Monastic Debate in Tibet: A Study on the History and Structures of Bsdus Grwa Logic byShunzo OnodaReview by: Peter SchwablandJournal of the American Oriental Society, Vol. 114, No. 4 (Oct. - Dec., 1994), pp. 647-649Published by: American Oriental SocietyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/606173 .

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Reviews of Books Reviews of Books

Finally, I noted a few minor printing errors, examples of which may be found on pp. 11, 18, 35, 36, 45, 53, 69, 75, 87, 141, 158, 162 and 200. To conclude, I have to say that Dr. Ucida has not only added a useful dictionary to those of the

Indo-Aryan languages but has helped solve the problems of the homeland of Saurashtrans and their migratory stages. I

congratulate Dr. Ucida and eagerly await his next publications on Saurashtrans and Saurashtra language.

SHANTIBHAI ACHARYA

AHMEDABAD

Monastic Debate in Tibet: A Study on the History and Struc- tures of Bsdus Grwa Logic. By SHUNZO ONODA. Wiener Stu- dien zur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde, 27. Vienna: ARBEITSKREIS FUR TIBETISCHE UND BUDDHISTISCHE STUDIEN,

UNIVERSITXT WIEN, 1992. Pp. 254.

It is regrettable that, even today, the vast quantity of pains- taking Japanese scholarship that is carried out in nearly every field within Buddhist Studies remains largely inaccessible to the majority of Western scholars. As a case in point, although Onoda has published regularly on the topic of Tibetan monas- tic debate since 1978, only his more recent contributions in

English have gained significant attention among Western scholars, while his earlier contributions in Japanese remain

relatively unknown. It is therefore with the stated intent of

making his earlier findings more accessible that Onoda has written the present book (p. 9).

The subject of Tibetan Buddhist epistemology and logic has become increasingly popular over the last decades, producing a number of works that may be divided, not too inaccurately, into those that deal primarily with the logical structures and

practices of monastic debate as presented in the Dge lugs pa tradition, often relying on personal training in the traditional Tibetan educational system, and those that have favored an historical and historiographical approach and have primarily treated the earlier traditions deriving from Rngog lo tsa ba Blo ldan shes rab (1059-1109) and Sa skya Pandita (1182-1251). The first approach is best exemplified by a two-part article by Goldberg (1985), which sought to explain the system of Dge lugs pa logic based on the bsdus grwa texts of 'Jam dbyangs Mchog lha' od zer (1429-1500) and Yongs 'dzin Phur bu lcog Byams pa tshul khrims rgya mtsho (1825-1901) via modern Western logical theory. The second approach is best exem- plified by several works by van der Kuijp (esp. 1979, 1983,

1 Unless otherwise indicated, all bibliographic references are as found in Onoda's book.

Finally, I noted a few minor printing errors, examples of which may be found on pp. 11, 18, 35, 36, 45, 53, 69, 75, 87, 141, 158, 162 and 200. To conclude, I have to say that Dr. Ucida has not only added a useful dictionary to those of the

Indo-Aryan languages but has helped solve the problems of the homeland of Saurashtrans and their migratory stages. I

congratulate Dr. Ucida and eagerly await his next publications on Saurashtrans and Saurashtra language.

SHANTIBHAI ACHARYA

AHMEDABAD

Monastic Debate in Tibet: A Study on the History and Struc- tures of Bsdus Grwa Logic. By SHUNZO ONODA. Wiener Stu- dien zur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde, 27. Vienna: ARBEITSKREIS FUR TIBETISCHE UND BUDDHISTISCHE STUDIEN,

UNIVERSITXT WIEN, 1992. Pp. 254.

It is regrettable that, even today, the vast quantity of pains- taking Japanese scholarship that is carried out in nearly every field within Buddhist Studies remains largely inaccessible to the majority of Western scholars. As a case in point, although Onoda has published regularly on the topic of Tibetan monas- tic debate since 1978, only his more recent contributions in

English have gained significant attention among Western scholars, while his earlier contributions in Japanese remain

relatively unknown. It is therefore with the stated intent of

making his earlier findings more accessible that Onoda has written the present book (p. 9).

The subject of Tibetan Buddhist epistemology and logic has become increasingly popular over the last decades, producing a number of works that may be divided, not too inaccurately, into those that deal primarily with the logical structures and

practices of monastic debate as presented in the Dge lugs pa tradition, often relying on personal training in the traditional Tibetan educational system, and those that have favored an historical and historiographical approach and have primarily treated the earlier traditions deriving from Rngog lo tsa ba Blo ldan shes rab (1059-1109) and Sa skya Pandita (1182-1251). The first approach is best exemplified by a two-part article by Goldberg (1985), which sought to explain the system of Dge lugs pa logic based on the bsdus grwa texts of 'Jam dbyangs Mchog lha' od zer (1429-1500) and Yongs 'dzin Phur bu lcog Byams pa tshul khrims rgya mtsho (1825-1901) via modern Western logical theory. The second approach is best exem- plified by several works by van der Kuijp (esp. 1979, 1983,

1 Unless otherwise indicated, all bibliographic references are as found in Onoda's book.

and 1989) and Jackson (1987).1 Onoda's book is one of the most detailed studies of bsdus grwa literature published to date in a Western language (see also D. Perdue, Debate in Tibetan Buddhism [Ithaca: Snow Lion, 1991]) and presents an interesting and welcome amalgam of these two approaches, the logical and the historical. He not only examines particular logical theories and patterns of debate as explicated by the standard Dge lugs pa tradition, but also takes great pains to examine the historical background of the Dge lugs pa system of debate as well as analyze the original formulations of some of the logical concepts it incorporates.

The topic of Onoda's book is what he calls bsdus grwa logic, a term which, as he points out (p. 59), has two distinct senses. In general, it means the introductory course or classes in dialectics that form a basis from which a student advances in the Dge lugs pa tradition of scholasticism. More specifically, it also indicates the first of the three parts of this course, viz., bsdus grwa (ontology), blo rigs (epistemology) and rtags rigs (logic). Onoda primarily employs the term in the former sense, the sense that I adopt here. Yet one should be aware that he also frequently uses the term in a third and more expanded sense to indicate not only the Dge lugs pa introductory system of dialectics, but also the Tibetan historical precursors to this

system, namely the "epistemological summaries" (tshad ma'i bsdus pa) which are said to originate with the highly creative

Phya pa Chos kyi Seng ge (1109-1069). Onoda's book consists of a brief, but complete, discussion

of previous scholarship on the topic of bsdus grwa (ch. 1); four topical chapters (2-5), comprising the heart of the book, that rework and summarize issues discussed in some of his

previous publications, primarily in Japanese; a transliteration of the topical outline of Yongs 'dzin Phur bu lcog's Bsdus grwa,2 usefully including the definitions and examples drawn both from the Bsdus grwa and other basic Dge lugs pa bsdus

grwa textbooks (ch. 6); and finally, a transliteration of Glo bo Mkhan chen Bsod nams lhun grub's (1456-1532) Rtag(s) kyi rnam gzhag rigs lam gsal ba'i sgron me (appendix).

In the first topical essay (ch. 2) Onoda discusses the connec- tion between the Dge lugs pa tradition and the monastery of

Gsang phu (s)ne'u thog, founded in 1073 by Rngog lo tsa ba's uncle Rngog Legs pa'i shes rab, at which Phya pa served as ab- bot for eighteen years. To this end, he presents detailed lists of the colleges (grwa tshang) of the four major Dge lugs pa mo- nastic universities of Dga' ldan, 'Bras spungs, Se ra, and Bkra shis lhun po, as well as the colleges of Gsang phu. He then produces very brief biographical information on sixteen Gsang phu abbots in order to demonstrate clearly the close relation- ship that existed between the Gsang phu and Dge lugs pa

2 The Bsdus grwa actually consists of five separate, but sequential, texts, which have been published collectively as Text- books of Se ra Monastery for the Primary Course of Studies, ed. Tshulkrim Kelsang and Shunzo Onoda (Kyoto, 1985).

and 1989) and Jackson (1987).1 Onoda's book is one of the most detailed studies of bsdus grwa literature published to date in a Western language (see also D. Perdue, Debate in Tibetan Buddhism [Ithaca: Snow Lion, 1991]) and presents an interesting and welcome amalgam of these two approaches, the logical and the historical. He not only examines particular logical theories and patterns of debate as explicated by the standard Dge lugs pa tradition, but also takes great pains to examine the historical background of the Dge lugs pa system of debate as well as analyze the original formulations of some of the logical concepts it incorporates.

The topic of Onoda's book is what he calls bsdus grwa logic, a term which, as he points out (p. 59), has two distinct senses. In general, it means the introductory course or classes in dialectics that form a basis from which a student advances in the Dge lugs pa tradition of scholasticism. More specifically, it also indicates the first of the three parts of this course, viz., bsdus grwa (ontology), blo rigs (epistemology) and rtags rigs (logic). Onoda primarily employs the term in the former sense, the sense that I adopt here. Yet one should be aware that he also frequently uses the term in a third and more expanded sense to indicate not only the Dge lugs pa introductory system of dialectics, but also the Tibetan historical precursors to this

system, namely the "epistemological summaries" (tshad ma'i bsdus pa) which are said to originate with the highly creative

Phya pa Chos kyi Seng ge (1109-1069). Onoda's book consists of a brief, but complete, discussion

of previous scholarship on the topic of bsdus grwa (ch. 1); four topical chapters (2-5), comprising the heart of the book, that rework and summarize issues discussed in some of his

previous publications, primarily in Japanese; a transliteration of the topical outline of Yongs 'dzin Phur bu lcog's Bsdus grwa,2 usefully including the definitions and examples drawn both from the Bsdus grwa and other basic Dge lugs pa bsdus

grwa textbooks (ch. 6); and finally, a transliteration of Glo bo Mkhan chen Bsod nams lhun grub's (1456-1532) Rtag(s) kyi rnam gzhag rigs lam gsal ba'i sgron me (appendix).

In the first topical essay (ch. 2) Onoda discusses the connec- tion between the Dge lugs pa tradition and the monastery of

Gsang phu (s)ne'u thog, founded in 1073 by Rngog lo tsa ba's uncle Rngog Legs pa'i shes rab, at which Phya pa served as ab- bot for eighteen years. To this end, he presents detailed lists of the colleges (grwa tshang) of the four major Dge lugs pa mo- nastic universities of Dga' ldan, 'Bras spungs, Se ra, and Bkra shis lhun po, as well as the colleges of Gsang phu. He then produces very brief biographical information on sixteen Gsang phu abbots in order to demonstrate clearly the close relation- ship that existed between the Gsang phu and Dge lugs pa

2 The Bsdus grwa actually consists of five separate, but sequential, texts, which have been published collectively as Text- books of Se ra Monastery for the Primary Course of Studies, ed. Tshulkrim Kelsang and Shunzo Onoda (Kyoto, 1985).

647 647

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Journal of the American Oriental Society 114.4 (1994)

colleges during the 15th through 17th centuries. Next, he suc-

cinctly discusses the relationship of Gsang phu to a few Sa

skya pa colleges. Finally, he concludes with an outline of the curriculum of monastic seminaries that he summarizes from in- formation gleaned largely from modern sources (p. 35, n. 29).

The second essay (ch. 3) provides a vivid account of the structures of Tibetan monastic debate, describing the formulaic

types of questions that may be asked and the highly limited answers that may be given in response. In addition, Onoda discusses the use in debate of the second person pronoun khyod as a logical variable, functioning much like the mathematical variable x.

The third essay (ch. 4) discusses the claim by the later tradition that bsdus grwa literature originated, both in terms of

style and content, with the eighteen subjects discussed in Phya pa's Tshad ma'i bsdus pa yid kyi mun sel, as reported by Klong rdol bla ma Ngag dbang blo bzang (1719-94/95). Onoda pre- sents lists of the eighteen subjects ascribed to Phya pa, as well as the subjects employed by several well-known Dge lugs pa bsdus grwa texts, thus allowing one to see the topical similar-

ity at a glance. Presumably, lest one assume that the summa- ries of Phya pa and his followers were merely earlier versions of Dge lugs pa bsdus grwa texts, however, he does raise the

cautionary note that the term bsdus pa was not restricted

merely to pramana texts, as both Phya pa and his student,

Gtsang nag pa Brtson 'grus seng ge (d. no earlier than 1192), are also said to have written summaries on Madhyamaka. One

may also raise a further cautionary note that the mere inclu- sion of the term bsdus pa in a title does not necessarily imply that the text has the nature of a summary. Gtsang nag pa's Pramanaviniscaya commentary, the Tshad ma rnam par nges pa'i tika legs bshad bsdus pa, for example, is precisely that, a

commentary, in spite of containing several topical excursus, and bears little resemblance to the later bsdus grwa texts (see van der Kuijp 1989: 19).

The fourth essay (ch. 5) discusses the topics of logical con-

sequences (thai 'gyur; prasahga),3 direct and indirect contrar-

3 The issue of the classification of prasangas that by their

contraposition imply a self-constituted proof of similar type (bzlog pa rang rigs 'phen pa) or of dissimilar type (gzhan rigs 'phen pa) is one in which there was considerable disagreement in the Tibetan tradition. Van der Kuijp has located two Mongol blockprints (hor sp/par ma) of the Tshad ma rigs pa'i gter, both of which verify the reading reported in the commentaries of both Go rams pa Bsod nams seng ge (1429-89) and Gser

mdog pan chen Sakya mchog ldan (1428-1507) that classifies these prasangas into four of similar type and fourteen of dis- similar type (van der Kuijp, "Two Mongol Xylographs (hor par ma) of the Tibetan Text of the Sa skya Pandita's Work on Buddhist Logic and Epistemology," JIABS 16.2 [1993]: 60-

79). Van der Kuijp, moreover, points out several systems that

ies (dngos 'gal and rgyud 'gal), and positive and negative pervasion (rjes 'gro and Idog khyab).

These four chapters function as a collection of focused, care-

fully researched articles on the same general topic, rather than as a unified whole with a fully integrated and explicit argument. Insofar as they have a common intent, however, it is in firmly locating the historical origins of the Dge lugs pa bsdus grwa system in the summaries of Phya pa. This point Onoda estab- lishes convincingly, thereby dispelling the not infrequent mis-

conception that bsdus grwa is nothing more than a Dge lugs pa training exercise of little historical or philosophical value

(pp. 1-2). An uncertainty inherent in each of the topical chapters,

however, is that, while Onoda gives ample and convincing evidence for bsdus grwa's origins in the summaries of Phya pa, he does not always make explicit the historical limits of certain features of his argument. Most conspicuous is the oc- casional use of the term bsdus grwa as a general expression meant to incorporate the entire Tibetan debate tradition. Even

though the term is sometimes used this way in modern litera-

ture, it is somewhat anachronistic and potentially misleading, as it can obscure the earlier tradition by regarding it merely as a precursor to the later tradition.4 Moreover, in his sketch of the structure of monastic debate, Onoda does not specify a

period for which the sketch is valid, nor does he identify the sources from which it is drawn. The reader is left to surmise

Onoda does not discuss. Bcom ldan Rig(s) pa'i ral gri (c. 1240- c. 1315) classified prasangas into four by thirteen types, re-

spectively. Bo dang pan chen Phyogs las rnam rgyal (1375- 1450) argued for a three by eleven classification and against three different classifications of five by sixteen, four by four-

teen, and three by ten, the first two of which are also attested by Glo bo mkhan chen Bsod nams lhun grub. In addition to these

sources, several other early pramdna texts by Dharmaratna, Chu mig pa Seng ge dpal, and others, have also recently come to light. It is hoped that a careful examination of these will shed significant light not only on Phya pa's theories in particu- lar, but also on the internal dynamic of the so-called rngogs lugs and also its relationship to the Tshad ma rigs pa'i gter and its commentaries.

4 It is not yet known precisely when the term bsdus grwa came to be used to refer to the summaries, but as it was not used, to the best of our knowledge, by Phya pa, himself, or his

followers, it would be safer to reserve this term for the texts that actively incorporate it, the earliest of which, so far, is

Mchog lha 'od zer's R(w)a stod bsdus grwa. As Onoda notes

(p. 60), we cannot be certain of the content of the summaries of the earlier period until we have examined them. Therefore, we should provisionally distinguish between these chronolog- ically distinct terms, as they may well represent distinct tex- tual genres.

648

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Reviews of Books Reviews of Books

for himself whether it is specific to the Dge lugs pa tradition or may be taken as a reasonably accurate depiction of the en- tire Tibetan tradition.5 Another case in point occurs in Ono- da's examination of several of Phya pa's logical theories of

positive and negative pervasion. His reconstructions of Phya pa's theories of prasanga and of direct and indirect contraries are marked by a careful and reasoned use of Sa pan's Tshad ma rigs pa'i gter, its major commentaries, and Gtsang nag pa's Pramanaviniscaya commentary to make sense of rather knotty issues. His discussion of the subject of positive and negative pervasion, however, although framed by reference to the sub-

ject's inclusion among the eighteen subjects attributed to Phya pa, is simply a presentation of Dge lugs pa positions. As the Tshad ma rigs pa'i gter does not supply the necessary evi-

dence, Onoda rightly does not attempt to reconstruct Phya pa's position, but then states that "therefore we have to extrapolate only from later Dge lugs pa works of the bsdus grwa litera- ture" (p. 105). I would argue, or perhaps quibble, that in this case what we have is a truly fine presentation of positions found in Dge lugs pa works, but that we cannot really say any- thing about Phya pa other than that the topic heading is as- cribed to him. Until more information becomes available and can be examined, we must suspend judgment on this issue.

The content of these chapters is almost entirely descriptive and Onoda judiciously refrains from drawing many conclu-

sions, preferring to let the information he presents speak for itself. In this fashion he solidly establishes the connection of bsdus grwa to Phya pa, and therefore grounds it historically. The precise nature of the relationship, however, he leaves for future research.

Aside from the occasional typographies, such as the sec- tions of chapter two running from A to F in the text but from B to G in the table of contents, there are only a few minor errors that I noted.

P. 1, line 7: "eleventh-century" should read "twelfth-

century." P. 32, nn. 3 and 4: "Kuijp 1985" should read "Kuijp 1983." P. 34, n. 22: Kuijp 1987 is not listed in the bibliography and

I have not been able to identify the work to which it refers. See, however, L. W. J. van der Kuijp, "Studies in the Life and

Thought of Mkhas-grub-rje, I: Mkhas-grub-rje's Epistemological Oeuvre and his Philological Remarks on Dignaga's Pramana-

samuccaya I," Berliner Indologische Studien 1 (1985): 75-105.

5 If Jackson (1987: 196) is right that the debating practice current at the time of Sa skya Pandita was already standard- ized, then one might be fairly safe in assuming that the system described by Onoda holds reasonably well for most Tibetan monastic debate. Yet unless such an historical comparison is actually made, it would be better to identify those sources ac- tually used and explicitly limit the discussion to them.

for himself whether it is specific to the Dge lugs pa tradition or may be taken as a reasonably accurate depiction of the en- tire Tibetan tradition.5 Another case in point occurs in Ono- da's examination of several of Phya pa's logical theories of

positive and negative pervasion. His reconstructions of Phya pa's theories of prasanga and of direct and indirect contraries are marked by a careful and reasoned use of Sa pan's Tshad ma rigs pa'i gter, its major commentaries, and Gtsang nag pa's Pramanaviniscaya commentary to make sense of rather knotty issues. His discussion of the subject of positive and negative pervasion, however, although framed by reference to the sub-

ject's inclusion among the eighteen subjects attributed to Phya pa, is simply a presentation of Dge lugs pa positions. As the Tshad ma rigs pa'i gter does not supply the necessary evi-

dence, Onoda rightly does not attempt to reconstruct Phya pa's position, but then states that "therefore we have to extrapolate only from later Dge lugs pa works of the bsdus grwa litera- ture" (p. 105). I would argue, or perhaps quibble, that in this case what we have is a truly fine presentation of positions found in Dge lugs pa works, but that we cannot really say any- thing about Phya pa other than that the topic heading is as- cribed to him. Until more information becomes available and can be examined, we must suspend judgment on this issue.

The content of these chapters is almost entirely descriptive and Onoda judiciously refrains from drawing many conclu-

sions, preferring to let the information he presents speak for itself. In this fashion he solidly establishes the connection of bsdus grwa to Phya pa, and therefore grounds it historically. The precise nature of the relationship, however, he leaves for future research.

Aside from the occasional typographies, such as the sec- tions of chapter two running from A to F in the text but from B to G in the table of contents, there are only a few minor errors that I noted.

P. 1, line 7: "eleventh-century" should read "twelfth-

century." P. 32, nn. 3 and 4: "Kuijp 1985" should read "Kuijp 1983." P. 34, n. 22: Kuijp 1987 is not listed in the bibliography and

I have not been able to identify the work to which it refers. See, however, L. W. J. van der Kuijp, "Studies in the Life and

Thought of Mkhas-grub-rje, I: Mkhas-grub-rje's Epistemological Oeuvre and his Philological Remarks on Dignaga's Pramana-

samuccaya I," Berliner Indologische Studien 1 (1985): 75-105.

5 If Jackson (1987: 196) is right that the debating practice current at the time of Sa skya Pandita was already standard- ized, then one might be fairly safe in assuming that the system described by Onoda holds reasonably well for most Tibetan monastic debate. Yet unless such an historical comparison is actually made, it would be better to identify those sources ac- tually used and explicitly limit the discussion to them.

P. 47, line 17: In the sentence, "This fact (of being a color) characteristic is not pervaded by the reason, namely the fact of

being existant," the phrase "is not pervaded by" should read "does not pervade" or "is not implied by." The point is that a statement such as "white is a color because it is existant" is incorrect because the reason (being an existant) does not im-

ply the predicate (being a color). P. 72, line 33: "Those seven prasatigas to which one can

reply ... " should read: "Those seven prasatigas to which one cannot reply ...." The error is unfortunate as the quite techni- cal and structured topic of prasaniga, which Onoda explicates so lucidly in this chapter, requires a reader's careful and or- dered attention. The argument of this and the following para- graph, moreover, would be clearer if the distribution of these seven prasangas into those that imply a self-constituted proof and those that do not were made explicit. Namely, only a sub- set of the seventh of these, which Onoda numbers 13a, implies a self-constituted proof; the other six and a half do not.

P. 110, n. 23: [RTGG] should read [RTNS]. The passage cited, which occurs in Sakya mchog ldan's Tshad ma rigs pa'i gter gyi rnam par bshad pa sde bdun ngag gi rol mtsho, is misidentified as occurring in his Tshad ma rigs pa'i gter gyi dgongs rgyan lung dang rigs pa'i 'khor los lugs ngan pham byed ces pa'am ming gzhan rtog ge 'khrul 'joms chen mo.

In sum, Onoda has presented a quite technical work includ-

ing both extensive historical detail and complex philosophical theory in very clear and readable English. Moreover, there are few scholars as qualified as Onoda to discuss the Tibetan bsdus

grwa tradition. His excellent book is a considerable addition to a rather sparsely researched field and will be a valuable re- source for years to come.

P. 47, line 17: In the sentence, "This fact (of being a color) characteristic is not pervaded by the reason, namely the fact of

being existant," the phrase "is not pervaded by" should read "does not pervade" or "is not implied by." The point is that a statement such as "white is a color because it is existant" is incorrect because the reason (being an existant) does not im-

ply the predicate (being a color). P. 72, line 33: "Those seven prasatigas to which one can

reply ... " should read: "Those seven prasatigas to which one cannot reply ...." The error is unfortunate as the quite techni- cal and structured topic of prasaniga, which Onoda explicates so lucidly in this chapter, requires a reader's careful and or- dered attention. The argument of this and the following para- graph, moreover, would be clearer if the distribution of these seven prasangas into those that imply a self-constituted proof and those that do not were made explicit. Namely, only a sub- set of the seventh of these, which Onoda numbers 13a, implies a self-constituted proof; the other six and a half do not.

P. 110, n. 23: [RTGG] should read [RTNS]. The passage cited, which occurs in Sakya mchog ldan's Tshad ma rigs pa'i gter gyi rnam par bshad pa sde bdun ngag gi rol mtsho, is misidentified as occurring in his Tshad ma rigs pa'i gter gyi dgongs rgyan lung dang rigs pa'i 'khor los lugs ngan pham byed ces pa'am ming gzhan rtog ge 'khrul 'joms chen mo.

In sum, Onoda has presented a quite technical work includ-

ing both extensive historical detail and complex philosophical theory in very clear and readable English. Moreover, there are few scholars as qualified as Onoda to discuss the Tibetan bsdus

grwa tradition. His excellent book is a considerable addition to a rather sparsely researched field and will be a valuable re- source for years to come.

PETER SCHWABLAND PETER SCHWABLAND

UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON

Sahopalambhaniyama: Struktur und Entwicklung des Schlusses von der Tatsache, dafi Erkenntnis und Gegenstand aussch-

lieflich zusammen wahrgenommen werden, auf deren Nicht- verschiedenheit. By TAKASHI IWATA. 2 volumes. Stuttgart: FRANZ STEINER VERLAG, 1991. Pp. xiv + 286; 246. DM 148

(paper).

At the end of the first chapter of his Pramdnaviniscaya (ed. T. Vetter [Vienna, 1966]; abbr. PVin I), Dharmakirti formulates two proofs in order to establish that an object of cognition and its cognition are not different from each other. He deduces their being not different from each other, on the one hand, from the fact that they are necessarily perceived together (PVin I 94, 18f. = v. 55ab) and, on the other hand, from the fact that

Sahopalambhaniyama: Struktur und Entwicklung des Schlusses von der Tatsache, dafi Erkenntnis und Gegenstand aussch-

lieflich zusammen wahrgenommen werden, auf deren Nicht- verschiedenheit. By TAKASHI IWATA. 2 volumes. Stuttgart: FRANZ STEINER VERLAG, 1991. Pp. xiv + 286; 246. DM 148

(paper).

At the end of the first chapter of his Pramdnaviniscaya (ed. T. Vetter [Vienna, 1966]; abbr. PVin I), Dharmakirti formulates two proofs in order to establish that an object of cognition and its cognition are not different from each other. He deduces their being not different from each other, on the one hand, from the fact that they are necessarily perceived together (PVin I 94, 18f. = v. 55ab) and, on the other hand, from the fact that

649 649

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