No 4 - Thursday, September 15, 2011

8/3/2019 No 4 - Thursday, September 15, 2011

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SELECTED NEWS AND VIEWSCOLLECTED BY YE KYAW SWA

No 4 - Thursday, September 15, 2011

This is the combination or the continuation of the blog named

http://mahathuriya.blogspot.com/ News,Views & Opinions

Thursday, September 15, 2011 NO 4

QUOTATION

"The talent of insinuation is more useful than that of persuasion, as everybody is open toinsinuation, but scarce any to persuasion. "

Philip Dormer Stanhope Chesterfield, 4th Earl

http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/insinuation?fromRef=true (Quotes)
http://mahathuriya.blogspot.com/https://www.btunnel.com/index.php/1010110A/f64ba309d689542a2c508379c7dec8210b86df9bd401e44c473d5a1e315316770https://www.btunnel.com/index.php/1010110A/f64ba309d689542a2c508379c7dec8210b86df9bd401e44c473d5a1e315316770http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/insinuation?fromRef=truehttp://dictionary.reference.com/browse/insinuation?fromRef=truehttp://dictionary.reference.com/browse/insinuation?fromRef=truehttps://www.btunnel.com/index.php/1010110A/f64ba309d689542a2c508379c7dec8210b86df9bd401e44c473d5a1e315316770http://mahathuriya.blogspot.com/


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Collectors Items

- Special Representative and Policy Coordinator for Burma Trip to Burma (Media Note)

- Derek Mitchell - Press Conference in Rangoon, Burma ( September 14, 2011 )

- James Manns About Face (Sino-American relations from Nixon to Clinton)

- The Depression in the United States (1929)--An Overview

- US.-Japan Relations for the 21st Century - Statement of Kurt M. Campbell

Assistant Secretary of State (July 27, 2010)

- Korea, Republic of (ROK) History - (Encyclopedia of the Nations )
http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/


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Home Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs Bureau of Public Affairs Bureau of Public Affairs: Press Relations Press Releases Press Releases:2011 Press Releases: September 2011 Special Representative and PolicyCoordinator for Burma Trip to Burma

Special Representative and Policy Coordinator for Burma Trip to Burma

Media Note

Office of the Spokesperson

Washington, DCSeptember 6, 2011

Ambassador Derek Mitchell, the Special Representative and Policy Coordinator for Burma, willdepart on his first trip to Burma in his position on Wednesday, September 7. During his trip, he

looks forward to meeting with a full spectrum of Burmese society, including governmentofficials, members of political parties, local civil society organizations, and others.

His trip is intended to build upon U.S. dialogue and engagement toward shared goals of genuine reform, reconciliation, and development for the Burmese people.

Ambassador Mitchell will attend meetings in Nay Pyi Taw on September 9-10 and will continueconsultations in Rangoon September 10-14. The Ambassador plans to consult with officials inBangkok September 14-15 and Jakarta September 16-17.

PRN: 2011/1416

http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/09/171711.htm
http://www.state.gov/http://www.state.gov/http://www.state.gov/r/index.htmhttp://www.state.gov/r/index.htmhttp://www.state.gov/r/index.htmhttp://www.state.gov/r/pa/index.htmhttp://www.state.gov/r/pa/index.htmhttp://www.state.gov/r/pa/index.htmhttp://www.state.gov/r/pa/index.htmhttp://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/index.htmhttp://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/index.htmhttp://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/index.htmhttp://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/index.htmhttp://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/index.htmhttp://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/index.htmhttp://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/index.htmhttp://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/index.htmhttp://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/index.htmhttp://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/index.htmhttp://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/09/index.htmhttp://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/09/index.htmhttp://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/09/index.htmhttp://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/09/171711.htmhttp://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/09/171711.htmhttp://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/09/171711.htmhttp://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/09/171711.htmhttp://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/09/171711.htmhttp://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/09/171711.htmhttp://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/09/index.htmhttp://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/index.htmhttp://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/index.htmhttp://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/index.htmhttp://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/index.htmhttp://www.state.gov/r/pa/index.htmhttp://www.state.gov/r/pa/index.htmhttp://www.state.gov/r/index.htmhttp://www.state.gov/


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Derek Mitchell: Press Conference in Rangoon,Burma

By Derek MitchellThursday, 15 September 2011 10:12

Derek Mitchell, Special Representative and Policy Coordinator for Burma

Press Conference in Rangoon, Burma

Thursday, 15 September 2011, 2:43 pm Press Release: US State Department

Press Conference in Rangoon, Burma

RemarksDerek Mitchell

Special Representative and Policy Coordinator for BurmaRangoon, BurmaSeptember 14, 2011

AMBASSADOR MITCHELL:Mingalaba. Good Morning. Let me read a brief preparedstatement. I have just completed my first visit to Burma as U.S. Special Representative


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and Policy Coordinator. I have spent the past five days in intensive consultations with afull spectrum of interlocutors in Nay Pyi Taw and in Rangoon to discuss the situationhere and ways in which the United States can support and promote democracy, humanrights, development and national reconciliation in the country in our common interests.

I want to acknowledge first the governments excellent hospitality, Charg dAffairesMichael Thurston and his outstanding team at the U.S. Embassy for a quick turnaroundin organizing a visit, and all my interlocutors for their time and candor during ourmeetings over the past several days.

Being my initial visit, my primary goal was to introduce myself, listen to localperspectives, and establish relationships that I will build on as I proceed to fulfill my

mandate and responsibilities for managing U.S. Burma policy.

In Nay Pyi Taw, I met with Union Parliament Speaker Khin Aung Myint, PeoplesParliament Speaker Thura Shwe Mann, Foreign Minister Wunna Maung Lwin, Labor andSocial Welfare Minister Aung Kyi, Border Affairs Minister Lieutenant General Thein Htay,Information Minister Kyaw Hsan, and USDP Secretary General Htay Oo. I also met witha cross section of opposition MPs, including representatives from ethnic minorityregions.

I was encouraged by and pleased with the quality and openness of the exchanges, andthe constructive and respectful tone of each interaction I had. During these meetings,my government interlocutors repeatedly stated that this country had opened a newchapter to a civilian-led democratic governing structure and expressed that they weresincerely committed to reform in the interest of human rights, democracy,development, and national reconciliation.

I responded that the United States recognized and welcomed recent gestures from NayPyi Taw, such as President Thein Seins meeting wit h Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, theestablishment of a National Human Rights Commission, public emphasis on dialoguewith ethnic minority groups in the interest of national reconciliation, and moderateeasing of media censorship. Among both the international community and the Burmese


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people, it is clear from my visit that there are heightened expectations and hopes thatchange, real change, may be on the horizon.

At the same time, I was frank about the many questions the United States and others

continue to have about implementation and follow-through on these stated goals. Inoted that many within the international community remain skeptical about thegovernments commitment to genuine reform and reconciliation, and I urged authoritiesto prove the skeptics wrong.

To that end, I raised concerns regarding the detention of approximately 2,000 politicalprisoners, continued hostilities in ethnic minority areas accompanied by reports of serious human rights violations, including against women and children, and the lack of

transparency in the governments military relationship with the Democratic PeoplesRepublic of Korea

I offered respectfully that the government should take concrete actions in a timelyfashion to demonstrate its sincerity and genuine commitment to reform and nationalreconciliation, including by releasing all political prisoners unconditionally, engaging inmeaningful outreach to the political opposition, including Aung San Suu Kyi, andengaging in dialogue rather than armed conflict with ethnic minority groups. I affirmed

the importance of establishing a legitimate and credible mechanism for investigatingreported abuses in ethnic areas as a first step toward building trust and promotingnational reconciliation through accountability. I also urged the government to adhere toall of its obligations under UN Security Council Resolutions related to proliferation.

I want to emphasize that our dialogue on these topics was respectful and open, which Igreatly appreciated. I noted that progress on these issues will be essential to progressin the bilateral relationship, and that if the government takes genuine and concrete

action, the United States will respond in kind.

Here in Rangoon, I continued the conversation on current conditions and trends in thecountry with a broad cross section of civil society. I consulted with the business anddiplomatic communities, and local and international NGOs, including citizens doing


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heroic and courageous work providing free funeral services for the poor and treatingthose with HIV/AIDS.

And of course I met with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and leaders of the National League for

Democracy to discuss their perspectives on recent developments in the country, thefuture of their party, and U.S. policy approaches. I was reminded consistently duringmy visit that Daw Suu remains deeply important to the citizens of this country, Burmanand ethnic minority alike, and that any credible reform effort must include herparticipation. It was also clear that she remains fully committed to the cause of peaceful change through dialogue.

Unfortunately, I was only here for a few days and thus was unable to explore the full

breadth and diversity of this beautiful country. However, the courage and commitmentof those with whom I met give me great hope for the countrys future should genuinereform and reconciliation proceed. I will be following developments closely from afar,and look forward to many return visits here to continue the United States principledengagement policy.

Again, I would like to thank the government for hosting me so warmly for my inauguralvisit in my new post, and to all my interlocutors for sharing their valuable insights. I

consider this a highly productive visit. I will now take a few questions before I have tocatch a plane.

QUESTION:Did you get any assurance of the release of political prisoners from thegovernment?

AMBASSADOR MITCHELL:As I suggested, we had a very candid dialogue on thissubject. There were no absolute commitments on anything. But we had a veryproductive exchange on the subject, so nothing further I can say on that.

QUESTION:And my second question is would it be possible for your government to liftthe sanctions if the political prisoners were not released?

AMBASSADOR MITCHELL:The issue of sanctions, again, that was not a primary point of discussion. There are a lot of issues that we need to deal with in terms of the


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relationship, and sanctions are one component, as I said. Most of this is about ourengagement, our principled engagement, with the regime. I know yesterday there wasa report that came out unfortunately, sad to say, that I think mischaracterized myposition on this, referring to a roadmap to lift sanctions. I think it took my words out of context. It mischaracterized what I said in response to a question. I never presented,nor have I developed such a roadmap. The conversation flow and tone were as I justdescribed earlier about the full range of issues being addressed concerning exchange of views, concerning what we would need to see in order to truly develop a productiverelationship and to change the parameters of the bilateral relationship.

QUESTION:What is the most important criterion for assessing the situation in thiscountry?

AMBASSADOR MITCHELL:There's no particular single issue, obviously. I listed thethings we needed to see that we thought were elements of demonstrating credible andgenuine commitment to reform. So there's no single answer to that, but if we see someof the things that I outlined, I think it would demonstrate the kind of genuinecommitment that people are looking for, not just probably -- obviously from the outside,but people within the country. And the issue of skepticism and uncertainty about howfar this is going and where it's leading, I think the government recognizes that the

skepticism is out there and we'll just see how this proceeds. And as I say, if we seeactions that are credible, the United States will respond.

QUESTION:I would like to ask if you've seen any change of attitude from the currentgovernment during your visit?

AMBASSADOR MITCHELL:Well this is my first visit, so I can't compare it to anyprevious visit to say whether they've changed or not. I can answer that question during

my second visit, which I hope will be soon. I have to say though, that I know therewere concerns about my position, coming in. My position was, as many of you know,was mandated by Congress under the JADE Act. In the United States, the JADE Act isthe sanctions act. So there were concerns that I was purely a function of sanctions, thatI was simply here to talk sanctions, and not to talk more broadly about the relationshipand to get a feel for the place and what's happening here. So my sense was, again, I


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was very pleased with the reception I got, very pleased with the nature of theconversations, very pleased with how welcoming they were. And I detected nonervousness about me or my position. And I look forward to continuing thoserelationships in a very frank and candid manor that befits a healthy relationship.

QUESTION:Yesterday the State Department released an annual religious freedomreport, and Burma being designated as one of the eight nations, countries of mostparticular concern. Did you have a chance to meet the various religious organizations?If so, what is their concern? Do they still have these concerns? How likely is Burma tobe out of this list soon?

AMBASSADOR MITCHELL:I did not meet with representatives of those organizations.

So I can't speak for them in terms of how they view the situation in the country.There's a separate section of the State Department that looks at these thingsindependently and I can't comment any further on the context or substance

QUESTION:I need a little clarification. Does it mean that the U.S. will continue toemploy the two-track policy, retaining the sanctions and engaging with the governmentat the same time? So in view of the current developments that you just mentioned, areyou going to, is the U.S. going to establish Ambassadorial-level engagement soon? And

another one is, does the government give any indication that they're initiating any tri-partite dialogue that involves ethnic minorities?

AMBASSADOR MITCHELL:On the latter, we didn't discuss that, so I don't know whattheir intentions are, or the prospects of that. I know there's been discussion of thathere. Before I came I read there was some kind of discussion of a potential peacecommission through the legislature, but that's in process. But I heard nothingspecifically on this during my visit, on a tri-partite process.

Yes, our policy has not changed. My trip is consistent with the policy. That sanctionsremain in place is a component of our policy. But really this trip was about goingbeyond that to engage in a principled fashion, to discuss a broad range of issues, butparticularly to talk about the relationship and what would be required to change theparameters of the relationship to date. And to get a feel for what's happening here on


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the ground. You can't learn about a country from afar. You have to come. You have totalk to people directly. You have to get a lot of different perspectives. You have tolisten. My point in coming here was to listen as well as provide very candidly the U.S.perspective so that people here were not misunderstanding our policy. I'm sure there'snot a clear understanding of what does principled engagement mean, what are yourintentions, how far can this go, and the same here. So again, I didn't see enough of thecountry in some fashion. I didn't see everybody that maybe I could see while here.Believe me, I worked very hard. I was having meetings from the first thing in themorning until late at night, trying to meet as many people as I possibly could to get asbroad a perspective on what's happening here. And as I said, my sense is people arehopeful about change. People do have high expectations and are hopeful thatsomething real may happen. The question is how far that will go and what the concretesteps will be going forward. So it's a long answer to the question; our policy has notchanged.

QUESTION:(Inaudible repeat of question about reestablishing Ambassador-levelengagement from Rangoon.)

AMBASSADOR MITCHELL: Oh, well the issue is that's a hypothetical. We've made nodecisions on that. Again, no changes to the way we've done things to date along those

lines.

QUESTION:(Interpreted from Burmese). Yesterday you met with the Human RightsCommission here. If the commission is formed by former government officials, so doyou think they will genuinely investigate the abuses here? What is your comment?

AMBASSADOR MITCHELL:It was a very good meeting. They gave us an overview of their plans, their thinking. But they're at the very, very early stages of thinking about it

themselves. I have some sympathy for them They're trying to get up and runningquickly and think things through I have no preconceptions about what they will or willnot be able to do. I certainly have an open mind about that and they're strugglingthemselves, I think, about it. They said they will have to work with Nay Pyi Taw andsend things, report up to Nay Pyi Taw. So I'm hopeful. I think it is a positive gesture.It's one of those things that I said to counterparts and put in my statement that is


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certainly a positive move to establish a human rights commission. But like everythingelse, the proof of its legitimacy will be how they proceed to implement that mandateafter establishment. So I was grateful for the opportunity to have the conversation.We'll obviously be watching them.

The other thing is we offered that given there is not a lot of expertise in this, and thereis some skepticism about whether it will be a real commission looking at abuses,reported abuses, alleged abuses here that it might be useful to have some partnershipwith international organizations, individuals with experience. And I said that also to thefolks in Nay Pyi Taw that we remain open to assisting with helping them do a job likeinvestigating or doing accountability in ethnic minority areas in the interests of nationalreconciliation. So again our minds are open but are arms are outstretched too to assistas we can in making them a fully credible and productive institution in the interests of national reconciliation, human rights and democracy.

QUESTION:When you go back to the States you'll be reporting to the Congress, right?So if somebody from the Congress asks you what is the most significant outcome of your trip, what would you answer?

AMBASSADOR MITCHELL: Significant outcome I think it's the remarkable sense of

hope that we see here among people. That they see something happening. There is,something is happening, something may be changing. It may be small gestures now.But again that sense of expectation is very, very important. And as I say, I really hopethat I think everybody who follows this country knows that there have been stops andstarts, that expectations have been dashed. That things only go so far, and then theystop or they reverse themselves. And I really urged the leadership to prove the skepticswrong. But it was very encouraging to me that my reception was as warm and welcomeas it was. And that the leadership in Nay Pyi Taw were open to having discussions,

having exchanges. Again, no commitments made. No outcomes that are tangible. Butwe were open to have a dialogue with respect, and I was able to say that I and theinternational community need to see the concrete action and genuine action for us tofeel that something is not only hope but real change here over time. So I'll have a veryfrank exchange with my friends in Congress and they I think, they're just like the rest.


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They want the best - everyone in America. I hope it's clear to folks that people in theUnited States wish this country no ill will at all. We want to do what's best to help thiscountry develop itself. Those four goals that were outlined by the government democracy, human rights, development, and national reconciliation we share. If thegovernment is serious and committed to those goals in a credible fashion they will havea partner in the United States and I think Congress and others will be watching veryclosely to see what this government decides to do in order to move credibly forwardtoward those goals.

One last question.

QUESTION:You said that this is your very first trip. So when will you be coming again?

And also I would like to know your opinions on the rising China influence here.

AMBASSADOR MITCHELL:It was not a topic of conversation, really, with the leadership.I do get a sense, talking to some citizens and others here that there is a palpable senseof Chinese influence, Chinese presence. But we really didn't have much of a discussionof that topic. The leadership here and the citizens here will have to decide how theydeal with their neighbor. Obviously whenever you have neighbors, there are challenges,there are opportunities. But there's really nothing more I would say about Chinese

influence in that regard.

Thank you all very much. I do have to catch the plane. I appreciate this and I will seeyou next time I'm sure.

ENDS

http://www.encburma.net/index.php/archives/internationl/70-international/630-derek-mitchell-press-conference-in-rangoon-burma.html

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James Manns About Face (Sino-American relations from Nixon to Clinton) About the Author & Prologue

James Mann provides an American perspective to Sino-American relations between the

years of the Nixon and Clinton administrations in his book About Face. Mann served as the Los Angeles Times Beijing bureau chief from 1984 to 1987 and more recently has served as adiplomatic correspondent and foreign affairs columnist for the Washington bureau of the samenewspaper. Mann is also the author of Beijing Jeep , has served as a guest scholar at theWoodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, and has won awards for his work.

Mann uses sources from interviews, journal articles, books, and the National Security Archives to support the information in his book. His writing style reflects his personal experiencein China, and provides a journalistic viewpoint on the events that shaped Sino-Americanrelations during the timeframe he presents to readers.

Mann begins About Face with a prologue that introduces American diplomat WinstonLord, who is living in China after a decade and a half of being a visiting honored guest in thecountry. Mann explains how Lords previous diplomatic work during the Nixon years was moreclimactic than his more recent experiences in China. The prologue shows how the conditions inChina have changed from the 1970s to the 1990s while giving examples of what Lord was doingat different times in this period.

Mann uses Lords experiences to explain why he chose to write his book. He states thathis goal is to explore, describe, and interpret American policy toward China over the pastquarter- century in the hopes of overcoming collective ignorance. The book uses achronological structure that describes how each administration from Nixon to Clinton cameabout their decisions on China policy.

The Nixon Years

Chapters one through three describe how U.S. President Richard Nixon soughtnormalization of relations with China after 20 years of no formal dealings between the twocountries. Chapter one, Opening Moves, provides notes written by Nixon prior to meeting withChinese leaders. The notes show what Nixon thought the Chinese wanted from the U.S., what
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the U.S. wanted from China, how to treat Chairman Mao Tsetung, and issues regarding Taiwanand Vietnam.

Chapter one also introduces Nixons nati onal security advisor, Henry Kissinger. By the

end of chapter one the reader finds out how Nixon and Kissinger worked independently of theState Department and other government agencies to perform their secret China diplomacy.People like CIA operative Jam es R. Lilley, helped to open up covert channels to Chinas leaders.

Chapters two and three provide details about Nixon and Kissingers first trips to Chinawhile explaining how these first meetings would set the precedence for future China visits by

American diplomats. Mann points out how Nixon was trying to use his secret trips in order tobenefit himself politically. Self-interest aside, Nixon had other ideas about how China could helpthe U.S. Nixon wanted out of the war in Vietnam and thought the Chinese leadership wouldhelp in the process. Nixon did not receive any promises on Vietnam and Mao Tsetung did notreceive any assurances regarding the re-unification of Taiwan.

Nixon and Kissinger did make some promises though. Kissinger told Chou Enlai that theU.S. would tell China about any understandings it had with the Soviet Union that affectedChinas interests, and later on promised to prevent Japan from obtaining a nuclear weapon. OnTaiwan, the U.S.s new approach was to recognize that Chinese on ei ther side of the TaiwanStrait maintain there is but China and that Taiwan is part of China

By the end of chapter three Mann has explained how the U.S. was no longer fightingCommunism in general, but rather the Soviet Union specifically. He shows how the Nixonadministration continued its policy of secret diplomacy with China to try to win them over as anally in the Cold War. Although Nixon sought normalization of relations with China, he could notachieve this goal during his time as president.

Fords China Policy

After Nixons resignation over Watergate, Gerald Ford became president, however hisadministration could not achieve Nixons goal of normalization. Chinese leaders were worriedthat Nixon s resignation would nullify his secret assurances, but Kissinger remained in office andpromised that policy would not change under the new president.


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Ford could not follow through with full normalization of relations though because, justlike Nixon, he needed the support of the Republican conservative base, who were staunchsupporters of Taiwan, to win re-election. Ford appointed George Bush as head of the U.S.liaison office in Beijing. Kissinger felt threatened by this appointment but later came to realize

that Bush would follow through on previous policy decisions made under the Nixonadministration.

Ford helped to arrange the purchasing of British jet engines by China and continued toshare intelligence with China in the fight against the Soviets.

Carter and the New Chinese Leadership.

Changes in leadership in both China and the United States helped to shape the beginningof a new era for Sino-American relations in the late 1970s. Chou Enlai and Mao Tsetung bothpassed away in 1976, which led to the arrest of Jiang Qing and the Gang of Four. The arrestsremoved leaders who were opposed to having good relations with the U.S. and paved the wayfor the return of Deng Xiaoping, who, in the mid-1970s, was known for swapping jokes aboutthe Soviets with American counterparts.

Chapters four and five discuss the normalization of relations in 1979 under JimmyCarter. Normalization helped to improve ties between the two countries military and intelligenceduring this Cold War period. Carters national security advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, followed inKissingers secretive style of diplomacy and helped influence policy, despite the StateDepartments opposing positions. Mann describes how Carter was a hum an rights advocate,except when it came to China he chose to ignore any abuses, which drew complaints from theSoviet Union.

Carter wanted to extend MFN benefits to both the Soviet Union and China, but others inthe administration did not want the Soviets to obtain the same benefits. Eventually MFNbenefits were granted to China under Carter, who also helped to extend Export-Import bank financing and the easing of export controls.


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In 1979 the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, which would later prove to draw theChinese and American intelligence and military communities closer together. Brzezinski pushedfor the U.S.-China military alliance; however, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance was opposed tothe idea. The Soviet invasion allowed Carter and Brzezinski to move forward with their goal of

strengthening U.S.-China military relations. After the invasion, Carter immediately postponedratification of the new SALT treaty, blocked grain sales to the Soviets, and began focusing onsecurity is sues in the Persian Gulf. Mann uses a quote from Brzezinskis book Power and Principle to make the point that Carter used the invasion to strengthen U.S.-China relations.

Brzezinski is quoted as saying: that we use the Soviet invasion of a count ry in a regionof strategic sensitivity to Asia as a justification for opening the doors to a U.S.-China defenserelationship.

The Cold War and Reagan

Ronald Reagan inherited the previous administrations Cold War policies when hebecame president, but he was a strong supporter of Taiwan and an anti-Communist, so hisrelationship with Chinese leaders was not always friendly at first.

By his second term, Reagan had reversed policy however and continued to provide

military cooperation with the Chinese and was willing to exchange intelligence with them to useagainst the Soviets. Chapters six and seven discuss these issues in more depth while providinginformation about Chinas weapons program. These chapters also explain how Reag an reversedthe decision to sell Taiwan FX jet fighters, feeling pressured by China who took advantage of the decision by asking for more concessions. China wanted the U.S. to end arms sales toTaiwan altogether and was threatening to downgrade their relations with the U.S., howeverReagan refused to end sales, and relations did not downgrade after China agreed to an officialcommuniqu in 1982.

Alexander Haig had left the State Department by this time and was working for aprivate company sel ling weapons. He influenced China policy by trying to sell his companysSikorsky helicopters to Taiwan, while also trying to sell weapons to China. Under Reagan, thearms race between the Soviets and the U.S. intensified. Reagans Star War Program pushedother countries to not only modernize their own weapons, but to gain financially by sellingweapons to third world countries.


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Although China was working with the U.S. to fight the Soviets in Afghanistan, they didnot feel restricted to just selling weapons to western friendly countries, and by the 1980s wereselling billions of dollars worth of weapons to Iraq and Iran, and other anti-western MiddleEastern countries.

Bush and Tiananmen

President George Bush wanted to return to the style of relations China and the U.S.had under Nixon, but the student protests in Tiananmen and other domestic policy issues wouldmake this impossible. The protests forced Bush to shift policy that would restrict relationsbetween the two countries. Because of the fall of the Soviet Union, the United States policytoward China was no longer based on their relationship against the Soviets in the Cold War.Under Bush there was a significant cooling of relations and reports of Chinese arms deals toMiddle Eastern countries was worrying Pentagon officials.

Bush was obliged to follow the Taiwan Relations Act, which had passed in 1979, and in1992, he allowed the sale of F-16s to Taiwan. Bush seemed to support the sale, but at thesame time wanted better relations with China, even after the violence during the TiananmenSquare protests, but domestic politics would not allow him to follow through on his wishes.Bush was still concerned about security in the Persian Gulf, which had become a focus under

the Carter administration. He sent U.S. troops to Kuwait to push back the Iraqi military whoinvaded the country in 1990. Both China and the U.S. had supplied arms to Iraq during theIraq-Iran wars.

Chapters nine through fourteen disc uss Bushs China policy in detail and explain theintricacies of the two countries economic relations. Mann states how Bush tended to run Chinapolicy from his own desk, leaving other foreign policy experts out of the decision makingprocess.

The events surrounding the Tiananmen Square protests had a significant impact on thefuture of U.S.-China relations. Immediately following the crackdown on protestors, Chineseactivist Fang Lizhi took refuge inside the American embassy to prevent the Chinese governmentfrom arresting him for his supposed role in the student protests and his pro-democracy stance.


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Bush used Fang as a negotiating tactic with the Chinese, but according to Mann, Bushwas not entirely successful at using Fang to get concessions from the Chinese.

Bill Clintons About Face

When President Bill Clinton came to office public anger in the U.S. over Chinascrackdown on Tiananmen protestors was still lingering, but Clintons focus was not on foreignpolicy. When Clinton did look at foreign policy, he had a whole host of issues to deal withincluding violence in Yugoslavia and the Middle East and problems in Haiti.

Clintons China policy focused on human rights and the economy, which he tried to tietogether to negotiate better terms with the Chinese, but was mostly unsuccessful. Clintonended up extending MFN with China, despite not getting Chinese leaders to agree to improvetheir human rights record.

Chapters fourteen through six teen discuss Clintons dealings with China during hispresidency, including the issue of Lee Teng- hui, Taiwans president, who brought the attentionof the U.S. relationship with Taiwan into the spotlight when he visited the United States in1995. China questioned the U.S. and their former promises to not have formal relations with

Taiwan. Taiwains effort to persuade Congress to allow the visit showed how foreign lobbyistscould influence the legislative branch of government. Clinton reassured China that Taiwan policyhad not changed and went as far as signing the three noes, which stated the same promisesNixon and Kissinger had agreed to over Taiwan. Also under Clinton, some tension betweenChina and the U.S. almost became hostile when China sent several missiles into the watersaround Taiwan. Clinton deployed warships to the area, but problems were resolved peacefully.

Mann shows readers how Clintons presidency was surrounded by scandal withallegations of sexual misconduct with Monica Lewinsky and accusations of receiving illegalcampaign contributions. About Face also shows how Clinton was influenced by Chinese studentswho pressed Congress to extend their visas. Students ultimately lost their influence when itcame to Chinas MFN status , and let the business community dictate economic policy.


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Conclusion

Mann argues in his conclusion that there has been a lack of continuity in Americanpolicy toward China from Nixon to Clinton. He states that the title, About Face , is about

administrative shifts in policy, which sometimes saw a 360 degree turn from their policy at theoutset of their first terms.

Mann explains how events during the Cold War shaped much of Americas China policy,and how each U.S. president attempted to keep foreign policy decisions within the executivebranch. He says that after the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests the American public began topay more attention to China policy. Mann shows how Congress changed the balance of powerbetween the executive and legislative branches by directly changing China policy after theprotests.

About Face shows how American policy toward China can shift according to worldevents and domestic politics, but how people like Kissinger have still managed to influencemultiple administrations, thus providing some continuity in American foreign policy. Mann sayspolicy changed significantly after the fall of the Soviet Union and that the China-U.S.relationship was directly impacted by the crumbling of the Soviet empire. He says policy formedsometimes as a reaction to the Cold War, and that the end of the war created new challengesfor the United States and China.

Mann does not attempt to predict what the future of China-U.S. relations will look like,but he does say that history can help us to understand what might happen. Manns arranges hissources in note form at the end of the book. Some of his sources include books by ZbigniewBrzezinski, James Baker, and Henry Kissinger. He interviews with officials such as Winston Lord,and documents from the CIA and State Department.

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The Depression in the United States--An Overview

The Great Depression

In October 1929 the stock market crashed, wiping out 40 percent of the paper values of common stock. Even after the stock market collapse, however, politicians and industryleaders continued to issue optimistic predictions for the nation's economy. But theDepression deepened, confidence evaporated and many lost their life savings. By 1933the value of stock on the New York Stock Exchange was less than a fifth of what it hadbeen at its peak in 1929. Business houses closed their doors, factories shut down andbanks failed. Farm income fell some 50 percent. By 1932 approximately one out of every four Americans was unemployed.

The core of the problem was the immense disparity between the country's productivecapacity and the ability of people to consume. Great innovations in productive

techniques during and after the war raised the output of industry beyond thepurchasing capacity of U.S. farmers and wage earners. The savings of the wealthy andmiddle class, increasing far beyond the possibilities of sound investment, had beendrawn into frantic speculation in stocks or real estate. The stock market collapse,therefore, had been merely the first of several detonations in which a flimsy structure of speculation had been leveled to the ground.

The presidential campaign of 1932 was chiefly a debate over the causes and possible

remedies of the Great Depression. Herbert Hoover, unlucky in entering The WhiteHouse only eight months before the stock market crash, had struggled tirelessly, butineffectively, to set the wheels of industry in motion again. His Democratic opponent,Franklin D. Roosevelt, already popular as the governor of New York during thedeveloping crisis, argued that the Depression stemmed from the U.S. economy's


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underlying flaws, which had been aggravated by Republican policies during the 1920s.President Hoover replied that the economy was fundamentally sound, but had beenshaken by the repercussions of a worldwide depression -- whose causes could be tracedback to the war. Behind this argument lay a clear implication: Hoover had to dependlargely on natural processes of recovery, while Roosevelt was prepared to use thefederal government's authority for bold experimental remedies.

The election resulted in a smashing victory for Roosevelt, who won 22,800,000 votes toHoover's 15,700,000. The United States was about to enter a new era of economic andpolitical change.

Roosevelt and the New Deal

In 1933 the new president, Franklin Roosevelt, brought an air of confidence andoptimism that quickly rallied the people to the banner of his program, known as theNew Deal. "The only thing we have to fear is fear itself," the president declared in hisinaugural address to the nation.

In a certain sense, it is fair to say that the New Deal merely introduced types of socialand economic reform familiar to many Europeans for more than a generation.

Moreover, the New Deal represented the culmination of a long-range trend towardabandonment of "laissez-faire" capitalism, going back to the regulation of the railroadsin the 1880s, and the flood of state and national reform legislation introduced in theProgressive era of Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson.

What was truly novel about the New Deal, however, was the speed with which itaccomplished what previously had taken generations. In fact, many of the reforms werehastily drawn and weakly administered; some actually contradicted others. And duringthe entire New Deal era, public criticism and debate were never interrupted orsuspended; in fact, the New Deal brought to the individual citizen a sharp revival of interest in government.

When Roosevelt took the presidential oath, the banking and credit system of the nationwas in a state of paralysis. With astonishing rapidity the nation's banks were first closed


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-- and then reopened only if they were solvent. The administration adopted a policy of moderate currency inflation to start an upward movement in commodity prices and toafford some relief to debtors. New governmental agencies brought generous creditfacilities to industry and agriculture. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)insured savings-bank deposits up to $5,000, and severe regulations were imposed uponthe sale of securities on the stock exchange.

Unemployment

By 1933 millions of Americans were out of work. Bread lines were a common sight inmost cities. Hundreds of thousands roamed the country in search of food, work andshelter. "Brother, can you spare a dime?" went the refrain of a popular song.

An early step for the unemployed came in the form of the Civilian Conservation Corps(CCC), a program enacted by Congress to bring relief to young men between 18 and 25years of age. Run in semi-military style, the CCC enrolled jobless young men in work camps across the country for about $30 per month. About 2 million young men took part during the decade. They participated in a variety of conservation projects: plantingtrees to combat soil erosion and maintain national forests; eliminating stream pollution;creating fish, game and bird sanctuaries; and conserving coal, petroleum, shale, gas,

sodium and helium deposits.

Work relief came in the form of the Civil Works Administration. Although criticized as"make work," the jobs funded ranged from ditch digging to highway repairs to teaching.Created in November 1933, it was abandoned in the spring of 1934. Roosevelt and hiskey officials, however, continued to favor unemployment programs based on work relief rather than welfare.

Agriculture

The New Deal years were characterized by a belief that greater regulation would solvemany of the country's problems. In 1933, for example, Congress passed the Agricultural

Adjustment Act (AAA) to provide economic relief to farmers. The AAA had at its core aplan to raise crop prices by paying farmers a subsidy to compensate for voluntary


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cutbacks in production. Funds for the payments would be generated by a tax levied onindustries that processed crops. By the time the act had become law, however, thegrowing season was well underway, and the AAA encouraged farmers to plow undertheir abundant crops. Secretary of Agriculture Henry A. Wallace called this activity a"shocking commentary on our civilization." Nevertheless, through the AAA and theCommodity Credit Corporation, a program which extended loans for crops kept instorage and off the market, output dropped.

Between 1932 and 1935, farm income increased by more than 50 percent, but onlypartly because of federal programs. During the same years that farmers were beingencouraged to take land out of production -- displacing tenants and sharecroppers -- asevere drought hit the Great Plains states, significantly reducing farm production.

Violent wind and dust storms ravaged the southern Great Plains in what became knownas the "Dust Bowl," throughout the 1930s, but particularly from 1935 to 1938. Cropswere destroyed, cars and machinery were ruined, people and animals were harmed.

Approximately 800,000 people, often called "Okies," left Arkansas, Texas, Missouri andOklahoma during the 1930s and 1940s. Most headed farther west to the land of mythand promise, California. The migrants were not only farmers, but also professionals,retailers and others whose livelihoods were connected to the health of the farmcommunities. California was not the place of their dreams, at least initially. Mostmigrants ended up competing for seasonal jobs picking crops at extremely low wages.

The government provided aid in the form of the Soil Conservation Service, establishedin 1935. Farm practices that had damaged the soil had intensified the severity of thestorms, and the Service taught farmers measures to reduce erosion. In addition, almost30,000 kilometers of trees were planted to break the force of winds.

Although the AAA had been mostly successful, it was abandoned in 1936, when the tax

on food processors was ruled unconstitutional. Six weeks later Congress passed a moreeffective farm-relief act, which authorized the government to make payments tofarmers who reduced plantings of soil-depleting crops -- thereby achieving cropreduction through soil conservation practices.


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By 1940 nearly 6 million farmers were receiving federal subsidies under this program.The new act likewise provided loans on surplus crops, insurance for wheat and asystem of planned storage to ensure a stable food supply. Soon, prices of agriculturalcommodities rose, and economic stability for the farmer began to seem possible.

Industry and Labor

The National Recovery Administration (NRA), established in 1933 with the NationalIndustrial Recovery Act (NIRA), attempted to end cut-throat competition by settingcodes of fair competitive practice to generate more jobs and thus more buying.

Although the NRA was welcomed initially, business complained bitterly of over-regulation as recovery began to take hold. The NRA was declared unconstitutional in

1935. By this time other policies were fostering recovery, and the government soontook the position that administered prices in certain lines of business were a severedrain on the national economy and a barrier to recovery.

It was also during the New Deal that organized labor made greater gains than at anyprevious time in American history. NIRA had guaranteed to labor the right of collectivebargaining (bargaining as a unit representing individual workers with industry). Then in1935 Congress passed the National Labor Relations Act, which defined unfair labor

practices, gave workers the right to bargain through unions of their own choice andprohibited employers from interfering with union activities. It also created the NationalLabor Relations Board to supervise collective bargaining, administer elections andensure workers the right to choose the organization that should represent them indealing with employers.

The great progress made in labor organization brought working people a growing senseof common interests, and labor's power increased not only in industry but also in

politics. This power was exercised largely within the framework of the two majorparties, however, and the Democratic Party generally received more union support thanthe Republicans.

The Second New Deal


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In its early years, the New Deal sponsored a remarkable series of legislative initiativesand achieved significant increases in production and prices -- but it did not bring an endto the Depression. And as the sense of immediate crisis eased, new demands emerged.Businessmen mourned the end of "laissez-faire" and chafed under the regulations of theNIRA. Vocal attacks also mounted from the political left and right as dreamers,schemers and politicians alike emerged with economic panaceas that drew wideaudiences of those dissatisfied with the pace of recovery. They included Francis E.Townsend's plan for generous old-age pensions; the inflationary suggestions of FatherCoughlin, the radio priest who blamed international bankers in speeches increasinglypeppered with anti-Semitic imagery; and most formidably, the "Every Man a King" planof Huey P. Long, senator and former governor of Louisiana, the powerful and ruthlessspokesman of the displaced who ran the state like a personal fiefdom. (If he had notbeen assassinated, Long very likely would have launched a presidential challenge toFranklin Roosevelt in 1936.)

In the face of these pressures from left and right, President Roosevelt backed a new setof economic and social measures. Prominent among these were measures to fightpoverty, to counter unemployment with work and to provide a social safety net.

The Works Progress Administration (WPA), the principal relief agency of the so-called

second New Deal, was an attempt to provide work rather than welfare. Under the WPA,buildings, roads, airports and schools were constructed. Actors, painters, musicians andwriters were employed through the Federal Theater Project, the Federal Art Project andthe Federal Writers Project. In addition, the National Youth Administration gave part-time employment to students, established training programs and provided aid tounemployed youth. The WPA only included about three million jobless at a time; whenit was abandoned in 1943 it had helped a total of 9 million people.

But the New Deal's cornerstone, according to Roosevelt, was the Social Security Act of 1935. Social Security created a system of insurance for the aged, unemployed anddisabled based on employer and employee contributions. Many other industrializednations had already enacted such programs, but calls for such an initiative in the UnitedStates by the Progressives in the early 1900s had gone unheeded. Although


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conservatives complained that the Social Security system went against Americantraditions, it was actually relatively conservative. Social Security was funded in largepart by taxes on the earnings of current workers, with a single fixed rate for allregardless of income. To Roosevelt, these limitations on the programs werecompromises to ensure passage. Although its origins were initially quite modest, SocialSecurity today is one of the largest domestic programs administered by the U.S.government.

A New Coalition

In 1936, the Republican Party nominated Alfred M. Landon, the relatively liberalgovernor of Kansas, to oppose Roosevelt. Despite all the complaints leveled at the New

Deal, Roosevelt won an even more decisive victory than in 1932. He took 60 percent of the population and carried all states except Maine and Vermont. In this election, abroad new coalition aligned with the Democratic Party emerged, consisting of labor,most farmers, immigrants and urban ethnic groups from East and Southern Europe,

African Americans and the South. The Republican Party received the support of business as well as middle-class members of small towns and suburbs. This politicalalliance, with some variation and shifting, remained intact for several decades.

From 1932 to 1938 there was widespread public debate on the meaning of New Dealpolicies to the nation's political and economic life. It became obvious that Americanswanted the government to take greater responsibility for the welfare of the nation.Indeed, historians generally credit the New Deal with establishing the foundations of the modern welfare state in the United States. Some New Deal critics argued that theindefinite extension of government functions would eventually undermine the libertiesof the people. But President Roosevelt insisted that measures fostering economic well-being would strengthen liberty and democracy.

In a radio address in 1938, Roosevelt reminded the American people that:

Democracy has disappeared in several other great nations, not because the people of those nations disliked democracy, but because they had grown tired of unemploymentand insecurity, of seeing their children hungry while they sat helpless in the face of


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government confusion and government weakness through lack of leadership....Finally,in desperation, they chose to sacrifice liberty in the hope of getting something to eat.We in America know that our democratic institutions can be preserved and made towork. But in order to preserve them we need...to prove that the practical operation of democratic government is equal to the task of protecting the security of thepeople....The people of America are in agreement in defending their liberties at anycost, and the first line of the defense lies in the protection of economic security.

Eve of World War II

Before Roosevelt's second term was well under way, his domestic program wasovershadowed by a new danger little noted by average Americans: the expansionist

designs of totalitarian regimes in Japan, Italy and Germany. In 1931 Japan invadedManchuria and crushed Chinese resistance; a year later the Japanese set up the puppetstate of Manchukuo. Italy, having succumbed to fascism, enlarged its boundaries inLibya and in 1935 attacked Ethiopia. Germany, where Adolf Hitler had organized theNational Socialist Party and seized the reins of government in 1933, reoccupied theRhineland and undertook large-scale rearmament.

As the real nature of totalitarianism became clear, and as Germany, Italy and Japan

continued their aggression, American apprehension fueled isolationist sentiment. In1938, after Hitler had incorporated Austria into the German Reich, his demands for theSudetenland of Czechoslovakia made war seem possible at any moment in Europe. TheUnited States, disillusioned by the failure of the crusade for democracy in World War I,announced that in no circumstances could any country involved in the conflict look to itfor aid. Neutrality legislation, enacted piecemeal from 1935 to 1937, prohibited tradewith or credit to any of the warring nations. The objective was to prevent, at almostany cost, the involvement of the United States in a non-American war.

With the Nazi assault on Poland in 1939 and the outbreak of World War II, isolationistsentiment increased, even though Americans were far from neutral in their feelingsabout world events. Public sentiment clearly favored the victims of Hitler's aggressionand supported the Allied powers that stood in opposition to German expansion. Under


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the circumstances, however, Roosevelt could only wait until public opinion regardingU.S. involvement was altered by events.

With the fall of France and the air war against Britain in 1940, the debate intensified

between those who favored aiding the democracies and the isolationists, organizedaround the America First Committee, whose support ranged from Midwesternconservatives to left-leaning pacifists. In the end, the interventionist argument won aprotracted public debate, aided in large measure by the work of the Committee toDefend America by Aiding the Allies.

The United States joined Canada in a Mutual Board of Defense, and aligned with theLatin American republics in extending collective protection to the nations in the Western

Hemisphere. Congress, confronted with the mounting crisis, voted immense sums forrearmament, and in September 1940 passed the first peacetime conscription bill everenacted in the United States -- albeit by a margin of one vote in the House of Representatives. In early 1941 Congress approved the Lend-Lease Program, whichenabled President Roosevelt to transfer arms and equipment to any nation (notablyGreat Britain, the Soviet Union and China) deemed vital to the defense of the UnitedStates. Total Lend-Lease aid by war's end amounted to more than $50,000 million.

The 1940 presidential election campaign demonstrated that the isolationists, whilevocal, commanded relatively few followers nationally. Roosevelt's Republican opponent,Wendell Wilkie, lacked a compelling issue since he supported the president's foreignpolicy, and also agreed with a large part of Roosevelt's domestic program. Thus theNovember election yielded another majority for Roosevelt. For the first time in U.S.history, a president was elected to a third term.

Japan, Pearl Harbor and War

While most Americans anxiously watched the course of the European war, tensionmounted in Asia. Taking advantage of an opportunity to improve its strategic position,Japan boldly announced a "new order" in which it would exercise hegemony over all of the Pacific. Battling for its survival against Nazi Germany, Britain was unable to resist,withdrawing from Shanghai and temporarily closing the Burma Road. In the summer of


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1940, Japan won permission from the weak Vichy government in France to use airfieldsin Indochina. By September the Japanese had joined the Rome-Berlin Axis. As acountermove, the United States imposed an embargo on export of scrap iron to Japan.

It seemed that the Japanese might turn southward toward the oil, tin and rubber of British Malaya and the Dutch East Indies. In July 1941 the Japanese occupied theremainder of Indochina; the United States, in response, froze Japanese assets.

General Hideki Tojo became prime minister of Japan in October 1941. In mid-November, he sent a special envoy to the United States to meet with Secretary of StateCordell Hull. Among other things, Japan demanded that the U.S. release Japaneseassets and stop U.S. naval expansion in the Pacific. Hull countered with a proposal for

Japanese withdrawal from China and Indochina in exchange for the freeing of thefrozen assets. The Japanese asked for two weeks to study the proposal, but onDecember 1 rejected it. On December 6, Franklin Roosevelt appealed directly to theJapanese emperor, Hirohito. On the morning of December 7, however, Japanesecarrier-based planes attacked the U.S. Pacific fleet at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, in adevastating, surprise attack. Nineteen ships, including five battleships, and about 150U.S. planes were destroyed; more than 2,300 soldiers, sailors and civilians were killed.Only one fact favored the Americans that day: the U.S. aircraft carriers that would play

such a critical role in the ensuing naval war in the Pacific were at sea and not anchoredat Pearl Harbor.

As the details of the Japanese raids upon Hawaii, Midway, Wake and Guam blared from American radios, incredulity turned to anger at what President Roosevelt called "a daythat will live in infamy." On December 8, Congress declared a state of war with Japan;three days later Germany and Italy declared war on the United States.

The nation rapidly geared itself for mobilization of its people and its entire industrialcapacity. On January 6, 1942, President Roosevelt announced staggering productiongoals: delivery in that year of 60,000 planes, 45,000 tanks, 20,000 antiaircraft guns and18 million deadweight tons of merchant shipping. All the nation's activities -- farming,manufacturing, mining, trade, labor, investment, communications, even education andcultural undertakings -- were in some fashion brought under new and enlarged controls.


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The nation raised money in enormous sums and created great new industries for themass production of ships, armored vehicles and planes. Major movements of populationtook place. Under a series of conscription acts, the United States brought the armedforces up to a total of 15,100,000. By the end of 1943, approximately 65 million menand women were in uniform or in war-related occupations.

The attack on the United States disarmed the appeal of isolationists and permittedquick military mobilization. However, as a result of Pearl Harbor and the fear of Asianespionage, Americans also committed an act of intolerance: the internment of Japanese-Americans. In February 1942, nearly 120,000 Japanese-Americans residing inCalifornia were removed from their homes and interned behind barbed wire in 10wretched temporary camps, later to be moved to "relocation centers" outside isolatedSouthwestern towns. Nearly 63 percent of these Japanese-Americans were Nisei --

American-born -- and, therefore, U.S. citizens. No evidence of espionage ever surfaced.In fact, Japanese-Americans from Hawaii and the continental United States fought withnoble distinction and valor in two infantry units on the Italian front. Others served asinterpreters and translators in the Pacific. In 1983 the U.S. government acknowledgedthe injustice of internment with limited payments to those Japanese-Americans of thatera who were still living.

Source

Return to The Great Depression

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Statement of

Kurt M. Campbell

Assistant Secretary of State

Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs

Submitted to the

House Armed Services Committee

July 27, 2010

U.S.-Japan Relations for the 21st Century

Chairman Skelton, Mr. McKeon, distinguished Members of the Committee, it is aprivilege to appear before you today.

The U.S.-Japan alliance is the cornerstone of our engagement in the Asia-Pacific. Thealliance has provided a basis for peace and security in the Asia-Pacific for a half-century

and has in many ways -- underwritten the Asian economic miracle and the spread of democratic governance throughout the region. This year the United States and Japanare celebrating the 50 th anniversary of our Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, ahistoric milestone that offers both an opportunity to reflect on the successes of the pastand, perhaps more importantly, to chart a forward-looking course for this relationship toensure that it is well positioned to manage issues of consequence both in the regionand beyond.

The Obama administration entered office with a deep appreciation of the strategicimportance of the U.S.-Japan alliance. Then-Prime Minister Taro Aso was the firstforeign leader to meet with President Obama. Japan was President Obamas first stopon his first visit to East Asia as President. Secretary Clintons maiden voyage asSecretary of State was to Asia, and it was no coincidence that her first stop was in


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Japan. As the worlds first and second largest economies the U.S. and Japan haveworked closely to contribute to the global economic recovery.

Bilateral Relations

Together, the United States and Japan bring tremendous capability and creativity tobear on the challenges the world faces today. Our economic relationship is strong,mature, and increasingly interdependent, firmly rooted in the shared interest andresponsibility of the United States and Japan to promote global growth, open markets,and a vital world trading system. Our bilateral economic relationship is based onenormous flows of trade, investment, and finance. In previous decades our economicrelationship was often characterized by conflict over trade issues. Today, even as wecontinue to address trade irritants such as beef and Japan Post, we are able toprioritize new modes of cooperation that allow us to pursue common interests such asinnovation and entrepreneurship, the internet economy and cloud computing asbuilding blocks to improve opportunities for our trade and economic growth. We have ashared interest in greener, more sustainable growth. Climate change is a trend thatobviously presents enormous challenges for both the United States and Japan, but alsocreates opportunities for us both to leverage our comparative advantage in innovation

to develop new, growth-inducing energy technologies. We were also very pleased thatour two nations initialed the text of an Open Skies aviation agreement in December of last year. It is a landmark agreement that is a pro-consumer, pro-competitive, pro-growth accord. The agreement will strengthen and expand our already strong trade andtourism links with Japan.

As our security and economic relationship has evolved, so has our cultural relationshipmatured and grown. We have a longstanding tradition of exchange and cooperation

between our two countries, and between the people of our two nations. We havecooperation in the fields of education and science, and through traditional programssuch as the Fulbright Exchange and the JET (Japan Exchange and Teaching Program).The global challenges we face today require a complex, multi-dimensional approach topublic diplomacy. As President Obama said recently, "... cooperation must go beyond


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our governments. It must be rooted in our people - in the studies we share, thebusiness that we do, the knowledge that we gain, and even in the sports that weplay." The Secretary echoed the Presidents views when she said, What we call people -to people diplomacy has taken on greater significance, as our world has grown moreinterdependent, and our challenges, more complex. Government alone cannot solve theproblems that we face. We have to tap into the challenge of our people, their creativityand innovation, and their ability to forge lasting relationships that build trust andunderstanding.

The historic elections in late August of 2009 ushered in the Democratic Party of Japan(DPJ). It should come as no surprise that over the past 10 months the relationship hashad its shares of ups-and-downs. Some commentators have even suggested that theU.S.-Japan alliance is in a period of strategic drift --- nothing could be further fromthe truth. In fact, public opinion polling shows support in Japan for the U.S.-Japanalliance is the highest it has ever been over 75 percent. After spending over half of my professional career thinking about the U.S.-Japan alliance I feel confident in sayingthat our alliance will continue to grow stronger. I would now like to take thisopportunity to lay out three elements of our relationship that I believe underscore thebilateral, regional and global depth and breadth of our relationship.

It is now more than 10 months since Japans historic change of government inSeptember 2009.The new ruling coalition came to power with a manifesto calling for areview of many of the policies of its LDP predecessors, including aspects of the alliancewith the United States, with some envisioning an alliance without bases. However, inpractice the Japanese government has continued to reaffirm the crucial role of the

Alliance in ensuring Japans security and maintaining peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region. This past January, then-Prime Minister Hatoyama, in a statement

celebrating the 50th anniversary of the signing of the revised U.S-Japan SecurityTreaty, said that it is not an exaggeration to say that it was thanks to the U.S.-Japan security arrangements that Japan has maintained peace, while respectingfreedom and democracy, and enjoyed economic developmentsince the end of the lastWorld War to this day. To celebrate this 50th anniversary year, and to deepen andbroaden our alliance, we and our Japanese allies are meeting at all levels and across


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government bureaucracies to share views and assessments of Asias dynamic strategicenvironment and charting a course to seize opportunities while minimizing potential forconflict.

Over the last fifteen years, the United States and Japan have worked together toupdate our alliance, through efforts ranging from the force posture realignment to thereview of roles, missions, and capabilities. The alliance has grown in scope, withcooperation on everything from missile defense to information security. Additionally,Japan provides approximately $1.7 billion annually in host nation support to the U.S.military, a key Japanese contribution to our alliance.

There are more than 48,000 American military personnel deployed in Japan, includingour only forward deployed carrier strike group, the 5th Air Force, and the III MarineExpeditionary Force.Through the Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI), the UnitedStates and Japan made a landmark alliance commitment under the 2006 U.S.-JapanRealignment Roadmap, which was reaffirmed by the 2009 Guam International

Agreement, to implement a coherent package of force posture realignments that willhave far-reaching benefits for the Alliance. These changes will help strengthen theflexibility and deterrent capability of U.S. forces while creating the conditions for a moresustainable U.S. military presence in the region. The transformation includes therelocation of approximately 8,000 Marines and their 9,000 dependents from Okinawa toGuam, force posture relocations and land returns on Okinawa, and other realignmentsand combined capability changes on mainland Japan (e.g., increased interoperability, aswell as collaboration on ballistic missile defense). This realignment will strengthen bothcountries ability t o meet current responsibilities and create an Alliance that ismore flexible, capable, and better able to work together to address common security

concerns.

It is understood by all that the relocation to Guam of significant elements of the IIIMarine Expeditionary Force is dependent on tangible progress by the government of Japan towards completion of the Futenma Replacement Facility, a linchpin of theRealignment Roadmap. The new Japanese government undertook an extensive review


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of existing plans for the Futenma Replacement Facility, carefully examining alternativeswith a goal of reconciling operational and security requirements with the recognitionthat the people of Okinawa, by hosting the majority of U.S. military facilities in Japan,bore a greater responsibility for our joint security than other regions of Japan. Thisreview culminated in the conclusion, as expressed in the May 28 Joint Statement of theU.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee, that the replacement facility would best belocated in Okinawa at Camp Schwab and adjacent waters. Secretaries Clinton andGates, along with their Japanese counterparts, directed that an experts groupundertake a study regarding the replacement facilitys location, configuration, andconstruction method. The objective is to ensure that the construction of thereplacement facility can be completed without significant delay. The Experts StudyGroup has been meeting steadily since June and we fully expect it to achieve its goals.

Let me also mention briefly another issue that is important to us in the StateDepartment, that is connected with our relationship with Japan and also, because insome cases these families include former or current service members, relevant to thiscommittee. That is the issue of international parental child abduction. Japan remainsthe only G7 country not to have ratified the Hague Convention; the Department of Stateconsistently urges them to do so at the highest levels. In fact, Secretary Clinton hasraised it with her Japanese counterpart, including most recently last week. In recentmonths, for the first time ever, the GOJ has co-sponsored with the Japanese Bar

Association a symposium on the Hague Convention and International ParentalChild Abduction. The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs has also posted for the firsttime preventative passport regulations to their official website. Where the dialogue wasonce muted less than a year ago, it is now part of the general discourse. While thisissue resolved is by no mean resolved, we believe these GOJ efforts are signs of increased engagement by the Government of Japan.

Regional Engagement

We have enjoyed unprecedented cooperation with Japan on a number of consequentialregional issues. Japans steadfast support for the Republic of Kor ea was vital in rallyingthe international community to offer a united response to the Cheonan sinking. Japan is


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a key partner in our efforts to seek the verifiable denuclearization of the KoreanPeninsula in a peaceful manner and in holding North Korea to its commitments underthe 2005 Joint Statement of the Six Party Talks. We also value our close cooperation onthe adoption and implementation of UN Security Council resolutions to curb NorthKoreas proliferation activities. Japanese insights into North Korean developments areequally valuable.

We and Japan have a mutual desire to engage constructively with a rising China. Weshare a stake in a successful China that follows international norms and standards.Japan has joined us in encouraging greater transparency from the Chinese military, and

joins us as we carefully watch Chinas growing maritime strength. Over the past fewyears Sino-Japanese relations have grown stronger and we look to both Beijing andTokyo to continue to take steps to enhance mutual confidence and trust.

Southeast Asia is another area where we have longstanding and fruitful cooperationwith Japan. It is an area where we and our Japanese allies share significant interestsand objectives. We cooperate in encouraging economic and social developmentthroughout the region, from Timor-Leste to Burma. We maintain close contact andcoordinate our efforts in order to gain the maximum benefit from a useful division of labor. Japan remains an important partner and advocate for ASEAN. Where thereappears to be potential for instability, we seek to harmonize our messages and ensurethat we are reinforcing each other effectively.

One of the most significant and consequential developments over the past ten yearshas been the strengthening of the U.S.-India relationship. Our efforts have beencomplemented and supported by Japan. Under the leadership of both the LDP and DPJgovernment, Japanese-Indian relations have strengthened and become more robust.Both nations recently signed a civil nuclear cooperation agreement, and Delhi continuesto look to Tokyo as it charts an Eastward course.

As Japans chairmanship of APEC continues and the United States is preparing for itshost year in 2011, we have been working to create opportunities to strengthen


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economic integration and address trade and investment issues in order to make itcheaper, easier, and faster to trade in the Asia-Pacific region.

We appreciate Japans support for U.S. participation and inclusion in the East Asia

Summit, a process the Secretary and President plan to engage in 2010 and 2011.Existing organizations such as ASEAN, APEC, and the ASEAN Regional forum and newones like the ASEAN Defense Ministers Plus and an expanded East Asia Summit provideexcellent platforms for advancing the multitude of shared U.S. and Japanese economic,security, and political interests and values.

Global Cooperation

Japan continues to be an increasingly active partner in global affairs, and our bilateraland multilateral cooperation transcends the Asia-Pacific region.

Our strong relationship with Japan is global in reach. Japan is working with us andothers on post-earthquake recovery in Haiti and Chile, to eradicate disease and developenvironmentally friendly sources of energy. In addition to their work in Haiti, Japan isinvolved in UN peacekeeping missions in Syria, Nepal, and Sudan, and has madecontributions in kind to numerous UN missions.

In Iraq, our Japanese allies have pledged nearly $5 billion in aid to Iraq, focusing onrebuilding the industrial base and energy, transportation, and irrigation infrastructure.By generating economic opportunities for the Iraqi people, these activities complementour own and contribute to our shared goal of ensuring the countrys long -term stability.

Japan is a vital international supporter of reconstruction, reintegration, anddevelopment in Afghanistan. Japan has assumed the lions share of the cost of salariesfor the Afghan police force. With a $5 billion commitment over five years, Japan is thesecond largest single donor, after the United States, to Afghanistan. Japan is providingexpertise as well as funding, and helping the Afghan government develop programs tohasten the reintegration of former Taliban into normal society. In Pakistan, as well,Japan is con tributing to the countrys stability by providing over $2 billion of


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humanitarian and development assistance. Japan is helping the international communityensure refugees and internally displaced Pakistanis receive the food, shelter, andmedical services they need. In a program that complements the American work Secretary Clinton announced in Islamabad on July 19, Japan is extending the electricitygrid to areas of the country that have not had it before and developing the energysector throughout the country.

As a nation dependent on international trade, Japan values the security of its sea linesof communication. Japan is an active and important member of the international flotillathat is combating piracy off the Horn of Africa to ensure freedom of navigation andsafety of mariners. Japan has also signed a bilateral agreement with Djibouti toconstruct a base to support its counter-piracy efforts, and is the largest single bilateraldonor to Djibouti.

The architecture of international cooperation is sturdy, but it also dates in part to thecold war or even earlier. We and Japan are seeking new ways to structure internationalcooperation.

Japan is one of the United States closest partners as we confront the global challengeposed by climate change. Last fall, the President endorsed the U.S.-Japan Clean Energy

Action Plan, which will build on our extensive scientific cooperation to help oureconomies transition to greater reliance on renewable forms of energy and ensure thattransition creates economic opportunities here at home. We are both committed toensuring all countries do their part to address this global threat, assisting those that canbenefit from our technical expertise. Japan was a strong partner in developing theCopenhagen Accord, and pledged in Copenhagen to provide as much as $15 billion infinancing to assist developing countries in combating climate change, premised on the

development of a fair and effective global framework. We continue tocoordinate closely as we look to the next Conference of the Parties in Mexico thiswinter.

Whatever challenges we may face in the next half century, I am confident that ourrelationship with Japan will be an important element of our success. Our relationship


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continues to develop and evolve, and continues to contribute to peace, prosperity andsecurity throughout the region and the globe. We are under no illusions that there willnot be periods of ups-and-downs in the relationship. However, our shared values andstrategic interests will enable us to continue to move the relationship forward andensure that it remains the cornerstone of our strategic engagement in the Asia-Pacific.

Thank you again for giving me the opportunity to testify about the U.S.-Japanrelationship and I look forward to answering your questions.

http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2010/07/145191.htm

http://democrats.armedservices.house.gov/index.cfm/files/serve?File_id=e5bc7266-b42d-4ead-9c90-ddc35ea0fd3f (pdf)

Korea, Republic of (ROK) - History

The Republic of Korea, headed by President Syngman Rhee (Rhee Syngman), was

proclaimed on 15 August 1948 in the southern portion of the Korean Peninsula, whichhad been under US military administration since 8 September 1945. Like the DemocraticPeople's Republic of Korea (DPRK), established in the north on 9 September 1948 withSoviet backing, the ROK claimed to be the legitimate government of all Korea. The ROK was recognized as the legitimate government by the UN General Assembly.
http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2010/07/145191.htmhttp://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2010/07/145191.htmhttp://democrats.armedservices.house.gov/index.cfm/files/serve?File_id=e5bc7266-b42d-4ead-9c90-ddc35ea0fd3fhttp://democrats.armedservices.house.gov/index.cfm/files/serve?File_id=e5bc7266-b42d-4ead-9c90-ddc35ea0fd3fhttp://democrats.armedservices.house.gov/index.cfm/files/serve?File_id=e5bc7266-b42d-4ead-9c90-ddc35ea0fd3fhttp://democrats.armedservices.house.gov/index.cfm/files/serve?File_id=e5bc7266-b42d-4ead-9c90-ddc35ea0fd3fhttp://democrats.armedservices.house.gov/index.cfm/files/serve?File_id=e5bc7266-b42d-4ead-9c90-ddc35ea0fd3fhttp://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2010/07/145191.htm


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At dawn on 25 June 1950, following a year and a half of sporadic fighting, the well-equipped People's Army of the DPRK struck south across the 38th parallel. Proclaimingthat the war was for national liberation and unification of the peninsula, the DPRK forces advanced rapidly; Seoul fell within three days, and the destruction of the ROK seemed imminent. At US urging, the UN Security Council (with the Soviet delegateabsent) branded the DPRK an aggressor and called for the withdrawal of the attackingforces. On 27 June, US president Harry S. Truman ordered US air and naval units intocombat, and three days later, US ground forces were sent into battle. The UnitedKingdom took similar action, and a multinational UN Command was created to join withand lead the ROK in its struggle against the invasion. Meanwhile, DPRK troops hadpushed into the southeast corner of the peninsula. At that juncture, however, UN linesheld firm, and an amphibious landing at Inch'on (15 September 1950) in the ROK underGeneral Douglas MacArthur brought about the complete disintegration of the DPRK army.

MacArthur, commanding the UN forces, made a fateful decision to drive northward. Asthe UN forces approached the Yalu River, however, China warned that it would nottolerate a unification of the peninsula under US/UN auspices. After several weeks of threats and feints, "volunteers" from the Chinese People's Liberation Army entered thefighting en masse, forcing MacArthur into a costly, pell-mell retreat back down thepeninsula. Seoul was lost again (4 January 1951) and then regained before the battleline became stabilized very nearly along the 38th parallel. There it remained for twoweary years, with bitter fighting but little change, while a cease-fire agreement wasnegotiated.

On 27 July 1953, an armistice agreement finally was signed at P'anmunjom in theDPRK. The Korean War was ended, but it had brought incalculable destruction andhuman suffering to all of Korea (some 1,300,000 military casualties, including 415,000combat deaths, for the ROK alone), and it left the peninsula still more implacablydivided. A military demarcation line, which neither side regarded as a permanentborder, was established, surrounded by the DMZ. An international conferenceenvisioned in the armistice agreement was not held until mid-1954. This conferenceand subsequent efforts failed to reach an agreement on unification of the North and


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South, and the armistice agreement, supervised by a token UN Command in Seoul andby the Military Armistice Commission and the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission,both in P'anmunjom, remains in effect.

In 1954, the United States and ROK signed a mutual defense treaty, under which UStroops remained in the country. Financial assistance throughout the 1950s was providedby the US, averaging $270 million annually between 1953 and 1958, and by othernations under UN auspices. Syngman Rhee ran the government until 1960, when hisauthoritarian rule provoked the "April Revolution," the culmination of a series of increasingly violent student demonstrations that finally brought about his ouster. TheSecond Korean Republic, which followed Rhee, adopted a parliamentary system toreplace the previous presidential system. The new government, however, was short-lived. Premier Chang Myon and his supporters were ousted after only 10 months by amilitary coup in May 1961, headed by Major-General Park Chung-hee. The military juntadissolved the National Assembly, placed the nation under martial law, established theKorean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) as a means of detecting and suppressingpotential enemies, and ruled by decree until late 1963 through the

Documents

No 4 - Thursday, September 15, 2011