1

Nationalism, ideological identification and solidarity: the

attitudinal sphere

By Enric Martínez-Herrera (CEPC) and Inés Calzada (CSIC)

c/e: emartine@eui.eu

Versión 11/11/09

NB: DRAFT/BORRADOR

Comments most welcome

For citation queries, please ask at the e/m above

Presentation at CANS meeting. Brussels, 12-13 November 2009

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Nationalism, ideological identification and solidarity: the attitudinal

sphere1

Enric Martínez-Herrera (CEPC) and Inés Calzada (CSIC)

Are nationalists progressive? Which nationalists are progressive and which are not?

During the last decade and a half some prominent political theorists have advanced an

attractive blend of nationalism with social-democratic and liberal ideas. One of their

most appealing yet not unproblematic or uncontroversial claims is that national

identification contributes to strengthen solidarity and support for re-distributive policies.

Notwithstanding conceptual and theoretical difficulties to match progressive and

nationalist tenets, however, different kinds of empirical evidence show that, more often

than not, nationalism is right-wing. In this paper we assess the relationship between

national identification, on the one hand, and left-right self-identification and economic

solidarity, on the other hand.

The analysis of the relationship between national identification and attitudes

towards solidarity and redistribution allows us to go beyond citizens’ perception of

themselves as progressive or conservative. Individuals’ self-perceptions as progressive

or conservative may well be flawed by their perceptions of the social desirability of

these political labels in their socio-political milieu. In this sense, the study of the

attitudes towards solidarity and redistribution affords the possibility not to take for

granted individuals generic ideological self-placements and to test their solidarity in

different instances of support to redistribution. In addition to it, this study compares the

orientation towards ideological identification and solidarity at different instances of

nationalism. In particular, by regarding Spanish, Catalan and Galician nationalisms, it

weights the solidarity credentials of both statewide nationalism and minority

nationalism. The attitudinal data stem from a survey conducted in May 2009 in

1 This communication and the social survey it is based upon have been produced within the frame of the

project “Citizenship after the Nation State?” (CANS), supported by Spain’s Ministry of Science and

Innovation (SEJ2007-30242-E/SOCI) and the European Science Foundation.

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representative samples of citizen’s living in three Spanish autonomous regions –

Catalonia, Galicia and Castilla-La Mancha.

The paper begins by engaging different claims according to which nationalism

has beneficent effects on solidarity and redistribution and by specifying some widely

accepted definitions of the concepts “nationalism”, “national identification” and “left

and right”. In particular, it pays attention to some basic postulates of the so-called

“liberal nationalism” stream in contemporary political theory. The paper then turns to

empirically analyze the relationship between individuals’ national identifications and

their identifications with the generic labels “left and right” on a widely used linear scale.

Next the paper evaluates more specific solidarity attitudes – solidarity towards people in

need, irrespective of their geographical location; and, subsequently, solidarity between

different regions of the same country.

Solidarity, redistribution and “good nationalism” – theoretical claims

The intellectual reputation of nationalism since World War II has been quite bad.

Nationalism has not only spurred the mass wars that occurred since the end of

nineteenth century – in which tens of millions of men and women would die – but also

genocide, mass deportation and other mass crimes committed in both wartime and

peacetime from the Modern age. Although the struggles of the 1950-60s de-

colonization movements partially enhanced its reputation, this improvement soon

vanished again because of nationalist violence in many of the new and old states. The

1990s witnessed, however, a two-fold scenario of intellectual revisiting and debate on

the subject. On the one hand, a nationalist revival – including increasing racism

towards international migrants and their offspring – in Western Europe and, overall,

civil wars in former Yugoslavia revived fears about nationalism. On the other, a wave

of political thought has made the case that nationalism has a virtuous side.

Some authors claim that nationalism not only justifies and generates zero-sum

game conflict between groups but also that it can foster genuine cooperation within

them. They claim that liberalism it not only compatible with liberal values but also that

it helps attain goals of social justice pursued by left liberalism and social-democracy.

One of their key theoretical assumptions is that nationalism and the resulting national

identity foster citizens’ solidarity and support for national re-distributive policies. By

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making this claim, they have managed to theoretically bring together two current

concerns in political and social theory – the rediscovery of the community and changes

in welfare stare regimes. Unfortunately, though, there has been little systematic

empirical evidence to support this claim, so this paper aims at empirically testing it –

the aim of this study is to empirically evaluate it.

During the last decade and a half, there have been different theoretical attempts

to revisit nationalism, looking back for some lost communitarian or republican ethical

tenets compatible with liberal values and institutions. These attempts have taken place

against the background of a rediscovery of community in political science and

sociology during the 1990s – some of the most celebrated books of that decade were

about social trust and social capital (Inglehart 1990, 1997; Putnam 1993, 2000). The

theoretical production of “liberal-nationalists” such as Yael Tamir and David Miller, has

gone quite further – they have sought to rescue the community by means of nationalism

and national identification. A common theme shared by the most prominent proponents

of liberal nationalism is, to borrow Tamir’s (1993) words, “distributive justice.”

“Liberal-nationalists” sympathise with nationalism while maintaining some form of

liberal stance, and they contend that national identification is necessary for safeguarding

citizens’ solidarity at the national level.

Moreover, changes of the welfare state since the late 1970s have raised much

concern in Western Europe, and Tamir and Miller put national identification to the fore

as an potential remedy. Welfare state and national identification seem to influence each

other in a non-recursive, reciprocal manner. On the one hand, the state has used the

welfare system to gain loyalty and a sense of national solidarity from citizens

(Hobsbawm, 1992; Keating, 2001; McEwen, 2002; Moreno and McEwen, 2005). On

the other, however, it is often argued that social consent towards distributive and

redistributive policies has one of its stronger bases in national identification. Certainly,

it has also been expected that support for redistribution could flow from a universalistic

sense of justice – regardless of national borders – but this alternative seems to be less in

vogue these days.

The main hypothesis argues that national identification lends support for

national solidarity. It links both variables through a sense of “common good” and

“mutual responsibility”. As a matter of fact, distributive and re-distributive policies

entail an essential, at least latent conflict, since some individuals or social sections must

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pay the costs of improving the situation of other individuals or sections. Yet these

policies, in special within the frame of a welfare system, often also entail a coordination

problem, insofar as most individuals and sections could be made better-off – especially

in the long-run. Noticeably, though, many individuals or sections could still be tempted

to escape the costs, thus leading to a problem of lack of cooperation.

The argument relating national identification and solidarity goes through the

notions of common good – taking various meanings – and mutual responsibility. The

analogy with the family that some authors put forward (Miller, 1996; Keating, 2001)

can be a useful departure point, since it easily evokes both ideas, and it can be

interpreted from either a strictly egoistic viewpoint or a less egoistic, perhaps even

altruistic one. Yet different meanings of the term “common good” (Dahl, 1989) and a

couple of different understandings of the welfare state (Keating, 2001) must be

considered altogether.

The first two meanings of the term “common good” as applied in relation to

national solidarity are neatly individualistic and selfish. First, common good is seen as

that which is good for all the members of, or a large majority in, a society. Here

national redistribution is understood as a “mutual insurance plan” where reciprocity is

expected, and the fact that this plan exists is likely to benefit most members of the

society (Keating, 2001). Thus, national identification helps coordinate individuals with

a latent shared egoistic interest.

Second, nationwide redistribution can be seen as solely making some sections of

the society better-off, whereas many sections and single members are unlikely to

directly benefit. If the individual believes that she shares a “common interest” (Keating,

2001), “common venture”, “enterprise” or “project” (Taylor, 1996), even “common

fate” with her nation fellow-members – as nationalism often induces individuals to

perceive themselves – then she can still think in egoistic rational terms that she also

benefit from her fellow nationals’ improvement, since she is indirectly affected by their

successes and failures (Tamir, 1993). Thus, “common good” is perceived by the selfish

individual in terms of such an interdependence – some degree of improvement of her

fellow-nationals may also benefit herself.

The third sense of “common good” is no more individualistic, but organicist

instead. A society or nation is seen as an entity with its own autonomous life –

independent to a degree from the individuals forming it – and the common good is

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referred to as its well-being. Since individuals can perceive a “sense of national interest”

(Brown et al., 1998), now the distributive and re-distributive policies are intended to

keep or improve the well-being of the social organism. Selfish individuals’ calculations

are possible insofar as they believe that the well-being of the organism is also good for

its cells – without denying that non-strictly egoistic sacrifices are possible too.

The analogy with the family also has the connotation that national identification

carries with it a feeling of “mutual responsibility” (Keating, 2001), a “fellow-feeling

and mutual concern” (Parekh, 2002), or a “sense of bonding among the people working

together” (Taylor, 1996). The analogy is of a limited scope, since members of the nation

do not know each other personally, nor do they share most daily life experiences.

However, it is assumed that from the fact of identifying with the same social unit – the

“nation” – individuals identify also with each other with comparable strength, and even

more, they develop an affection for each other. This is indeed a much debatable

assumption (Brubaker and Cooper, 2000; Abizadeh, 2002), but it works to rhetorically

legitimate the “distributive justice” understanding of re-distributive policies (Tamir,

1993). However, were it true, affection for fellow-nationals would inspire a sense of

moral responsibility, obligation towards them, similar– though less intense – to the

feelings within a Western ideal family.

Therefore, from any of those arguments we should expect that

the stronger the individual identifies with her nation, the more supportive will be

to redistributive policies.

There is little empirical research on this matter. Previous empirical analyses

have grounded on a public opinion survey conducted in England and Scotland – the

1997 British General Election Study (Martínez-Herrera 2004, 2009). This survey had

two main virtues. First, the survey included a large variety of indicators intended to

measure a so-called ‘British national sentiment’ as well as attitudes to the welfare state.

The “British national sentiment” was tapped through a wide array of questions

comprising exclusionary forms of nationalism as well as softer questions on national

identification. In turn, support for the welfare state was tapped through support for

policies of public health, public education and financial assistance to people in need. A

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second virtue was the fact that Great Britain was the country that David Miller bore in

mind when prising the allegedly progressive virtues of “liberal nationalism”.

As a matter of fact, however, empirical findings disagreed with theoretical

claims. Even if controlling by important variables as left-right identification and

household income, citizens showing a greater reluctance towards any influence of other

countries in British politics as well as holding an uncritical British pride, and citizens

showing the stronger British identification and stronger wish to keep Great Britain

united, tend to be the least supportive to welfare state schemes. In other words, contrary

to liberal nationalist theoretical expectations, the effects on solidarity of both soft

national identification and tougher nationalist views were found to be negative.

Therefore, Miller’s and Tamir’s hypothesis did not hold in Great Britain. The current

piece research supplies a new test for the hypothesis in a different setting and affords

the possibility to operationalize national identification as referring to both the state

political community and sub-state level national projects.

Basic concepts

Before testing the above-mentioned hypothesis, however, we need a clarification of

what is meant by “national identification” in this literature. First of all, following from

Gellner (1983), it could be agreed that “nationalism” is a “principle of political

legitimacy”. A principle that states that “the political and the national unit should be

congruent”, understanding the “national unit” as defined by ethno-cultural – e.g.

religious and/or linguistic – markers (see also Hechter 2000). This principle underpins

a wide array of phenomena under the label “nationalism”, namely attitudes, doctrines,

movements, and organizational patterns of the world. Second, Gellner emphasizes that

the assumption of this principle has as a consequence a strong concern about the

congruence in ethno-cultural traits between the rulers and the ruled. Therefore, one

important dimension of nationalism as an attitude is a negative orientation towards any

actor considered to be alien to the “nation” – at least, to the extent that such an actor

seeks to intervene in the political realm.

When Tamir (1993) and Miller (1995) refer to something they call “liberal

nationalism” or “nationality”, they seem to be referring to a different principle. This is

because, albeit they praise a sense of belonging together, they would probably dislike

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that citizens mistrusted cultural minorities, foreigners and other countries while being

uncritical towards their own “nation”. Rather than to nationalism as defined by Gellner,

they seem to refer to a sense of “national identification”, which other would willingly

call “patriotism” (e.g. Habermas, 1996). To be certain, Miller (1995) seems to be clear

enough that his “nationality” is culturally specific (Abizadeh, 2002), but one could be

prone to think that this is not Tamir’s case (1993).

A second term that may require some definition is that of ideological

identification. The concepts of “left” and “right” supply a structure to the systems of

political orientations in Europe.2 They synthesize the tension between conflicting

values in European societies while integrating a wide number of issues. Inglehart

(1990: 320) admits that, while the main, basic meaning of the left/right dimension

“consists on whether one supports or opposes social change in an equalitarian

direction”, his study reveals that this dimension tends to assimilate most important

issues in the long term. In spite of the crisis of these concepts in their traditional

meaning, this dimension still has full effect, as new values and interests integrate into it.

Whereas ideological identification in terms of left and right is a rather vague and

generic conceptualization, it is very useful in practical terms. The labels allow the

diverse political actors to find one’s way about within the wideness and complexity of

the political universe. They fulfill cognitive and affective functions in the

understanding and evaluation of actors and policies (Sani 1974; Sani and Sartori 1983).

For Sani and Montero, in Spain the individual “perceives the terms as if they were

related to her/his own value system and, directly or indirectly, with her/his own position

on the [left-right] continuum.” Even though those identifying themselves with the same

position on a left/right axis may differ in some aspects of their political orientations and

general social values, there are empirical reasons to believe that the agreement – i.e.

what they share – prevails. For these authors, the left-right scale is like a “mirror” of

sorts, a mirror that “necessarily reflects an oversimplified and partly distorted image, yet

an image that reveals some interesting aspects of voters’ political composition” (Sani

and Montero 1986: 180-181, our translation).

2 For the concept of structure in mass belief systems, see Converse (1964), Benedicto (1989) and Dalton

(2005).

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Against the historical backdrop, it is difficult to attach nationalism to either the

label of “right” or the label “left”. There are instances of nationalism related to both

radical (i.e. left-liberal) party families and to conservative party families (Beyme 1986;

Ware 1996). During World War I there was a strong tendency within the social-

democratic family invoking internationalism and hence opposing any conflagration

between nations. Yet in the end some social-democratic parties broke the

internationalist tradition and embraced nationalist allegiances. In turn, communist (and

post-communist) parties have often joined nationalist movements – in particular, but not

only, in developing countries during the decolonization phase. Nationalism can be

found in left and right parties and nationalism can refer to overarching political systems

(“state nationalism”) as well as to minority nationalisms – whether they are secessionist

or come to terms with some sort of minority territorial self-government. Hence it is an

empirical open question whether some nationalisms are more inclined to the left or to

the right both in political labeling and discourse and in specific attitudes of solidarity

and support for policies that help to change society in an equalitarian direction –

namely, re-distributive policies.

Data and results

The data analysed here stem from the Spanish contribution to the international

research project “Citizenship after the Nation-State?” (CANS), with the support of the

European Science Foundation and the national governments of Austria, Germany and

Spain, and different regional public agencies of Bretagne, Ille de France (France),

Scotland and Wales (United Kingdom). The aim of the international study is to analyze

hypothetical shifts of citizens’ public engagement and solidarity from the state level to

the regional level. Nevertheless, some of the survey indicators analyzed here are

specific for Spain. According to the research design for the transnational analyses, the

inquiry comprises a variety of regions selected according to the strength of regional

identity, regional institutional authority and regional economic wealth. The regions

selected for Spain are Catalonia, Galicia and Castile-La Mancha.

Catalonia is a “usual suspect”, well-know for the strength of its regional identity

and self-government institutions and its relative economic affluence as compared to the

Spanish average. Galicia and Castile-La Mancha, in turn, are two of the less rich

regions in the country but differ from each other in that the former has a relatively

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strong distinctive identity while the latter is representative of the mainstream Spanish

identity. The survey, carried out through computed-assisted telephone interviews

(CATI), includes adult citizens as well as a proportional share of international migrants

that reside in the regions. The fieldwork was carried out in May 2009.

In the next pages we present, in a somewhat sketchy form, different data about

national identification, ideology and solidarity in the three regions under study. We will

start by looking at simple cross-tabs that show the frequencies in each region of the

variables used as indicators of national identification. We will proceed with an analysis

of the relationship between national identification and ideology, and we will finish the

analyses by looking at the relationship between national identification and some

variables that can serve as proxy for economic solidarity.

Relative identifications (with Spain and the region) (bi-polar scale)

In Spain there is a three-decades long tradition of measuring national

identification with a bi-polar scale, which was first used in 1979 and later has travelled

to other countries. In a context with rival nationalisms (e.g. Catalan vs. Spanish

nationalism), this instrument aims at tapping which national referent citizens feel their

primary loyalties go with.3 The predispositions towards two objects potentially or

actually conflictive with each other are explicitly opposed and hence we can label this

“relative identifications.” Offering the same scale than most previous inquiries, in the

CANS context it reads:

Q5. Were you to choose, which of the following sentences best expresses how do you feel?

- I feel Spanish only

- I feel more Spanish than Basque/Catalan/Galician

3 This question was first used in 1979 by the opinion poll company DATA, S.A. in the Basque Country,

Catalonia and Galicia (see Lint et al. 1981, 1986; Shabad and Gunther 1982) and since then has been

administrated lots of times by the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas and other research teams in

Spain (for the DATA and CIS series, see Martínez-Herrera 2002). Luis Moreno (1986, 1988) introduced

this in the United Kingdom and later it has been applied in Belgium and Canada and, in the context of the

international project CANS, in regions of Austria, France and Germany.

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- I feel as much Spanish as Basque/Catalan/Galician

- I feel more Basque/Catalan/Galician than Spanish

- I feel Basque/Catalan/Galician only

Table 1. Relative identifications with the region and Spain (bi-polar scales) by region

Castilla-

La Mancha Cataluña Galicia Total

Me siento únicamente catalán/castellano-manchego/gallego 1,8 15,7 5,6 7,6

Me siento más catalán/castellano-manchego/gallego que españo 5,0 29,4 25,1 19,8

Me siento tan catalán/castellano-manchego/gallego como españ 53,0 39,2 57,7 50,1

Me siento más español que catalán/castellano-manchego/galleg 17,5 6,4 6,1 10,0

Me siento únicamente español 20,8 6,7 3,5 10,3

No sabe 0,9 0,7 0,9 0,8

No contesta 1,0 2,0 1,0 1,3

(n) 878 865 888 2631

As we can see in Table 1, Catalonia is the region where more people identify

themselves more with their region than with Spain at large – 45% of Catalonia citizens

feel “only Catalan” or “more Catalan than Spanish.” This percentage is 31% in Galicia

and 7% in Castile-La Mancha. It is worth to note, however, it is not Catalonia but

Galicia where less people feel “only Spanish”, and that in the three regions the largest

percentages are found in the option “as much as Catalan/Castilian-Manchego/Galician

as Spanish.”

Intensity of identifications (mono-polar scales)

Contestation of a national community is not the same that the intensity of the

attachment to another one – the relative identifications scale bears the problem that it

may well mix people strongly rejecting one denomination with people strongly

attaching to the other one, without these two things being necessarily complementary.

For this reason, we also analyze the results of scales tapping the intensity of the

identification with every geographical denomination separately – i.e. mono-polar scales.

The scales of intensity of identification with Spain and with the region stem from these

questions:

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Q31a. Todos nos sentimos más o menos ligados al lugar donde vivimos, pero muchos nos

sentimos más ligados a unos ámbitos que a otros. Usando una escala del 0 al 10, en la que

0 significa que Ud. se siente “muy poco identificado” y 10 que se siente “muy

identificado”, ¿en qué medida se siente Ud. identificado con [Cataluña/Castilla-La

Mancha/Galicia]?

Q31b. ¿Y en qué medida se siente Ud. identificado con España?

Table 2. Intensity of identification (mono-polar scales) with the region and Spain. Means comparison by region. Scales 0-10 Castilla La

Mancha Cataluña Galicia

Regional identification 7.18 8.11 8.39

National identification 8.18 5.88 7.50

Table 2 shows the sample means on the mono-polar scales of intensity of the

identification with the country and the region. All differences are statistically

significant. The majority of those living in Castile-La Mancha, Catalonia and Galicia

feel identified both with their region and with Spain. Galicia is the region where people

show the strongest identification with their region (8,4), and Castile-La Mancha is the

area where this scores the lowest (7,2). Identification with Spain is more extensive in

Castile-La Mancha and less so in Catalonia. Castile-La Mancha is also the region with

the strongest score for intensity of Spanish identification (8,2). Even though Galicia

leads the ranking of regional identification, it is worth it to note that this is not translated

into a low identification with the country as a whole.

The Galician case illustrates that the intensity of identification can measure

regional nationalism as much as an ordinary sense of attachment to the region of birth or

residence, without consequences for the loyalty to the Spanish political community.

Hence, in the case of regional nationalism, we need to differentiate Catalan or Galician

national identification from a rather apolitical sense of attachment to the region. For

this reason, in some models we have introduced an interaction term with which we

distinguish the strength of attachment of those that consider that Catalonia or Galicia are

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nations in their own right from those that label them as regions.4 The interaction term is

based on the following question:

Q32. Which term do you prefer to describe [Catalonia/Galicia]?

- A nation

- A region

- Neither/Other

Relationship between national identification and ideological identification

The association between frequency of religious practice and left-right

identification in Spain is well-known. Religiosity (or its absence) is the most important

predictor of individuals’ self-placement on a left-right continuum (e.g. Díez-Medrano et

al., 1989; Montero and Torcal, 1995). In our models, it is the variable that yields the

strongest effects on this identification. However, the main findings from the models in

Table 3 concern national identification. For one thing, relative identifications attain

statistically significant effects in all three regions. As individuals express to feel more

strongly their Spanish allegiance than the regional one, they also tend to feel more

inclined to the right than to the left.

Next we turn to intensity of identifications with each collective reference. As far

as intensity of Spanish identification is concerned, we find statistically significant

coefficients in all three regions. The sign of the association is always positive, which

means that as people express a stronger Spanish identification they tend to lean more

towards the right than towards the left. As said above, for identification with the

autonomous region we devise an interaction between this identification and the

perception of the autonomous region as either a nation or as a region. This is to help us

distinguish between minority nationalism and ordinary regional identification. The

interaction term attains significant coefficients in Catalonia and Galicia, with negative

signs that mean that Catalan and Galician nationalists tend to perceive themselves as

4 As our research moves ahead, we will include this interaction in all relevant models. We apologize for

this draft not covering all of them yet.

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leaning more towards the left than toward the right [This Table has to be revised as to

include the interaction term].

Table 3. Ideological identification. OLS regression models. Castilla La Mancha. Regresión lineal

Dep: IDEOLOGIA Modelo 1 Modelo 2 Modelo 3 RELIGIOSIDAD .4076254 *** .4152841 *** .4002843 *** SEXO .1468794 .0683702 .0723548 EDAD -.000705 -.0004773 -.0013663 ESTUDIOS -.0334186 -.0080126 -.001771 PARADO -.3673279 -.3355935 -.3111956 IDENTIDAD NAC. .2263875 * IDENTIF. CCAA -.0007314 IDENTIF. ESPAÑA .0870594* _cons 2,869 3,641 2,971 (n) 741,000 762,000 763,000 Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 R2 0.1088 0.1017 0.1087 Adj R2 0.1015 0.0946 0.1016

Cataluña. Regresión lineal

Dep: IDEOLOGIA Modelo 1 Modelo 2 Modelo 3 RELIGIOSIDAD .3667616 *** .4388664 *** .3840663 *** SEXO -.0048772 -.0028743 -.0380168 EDAD .0028841 .0032221 .0003731 ESTUDIOS -.0484788 -0,129 -.0614817 PARADO .1034527 .090482 .0122005 IDENTIDAD NAC. .5841108 *** IDENTIF. CCAA -0,090 * IDENTIF. ESPAÑA .1754633 *** _cons 1,954 4,293 2,626 (n) 760,000 802,000 801,000 Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 R2 0.1611 0.0996 0.1505 Adj R2 0.1544 0.0928 0.1441

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Galicia. Regresión lineal

Dep: IDEOLOGIA Modelo 1 Modelo 2 Modelo 3 RELIGIOSIDAD .4229312 *** .4628119 *** .424658 *** SEXO .0370192 .0756801 -.0163065 EDAD .0003468 .0027199 -.0049973 ESTUDIOS -0,129 * -0,137 * -.1163638 PARADO .0357911 .0494733 .062865 IDENTIDAD NAC. .5261603 *** IDENTIF. CCAA -.0284381 IDENTIF. ESPAÑA .2023437 *** _cons 2,424 3,845 2,627 (n) 743,000 761,000 759,000 Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 R2 0.1290 0.0976 0.1344 Adj R2 0.1219 0.0904 0.1275

* P>Z < 0.05 ** p>Z < 0.005 *** P>Z < 0.005

In a nutshell, our data show that as people identify themselves more strongly

with the Spanish nation, they tend to identify themselves also with the right rather than

with the left. Conversely, people identifying themselves more strongly with Catalonia

and Galicia and seeing them as nations rather than regions, tend to identify themselves

more with the left rather than with the right. Nevertheless, as argued above,

individuals’ self-perceptions as progressive or conservative may well be flawed by their

understandings of social desirability concerning these political labels. Because of this,

we shall also test more specific attitudes of solidarity in different instances of support to

redistribution. [Elaborate comments further]

Relationship between national identification and various measures of economic

solidarity

Solidarity to people in need

33a. ¿En qué porcentaje estaría Vd. dispuesto a aumentar los impuestos que Vd. o su familia

pagan actualmente para mejorar la atención a personas necesitadas? Por ejemplo, personas sin

techo, discapacitados, ancianos y el tercer mundo.

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First of all, there is no statistically significant difference in solidarity towards

people in need across the three regions at the aggregate level, a result that casts doubts

about the existence of a relationship between national identity and economic solidarity.

It is worth it to highlight, in particular, that Catalans show about the same disposition to

increase their taxes than Castilian-Manchegos and Galicians.

Table 4. Increasing interviewee’s taxes to help people in need. Means comparison by region.

Comunidad Autónoma MeanStd. Err. (n)

Castilla-La Mancha 11,4 16,4 770

Cataluña 10,2 16,0 799

Galicia 11,3 20,0 826

Total 11,0 17,6 2394

Eta2 0,00 ns

In order to study in depth the relationship between national identification and

disposition to increase taxation to help people in need, we built linear regression models

with Q33a as dependent variable, and several other as independents: sex, age, education,

ideology (1-10), unemployed vs. in work, and three different measures of national

identification (Model 1: relative national identification; Model 2: identification with

CCAA; Model 3: identification with Spain). We run different models for each region,

what leaves us with the nine regression models presented in Table 5.

Results of these models show that relative identifications do not attain

significant coefficients in any region. Identification with the region only yields a

significant effect in Castile-La Mancha, which happens to be negative – i.e. the more

identified with this region, the less ready to increase personal or family contributions to

help people in need. In turn, intensity of identification with Spain only yields a

significant effect in the same region, which is negative again. Thus national

identifications turn out to be either irrelevant or even counterproductive when solidarity

towards people in need such as homeless, handicapped, elder and developing countries

is at stake.

As a matter of fact, the variables that best predict this solidarity inclination are

age, the level of studies and ideological identification. Young people are more prone to

rise taxes than the old. As expected, left-wing people show more solidarity than right-

17

wing people. In addition, interestingly enough, people with the lowest educational

attainments in Castile-La Mancha and Catalonia show more inclination to increase taxes

than those with higher levels of education. Although this could be due to the actual

effect of education, this rather suggests a relationship with family income and property

and social class – in this analysis, education seems to work as a proxy to family wealth.5

Table 5. Increasing interviewee’s taxes to help people in need. OLS regression models. CASTILLA LA MANCHA. REGRESIÓN LINEAL. Dep: ¿Más impuestos?

Modelo 1 Modelo 2 Modelo 3 SEXO 1,8046 1,4277 1,3734 EDAD -0,1489 *** -0,1331 *** -0,1316 *** ESTUDIOS -0,7977 -1,0304 * -0,7911 IDEOLOGIA -0,3763 -0,3663 -0,3091 PARADO -1,5250 -0,5109 -0,2215 IDENTIDAD NACIONAL

0,6034

IDENTIF, CCAA -0,8031 *** IDENTIF, ESPAÑA -0,8656 *** _cons 17,8567 26,2763 26,5117 (n) 662 679 677 Prob > F 0,001 0 0 R2 0,0337 0,0464 0,0451 Adj R2 0,0249 0,0379 0,0366

5 From sociological research in Spain during the 1980s and 1990s, we know that education tends to

correlate with left-right identification when controlling by income. We also know that, at the same time,

education and income tend to correlate moderately. The CANS questionnaire, however, does not include

any question on income as to isolate this from educational attainments. Hence our interpretation that

formal education is working here as a proxy to family affluence.

18

CATALUÑA Dep: ¿Más impuestos?

Modelo 1 Modelo 2 Modelo 3 SEXO 2,2920 2,0679 2,1015 EDAD -0,1119 *** -0,1129 *** -0,1125 *** ESTUDIOS -0,9447 * -1,1104 * -1,1625 * IDEOLOGIA -0,6865 * -0,7329 * -0,6643 * PARADO 0,1103 0,2264 0,3500 IDENTIDAD NACIONAL

0,0298

IDENTIF, CCAA -0,0082 IDENTIF. ESPAÑA -0,1650 _cons 18,6480 19,9760 20,6607 (n) 696 730 730 Prob > F 0,0024 0,0008 0,0006 R2 0,0291 0,0312 0,032 Adj R2 0,0206 0,0231 0,024

GALICIA Dep: ¿Más impuestos?

Modelo 1 Modelo 2 Modelo 3 SEXO -2,1317 -2,0476 -1,9223 EDAD -0,1703 *** -0,1660 *** -0,1562 *** ESTUDIOS -0,0111 0,0497 0,0195 IDEOLOGIA -0,6049 -0,5930 -0,5383 PARADO -1,6099 -1,4546 -1,5316 IDENTIDAD NACIONAL

0,0057

IDENTIF, CCAA 0,0187 IDENTIF. ESPAÑA -0,2800 _cons 25,3932 24,5805 26,0484 (n) 699 716 715 Prob > F 0,0004 0,0004 0,0003 R2 0,0353 0,0337 0,0348 Adj R2 0,0269 0,0255 0,0266

Interregional Solidarity In all three regions, a large majority of citizens favours policies that re-distribute

wealth from poorer to richer areas: 95% of those living in Castile, 91% in Galicia and

71% in Catalonia “agree” or “strongly agree” with the statement:

Q28. Money should be transferred from the richer parts of Spain to the poorer parts to

ensure that everyone can have similar levels of public services.6

6 The Spanish questionnaire reads: “Debería transferirse dinero desde las zonas más ricas de España a las

más pobres para asegurar que todo el mundo pueda tener niveles similares de servicios públicos.”

19

A related statement, not referring to public services but just to redistribution (Question

27), attracts a similar level of support. 94% respondents in Castile-La Mancha, 90% in

Galicia and 74% in Catalonia “agree” or “strongly agree” with:

Q27. The Spanish government should step in to even out economic differences between

the different parts of Spain.7

The similarity of the answers to both questions seems to indicate the existence of a

consistent and cross-regional support to a certain degree of territorial redistribution

through the State. We have to point out that this support, though extensive in all three

regions, is higher in Castile and Galicia and lower in Catalonia.

Table 6. Agreement with direct statements about solidarity between different parts of the country

Money should be transferred from richer parts to poorer parts of Spain to ensure similar public services

Q28 Castilla La Mancha Cataluña Galicia

Muy de acuerdo 56.22 29.56 52.22

Bastante de acuerdo 35.00 37.78 33.89

Bastante en desacuerdo 3.78 20.56 5.89

Muy en desacuerdo 0.89 8.11 3.11

Ns/Nc 4.11 4.00 4.89

Total 900 900 900

7 The Spanish questionnaire reads: “El gobierno de España debería intervenir para reducir las diferencias

entre los distintos territorios de España.”

20

Government to even out economic differences between different parts of Spain Q27 Castilla La Mancha Cataluña Galicia

Muy de acuerdo 53.06 31.98 53.21

Bastante de acuerdo 40.92 41.83 36.94

Bastante en desacuerdo 4.39 17.38 6.65

Muy en desacuerdo 1.62 8.81 3.21

(n) 865 863 842

Cramer's V = 0.1973

gamma = 0.0269 ASE= 0.026

In order to measure to what extent national identification and regional solidarity

are associated, we have built ordinal logistic regression models with Q28 as dependent

variable, and several other as independents: sex, age, education, ideology (1-10),

unemployed vs. in work, and three different measures of national identification (Model

1: relative national identifications; Model 2: identification with CCAA; Model 3:

identification with Spain). We run different models for each region, which leaves us

with the nine regression models presented in Table 7.

The bi-polar scale on relative identifications yields a statistically significant

effect in Catalonia and Galicia: a mayor identidad regional en detrimento de la española

es menor el apoyo a transferir dinero desde las zonas más ricas a las más pobres de

España para que todos tengan unos servicios públicos similares. Este efecto es

especialmente pronunciado en Cataluña. En Castilla La Mancha la identidad nacional no

tiene efectos sobre el deseo de realizar dichas transferencias entre territorios.

Si sustituimos en el modelo las relative identifications por la intensidad de la

“identificación con la CCAA” podemos ver que esta variable sólo muestra efecto en

Cataluña, donde quienes más se identifican con Cataluña, más en contra están de las

transferencias entre CCAA.

Finalmente, si incluimos en los modelos la intensidad de la “identificación con

España”, encontramos que esta variable únicamente se asocia significativamente con la

solidaridad interregional en Cataluña y Galicia. En ambos casos, quienes más se

identifican con España son más favorables a reducir las diferencias entre territorios. La

relación es más fuerte en Cataluña que en Galicia, como viene siendo habitual en los

21

anteriores modelos de regresión. Con todo, no deja de ser llamativo que en una región

de inequívoca lealtad española como es Castilla-La Mancha ningún indicador de

identificación nacional tenga capacidad predictiva con respecto a la solidaridad

interterritorial.

Cabe señalar que en Castilla La Mancha dos variables correlacionan con la

solidaridad territorial: la edad y los estudios. En ambos casos la relación es positiva: a

mayor edad o más estudios, más apoyo a la solidaridad territorial. En Cataluña y Galicia

estas variables no arrojan efectos significativos.

It is also worth mentioning that left-right identification only predicts support for

this type of redistribution in one out of nine models. This is interesting as it suggests

that, for many people, the fact of not being supportive to solidarity between territories

does not prevent them to feel they are on the left – nor the other way around either.

Hence it seems that for them, generally, solidarity between different parts of the same

country does not belong to their understanding of the concepts left and right. This can

look surprising if considering that, during the last three decades at least, the mainstream

parties of the Spanish left and center-left have considered transfers from the most

economically developed areas of the country to the less developed ones to be part and

parcel of social justice.8 However, the explanation can also lie in the rhetoric of the

parties in the center-right and the right. While the Basque and, especially, the Catalan

center-right parties opposed the doctrine of evening out economic differences between

regions, the Spanish-wide conservatives tended to accept it to the extent that the

financial transfers were sent to regions governed by them, such as Galicia.9

8 In special, the Izquierda Unida (United Left) of Julio Anguita and the social-democratic party (PSOE) of

Felipe González.

9 However, the state-wide conservatives tended to criticize subsidies to the long-duration countryside

unemployed in Andalusia and Extremadura, both regions being ruled by the social-democrats.

22

Table 7. Money should be transferred from richer parts to poorer parts of Spain to ensure similar public services. Ordinal logit regression.

CASTILLA LA MANCHA. REGRESIONES ORDINALES. Modelo 1 Modelo 2 Modelo 3 SOLID. REGIONAL (P28) Coef. Coef. Coef.

SEXO -.2141533 -.1574812 -.1804644

EDAD -.0152937** -.0145375** -.0143178**

ESTUDIOS -.1365468* -.1207529* -.1169202*

IDEOLOGIA -.0375952 -.0432627 -.0448914

PARADO .2914976 .245187 .2394766

IDENTIDAD NAC. .0301109

IDENTIF. CCAA -.0048325

IDENTIF. ESPAÑA .0278383

Modelo 1 Modelo 2 Modelo 3

Number of obs. 723 744 745 LR chi2(6) 19.09 17.28 16.93 Prob > chi2 0.004 0.0083 0.0095 Pseudo R2 0.0158 0.0137 0.0134

CATALUÑA. REGRESIONES ORDINALES. Modelo 1 Modelo 2 Modelo 3 SOLID. REGIONAL Coef. Coef. Coef.

SEXO .0300877 -.0493185 .0174587

EDAD -.0109553* -.0131663*** -.0073842

ESTUDIOS .0430013 .1236082* .0526693

IDEOLOGIA .0141444 -.0698366* -.0153899

PARADO -.3271494 -.2876028 -.3671617

IDENTIDAD NAC. -.647615***

IDENTIF. CCAA .2402958***

IDENTIF. ESPAÑA -.1837277***

Modelo 1 Modelo 2 Modelo 3

Number of obs. 739 780 779 LR chi2(6) 101.37 73.20 84.47 Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Pseudo R2 0.0537 0.0368 0.0425

23

GALICIA. REGRESIONES ORDINALES.

Modelo 1 Modelo 2 Modelo 3 SOLID. REGIONAL Coef. Coef. Coef.

SEXO .2334918 .1877797 .243642

EDAD -.0075357 -.0084196 -.0059431

ESTUDIOS -.0119901 -.0052851 -.0097907

IDEOLOGIA -.0090536 -.0345877 -.0181022

PARADO .1275225 .0661187 .0613862

IDENTIDAD NAC. -.2031408*

IDENTIF. CCAA -.0489964

IDENTIF. ESPAÑA -.0891863**

Modelo 1 Modelo 2 Modelo 3

Number of obs. 726 745 743 LR chi2(6) 12.29 10.38 16.10 Prob > chi2 0.0557 0.1095 0.0132 Pseudo R2 0.0086 0.0071 0.0110 * P>Z < 0.05 ** p>Z < 0.005 *** P>Z < 0.005

Regresión lineal con INPUESTOSREST como dependiente

33b. (Si P33a <>0) Y de esta cantidad, ¿qué porcentajes le gustaría que se destinasen a personas necesitadas de su municipio, de Galicia, de España, de Europa y del resto del mundo? 33c. (Si P33a =0) Y de los impuestos que usted ya está pagando, ¿qué porcentajes le gustaría que se destinasen a personas necesitadas de su municipio, de Galicia, de España, de Europa y del resto del mundo?

In order to analyse the preferred area for allocating tax money we have build a

new variable named “Impuestosrest”. This variable indicates whether the interviewee

wants to see the tax money spent principally on his/her region, or in Spain at large. The

range of values of this variable goes from -100 (100% of taxes should be spent on the

interviewee’s region) to 100 (100% of taxes should be spent on Spain as a whole). A

value of 0 indicates that the interviewee wants 50% of tax money spent in his/her region

and the other 50% in Spain. As we can see in the following table, mean values for this

variable are negative for Catalonia and Galicia and positive for Castile-La Mancha.

This means that citizens of Castile-La Mancha tend to prefer a distribution of tax money

that benefit all Spanish territories, while citizens of Catalonia and Galicia prioritise their

own regions. DEPENDIENTE: IMPUESTOSREST = [(%Impuestos a España-%Impuestos a la CCAA)/( (%Impuestos a España+%Impuestos a la CCAA)]x100

24

Linear regression models with Q33b/c as dependent variable and the same

independent variables included in previous models (Table 8) confirm most of the

findings about inter-territorial solidarity. Intensity of Spanish identification remains

unable to predict this solidarity in Castile-La Mancha. In one model for support for

inter-territorial transfers in Catalonia, people identified with the right support inter-

regional transfers the most. These findings suggest two things. For one, if anything,

inter-territorial transfers seem to be a policy supported by the right rather than by the

left. Spanish national identification solely increases the probability of support for

solidarity across territories in regions in which it is challenged by rival national projects.

Comparación de medias. Distribución del dinero recaudado vía impuestos

Rango (virtual) de la variable: -100/100. -100 = el 100% de los impuestos recaudados en la CA deben gastarse en la CA; 100 = el 100% de los impuestos deben gastarse en el resto de España; 0 = 50% a la CA y 50% al resto de España.[i1]

CCAA Mean Std. Err. [95% Conf. Interval] Castilla La Mancha 2,15 1,26 -0,33 4,62 Cataluña -2,07 1,49 -2,36 -1,78 Galicia -1,45 1,30 -1,70 -1,19

25

Table 8. Difference in assistance to regional and statewide people’s in need. OLS regression.

CASTILLA LA MANCHA. REGR. LINEAL

Modelo 1 Modelo 2 Modelo 3

IMPUESTOSR~T Coef. Coef. Coef.

SEXO -2.542.036 -1.421.453 -2.862352

EDAD -.1663923 -.1595051 -.1720667*

ESTUDIOS .6992608 .4635496 1.059175

IDEOLOGIA 1.110066 1.3528* 1.270772*

PARADO -2.497401 -3.228474 -3.262957

IDENTIDAD .NAC 3.312978*

IDENTIF. CCAA -1.905714***

IDENTIF. ESPAÑA .3962822

_cons -5.513.301 1.755.294 1.644.672

Modelo 1 Modelo 2 Modelo 3

Number of obs 627 644 643

Prob > F = 0.0149 = 0.0003 = 0.0447

R-squared = 0.0251 = 0.0387 = 0.0200

Adj R-squared = 0.0156 = 0.0296 = 0.0108

CATALUÑA. REGR. LINEAL

Modelo 1 Modelo 2 Modelo 3

IMPUESTOSR~T Coef. Coef. Coef.

SEXO -.646032 .0900252 -.7585033

EDAD -.1169243 .0028474 -.1562014

ESTUDIOS -1.87126 -3.652.992*** -1.53063

IDEOLOGIA .7257474 2.469.557*** .8061398

PARADO 1.61319 1.649.642 1.060912

IDENTIDAD NAC. 16.8641***

IDENTIF. CCAA -5.31072***

IDENTIF. ESPAÑA 5.778.053***

_cons -54.66699 24.10772 -44.4796

Modelo 1 Modelo 2 Modelo 3

Number of obs 661 693 693

Prob > F = 0.0000 = 0.0000 = 0.0000

R-squared = 0.1894 = 0.1040 = 0.1871

Adj R-squared = 0.1820 = 0.0962 = 0.1800

26

GALICIA. REGR. LINEAL

Modelo 1 Modelo 2 Modelo 3

IMPUESTOSR~T Coef. Coef. Coef.

SEXO -3.123567 -2.114.833 -2.406.194

EDAD .0250856 .1464995 .0366581

ESTUDIOS .5202302 .2900946 .4834794

IDEOLOGIA .2450658 .8101761 .4112595

PARADO -1.222239 -1.163.807 -.8867832

IDENTIDAD NAC. 8.227.056***

IDENTIF. CCAA -3.273301***

INDENTIF. ESP 1.216911*

_cons -36.2465 5.382.293 -24.24533 Modelo 1 Modelo 2 Modelo 3

Number of obs 632 651 649

Prob > F = 0.0005 = 0.0002 = 0.3190

R-squared = 0.0374 = 0.0406 = 0.0108

Adj R-squared = 0.0282 = 0.0317 = 0.0016* P>Z < 0.05 ** p>Z < 0.005 *** P>Z < 0.005

Discussion and conclusions

Many hopes have been pinned on national identification since the 19th century,

not only by ordinary citizens but also by political elites who have suffused their

discourse with ubiquitous invocations to national feelings. More recently, during the

last decade and a half, a number of political theorists have advanced a sophisticated and

attractive combination of nationalism and liberalism. One of their most appealing

arguments is the suggestion that national identification – as a product of nationalism –

helps secure or regain citizens’ solidarity inclinations – in particular, their support for

redistribution policies and the welfare state. Since this claim is widely extended but

seldom proved, this study has tested empirically it as a falsifiable scientific hypothesis.

Previous research showed that it was untenable for British national identity. The

current piece of research shows that is also untenable for Spanish national identity, for

Catalan national identity and for Galician national identity. In Castile-La Mancha,

Galicia and Catalonia alike a large majority of citizens favour policies that re-distribute

wealth from poorer to richer areas. Yet as a matter of fact, Spanish national

identification only has a significant positive impact on support for territorial transfers in

27

regions in which rival nationalist projects are on extant – namely, Catalonia and Galicia.

In turn, Catalan and Galician national identifications only predict reluctance to

solidarity between richer and poorer territories and a preference for supporting their

local people in need rather than people in need in Spain at large. Interestingly enough,

this is so in spite of Galicia qualifying as a poor region vis-à-vis the Spanish average.

Furthermore, Catalan and Galician nationalists tend to see themselves as leaning

to the left rather than to the right, while the opposite holds for Spanish nationalists.

This lends credence to the view that Spanish nationalism remains associated to

conservative and traditional political values, parties and political leadership more than

thirty years after the end of Franco’s regime and its Spanish nationalist rhetoric and

paraphernalia. However, when respondents are asked about their inclination to increase

their taxes in order to aid people in need, the expectation of redistributive generosity of

people who feel stronger their national identity becomes doubtful. Ideological

identification, together with class and age, is the variable that best predicts solidarity

toward people in need. Conversely, measured through different indicators and referring

to the different “nations”, national identifications turn out to be either irrelevant or even

counterproductive. Therefore, as it came up in the case of British nationalism, the

theory does not hold for Spanish national identification. In addition, it is dubious for

Catalan and Galician minority nationalisms. If we are to found the sources of solidarity,

including support for re-distributive policies, social research should rather look

elsewhere – the most plausible candidates being the values of universalism and human

equality.

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