NGOs and UN peacekeeping operations: Strange bedfellows

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NGOs and UN peacekeepingoperations: StrangebedfellowsFrancis Kofi Abiew a & Tom Keating aa Members of the Political ScienceDepartment , University of Alberta , EdmontonPublished online: 08 Nov 2007.

To cite this article: Francis Kofi Abiew & Tom Keating (1999) NGOs and UNpeacekeeping operations: Strange bedfellows, International Peacekeeping, 6:2,89-111, DOI: 10.1080/13533319908413773

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SOLDIERS AND CIVILIANS

NGOs and UN Peacekeeping Operations:Strange Bedfellows

FRANCIS KOFI ABIEW AND TOM KEATING

This article examines the increased interaction between international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and UN peacekeeping operations in complexemergencies and civil conflicts. The involvement of NGOs in civil conflicts and theincreased delegation of service delivery from states and institutions to NGOs hasbecome a prevalent aspect of peacekeeping and peacebuilding exercise in the 1990s.The article reviews a number of the reasons for this development and argues that theincreased involvement of NGOs in conflict situations has not always facilitated theresolution of conflicts or the implementation of UN mandates. The authors argue thatNGOs will need to reassess their practices if they are to play a constructive role in UNoperations in the future.

Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have emerged to play anincreasingly significant role alongside multilateral peacekeeping operationssince the end of the Cold War. At the same time, multinational peacekeepingactivities by international and regional organizations have moved into areaspreviously limited to non-governmental development agencies. Theincreasingly muddied waters of peacekeeping and peacebuilding in the1990s make it necessary to reflect critically on the evolving relationshipbetween NGOs and these multilateral operations. The activities of NGOs,particularly those involved in development, humanitarian relief and humanrights, now cut across all phases of the peacekeeping process fromadvocates and advisers to governments and international organizations; toclose contact in field operations; to unintentional but very real sources ofconflict in contested settings. NGOs have become significant players in allaspects of the so-called second-generation peacekeeping exercises fromearly warning to peacebuilding operations.1

Francis Kofi Abiew and Tom Keating are members of the Political Science Department,University of Alberta, Edmonton.

International Peacekeeping, Vol.6, No.2, Summer 1999, pp.89-111PUBLISHED BY FRANK CASS, LONDON

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90 INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING

This article provides a critical reflection on the relationship betweenNGOs and UN peacekeeping operations. It examines three particularaspects of these interactions. First, it reviews the nature and scope of NGOinvolvement in multilateral operations during the past decade. The primaryobjective here is to identify the range of activities that have been pursued bythese NGOs and the factors which have influenced their interaction withpeacekeeping operations. Second, it examines the rise and subsequentdecline of multilateral peacekeeping operations in the 1990s and the effectsof this record on the relationship between NGOs and second-generationpeacekeeping operations. Third, the article critically assesses therelationship of NGOs with these operations. The objective in this section isto raise a series of questions about NGO involvement in peacekeepingoperations including those involving the capacity, effectiveness, legitimacyand accountability of NGOs.

'NGOs' are a wide variety of associations involved in an equally widevariety of social, political and economic activities. Even within the morelimited area of humanitarian relief there is a considerable range oforganizations reflecting very different goals: membership; funding sources;size; political, cultural and ethnic affiliation; and operational practices. Ataxonomy of NGOs might also distinguish these organizations according totheir relationship with local, national and international groups. It isimportant, for example, to differentiate between local non-governmentalorganizations (LNGOs), international non-governmental organizations(INGOs) and to distinguish state-sponsored or government-created non-governmental organizations from more autonomous ones. Existing researchdemonstrates that different types of NGOs are influenced by different setsof interests and concerns that in turn shape the mandates and operations ofthe organization.2 It is, however, beyond the scope of this article to developa taxonomy of NGOs. Instead this study's reference to and use of NGOs, isbased primarily on the activities of INGOs operating in the area ofhumanitarian relief. While we will revert to using the more generic termNGOs, the reader should be aware of these distinctions among various typesof NGOs and the fact that different types of NGOs behave differently.

The number of NGOs has grown over the last 40 years from 832 in 1951to 16,208 by 1990. It is estimated that some 400-500 international NGOsare currently involved in humanitarian activities worldwide, and that NGOscollectively spend an estimated US$9-10 billion annually, reaching some250 million people living in poverty.3 The range of NGOs, as suggestedearlier, varies from large international NGOs whose budgets rival those ofgovernments and multinational corporations and whose operations span theglobe, to small autonomous local organizations operating in a singlecountry. The size and range of activities of the larger NGOs leave them well

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NGOs AND UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS 91

placed to be significant institutional players in developing countries andthose experiencing complex emergencies. These NGOs have the potential tocircumvent or erode the political, economic and civil structures of thesesocieties and could, through their activities, alter the balance of domesticforces in situations of political and social conflict.

Among the many international NGOs operating in the area ofhumanitarian relief, eight are responsible for more than 50 per cent of reliefdollars. They are: CARE, World Vision International, Oxfam, Médecinssans Frontières, Save the Children Federation, Eurostep, CIDSE(Cooperation Internationale pour le Développement et la Solidarité), andAPDOVE (Association of Protestant Development Organizations inEurope). The remainder of the funding is distributed among hundreds ofothers, including many local NGOs. Among the international NGOs, theICRC has an annual budget of about one billion dollars, about 27 per centof which is devoted to humanitarian relief operations.4 CARE-US A's annualbudget is over US$364 million, while that of World Vision is over US$140million. The 160 NGOs comprising Inter Action (a coalition of NGOs basedin the US), for instance, have combined annual revenues of US$2.3 billion.5

NGOs have on occasion overshadowed major UN agencies inpeacebuilding activities. World Vision International, for instance, spent overUS$180 million in Mozambique between 1993 and 1994, while the totalfive-year budget of UNDP is expected to be about US$60 million. Onaverage it has been estimated that international NGOs account for about 13per cent of all development assistance. This amount is larger than that beingtransferred through the UN system, excluding the Washington-basedinternational financial institutions. In 1996, the UNHCR expressedconcerns that the increased flow of funds to national NGOs and theproliferation of NGOs in the field to the neglect of international institutionswas undermining 'systems of cooperation and coordination in large-scaleemergencies'. There is a considerable body of evidence to suggest thatNGOs are increasingly active as a result of the absence of local authorities,the disinterest and fatigue of donor governments, and the limited capacityof international institutions.6 Indeed during the 1990s, NGOs have emergedto challenge the prominence and, potentially, the influence of states andinternational institutions in humanitarian interventions.

Nature and Scope of NGO Involvement in Second-generationPeacekeeping

International NGOs are becoming central agents in the internationalresponse to civil conflicts in places such as Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda andZaire, among others and have increasingly been required or called upon to

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perform their humanitarian tasks alongside UN peacekeeping units. Forsome this demonstrates 'the militarization of the international reliefsystem', as peacekeepers represent 'the arrival of a major new player intoday's humanitarian operations - a large new kid on the block.7 It can,however, also be read as an expansion in the mandates and activities ofhumanitarian NGOs. At the very least, the development of armedhumanitarianism, is a reflection of the changed character of conflict inglobal politics and the international community's response to this conflict.The increased presence of international NGOs in these conflict situations inrecent years is partly a reflection of the relative growth in the resources thatthey command and the growing relevance of their activities in these civilconflicts. The expansion in resources has been fostered by two convergingdevelopments. One has been the increased proportion of donor governmentfunding for development assistance that has been channelled throughNGOs. Over the past two decades there has been a fivefold increase in theamount of official development assistance delivered through NGOs and amarked decline in the amount delivered through recipient governments. Inthe past few years NGOs have also increasingly been favoured overmultilateral institutions.8 These multilaterals have also increasingly turnedto NGOs to deliver their assistance programmes. A second development hasbeen the increased amount of development assistance funds directed tohumanitarian relief operations. Not surprisingly, in the light of these fundingdevelopments, there has been a proliferation of NGOs in the area ofinternational development and humanitarian relief. Among other things, thisproliferation has generated considerable rivalry among NGOs for limiteddonor support. The rivalry has become even more intense, since theproliferation of agencies has coincided with an overall decline in thedevelopment assistance budget in most northern states.

International NGOs have performed a variety of tasks in the civilconflicts that have been the site of multilateral peacekeeping operations.They have been engaged in these complex emergency situations deliveringhumanitarian aid such as food, medicine, and temporary shelter to victimsof war or the famines brought on by war. In Afghanistan, where theUNHCR, the governments of Pakistan, and the USA could not handle the3.5 million Afghan refugees, NGOs filled the void in providinghumanitarian assistance. At the height of the Rwandan emergency, anunprecedented number of NGOs responded to the refugee influx with morethan 100 groups operating in Goma and North Kivu, and another 169, insideRwanda during late 1994.9 Many NGOs have also been drawn to varioustrouble spots around the world including: Somalia, Sudan, Ethiopia, theformer Yugoslavia, Haiti, Cambodia, Tajikistan and Chechnya, and haveoften assumed a prominent role in humanitarian operations in these

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countries. Their presence has been motivated by various concerns includingthe personal and collective commitment of their membership, but otherinterests are also often involved. The rush of NGOs to emergency situationshas been influenced as well by their pursuit of personal and organizationalinterests such as prestige and funding. Competition among NGOs hasencouraged involvement in these high-profile conflicts. This was perhapsbest demonstrated by the number of organizations that flocked to EasternZaire after the Rwanda genocide of 1994.10 International NGOs alsorespond, however, in the absence of, or at the behest of, governments andinstitutions that lack the interests, will, or capacity to get involved. AsBaitenmann has noted in examining the Afghan conflict, the NGOs can bean effective means whereby governments attempt to influence the politicaldirection of a conflict without direct involvement." While this could be readas an explicit policy to offload responsibility from governments to privateagencies, the involvement of NGOs more often bespeaks less a policyoption, than the lack of a policy on the part of governments.

Alternatively, in some instances the conflicts have enveloped the NGOs,infecting areas in which they have been actively engaged in developmentwork. By their nature and mandate, many humanitarian NGOs have acommitment to long-term projects in support of economic and socialdevelopment. This includes working in situations and societies where thesecivil conflicts have occurred. As a result, NGOs are often inside the countryor nearby and among the first outsiders in these conflict situations and inplace to respond. Alternatively, because of the nature of their organizations,they are often able to react more quickly and get personnel to the emergencyarea more efficiently than the UN or other international institutions. Tobegin with, they have shown a greater disregard for sovereignty that oftenencumbers international and regional institutions. In that regard, NGOshave sometimes been able to identify the status of conflicts or provide earlywarning indicators and make their reports available to governments, theUN, and the western news media. In other instances they flood in quicklywhen the first indications of a humanitarian emergency are felt. To useEliasson's metaphor, 'such activity among NGOs moves the internationalcommunity from merely extinguishing fires to finding the arsonist beforethe fire breaks out and to identify the conditions that lead to arson'.12 Inacting in this way and setting the agenda for governments and institutions,NGOs are also able to marshal public support for an international responseas they seek to raise funds for their own operations.

In their ongoing development work, it has been argued, NGOs have alsoperformed important peacebuilding tasks. They have taken on the challengeof post-conflict reconstruction by engaging in activities relating toeconomic and social development in a manner intended to contribute to a

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more lasting peace. They provide services such as building organizationalstructures for development projects in rural areas and supporting some ofthe social and economic infrastructure that encourages local individuals andgroups to be more active,13 thus providing a linkage between short-term aidwork and longer term political and economic development priorities. Somehave challenged the effectiveness of such efforts, but it is this type of workthat places NGOs in situations where UN peacekeeping operations are, willbe, or have recently been active.14

It has been suggested that NGOs also possess certain comparativeadvantages in terms of their capacities. These have included their ability toreach the poorest and to get to remote areas; a capacity to promote localparticipation and to implement programmes in direct collaboration withtarget beneficiary groups; a capacity to operate on low costs; a capacity tostrengthen local institutions, and the empowerment of marginal groups.15

Added to these qualities, observers have noted that NGOs have been moreflexible and pragmatic, provide a people-to-people approach, are lesspartial, and operate, to some extent on rules of neutrality in their delivery ofservices in conflict situations. As Griffiths, Levine and Weiler note:

The great strengths of NGOs - flexibility, speed of reaction,comparative lack of bureaucracy, operational and implementationcapacity, commitment and dedication of the usually young staff - areparticular advantages in emergency work. In addition, the politicalindependence of the NGOs, not bound by the rules of the UN Charter,gives them a strong comparative advantage in increasingly complexinternal conflicts.16

Another factor encouraging NGO involvement in peacekeepingoperations is the fact that governments or warring factions are more likelyto welcome their input than other institutional actors, and for a good reason.Eliasson makes an important point when he states that: 'particularly indifficult internal situations, governments are often unwilling to acceptintergovernmental involvement, be it by the United Nations, regionalorganizations, or other states, because of the legitimacy it may seem tobestow on insurgents or opposition groups. NGOs...may instead haveunique possibilities to gain access and try to diffuse conflict.'17 It could,however, also be argued that parties to the conflict are able to use NGOs fortheir own political purposes more effectively than other institutions andforeign governments and thus prefer their involvement because they aremore manipulable.

Finally, as the Final Report of the Carnegie Commission on PreventingDeadly Conflict acknowledges, lack of mechanisms in place forgovernments or the decision-making bodies of regional organizations to

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acquire systematic information that NGOs possess from years ofinvolvement in conflict situations make their role in that regard crucial.18

Thus, encouraging information sharing and exchange between NGOs andother institutional actors was emphasized by the UN Secretary-General inhis report on UN reform, recognizing the importance of NGO contributionsto UN operations.19 There is considerable evidence, especially from eventsin the Great Lakes region of Africa in the 1990s, that NGOs wereparticularly influential in providing information and analysis to the UN andto state actors. Alex de Waal has even argued that NGOs were generallytreated as a more reliable and presumably credible source of informationabout developments in Somalia than UN Special Representative MohamedSahnoun.20

On balance then the international NGOs by virtue of their presence inthe field and the type of activities they performed have been seen as veryrelevant players in complex emergencies. For their part, the NGOs haveviewed complex emergencies as an opportunity both to respond to apressing need and to expand their profile and influence in the politics andeconomics of development and humanitarian relief. Operating in thesehostile situations, however, has increased the risks to NGO workers, in part,because of the general level of violence in their surroundings and becauseof the increased politicization of their work. In these situations the NGOshave looked to UN peacekeepers to provide them with protection as theyattempt to go about their business of delivering assistance to the population.

The Rise and Decline of Multilateral Operations and the Effects onNGOs

As suggested above, the increased prominence of NGOs in peacekeepingoperations has occurred in the wider context of the changing securitypractices that have transformed post-Cold War international politics and theactivities of states and the United Nations in response. Three interrelateddevelopments are particularly worthy of note. First, and perhaps foremost,has been the increased prevalence of civil conflict. The end of the Cold Warencouraged a realignment of domestic political coalitions in manycountries; realignments that had been constrained by the outside pressuresof the East-West rivalry. Freed from such constraints political coalitions ina number of countries have sought to wrestle power from establishedauthorities. Second, has been the growing interest in and concern for humanor individual security as opposed to the more traditional notions of nationalsecurity. The proliferation of civil conflict has placed civilians on the frontline of most of today's battlefields. It has also meant that the primary threatsto regional peace and security lie within national 'sovereign' borders. In

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response the international community has confronted the longstandingcontradictions between state sovereignty and its corollary non-interventionamidst demands for humanitarian intervention and pressure to protectcivilians and those who would assist them. The increased interest in, andsupport for, humanitarian interventions corresponded with a thirddevelopment, that being an historic opportunity to use the United Nations toundertake these new security initiatives. The end of the Cold War and astrong consensus among the permanent members of the Security Councilenabled the UN to move into the largely unchartered terrain of civil conflictand humanitarian intervention.

The change in attitudes in the early 1990s among members of theSecurity Council in addressing issues pertaining to international peace andsecurity encouraged former Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali topromote a more active and interventionist role for the UN in conflictmanagement. The euphoria generated in the aftermath of the Gulf War sawthe Council taking on issues dealing with internal conflicts as well as inter-state wars including 'non-military sources of instability in the economic,social, humanitarian and ecological fields'.21 Consequently, with theincrease in the number and ferocity of civil wars and the search for a moreexpansive role for the UN, the number of peacekeeping operationsincreased dramatically around the world. The result was not merely anincrease in the number of UN and regional peacekeeping operations, but afundamental change in the character of these operations. Instead of thetraditional, Cold War era style of UN peacekeeping in which neutral forceswere interpositioned between two conflicting parties (states) that hadalready agreed on a ceasefire, the UN took on more complex andinterventionist tasks which included more complicated civilian andhumanitarian junctions, often conducted in the absence of a stable ceasefire.Such tasks ranged from election-monitoring, human rights observation,training of civilian populations in areas such as public administration,policing and justice, and a variety of socio-economic developmentactivities. The changes took peacekeeping in two contradictory directions -peace enforcement and peacebuilding. The number and complexity of theseoperations placed further strains on the already overstretched organizationin the face of declining levels of bilateral and multilateral aid. Many of thesenewly acquired responsibilities also involved activities that required skillsbetter suited to civilians than to militaries and encouraged somegovernments (such as Norway and Canada) to explore and develop policiesin support of civilian peacekeepers. These new tasks also encouraged theorganization and its member governments to look for new partners in orderto carry out these more complex and multifaceted Security Councilmandates. Regional organizations were favoured by some in the UN, but

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most of these also had limited resources and faced constraints quite similarto those confronting the UN.

It is in this context that NGOs became especially useful, as a result oftheir capacity to perform the type of additional tasks demanded by what theUN Department of Peace-keeping Operations has characterized asmultidisciplinary peacekeeping.22 Some NGOs in that regard have thusfunctioned as implementing agents for the UN and donor governments,carrying out, most often informally or by default, UN mandates. From theperspective of the UN, NGOs provided them with the sort of expertiserequired. Moreover, NGOs are often more directly involved in addressingthe issues that lie at the source of the conflict and are thus viewed as beingable to contribute effectively to a resolution of the conflict. Perhaps, mostimportantly NGOs have not been burdened with sovereignty considerationsthat have often impeded more effective international responses. NGOsprovided a means for overcoming the conflicting principles of humanitarianintervention and state sovereignty as these entities, in most instances, haveeither already gained access or find it easier to gain access to these civilconflicts. As sovereignty-free actors, NGOs provide the internationalcommunity with both a window from which they can observe and monitordevelopments in these zones of conflict and a door through which assistancecan be delivered to the victims of these conflicts.

A second development has been the more explicit linkages betweenlevels of economic and political development and civil conflict. Theproliferation of civil conflicts in impoverished parts of the globe - Haiti,Somalia, Sudan, Afghanistan - has clearly demonstrated theinterconnections between poverty, underdevelopment and conflict. It hasalso moved development workers to centre stage in many conflicts. Thus,even without formal partnerships this second-generation peacekeepingincreasingly brought UN operations into more direct contact withestablished NGOs that were active in the arenas of social and economicdevelopment and emergency relief. The linkages between economic andsocial development and civil conflict frequently also brought humanitarianand development NGOs to the front line of civil wars. The intensecompetition for political power also made it increasingly difficult for theseNGOs to retain neutrality as they sought to provide relief to civilianpopulations. Not only have they been at risk as a result of ongoing fighting,but they have also been more directly implicated as abettors to one side orthe other, at best, or at worse parties to the conflict.

A third noteworthy development has been the declining interest of thegreat powers in direct intervention. They too have been freed from thepressures of the Cold War and with some notable exceptions, have soughtrelief by refraining from the sort of assertive unilateralism that marked the

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Cold War years. Instead Western powers initially argued for a moreassertive multilateralism in which powers were to be invested in the UnitedNations and regional institutions in what in retrospect can be seen as a half-hearted attempt to secure a measure of international peace and stability.More recently these states have resorted to a more restricted and isolationistview of security and have turned away from conflicts in other regions,especially Africa.

This expanded role for NGOs has occurred at a time when governmentsin the West have substantially withdrawn from direct involvement indevelopment assistance and in the midst of declining developmentassistance budgets have invested in NGOs as the primary service deliverersin the area of development. This 'privatization' of development assistanceis reflected in the tendency on the part of donor governments to place agreater reliance on NGOs to deliver development programmes.23 Theprivatization of development assistance has, in part, been encouraged by therepeated failures of past efforts and the more pervasive anti-statist ideologythat has been prominent throughout the West since the days of Reagan andThatcher. This in turn has been supported by the NGO community itselfwhich has argued persistently that it and other civil society actors are moreeffective than governments in delivering assistance to people in need. Thusmuch of the proliferation of NGO activity has come at the expense of bothstate and international institutions. The convergence between nationalgovernments' interest in downloading responsibility for development toNGOs and the linkages between economic and social development andconflict has enhanced even further the important role that NGOs now playin international security debates and related peacekeeping andpeacebuilding operations.

The NGOs, for their part must also reconcile themselves to dealing withan ever more complex set of issues as their practices become an integral partof civil conflicts in many areas.24 While NGOs have their own interests inbeing there and extending their mandates and activities into these emergingsecurity arenas, in doing this they also serve the interests of states andinstitutions such as the UN.

Some would argue that relief development workers have become defacto advance men and women in conflicts where states have no realpolitical intent or practical means to guarantee their safety - let alone,achieve peace. Others allege that the political and humanitariandimensions of complex emergencies are poorly understood, and thatlack of coherent situation assessment, priority-setting, and fieldoperations on the part of the international community not onlylengthens the agony of people living in countries in crisis, but puts at

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risk those trying to help them.25

Reiff has also raised the spectre of such actions becoming part of theproblem rather than the solution and doing so at the behest of nationalgovernments:

The ardour with which governments in the West have embraced theidea of humanitarian aid, even as they have cut almost every otherform of development aid, should give one pause. For it may be in theattention-grabbing, media-enthralling luster of its real heroism and itsapparent success that, paradoxically, contemporary humanitarianismmay be providing the great powers with the excuse that they need toturn their backs on a world in which chaos increasingly reigns and inwhich hundreds of millions of people have become superfluous to theglobal economy; in effect these people have been excommunicated.26

While it would be absurd to suggest that humanitarian NGOs havepositioned themselves to be the agents by which the West disentangles itselffrom the rest of the world, it is perhaps not so absurd to argue that they mayunwittingly facilitate such an endgame.

In Bosnia, Somalia, and Rwanda international NGOs became more thanco-providers or helpful assistants, they became the rationale for UNintervention in the first place. As de Waal and Maren have demonstrated inthe case of Somalia, it was the international NGOs who led the cry foroutside intervention. In the words of Philip Johnston, President of CARE-USA, 'we have to fight the Somalis themselves' to deliver food aid to themasses.27 UN 'peacekeeping' forces were needed to enforce the delivery ofhumanitarian relief and to protect NGO workers from the Somalis. For deWaal 'this indicated that the formal focus of the (UN's) effort was on therelief agencies and not the subjects of their concern'.28 In the perversecontext of Somalia in the early 1990s, UN peacekeepers protected foreignNGO workers from the political authorities who were among the most likelysource of longer term political stability in the country. A few years later asimilar situation recurred in Rwanda.

It would seem that the UN and its member governments have retreatedfrom the more interventionist practices of the early 1990s. Events inSomalia, Rwanda, Bosnia, and to a lesser extent Haiti, questioned the abilityand willingness of the international community to offer an effective andsustained response to civil conflict. The persisting problems in these andother societies called into question the post-Cold War practice where stateshave downloaded responsibility to international and regional institutionswithout providing these institutions with the necessary capacity to act.Many observers, including members of the NGO community, have

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criticized the failure of multilateral peacekeeping operations, arguing that'military intervention is no panacea' and that such interventions 'too easilybecome part of the problem',29 while others view armed peacekeepers asnecessary to protect humanitarian relief workers. The problems encounteredin these multilateral operations have also raised concerns about theeffectiveness and responsibility of the international NGOs involved.Reports from Somalia, Rwanda and Sudan, among others, have noted thatNGOs have too often been motivated by self-interest and have oftenexacerbated difficult situations rather than making an effective contributionto their resolution.30 That both the UN and the NGOs have emerged fromthese conflicts with sizeable scars is not surprising. The considerableproblems experienced by the multidimensional peacekeeping operations inBosnia, Somalia and elsewhere suggest the need for a reappraisal of theinterventionist practices of both the UN and international NGOs.

Assessing the Role of NGOs in Peacekeeping Operations

The brief but intense experiences where UN peacekeepers have shared thefield with a variety of other interventionists from the NGO community havebeen subjected to a considerable amount of commentary.31 Much of thiscommentary has focused on the problems which confront the UN and NGOsin such settings, given differences in mandates/interests, personnel,authority structures, resources, and has generated additional problems ofmanagement, service delivery and coordination. The number and variety ofagencies involved in response to civil conflicts in recent years has grownsubstantially. Lines of coordination and responsibility in such situations areoften blurred and accountability becomes a difficult practice to implement.

In Bosnia, nine agencies and departments of the US government arecooperating with more than a dozen other governments, seveninternational organizations, and 13 major NGOs - from the Red Crossto the International Crisis Group to the American Bar Association - toimplement the Dayton Peace Accords.32

The heady days of the early 1990s have now passed and more soberassessments of the UN's peacekeeping role dominate discussions ofcontemporary security issues. Yet the problems which confronted the worldin the early 1990s are still very much evident and the need for an effectiveresponse is as important as ever. Civil conflicts still proliferate in manyareas of the world and the need for, if not the support of, effectiveinterventions is clearly evident. For some governments and observerspeacekeeping has or should yield to peacebuilding and with this a moredirect and sustained role for civilians and for NGOs. It is readily apparent

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that the UN will scarcely be able to avoid interacting with NGOs as it seeksto play a constructive role in ameliorating civil conflicts. These civilconflicts have justifiably raised concerns about their victims and about theappropriateness of traditional means of security provision:

under those conditions, a stronger link must evolve between theUnited Nations, the Security Council and organizations like OXFAM- who are on the ground, doing humanitarian work, who are touchingthose societies, looking into the eyes of the people in danger, learningwho they are and what is going on and who the factions are and whatrelations people have with their leaders — much of which never gets tothe table of the Security Council.33

Donor governments and international institutions have increasinglychannelled resources through NGOs and delegated tasks to them becausethey are perceived as more reliable than some recipient governmentagencies and better able to deliver aid where needed without having to gothrough official recognition of rebel groups implied by direct governmentinvolvement.34 Additionally, NGOs are able to grapple with problems inways that other institutional actors cannot. They are capable of providing aprompt response in emergency situations, and are valued as providingproblem-solving skills in situations where the use of military force worsensrather than reduces the deleterious effects of localized and regionalconflicts.35 They also have access to information often unavailable to theUN and other regional organizations. The International Committee of theRed Cross , for example, meets regularly with representatives from theSecurity Council, and a collection of NGOs have regular consultations withthe Department of Humanitarian Affairs to discuss responses to complexemergencies.

The UN's interest in expanding contacts with NGOs also extends toother areas and can be viewed both as a recognition of the growinginfluence of such groups and the pressing needs for greater democratizationin its practices. Yet as Somavia has noted:

The pressing need for new partnerships between states, institutionsand NGOs, and enthusiasm on the part of different players andobservers for such partnerships has perhaps obscured a more troublingfeature of these developments. The mix of actors involved in theseconflicts creates a situation where responsibility for deliveringsecurity is at best blurred, but too often delegated to others - by statesto organizations, by organizations to NGOs, by NGOs to theirvolunteers, and by the volunteers to the victims à la self-help. Thechallenge is to develop a series of interlocking legal and logistical

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safeguards - shored up by the political will of countries to enforcethem, and operationalized through a coherent UN system thatfunctions in tandem with regional, national, and local institutions.36

It is evident that NGOs have not been immune to these sorts of concerns.Since the mid-1970s efforts have been made to coordinate the activities ofNGOs working in the area of humanitarian relief. One example of suchefforts is the SPHERE project. Initiated in 1997 by a coalition of frontlinehumanitarian agencies including the International Federation of Red Crossand Red Crescent Societies, Caritas Internationalis, the World Council ofChurches, Oxfam, Save the Children, Médecins sans Frontières, and CAREInternational, the project is designed to coordinate activities in the disasterrelief field and to develop common policies and strategies for theseagencies. Among the more specific objectives of the project is thedevelopment of a code of conduct for relief agencies in an effort to makethem more accountable. Such efforts on the part of NGOs to examine theiractivities more critically and systematically are promising, but they do notcompletely overcome the problems generated by competition for decliningpublic and private funds and which emerge from the complex politicalenvironments in which these groups operate.37

Another viewpoint suggests that NGOs are somewhat more effective inidentifying the needs of the local population and thus serve to moderate theeffects of outside interventionists in complex emergencies. Some havequestioned this assumption.

Whereas INGOs are usually present in the field during UNPKOs, theyare usually not in a position to facilitate the relationship between UNmissions and local organizations. Moreover, in El Salvador and Haiti,for instance, whereas several members of human rights components ofUN missions were coming from international NGOs, this did not helpto improve relations. Local NGOs denounce identically the'collusion' between international NGOs and the UN.38

As noted earlier, NGO operations sometimes cause unintendedconsequences which might have been avoided. Observers have noted thatNGO operations and humanitarian aid in civil wars may prolong the war,even as it saves lives.39 Anderson, for instance, asserts that although NGOs'do not generate conflicts, they sometimes contribute to and reinforceviolent conflicts pre-existing in societies where they work'.40 Certain NGOshave also reflected on their own role in civil conflicts and have debated thepros and cons of remaining involved in situations where their activitiesseem likely to promote more hardship. Directly or indirectly, commentatorshave maintained that the negative consequences of relief assistance include:

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freeing up local relief resources for continuation of war; diversion of aid towarring factions, and thus supporting and financing their activities;escalating violence by attracting raiding; creating false economies orforeign exchange sources which are fought over; dominating employment,rents, contracts, transport, currency exchange; facilitating the isolation ordisplacement of particular populations; and conferring unrepresentativelegitimacy on warlords and leaders of particular factions prosecuting thewar.41 Examples of these phenomena are not difficult to find. The provisionof relief to Rwandan refugees in Goma, for instance, drives home the point.In providing assistance to the camps controlled mainly by the Hutu militia,NGOs aided the military objectives of the militia. Anderson cites theexample of a road constructed into a remote area in Ethiopia for purposes ofdelivering humanitarian assistance which, subsequently, allowed militaryvehicles to reach these parts for purposes of recruiting young men into thegovernment army.42 In Somalia, as Prendergast writes:

UN military intervention and many NGOs helped refuel andunderwrite an extortionist, militarized political economy in manySomali towns. Much of the benefit was captured by General Aidid andhis allied militia in Mogadishu South. The intervention greatlyexacerbated the conflict, as competing militia positioned themselvesfor the potential spoils of a resurrected aid-dependent state.43

Humanitarian assistance has also had an effect on the course of the war inthe Sudan. Again, Prendergast maintains 'aid has become directly integratedinto the dynamics of conflict through the negotiated access agreements ofOperation Lifeline Sudan and the Sudan Emergency OperationsConsortium'.44 These examples demonstrate the pressing need for NGOs,UN peacekeepers and the various UN agencies to develop a more refinedstrategy for dealing with emergencies in the midst of civil conflicts. Theeffective management of relief resources must be contingent upon ananalysis of existing structures and the capacity of the various actors inmanaging relief in a way that ensures resources are distributed on the basisof need while military actors and activities receive no support.45

The local context must be taken into account in decision makingregarding where, when, and how, to engage in humanitarian assistance. AsPrendergast contends, 'any form of aid that ignores local context ispotentially destabilizing; that which takes it fully into account can helpresolve local conflicts and ease local resource pressures and competition'.46

At a symposium organized by the United States Institute of Peace at therequest of several concerned NGOs, participants identified eight steps thatcould be taken to minimize the negative impact of humanitarian aid. Theseincluded: improving planning; assessing need more accurately; analysing

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the consequences of agreements negotiated to gain access to needypopulations and obtaining security for NGO personnel; providing assistancethat will have the longest term benefit to particular targeted groups;contracting for independent monitoring and evaluation of aid programmesto reduce management and the diversion of supplies; making theempowerment of local institutions a high priority; coordinating closely withother assistance organizations operating in particular crisis situations; anddeploying human rights monitors to help protect local populations fromexploitation and repression by the warring factions.47

Another issue affecting NGO participation in peacekeeping operations isthe claim that NGOs are non-political actors48 and have the particularadvantage of being able to rise above the narrow national interests of statesand UN agencies (whose basic function is to support the governments ofmember states) in fulfilling their humanitarian aid mandate. Politicalneutrality is best exemplified and practised by the ICRC which, with itsunique mandate, endeavours to preserve the humanitarian space needed fordialogue and political settlement in conflict settings. However, the veryconcept and appropriateness of NGO neutrality and impartiality in complexemergencies devoid of political considerations has been the subject ofintense debate in recent times.49 Some writers point to the problematicnature of the term 'neutrality' in that it inaccurately reflects the activities ofmany NGOs and instead adopt the term 'independence' or 'detachment'.50

The concept is under threat given 'the militarisation, the overt politicisationof humanitarian crises and an ever greater reliance on donors to underwritethe costs of humanitarian operations'.51 The ICRC has argued thatimplementation of the concept is becoming difficult.52 For instance, inRwanda where NGOs operated side by side with UNAMIR and thusbecame dependent on its support assets, NGOs became apprehensive thattheir commitment to neutrality had sometimes been compromised throughthat association.53

Examples of difficulty with aid delivery in some situations serve tohighlight the problem of neutrality. As Griffiths and others maintain, aid isusually viewed by warring factions as secondary to military and strategicaims and allowed only when it is deemed beneficial to political objectives.In those circumstances, humanitarian aid is denied by a government to areasunder control of the enemy. Operation Lifeline Sudan, for instance, hassuffered prolonged periods of inertia due to a lack of consent. Similarly, inMozambique, subsequent to the signing of an accord for the provision of aidto FRELIMO (government) and RENAMO (rebels) controlled areas, theUN committee which was created to oversee that programme was unable tosecure the agreement of both sides. Other such instances of themanipulation of aid for military and political purposes have taken place in

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Somalia, Bosnia, Ethiopia and Angola.54

Given the prevailing state of affairs, commentators have called forNGOs to address more directly the political dimensions of conflicts.Roberts has pointed out that NGOs and donors can no longer avoid thepolitical issues by claiming neutrality. The fact that many of these wars aredecimating whole populations and ways of life makes it imperative thatNGOs confront the political dimension.55 In questioning the claim to NGOs'neutrality and confining their work to humanitarian assistance, Deng notesthe importance of recognizing that NGOs' work must be linked to thechallenge of peace, because the ultimate humanitarian objective is that ofending wars. Even though some of the wars may seem senseless, others arewaged for a just cause. Thus, in situations, for instance, where a war isfought challenging the oppression of a minority group, should NGOsmerely claim neutrality?56 Prendergast argues NGOs need to be aware of thepoliticization of their activities. For him, NGO actions often influence themilitary and political character of conflicts although this is rarely intended.57

According to De Mars, neutrality might be adhered to in cases of traditionalinterstate conflicts, and in internal wars where the warring factions resemblesmall states. However, in failed states (such as Somalia and Liberia) wherevarious factions lack the internal coherence of a state, neutrality can hardlybe adapted to fit. A 'generic problem for aid operations' in those situationsis that 'the boundary between the political and humanitarian erodes'.58 Insum, it seems to be the case that whatever the claims of NGOs to neutralityand impartiality, engaging in relief operations in today's conflict situationsis hardly a non-political activity. In coming to grips with the issuesdiscussed here, Slim makes an important point by stating:

NGOs' effectiveness in responding to the suffering of civil wars isheavily dependent on the quality of its people. To operate effectivelywithin the international, regional and local politics of today's civilwars, NGO workers must embody a combination of politicalsophistication, humanitarian principle and operational imagination.Unless they have adopted a position of solidarity, they must benonpolitical, but must have a detailed political analysis which informstheir work. They must have an understanding of conflict and the roleof third parties within it.59

Perhaps, an important issue that must be raised is the expanded roles inrecent years on the part of NGOs in peacekeeping/peacebuilding processes.As noted earlier, in addition to providing relief, these organizations areincreasingly being asked to perform more politicized roles such asmonitoring human rights violations, conflict resolution and peacebuilding.Some have even taken over state-type functions in areas like health,

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education, water and sanitation systems and agricultural extension services,to name but a few.60 In many ways NGO activity can thus be seen asreplacing the state. NGO representatives have often made references to theiroperations 'as comprising a continuum of relief efforts, rehabilitation,reconstruction, and sustainable development'.61 But then, the questionbecomes one of whether such expanded roles are appropriate for NGOs.

In the light of these developments there have been calls for areassessment of the role of NGOs. Should NGOs more clearly define theirmission? Should they concentrate on relief work and specialize in thatdomain, or, engage in both relief and development? Should they respond tocomplex emergencies wherever they occur and under any circumstances, orlimit their involvement geographically or sectorally? Are other actors bettersuited to performing some of these roles? As Natsios suggests, 'it may bepossible to perform some of these functions well, but it is nearly impossibleto coordinate efforts in all.. .of these very different [spheres] so that they areperformed well and do not conflict with one another'.62 If they are going tobe engaged in the performance of different functions, for example in reliefand development, then they must recognize the important relationships thatexist between these programmes. In terms of their response to complexemergencies, limiting their operations to areas where they have ongoingprogrammes might yield better results. In cases where they must work buthave less knowledge of the area, those NGOs willing to respond would needto rely on or develop a strong sectoral expertise to make up for lack ofexperience working in a particular country.63

The involvement of NGOs in these different roles has generated greaterdemands for accountability, transparency and effectiveness. NGOs mustaccount to the victims, the host governments and the donors who fund theirprogrammes. Obviously, internal accountability is imperative as workers in thefield must account for their actions to their superiors. It is not surprising,however, as Harriss and others point out, that those with the 'greatest reason todemand accountability - the victims - are those least likely to receive it.'Understandably, theirs is a powerless voice. But failure or refusal to consultwith victims or nationals of their target countries leads further to theirmarginalization, demeans them, and consequently can result in less efficientprogrammes. And so, 'until.. .NGOs.. .find more systematic ways of genuinelyanswering to those whom they claim to serve, the problem will remain ofaccountability to those with power but not to those without'.64 For Slim, NGOsmust be held accountable in terms of international humanitarian law, humanrights law, and quality of service to those they seek to help and their donors.Their programming standards should be part of this, and must be judged ontheir social and economic impact as well as their technical competence.Ultimately, this process of regulation has to be transparent and public.65

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Concluding Remarks

The increased prominence of NGOs in peacekeeping operations has manysources. Most importantly, it has coincided with a gradual withdrawal on thepart of states and institutions, and a greater delegation of peacebuildingfunctions to NGOs. This development has led to increased expectationsabout the capacity, efficiency, effectiveness and legitimacy of NGOs inaddressing complex civil conflicts. The results to date, however, have beenmixed. And while the performance of NGOs has on balance been nodifferent from other players, the results threaten to undermine their long-term credibility in these and other areas. If the international communitycontinues to lose interest in complex peacekeeping operations, NGOs willlikely attempt to or be called on to fill in the gaps in performing theseimportant tasks. In this context, 'the challenges facing international NGOstoday,' as Anderson suggests, 'are to recognize where things go wrong inorder that they "do no harm" and to explore, develop, and implementprograms that support local people who seek alternatives to conflict.'66

NGOs may perhaps be better positioned to work hand in hand with localforces than other institutional actors are capable of doing. However, withthe rise and subsequent decline of multilateral peacekeeping operations, it isimperative to recognize that donor governments, the UN, and even NGOshave perhaps reached their political limits in terms of their willingness andability to invest in the people, resources and programmes to address andresolve many of today's conflicts. Increasingly, the burden will have to shiftto the local level and the development of indigenous initiatives andcapacities in addressing the root causes of conflict and supporting conflictresolution processes. Ultimately, outside NGOs can play only a supportingrole.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Research for this paper has been supported by a grant from the Social Sciences and HumanitiesResearch Council of Canada, Grant No.410-97-1628. An earlier version of this paper waspresented at the eleventh annual meeting of the Academic Council on the United Nations System(ACUNS), in Cornwallis, Nova Scotia, Canada, 17-19 June 1998. The authors would like tothank anonymous reviewers for their comments.

NOTES

1. The new terminology of UN operations such as peacebuilding is developed in former UNSecretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's, Agenda for Peace. For an elaboration on the so-called second-generation UN peacekeeping operations, see for example, John Mackinlay andJarat Chopra, A Draft Concept of Second Generation Multinational Operations 1993,

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Providence, RI: Watson Institute for International Studies, 1993. See also Jarat Chopra,'Introducing Peace-Maintenance', Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism andInternational Organizations, Vol.4, No.1, 1998, p.1 (discussing the current third phase ofpeace operations doctrine).

2. See, for example, Beatrice Pouligny-Morgant, 'Analysing the encounter between UNPKOsand local social actors: The necessity of a cross-cultural and dynamic framework ofanalysis', paper presented to the ACUNS Annual Meeting, June 1998, Cornwallis, NovaScotia.

3. See Yves Beigbeder, The Role and Status of International Humanitarian Volunteers andOrganizations: The Right and Duty to Humanitarian Assistance, Dordrecht: MartinusNijhoff Publishers, 1991, pp.80-82; Jon Bennet et al., Meeting Needs: NGO Coordination inPractice, London: Earthscan Publications, 1995, p.xi.

4. Cyrus Vance and Herbert Okun, 'Creating Healthy Alliances: Leadership and Coordinationamong NGOs, Governments, and the United Nations in Times of Emergency and Conflict',in Kevin M. Cahill (ed.), Preventive Diplomacy - Stopping Wars Before They Start, NewYork: Basic Books, 1996, p.194.

5. Pamela Aall, 'Nongovernmental Organizations and Peacemaking', in Chester Crocker, FenOsier Hampson and Pamela Aall (eds), Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Responsesto International Conflicts, Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1996, p.435.

6. Thomas G. Weiss, 'Nongovernmental Organizations and Internal Conflict', in Michael E.Brown (ed.), The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,1996, p.446. See also, Henrik S. Marcussen, 'NGOs, the State and Civil Society', Review ofAfrican Political Economy, Vol.69, 1996, pp.406-7 (discussing the growing importance ofNGOs).

7. Hugo Slim, 'The Continuing Metamorphosis of the Humanitarian Practitioner: Some NewColours for an Endangered Chameleon', Disasters, Vol.19, June 1995.

8. See Mike Powell and David Seddon, 'NGOs and the Development Industry', Review ofAfrican Political Economy, No.71, pp.3-10.

9. For a discussion of the details of NGOs' role in Afghanistan see, for example, HelgaBaitenmann, 'NGOs and the Afghan War: The Politicisation of Humanitarian Aid', ThirdWorld Quarterly, Vol.12, No.1, 1990, p.62. For the Rwandan emergency see, for example,Von Bernuth, 'The Voluntary Agency Response and the Challenge of Coordination', Journalof Refugee Studies, Vol.9, No.3, 1996 (Special Issue, 'The Rwandan Emergency: Causes,Responses, Solutions'), p.283. About 40 NGOs were working in Somalia when OperationRestore Hope was deployed. Andrew Natsios, 'NGOs and the UN System in ComplexEmergencies: Conflict or Cooperation?', Third World Quarterly, Vol.16, No.3, 1995, p.406.Elizabeth Ferris notes the tremendous resources that NGOs bring to the field of refugee reliefand estimates hundreds, perhaps thousands of NGOs are involved in one way or another withrefugee work. See Ferris, Beyond Borders: Refugees, Migrants and Human Rights in thePost-Cold War Era, Geneva: WCC Publications, 1993, p.41.

10. Alex de Waal, Famine Crimes, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998, especially, pp.191-203.11. (n.9 above), pp.62-85.12. Quoted in Crocker et al. (n.5 above), p.437.13. See Peter Sollis, 'Partners in Development? The State, NGOs, and the UN in Central

America', in Thomas G. Weiss and Leon Gordenker (eds), NGOs, the UN, and GlobalGovernance, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1996 (describing the role of NGOs in Central Americawhere they are expected to make a contribution in terms of protecting the environment,reducing poverty and strengthening the democratization process).

14. Among the sceptics see, for example, Michael Maren, The Road to Hell, New York: FreePress, 1997 and Paul Stubbs, 'Croatia: NGO Development, Globalism and Conflict', in J.Bennett (ed.), NGOs and Governments: A Review of Current Practice for Southern andEastern NGOs, Oxford: INTRAC, 1997.

15. See Marcussen (n.6 above), pp.408-413.16. They point out, however, that not all NGO relief operations are professionally competent,

and that accounts of operations from Cambodia, Sudan, Ethiopia, and Mozambique revealNGOs-run programmes as incompetent as the worst UN programmes. Martin Griffiths, Iain

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Levine and Mark Weiler, 'Sovereignty and Suffering', in John Harriss (ed.), The Politics ofHumanitarian Intervention, London: Pinter Publishers, 1995, p.72.

17. Jan Eliasson, 'Establishing Trust in the Healer', in Cahill (ed.) ( n.4 above), p.332.18. See Final Report of the Carnegie Commission, Preventing Deadly Conflict, Washington DC:

Carnegie Commission, 1997, pp.45-7.19. Kofi Annan, Renewing the United Nations: A Programme for Reform, Report of the

Secretary-General, New York: United Nations, 1997, para. 207-16.20. See de Waal (n.10 above), pp.179-221.21. See UN Security Council, Annual Summit Declaration, 31 January 1993, pp.1-5.22. The Lessons Learned Unit of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations has undertaken

studies of four such multidisciplinary peacekeeping operations and released a report thatdeals with a wide range of issues: from mandate and means, planning, coordination,intelligence and information analysis, military, security, training of local police and humanrights monitoring, logistics, finance and budget, personnel and training, medical and health,demining, humanitarian relief in a peacekeeping environment, public information, relationswith local population and demobilization. See Multidisciplinary Peacekeeping: Lessons fromRecent Experience, www.un.org/Depts/dpko/lessons/handbuk.htm.

23. See for example the discussion in Antonio Donini, 'Surfing on the Crest of the Wave Untilit Crashes: Intervention and the South', Journal of Humanitarian Assistance, 3 Oct. 1995,www.jha.sps.com.ac.uk

24. See for example the recent discussions concerning emergency relief in Sudan. John Ryle,'Sudan: The Perils of Aid', New York Review of Books, 11 June, 1998, p.63; John Ryle, 'HowFamine Sharpens the Hunger for Power', Manchester Guardian Weekly, 10 May, 1998; andMichael Ignatieff, 'Unarmed Warriors', The New Yorker, 24 March 1997.

25. Ambassador Juan Somavia, Permanent Representative of Chile to the UN, 'TheHumanitarian Responsibilities of the United Nations Security Council', Gilbert MurrayMemorial Lecture, Oxford, 26 June 1996.

26. David Reiff, 'The Humanitarian Trap', World Policy Journal, 1995/96, pp.10-11.27. de Waal, (n.10 above), p.181.28. Ibid., p.185.29. Save the Children, The United Nations and Humanitarian Assistance: A Position Paper,

cited in Hugo Slim, 'Military Humanitarianism and the New Peacekeeping: An Agenda forPeace?' Journal of Humanitarian Assistance, 22 Sept. 1995, www.jha.sps.com.ac.uk.

30. Significant critiques can be found in the writings of de Waal (n.10 above), Maren (n.14above) and Stubbs (n.14 above).

31. For a sample see Weiss and Gordenker (eds) (n.13 above); and on a more critical note, Maren(n.14 above), esp. Chs 13-16.

32. Strobe Talbot, 'Globalization and Diplomacy: A Practitioner's Perspective', Foreign Policy,No.l08, Fall 1997, p.79.

33. Somavia (n.25 above).34. Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse, Humanitarian Intervention in Contemporary

Conflict: A Reconceptualization, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996, p.153.35. See Ken Boulding, 'Roles for NGOs in Reducing or Preventing Violence', Transnational

Associations, Vol.49, No.6, 1997, pp.317-27.36. Ibid.37. For additional information on the SPHERE project see, www.ifrc.org/pubs/sphere/

Index.htm.38. Pouligny-Morgant (n.2 above). Also see Sheelagh Stewart, 'Happy Ever After in the

Marketplace: Non-government Organisations and Uncivil Society', Review of AfricanPolitical Economy, No.71, pp.11-34.

39. See, for example, Joanna Macrae and Anthony Zwi (eds), Engaging with Violence: AReassessment of Relief in Wartime in War and Hunger, London: Zed Books, 1996.

40. Quoted in David R. Smock, 'Humanitarian Assistance and Conflict in Africa', Journal ofHumanitarian Assistance, July 1997, p.3, www.jha.sps.cam.ac.uk/a/a016.htm.

41. See Hugo Slim, 'International Humanitarianism's Engagement with Civil War in the 1990s:A Glance at Evolving Practice and Theory', Journal of Humanitarian Assistance, 1998, p.10,

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www-jha.sps.cam.uk/a/a565.htm; Peter Shiras, 'Humanitarian Emergencies and the Roles ofNGOs', in Jim Whitman and David Pocock (eds), After Rwanda: The Coordination of UnitedNations Humanitarian Assistance, London: Macmillan, 1996, p.114; John Prendergast,Crisis Response: Humanitarian Band-Aids in Sudan and Somalia, London: Pluto, 1997,p.140.

42. Similarly, an NGO health training programme for Cambodian refugees along the Thai bordercamps had the effect of conscripting some of the trainees as medical personnel that werereturned to Cambodia to care for wounded soldiers on the frontlines. Again, in Tajikistan,NGO assistance focused on rebuilding homes destroyed during the war drew the ire of the'victors' of the conflict, as they saw assistance being channelled to the faction that wasdefeated in the conflict. See Mary Anderson, 'Humanitarian NGOs in Conflict Intervention',in Crocker et al. (n.5 above), pp.347-8.

43. Prendergast (n.41 above).44. See ibid.45. Joanna Macrae, 'Purity or Political Engagement? Issues in Food and Health Security

Interventions in Complex Political Emergencies', Journal of Humanitarian Assistance,1998, p.10, www-jha, sps.cam.ac.uk/a/a574.htm. Hugo Slim maintains since more academicattention is being paid to the negative effects of NGOs' involvement in humanitarianism, itis incumbent on NGOs in the years ahead to articulate and assess the positive effects of theiroperations. He stresses the fact that such an assessment of the positive effects 'must movebeyond traditional quantitative indications of output (food and blankets given etc.) to a moresubtle analysis of impact and outcome which can stand up to the increasingly rigorousanalysis of the dark side of relief in war.' Slim (n.41 above).

46. Prendergast (n.41 above), p.121. For a further discussion on the ten commandments ofproviding aid without sustaining conflict see John Prendergast, Frontline Diplomacy:Humanitarian Aid and Conflict in Africa, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1996, Ch.4.

47. See Smock (n.40 above).48. In the light of the limited impact of NGO operations during the Cold War, they developed

the necessary skills and experience in seeking and maintaining the consent of local warringfactions. Thus, they were less constrained by the political and strategic conflicts thatcharacterized state actors, or even UN relief programmes.

49. Griffiths et al. define 'impartiality' as the provision of relief solely on the basis of need, and'neutrality' as the refusal to take sides in a conflict. Griffiths et al. (n.16 above), p.78.

50. See Prendergast (n.41 above), p.40. Minear and Weiss use the term 'nonpartisanship'. Theydefine the nonpartisanship principle thus: '[humanitarian action responds to humansuffering because people are in need, not to advance political, sectarian, or other extraneousagendas. It should not take sides in conflicts.' Larry Minear and Thomas G. Weiss,Humanitarian Action in Times of War, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1993, p.23.

51. Griffiths et al. (n.16 above), p.76.52. Macrae notes in this context: 'neutrality tends to be identified primarily at the macro-level,

rather than at the meso- and micro-level. In other words, achieving neutrality is associatedwith not using bilateral-government to government instruments, but ignores how otherinstitutions - NGOs and UN agencies - interact with national and local governmentauthorities, and how decisions regarding distribution strategies function at the communitylevel. Responsibility for neutrality is thus effectively delegated downwards through thesystem, but not regularly monitored', Macrae (n.45 above), p.10.

53. Dallaire writes: 'One example occurred during the time when RGF broadcasts weregenerally attacking both the UNAMIR operation as a whole and some of its senior officials.These broadcasts not only alienated UN personnel from the large Hutu population, therebyhindering the mediation process, but also put numerous NGOs in a difficult situation.'Romeo Dallaire, 'The Changing Role of UN Peacekeeping Forces: The Relationshipbetween UN Peacekeepers and NGOs in Rwanda', in Whitman and Pocock (eds), (n.41above), p.215.

54. See Griffiths et al. (n.16 above), pp.77-8.55. Cited in Smock (n.40 above), p.12.56. Deng, cited in ibid.

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57. Cited in ibid.58. Quoted in ibid.59. Slim (n.41 above).60. Donini maintains that 'in operational terms, this has led to the emergence of a competitive

culture in the international NGO community. In structural and ideological terms, this meansthat "development" has ceased to function as a "mobilizing myth" for the South.' AntonioDonini, 'Asserting Humanitarianism in Peace-Maintenance', Global Governance: A Reviewof Multilateralism and International Organizations, Vol.4, No.1, 1998, p.85. See alsoAndrew Natsios, 'An NGO Perspective', in William Zartman and Lewis Rasmussen (eds),Peacemaking in International Conflict: Methods and Techniques, Washington DC: UnitedStates Institute of Peace, 1997, p.337; Mark Duffield, 'NGO Relief in War Zones: Toward anAnalysis of the New Aid Paradigm', in Thomas G. Weiss (ed.), Beyond UN Subcontracting,London: Macmillan, 1998, pp.139-59.

61. See Aall (n.5 above), pp.442-3.62. Natsios (n.60 above), p.351.63. For a detailed discussion of these issues, see for example, Shiras (n.41 above), pp.106-17.64. Griffiths et al. (n.16 above), p.79.65. Slim (n.41 above), pp.12-13.66. Anderson (n.4 above), p.353.

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NGOs and UN peacekeeping operations: Strange bedfellows