captors if they appear to feel under

threat, so as to avoid actions driven by fear or panic. The negotiator can help in

humanizing the abductees by giving them a personality, while at the same time

establishing his or her own humanity.


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The negotiator can attempt to pass on a (message to the abductee that his/her

relatives are safe and well) in order to liberate the hostage from worrying about

others. The negotiator's attention, however, must remain focused on the captors

and their demands.

Building rapport establishes a climate for dialogue. Discreteness and

confidentiality often help to build trust. The negotiator will seek to frame the

situation as a "problem" in need of "solving." The message is sent that the situation

can be resolved through dialogue. Empathy, openness, attention to the demands

and concerns of the captors, using "we" rather than "you" and "I" in the

conversation should be balanced with expressing one's own concerns and

constraints. The negotiator should appear open and ready to compromise, but also

firm, not soft.

The aim is to move the dialogue towards a climate of compromise, to create a

willingness to bargain, a give-and-take attitude. If possible, focus first on some

minor issues on which agreement can be reached easily. This establishes firmer

ground on which to discuss the more difficult issues. The negotiator may play a

"model" role by "compromising" on certain points.

The negotiation style must be adapted to suit the style of the perpetrators. If the

abductions were carefully planned and implemented, then rationality and

problem-solving logic can be used; if the perpetrators and the abduction appear

more emotion-driven, a more emotional, empathic language may be more

appropriate.

Throughout the process, it is important to help the perpetrators maintain face. This

is also important once they agree to release the hostages, as this may be seen as

a moment of humiliation and defeat; one that can spark violence if not handled

carefully.

E. SIEGE AND RESCUE OPERATIONS

The authorities and law enforcement agencies can be inclined to try and establish

a siege situation. The captors and kidnapped are then surrounded and the setting

becomes controlled by the law and order forces. A siege or blockade strategy is a

coercive approach in which persuasion through negotiation is combined with

pressure and the threat of force.

Aid agencies should understand the command structure of the law enforcement

unit handling such a stand-off. There may be different units involved, with different

lines of authority, but there should be an overall command in charge. If at all

possible, the agency should have access to the command and monitor the strategy

pursued.


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Crucial in a siege operation is the balanced and coherent management of the

threat (forced rescue intervention) and the persuasion (surrender the hostages).

This requires a capable leader who can understand and reconcile the often

conflicting assumptions and tactics of the negotiation team and the armed force at

stand-by. One believes in building rapport and in persuasion, the other in force and

mounting the pressure. Mismanaged, these approaches become contradictory

and can lead to an uncontrolled escalation.

A pure rescue operation is a surprise attack on the place where the hostages are

(believed to be) held. It may not be preceded by a siege situation. If it fails,

however, it may turn into a siege situation with the negotiation made even more

difficult due to the captors being first confronted with force.

In siege and rescue operations, all troops involved have to have a very clear

description of the hostages to differentiate them from the captors. This needs to be

a physical identification, as it is possible that they may be in different clothes, have

lost their glasses, etc.

Siege situations are vulnerable to the threat by the captors that they will kill one or

more of the hostages. Also, in forceful rescue operations hostages are at risk of

being caught in the crossfire, of being shot by the abductors or accidentally by the

rescue team. Siege and rescue operations, therefore, involve high risks.

F. RETURN FROM ABDUCTION

The abducted person’s return also needs to be fully managed.

Several issues need to be taken into account simultaneously:

• the person's need for rest, tranquillity and, possibly, medical care;

• the person's need to communicate with loved ones;

• the value to be had from a post-trauma stress debriefing;

• the urgent need of the authorities for debriefing on information that could lead to

the arrest of the captors or the release of other hostages; and

• the desire of the press to get the story.

Obviously, the immediate physical and psychological needs of the person released

take precedence.

There may be situations where, for a prolonged period, the demands from the

authorities and/or from the press cannot be resisted completely. In such cases,

after consultation with the released, one may choose to allow an encounter, but to

limit its duration while also accompanying and staying with the released.


21

Quick notification of other agencies and others who were aware that the abductee

has been released is required (see also the module on “Security Information

Management”). Provide elementary factual detail about when and where as rumor

may spread quickly.

During the final phase of the negotiations with the businessman who had kidnapped the aid worker

in Somalia, controlling rumors became a real challenge for his agency. When the situation was still

tense, another agency unexpectedly announced that the hostage had been released and left on a

plane the day before. That rumor circulated immediately among the agencies and was taken up in

the local press, without cross-checking with the agency concerned. It took them two frantic hours to

find out where the announcement had come from and to release a correcting statement.

It is quite normal for anyone having gone through a stressful ordeal to relive it at

times, sometimes for years afterwards. The agency may offer contact and access

to counseling beyond the term of the person's contract.

G. DEALING WITH FAMILY AND RELATIVES

Dealing with the family and relatives of abducted staff members is as important as

managing the actual problem; therefore, there needs to be a clear contact, who is

responsible, and a committed approach.

The family needs to be informed immediately of any serious incident, including an

abduction.

An information policy will need to be quickly decided upon. Its main objectives may

be

• to honor the family's right to know; and

• to preserve the integrity of the crisis management approach.

This may involve finding answers to questions and concerns such as the following:

• Will the family be told everything or not?

• How to explain that they may not be told everything, while still maintaining their

confidence.

• If the family is in the country where the abduction took place, should they remain

there and for how long, or should they be made to return home (for international

staff)?

• If the family is not in the country, should they be brought there to show them

first-hand how the crisis is being managed and by whom?

• What does one advise/request of the family in terms of contacts with the press?


22

Family and friends can provide deeper psychological insight into the mental state

and resilience of the abductee in general and, perhaps, just prior to the abduction.

Can the family be advised on "meaningful" activities such as keeping a diary,

writing and preparing a parcel that the agency hopes to get to the abductee?

A trusted friend of the family may be a constructive "third party" participant and

facilitator in the interaction between the agency and the family.

Expect that, after a while, the family will question whether the agency and the

authorities are doing everything in their power to obtain the speedy and safe

release of the abductee.

It is not uncommon for support groups of friends, neighbors and sympathizers to

come into being that also organize events to keep the abduction in the media and

prevent it from slipping from the political agenda. How will the agency relate to

this?

Among the most difficult aspects for the agency managers monitoring the situation of one of the

abducted aid workers in southern Sudan was handling the silence, impotence and waiting. After an

initial few days of hectic activity, there followed six weeks of virtual silence, although rumors and

speculation were rampant. It was no less difficult to deal with the family of the abducted aid worker,

who were in another country than that of the agency headquarters. The agency director went to see

them personally, their local church minister got actively involved, the field representative in Kenya

phoned them and regular supportive gatherings of friends and neighbors were organized.

H. MANAGING THE PRESS

As mentioned before, in some cases international publicity may be the best

available strategy to prevent an abducted person from being killed. In a way that is

Amnesty International's approach to (political) "disappearances." The strategy

may only be effective when a government is behind the abduction, or an opposition

group that hopes one day to gain power and international respectability (and is not

yet desperately frustrated as, for example, the Palestinians at times have felt);

otherwise, high media attention is more likely than not to seriously complicate the

negotiations and may endanger the life of the hostages.

There is the possibility that an abduction has taken place with the intention of

getting a high media profile and international attention. How the agency reacts to

that may depend on the demands of the captors, and on whether the abductee or

the agency can be perceived as being in the category of the "enemy" of the captors.

Possibly the best approach is to limit comments to a neutral and factual minimum.


23

In many cases discreteness is the most promising situation. Expect however that

sooner or later the national and/or international press may find out, if not from you,

then perhaps from relatives of local staff, the family of the abductee or other

sources.

Be aware that "news" is a competitive business and that the primary interest of a

journalist may be to "get a story."

In the spring of 1998, 10 aid agency workers were kidnapped at gunpoint at Mogadishu airport in

Somalia. They were kept in captivity together in a compound and under armed guard. On one

occasion, the group was ordered out of the room and put up for a camera and soundman of an

international press agency. These obviously had paid money to be allowed to film the hostages.

The hostages refused to issue a declaration. The cameraman actually aggravated the situation by

turning the gun of one of the guards towards the hostages in a more threatening manner. The guard

became agitated, started acting in a more aggressive way and on the spot came up with a demand

for $100,000 per person. The cameraman thus actually created increased risk, and his actions

could have undermined the ongoing political negotiations. For partners and relatives, the TV

images of the hostages were a shock that made it more difficult for them to keep their emotions

under control.

An active press strategy is more constructive than a passive one whereby you only

respond to the press approaching you.

Talk on the assumption that the press may give a distorted version of what you say.

Talk also on the assumption that the captors are receiving messages from public

media sources. Satellite television and world service radio news make for

increasing global spread and immediate feedback of news input. Therefore never

say anything that might endanger the abductee(s).

Beware of sending "messages" to the abductors through the media, unless there is

no other channel of communication at all. The media messages can quickly

undercut the messages being sent through more direct channels. If you need or

have to involve the media, cultivate a few trustworthy and reliable reporters who

will work WITH you to get your message out very clearly and accurately.

Be prepared to manage the media attention when hostages are released. The

press that has worked with you, or has felt deprived of information from you till then,

will want some "return" now.

After initial caution, an agency, one of whose staff was among the abducted in southern Sudan,

decided to go for high-level press contacts and the abductions received significant coverage. The

SPLA at the time was seeking international support, so this was felt to be positive pressure. When

the released aid workers later were flown from southern Sudan to Nairobi, it proved impossible to

avoid the press congregating at the airport. A press conference had to be held the same evening.


24

The released aid workers made front page news in international newspapers and were heard and

seen on radio and television even before their return home. Another press conference had to be

held upon arrival at the airport in their home countries.


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GLOSSARY OF TERMS

abduction/kidnapping a general term to denote the taking away of a person's

free control over his/her movements, by an illegal

authority, normally with an implicit or explicit threat

hostage taking taking forceful and illegal control over another person

in order to strengthen one's bargaining position in

demanding concessions in exchange for the safety and

release of the hostage

surveillance recognition alertness to, and the detection of, indicators that

someone is observing you and monitoring your

movements, possibly with malicious intent


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BIBLIOGRAPHY

This module has drawn upon the guidelines for abduction and hostage taking of a

number of aid agencies from the UN, the Red Cross movement and NGOs. These

guidelines are not for open dissemination beyond the agency; therefore, they can

not be referenced.

By and large these guidelines tend to be very generic, without much reference to

the variations on the abduction theme that may occur. Several also appear to have

important omissions on aspects of the abduction or hostage situation. Many

guidelines concentrate on hostage survival, with comparatively little, or no

attention being paid to risk analysis, vulnerability reduction and crisis

management.

It is unclear to what degree they are derived from the comparative analysis of case

studies, or copied from standard publications and manuals for an audience of

standard security forces or private sector clients. To a degree, agencies do copy

parts of each others guidelines that circulate confidentially.

There also exists substantial published literature on kidnapping, hostage taking

and anti-terrorist measures, some of which provided useful and relevant points

which have been incorporated. Much of it is, however, not very relevant for aid

agencies, because the main paradigm is that of kidnapping and hostage taking

situations whereby the law and order forces, police, FBI etc. can take charge and

create a siege/blockade situation.

Some examples are:

Bolz, F., K. Dudonis & D. Schulz (1990) The Counter-Terrorism Handbook. Tactics,

procedures and techniques. New York, London, Elsevier

McMains, M. & W. Mullins (1996) Crisis Negotiations. Managing critical incidents

and hostage situations in law enforcement and corrections. Cincinnati, Anderson

Publ.

Miron, M. & A. Goldstein (1979) Hostage. New York, Pergamon Press

Rogan, R., M. Hammer, & C. Van Zandt (eds.) (1997) Dynamic Processes of Crisis

Negotiation. Theory, research and practice. London, Praeger


27

ANNEX 1. HOSTAGE SURVIVAL

There are cases in which an abducted person is kept in isolation for a long period

of time, and others in which a group of abducted people stays together. There are

cases in which the abductee stays in the same place, others in which s/he is

moved frequently from one place to another. In yet other cases, may be walking for

weeks with your captors through the bush. In some cases the captors treat you

well, in others they may try to disorient you and break your mental resistance, or

subject you to prolonged interrogations and accusations of being, for example, a

spy. The following, therefore, may not always be equally relevant. Use common

sense and assess the situation you are in very carefully.

Also attached are three case studies. They are not representative and all abducted

aid workers certainly do not get treated as harshly as they do in two of them. Those

two were chosen because they illustrate how the abductee(s) dealt with very

difficult conditions.

A. Key Principles to Remember

• The most dangerous moments are during your abduction and at the time of your

release, especially if this is obtained through a rescue operation. The

kidnappers will feel threatened and tense; stay calm and avoid adding to their

tension through your behavior.

• During your abduction you may be blindfolded and even drugged, do not resist

this as the main purpose is to keep you quiet, a quietness which is then also to

your benefit.

• Prepare for a long period: although some kidnap situations end quickly, others

can last for weeks or for months, be patient.

• Securing your release is not your problem, but that of your organization; be

confident that they will do everything possible and are also providing support to

your relatives, even if your captors tell you otherwise.

• Do not try to escape unless you are very certain of success and in good

condition, otherwise you may put yourself at risk; if there are other people

kidnapped, your escape may put them at risk.

• You are of most value to your kidnappers when alive, play on that fact.

B. Surviving Detention

1. Passive Cooperation

• Obey the orders of your captors without appearing servile.

• Do not talk though or threaten them.


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• Be careful about eye contact, the expression in your eyes may appear

aggressive or superior; on the other hand, establishing eye contact may

strengthen your humanity and make it harder to do you harm.

• Avoid surprising or alarming your captors, always ask for permission before

doing something even as simple as opening a window.

• Keep a low profile, avoid appearing to seek clues to their identities, or to be

witnessing criminal acts.

• Do not speak unless spoken to, listen attentively, don't appear argumentative.

• Offer persuasive reasons why your captors should not harm you.

• Encourage your captors to let the authorities know your whereabouts and

condition.

• Be conscious of your body language.

2. Escaping

• Attempting an escape is dangerous decision.

• You should consider escape if you are very confident that your captors are likely

to kill you.

• If you are not the only hostage, you put at risk the life and well-being of other

hostages.

• If you are the only hostage, there are a number of questions that you need to

ask yourself:

* How many captors/weapons are there?

* Do you know the location of your room in the building?

* Are there captors stationed outside the building?

* What will you do once loose outside the building?

* Are you physically and mentally capable of attempting an escape?

* Are you prepared to accept the psychological and physical consequences

of failure/recapture?

3. Build Rapport when the Situation Appears "Stabilized"

• Insist on your impartial role as a humanitarian worker and explain your agency's

mandate and ways of operating.

• Do not argue politics or ideology with your captors.

• Build human rapport to generate sympathy and respect; do not beg, plead or cry,

but draw attention to your human needs such as hunger, thirst, etc. Ask for food,

water, a radio, the use of a toilet.

• Try discussing family and children—topics of mutual interest.

• Try not to give up your personal belongings such as clothes, a wristwatch,

spectacles, a ring.


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• Always face your captors, it is more difficult to hurt someone who is facing you

than someone who has turned his or her back.

• There have been cases in which the kidnapped began to empathize strongly

with their captors, and their interpretation of the situation. In the technical

literature this is called the "Stockholm syndrome." Building rapport with one's

captor is a protective strategy that should not cancel out one's separate identity

and position.

4. Physical and Mental Health

• Maintain whatever structure you can in the space under your control, in what is

otherwise a situation of chaos and dependency.

• Try to keep track of time.

• Try to keep to a daily schedule, keep structure in your life.

• Exercise daily, stick to a daily fitness program.

• Accept food and drink, you need to maintain strength.

• If possible, try to stay well groomed and clean.

• Think positive, emphasize your values, focus on pleasant memories and scenes,

recall plots of books and movies.

• Ask for medicines, books, paper.

• Your real release may or may not be imminent when your captors mention it,

keep yourself under control until you really are free.

• You may be deliberately subjected to humiliating or terrifying experiences such

as mock executions; accept that humiliation and fear of pain or death are very

normal reactions, do not loose hope.

5. Communicating and Negotiating

• Be prepared to speak on the radio or telephone, say only what you are told to

say.

• Avoid being drawn into the negotiation process, do not seek to involve yourself

in the negotiations.

• If you have been captured as a group, appoint a spokesperson.

• If you end up serving as a negotiator between the captors and the authorities,

be very careful to convey messages accurately.

• You may be shown to one or more press people: bear in mind that their primary

interest is in the headline-making story, not in your release; their intervention is

more likely than not to complicate the negotiations for your release.


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6. A Rescue Operation

• Try to avoid changing clothes with your captors as this may put you at risk

during a rescue operation.

• If there is a rescue attempt by force, drop to the ground, seek cover and keep

your hands on your head.

• When appropriate, identify yourself, be prepared that rescuers may not

immediately recognize you and may handle you roughly until you are identified.

HOSTAGE SURVIVAL IN SOMALIA

In the spring of 1998, Red Cross workers were kept hostage in Mogadishu for 10

days.

They were kidnapped at Mogadishu airport, a few minutes after having flown in

from Nairobi. Afterwards, the hostage taking was revealed to have been carefully

planned, as part of a show of strength of one clan in its rivalry with another.

Although the Red Cross did get regular security information from Mogadishu, there

had been no advance warning.

Altogether 10 people were taken hostage: the two pilots, five ICRC workers, two

Norwegian Red Cross workers and one Somali Red Crescent worker. One of the

hostages was a woman. They were captured at the airport by five "technicals"

(pick-ups usually with a mounted machine-gun) manned with up to 40 gunmen,

who were shooting all around. Four other passengers of the plane had been

standing further away and managed to avoid capture by hiding behind a hut and

some sand dunes. The escort of the Red Cross workers, consisting of six gunmen,

was at some distance, drinking tea. They were prevented from intervening by

airport officials in what would have been, in any case, an unequal battle.

The hostages were driven by daylight in the open pick-ups through the streets of

Mogadishu. During the transit, the captors went through their belongings and

started quarreling among themselves over the money they found. Upon arrival at

the building where they would be held, they had to give up their wallets, rings and

watches. The guards stayed in a room next door.

Although the ICRC security training had included various simulations, kidnapping

had not been among them. But they followed hostage survival recommendations.

Initially they kept a low profile and showed themselves cooperative. When the

situation appeared somewhat stabilized, they started seeking rapport. This was

facilitated by the fact that one of them was a Somali who spoke the language and

because the guards stayed the same. They took responsibility to keep their

common room clean and organized. Two of the group acted as spokesperson: the


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head of the delegation and the medical coordinator, because the latter had been

working in Somalia for over a year and a half, and the former was new.

For the first few days hope and spirits remained high. There had been previous

cases of hostage taking, all of which had ended after two or three days. There was

also awareness of the customary laws of hospitality that forbade a "host" to harm a

"guest." They were also well treated and received food, water, clothes, books and

writing utensils.

After some days however, it became more difficult to control one's emotions.

Energies became devoted to maintaining one's own reserves, there was less left to

support one's colleagues. A sudden moment of unexpected friendliness in an

otherwise tense situation could provoke an outburst of tears and emotions, such as

when they received some clothes from outside with a note from a friend or family

member. Emotions also flared up when a look from the window showed children

playing outside, with life continuing normally all around while the hostages could

be dead at any moment.

As time passed, the emotional sweeps between "sky high" and "deep down"

increased. One evening they overheard a heated discussion outside in which

some of their captors argued that some of the hostages should be killed.

They came to the door and demanded that the guards let them through. Apparently

negotiations were leading to an imminent political deal which satisfied the elders

but not the young aggressive gunmen who wanted a lot of money. On two

occasions the group was taken out of the room for reasons that were not

immediately clear, and found itself face to face with agitated gunmen. They feared

they would be executed. On three occasions they were told they would be released,

but the situation continued.

When the hostages were eventually released, they were taken by ambulance to

the hospital in Mogadishu, which was full with politicians, clan leaders and

journalists. Later, at the airport of Nairobi, there were the families, but also another

200 people.

After the event, all went through a complete emotional debriefing. This included a

review of all the difficult moments, and provided the opportunity for each abductee

to tell what they had really felt but not wanted to tell others.

HOSTAGE SURVIVAL IN SIERRA LEONE

The two Red Cross workers held by the RUF in Sierra Leone over time established

a regular routine. Each day they exercised, read, meditated and debriefed each

other. During their many walks, they familiarized themselves with their


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environment (aided by the map that one of them had been carrying on him), while

raising the fact of their presence in numerous villages, on the roads and footpaths,

among rebels and civilians, beyond suspicion. They created private space to

evade the scrutiny of youthful, curious and self-aware rebel soldiers. While

maintaining civil discourse with the rebels, they also established personal

boundaries.

Together they explored options for contacting the "outside." They sent messages

via rebel courier to the ICRC office in Gbarnga, Liberia. They approached Guinean

border guards in an attempt to transmit a message to any of the relief agencies

working in the refugee camps that had sprung up just across the border with Sierra

Leone, but these refused. At one point a local civilian driver for the RUF informed

the Red Cross people that he intended to escape from the RUF-controlled area.

The Red Cross person gave him his business card and a brief message to be

passed on to any Red Cross official.

As the weeks passed, the two men grew anxious lest they be forgotten. Each day

they joined the rebels to listen to the BBC radio. A mention of the Red Cross

hostages on it restored their spirits. It took nearly two weeks before an official from

the Red Cross publicly appealed to the rebels to release the two captives. The plea

fell on deaf ears, but at least the men now knew they had not been forgotten.

HOSTAGE SURVIVAL IN LEBANON

In early 1988 a Belgian medical doctor started working as a volunteer for a

Norwegian organization in a Palestinian refugee camp in Lebanon. In May, he was

kidnapped by a Lebanese militia and released 13 months later, in June 1989.

Although he might have been kidnapped anyway, the non-observance of security

guidelines facilitated the task of the captors. The security procedures advised

never to move around alone. Yet after a busy morning in the hospital in the refugee

camp, where he also had his residence, he had gone for a walk. He was aware of

kidnappings in Lebanon, including in the same area, but there had never been a

case of a Western aid worker. Hence a sense of personal security. While

approaching the corner of the main street, two men stepped towards him from a

group that appeared to be chatting, and asked him to come along. For the first

minutes while following them, he thought they were taking him to see a person in

need of medical attention.

Following the kidnapping, all international aid workers were withdrawn from

Lebanon. Local people put up posters demanding his release and even organized

strikes.


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After a few weeks of reasonable comfort, his captors started withdrawing certain

facilities. He was treated badly in the last six to seven months of his captivity. For

the first three weeks, a guard brought a French language weekly, but then had to

desist, clearly under instructions from above. In the first six weeks, the daily food

also included fresh meat. Then it became only food from tin cans, and in the last six

months very little food was given, often dirty and rotten. After six months the radio

was withdrawn, which very much increased the sense of dependency on the

guards.

In the first months, the doctor was kept in a cell in a house, probably close to the

refugee camp. Then he was transported to a specially prepared underground cell

of 2 x 3 meters, barely high enough to stand in, near another city. During that

transport he was drugged and unconscious. The day prior to his release he was

again moved, this time handcuffed and with tape over his mouth and eyes.

In the last six months, attempts were also made to disorient the hostage. For two to

three months he was kept in total darkness, then for a similar period in continuous

light. Throughout he was in isolation. He was also no longer allowed outside, nor

washed. The isolation and despair gave rise to feelings of wanting to commit

suicide. Although the doctor recognized that some of the guards did not approve of

the harsh conditions in which he was kept, he did not plead with them but adopted

an attitude of passive resistance on the grounds that kidnapping someone who

had come to help the local people was unjustifiable.

Personally very important during the ordeal was his successful attempt to keep

track of time. Initially there had, of course, been the radio. Later the toilet-bucket

became a major aid: given the constant intake of food, it would fill completely after

10 to 11 days. Another aid was the change in fruits. When oranges were suddenly

followed by another fruit, it became clear it was late April, early May, when the

orange season ends. A guard unexpectedly offering a few sweets one day, with a

"happy Christmas" in broken English, indicated the Eid-festivity at the end of

Ramadan, which then fell in mid-May. The awareness of the anniversary of his

kidnapping, however, proved a difficult moment.

On two occasions, the idea of escape crossed his mind. In the beginning, when still

guarded in a cell in a house, the door was open because of the heat. The guard in

the courtyard appeared to be sleeping and unarmed, the wall around the courtyard

invited quick action. The hostage decided not to take the risk. It transpired that the

guard had been testing his captive, had been watching and had kept a pistol

hidden, but at hand. The second instance occurred when the hostage was kept in

the underground cell. A guard suffering from persistent cough had asked the

doctor to examine him. To that end the guard undid his shirt and his belt with his

gun. When leaving the cell, the guard forgot his belt. He returned within seconds


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but the opportunity had been there. Yet the doctor realized that the house and the

street probably were guarded, and that, even in those circumstances, he was not

ready to pull a trigger at another human being.


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ANNEX 2. A POSSIBLE CRITICAL INCIDENT REPORT FORM

The basic information that the management of your agency and possibly other

authorities will require, as soon as possible, will involve this:

1. The problem? (person missing, confirmed abduction, confirmed hostage

situation)

2. The victims: names, nationality, numbers, age, gender, position in the office,

affiliations if staff of different organizations involved.

3. Next of kin? Notified or not?

4. What happened (what is known, unknown)?

5. Where did it occur, as exactly as possible?

6. When did it occur, as exactly as possible?

7. Who did it (known, suspected, speculation)?

8. Any contact with kidnappers?

9. What demands, if any?

10. Why did it occur (motive, stated, speculation)?

11. Who has been, or will be, notified outside the organization?

12. What actions are underway?

13. Is the press aware of the incident?

14. What other relevant facts? e.g. victim has an injury that prevents him from

walking long distances, victim can hardly see without glasses that were left

behind in the flat, victim was near end of contract and intended to get married

three weeks later, victims speaks local language very well, victim has just

arrived and is totally unfamiliar with local context and culture, etc.

Documents

MODULE: ABDUCTION AND HOSTAGE TAKINGAbduction and Hostage Taking 5 is the abduction, torture and assassination of NGO staff and social activists by right wing death squads in Central