Nigeria and Southern Africa: Interest, Policy, and Means

Nigeria and Southern Africa: Interest, Policy, and MeansAuthor(s): James H. PolhemusSource: Canadian Journal of African Studies / Revue Canadienne des Études Africaines, Vol.11, No. 1 (1977), pp. 43-66Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd. on behalf of the Canadian Association of African StudiesStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/483669 .

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Revue canadienne des 6tudes africaines/Canadian Journal of African Studies Volume Xl, no 1, 1977, 43-86

Nigeria and Southern Africa : Interest, Policy, and Means

James H. POLHEMUS*

RESUME - Le Nigeria et I'Afrique australe : les int6r&ts, la politique, les moyens

Parce que le Nigeria est le hulitieme plus grand producteur (de petrole dans le monde et le plus puissant tat e I'Afriquwe noire, I'dtutle diu dd('eloppement de ses relations internationales est importante. L'opposition m orale auxl regimes coloniaux et minori- taires de I'Afrique auistrale fuit notiamment renfor'cie alt moment de la giuerre civ'ile de 1967-70 par la conviction que les rdgimes blan's

en Afrique iaustrale poun'aient cons- tituer une menace directe pouir la( s'curite du / Nigeria.

Pour le Nigeria, la libh;ration de l'Afriquie australe signifie /I'tablissem/lenti de goul- vernements nationaux reellement repre`sentattfs sans conside'ration cdes classes so- ciales et des questions iddologiques.

Les moyens adoptes par le Nigeria pour promnouvoir la libIration de I'Afrique

autstrale ont varit e tres peu dans leur essence, mais les gouvlernements nigeriains siuc- cessifs ont aippliqudl les inethodes c'hoisies a 'ecC ine de;terminaltion c'roissante.

As a black African state emergent from the British Empire, Nigeria has perforce been concerned with the twin problems of colonialism and minority white regimes in Southern Africa. If Southern Africa has been a constant in Nigeria's foreign policy deliberations, the outcome of Nigeria's deliberations has been of increasing interest to foreign policy makers elsewhere in Africa and the world.

When Nigeria became independent on October 1, 1960 there was good reason to regard it as potentially the most powerful state in Africa. Its population (55 670 000 according to the somewhat questionable 1963 census) was by far the largest in Africa, approximately double that of its nearest rival the United Arab Republic. Its area of some 357 000 square miles was by no means the largest in Africa, but unlike most larger African states it did not include great expanses of desert. Nigeria had a good agricultural and mineral resource base, including large deposits of petroleum the extent of which was just beginning to be realized in 1960. Ten years later Nigeria emerged intact from the civil war which overcame Biafran secession with an army of 180 000, an airforce with 3 000 men and thirty-

* Senior Lecturer in International Relations, Deakin University, Geelong, Victoria, Australia. An earlier version of this paper was presented at Duke University's Commonwealth Seminar while the author enjoyed the facilities of the Duke University Center for Commonwealth and Comparative Studies as a Visiting Fellow.

43



44 CANADIAN JOURNAL OF AFRICAN STUDIES

three combat aircraft,' and an oil industry which despite the civil war had in- creased exports from 6 243 527 barrels in 1960 to 383 455 353 barrels in 1970.2 By 1977 Nigeria was developing plans to modernize its war-swollen military establishment and the oil industry continued to boom in the era of international petroleum politics which began in 1973. Oil production had more than doubled since 1970 and in 1975 and 1976 Nigeria had become the world's eighth largest producer.3 At the end of 1975 Nigeria was the second largest source of oil imported by the United States, supplying 16 per cent of imports as compared to 17 per cent from Saudi Arabia and 15 per cent from Canada.4

As its economic and military power base developed Nigeria began to realize its potential. The foreign policy of the civilian government of Prime Minister Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, which led Nigeria to independence and governed with increasing difficulty until overthrown in the coup of January 15, 1966, was charac- terized, accurately enough but with radically differing value implications, by the regime itself, by the domestic opposition, and by outside observers as moderate and pragmatic.5 At this stage Nigeria exhibited a certain ambivalence about its international role. In the words of the Nigerian journalist Peter Enahoro:

Every nation in Africa, small or big, was involved in the ratrace to prove that it had arrived. Nigeria's dedicated policy was to avoid participating in this contest which we considered in very bad taste. Although by this indifference we hoped to be recognised as the leading state in Africa.6

A second era in Nigeria's international relations began with the January, 1966 coup which briefly made General Aguiyi-Ironsi Nigeria's head of state, continued through the July 29, 1966 coup which brought Lt.-Col. Yakubu Gowon to power, and extended throughout the civil war. This was a period of intense concentration on the domestic problem of keeping Nigeria one, but it was also a time when international relations assumed a hitherto unknown importance, especially after Biafra's secession on May 30, 1967 and the outbreak of the civil war. The Federal Military Government was forced to engage in active diplomacy and propaganda to

1. As of July, 1970. The Military Balance 1970 - 1971 (London: Institute of Strategic Studies, 1970), p. 50.

2. Federal Republic of Nigeria, Ministry of Mines and Power, Department of Petroleum Re- sources, Annual Report 1970-71 (Lagos: Federal Ministry of Information. [1973]), p. 23.

3. West Africa, January 17, 1977, p. 99 citing Petroleum Economist. 4. 1976

Commodit, Yearbook (New York: Commodity Research Bureau, 1976), p. 259.

5. There are some exceptions to the generally moderate and pragmatic nature of the foreign policy of the Balewa regime, most notably the break in diplomatic and economic relations with France as a protest over atomic tests in the Sahara early in 1961. The best study, of Nigerian international relations during Ghana and Nigeria 1957-70: A Study in Inter-African Discord (London: Rex Collings, 1976). Other monographs on the foreign policy of the period are: A. B. Akinyemi, Foreign Policy and Federalism: The Nigerian Experience (Ibadan: Ibadan University Press, 1974) ; Claude S. Phillips, Jr., The Development of Nigerian Foreign Policy (Chicago: Northwestern University Press, 1964); Gor- don J. Idang, Nigeria : Internal Politics and Foreign Policy (1960-1966) (Ibadan: Ibadan University Press, 1973); Mahmud Tukur, Nigeria's External Relations: The United Nations as a Forum and Po- licy Medium in the Conduct of Foreign Policy, October 1960-December 1965 (Zaria: Ahmadu Bello University Institute of Administration, n.d.). These, combined with a number of articles and chapters in books, make the international relations of Sir Abubakar's government the most extensively studied of any in black Africa.

6. Houw to Be a Nigerian (Lagos: Daily Times, 1966), pp. 19- 20.



NIGERIA AND SOUTHERN AFRICA : INTEREST, POLICY, AND MEANS 45

prevent as much as possible other states from recognizing or assisting Biafra and, when the United Kingdom and the United States refused to allow Nigeria to purchase the armaments it needed, Nigeria broke out of its previous pattern and turned to the Soviet Union.7

The end of the civil war, in January 1970, which came with a military victory by the Federal Military Government ushered in a third era during which it seemed to some Nigerians that their country's role in international relations had come close to achieving the dynamism and importance which had been wanting during the civilian regime.8 Freed from the preoccupation of the war and armed with confidence derived not only from winning the war but also from the related successful wartime diplomacy, Gowon travelled extensively in Africa, the East, and the West. He was elected chairman of the Assembly of Heads of State and Gov- ernment of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). With the President of Togo, Gowon was instrumental in founding the Economic Community of West African States, linking fifteen African states in a nascent common market which bridges the division between Francophone and Anglophone Africa.

While it is possible to document a growing leadership role for the world's "first black power"' under Gowon, the symbolic apotheosis of Nigeria's bid for international leadership came when the government of General Murtala Ramat Muhammed, which replaced Gowon's regime after the bloodless coup of July 29, 1975, confronted the Angolan civil war. Portugal had withdrawn from Angola early in November, 1975 leaving no clearcut successor. Competing liberation movements had declared two rival independence governments, each with its own constellation of African and extra-African supporters. Nigeria's initial policy was to urge unity on all involved, but in reaction to the invasion of Angolan territory by South African forces in support of the United States-backed UNITA-FNLA government, Nigeria recognized the MPLA government of Augusthino Neto, which had the backing of the Soviet Union. The recognition of the MPLA government in Angola was praised by the political editor of the Lagos Sunday Times as "singularly the most daring and responsible foreign policy decision taken by any Nigerian government since independence" '0 and this assessment was widely and proudly shared in Nigeria. Subsequently when the United States expressed concern about the presence of the Soviet Union and more recently arrived Cuban

7. On the impact of the civil war on Nigerian international relations, see: Aluko, Ghana and

Nigeria, passim; Olajide Aluko, The Civil War and Nigerian Foreign Policy," Political Quarterly, XLII (April-June, 1971), pp. 177-90: Oye Ogunbadejo, "Nigeria and the Great Powers: The Impact of the Civil War on Nigerian Foreign Relations," African Affairs, LXXV (January, 1976), pp. 14- 32; Martin Dent, "Nigeria, Ghana and the World," Venture, XXI (February, 1969), pp. 9- 12.

8. On Nigeria's enhanced international stature during this period see: Jean Herskovits, "'Nigeria: Africa's New Power," Foreign Affairs, LIII (January 1975), pp. 315-33; Ibrahim Agboola Gambari, "Nigeria and the World: A Growing Internal Stability, Wealth, and External Influence," Journal of International Affairs, XXIX, no. 2 (1975), pp. 155- 69. The new independence of Nigerian foreign policy under Gowon after the civil war can easily be over-stressed. In spite of the very useful purchases of arms from the East during the war and in spite of increases in diplomatic links with Eastern countries, Nigeria's economy and outlook remained much closer to the West than the East. For what is no doubt the bellwether of a post-coup revisionist school, see Yusufu Bala Usman, "Nigeria's Foreign Relations 1970-75," New Nigerian Supplement on Independence Celebrations (Kaduna), October 1, 1975.

9. A phrase used in The New Nationalist(Ibadan), I, no. 7 (July, 1974), pp. 1, 3. 10. Sunday Times (Lagos), February 1, 1976.



46 REVUE C4NADIENNE DES ETUDES AFRICAINES

troops in Angola and sought Nigeria's support in bringing about a government involving each of the three major liberation movements, Nigeria published the text of what it regarded as "Ford's overbearing directive to the head of state."" It published as well the text of a reply to the United States rejecting "completely this fatuous attempt by the Ford administration to insult the intelligence of African nations and scorn the dignity of the black man" and totally repudiating "the false logic which equates the presence of the Cuban and Soviet advisers in Angola with that of the South African regular troops, their fellow soldiers of fortune and motley mercenaries."'2 This too was well-received in Nigeria.'3

Although Nigeria's four post-independence regimes have varied considerably in the degree of dynamism they brought to the conduct of foreign affairs, condem- nation of colonialism and white minority rule are consistent themes in the foreign policy pronouncements of each. There are remarkable similarities in tenor between statements of the civilian regime of Sir Abubakar, widely regarded as having been "moderate," and those of the third military regime which has been in power since July, 1975, which is often referred to as "revolutionary.'')4 On June 29, 1976 General Olusegun Obasanjo, successor to the assassinated General Muhammed as head of state in the third military regime, announced the conclusions of a nine- month high level review of Nigerian foreign policy, the first such review since independence. Among the five objectives identified was "the promotion and defence of justice and respect of human dignity especially the dignity of the black man" and it was stated that:

These objectives are to be pursued with the realization that the centre-piece of our foreign policy is Africa. We are committed to the total liberation of oppressed black people in Africa and indeed anywhere in the world.'"

The earliest foreign policy statement of Sir Abubakar, delivered in the House of Representatives in Lagos prior to independence, condemned racism but had not specifically referred to the need for liberation from colonialism. However, in 1961 Jaja Wachuku, Nigeria's first Minister for External Affairs added a gloss to Sir Abubakar's 1960 statement. He identified "the total eradication of all forms of racial discrimination" as "one of the pillars of Nigerian foreign policy." He added that:

Our second objective in Africa is the total liberation of the whole of the African continent from foreign domination. There can be no going back on that : colonialism in

11. New Nigerian (Kaduna), January 9, 1976. 12. Daily Times (Lagos), January 8, 1976. 13. For example, the Daily Times (Lagos) editorialized: "Who would have believed that this

country could ever muster enough courage to stand up to the Washington overlords and tell them to shut up and stop insulting Africa and the blackman ? This precisely is what the Federal Government has done. Needless to say, it has the support of Nigerian people who must be feeling proud and confident in our ability to tell grey beards the truth. It is a mark of real independence." (January 9, 1976).

14. It is to be noted that neither General Muhammed nor his successor General Obasanjo have referred to Nigeria's third military regime as "revolutionary". The July 29, 1975 coup was justified on the basis of the Gowon regime's corruption, inefficiency, and having lost touch with the country. It did not repudiate or add to the objectives of Gowon's government; it merely promised to put them into effect.

15. The full text of the address in which the conclusions of the foreign policy review were announced is printed in New Nigerian (Kaduna), June 30, 1976.



NIGERIA AND SOUTHERN AFRICA: INTEREST, POLICY, AND MEANS 47

all its manifestations anywhere in Africa must be ended. We would be failing in our duty if we did not use our full resources - mental, moral, and material - in the struggle for emancipation of the rest of the continent. 16

In 1963 Sir Abubakar himself told the Addis Ababa summit conference which founded the OAU that "on the question of colonialism and racial discrimination, I am

afrjaid that we in Nigeria will never compromise."'7

While there is a large degree of verbal consistency in Nigeria's general statements with regard to the dual problems of Southern Africa, over time there emerged substantial differences in Nigeria's perception of its national interest in Southern Africa, the specifics of Nigerian policy with regard to Southern Africa, and the means which Nigeria was able and willing to employ to pursue its interest and implement its policy. The balance of this essay considers the development of Nigerian interests, policy, and means of implementing policy with regard to colonialism and white minority regimes in Southern Africa and suggests that while there have been substantial changes, the elements of continuity are strong and likely to remain so.

I - NATIONAL INTEREST

Since independence Nigeria has regarded the abolition of colonialism and white minority regimes in Southern Africa as in its interest. Initially this assessment was based on emotion and moral principle deriving from the fact that Nigerians themselves were black African peoples who had first hand experience with colonialism. Nigeria shares no boundaries with Southern African states. The straight-line distance between Nigeria and the nearest point in Angola (cutting through the Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Congo, and Zaire) is nearly 800 miles, between Nigeria and Southwest Africa approximately 1 450, between Nigeria and South Africa 1 800 miles. Southern Rhodesia and Mozambique are farther still. Nigeria does not have substantial numbers of its nationals in any of the Southern African territories whose interests it feels compelled to protect.'" Nigeria inher- ited a small amount of trade with South Africa, but not of a quantitatively or qualitatively vital nature.'9 Doubtless South Africa, which is almost wholly dependent on imported petroleum, would be pleased to purchase Nigerian oil but Nigeria has experienced no difficulty in finding other buyers. Nigeria's leaders may not have made contributions to the literature on negritude to rival those of

16. Jaja Wachuku, "Nigeria's Foreign Policy," University of Toronto Quarterly, XXXI (Oc- tober, 1961), pp. 68-69.

17. Summit Conference of Independent African States, Proceedings of the Summit Conference of Independent African States, Addis Ababa, May 1963, vol. I, Sec. 2, CIAS/GEN/INF/35, p. 3.

18. Nigerians are great travellers and there are, or were, sizeable Nigerian communities in many African states, including Zaire which shares a long border with Angola. See Margaret Peil, "The Expulsion of West African Aliens," Journal of Modern African Studies, IX (August, 1971), 205-29. It may well be that some Nigerians have ventured as far as Angola or even beyond, but the treatment of Nigerians in Southern Africa does not seem ever to have been an issue.

19. In 1959, $800 000 out of Nigeria's total of $461 800 000 in exports went to South Africa. In the same year $2 800 000 out of $502 500 000 in imports came from South Africa. Trade with Portugal was not substantial enough to register separately in the statistics. International Monetary Fund-Inter- national Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Direction of Trade: A Supplement to Interna- tional Financial Statistics Annual 1958-62 (Washington: Statistics Bureau of the International Monetary Fund, n.d.), p. 302.




President Senghor of Senegal, but the same sort of ideas underlay Nigeria's initial interests in Southern Africa. Jaja Wachuku, in the statement quoted previously, explained that the reason Nigeria felt "so strongly" about racial discrimination was that "for centuries people of African descent have been humiliated. They have been treated as anthropoid apes rather than members of the human community.''20

The civil war of 1967-1970 gave a more concrete dimension to Nigeria's perceived interest in Southern Africa. Among the "lessons" of the war was "the fact that the existence of the minority-dominated regimes in Southern Africa is a direct threat to Nigeria's security."2' At the war's end Nigeria announced that it would not accept relief assistance from any country which had been "studiously hostile" to the Federal Military Government during the war, specifically mention- ing South Africa, Portugal, Rhodesia and France.22 During the war South Africa stated that it was not providing arms to Biafra and that its role was limited to humanitarian aid supplied through the International Red Cross. Suzanne Cronje, a London-based journalist not noted as an apologist for the South African government, made a systematic effort to trace and validate stories of South African activity in the war and concluded that while both sides had employed South African mercenaries, "there was no evidence whatsoever of any other South African involvement on either side."23 There are no ambiguities about Portugal having been of crucial assistance to Biafra. Lisbon was the center of Biafra's armament procurement activities and a terminus of the air route to Biafra in which the Portuguese island of Sao Tome was a vital link, especially after Equatorial Guinea's independence from Spain rendered Fernando Po unavailable. Financial and other contributions of Lisbon to Biafra may be open to question, but there is no doubt that Portugal greatly assisted Biafra by allowing the use of its territory. As for Rhodesia, it was reported in the Rhodesian Herald that a Salisbury-based airline employing Rhodesian and South African pilots was engaged in transporting armaments from Lisbon to Biafra via Sao Tome.24 Olajide Aluko reports that "Dr. Okoi Arikpo, the Commissioner for External Affairs, said that the first bomb dropped on Lagos by "Biafra" was made in Rhodesia."25 Dr. Aluko observes that "though difficult to prove, this was believed to be true by the Nigerian Government leaders and this is what in any case is important."26 The same could be said with regard to South African and Portuguese involvement.

Efforts to fragment Nigeria would have made excellent sense for South Af- rica, Southern Rhodesia, and Portugal. While weakening a potentially powerful

20. Wachaku, p. 68. 21. Aluko, Political Quarterly, p. 179. 22. New York Times, January 15, 1970, p. 1. 23. Suzanne Cronje, The World and Nigeria.: The Diplomatic History of the Biafran War

1967-1970 (London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1972), p. 189. Sam C. Nolutshungu records that the South Africans employed by the Federal Government were pilots recruited in London, that they were an embarrassment to the government, and that they disappeared from view after 1967. South Africa in Africa : A Study of Ideology and Foreign Policy (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1975), p. 264.

24. Africa Research Bulletin: Political Social and Cultural Series, January 1-31, 1968, p. 955. Subsequent references to this source are abbreviated "ARB."

25. Aluko, Political Quarterly, p. 180. 26. Ibid.



NIGERIA AND SOUTHERN AFRICA . INTEREST, POLICY, AND MEANS 49

opponent to minority white rule in South Africa and Rhodesia and to colonialism in Angola, Mozambique, and South West Africa, the three could hope to earn the gratitude of an independent Biafra which would itself be a potential power in Africa.27 This would have been consistent with South Africa's policy of building bridges to black Africa and might have offered a source of oil much closer than Iran. After the civil war it was reasonable for Nigeria to see the white minority and colonial regimes in Southern Africa as direct threats to the security of Nigeria itself and not simply as oppressors of Nigeria's black brothers and sisters. The invasion of Guinea in November, 1970 under circumstances which strongly impli- cated Portugal reinforced this point of view. The post-civil war and contemporary Nigerian perception of its interest in Southern Africa was well-summarized by General Gowon in 1971 in a statement with regard to African territories still under colonial rule :

Besides the vivid affront which they constitute to our conscience, the threat they pose to our political independence and security is as real as it is intolerable. 28

II-POLICY

To perceive an interest in the elimination of colonialism and white minority rule in Southern Africa is one thing; to realize these objectives is another. Foreign policy can be defined as the application of national interest to particular situations. It is artificial to discuss foreign policy so conceived in isolation from the means of its execution, but there is some utility in considering a level of abstraction midway between the generalities of national interest and the specifics of behavior in particular cases at particular times.

During 1960 when Nigeria became independent sixteen other African states became independent as well and independence for still others was in view. All of Southern Africa with the exception of the Union of South Africa remained non- independent. It was reasonable to expect that those territories under British tute- lage, with the possible exception of Southern Rhodesia, would make their way to independence with the cooperation of the administering power just as Nigeria had done. They would not require from Nigeria much more than an occasional en- couraging word and appropriate gestures upon independence. The Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mozambique, South Africa with its white minority government, its apartheid policy, and its hold over South West Africa, and Southern Rhodesia where the threat of another white minority regime became a reality with the unilateral declaration of independence in November, 1965, emerged as qualitatively different problems. As they evolved they produced new situations which called for new foreign policy decisions. In response to these Nigeria slowly developed a body of doctrine on the meaning and means of liberation which would guide it in making specific foreign policy decisions on Southern African issues.

27. Assuming that Biafra had the population of the former Eastern Region under the 1963 census (12 400 000) it would have been more populous than all other African states or dependent territories in 1967 except Congo (Kinshasa), Ethiopia, the remainder of Nigeria, South Africa, Sudan, and the United Arab Republic. It would also have had some 65 per cent of Nigeria's oil production.

28. 'Statement by His Excellency, Major-General Yakubu Gowon, Head of the Federal Military Government, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Nigeria, June 21, 1971," Nigeria : Bulletin on Foreign Affairs, I (July, 1971), p. 43.



50 REVUE CANADIENNE DES ETUDES AFRICAINES

Prime Minister Balewa had told the Addis Ababa conference that "on the question of colonialism and racial discrimination, I am afraid that we in Nigeria will never compromise," but if Balewa was not prepared to compromise he was prepared to countenance delay until the territories in question were prepared for independence. Perhaps this was a consequence of his experience as a Nigerian politician. More likely it was a conclusion derived from observing the chaos which accompanied the precipitate independence of the former Belgian Congo in the summer of 1960. Around the time when Nigeria became independent there was a minor debate in Africa on setting a deadline for the freedom of all African territories. In 1961 Balewa's government subjected itself to considerable criticism from the domestic political opposition, Nigerian interest groups, and even members of the governing coalition when it introduced a resolution in the United Nations which would have made 1970 the deadline.29 In the face of criticism that argued that 1970 was much too long to wait the resolution was withdrawn, although the 1970 target date was mentioned again in 1962. In spite of domestic impatience, as late as 1964 Balewa said with regard to Southern Rhodesia that

we feel that all the dependent territories should be granted independence as soon as possible... but the people of these territories should be given some real responsibility to give them the necessary training so that when they take over, it will not be too difficult for them. 30

The doctrine of the necessity or acceptability of a period of preparation for independence and majority rule did not survive the Balewa regime. In March, 1967 Nigeria was among four African members of the United Nations ad hoc Committee for South West Africa to propose independence for that territory no later than June, 1968.3' In 1971 when General Gowon told the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government that

It is my strong conviction that the time has come when we should liberate at least one colonial territory within the next three years, 32

the delay he envisaged stemmed not from any idea of the necessity for preparing the people for independence but rather from difficulties in inducing the colonial power to leave.

Nigeria has sometimes spoken of liberation in global terms. Jaja Wachuku said in 1961 that

nowhere in the world, in no state, however powerful, however wealthy, will Nigeria countenance humiliations to people of African descent; and we will not consider any action on our part as interference in the internal affairs of another state. 33

The announcement of the results of the third military regime's first ever review of Nigerian foreign policy said Nigeria "is committed to the total liberation of all

29. Akinyemi, p. 106 citing UN document A/L357 (9 November 1961). 30. West African Pilot, July 16, 1964 quoted in Akinyemi, p. 107. 31. ARB, Mach 1-31, 1967, p. 746. 32. The text the address is printed in Nigeria: Bulletin on Foreign Affairs, I (July, 1971),

pp. 43-44. 33. Pp. 68-69.



NIGERIA AND SOUTHERN AFRICA: INTEREST, POLICY, AND MEANS 51

oppressed black people in Africa and indeed anywhere else in the world."34 In practice, however, Nigeria's concern for African liberation has centered on the liberation of black people from oppression by white colonialists and white minority regimes. Nigeria's leaders, unlike Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana or Julius Nyer- ere of Tanzania,35 have not developed a concept of liberation applicable to neo- colonial or tyrannical regimes in African states which by virtue of their membership in the OAU and recognition by the international community are regarded as liberated by definition. While Nigeria may object to the excesses of Idi Amin, to the establishment of diplomatic relations between Malawi and South Africa, or to the brutality of the Nguema regime in Equatorial Guinea against Nigerian contract workers, Nigeria has not set about trying to liberate these countries. Nigeria has eschewed the temptation to interfere in what it regards as the internal affairs of other independent African countries even in the face of extreme provocation.36

Nigeria's leaders are not given to producing treatises on the nature and meaning of liberation, but on the basis of practice and occasional pronouncements it can be said that for Nigeria liberation means the creation of genuine representative governments reflecting majority will and national self-determination. From Nigeria's point of view liberation has meant national or even racial liberation and not class liberation. Debates on this level have passed Nigeria's successive a-ideological governments by.37 When confronted with the common phenomenon of rival liberation movements within non-liberated territories Nigeria's habitual practice has been to urge the creation of united national fronts. Only when a particular movement has clearly established a preponderant position, as in the

34. Neit' Nigerian (Kaduna), June 30, 1976. 35. On Nkrumah's subverting of independent African governments, see: W. Scott Thompson,

Ghana's Foreign Policy 1957-1966: Diplomacy, Ideology, and the Nei•t

State (Princeton: Princeton

University Press, 1969), pp. 221-249; Ghana, Ministry of Information, Nkrumah's Deception of Africa (Accra: Ministry of Information, [1967]). On Nyerere's proposals for states which betray the liberation struggle, see Yash Tandon, 'The Organization of African Unity and the Principle of Univer- sality of Membership: Commentary on The Organization of African Unity and the Freedom Struggle: A Document Presented by the Government of Tanzania at the OAU Summit Conference at Addis Ababa, June 1971," The African Review, I (April, 1972), pp. 52-60.

36. Among Nigeria's inheritances from the colonial period was an arrangement whereby Nigerians were recruited as contract laborers for plantations on Fernando Po, now part of independent Equatorial Guinea. In 1975 there were mounting complaints of mistreatment of Nigerians in Equatorial Guinea, where conditions had been deteriorating since independence from Spain. After eleven Nigerians were killed Nigeria repatriated most of its nationals amid calls for the annexation of Equator- ial Guinea. Early in 1977 reports from Spain said that exiled opponents of the Equatorial Guinea regime, despairing of bringing it down in any other manner, have proposed the annexation of the country by its neighbors, including Nigeria.

37. As an example of the sort of debate which does not publicly take place at official levels in Nigeria, see Ben Turok, Strategic Problems in South Africa's Liberation Struggle: A Critical Analysis (Richmond, B.C.: Liberation Support Movement Information Center, 1974). The a-ideological nature of Nigeria's third military regime was made abundantly clear when General Muhammed addressed the Constitutional Drafting Committee in October, 1975: "... there has been a lively debate in the press urging the introduction of one form of political ideology or another. Past events have, however, shown that we cannot build a future for this country on a rigid political ideology. Such an approach would be unrealistic. The evolution of a doctrinal concept is usually predicated upon the general acceptance by the people of a national political philosophy and, consequently, until all our people, or a large majority of them, have acknowledged a common ideological motivation, it would be fruitless to proclaim any particular philosophy or ideology in our Constitution." Text in Selected Speeches of General Murtala Ramat Muhammed (Yaba: Pacific Printers, Ltd. [1976]), pp. 12- 15.




case of PAIGC in Guinea-Bissau or FRELIMO in Mozambique, or opposing movements have discredited themselves, as in the case of South African assistance to UNITA and FNLA in Angola, has Nigeria thrown the weight of its support behind a single movement.

Nigeria has been suspicious of those who attempt to impose their own imprint upon independent governments by manipulation of the liberation struggle. In 1963 when Sir Abubakar told the Addis Ababa conference that "we in Nigeria are prepared to do anything towards the liberation of all African countries" he added :

I have observed that, when we give assistance to another country which is fighting for its independence, some of us are in the habit of imposing obligations on those States. That is wrong. If we give assistance to African people in any dependent territory, we should not ask for any obligation on their part, because that would almost come to the same point that many of the speakers have made that they would only accept foreign aid without any strings attached.38

When subsequent Nigerian governments were confronted with the necessity of making choices in a more fluid Southern African situation, the major criterion they applied was whether or not a particular alternative would bring to power a government genuinely representative of the African people involved. In 1972 when the Pearce Commission reported that the majority of the Rhodesian population rejected the terms of a proposed settlement worked out by Great Britain and the Rhodesian government in 1971, Nigeria welcomed this on the grounds that the proposed constitutional settlement would have perpetuated minority rule.39 In justifying Nigeria's recognition of the MPLA government in Angola General Muhammed told the First Extraordinary Session of the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government in January 1976:

This is the crux of the Angolan question. On the one hand is the MPLA whose record in the struggle against Portuguese imperialism is impeccable and whose Government in Luanda has been recognized by 23 African countries. The Nigerian Federal Mili- tary Government being deeply convinced that the MPLA is the most dynamic, most nationalistic of all the movements representing the interests of the Angolan people, and convinced that it possesses the attributes of an effective government, joined other African countries in according it recognition... On the other hand are the FNLA and UNITA, two movements which no doubt played their part in the liberation struggle but which have forfeited their right to the leadership of the Angolan people by joining hands with neo-colonialist adventurers and racist soldiers of fortune, including the apostles of apartheid, in a determined effort to destroy the sovereignty of Angola.40

When the independence of the Transkei from South Africa was announced in October, 1976, Nigeria regarded it as a sham and the Nigerian representative to the United Nations promptly introduced a resolution subsequently adopted by 134 members of the General Assembly (with only the United States abstaining) declar- ing Transkei independence invalid.4' In the same month Nigeria condemned the terms of settlement in Rhodesia which had emerged from the initiative of the United States Secretary of State Henry Kissinger on the grounds that the authen-

38. Proceedings of the Summit Conference of Independent African States, CIAS/GEN/INF/35, p. 3.

39. ARB, May 1-31, 1972, p. 2485. 40. Text in New Nigerian (Kaduna), January 19, 1976. 41. ARB, October 1-31, 1976, p. 4190.




tic representatives of the people had not been involved in their formulation and that the proposed interim arrangements were undemocratic and intended to legitimate the minority government.42

With regard to the role of violence in the liberation of Southern Africa, Nigeria has not offered a coherent articulated doctrine but it has evolved a body of consistent practice. It was part of the moderation of the Balewa regime to prefer peaceful solutions to the problems of Southern Africa. Four days before his death in the January, 1966 coup which ended civilian rule in Nigeria Sir Abubakar was addressing an extraordinary meeting of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers. He had convoked this in Lagos in the aftermath of the Rhodesian unilateral declaration of independence in an effort to promote a solution which would involve a peaceful resumption of British rule in Southern Rhodesia followed by constitutional progress towards independence as in any other British colony. At the same time, however, Sir Abubakar's government did not renounce the use of violence in the liberation of Southern Africa. In 1963 Nigeria became one of nine charter members of the OAU's Coordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa, the raison d'etre of which was to channel financial and material support from the independent African states to liberation movements waging warfare against colonial and white minority regimes in Africa. Nigeria participated in the work of the committee and regularly paid its annual contribution to the OAU liberation fund with no protestations of pacifism. If subsequent Nigerian regimes have been still less reticent about the role of violence in the liberation of Southern Africa this can be attributed to the failure of other means of inducing change. The collapse of Portuguese colonialism in Africa in 1974 was above all a proof of the efficacy of violence.

Having suggested that each of Nigeria's four governments since independence has been prepared to support the use of violence in the liberation of South- ern Africa, two refinements should be noted. First, for Nigeria violence in liberating Southern Africa has invariably been violence by proxy. The same is, of course, true of all or nearly all other independent African states, but Nigeria stands out as a black military power with an army of some 200 000 and inevitably there has been speculation both governmental and, especially, non-governmental about direct engagement of Nigerian forces in Southern Africa. There have been some attempts at elevating Nigeria's abstinence from direct military engagement in the liberation of Southern Africa to the level of doctrine. For example, in 1975 Dr. Okoi Arikpo, the then Commissioner for External Affairs, wrote:

As regards the Liberation Movements in Africa, Nigeria believes that only the peoples of the various territories under the leadership of their authentic representatives, can liberate themselves. The duty of independent African countries is to give the Freedom Fighters material and diplomatic support.43

However, this justification is not used consistently each time the idea of a direct military role for Nigeria presents itself and it seems probable that the obstacles to

42. New Nigerian (Kaduna), October 11, 1976. 43. Dr. Okoi Arikpo, "Nigeria and the OAU," Nigerian Journal of International Affairs, I (July,

1975), p. 7. For an indication that this approach was in accord with the thinking of at least one of the more successful liberation movement leaders, see: Amilcar Cabral, Revolution in Guinea: Selected Texts, trans. Richard Handyside (New York and London: Monthly Review Press, 1969), p. 147.




Nigerian military engagement in Southern Africa are more practical and political than doctrinal. Second, it should be noted that while Nigeria has placed increasing emphasis on violence as a means of forcing change in Southern Africa, it has not adopted the Fanonesque idea that the only path to true liberation lies through violence and bloodshed. To do so would be somewhat awkward for a country with

Nigeria's path to independence.

111-MEANS

Nigeria, not contiguous to any of the Southern African territories, powerful by African standards but not sufficiently powerful to hope by itself to sway South Africa, Southern Rhodesia, or Portugal, has approached the liberation of South- ern Africa in concert with other independent African states, the great majority of which share Nigeria's orientation towards Southern Africa. The means available to and employed by Nigeria in pursuit of its objectives in Southern Africa have changed little in their essential variety since the years of the civilian regime. There has been change in Nigeria's capability and determination in employing the available means.

A-Isolation and Deprivation

A series of measures adopted unilaterally or multilaterally by independent African states including Nigeria has sought the diplomatic, economic, and social ostracism of South Africa, Portugal, and, after its unilateral declaration of independence, Southern Rhodesia from the international community. For example, at the 1963 Addis Ababa summit conference the heads of state or government of thirty of the thirty-two then independent African states (excluding South Africa) decided unanimously on:

...the breaking off of diplomatic and consular relations between all African States and the Governments of Portugal and South Africa so long as they persist in their present attitude towards decolonization. ...an effective boycott of the foreign trade of Portugal and South Africa by: (a) prohibiting the import of goods from those two countries; (b) closing all African ports and airports to their ships and planes; (c) forbidding the planes of those two countries to overfly the territories of all African States.44

Diplomatic isolation could be approached both bilaterally and in international organizations. South Africa was invited to Nigeria's independence ceremonies but diplomatic relations were never established. Nor were diplomatic relations established with Southern Rhodesia (although the Balewa regime did allow the establishment in Lagos of a mission from the non-independent Central African Federa- tion). However,

up till the time of the coup in January 1966, the Portuguese government maintained a diplomatic post in Lagos, though manned by a very junior official. 45

44. Proceedings of the Summit Conference of Independent African States, CIAS/Plen2/Rev.2. 45. Aluko, Ghana and Nigeria, pp. 42-43.




The Portuguese diplomatic presence in Lagos was terminated by the first military regime of General Ironsi in 1966.

Nigeria's most telling blow in the diplomatic isolation of South Africa was its role in forcing South Africa out of the Commonwealth in 1961. How vital a part Sir Abubakar played in this is a matter of disagreement.46 However, there is no disagreement with the historical facts that Afro-Asian states like India and Ghana had joined South Africa at the Prime Ministers' meeting table in previous years and that it was only after Nigeria's participation, which fortuitously coincided with South Africa's application to remain a member after becoming a republic, that South Africa was forced to withdraw. Nor is there any doubt that being forced out of the Commonwealth association with Great Britain, Canada, Au- stralia, and New Zealand was much more bitter for South Africa than the refusal of a series of new African states to establish diplomatic relations. Contributing to the ousting of South Africa from the Commonwealth was difficult to surpass, but Nigeria and other African states maintained the pressure. In June, 1961 the Inter- national Labor Organization adopted a resolution proposed by Nigeria which asked South Africa to withdraw, which ultimately it did in 1964. South Africa and Portugal were either driven out of international organizations or, where this failed, subjected to harassment by walkouts, votes of censure, non-recognition of cre- dentials, or other radical international parliamentary techniques. With the re- habilitation of Portugal since 1974 the campaign continues against South Africa. In 1976 Nigeria was reported to be mounting a campaign to have South Africa barred from the International Atomic Energy Agency.47

Nigeria's economic boycott of South Africa dates back to the adoption of a ban on South African imports by the House of Representatives in April, 1960 in response to the Sharpeville killings. As Table I shows, Nigerian trade with South Africa and Portugal did not disappear from the International Monetary Fund and United Nations Economic Commission for Africa statistics until 1970. Even after South Africa and Portugal had disappeared from Nigerian trade statistics there were some leakages. In 1973 and 1974, well before Portugal had ceased being a colonial state in Africa, a Portuguese wine, Mateus Rose, was readily available in Nigerian supermarkets. In 1975 when the Federal Military Government responded to a serious beer shortage by facilitating imports there were complaints from the political gossip columnist of the New Nigerian that among the cosmopolitan array of beers which turned up was a South African brand.48 The important thing, however, is the curtailment of trade on a significant scale. The few leakages point to the difficulty in enforcing the boycott in the face of re-exports from less moral states and a booming economy with heavily overloaded international cargo han- dling and clearing facilities when much of the wholesale and retail trade is still in the hands of large multinational trading companies. Of late the Federal Military

46. On his return to Nigeria Sir Abubakar did not discourage the impression that he played the key role in driving South Africa out of the Commonwealth. J. D. B. Miller's painstaking reconstruction of what took place in the closed meetings suggests that Nigeria's part was important but not preponderant. "South Africa's Departure," Journal of

Commonwl'ealth Politic-al Studies, I (November, 1961),

pp. 56-74. 47. West Africa, September 6, 1975, p. 1305. 48. "Candido: The Man Behind the Mask," New Nigerian (Kaduna), November 26, 1975;

December 3, 1975.




TABLE I

Nigeria's trade with South Africa and Portugal, 1959-197/a (in US $1/,000,000 to nearest ./)

59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71

Imports from S. Africa 2.8 2.9 .3 .1 + + + + + + .1

Portugal - - - .8 .8 .8 .5 .7 1.7 2.1 1.0

Exports to S. Africa .8 .3 .1 .1 + .1 1.1 .1 .1 .2 +

Portugal - - - .8 5.2 4.3 13.0 5.2 14.8 11.5 13.5

Symbols : + = trade valued at less than $50,000 - = no trade recorded in the statistics used

a Completed from International Monetary Fund-International Bank for Reconstruction and De-

velopment, Direction of Trade Annual, 1958-1972 (Washington: Statistical Bureau of the International

Monetary Fund, n.d.) and United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, Foreign Trade Statistics

for Afi-ica (E/CN. 14/STAT/Ser.A/7-24).

Government has begun to bear down on retailers of contraband. In February, 1977, for example, it was reported that the Nigerian Police,

after a raid in search of South African goods... sealed the premises of a UTC branch at Apapa and took away raisins apparently produced in South Africa.49

In 1964 the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government supplemented the 1963 Addis Ababa Conference resolution barring overflight rights and port and airport facilities to South African and Portuguese carriers with a decision

to take the necessary steps to refuse any aroplane or ship or any other means of communication going to or coming from South Africa the right to fly over the territories of member states or utilize their ports or any other facilities.50

In Nigeria the primary boycott against South African and Portuguese flag carriers does not appear to have been fully implemented until July, 1966 when the Ironsi

regime announced that it was closing Nigerian ports and airports to Portugal because of her "brutal colonial policy in Africa."''" Application of the secondary boycott on airlines and shipping took longer and may still not be fully in effect. In the mid-1970s European airliners regularly landed at Lagos and Kano en route to and from South Africa, although by 1976 there seemed to be an attempt in published airline flight schedules to make this less than obvious. It was only in Feb- ruary, 1977 that the shipping news in the weekly West Africa stopped showing ships of the Mitsui Osk Line stopping in Durban and Capetown before proceeding to Apapa. Whether it is the practice which has stopped or the public announcement of it remains open to question.

The most widely publicized aspect of social isolation as an instrument for inducing change in Southern Africa is doubtless the continual boycott campaign in

49. West Africa, February 21, 1977, p. 390 citing Daily Times (Lagos). 50. OAU documents CM/Res. 13 (II); AHG/Res. 5 (I). 51. Morning Post, July 23, 1966 quoted in Aluko, Ghana and Nigeria, p. 96.




sports, directed particularly against the Republic of South Africa to which sports seem to be important. As in other areas of sanctions, Nigeria has demonstrated increasing determination in the application of the sports boycott. This can be seen in a comparison of the 1972 Olympic Games in Munich and the 1976 Olympic Games in Montreal. Rhodesia had been barred from the 1968 Olympics but arrangements had been agreed to by the Supreme Council for Sports in Africa for Rhodesia to compete at Munich under certain conditions, such as that Rhodesians participate as British subjects with British passports and that the British national anthem be played for them. This arrangement had been agreed to by the Nigerian Federal Ministry of Labour, which had jurisdiction over sports, but as the Olym- pics approached there was public protest against any form of Rhodesian competition. The Nigerian Ministry of External Affairs thought that Nigeria should withdraw, which led to disagreement with the Ministry of Labour. Ultimately the Rhodesians were banned from competing on the grounds that they had not abided by the terms of the agreement on their participation in such areas as British passports for all contenders, which created a way out of an embarrassing predicament.52 The confusion and disagreement between the two ministries suggested that in 1972 the application of the boycott was not automatic, in marked contrast to the reaction to the 1976 Olympics where the grounds for boycott were much more remote. During the interim between the 1972 and 1976 Olympics Nigeria had withdrawn from several international sports events, including Davis Cup tennis competition in 1975, the World Amateur Squash Championship in 1976, and junior tennis championships at Wimbledon in the same year, because of the National Sports Commission's policy of "total boycott of racist South Africa in any sporting event anywhere in the world.""53 At the 1976 Olympics the issue was not Southern Rhodesia or South Africa, neither of which were there, but New Zealand which had not prevented a private football club from making a tour of South Africa. Nigeria was one of the first African states to withdraw because of New Zealand's presence and this time the decision did not seem to involve any confusion.54 Later in the year, apparently taken with the success of the secondary boycott at Montreal, Nigeria let it be known that it would organize a boycott of the 1978 Commonwealth Games in Edmonton, Alberta, if any Commonwealth state participated in sports with South Africa.55

The social isolation of the minority and colonial regimes also extended to the prevention of inter-personal contacts other than sports. Again in reaction to the Sharpeville killings, in 1960 both the Federal and Northern Region governments pledged not to employ white South Africans. In November, 1961, South Africans lost the privileges of Commonwealth citizenship in Nigeria. In the same month the South African Dutch Reformed Church was expelled from Nigeria.56 There continued to be a small number of white South Africans privately employed in Nigeria until 1966 when the Ironsi government declared Portuguese and white South

52. The account of Nigeria and the 1972 Olympics is derived from Olajide Aluko, "Public Opinion and Nigerian Foreign Policy Under the Military," Quarterly Journal of Administration, VII (April, 1973), pp. 260-63.

53. New Nigerian (Kaduna), May 10, 1976. 54. West Africa, July 26, 1976, p. 1082. 55. Ibid., November 15, 1976, p. 1731. 56. Phillips, pp. 119- 121.




Africans prohibited immigrants.57 After the war there were exceptions to this policy. In July, 1974 Colin Eglin, the white leader of South Africa's Progressive Party, who was touring Africa in company with a Progressive Party MP, not only visited Nigeria but met with the head of state. However, in March, 1975 Nigeria barred an annual meeting of the International Press Institute scheduled for Lagos because it was not prepared to admit white delegates from South Africa."5

At the same time Nigerians were prevented form visiting South Africa. In March, 1975 a Nigerian journalist who turned up in South Africa (where he was quoted as saying that 'in Nigeria the general view was that this was a place where the whites were cannibals and eat the blacks") said that he expected to be de- tained upon his return home.59 At about the same time rumours of other Nigerians traveling to South Africa with commercial motives were met with warnings that they and embassies which assisted them would have to face the consequences of violating Nigeria's policy of isolating South Africa until it changed its ways. In August, 1976 the passports of six Nigerian Reformed Church members who wanted to attend an ecumenical meeting in Capetown were reported to have been seized.60

Several patterns emerge from this survey of Nigeria's efforts to promote liberation by subjecting colonial and minority regimes to deprivation and isolation. Portugal was more leniently dealt with than South Africa, particularly under the civilian regime. This was acknowledged during the civil war when Dr. Okoi Arikpo, the Federal Commissioner for External Affairs, expressed his disap- pointment at Portugal's assistance to Biafra, saying that Nigeria had always tried "to adopt a modest approach" with Portugal.6' Perhaps there was a feeling that since Portugal was a European colonial state it would eventually follow the example of Great Britain and France, or perhaps Portugal received easier treatment because it at least preached a doctrine of assimilation and was not the avowedly racist state South Africa was. There was a general tightening of sanctions against both South Africa and Portugal until Portugal's withdrawal from Africa rendered them unnecessary in its case. As for Southern Rhodesia, there were so few ties that it was difficult to find any to break. By the third military regime primary sanctions against South Africa were almost one hundred per cent effective, in spite of the occasional tin of South African beer.

While the potential for primary sanctions operating directly against South Africa and Southern Rhodesia seems to be almost exhausted, the more difficult and complex area of secondary sanctions - sanctions against other international actors both state and non-state which do not cooperate with the policy of isolating South Africa and Southern Rhodesia - has until very recently been largely un- explored except for the imperfectly observed ban on air and sea traffic to and from South Africa. There have been occasional threats of secondary sanctions. At the 1971 Commonwealth Prime Ministers Meeting in Singapore the possibility of a resumption of British arms sales to South Africa was a major topic. Nigeria's

57. Aluko, Ghana and Nigeria, p. 96. 58. ARB, March 1-31, 1975, p. 3579. 59. Ibid., p. 3552. 60. West Africa, August 16, 1976, p. 1197. 61. ARB, November 1-30, 1967, p. 912 citing Radio Kaduna.




Commissioner for External Affairs, who led the delegation, said in a press conference that if Britain did sell arms to South Africa

breaking off economic ties, actions against British oil companies, or action against British business, any or a combination of these might well be taken.62

In 1973 it was reported that Nigeria had refused to increase oil exports to Great Britain due to displeasure over recent helicopter sales to South Africa.63 In 1975 when the Gulf Oil Company refused to pay royalties to the MPLA government in Angola for Gulf's oil production in Cabinda Nigeria may have dropped hints to the Gulf Oil Company in Nigeria. However, as yet Nigeria has not openly and sys- tematically attempted to exert pressure on and through multinational banks and companies operating in both Nigeria and South Africa. It can be expected that there will be greater use of secondary sanctions in increasing the ostracism of South Africa. Nigeria is economically strong enough and attractive enough as a market to force shipping lines, airlines, and individual multinational corporations to choose between business in South Africa and business in Nigeria.

B -Force

Precise data on Nigeria's assistance to liberation movements engaged in armed struggle for the liberation of Southern Africa are not to be had. It is clear that it began at least by 1963 when Nigeria became a member of the Coordinating Com- mittee for the Liberation of Africa. Nigeria's election to the committee was due to recognition of Nigeria's potential importance in any joint African endeavor rather than to recognition of past performance. Nigeria under Balewa exhibited considerable diffidence in its relations with all liberation movements and tended to keep them at a distance.64 Some liberation movements were received in Lagos and others were not. None were allowed to establish a permanent presence in Nigeria. Channeling all its support to the liberation movements through the Coordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa offered a highly satisfactory means of assisting the movements while keeping them at arms' length. The Committee continued to be the primary, perhaps sole, vehicle of Nigerian support to the liberation movements until 1968 when a problem arose. The Liberation Committee was a branch of the OAU but it had its headquarters in Dar es Salaam, where Tanzania kept it under fairly close supervision. In 1968 when Tanzania was the first of five states to recognize Biafra, the Federal Military Government of Nigeria ceased making its contribution to the liberation movements through the Liberation Com- mittee on the grounds that Tanzania was diverting liberation funds to Biafra.65 After the war Nigeria resumed its payments through the Committee but continued its direct contributions and other contacts with the liberation movements.

Like all entities involved with Southern Africa's liberation movements, Nigeria has encountered the frustration of the existence of multiple movements.

62. Ibid., February 1-28, 1971, p. 2027. 63. Africa Confidential, XIV, no. 25 (December 14, 1973), pp. 4-6. 64. On Balewa and liberation movements, see: Akinyemi, p. 106; Phillips, p. 127; Aluko,

Ghana and Nigeria, p. 92. Holden Roberto's experiences with the Balewa regime are related in John Marcum, The Angolan Revolution: Volume I-The Anatomy of an Explosion (1950-1962) (Cam- bridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 1969), p. 257.

65. Aluko, Political Quarterly, p. 187.




For a variety of reasons, the specific mix of which varies from case to case but which includes power struggles, disagreement over ideology and tactics, backing by rival African and extra-African states, and ethnic and regional differences, each of the non-liberated territories in Africa has produced at least two and sometimes many more liberation movements, each with its own acronym and search for external support. Especially after it stopped sheltering behind the collective decisions of the Coordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa, Nigeria had to decide which movements to back. The development of the policy of ignoring ideological differences and concentrating on establishment of truly nationalist regimes in each territory has already been mentioned. In some cases this meant supporting a single ascendant liberation movement. Where liberation movements were divided and of approximately equal strength and none was tainted by association with the enemy, Nigeria urged the creation of national fronts.

Nigeria's approach to the support of liberation movements developed under earlier regimes but its application can be seen most clearly since the advent of the third military regime in July, 1975 brought an intensification of Nigeria's relations with liberation movements in Southern Africa. The flexibility of the policy was exhibited during the Angolan civil war. Nigeria's initial policy was to urge the three major Angolan movements to form a government of national unity. As November 11, 1975, the scheduled date of Portugal's withdrawal, drew closer Nigeria launched a vigorous campaign for a three week delay in Angolan independence to enable this to be accomplished.66 The Portuguese withdrew on schedule leaving behind a civil war between rival governments proclaimed by MPLA on the one hand and UNITA-FNLA on the other. As the war raged Nigeria continued to urge unity67 until November 25, 1975 when it recognized the MPLA government after South Africa's military entry into Angola in support of UNITA and FNLA. A few days later the Nigerian Commissioner for External Affairs repeated the call for unity and invited leaders of the three movements to Lagos for talks with that objective (although he did not express much hope that the invitation would be

accepted).68 Recognition of the MPLA, which ceased from Nigeria's point of view to be a liberation movement and became the government of an independent Afri- can state, was followed by a grant of $20 000 00069 in December and active diplomatic support which contributed to the acceptance of MPLA as the legitimate government of Angola by most African and extra-African states.

Angola was a success for Nigeria because a timely abandonment of the policy of national unity placed Nigeria on the winning side at a time when its winning was by no means inevitable, thereby creating close bonds between the two governments. Elsewhere Nigeria's efforts have been more frustrating. In Southern Rhodesia the problem has been whom to assist. In September, 1975 the Nigerian Federal Military Government gave $32 750 to the African National Con- gress (ANC) "for appropriate use in the interest of all the people of Zimbabwe."70 The money was placed in the hands of Bishop Abel Muzorewa, who had just announced the expulsion of Joshua Nkomo from the ANC. In receiving the money

66. New Nigerian (Kaduna), November 10, 1975. 67. Ibid., November 23, 1975; November 24, 1975; Sunday Times (Lagos), November 23, 1975. 68. Daily Times (Lagos), December 5, 1975. 69. Ibid., December 22, 1975. 70. New Nigerian (Kaduna), September 15, 1975.




Muzorewa referred to past Nigerian assistance through the OAU and Nigeria's provision of many places in universities and schools for Zimbabwe students, but left the impression that this was the first time the ANC had received funds directly from Nigeria. In October the Nigerian Federal Commissioner for External Affairs, Joseph Garba, publicly confirmed that Nigeria recognized and supported the ANC under the leadership of Muzorewa." In April, 1976, however, Garba said that "because we are getting disenchanted with the leadership of the African National Council" requests from both Muzorewa and Nkomo for permission to visit Lagos had been turned down.72 In July, 1976 the OAU adopted a policy of cutting off direct aid to the various movements and factions in Zimbabwe and channeling all assistance through the Liberation Committee and the government of Mozambique in the hope that this would provide a degree of leverage for the promotion of unity. Nigeria's compliance with the OAU policy was indicated on July 5 when Garba presented $250 000 to Mozambique for use in Zimbabwe and said

In normal conditions, the cheque would have been sent to the unchallenged leader of Zimbabwe. Unfortunately, this person does not exist, the two liberation movements being busy fighting each other.73

He called for a united front, a theme to which he returned in October:

Almost daily we hear that somebody has shot into prominence from virtually nowhere and the next day you hear that another person has gone down into obscurity. It is our hope that the nationalists will be able, even at this late hour, to forge a united front for the purpose of effective bargaining.74

There has been comparatively less interaction between Nigeria and liberation movements in South Africa and South West Africa. An occasional delegation from the South African movements visits Lagos. For example, a representative of the Pan-African Congress (PAC) of South Africa came to Nigeria in September, 1976 for talks with the Federal Military Government. He praised Nigeria's support for Angola as an encouragement to South Africa and referred to the "popular uprising" in Soweto and elsewhere in South Africa as the beginning of the end for the apartheid government.75 However, in spite of his praise and the interjection of a note of urgency and optimism, he did not seem to have secured any direct support from the Federal Military Government. As recently as January, 1977, in a joint communique issued by General Obasanjo and President Kaunda of Zambia, Nigeria was urging the PAC and the African National Congress of South Africa to unite in a common front.76 One of the most telling changes in Nigerian policy on liberation movements under the third military regime has concerned South West Africa (Namibia) where Nigeria recognizes the South West African Peoples Or- ganization (SWAPO) and supports its armed struggle against South Africa. There is no public record of substantial direct assistance to SWAPO, but in April, 1976

71. Ibid., October 28, 1975; Daily Times (Lagos), December 1, 1975. 72.

Newi, Nigerian (Kaduna), April 24, 1976. 73. ARB, July 1-31, 1976, p. 4080; West Africa, July 19, 1976, p. 1042. 74. West Africa, October 25, 1976, p. 1602. In January, 1977 Joshua Nkomo was reported to

have met with General Obasanjo in Lagos. Ibid., January 17, 1977. It is as yet unclear what this may signify.

75. Ibid., September 6, 1976, p. 1305. 76. Ibid., January 24, 1977, p. 173.




when SWAPO's President Samuel Nujoma visited Nigeria he was given permission to open a permanent SWAPO office in Lagos. This seems a small thing, but it was the first breach of a long standing Nigerian policy of refusing to allow any liberation movements whatsoever permission to establish a continuing presence in Nigeria. Nujoma himself had been turned down by the Gowon regime in an earlier request.77

Although there has been an increase in the magnitude and intimacy of Nigeria's support to movements engaged at least in part in the liberation of South- ern Africa by force, there has been no change in Nigeria's refusal to become engaged militarily itself, either unilaterally or in concert with other African states. There have been periodic Nigerian flirtations with the idea of establishing an "African High Command," a concept which had been part of Kwame Nkrumah's proposals for the political unification of Africa.7" The functions an African High Command was expected to perform included protecting the continent from ag- gression from external sources and serving as a "police force" in intra-African disputes as well as liberation. When the idea was discussed within the OAU in 1963 Nigeria rejected the Ghanaian proposal out of hand but did recognize the utility of an African force which could take over from the United Nations Opera- tion in the Congo or occupy the then disputed territory between Algeria and Morocco. However, the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government in 1964 rejected any institutionalization of military cooperation in Africa.

Circumstances combined to place Nigeria at the center of a resumed debate on an African High Command in 1970. Nigeria, as noted previously, had emerged from the war with a much enlarged military establishment and had not im- mediately set about its demobilization. When questioned about this in March, 1970 the Army Chief of Staff had said

We should be ready to fight for any African country on the platform of the OAU and also to fight on behalf of the United Nations.79

There were similar statements from other members of the government. In November, 1970 the Republic of Guinea experienced a small and unsuccessful invasion which it blamed on Portugal. In response Nigeria convoked an extraordinary session of the OAU Council of Ministers which met in Lagos in December simultaneously with a meeting of the OAU Defence Commission, which had been moribund for some time. Gowon welcomed the Council of Ministers with a call for "action, timely action." The Council responded by calling on the Defence Com- mission to "study ways and means of establishing an adequate and speedy defence of African States,"80 which the Nigerian chairman of the Defence Commis- sion subsequently interpreted as a mandate to prepare a proposal for the establishment of an African High Command."' Subsequently the idea of an African High Command was dropped again although there was some progress in planning

77. New Nigerian (Kaduna), April 1, 1976; April 7, 1976; Times International (Lagos), March 8, 1976; Sunday Times (Lagos), April 11, 1976.

78. On the idea of an African High Command see, inter alia : O. lyanda and J. Stremlau, " The Dilemma of the African High Command," Nigeria: Bulletin on Foreign Affairs, I (October, 1971), pp. 8-13.

79. ARB, March 1-31, 1970, p. 1700. 80. Ibid., December 1-31, 1970, p. 1947. 8 1. Ibid., December 1 1- 31, 1971, p. 2303.




for regional defence arrangements. However, all the talk of an African High Command coupled with the failure to establish one created such a situation in Nigeria that on July 20, the then Commissioner for External Affairs felt compelled to convene a special press conference

to clear up the current misconception about a long-standing cliche on a matter of the utmost importance to independent Africa... that favourite emotive phrase, AFRICAN HIGH COMMAND.

He stated that the establishment of such a body was impractical at the time, that General Gowon's OAU speech calling for liberation of at least one territory within three years was "not based on the expectation that an African High Command will spring up overnight to accomplish the task," and that "the Freedom Fighters themselves do not pin their hopes on an African High Command."82

The Angolan civil war brought another flurry of interest in the possibility of Nigerian military engagement in Southern Africa either singly or in an African High Command.83 A military role for Nigeria in Angola seemed to make sense, especially after Nigeria's recognition of MPLA and the establishment of close relations between the two governments. It certainly seemed to make more sense than the continued Cuban presence. Nigeria had some experience in military activities beyond its borders, having participated in the United Nations Operation in the Congo and having sent a military contingent to take over from British troops which Tanganyika had called in on an emergency basis after the Tanganyikan army mutiny of 1964. In December, 1976 Dr. Jonas Savimbi, leader of UNITA which was continuing the civil war against MPLA in Angola, said that plans were under way for Nigerian troops to replace Cuban troops supporting MPLA in Angola. In January, 1977 it was reported in London that not only were Nigerian troops replacing Cubans in Angola but also that Nigeria had offered to engage its military forces in Zimbabwe.84 In response to such reports the Nigerian Federal Military Government stated that "no such offer of troops has been made to either the Zimbabwean freedom fighters or to the independent Angolan Government" and added that

the Nigerian Government does not consider the commitment of its troops to the struggle in Zimbabwe or any other part of the African continent as necessary.85

82. "Statement by the Commissioner for External Affairs, Dr. Okoi Arikpo, at a Press Confer- ence held in Lagos on Tuesday, 20th July, 1971," Nigeria: Bulletin on Foreign Affairs, I (October, 1971), p. 54.

83. The Newt Nigerian (Kaduna), January 28, 1976 printed readers's submissions under the heading "Should Nigerian Troops Fight in Angola ? with one contributor arguing "yes" and the other "no". The Nigerian Herald (Ilorin), March 3, 1976 asked its readers "Is It Not Time to Establish an African High Command ?" and published four favorable and three negative responses. In contrast to 1970, there were few public statements from government officials which suggested a favorable orientation toward Nigerian military engagement in Angola, although General Bisalla, the Commissioner for Defence who was soon to be executed for his alleged role in the abortive coup of February 13, 1976, did state publicly that Nigeria would send troops to Angola "should the need arise." New, Nigerian (Kaduna), February 2, 1976.

84. ARB, December 1-31, 1976, p. 4257; Daily Telegraph (London), January 31, 1977, n.v. 85. Neit' Nigerian (Kaduna), February 4, 1977.




C-Dialogue

"Dialogue" became a topic of debate in African international relations in 1970 when President Felix Houphouet-Boigny advocated it as an alternative to confrontation and ostracism as a means of inducing change in Southern Africa, particularly South Africa. Houphouet-Boigny's initiative had its antecedents in a series of events in the late 1960s-the independence of Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland, three black African states whose circumstances prevented them from severing relations with South Africa; the adoption of the Lusaka Manifesto in which black African states acknowledged their own imperfection, expressed a preference for peace and a promise of patience if the white regimes would begin to move in the direction of majority rule, and sought to allay fears by stating that i all the peoples who have made their homes in the countries of Southern Africa are Africans regardless of the colour of their skins"'86 ; and the exchange of diplomatic representatives between South Africa and Malawi.

Dialogue was subjected to a full-scale debate at the meetings of the OAU Council of Ministers and Assembly of Heads of State and Government in Addis Ababa in June, 1971. During the preceding year when advocating dialogue Pre- sident Houphouet-Boigny had referred to measures such as breaking diplomatic relations and forbidding landing rights as "tragic and ridiculous" and had said that

We must not underestimate South Africa, we must not threaten force. We do not have the means of following up our threats.87

Houphouet was not present at Addis Ababa but a statement read on his behalf repeated the arguments for dialogue in a less abrasive tone, placing particular emphasis on the need for peace but not ignoring the futility of what had been undertaken in the past. The statement also observed that

the activities of Nationalists [i.e., guerrillas] are not incompatible with the search for Peace by way of Dialogue. They are complementary.88

Nigeria was not convinced. It joined twenty-seven other OAU members in adopt- ing a declaration which stated that

the proposal for a dialogue between the independent African States and the racist minority regime of South Africa is a manceuvre by that regime and its allies to divide African States, confuse world public opinion, relieve South Africa from international ostracism and isolation and obtain an acceptance of the status quo in southern Africa. 89

General Gowon explained Nigeria's position as follows:

I see only two alternatives: either abject appeasement or direct confrontation. Nigeria will never be a party to the first alternative. We reject any appeasement or accommo- dation with South Africa as inconsistent with the principles of our Charter and the

86. On the Lusaka Manifesto, see: N. M. Shamuyarira, "The Lusaka Manifesto on Southern Africa, Lusaka 14th- 16th April 1969: Full Text Commentary on the Lusaka Manifesto," The African Review, I (March, 1971), pp. 66-79.

87. ARB, November 1-30, 1970, p. 1921. 88. Organization of African Unity, The Principles of the OA U Charter, the Lusaka Manifesto,

Dialogue and Future Strategy (Addis Ababa: OAU Secretariat, June, 1971), p. 164. 89. OAU document CM/ST.5 (XVII).




provisions of the Lusaka Manifesto. Apartheid is a crime against humanity. This view is not based on a diagnosis of probability. The facts are clear. The international community knows them. Africa has identified them. It is for us to mobilize ourselves effectively and totally to deal with the situation. Let no one deceive himself that South Africa is spending over ?180 million for defence purposes and seeking to acquire nuclear capability only to come to terms with independent Africa and to grant the right of self-determination to her African population. South Africa is growing into an oc- topus. It is reaching out beyond its frontiers. It is exporting its racist policies. It is being used by imperialist powers to regain their foothold in Africa.90

Neither South Africa nor some black African advocates of the policy of dialogue have wholly given up on it. Nigeria has not altered its position on the issue since its thorough rejection by General Gowon in 1971.

CONCLUSION

During the sixteen years of its independence the continuing emotional interest Nigeria perceived in the liberation of the black peoples of Southern Africa was overlaid by the civil war lesson that continuation of colonialism and white minority regimes represented a threat to Nigeria's security and national survival. Start- ing before independence Nigeria adopted a series of measures intended to induce change in Southern Africa by ostracizing the minority and colonial regimes and supporting guerrilla warfare by liberation movements. The means and meaning of liberating Southern Africa adopted by the civilian regime did not differ essentially from those employed by the military regime ten years later. In particular, all of Nigeria's governments eschewed direct military engagement in Southern Africa. There was, however, corresponding in part to the changed perception of Nigerian national interest in the liberation of Southern Africa, a growing intensification of Nigeria's efforts and an increasing support for and intimacy with liberation movements.

Nigeria's greater involvement in the campaign to liberate southern Africa has not as yet involved major sacrifices or serious risks. In fact, it has been to the domestic political advantage of the military regimes to assume a more visible role in supporting African liberation. Nigeria's attentive public concerned with foreign policy is composed of the press, student organizations, academics, labour organizations, former politicians with an eye towards the return of civilian rule in 1979, and a handful of associations organized with the purpose of advancing the liberation struggle in Southern Africa (the membership of such groups overlaps considerably with those components of the attentive public already mentioned). It has almost invariably demanded a more activist role from its government. A stronger line on Southern Africa has, aside from its other virtues, been an inexpensive and easy way of gratifying an influential segment of the population.

If Nigeria has not yet made major sacrifices or incurred serious risks in Southern Africa, whether it will do so in future is open to question. The most likely departure from past policy is commitment of Nigerian forces to Angola, but since this would simply be a matter of coming to the assistance of a reasonably well-entrenched friendly government recognized by the international community it would not mark a radical departure from the precedent of Nigeria's assistance to

90. The Principles of the OAU Charter, p. 153.




Tanganyika in 1964. Commitment of Nigerian forces to Zimbabwe or Namibia would be a different matter and is much less likely to occur. Still more open to question is whether any additional measures Nigeria is likely to undertake would have any appreciable impact on South Africa or Southern Rhodesia. However, at the same time there is the undoubted fact that Nigeria accomplishes a great deal by maintaining its present stance. Any move toward acceptance of dialogue and ditente by the world's "first black power" would be a significant breakthrough for South Africa.



Documents

Nigeria and Southern Africa: Interest, Policy, and Means