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GRADUATE INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AND DEVELOPMENT STUDIES
New Media & the Arab Uprisings: The Role of Tunisian Activists in Shaping
the Transition’s Outcome
DISSERTATION
Submitted in fulfillment of the requirement for the
Master in Development Studies (MDev)
by
Noemi Renevey
(Switzerland)
Geneva
2013
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction
I.! LITERATURE)REVIEW) 10!1.! The&Internet&as&a&Network:&&Reshaping&Civic&and&Political&Engagement& 11!A.! Is!the!Internet!a!better!“public!sphere”!than!other!realms!of!publicity?! 12!B.! Collective!identity!diffusion!and!the!reshaping!of!citizenship! 14!
2.! The&Internet,&Mobilization&and&Activism& 17!A.! Is!the!Internet!effective!in!mobilizing!individuals?! 17!B.! Internet!as!a!tool!for!activism:!characteristics! 20!
3.! The&Internet,&Authoritarianism&and&Political&Change& 22!A.! Internet,!a!democratizing!tool?! 22!B.! Internet,!activism!and!political!change:!the!specific!case!of!the!Arab!
! !uprisings! 24!
II.! THEORETICAL)FRAMEWORK))&)METHODOLOGY) 27!1.! Theoretical&framework:&The&Market&for&Loyalties,&Monroe&Price&&
& (1994;&2002;&2007)& 27!A.! The!“shuffle!for!allegiances”! 27!B.! Control!over!the!public!sphere:!media!regulation!and!the!issue!of!new!ICTs! 28!C.! Access!to!the!Market!for!Loyalties!and!political!power! 30!D.! The!specific!case!of!political!transitions! 31!
2.! Research&questions&and&hypotheses& 32!A.! Topic!outline! 32!B.! Hypotheses! 33!
3.! Methodology& 36!A.! Sampling! 36!B.! Outlining!the!questionnaire’s!framework! 36!C.! Interviews! 38!D.! Conclusion:!!Research’s!contributions!and!limits! 39!
III.!CONTEXTUALIZATION) 40!1.! Ben&Ali’s&Tunisia:&Information&control&as&a&pillar&of&the&dictatorship& 40!A.! The!evolution!of!ICT!surveillance!in!Tunisia! 41!B.! Ben!Ali’s!support!to!Internet!diffusion!in!Tunisia! 43!C.! Exploring!the!new!market!for!loyalties!in!postXrevolution!Tunisia! 44!
2.! Tunisian&cyber&dissidence:&A&contextualizing&overview& 46!
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A.! Characteristics!and!goals! 47!B.! Normalizing!dissident!practices!on!the!web! 50!
IV.! RESULTS) 58!1.! Visibility:&Activists&as&Public&Figures& 58!A.! From!the!Internet!to!the!TV:!activists!as!“newsworthy”!individuals! 58!B.! The!politicization!of!online!platforms! 60!C.! Activists’!selfXawareness:!their!“historical!responsibility”!towards!!
! the!country! 62!2.! Popularity:&Activists’&Legitimacy&in&the&Current&Political&Context& 65!A.! Activists!as!trusted!individuals! 65!B.! Politicized,!but!not!political! 71!C.! Perceived!threats!to!the!sustainability!of!activists’!political!action! 73!
V.! DISCUSSION)&)CONCLUSIONS) 75!1.! Defining&the&“shuffle&for&allegiance”&in&the&Tunisian&context& 75!A.! Can!activists!be!considered!as!“sellers”!of!identity?! 75!B.! Applicability!of!Price’s!model! 76!
2.! Discussion& 78!A.!The!fight!over!“new!tropes!of!legitimacy”:!the!!“Revolution!spirit”!vs.!political!Islam! 78!
B.!“Attempts!to!seize!the!popular!spirit!and!filling!it!with!ideas!of!loyalty”:!Credibility!as!the!key!to!public!legitimacy! 81!
C.!“Control!over!at!least!some!of!the!instruments!of!imagination”:!freedom!of!speech! 82!
D.! Conclusion:!Linking!field!results!to!the!theoretical!framework! 84!3.! Conclusions:&Summarizing&Arguments&and&Answering&Research&Questions& 85!A.! Have!Tunisian!activists!been!empowered!through!their!use!of!new!
communication!technologies?! 85!B.! Is!this!empowerment!of!a!sustainable!nature?! 88!
Appendix 1: Summary of Research
Appendix 2: Questionnaire
Appendix 3: Interviews’ details
Appendix 4: Example of online interactions and information flow - “Weld El 15” affair
(June 2013)
Bibliography
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ABSTRACT
This dissertation is a study of the information and communication dynamics during
the Tunisian Revolution and the ensuing transition period. It explores the role
technology played in enabling individuals to make their grievances public. Have
Tunisian activists been politically empowered through their use of new
communication technologies? Is this empowerment of a sustainable nature? I argue
that Tunisian activists have indeed acquired public authority because of the visibility
that has been conferred to them through their innovative use of online platforms.
Having said that, I further argue that public authority does not translate into political
power, and that should these activists lose the battle over the very nature of the
political system that is being put in place, the space they secured might as well be
lost. In conclusion I contend that the innovative use of online platforms for political
purposes is key for activists to keep the public engaged with a sometimes tedious and
lengthy political process, hence preserving their influence over politics.
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“The sellers in this market are all those for whom myths and
dreams and history can somehow be converted into power and
wealth” (Price, 1994. “The Market for Loyalties: Electronic
Media and the Global Competition for Allegiances”)
“We have shown that revolutions are still possible. One can’t
miss to be one of those who will contribute directly, or
indirectly, to the greatest change in this country’s modern
history" (H., Tunisian activist, blogger and journalist)
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Introduction
In 2010, after twenty-three years of media muzzling and a tight surveillance of
the Internet, Tunisian president Zine El Abidine Ben Ali lost control over a central
piece of his dictatorship: information. The suicide of the fruit seller Mohamed
Bouazizi that took place in Sidi Bouzid on the 17th of December was followed by a
viral dissemination of “sensitive” news on online platforms – not easily censored due
to technical specificities and a hint of corporate assistance.1 For the first time, videos
showing brutal police repression and vividly depicting death reached a wide and
overwhelmingly young public, frustrated by the lack of socioeconomic perspectives
and increasingly hostile to the regime. As this information reached international
media outlets and audiences, the regime lost the last pillar of its crushed legitimacy:
international support. Politically active individuals, in Tunisia or abroad, engaged in
fervent “outreach campaigns”, translating online content in Arabic, French and
English, and contextualizing crowd-sourced videos for the media. Through the
contacts they had been establishing with journalists over the past decade, and thanks
to the speed, connectivity and interactivity allowed by the technologies at hand,
activists reached out directly to international and regional media outlets and imposed
their revolution on worldwide audiences, soon to be enthused about “the Arab
Spring”. As a result of both internal and external pressures, Ben Ali flew the country a
few weeks later, on the 14th of January 2011.
This dissertation is a study of the information and communication dynamics
during the Tunisian revolution and the ensuing transition period. More specifically, it
intends to explore the role technology (hereafter, also new media, new ICTs, digital
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!1 Facebook agreed not to remove videos reported as « spam » when accompanied by the Htag #Sidibouzid
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media, online social networks and the Internet) played in enabling individuals to
make their grievances public. Who are those individuals hailed by international media
as the “Facebook revolution leaders”? What role do they play today? Do they still use
these online networks to engage in post-revolutionary politics? My research questions
will be focusing on two dimensions, addressing the question of the sustainability of
the 2011 “democratic momentum”. Have Tunisian activists (hereafter, also cyber-
activists, cyber-dissidents, bloggers) been politically empowered through their use of
new communication technologies? Is this empowerment of a sustainable nature?
I am defining the terms of my research questions as follows.
“Activists” in Tunisia, may be divided as follows: Hackers (often linked to the
“open data, free software” movements); “bloggers” (who contribute to blogs, media,
Facebook pages… by creating the information); “citizen journalists” (who
contribute to blogs, media, Facebook pages… by spreading the information). The
term “cyber dissidents” is used to describe those individuals who invested the virtual
sphere to contest the regime and raise political awareness among Internet users. The
revolution blurred those distinctions, mainly due to international media’s coverage
(some individuals have been qualified as “bloggers” by the media even though they
never had a blog). It should be noted however that interviewees do not necessarily see
themselves as “activists” but use and accept the term for the lack of a better one.
“Political” is largely understood as the way a particular group or individual’s
ideas and strategies are negotiated and communicated in the public sphere.
I understand empowerment as the capacity to gain greater control over one’s
life. Political empowerment is understood as gaining greater control over public
decision-making processes. The notion of empowerment here is linked to the power
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(the “authority”) gained by a group of individuals (“activists”) promoting specific
values and ideas. The notion of empowerment induces a preexisting
“marginalization”. Therefore, I would like to assess the nature of the qualitative
change in activists’ status and role that has taken place since the Revolution. I
especially focus on the way the Internet and new communication technologies have
contributed to this new status quo.
“Sustainable” empowerment is understood as the capacity for those individuals
to have a say in public affairs independently from the specific political and social
conditions of the Revolution, i.e. if their involvement with the political process is
possible in a pluralistic space. Are the “voices of the Revolution” still heard when
anyone can now open a blog, share content on Facebook and organize
demonstrations? Do these individuals still have an audience now that the frenzy is
gone?
The contention defended in this dissertation is that Tunisian activists acquired
public authority through the visibility, both national and international, that was
conferred to them through their innovative use of new communication technologies
and online platforms. Those who have chosen to further their engagement have found
a space in which to continue communicating ideas and influencing the transition
process; a space that has been not only widened but institutionalized after two and
half years of “democracy in the making”. It seems Tunisian activists have not lost
their credibility with the media and the connected youth, while their position is
strengthened by the population’s current interest in politics. I do argue, however, that
public authority does not mean political power, and that the sustainability of their
actions might be threatened by the legal void surrounding questions related to
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freedom of the media and freedom of speech. Dependency on online platforms, such
as Facebook, to reach out to audiences also constitutes a threat to their long-term
engagement. Should they not be able to “adopt and adapt” to potential technological
evolutions, they might lose their audience and the legitimacy thus conferred.
This dissertation is organized into five sections: the first section will review the
literature linking Internet use to social movement organization and civic engagement.
The second section outlines research questions, hypotheses, methodology, and
presents the theoretical framework. The third section gives background information
on Ben Ali’s dictatorship and cyber dissidence, in order to contextualize the analysis.
The fourth section analyzes fieldwork results pertaining to three themes: activists’
perceived responsibilities and their weight in the current context, i.e. evolution of
their popularity; the evolution of their relationship to media, i.e. evolution of their
visibility; the evolution of their relationship to political institutions, i.e. evolution of
their legitimacy. The fifth and final section discusses results as linked to the
theoretical framework and presents conclusions.
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I. LITERATURE REVIEW
!
The interaction between politics and technology has been explored from various
academic perspectives, going from law to behavioral psychology. This literature
review explores the state of research in two fields: contentious politics, i.e. disruptive
authority contestation; and political communication, as related to the notion of public
sphere and civic engagement in democracies. Contentious politics scholars tried to
explain the way collective action for political purposes is organized, notably focusing
on individual mobilization. Communication scholars have been exploring, among
other topics, the role of media and communication channels in functioning
democracies and their impact on civic participation. !
This literature review outlines the debate about the Internet (hereafter, also
online social networks) and internet-based new communication technologies’
(hereafter, also new media, digital media, new ICTs) impact on politics as addressed
in the above-mentioned academic fields. It aims to introduce the theoretical
background underpinning my research questions. !
More specifically, I explore the notion of political engagement from two
standpoints: political action (focusing on mobilization and activism) and political
participation (focusing on citizenship). This focus is mostly adapted from my
conclusions, in which I contend the sustainability of activists’ empowerment lies in
their capacity at 1) fully exercising their citizenship themselves (i.e. success of the
transition process), and 2) fostering a sense of citizenship among the population
(which itself determines the transition’s success, and the extent to which activists will
be playing a role in “politics”).!
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I will address the following questions: to what extent has the Internet reshaped
the notion of political engagement, citizenship and civic engagement? How does use
of the Internet influence individual mobilization? What opportunities for action does
the Internet provide for grassroots structures or individuals in the specific case of
autocracies? !
From “e-democracy” to “cyber war”, the launch and subsequent evolutions of the
Internet triggered grandiose hopes and excessive fears among scholars. In between
extremes, “skeptics” have argued the Internet does not have any impact on the way
political action, and politics in general, are conceived of and practiced. Drifting away
from technological determinism, on the one hand, and technological pessimism, on
the other, scholars have argued that the Internet per se does not have any impact on
politics. Rather, what makes a difference is a specific - usually innovative and
informed - use of the technology; a specific use about which doubts have also been
clearly expressed. !
1. The Internet as a Network: Reshaping Civic and Political
Engagement
“Evaluating electronic networks through the frame of how they concretely
contribute to new social network formations that, in turn, lead to new forms of
social capital that can be deployed by differing groups, we begin to forge a
criterion for understanding their effects that moves beyond the abstract debate
over information equity" (Friedland, 1996) (my emphasis). 2
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!2 FRIEDLAND, L.A., “Electronic democracy and the new citizenship”, Media Culture Society, 1996, 18: 185, p. 207
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A. Is the Internet a better “public sphere” than other realms of publicity?
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Political empowerment is understood as the capacity for citizens to voice their
opinions over governmental decisions.3 Therefore, theories of democracy have been
extensively concerned with the communicative interactions among citizens, and
between citizens and the state, as “civic discussion is seen as constitutive of publics”,4
and “the basic rights of citizens to speak and hear are linked to the power to transmit
and receive information (Williams, 1963; Sparks, 1993)”.5
It has been contended the Internet makes a better communication space, a better
“public sphere”, than other realms of publicity and communication (Jankowski and
van Selm, 2000, Rucht et al, 2008, van de Donk et al, 2004, van Os et al, 2007) 6, as it
potentially empowers citizens over the decision-making process. Thus, it is argued the
real newness of the medium lies in the way it connects people.
The Internet’s capacity to support user-generated content, which supplants mass
media’s one-way communication flow by citizen-to-citizen interaction is especially
highlighted in the literature.7 This is thought to foster a more active citizenry than
previous media (Shah, McLeod, Yoon, 2001b, Shah et al. 2005: 551),8 and to
empower otherwise silenced individuals in finding a space for dissidence and power
contestation.9 More specifically, the Internet and Internet-based ICT are thought to
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!3 ZHENG, Y., WU, G., Information Technology, Public Space, and Collective Action in China, Comparative Political Studies, 2005, 38: 507, p. 512 4 DAHLGREN, P., “The Internet, Public Spheres, and Political Communication: Dispersion and Deliberation” Political Communication, 2005, 22:147–162, p. 156 5 Idem. 6 GERHARDS, J., SCHAFER, M., “Is the internet a better public sphere? Comparing old and new media in the USA and Germany”, New Media Society, 2010, 12: 143, p. 145 7 KELLNER, D., “Habermas, the Public Sphere, and Democracy: A Critical Intervention”, in: Edwin Hahn, L (Ed.), Perspectives on Habermas, AKG, London, 2000, p.4, p. 6 8 COLEMAN, R., LIEBER, P., MENDELSON, A., KURPIUS, D., “Public Life and the Internet: if you build a better website, will citizens become engaged?” New Media Society, 2008, 10:179, p. 183 9 ETLING, B., FARIS, R., PALFREY, J., “Political Change in the Digital Age: The Fragility and Promise of Online Organizing”, SAIS Review, Volume 30, Number 2, Summer-Fall 2010, pp. 37-49, p. 39
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provide otherwise excluded individuals with “entry points” to publicity,10 thus making
them less dependent on mass media to publicize their actions or grievances. This is
especially crucial in the event of protests and other public claims, as media access
grants publicity and, therefore, a chance to win popular support.11
As linked to civic participation in democratic contexts, earlier literature expressed
hopes that computer-mediated communication (CMC), and then the Internet, would
“connect the government to citizens (Arterton, 1987)”, thus “restructuring public
affairs (Grossman, 1995, Rash, 1997)”.12 The Internet has therefore been conceived of
as potentially remediating the relations between political representatives and the
wider population (Bimber, 1998).13
Similarly, the “networked public sphere” supported by the Internet and related
communication technologies is thought to favor citizen-to-citizen interaction, and
“ground deliberation in the concrete practices of citizens” 14 , thus allegedly
rejuvenating democracy and “fostering among citizens a shared responsibility in the
knowledge-building dissemination process”.15 Studies besides show that increased
time spent on the Internet is positively correlated with civic engagement (Shah,
Schmierbach, Hawkins, Espino, Donavan 2002)16.
A major counterpoint to these arguments is that of access to technology. Because
access is not universal, the virtual public sphere might as well be an elitist space in
which a small fraction of the better-educated citizens investigate new ways of “doing !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!10 PEEPLES, J., DeLUCA, K.M., “From Public Sphere to Public Screen: Democracy, Activism, and the “Violence” of Seattle”, Critical Studies in Media Communication, Vol. 19, No. 2, June 2002, p. 135 11 WOLFSFELD, Gaudi. Media and Political Conflict, News from the Middle-East, Cambridge University Press, 1997, p.13 12 PAPACHARISSI, Z., “The virtual sphere: the Internet as a Public Sphere”, New Media Society, 2002, 4:9, p. 13 13 AYRES, J.M., “From the Streets to the Internet: The Cyber-Diffusion of Contention”, ANNALS, AAPS S , 566, November 1999, p. 141 14 FRIEDLAND, L.A., “Electronic democracy and the new citizenship… p.207 15 DIETEL, E., MCLAUGHLIN, “Remediating Democracy: Irreverent Composition and the Vernacular Rhetorics of Web 2.0”, Article for Computers and Composition Online: Special Web 2.0 Edition, January 7, 2009, p. 2 16 SCHWARZ, E.A.G., “Political Mobilization Through Online Social Networks”, 2011, p. 10
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citizenship”.17 Moving political discussion to a virtual space indeed “excludes those
with no access to this space”.18 More radically, scholars doubt the Internet is at all
suited for deliberation, arguing online interactions spur “fragmented, nonsensical and
enraged discussion (…) far from guaranteeing a revived public sphere”.19 The quality
of information shared over the Internet is thus traditionally called into question when
it comes to discussing the Internet’s capacity in increasing awareness on political
issues. 20 More importantly, empirical research finds that despite the Internet’s
potential for civic inclusion and participation, it is not being used to “promote
increased deliberation among citizens, or between citizens and politicians (Stromer-
Galley, 2000)”.21
As such, increased audiences does not mean actively involved publics; new
public spaces are “not synonymous with a new public sphere (…): space enhances
discussion, sphere enhances democracy”.22
B. Collective identity diffusion and the reshaping of citizenship
Collective identity formation is key in fostering actively involved publics:
resonance with identities and self-representations is crucial for individuals to get
interested in common interest issues, adhere to causes and stay involved.23 As such,
scholars have explored the Internet’s capacity in fostering a sense of identity among
its users. This is especially crucial for social movements, as “contention begins when
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!17 PAPACHARISSI, Z., “The virtual sphere: the Internet as a Public Sphere”… p. 14 18 Ibid., p. 13 19 Ibid., p. 14 20 GARRETT, K.R., “Protest in an Information Society: A Review of Literature on Social Movements and New ICTs”, Information, Communication and Society, 9(2), 202-224, p. 5 21 COLEMAN, R., LIEBER, P., MENDELSON, A., KURPIUS, D., “Public Life and the Internet… p. 182 22 PAPACHARISSI, Z., “The virtual sphere: the Internet as a Public Sphere”… p. 11 23 PASSY, F., “Social Networks Matter. But How?”, in: DIANI, M., MCADAM, D., (eds.): Social Movement Analysis: The Network Perspective, Oxford University Press, 2002
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people collectively make claims on other people, claims which, if realized, would
affect those others' interests (McAdam, Tarrow, Tilly, 1996)”.24 As such, social
movements and protests form when “previously unorganized groups find a political
voice as vague dissatisfactions crystallize into a specific goal or demand for change”
(Gamson, 1975).25
Media, it is argued, are key in cultivating an informed and vibrant citizenry. More
specifically, it is argued “public communication (…) allow[s] us to analyze how
shared democratic values and identification as democratic citizens are achieved and
maintained (Dahlgren)” 26 (my emphasis). The realization of citizenship is indeed
crucial to the sustainability of individuals’ political engagement, as it is not only a
status granting rights and holding individuals accountable to collective duties. The
subjective side of citizenship, i.e. identification, matters when it comes to willful and
sustainable engagement in public affairs, i.e. in “politics”.
As such, it has been argued the Internet could influence citizens’ self-awareness
by providing them with alternative ways of practicing their citizenship, i.e. identifying
to, and interacting with, public affairs. Academics studying qualitative change in
citizenship - making have theorized new forms of engagements, such as "life politics"
(Giddens, 1991),"sub politics" (Beck, 1997), or "lifestyle politics" (Bennett, 2003b).27
It is argued the subjective notion of citizenship is reshaping, and it has been
empirically found that many citizens, especially the youth (Bennett 1998), lack of
interest when it comes to traditional forms of civic engagement. 28 Therefore,
technologies that enable the kind of horizontal, direct and interactive discussion
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!24 AYRES, J.M., “From the Streets to the Internet… p. 134 25 INSTITUTE FOR HOMELAND SECURITY SOLUTION, “Literature Review: How Political and Social Movements Form on the Internet and How They Change Over Time” November 2009, p. 3 26 DOWNEY, J., FENTON, N., “New Media, Counter-publicity and the Public Sphere”, New Media and Society, Vol.5, No.2, 185-202, 2003, p.191 27 DAHLGREN, P., “The Internet, Public Spheres… p.154 28 VAN AUDENHOVE, L., CAMMAERTS, B., “Online Political Debate, Unbounded Citizenship, and the Problematic Nature of a Transnational Public Sphere”, Political Communication, 22:2005, 179-196, p. 180
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favored by the youth are perceived as potentially reshaping civic engagement. This
seems to be backed up by empirical studies, which have found that youth’s online
civic engagement has been increasing over the years (Pasek, More, and Romer,
2009).29
However, an important reserve lies in skepticism, not only about opportunities
and capacities to engage (access, education, etc.) but willingness to do so. Because
people are interested in politics does not mean they will use any medium to
participate. For instance, Diani (2001), observes “no major impact of the Internet in
terms of identity building or maintenance”, arguing that “the most distinctive
contribution of CMC to social movements still seems to be instrumental rather than
symbolic”. In addition, Brunsting and Postmes (2002) found that “online action might
be driven somewhat more strongly by cognitive calculations than by movement
identification”. Therefore, the positive impact of the Internet and Internet-based new
communication technologies on spurring identification, and, thus, sustainable political
engagement, is yet unclear.
As a conclusion, and taking into account both the optimism and the reserves
expressed regarding the Internet’s capacity to effectively engage individuals in
politics, it can be said that the “virtual sphere” holds great potential for grassroots
participation, and does impact on the way the youth thinks about politics and express
their conception of citizenship.
Therefore, "the Internet and related technologies have created a new public space
for politically oriented conversation; whether this public space transcends to a public
sphere is not up to the technology itself".30 As such, there seems to be limited
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!29 SCHWARZ, E.A.G., “Political Mobilization Through Online Social Networks… p. 13 30 PAPACHARISSI, Z., “The virtual sphere: the Internet as a Public Sphere… Abstract
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empirical evidence that the Internet is a “better communication space” as compared to
other media; rather, interesting venues for reflection lies in the particular use that is
made out of the technology, and the context that influences this use’s modalities.31
2. The Internet, Mobilization and Activism
A. Is the Internet effective in mobilizing individuals?
It is generally accepted in the literature that “new communication technologies
have historically been powerful factors shaping political mobilization (Jones, 1994:
152-3)”.32 As such, scholars agree that the Internet has an impact on the way
individuals mobilize for, and participate in, political matters (Diani 2000, Wellman
2002, Della Porta & Mosca 2005, Fisher & Boekkoi, 2010).33 The nature of this
impact is, however, debated.
Proponents of the mobilization thesis contend that “ICTs and the Internet may
enhance mobilization and participation among traditionally excluded or
underrepresented groups and individuals in the political process”.34 As such, scholars
have argued that the use of the Internet for political purposes would likely increase
offline political engagement (Della Porta and Mosca, 2005, Fisher and Boekkoi,
2010).
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!31 GERHARDS, J., SCHAFER, M., “Is the internet a better public sphere? Comparing old and new media in the USA and Germany”, New Media Society, 2010, 12: 143, p. 148 32 CHADWICK, A., “The Internet, Political Mobilization and Organization Hybridity: “Deanspace”, MoveOn.org and the 2004 US Presidential Campaign, Paper prepared for presentation to the Political Studies Association of the United Kingdom Annual Conference, University of Leeds, April 5th-7th, 2005; Session 1, Panel 17: 'The Internet and Political Mobilization' p. 2, Chadwick, The Internet, Political mobilization and organizational hybridity, p.2 33 SCHWARZ, E.A.G., “Political Mobilization Through Online Social Networks…, p.10 34 VAN LAER, J., “Internet Use and Protest Participation: How do ICTs affect mobilization?” Politieke Wetenschappen, PSW-paper 2007/1, p. 5
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The adverse position, supported by proponents of the reinforcement theory,
contends that instead of providing marginalized groups and individuals with
alternative resources, the Internet reinforces existing social inequalities when it comes
to who gets informed and involved in politics.35 It is argued that the Internet extends
existing social ties rather than building new connections (Diani, 2001), thus
reproducing offline social inequalities. 36 More specifically, related to collective
action, it is argued that Internet use is “a solitary and individual activity that is
unlikely to foster collective action” (Dahlgren, 2001, Diani, 2001, Ward et al. 2003).37
Empirical studies tend to find that the Internet indeed does not normalize protest
attendance among traditionally excluded social groups (unemployed, elderly…) and
that being interested and active in online networks is generally correlated with higher
levels of education and an existing interest in politics38 : “[o]nline politics has had
more success at drawing in the politically engaged than in converting the
disaffected”.39 Gerhards and Schäfer (2010), among others, do not find “a more
extensive popular inclusion of citizens on the web”.40 Furthermore, it has been found
that offline engagement more likely determines whether people consume political
information on the web and act upon it (Schwarz, 2010).41
Moreover, the isolation associated to Internet use does not seem to negatively
affect decisions to participate in “offline” actions. Empirical studies indeed find that
the Internet “mobilizes mostly isolated individuals who are not personally connected
to a wider circle of people with whom they engage in social movement activity
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!35 VAN LAER, J., “Internet Use and Protest Participation: How do ICTs affect mobilization?” Politieke Wetenschappen, PSW-paper 2007/1, p. 5 36 Ibid., p. 19 37 Ibid., p. 5 38 Ibid., pp. 16- 17 39 NEUMAN, R., BIMBER,B., HINDMAN, M., “The Internet and Four Dimensions of Citizenship”… p. 38 40 GERHARDS, J., SCHAFER, M., “Is the internet a better public sphere? ..., p. 148 41 SCHWARZ, E.A.G., “Political Mobilization Through Online Social Networks…,p. 23
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(Wellman et al. 2003; Boase et al. 2006)” 42 (my emphasis). It thus seems that the
Internet helps bypass the deemed-necessary interpersonal contacts when it comes to
fostering adherence over a cause or inciting participation.
These relatively recent empirical results are at odds with the argument, found in
earlier social movement literature, according to which “individuals with friends or
acquaintances already involved in social movements are more inclined to take part in
collective action (e.g. Della Porta 1988, 1995; Gould 1993, 1995; Klandermans 1997;
Kriesi 1993; McAdam 1986, 1988; Snow et al. 1980).43 The discrepancy between
earlier findings about social movement recruitment on the one hand, and empirical
results analyzing the impact of the Internet thereupon on the other hand, suggests that
the nature of mobilization in collective action has changed. The extent to which this
change can be attributed to technology is still debated.
In essence, research suggests that the Internet is not “politics as usual” (Margolis
and Reisnick, 2000) but yet does not fulfill the hopes of inclusiveness, quality and
change that it had spurred almost two decades ago. Virtual communication channels
likely extend mobilization quantitatively, i.e. it does indeed have the potential to
mobilize a greater number of people. However, it likely extends mobilization to a
politically aware public, potentially already involved “offline” in more traditional
structures.44 Therefore, attention must be paid not to confuse what stems from the
impact of technologies per se, and the characteristic use that is made out of it by
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!42 FISHER, D., BOEKKOI, M., “Mobilizing Friends and Strangers”, Information, Communication and Society, 13:2, 2010, 193-208, p. 204 43 PASSY, F., “Social Networks Matter. But How?”, in: DIANI, M., MCADAM, D., (eds.): Social Movement Analysis: The Network Perspective, Oxford University Press, 2002, p. 7 44 VAN LAER, J. “Activists “online” and “offline”: The Internet as an Information Channel for Protest Demonstrations”, Mobilization: An International Journal 15(3), 2010, p. 412
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atypical citizens45 : “early adopters of new technologies are systematically different
from mainstream adopters” (Everett Rogers, 1986, 2003).46
B. Internet as a tool for activism: characteristics
The Internet is not only a new communication tool: it is also a new social space
underpinned by specific types of networks. 47 Therefore, any discussion of the
Internet’s impact on political action has to consider both the technical evolutions of
the tool and the networks and new social relations these technical specificities enable.
Discussing the alleged advantages of the Internet as a tool of political activism,
the earlier literature focuses on the latter’s technical evolutions as compared to
previous information technologies. It is mainly argued that speed, reduction in
communication costs (Fisher, 1998; Klein, 1999; Pickerhill 2001a; Almeida and
Lichbach, 2003)48 and abolition of space as an obstacle to communication (Kern,
1983; Carey, 1989) significantly effect both participation in (Bonchek 1995; Butler et
al. 1997; Leizerov, 2000), and organization of (Van Aelst and Walgrave, 2004)
collective political action. 49
The reduction in communication costs and the reshaping of time and space is
thought to encourage participation by making “micro-contributions profitable”50 (my
emphasis), rather than simply possible. In essence, it is argued “the Internet brings to
collective action: organization, logistics, networking between groups; a way of
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!45 NEUMAN, R., BIMBER,B., HINDMAN, M., “The Internet and Four Dimensions of Citizenship”, in: The Oxford Handbook of American Public Opinion and the Media, 2011, p. 25 46 Ibid., p. 25 47 STORCK, M., “The Role of Social Media in Political Mobilisation: a Case Study of the January 2011 Egyptian Uprising”, Unpublished MA Thesis, University of St Andrews, Scotland, 2011, p. 10 48 CHADWICK, A., “The Internet, Political Mobilization and Organization Hybridity…, p. 20 49 GARRETT, K.R., “Protest in an Information Society: A Review of Literature on Social Movements and New ICTs”, Information, Communication and Society, 2006, 9(2), 202-224, p. 5 50 Ibid., p. 207
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expressing dissent and protest, and information dissemination (Della Porta and
Mosca, 2005).51 Scholars have concluded that these changes are making political
action "easier, faster and more universal" (Van Aelst and Walgrave, 2002).52
Further, it has been found that the Internet sustains “weak ties” networks, namely,
networks linking acquaintances or strangers, rather than close friends, over issues
(Granovetter, 1973). “Weak ties” networks are sparse, fluid, and horizontal, and are
better suited to spread new information, as opposed to strong ties (friends, family)
networks, in which all individuals likely possess the same information. It has been
argued that “weak ties” networks might be accelerating and extending the diffusion of
social contention (Myers 1994, 2000, Bimber 198b; Bimber 2000)53, potentially
contributing to an intensification of conflict in the event of social upheavals.54
As such, the Internet allegedly facilitates collective action by enabling
“coordination of activities over networks with many nodes and numerous connecting
points (“hubs”). In such a network, active individuals may become the “hubs” around
which mobilization is sustained. It is notably argued that loosely structured networks
are more suited to sustain a movement in the long term as “even if particular nodes
and hubs die, change their mission or move out of the network" collective
organization can be maintained.55
A gap in the research however still exists with regards to the sustainability of
political mobilization via online networks, which has been charged as a critique to
overly optimistic claims linking evolution in technology and political change.56 It has
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!51 SCHWARZ, E.A.G., “Political Mobilization Through Online Social Networks”, 2011, p. 10 52 VAN AELST, P, WALGRAVE S,”New Media, New Movements? The Role of the Internet in Shaping the “Anti-Globalization” Movement”, Information, Communication, Society, 5:4, 2002, p. 446 53 PICKERHILL, J., “Rethinking Political Participation: Experiments in Internet Activism in Australia and Britain”, Draft for Book Chapter,July 2012, p. 5 54 GARRETT, K.R., “Protest in an Information Society…p. 9 55 BENNETT, W.L, “New Media Power: The Internet and Global Activism”, in: COULDRY, N., CURRANG, J., (Eds.), Contesting Media Power, Rowman and Littlefield, 2003, p.7 56 INSTITUTE FOR HOMELAND SECURITY SOLUTION, “Literature Review: How Political and Social Movements Form on the Internet and How They Change Over Time” November 2009, p. 4
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been suggested that research focus on the sustainability of those political and social
movements entrenched in the “integrated infrastructures of communication on the
Internet”.57
In essence, it is contended that new types of social movements, contentious
activities and political activism are emerging (Garner, 1999) that “are built on non-
hierarchical, diversely networked bases (Castells, 1996, Ronfeldt and Arquilla, 2001,
Castells, 2004, Juris 2004, Bennett et al, 2008)”.58 Loose and issue-specific networks
supported by the speed and technical efficacy allowed by ICT enable individuals “to
bypass the up-to-date necessary institutionalization of being in a "group" (…) thus
permitting “citizens to group without an organization” 59 and create their own
structures of meaning 60 More specifically, studies have found that political
participation and action via online networks specifically increase political efficacy,
i.e. the impression of one’s action’s usefulness: “engagement 2.0 suggests that the low
barriers to participation, easy accessibility and affinities with other users may give
participants the feeling that their voice "counts" in conversations about global issues -
an important factor in future political behaviors”. 61
3. The Internet, Authoritarianism and Political Change
!A. Internet, a democratizing tool?
The exploration of the Internet’s impact on political regime change and
democratization essentially focuses on elements theorized as constitutive of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!57 INSTITUTE FOR HOMELAND SECURITY SOLUTION, “Literature Review: How Political and Social Movements Form on the Internet and How They Change Over Time” November 2009, p. 6 58 SCHWARZ, E.A.G., “Political Mobilization Through Online Social Networks…, p.3 59 PETTINGILL, L., “Engagement 2.0? How the New Digital Media can Invigorate Civic Engagement”, September 2007, p.8. 60 PASSY, F., “Social Networks Matter. But How? …, p. 30 61 PETTINGILL, L., “Engagement 2.0? …, p. 15
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democracies - namely “participation, deliberation, transparency, accountability and
rights (Dahl, 1989)”. 62 Kedzie (1997) has, for instance, found a “statistically
significant correlation between network connectivity and political freedom”. This is
backed up by later studies that link democratization to the proportion of Internet users
in a given country (Norris, 2001).63
Political agendas and legal frameworks however often decide the extent to which
a given technology has an impact: the “institutional arrangements of its (new ICTs)
control”64 are crucial to determining how technologies are used, and by whom.65 As
such, rather than the technology itself, the “nature of interactions between the state
and society (…) decides whether Internet-based collective actions can lead to political
change”.66 Therefore, it seems that “political change is a determinant to internet
diffusion, not the other way around”. 67
As such, scholars contend that rather than technology, context is primordial in
understanding why some activists or groups pursue “more empowering applications
of new communication technology” than others.68 Studies find that sociopolitical
instability amplifies so-called “internet effects” - even when the technology is not
widespread.69 Instability is typically characterized as rapid change that affect the
“established pattern of life of a society or government” (Weaver, 1977:60).70 As such,
the availability of technology might be crucial in the case of social upheavals – not
because of technology, but because of the particular sociopolitical context.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!62 ZHENG, Y., WU, G., Information Technology, Public Space, and Collective Action in China, Comparative Political Studies, 2005 38: 507, p. 511 63 Ibid., p. 510 64 Slevin, J., The Internet and Society, Wiley, 2000, p.136 65 As quoted by PICKERHILL, J., “Rethinking Political Participation: Experiments in Internet Activism in Australia and Britain”, Draft for Book Chapter,July 2012 66 ZHENG, Y., WU, G., Information Technology, Public Space…, p. 508 67 Ibid.,p. 511 68 BENNETT, W.L, “New Media Power: The Internet and Global Activism”, in: COULDRY, N., CURRANG, J., (Eds.), Contesting Media Power, Rowman and Littlefield, 2003, p. 13 69 GROSHEK, J., “The Democratic Effects of the Internet, 1994-2003. A Cross-National Inquiry of 152 Countries”, The International Communication Gazette , 2009, p. 133 70 Ibid., p. 123
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Therefore, authors have nuanced the Internet’s alleged subversive role (Kalathil
and Boas, 2003),71 arguing that the Internet, strictly understood as a communication
tool, cannot be deemed to drastically alter “asymmetric power and economic relations
within and between countries”.72 Moreover, scholars, especially in the later literature
and in light of empirical situations, have expressed concern over the seemingly
widespread assumption that activists or grassroots organizations are the most evident
benefactors of new technology. While it is often empirically true that early adopters
of technology stem rather from the well-educated, young fringe of the population than
from well-established, de facto older, power-holders, “established organizations, the
wealthy, and the privileged are moving into cyberspace and taking their advantages
with them”.73 New ICTs and the Internet can and are being used by governments for
surveillance purposes (Margolis and Reisnick, 2000; Kalathil and Boas, 2003;
Hussain and Howard, 2012), and are therefore not exclusively useful to activists.
It is, however, fair to acknowledge that the Internet and new ICTs, if not tools of
freedom, have “at least provided a new public field for social groups to jostle for
space vis-à-vis the authoritarian state".74
B. Internet, activism and political change: the specific case of the Arab uprisings
Scholarship concerned with the Internet’s impact on authoritarianism has
expanded since the early 2000s, with the “Color Revolutions”75, the Iranian Green
movement, and finally the Arab uprisings. Although heterogeneous, these movements
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!71 DAHLGREN, P., “The Internet, Public Spheres, and Political Communication…, p.151 72 GROSHEK, J., “The Democratic Effects of the Internet, 1994-2003. A Cross-National Inquiry of 152 Countries”, The International Communication Gazette , 2009, p. 135 73 MARGOLIS, M., REISNICK, D, Politics As Usual. The Cyberspace Revolution, Sage Publications, 2000, p. 8 74 ZHENG, Y., WU, G., Information Technology, Public Space…, p. 522 75 The term was used by the media to refer to upheavals that took place in former USSR (e.g. Ukraine, Yugoslavia, Georgia) and in the Middle East (Lebanon) in the early 2000s
! 25!
witnessed a comparable use of new media and Internet platforms for rapid content
dissemination and protests organization.76
Since 2011, specific attention has been given to social media platforms, such as
Facebook, Twitter and blogs. The question has brought together different
scholarships, adding a media and communication twist to previous social movement
literature, backed up by arabists’ and orientalists’ analyses of particular historical and
political contexts.
Quantitative studies usually center on activists’ role during the uprisings. Twitter
feeds are often analyzed, and it seems the importance of bloggers and activists lie in
their “bridging” position between different communities - often acting as
intermediaries among local and regional actors, and between local and international
actors (journalists, NGOs).!77
Qualitative fieldwork tried to systematize “good practices” among bloggers and
activists. For instance, it has been found that blogs are perceived as ideal spaces for
the discussion and diffusion of controversial content in restrictive countries. 78
Similarly, it seems that those very active individuals, often - but not necessarily - both
offline and online, have mostly inspired the “tech-savvy youth” by setting the
example and showing the authoritarian status quo could change, even in the face of
heavy-handed governmental repression.
Further, authors have asserted the Internet and online platforms shape a new
culture, underpinned by new kinds of social interactions creating discourses and
symbols.79 Studies find the tech-savvy youth in those countries have constituted
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!76 Ibid., p. 40 77!LOTAN,!G.,!GRAEFF,!E.,!ANANNY,!M.,!GAFFNEY,!D.,!PEARCE,!I.,!BOYD,!D.!“The!Revolutions!Were!Tweeted:!Information!Flows!During!the!2011!Tunisian!and!Egyptian!Revolutions”!,!International&Journal&of&Communication,&Issue!5,!2011,!p.1377!78 NEUMAN, R., BIMBER,B., HINDMAN, M., “The Internet and Four Dimensions of Citizenship”… p. 28 79 RAHIMI, B., “Facebook Iran, The Carnivalesque Politics of Online Social Networking”, Sociologica, 3:2011, p.7
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communities shaped by a loose network of acquaintances and a culture of ”remix”
(Lessig, 2008), in which each individual is at the same time producing, consuming
and mixing content.80 Interestingly, it is argued that the main empowerment brought
about by Internet use for political ends might as well be the “social capital” this use
creates. Indeed, if individuals can be physically impeded from regrouping, skills
acquired online (critical mind, political knowledge) add up and are not easily targeted
by repression.81
After three years of academic research, it has become clear that labeling the Arab
uprisings “Internet Revolutions” does not do justice to reality. The Internet per se did
not oust dictators from their position; rather, interesting venues for reflection lie in the
particular uses of this technology by specific individuals, which eventually helped
bridge the gap between virtual organizations and real life mobilization.
!!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!80 VALERIANI, A., « Bridges of the Revolution, Linking People, Sharing Information and Remixing Practices », Sociologica, 2001:3, p.5 81 FARIS, D., “Revolutions Without Revolutionnaries? Network theory, Facebook and the Egyptian Blogosphere”, Arab, Media and Society, Saint Anthony’s College, University of Oxford, 2008, p. 7
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II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK & METHODOLOGY
!1. Theoretical framework: The Market for Loyalties, Monroe Price
(1994; 2002; 2007)
A. The “shuffle for allegiances”
Have Tunisian activists gained a voice in the new market for loyalties through
their use of new communication technologies during the revolution? Has Tunisian
activists’ use of new media challenged the local market for loyalties? Have they
succeeded, through the “subversion of the public sphere” (Lynch, 2012), to become
“sellers” in the market for loyalties, by providing new sources of identity and
citizenship to the population?
Monroe Price is best known for his work on media regulation. He is the director
of the Center of Global Communication Studies at the University of Pennsylvania.
The model he developed is called the “market for loyalties”, and theorizes the power
battle fought by governments and corporations over the control of the public sphere,
in terms of a “shuffle for allegiances”:
“Large scale competitors for power, in a shuffle for allegiances, often use the
regulation of communications to organize a cartel of imagery and identity among
themselves. Governments are usually not only the mechanisms that allows the
cartel to operate, but is often part of the cartel itself" (Price 1994; Price 2002)
! 28!
The “sellers” of this market are global actors (corporations, governments) who
create a “cartel of imagery and identity”, offered to the buyers (i.e. the citizens) that
“pay” the sellers through identification, i.e. loyalty or citizenship. In this market,
attention thus becomes a commodity (Price, 2007).
Sellers in this market are all those for whom myths and dreams and history can
somehow be converted into power and wealth (…) The "buyers" are the citizens,
subjects, nationals, consumers-recipients of the packages of information (…) The
consumer "pays" for one set of identities or another in several ways that, together,
we call "loyalty" or “citizenship”(…) Buyers pay not only through compliance
with the law, tax payment etc. but also with their own sense of identity” (Price
1994, p.669)
B. Control over the public sphere: media regulation and the issue of new ICTs
As long as citizens identify to and comply with one seller’s identity, the latter
remains in control of the public sphere. Control over the public sphere is ensured by
governmental regulation of the communication market, i.e. through legislation passed
in the media industry and control of communication channels. Governments have the
choice of either excluding new actors in this market by ensuring that only certain
corporations / groups of actors gain control over communication channels, or by
including these new actors, when the identity promoted by the latter complies with the
government’s national goals.
! 29!
“Control over the participation in the market has often been the condition for
political stability” (Price 1994; Price 2002)
The introduction of new ICTs disrupts the market for loyalties in the sense they
enable new voices to be heard outside of the realm of governmental control, reaching
directly to national or transnational audiences. In that regard, the unregulated (from a
legal standpoint) Internet is a privileged means for citizens to access information and
spread news.
“Changes in media technology are creating new global pressures in the
market for loyalties, altering the capacity of governments to perform their
historic function of regulating their own segment of the market and
transforming local, national, and global regulatory arrangements” (Price
1994, p.667)
“Now, thanks to the evolution in technology, buyers also have roles as
potential sellers: the previously domestic market is opening up to the civil
society and transnational groups” (Price 2007, p. 47)
ICTs that bypass governmental regulations also have the potential to empower
citizens in bypassing rules and restrictions, i.e. bypassing barriers to the entry in the
market for loyalties. This opens the door to change in power dynamics and control,
even more so in the event of a social drive towards political change.
! 30!
“Changes in strategy are intensified when technology shifts are combined
with large political upheavals altered demographics and changed concepts of
law" (Price, 2007, p. 46)
C. Access to the Market for Loyalties and political power
The contention pursued in this dissertation is that activists and citizens have
gained a voice in the global market for loyalties through their use of new ICTs and the
Internet, that had opened alternative channels of communication, thus enabling
activists to bypass the regime’s monopoly on media. The question pursued is whether
this empowerment translates into political legitimacy, i.e. whether gaining visibility
and support is bound to the special conditions of the Revolution.
"All (...) actors in the global theater, if they wish to deepen or expand
allegiances must determine how best to gain access to markets and how to
have sufficient entry to exploit the shifts in communications" (Price, 2007,
p.46)
The opening of the market for loyalties to new entrants depends on several
factors. One of them is globalization and the subsequent international pressure (i.e.
global advocacy) exerted to abide by general, “democratic”, standards pertaining to
civil society rights. Thus, “free speech” norms, coupled to international support for
new entrants on local markets for loyalties and the evolution of technology potentially
empower new actors to be heard in the public realm.
! 31!
“A market for loyalties analysis explores the formal and informal efforts made
to restrict access to certain voices (…) Communication avenues in any given
state are increasingly a matter of international action or pressure, justified
under the aegis, for example, of stability, trade or human rights” (Price 2007,
p.48; p. 50)
D. The specific case of political transitions
Price also theorizes the consequences, for the state or corporations, of a loss of
their monopoly. He thinks of transitions as especially interesting, because national
identity is discussed and reframed, and new actors fight for “new tropes of
legitimacy” among the public, notably through media outlets and other
communication channels.
These transformations discredit the old, substitute the new, and will have
important consequences for issues of stability and the establishment of
democratic values (Price, 2004, p.684)
Of particular interest to Price’s model are those countries with a formal yet not
fully constituted statehood, which makes the fight for control over loyalties more
evident. This is the case in Tunisia.
These public efforts have a special poignancy where a nation has the actuality of
statehood, but not its full blossom (…) the dynamism of this market is evidenced
by the efforts to refrain it. (Price, 2004, p.684)
! 32!
2. Research questions and hypotheses
!A. Topic outline
This dissertation studies the evolution of Tunisian activists’ role in local politics,
focusing on their use of new communication technologies as a way to enter the public
realm, and potentially have a say in political (i.e. public) affairs. Relating to Price’s
model, I will discuss whether activists effectively sell an identity in the “market for
loyalties”. Price considers countries is so-called transition periods to be particularly
interesting, as "the contest for control over a nation's identity is greatest where new-
found independence leads to attempts to seize the popular spirit and fill it with ideas
of loyalty".82
New communication technologies, because they empower citizens to be active
producers of their own content, thus producers of a potential alternative identity,
constitute a threat to those in control of the “market for loyalties”. This is particularly
true in autocracies, where the only “voice” heard is the State’s – be it through
advertisement, political discourses or mass media. In the case of Tunisia, new
communication technologies enabled individuals to bypass Ben Ali’s control over the
public sphere. A small group of individuals (i.e. “activists”) engaged in a
“technology-race” where their tech-savyness concurred the massive surveillance and
censorship apparatus of the State. It is partly through this “subversion of the public
sphere” (Lynch, 2012) and the active condemnation of the regime through blogs,
Facebook pages, Youtube channels… that Ben Ali’s regime was overthrown, once the
citizens acknowledged its legitimacy only rested upon the fear it had managed to
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!82 PRICE, M., “The Market for Loyalties: Electronic Media and the Global Competition for Allegiances”, The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 104: 667, 1994, p. 683
! 33!
anchor in the collective mind. It is the status and role of those individuals in the
transition "from monopoly control over the imagery to a more pluralistic competitive
structure"83 I would like to assess in this dissertation.
B. Hypotheses
RQ: Have Tunisian activists been politically empowered through their use of new
communication technologies? Is this empowerment of a sustainable nature?
H1: Tunisian activists have been politically empowered through their use of new
communication technologies because they have managed to engage as leaders of a
shift in mentality, namely the "fall of the wall of fear". Coupled to the evolutions
in information and communication technologies, this has challenged Ben Ali’s
regime as it progressively tackled two primordial control mechanisms at the same
time: fear and information blackout.
H1 would be supported by anecdotes, observations or examples attesting that my
interviewees have become “popular” public figures (fans on a Facebook pages or
followers on Twitter, citizens reactions during a conference, popular support of civil
society initiatives launched since the revolution…). Similarly, H1 would be supported
if it seems a greater “trust” is given to activists rather than to other groups in the
society or to the government representatives, notably in regard to information about
political or public issues.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!83 PRICE, M., “The Market for Loyalties…, p.683
! 34!
Conversely, H1 would be rejected if interviewees feel their actions, publications
or opinion do not have the impact it used to have under Ben Ali; if they feel they have
been losing in audience or do not relate with the political process launched after the
Revolution.
H2: This empowerment is potentially of a sustainable nature because the medium
they are using has become “mainstream”, i.e. they have “become the media”. The
web 2.0, supporting communication technologies (e.g. smartphones) and related
applications (e.g. geo-localization) have become intrinsically political because
both the political change of the Revolution and the activists’ strategic use thereof
have transformed it into a media. Thus, Tunisian activists have empowered
themselves through their political use of technology (i.e. their use of technology
for political ends).
H2 would be supported if mainstream media outlets use those online platforms as
a tool for their daily work, or if it is observed bloggers have professionalized mainly
as journalists. H2 would also be supported if news are mostly driven by content
shared and produced by bloggers, even when they are not journalists.
Conversely, H2 would be undermined if online platforms’ use has been
normalized, i.e. if it is rather used for entertainment than politics, or if it is found
people do not consume news online. Similarly, if it is observed online platforms share
information broadcasted through mass media rather than producing their own content,
H2 would be rejected.
! 35!
H3: Institutionalization of the action is not necessarily the best way to ensure
entrance in the market for loyalties. As long as a full democracy is not achieved,
the “voice” could potentially be better heard if it stays in the realm of the
informal, with the relative freedom a lack of legal frameworks also suggests.
H3 would be supported if interviewees feel the transition period has opened up
more opportunities for action. H3 would also be supported if activists feel the
transition empowers them in furthering their goals better than a stable, democratic
system would have.
H3 would however be undermined if the lack of a defined legal framework
guaranteeing the freedoms acquired with the Revolution is perceived as a threat to
further action.
H4: Sustainability of activists’ prominence in public affairs is threatened by the
politicization of the social web, and the use of online platforms by political
parties, notably moderate Islamist ruling-party Ennahdha, who now also “fight for
new tropes of legitimacy”.84 Sustainability might also be threatened by the
exclusivity of the platforms used: should activists not be able to adapt to technical
evolutions, they risk losing their main outreach tool to their audience.
H4 would be supported if interviewees find they are being outpaced by political
parties in the mastery of ICTs as outreach tools, for financial or ideological reasons.
Similarly, if interviewees mention “evolution in technology” as a perceived threat to
their current action, H4 would tend to be supported.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!84 PRICE, M., “The Market for Loyalties…, p.683
! 36!
Conversely, if interviewees testify to political parties’ incapacity at effectively
using online platforms for political communication purposes, H4 would be rejected.
3. Methodology
!A. Sampling
I used snowball sampling to select my interviewees. Field research (three months)
enabled me to meet with several individuals, who in turn recommended people who
corresponded to my research’s criteria. I would not have been able to get many of
those contacts in that period of time if I had used another type of methodology. I also
believe that snowball sampling is well suited to the nature of the group I am studying:
it is a very small subgroup of the population, and is therefore not representative per
se, which would render efforts to be statistically representative through probabilistic
sampling inefficient. From my research perspective, it is also a better way to ensure
collaboration: I am not only doing research on people, but with people whose
expertise I use to complete and refine my analysis.
B. Outlining the questionnaire’s framework
In order to link theory to fieldwork and define the questionnaire’s framework, my
research question may be rephrased as follows: have Tunisian activists been able to
impose their presence in the public sphere using alternative communication channels
supported by new communication technologies? How can these individuals sustain
their visibility and influence via these new communication channels now that the
main impediment to one’s online action (governmental repression) is gone, i.e. can
! 37!
they survive in a pluralistic context? How have Tunisian activists used the revolution
and the power gained to become those “whose dreams and myths are translated into
power and wealth” (Price, 2002)?
The inquiry here is structural in nature: I am trying to assess the nature of the
interaction between a given group of individuals and the political process, to analyze
the evolution of the “market for loyalties” (structure) and the status of those activists
using new communication technologies as a mobilization and outreach tool, i.e. as a
way to provide “new tropes of legitimacy”.85
I thus attest of the “political empowerment” Tunisian activists have witnessed
through the concept of “legitimacy”. Legitimacy can be accounted for in different
ways, but I feel three general themes are important to explore.
1) The position of activists towards state’s authorities and political institutions,
exploring whether they are allowed to voice divergent opinions. Activists’
freedom in the new political context may be used to outline the current
government’s strategy to control the market for loyalties, and simultaneously,
the evolution of activists’ place therein. This will help us test the hypothesis
(H1) according to which activists have been politically empowered because new
communication technologies have enabled them to broadcast not only
oppositional content, but foment a “shift in mentalities” that challenged (and
still challenges?) governmental authority.
2) Similarly, assessing the relationship between activists and both national and
international mainstream media outlets will help us attest of the former’s
position in the market for loyalties, and test the hypothesis (H2) that contends
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!85 PRICE, M., “The Market for Loyalties…, p.683
! 38!
activists have become politically empowered because the medium they are
using has shifted from being an alternative communication channel to an
alternative (yet credible) source of information.
3) The relation of activists to their direct competitors for the “new tropes of
legitimacy” in the transition context, i.e. Islamists, notably ruling party
Ennahdha. How do they see the “shuffle for allegiances”? Who do they consider
to be their direct opponent?
C. Interviews
In order to attest of the qualitative change in activists’ role before, during and
after the revolution, I focused on specific profiles. More specifically, I interviewed
individuals that: 1) Define themselves as bloggers, activists or as cyber-dissidents; 2)
Have been politically active online before the revolution (i.e. have not started their
activism after the revolution); 3) Have succeeded in finding a space in the transition
context (i.e. have not “disappeared” after the revolution).
This selection introduces a fundamental bias in this research, as looking for still
active individuals de facto exclude not only those who have not been able to further
their engagement, but those who have not been willing to do so. Individuals’
motivations and reasons not to further their engagement have however been
accounted for in informal discussions; yet the sixteen formal interviews conducted
only took into account individuals still active today.
! 39!
D. Conclusion: Research’s contributions and limits
!This work tries to account for three questions: have Tunisian bloggers and cyber-
dissidents been playing a role since the revolution? What exactly was their role prior
and during the Revolution? And is the idea of an “Internet revolution” a myth, or a
misinterpreted reality?
This research’s limit is that I will only focus on how activists understand their
role, whether their modus operandi has changed since the Revolution, what prospects
they see for their action, and how they interact with the rest of society - focusing,
here, on three components of the “market for loyalties”, i.e. the government, the
mainstream media and competitors for the new “tropes of legitimacy”. The way the
government, citizens and the mainstream media perceive these individuals will not be
accounted for here. I am thus accounting for the nature of a structural change through
subjective impressions – which withholds both promising perspectives and inevitable
limits.
!!
! 40!
III. CONTEXTUALIZATION
1. Ben Ali’s Tunisia: Information control as a pillar of the dictatorship
“How states respond to the new media environment influences the profile and the
capacities of global civil society” (Price 2007, p. 55)
How did Ben Ali respond to the evolutions in communication technologies over
the past decades?
While Tunisia was the first country in the Arab region to grant Internet access to
its population (1991), the regime rapidly developed a control structure that
progressively restricted its population’s right to access and freedom of expression.86
Rather than purely banning the Internet from the country or restricting its access to
official institutions, as it is the case in Cuba (Kalathil and Boas, 2002), Ben Ali’s
regime opted for the continuous harassment and repression of individuals, foremost
human rights activists but also ordinary citizens.
The example of Tunisia is particularly interesting as repression and censorship
were part and parcel of the communication infrastructure. Control over ICT in Tunisia
was not simply a matter of preventing the system from working correctly: the system
was specifically designed to allow interference.87 The system was de facto supported
by telecommunication companies, and actively supplied for by surveillance
technology providers. The latter had found a sacred haven in Tunisia, and used the
country to test their technologies before commercializing them elsewhere. As a form
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!86!YORK,!Jillian!C.!“The!Arab!Vanguard:!How!a!Decade!of!Blogging!Contributed!to!a!Year!of!Revolution”,!Georgetown&Journal&of&International&Affairs,!Vol.13,!Issue!1.,!Winter/Spring!2012!87 “After the Arab Spring: New Paths for Human Rights and the Internet in European Foreign Policy”…p.21
! 41!
of compensation, Ben Ali’s regime benefitted from discounted prices on the
technologies tested, free infrastructure maintenance and free software updates.88 This
is what enabled the regime to maintain a firm grip on the country, even as technology
evolved over the years.
A. The evolution of ICT surveillance in Tunisia
Ben Wagner (2012) describes Tunisia as a “push-button autocracy”, as
technology empowered the state’s institutions rather than the population.89 In 1996,
Tunisian authorities established the Tunisian Internet Agency (known by its French
acronym ATI), as the main Internet provider. Hence, the regime had discretion over
the totality of Internet traffic. In addition to the surveillance technologies
implemented to monitor the information flow, state employees were charged with
filtering e-mails, texts and instant messaging devices. The fact Ben Ali was able to lift
all restrictions on ICT and the Internet in a matter of hours, on January 13th, 2011, in a
last desperate attempt to buy social peace, illustrates the extent to which means of
information and communication were at the regime’s hands.90
In Tunisia, censorship and surveillance intensified as layers of diverse
technologies came to reinforce the state’s control over communications in the country
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!88 Ibid., p.5 89 WAGNER, B., “Push-button autocracy in Tunisia : Analyzing the role of Internet infrastructure, institutions and international markets in creating a Tunisian censorship regime”, Telecommunications Policy 36, 2012 90 Idem.
! 42!
(see above figure). A significant stage was reached as the Tunisian authorities
introduced, in 2007, “deep-packet inspection” (DPI) technology to their surveillance
apparatus. DPI enables the shaping of live information flux in a network, as opposed
to content stored in databases. This opens up the possibility for live manipulation of
traffic, either to optimize it – the primary function of this technology - or control it.
More specifically, DPI was used by the Tunisian ATI to block the movement of
certain information into or out of the Tunisian network.91 Thus, DPI endowed the
Tunisian regime with the capacity to shift from passive recognition of information
patterns to active manipulation thereof. In the year preceding the revolution, and
during the uprisings as well, (2010-2011), state employees went as far as
manipulating mail content or directly reaching out to individuals through threatening
messages (Hack attacks).
As different layers of technology came to consolidate the surveillance
infrastructure, it became increasingly difficult for the population to identify the source
of these restrictions and attacks. The authorities came to increasingly hide themselves
behind “Ammar 404”, the typical “technical error” message. The frequency at which
this message was used to deny access to content in the years preceding the revolution
made it a public subject of laughter (and an increasing source of fear as well), a quasi-
personified “big brother” whose authenticity could never be ascertained – as technical
errors do happen too, sometimes.92 Such disruptive practices instilled fear and
uncertainty among the population, for whom it was almost impossible to imagine the
subtlety of the system that controlled their digital interactions. Instilling insecurity
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!91 MUELLER, Milton. “DPI Technology from the standpoint of Internet governance studies: An introduction”, Syracuse University School of Information Studies, p.4 92!!YORK,!Jillian!C.!“The!Arab!Vanguard:!How!a!Decade!of!Blogging!Contributed!to!a!Year!of!Revolution”,!Georgetown&Journal&of&International&Affairs,!Vol.13,!Issue!1.,!Winter/Spring!2012!
! 43!
was also a way of tackling the problem of content production at its root by inciting the
population to self-censorship – building the “wall of fear”.
Tunisia was by far not the only country to engage in repressive communication
practices, although it pushed the logic of surveillance to its extremes. All authoritarian
regimes in the Arab region opted for intensive control over ICT and the Internet,
implementing country-wide surveillance and censorship through filtering
technologies, tracking software, proxies and firewalls. The coupling of censorship
with technology-based surveillance ensured a “double-protection” that simultaneously
blocked incoming and outgoing content (proxies and firewalls) while filtering
domestic exchanges. Freedom of expression and the right to information were dealt
with in a meticulous way, and technology played a pivotal role in the shift from
physical (restricting access to internet-cafés or monitoring screens) to virtual
surveillance.93
B. Ben Ali’s support to Internet diffusion in Tunisia
“The Market for loyalties is not a zero sum game (…) it is not the question of how
the messages are received and gain adherence, but rather what steps are taken so
that audiences have access.” (Price 2007, p. 49)
The impact of activists’ actions before and during the revolution emerges from a
complex interplay of structural and proximate factors. One of the latter is the
relatively high Internet connectivity witnessed in Tunisia prior to the Revolution.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!93 OpenNet Studies. “Internet filtering in the Middle East and North Africa in 2006-2007”, October 31st, 2012, p.3
! 44!
Key moments mark the steps to the vulgarization of the Internet and ICTs in
Tunisia: the introduction of telecommunication companies in Tunisia in the late 90s; a
massive subvention to computers in 2005, aiming to support the telecommunications’
business, controlled by Ben Ali’s extended family. Finally, the introduction of 3G,
only a few months before the Revolution, proved crucial. Images and videos are
indeed overwhelmingly cited as triggers to demonstrate against the regime.
The 2005 computer policy proved especially crucial. In the early 2000s, few
individuals could afford to purchase computers, thus making the cheap Internet access
offered by telecommunications companies inefficient. Therefore, a subsidy to cover
computers’ expenses was introduced in 2005, aiming to provide each family with one
computer (“PC familial”). 3G was introduced in May 2010 by Orange and Ben Ali
granted exclusivity on the service to the company. Interviewees attested that
technological evolutions made the Revolution possible. Some ironically think of
State-supported ICT and Internet diffusion as “Ben Ali’s contribution to the
Revolution”.
“Ben Ali did not know that he was burying himself by vulgarizing the Internet (…)
had 3G not been introduced in Tunisia, it would have been impossible to live
stream videos” (K.B)
C. Exploring the new market for loyalties in post-revolution Tunisia
In the aftermath of the Arab uprisings, support from Western companies to the
surveillance apparatus in Tunisia has waned. However, institutions are still in place,
and the new Tunisia must get rid of this heavy legacy in order to achieve its transition
! 45!
to democracy.94 The main institution in need of reform is the ATI, and its new CEO
Moaz Chakchouk has taken a strong stance on the question by publicly disapproving
past practices. He is openly opposed to censorship, and wants to develop a new
Internet model in Tunisia based upon best practices of Internet governance. He further
wishes to challenge the “top-down” censorship and is favorable to the implementation
of a technology that would enable customers to filter content they do not desire, thus
shifting control over to users of technology. The biggest impediment to these
realizations lies in the lack of funds: since the revolution, the “special deal” between
companies and the former regime has been broken, and the ATI now has to cover the
new costs linked to software updates and infrastructure maintenance. This does not
leave a lot of flexibility for investment in reform.95
Moaz Chackchouk had the opportunity to express himself during the third
Bloggers’ conference in Tunis, in October 2012. Price argues that sometimes, to gain
access to the market of loyalties, “the event itself can become a medium, its link to
celebrity (…) the means of circumventing the normal obstacles to entry. The notoriety
of the event becomes an argument, often compelling, for the message (embodied in the
event) to be transmitted through traditional media outlets. (Price, 2007, pp. 51-2).
The fact that the CEO of a governmental agency participates rather than organizes
such an event does testify to the increased, if not legitimacy, at least importance that
the revolution conferred to the active civil society, to the fact that the revolution
granted de facto an entry to its proponents. Thus, a new market for loyalty has
emerged in Tunisia, in which activists seem to play an active part.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!94 “After the Arab Spring: New Paths for Human Rights and the Internet in European Foreign Policy”…p. 21 95 Chakchouk, M. (2011). Towards the Development of Broadband Internet in Tunisia: New Challenges, Opportunities and Perspectives. 3rd Arab Bloggers Meeting. Tunis, Tunisia (Audio File).
! 46!
As such, this dissertation studies the extent to which the use of social media and
ICTs granted these activists’ a voice in the local (i.e. Tunisian) market for loyalties,
and empowered them to be in position of shaping the transition’s outcomes.
2. Tunisian cyber dissidence: A contextualizing overview
Historically, media blackouts have surrounded popular upheavals in Tunisia. This
is at best exemplified by the 2008 year-long strike that took place in Redeyef (Gafsa
governorate), in phosphate extraction sites, and resulted in four dead and thirty
injured. Economically speaking, Gasfa is not an obscure region at the Sahara’s
border: there, phosphate extraction sites provide Tunisia with a third of its national
wealth. Politically, the region is known for its historical resistance to authority. It
hosts the regional headquarters of the country’s biggest union (UGTT), the major
force of the “classical opposition” under Ben Ali. Strikes and upheavals were
manifold as the region’s population was systematically deprived from the wealth that
they yielded. The latter was “stolen” by the regime and massively reinvested in the
coastal cities, to support Tunisia’s tourism industry. The strikes in Redeyef have
mostly gone unnoticed - the only journalist, Farem Boukkadous, who covered the
events for TV channel Al Hiwar (broadcast one hour a day) was arrested and tortured.
Still today, a general ignorance surrounds the events.
Two years later, forty kilometers away from Redeyef, a street vendor set himself
on fire. This time, the information spread in a matter of days, and contributed to
triggering nation-wide protests against corruption, unemployment, and poverty. What
changed in two-years time? This section of my dissertation explores the
communication and information dynamics that led to the Revolution. It is my
! 47!
contention that neither technology itself nor activism alone managed to trigger the
uprisings: rather, by setting the example, cyber-activists have managed to normalize
online practices previously considered as “dangerous”, i.e. they have managed to
break the “wall of fear” online, which proved determinant for people to massively
demonstrate against the regime and eventually ousting Ben Ali out of the country.
A. Characteristics and goals
a. “Cyber” by necessity
As the uprisings unfolded in late 2010 in Tunisia and spread to the Arab region
throughout 2011, political analysts and the media were quick to praise the spontaneity
with which protesters filled the streets. However, the first steps of activism in Tunisia
can be traced back to the early 2000’s. As such, the massive and apparently informed
mobilization which took place in 2010-11 has to be understood as the result of
activists’ decade-long efforts at raising awareness among the connected (i.e. to the
Internet) youth.
Rather than a choice, going “cyber” is defined as the necessity to bypass the
confiscated public sphere. Deprived of a public “physicality”, active individuals
invested the relatively freer virtual space. As such, activists generally consider that
they have been propelled to activism and the political realm without a choice. This
opportunity was seized, almost naturally, by the more adventurous and politically
educated.
Since its inception in the late 1990s cyber dissidence focused on the issue of
freedom of speech. Writing, sharing content, was a way to practice a right that was
not granted. In the early 2000s, personal blogs and forums served as hubs connecting
! 48!
individuals who shared a common vision. Soon, the blogosphere came to be divided
into two camps: those who wished to keep the web “neutral” – in order to secure a
space of expression; and those who saw in those platforms a potential tool for raising
awareness. These “web pioneers” knew how to circumvent censorship, and used their
technical knowledge of the tool to introduce the less tech-savvy, yet politicized
individuals, to the virtual sphere.
In 2005, online political contestation was taken to a new level, as the World
Summit on Information Systems (WSIS) triggered heated reactions on the
blogosphere. Indeed, the “information summit” took place only a year after Zohair
Yahyaoui, the first “web martyr”, had died, allegedly as a result of two years spent in
prison. Yahyaoui was the founder of TunEzine, an opposition website created in
2001. Subsequently, the “Yezzi Fock” (it’s Enough!) movement called for a “virtual
demonstration”, asking for users’ contributions (drawings, pictures bearing the
inscriptions “Yezzi”).
Although it was censored the day it was launched, the website contributed to the
intensification of online contestation. Efforts to set the example by raising issues and
confronting the regime slowly started to pay off.
“Since we are physically unable to demonstrate within the Tunisian public spaces,
we will use the internet to organize permanent virtual demonstrations in order to
express our total disapproval with the Tunisian dictatorial regime” 96
b. Resistance rather than politics
!Early activism on the web was not about “politics”, it was about rights – notably
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!96 “Tunisian online protest blocked”, GlobalVoicesonline.org, 4 October 2005: http://globalvoicesonline.org/2005/10/04/tunisian-online-protest-blocked/
! 49!
about “freedom and dignity”. From forums to blogs, to websites, to Facebook and
Twitter, the first generation of Tunisian activists adapted to the successive evolutions
of online platforms, coalescing the medium and the message, and managing to be
“one step ahead” of authorities in their use of the Internet for political purposes.
Blog posts, contributions to forums, and status updates are never referred to as
political activism, but as a “therapy” for the frustration built through the daily
pressure and control structures set up by the regime. When asked about their
influences and personal motivations, activists often referred to context, rather than
family or education, to explain their political awareness – an awareness molded by
everyday injustices, which slowly pushed the limits of what could be taken in silently.
As such, the anger, and the motivation to express it, take their roots “in the daily
injustice, the cop that bullies you, through Twitter, Facebook, by what we have seen”
(K.B.).
Data suggest that this general state of frustration is fostered by a “window on
difference”, consisting in either, or all, of the following elements: a politicized or
(more rarely) a politically active family; exile or studies abroad; access to and mastery
of technologies which enable the circumvention of censorship, and thus open up
access to “sensitive” content. The first two elements (politicized family and exile) are
particularly present among first-generation activists. This initial discrepancy between
a relatively liberal private realm and the dictatorship’s public lethargy yielded the
perception of necessary expression.
“I come from a family in which you don’t really get a choice: democracy is
applied; we discussed, debated, accepted the fact we could not always agree -
and when you go out it is a massive shock” (A.)
! 50!
Speaking up is therefore perceived as a personal necessity. As such, it is rather the
reactions these contributions triggered at the governmental level than an explicit
willingness to challenge the regime that propelled the de facto defined activists into
the political realm. At first, these reactions came as a surprise to mostly apolitical and
sometimes very young individuals.
“The regime choses your denomination. It’s not politics, it’s resistance” (S.)
The formation of a political consciousness among the youth in Tunisia therefore
seems to have mainly been apolitical in the sense that it took place outside of the
formal political realm. Besides the fact that Ben Ali’s dictatorship did not allow for
any kind of political scene (except for allowed opposition parties), prominently active
individuals were not, and still are not affiliated with parties or unions, and did not
militate against or for any ideology – be it leftist, rightist or Islamist. This stance is
still shaping Tunisian activists’ contribution to the transition period.
B. Normalizing dissident practices on the web
a. From frontal to “soft”, but widespread, opposition
Decade-long efforts at politicizing the web reached a peak in 2010, with the “anti-
censorship” movement. In 2010, censorship had indeed reached unprecedented levels,
targeting random content (cooking blogs, for instance), and covering it up as technical
errors (404). Censorship therefore emerged as the problem of a generation, and more
! 51!
specifically, of the young web professionals. Indeed, lack of access to software or
programs impeded their everyday work. More importantly for activists, web
professionals are well versed in technology, meaning they were overly represented
among the “wired” population.
As such, the anti-censorship movement launched on the web came to bridge the
interests of both hard-core activists and the wider public of the tech-savvy youth.
While the former focused on issues relating to freedom of expression, the latter were
concerned with the lack of access to information for economic and professional
reasons. A progressive shift became conspicuous, from the contestation of censorship,
to that of the regime.
“We could not ask the people to say “out with Ben Ali”, but we could lead
them to say “no to censorship” (M.)
“Even someone who does not pay attention to politics has that kind of
connection to dissidence: if you worked in web development, it was almost
inevitable that sooner or later you became a blogger” (K.)
In a sense, this new generation of soon-to-be activists was freer to contest the
regime than were hard-core activists, under close surveillance and often intimidated,
bullied, and repressed by intelligence services. As such, the newly politicized
community of web professionals rejuvenated the growing opposition. Ridiculing the
regime through jokes and humor became the online ethos that appealed to more
individuals and somehow took the regime by surprise. Those “hidden” attacks were
often more efficient in arousing the regime’s reactions than were actions lead by the
! 52!
classical opposition.
“We don’t have that core link to the regime, we have not been tortured for
instance. So when we opposed, we did it in a cooler way” (H.)
This widened network was pivotal during the revolution, as it multiplied the
potential outreach of information. The 2010 anti-censorship demonstrations, which
were simultaneously organized in Paris, Berlin, and tentatively, Tunis, eventually
politicized the tech-savvy youth, and prepared them for the kind of online practices
that contributed to the revolution, sharing, commenting, discussing – in essence
forcing interaction and rising popular awareness.
b. Preparing Internet users to a revolution
The introduction of Facebook, in 2007, exponentially contributed to the
consolidation of cyber dissidence’s networks – notably because governments cannot
censor corporate-owned platforms: once accessed through proxies, content can be
shared and commented upon freely. The popularity of the platform also significantly
increased activists’ outreach to wider, apolitical audiences.
This was precisely the challenge activists had set for themselves: breaking the
wall of fear the regime had instilled in the public mind. Under Ben Ali’s regime,
“liking” a subversive status or sharing “insulting” content could put one behind bars.
Preparing dissidence meant preparing the public to a certain type of content and
certain types of online practices.
! 53!
“The idea was to share information to break this wall of fear, even anonymously.
When I meet activists from Iran, that’s what I tell them: do not expose yourself to
danger, be intelligent and break the fear through information (…) the fear had to
be broken virtually for people to go “offline”, and internet users did play a big
role in that” (L.)
As such, by the end of 2010, strategies pursued by the more active individuals of
the Tunisian cyber-dissidence started paying off: the “wall of fear” had been broken;
previously “forbidden” practices were normalized among Internet users.
“In 2008, there were some videos about the riots in Redeyef. I did share quite a lot
of them, but at that time, people were afraid to click on the link, they would
suppress the video from their Facebook walls (…) we thus decided to blur the
limits between what is acceptable or not – we shared a lot of information, which
lead people to spread information too – almost “naturally”. But really we did
work on that. When I insulted Ben Ali on his official page,” liking” a link looked
like a child’s game.” (S.)
It is therefore really through a specific use of the tool, rather than discussion, that
dissents spread. The “emulation” effect stemmed from the example set forth by the
“pioneers of the web”, the first generation of Tunisian activists. In early 2010, the
attempt at demonstrating against censorship was a sort of real-time training to pacific
mobilization. As a result of an accumulation of frustration and virtual actions, toppled
by the publication of the Tunisian wikileaks, users were almost “mentally” ready to
confront the regime by the end of 2010. It is in this context that the news of Sidi
! 54!
Bouzid spread like wildfire.
Spreading the information was key to the success of the uprisings, as it crushed
the last pillar of Ben Ali’s legitimacy, namely, international support. As such,
Internet’s role before the revolution was to shift mentalities by entrenching previously
“forbidden” online practices into the “typical user” ‘s normality. The impact of the
Internet during the revolution rather lies in the kind of information that this
“normalized practices” sustained.
“The regime was demised because of the struggle, yes, but really it was the
information: Ben Ali was scared of Tunisia’s international image (…) suddenly,
the police is killing people and crushing their brains in the country of security and
safety (…) To kill, even ten people, in a country that is not used to see death,
that’s what really mobilized the Tunisians, that gave them the courage to get out”
(A.)
Outreach to international media outlets was a crucial element leading to the 14th of
January. Internet, Twitter, and Facebook accounts became primary sources of
information for foreign journalists, and the population was principally informed
through the Internet. Bloggers and cyber-activists became the virtual hubs that
sustained the “continuous noise on the web about what was going on in the streets, so
that it would be known everywhere and would make the headlines of international
newspapers. This is what we managed to do – when I say “we”, I mean the greatest
civic news agency of all times” (H.)
As such, the “leaderlessness” of the uprisings, often praised in the academic
! 55!
literature, is better explained by a shift of online practices than by that of technology.
It is interesting to conceive online practices mostly as social practices, as part of a
new “internet culture”.
“There is no real organization between the guy who filmed in Sidi Bouzid, the
guys who spread information, and those who contextualized it on Nawaat” (K.B)
c. Internet as a culture: the example of Al Bawsala
“Where Marx failed, Zuckerberg succeeded: we are all equal before Facebook
and the web in general, once one has access to it. Then, talent and strategies are
left to successfully spread a message” (K.B)
Data gathered suggests that the Internet and related ICTs shaped the way
individuals think, behave and apprehend social relations.
“Because we are used to communicating through the Internet, we don’t take
people for fools: we assume everybody understands what we say since we don’t
really choose our public. This is why, in my opinion, people who know how to use
the Internet and have that culture, know how to mobilize people in real life, and
are generally closer to people.” (A.)
More specifically, horizontal networks shaped a different approach to authority:
on the web, social status, gender, and age do not matter – neither does the respect that
usually stems from it. As such, the population’s proximity to ministers, or public
! 56!
figures, is increased. It seems that horizontality and the perceived equality among
users which ensues therefrom has been interiorized as a social norm - which impacts
the way individuals behave “offline”. The Internet, therefore, is not only a space for
organizing and sharing content; interviewees experience it as a space to practice
democracy, rather than simply understand it.
This shapes the activists’ political engagement in the transition process, and the
kind of goals they set for themselves, namely: holding the power accountable towards
citizens by ensuring total transparency in political or legal affairs.
The work accomplished by Al Bawsala, an NGO monitoring the National
Constituent Assembly through online platforms (marsad.tn), testifies to this new
ethos. The NGO’s goal is to create proximity between representatives and the
population, while fostering abidance by a core democratic value: accountability. One
of the greatest challenges of this transition period is indeed to include the previously
marginalized population in transition politics – an often technical, lengthy and
complex process. Marsard.tn, the NGO’s project, reveals deputies’ votes and
participation in plenary sessions, but also provides citizens with the opportunity to
directly ask questions to their deputies. NGO staff makes sure those questions are
answered. In addition, Al Bawsala organizes debates between representatives and the
population in the poorest regions of Tunisia. This dialogue seems to be fruitful, as
founder Amira Yahyaoui testifies to growing popular support.
What might be argued is that Tunisia in the transition context is experiencing a
striking divide between the most active and effective members of civil society (more
often than not, prominent opponents to Ben Ali) and the government. This divide is
not only generational, it is also “cultural”: it illustrates a fundamental discrepancy in
the way citizenship and politics are understood. Those in power are discovering what
! 57!
a formal democracy means (elections, free press, free speech…), while activists and
the “wired” youth have interiorized the democratic prerequisite of participation, and
conceive of politics as a direct exchange of ideas between voters and the accountable
politicians.
“Politicians communicate with 19th century’s means, on 20th century technical
supports, to citizens living in the 21st century.” (A.)
“The citizenry, the civil society movements, are more advanced than the
politicians. Civil society is more vivid” (L.)
Again, it seems that activists are linking two distinct communities, the population
and those in power, by spreading and contextualizing information – as they did under
Ben Ali, drawing in the politically disaffected; and as they did during the Revolution,
reaching out to international media outlets. This is one of the “continuities in change”
that underpin activists’ role in the transition period.
We now turn to Section IV, which outlines the gathered data to attest of three
elements: the qualitative change in the popularity, visibility, and legitimacy of
activists. This will enable us to discuss Price’s model as linked to the Tunisian context
in Section V.
! 58!
IV. RESULTS
1. Visibility: Activists as Public Figures
!A. From the Internet to the TV: activists as “newsworthy” individuals
The frenzy surrounding the “Facebook revolution” during the uprisings
subsequently shifted to the “bloggers” in the months following the Revolution, who
were presented as the leaders of a new kind of social movement. In order to grasp the
intensity of this shift in frenzy, one could cite Tunisian blogger Lina ben Mhenni’s
nomination for the 2011 Peace Nobel Prize. As such, in the aftermath of the
Revolution, Tunisian activists became privileged guests of national TV shows,
conferences and political debates.
“Bloggers do not necessarily have a refined political analysis. But we were
invited because we had acquired a kind of legitimacy, especially with the
western’s “revolution 2.0” coverage. It would have been more interesting to listen
to what people from Sidi Bouzid had to say” (Kh.)
“Whether positive or negative, it’s defamation to say we are heroes, as if we were
shooting missiles through our keyboards”(B.S.)
Under Ben Ali, blogging was a way to bring up issues, investigate facts, raise
political awareness and hold those in power accountable (to the extent this could be
done in an autocracy). Namely, cyber dissidents pursued journalists’ work. As such,
! 59!
bloggers and cyber-activists are often, even today, more qualified than local
journalists.
“Blogging was a way to say we did not accept the ways of the traditional press,
that we were able to create information at our own level” (Kh.)
“ The blog is a micro-media - the “micro” part of it is interesting, it’s a sort of
criterion of independence” (S.)
Activists’ newsworthiness, if tempered, has not waned two years in the transition.
Cyber dissidents are still privileged guests of TV programs and radio stations – this
time not only as individuals rendered newsworthy by an extraordinary context, but as
professionals setting high standards for political debates, and as experts on web-
related questions. Indeed, the Tunisian media’s economy has transformed, favoring
the web; therefore, as news mainly flows from the web into the media, mainstream
media outlets need individuals capable of understanding “web politics” and
discerning verified information from rumors.
“There is a word on the net that I like a lot. It says that newspapers are the best
way to follow what has been said on Twitter the day before” (H.)
“Many media after the revolution were obliged to seek assistance from bloggers -
we actually looked more like journalists than the journalists themselves” (S.)
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Hence, bloggers and cyber-activists now often work in the media, or media-
related businesses, having found a professional “niche”: that of web experts well
versed in politics. Some are invested in youth media training (e.g. blogging
workshops), others offer political communication trainings to deputies - though this is
rare, cited as an exception to an otherwise “apolitical” work. Interviewees usually
acknowledge that it is the visibility they acquired during the revolution that enabled
them to professionalize.
“I was very engaged, so (…) journalists spotted me through what I was doing on
Facebook and Twitter” (H.)
“It’s better to be in a structure (i.e. “mainstream” journalism). It gives one more
visibility. People will be following you on Facebook, you’ll be having more
weight” (W.)
B. The politicization of online platforms
In Tunisia, activists’ role, importance, visibility and space cannot be understood
outside of the specific role online platforms (prominently Facebook) have come to
play in the aftermath of the Revolution. Facebook has indeed entered the political
game and is progressively shaping the practices, the interactions and the agenda of
topics that are discussed in the public realm. Political institutions (ministries and
ministers), parties (in power and in the opposition), and the “independent activists”
(the individuals on which this study focuses) all use Facebook for political
communication. Some (i.e. “admins” running Facebook pages) have been quick to
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observe an economic opportunity in this new status quo: a “black-market” of most
connected (i.e. “liked”) Facebook pages has developed over the years, taking massive
proportions today. For instance, a football team’s Facebook page, connecting
thousands of people, might be sold to a political party, fetching more than thousands
of dinars at times: the richer the party, the greatest potential audience at hand.
Therefore, state authorities, and mainly the moderate-Islamist party, Ennahdha,
have invested in virtual spheres; this time not as controlling “invisible hands” but as
effective actors. As such, Ennahdha has developed a solid online communication
strategy: professional, well-paid teams are in charge of the party’s online political
communications - which have, from interviewees’ account, taken the form of overt
“bashing” campaigns. Furthermore, it has been alleged that Ennahdha controls both
pro - and anti-Islamist Facebook pages, attempting to fake debate while deceiving
public opinion – a deceit which, according to interviewees, is gradually being
“uncovered” by online audiences:
“Resistance (to those fake pages) comes from citizens, not from political parties
or political (Facebook) pages” (H.)
Anecdotes tend to suggest activists are more efficient in rallying support online
than the party is. However, the accuracy of these claims, and the extent to which these
events are effectively impacting public opinion-making would require further
research.
Interviews have highlighted that online politics have a life of their own – virulent
clashes, tensions and fear went viral on the social web, while public debates, usually
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broadcasted on TV, convey the impression of “politics as usual”. This would be
insignificant if it did not have very real consequences: it has been recalled that on
several occasions, people have been effectively mobilized through Facebook pages to
plunder the main union’s (UGTT) offices throughout the country. Rumors have been
spread to destroy opposition leaders’ credibility - often on the chapter of religion and
alleged impiousness. Some interviewees have linked hate speech to the assassination
of leftist opposition leader Chokri Belaïd, in early February 2013.
As such, interviewees feel that it is their responsibility to shed some light on the
debate, arguing that their expert knowledge of the web, and mostly of the people
behind Facebook pages, is crucial to let only the “real” information filter into the
mass media.
“We have this responsibility to denounce those practices so people are able to
understand when someone is trying to fool the public opinion (…) we all need
those youth, those bloggers, to denounce dictatorial drifts, as freedom of the press
is not yet guaranteed” (Kh.)
“There has not been a single “weird story” since the Revolution in which the
ministry of interior and the secrete police somehow did not play a role. They are
everywhere. Corruption, nepotism, lack of transparency… it’s like under Ben Ali”
(S.)
!C. Activists’ self-awareness: their “historical responsibility” towards the country
Be it under Ben Ali, during the Revolution or in this transition period, Tunisian
activists seem to be acutely aware of their role, which testifies to their deep
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understanding of shifting contexts. Interviewees have often brought up their perceived
“historical responsibility”, which has as much been the underpinning motivation for
individuals to further their political (i.e. public) engagement, as it has been a reason to
withdraw from the public scene.
Those who renounced often explain that they are destabilized by the weight of the
sudden responsibilities (perceived or real) they feel they have inherited from the
Revolution; while those who furthered their engagement on the contrary see in the
new context an once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to be part of the “greatest change of
this country’s modern history” (H.).
“It is a very heavy burden to carry, it is a historical responsibility and it can be
too heavy to carry” (K.K)
When asked about their understanding of their roles, interviewees most often cite
raising political consciousness among citizens, and connecting them to their
citizenship. The main point cited for educating people, especially the youth, in politics
and political debate is to foster a sense of informed critique among the population,
while spreading the idea of citizenship is also cited as key to ensuring active
participation in the democratic process. Far from being isolated from the widest
concerns of citizens, Tunisian activists are conscious of the marginalization of some
regions and populations, and strive to bridge the gap between “Tunis and the rest”.
There is a widespread sensitivity to field work, to the necessity of talking to people to
know where to most actively intervene.
“We are building a much more politically - aware, critical, youth” (Kh.)
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“Citizenship is a very important axis. When people realize the amplitude of their
citizenship it’s the solution (to a successful transition)” (S.)
“It’s our responsibility, to converge all debates on one platform, to make them
more consistent, therefore less boring, easier to follow” (H.)
Largely, the prominent members of the civil society today are those individuals
that actively opposed Ben Ali’s regime. Perhaps the best example of how activists
have come to play an active role in the political game is web-based media Nawaat.
Founded in 2004 as a forum, which gathered politically aware individuals, Nawaat is
often referred to the “Tunisian Mediapart”: referring to the well-known French
investigative journalism website. In 2010, Nawaat was selected, along with other
prominent international newspapers, to publish the Tunisian Wikileaks – a publication
that undoubtedly increased the tension eventually leading to the Revolution. Today,
Nawaat has established itself as the most professional media point in Tunisia, and is
still functioning as a participative blog. It has also opened an advocacy section, which
provides media training to young bloggers in marginalized regions of Tunisia. Nawaat
has investigated and published virtually every major political affair in the past two
years. Moreover, their content and contributors are systematically broadcasted in the
mass media.
Thus, founders and journalists are increasingly famous even among “ordinary”,
i.e. less connected, tech-savvy or politicized, citizens.
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2. Popularity: Activists’ Legitimacy in the Current Political Context
A. Activists as trusted individuals
Anecdotes and facts recalled during interviews suggest not only that Tunisian
activists have accessed publicity and established a strong presence in the political
realm: they have also managed to remain trusted news sources and credible actors in
the political scene.
“Whether we like it or not, we are all quite famous, we all have a credibility –
people in the streets know us, on the Internet as well” (K.B.)
“I went to the southern regions with the second of the constituent assembly and
ministers to meet the military. As I arrived, I was greeted by the officers, who
asked me: “so, where are the ministers?”. They were right beside me” (A.)
When asked, interviewees stated that they feel they are being heard, and
understand their audiences’ adherence and respect as a positive recognition of their
actions under the dictatorship.
“People do not come to the internet with zero internet culture: because they
already know us, as we spoke on the radio, on TV, they approximately know who
we are on the net – and when they connect, they subscribe to our pages, to our
profiles” (B.S.)
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Tunisian activists indeed often feel they are gaining in legitimacy because they
share credible information – potentially leading them to be perceived as those who do
not “fool” the public opinion.
“People search for the “safe values”, those who spoke before, that have the
network” (M.)
Spreading unverified information, amplifying rumors or publishing unknown
videos have proven fatal practices, influence-wise, for some of them. Given the speed
of dissemination of information, and the perceived responsibility to react and
comment thereupon, activists have learnt the hard way to professionalize in order to
stay visible and heard.
This has led some interviewees to regret, half laughing, half serious, their
anonymity, which ensured them a kind of freedom. Now “everything has become
political” (D.) and activists testify to the necessity to self-censor in order to keep their
position: the more visible, the more at risk of losing credibility when facing an
increasingly critical audience.
There is indeed a feeling that citizens have come to be more critical of the
information shared, after almost three years of “democracy in the making”. This
evolution is tangibly evidenced by everyday online practices, and shaped by the very
structure of online platforms that flattens social relations and strips critique from the
deference usually imposed by authority. A general feeling shared by interviewees is
that “collective intelligence” stemming from the way content is shared and discussed
online, coupled with greater political awareness among users, shifts the way rumors,
bashing campaigns and fallacious information are received. For instance, commenting
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on Ennahdha using the Facebook “pages of the revolution” (i.e. the very much
connected pages used during the revolution and sold to the party) a journalist stated:
“It’s done, they have lost their credibility (…) the people have uncovered the lies
– increasingly they comment: “you are not the pages of the Revolution, you are
Nahdha pages” (Hm.)
a. Mobilizing people again
Interviewees overwhelmingly think that they are still able to effectively mobilize
their audience for protest actions or contestation. Notably in this regard is the “anti-
police” wave streaming the youth: should a movement targeting police abuses (mainly
rampant corruption, but also allegedly “brutal methods” used in custody), be initiated,
it would gather support.
Recent examples support this claim. For instance, one of my interviewee recalled
that authorities confiscated his camera as he was shooting a demonstration. He created
a Facebook page around the matter, and asked by-now well-known caricaturists to
contribute to it by illustrating the page. Information spread through their networks like
wildfire in a matter of hours. The next day, city walls were bearing the slogan, “Give
the Camera Back”, of what had become a movement overnight. In the end, the camera
was indeed given back to him by the police, without further procedures. This is a
concise example of how dissent and social protest may be organized in a short period
of time, and, in the Tunisian context, further outlines the activists’ popularity.
Similarly, in March 2013, rapper Weld El 15 was convicted in abstentia to two
years in prison, because he had insulted the police in one of his songs (El Boulicia
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Kleb, the Police are dogs). This triggered indignation among the youth and activists -
as a comparison, the Salafists who had participated in US Embassy’s attack in
September 2012 had only received suspended sentences. Rapper Weld El 15 went into
hiding for months, before he decided to give himself up to justice, to “know whether
(he) lives in a country that made a revolution or if we are going back to
dictatorship”.97 A new trial was held on the 13th of June, which resulted in the same
sentence. The week following the trial, the affair received intense media coverage
inspired by angry Facebook posts and viral online discussions (see Annex 4). Internal
pressures became external as the news reached international media, already focusing
on Tunisia due to Femen’s trial, held on the 11th. Vivid discussions translated into
demonstrations, during which activists were impeded by force from gathering before
the tribunal, while journalists, notably from Nawaat, were kept in custody. Many of
my interviewees were arrested during the support protests they organized and all
accuse the police of mistreatment. As an example, Franco-Tunisian journalist Hind
Meddeb had to flee the country, as she feared repression after overtly supporting the
rapper and condemning police actions at the tribunal.
Probably as a result of media coverage and international attention, Weld El 15
received a suspended sentence (six months) as he was judged in appeal. He testifies to
the fact he was freed “because of friends, and the pressure”.98
Both the “Give the Camera Back” and “Weld El 15” affairs shed light on the
relationship opposing the youth to State’s authorities. Government’s reactions in both
cases provide a benchmark to induce activists’ weight. It testifies to efforts at
silencing a perceived-as-threatening dissidence – stemming not from political
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!97 GOZLAN, M., “Tunisie. Hind Meddeb: “Allons-nous revenir à la dictature?” Télégrammes d’Orient, Marianne 2, 18.06.2013 http://www.marianne.net/martinegozlan/Tunisie-Hind-Meddeb-Allons-nous-revenir-a-la-dictature_a89.html 98 Idem.
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opposition, but from civil society. The outcomes of both affairs testify to the activists’
efficacy in attracting attention to events that would have otherwise gone unnoticed.
Further, both outcomes testify to the activists’ capacity in rallying support, be it
nationally, among the youth, or internationally, in the media.
It might be argued that the threat posed is one of legitimacy: as soon as
governmental action is perceived to be a “step back” on the Revolution’s legacy, it
steers popular discontent, mainly among the politically-aware, urban youth, for whom
the Revolution’s symbols and goals are still a reference, two and a half years in the
transition.
“We will not go back; at least, those who will not accept to go back will be much
more numerous that under Ben Ali” (M.)
b. The question of freedom of speech
It may be inferred from the data collected that there is a certain lack of trust
towards the mainstream media, which might explain why people tend to privilege the
“circle of trust” when getting informed.
“They (citizens) have kept the habit of incredulity. Everyone double-checks
information (…) Even people that were not interested in politics tried to get the
information from several sources. We have 10 millions of journalists, everybody
makes screen shots, we have methods – we are, as a people, used to that kind of
methods because of the regime…” (Kh.)
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“People do not care about propaganda, everybody wants true information” (L.)
Often mentioned during interviewees is the particular sensitivity to questions
pertaining to freedom of speech and censorship among activists’ audiences.
Censorship and freedom of expression have indeed been the “battle” that politicized
the youth, before or during the revolution. It is also often mentioned as the sole
qualitative change the youth can testify to since the revolution.
“When someone suppresses a post from their profile, straight away people
denounce censorship – you can see the censorship culture (…) everybody claims
it, and it needs to be put in the law because it’s already in everybody’s hearts.”
(L.)
“What we call censorship in a dictatorship is called lack of access to the
information in a transition. It’s not because now I don’t get beaten when I ask
for it that something has changed; I don’t have access to the information and this
is what I have been fighting for my whole life” (A.)
Through everyday online practices, activists are instilling the idea of
accountability in the public mind. It seems to be considered progressively “normal”
when politicians respond publicly and justify themselves on the web when singled out
by the audience.
“Now, it is the power that is under scrutiny and surveillance, and yes this goes
through new communication technologies, the Internet and Facebook” (L.)
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“There was a clash on Facebook between me and the President of the National
Constituent Assembly (NCA), it was her word against mine (…) the people
believed me rather than a representative. She denied what was reproached to her,
but people went on her Facebook account and found that she had erased
information. The next day she had to justify herself on the radio before the
growing buzz and criticism” (Ma.)
B. Politicized, but not political
Among bloggers and activists, the stance is clear: the government does not
represent them – not only ideologically, but also in the way politics are done. As such,
defiance of the government generally characterizes interviewee’s relationship to party
politics. Many interviewees feel that the political scene has been created and that it is
unfaithful to the “spirit of the revolution”.
“I can change my mind but I’m not obliged to vote for a political scene they have
created, I don’t like that” (M.)
“I refuse to enter clearly in the political game, in this exclusive fashion of talking
about this or that party; fuck them, I want to speak about the country” (H.)
Furthermore, from interviewees’ accounts, it is evident that the “internet culture”
brings about a preference for horizontally organized structures and shatters deference
to authority. In that sense, it has heightened expectations as to what public political
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communication should be: total transparency. Increasingly, Wikileaks style
transparency is thought to be the only way of ensuring real accountability.
“There will only be a revival of trust for the State if a government leads the path
to transparency, to make sure the population adheres to tax collection (…) we are
trying to build the bases of something else, something more transparent” (S.)
“Parties are the worst creation of democracy” (H.)
“I’m tired of politics, I don’t feel I belong to any ideology, and nobody (in the
political game) shares my convictions” (B.S.)
Also it is overwhelmingly felt that the youth has been ousted out of the power it
had claimed by a disconnected political elite; both as a result of their age and the
decades spent in prison or in exile.
“The dialogue is cut between the youth and politics. Even when we are invited to
debates, it’s never to acknowledge what we say – we are always treated as
idealists, utopists. We really need a new social pact between the state and the
population because they totally lost their credibility” (S.)
However, data suggests that where NGO work has been pursued and accepted as
legitimate by political representatives and the population, significant progress has
been made in the acceptance of “horizontality”, “transparency” and “accountability”
as core elements of a successful transition to democracy.
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“During the plenary session (of the NCA) I said to the deputies: if you don’t feel
that you are here as servants to the people, I will ask you to leave. I told them:
“now it’s the people that is in charge, it’s us, it’s not you”. And this has been
shown on the news (…) the representatives have understood that now (…) and
because we were on the news, the people understand it as well” (A.)
C. Perceived threats to the sustainability of activists’ political action
Although Tunisian activists have gained visibility and they often express
themselves freely and feel their actions are having an impact on the political
transition, a potential threat lies in the financial and physical means of their
adversaries in the “fight for new tropes of legitimacy” (Price, 1994).
The majority of my audience (on the radio) are from lower social classes and not
so young. These are my most loyal listeners. However, I talk to them five minutes
over the radio, and they have people in their suburbs that talk to them all day
long, and are brainwashing them (referring to Salafists preaching in the poorer
suburbs)” (H.)
Additionally, the difficulty in adapting to future evolutions in the technology as
well as feeling the pressure of being the ones making the “best use” out of the
newness, is often mentioned as a potential future issue. The tool has indeed come to
shape the tactics, strategies, successes and failures of actions lead. It remains to be
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seen if information spreading schemes on which activists currently rely can be used in
an even more attractive way in the long term.
“We will always have to distinguish ourselves to have a weight. I am sure this can
be done not only through content, but format, style, personality” (S.)
“ To what extent we will always be technologically “on the top”, and even a little
be ahead of our time on some technical aspects of our work - that we don’t know
and it’s clearly unpredictable” (H.)
“The exclusivity of Facebook is a problem that can threaten us” (L.)
A more substantial issue is that of the population’s interest in political content.
Tunisian activists are also clearly conscious that their role and influence is defined by
context and a certain mindset that is peculiar to the post-revolution period. Instability
has indeed not only been a threat to individuals’ rights and security; it has also been
the occasion, for the past two years, to have a greater say in the shaping of society and
political institutions. Interviewees consider this peculiar “time-lapse” as crucial, and
are conscious they need to take advantage of it.
“Today we control the cultural chapter. This means Tunisia belongs to us. And as
long as we hold on this, they cannot do anything” (K.K)
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V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
1. Defining the “shuffle for allegiance” in the Tunisian context
A. Can activists be considered as “sellers” of identity?
Activists, as prominent online hubs and new public figures, were propelled to the
center of the political game when the regime collapsed. This is not a natural
development stemming from the Revolution: cyber activists were not well-known
opposition leaders aimed at seizing power, and their existence was mostly revealed to
the wider Tunisian public through international, and then national, media coverage.
As a result of the “Internet revolution” frame adopted by mainstream international
media, Facebook witnessed an exponential increase in subscriptions in the days
following Ben Ali’s demise. As of today, out of a population of 10 million, almost 3.5
million Tunisians99 including political parties and State institutions are connected to
Facebook. This has widened the activists’ audience, while also creating a potential
threat to the activists’ prominent position on the social web. I argue Tunisian activists
have become political actors because of the social web’s politicization. By political
actors, I understand visible and popular public figures able to have a say over public
affairs and striving towards “common interest” (i.e. political) matters. As such, it
might be said that Tunisian activists are effective “sellers” of identity in the new
“market for loyalties”.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!99 Internet World Stats, Usage and Population Statistics: http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats1.htm (accessed 12.07.13)
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Price (1994) defines the “shuffle for allegiance” in transition periods as “attempts
to seize the popular spirit and fill it with ideas of loyalty”100. Activists’ outreach
efforts entail shaping the way people think about politics as well as conceive of their
own implication therein. These efforts are lead both online (continuous information
flow and content sharing) and offline (blogging, citizen journalism workshops…).
Core elements upon which activists have focused are generally accepted as
constitutive of democracies, namely proximity to state authorities, representativeness
and accountability. By “seizing the popular spirit”, activists hope to shape the
transition’s outcome.
B. Applicability of Price’s model
The Tunisian context calls for some adaptations in Price’s model. In Tunisia,
mainstream media has not yet recovered from twenty-three years of tight control. As
such, mass media does not necessarily choose the information that is broadcasted.
Even though this is changing as institutions consolidate, mainstream media journalists
are often mainly verifying information discussed online before broadcasting it – this
is often done with the help of the newly professionalized bloggers and activists.
In addition, the fact that individuals are now able to produce and share their own
content undermines the media’s monopoly in spreading “identity”. This coupled with
the fact that online platforms have become important hubs in Tunisian politics means
that the “shuffle for allegiance” in Tunisia principally takes place online. Moreover,
fieldwork also plays an important role in shaping new identities. As such, actors’
outreach to an audience/population is mostly “disintermediated” – be it online or
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!100 PRICE, M., “The Market for Loyalties… , p.681
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“offline”. Adding up to this particular status quo, the State’s legal apparatus is still
too weak to be imposing regulations and restrictions in the media market, not to
mention the web. Even censorship, cannot be imposed in the current context.101 This
de facto excludes any discussion on the State’s efforts at regulating the broadcast
market, as was done by Price (1994) with regard to Eastern Europe’s transitions.102
Furthermore, the transition process has weakened the State’s legal core, which is
currently under revision, while the security apparatus has not been challenged by the
Revolution. This creates an initial disequilibrium and dictates the way internal affairs
are dealt with. Efforts made by the State to refrain from engaging in the “market for
loyalties” (“the dynamism of this new market is evidenced by the extent of efforts to
refrain it”103) are thus rather shaped more by repression than regulation. Activists are
thus not dismissed by authorities but considered as threats that need to be dealt with.
As such, I argue activists are fully engaged in the battle for loyalties, in which they
have a prominent place alongside the Islamist ruling-party Ennahdha.
This discussion will be focusing on the following elements, outlined by Price as
constitutive of the fight over loyalties in a political transition:
1. The fight over “new tropes of legitimacy”
2. The “attempts to seize the popular spirit and fill it with ideas of loyalty”
3. The “control over at least some of the instruments of imagination”
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!101 Since the revolution, the “special deal” between foreign companies and the former regime has been broken; as such the new government would have to pay for the expenses generated by the use of surveillance technology (software updates and infrastructure maintenance). 102 PRICE, M., “The Market for Loyalties…, p. 683 103Ibid., p.682
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2. Discussion
A. The fight over “new tropes of legitimacy”: the “Revolution spirit” vs. political
Islam
National identity was at the core of Tunisia’s first democratic elections (October
2011). The debate was launched and defined by the moderate Islamist party
Ennahdha, which is currently in power, and focused on the question of Islam’s place
in society. The attempt at redefining national identity around Islamic values centered
on the alleged “threats” to religion posed by the progressive, “laic” and, in between
the lines, Occidentalized “way of life”. In addition, because Islamists were violently
repressed throughout Ben Ali’s mandate, forced into exile or serving decade-long
prison sentences, it is often mentioned that voters entrusted the Islamists to clear State
structures from “benalist” elements.104 Finally, Ennahdha was better structured and
funded than any other Tunisian party, which proved decisive in their 2011 victory:
left wing parties, taken together, have collected almost as much voices as Ennahdha
did105 – their division however impeded them to independently weigh in the political
scene. Ennahdha is, financially, by far the most powerful party in the current coalition
ruling the country. As such, governmental decisions so far have been overall
reflecting Ennahdha’s positions.
Both activists - as representative of a larger, “progressive” movement - on the one
hand and Ennahdha - as representative of political Islam - on the other hand, were
oppressed groups under Ben Ali. Therefore, both are new political actors and new !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!104 FELDMAN, N., “Islamists’ Victory in Tunisia a Win for Democracy”, Bloomberg, October 31st, 2011. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-10-30/islamists-victory-in-tunisia-a-win-for-democracy-noah-feldman.html 105 Mission d’observation électorale de l’Union Européenne en Tunisie, Rapport Final, Election de l’Assemblée Constitutante 2011, p. 10
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public figures. Thus, legitimacy-wise, it might be argued that both compete on equal
terms to define and organize the transition’s outcome. The outcome will be in part
influenced by the identity the population will be buying, as it is in fine the voters that
will elect the next head of state, thus shaping the direction in which the country will
head. While Ennahdha hopes to define a system based upon political Islam, activists
advocate for democratic universalism and the respect of internationally set standards
of democracy, rule of law and human rights.
As such, the divide over the transition’s outcome indeed defines the axis along
which the “shuffle for allegiance” takes place. This divide is expressed at every level
of publicity:
In politics, notably in the National Constituent Assembly (currently discussing the
Constitution’s draft), foremost divided on the place of religion in politics and state
structure, as well as on references to Tunisia’s “cultural particularisms”, supposed to
justify restrictions on Universal principles;
In the media, through heated debates opposing public figures (among which,
activists and journalists) to political representatives, notably on the chapter of
religion, freedom of expression and democracy;
“In the field”, through outreach campaigns organized both by international
development aid actors and activists (sometimes together) on the theme of human
rights and democracy, on the one hand; and Islamists (moderate (Islamic charities)
and radical (Salafist groups)) on the other hand;
In speech, i.e. in the “public mind”, as picked up through discussions: it seems a
part of the population feels deprived of their Tunisian “national identity” by the
perceived-as-imposed vision of an Islam more inspired by Gulf countries’ than local
societal practices; while others increasingly adopt overt religious signs and attitudes.
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However, two and a half years into the transition, as economic instability
increasingly marginalizes vulnerable populations, the government seems to be losing
its legitimacy. As such, as one of the ruling parties, Ennahdha needs to sustain
outreach to stay in good grace among voters, since legitimacy-wise “being in power”
is not necessarily a comfortable position due to the weakness in the State structure.
Hence, discussing Ennahdha’s strife towards legitimacy is not necessarily discussing
that of the State’s – Price indeed theorized that, in transitions, the State should play
“virtually no role”.106
Similarly, it may be inferred from activists’ claims that their shuffle for allegiance
situates them in opposition to the Islamists in power. However, it also seems this is
not due to ideology (although Islamism does not seem to gather much support among
interviewees), but to the fact that the ruling party is perceived to be “doing politics”
outside of the realm of democracy, e.g. “winning hearts and minds” through
disinformation and “brainwashing” in the poorest suburbs of the country, rather than
by education and discussion. As such, it is not an ideological fight against a party or
the State as an entity; Tunisian activists’ fight for legitimacy is more structural than
ideological: The activists feel that they were, as active citizens in the time leading up
to the revolution, during it and immediately after, been practicing democracy in
different ways and that the current transition process is depriving them of the tools
and modalities through which they have been empowered. As such, examining these
two actors fight for legitimacy translates much more complex societal dynamics
currently streaming Tunisian society.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!106 PRICE, M., “The Market for Loyalties…, p. 683
! 81!
B. “Attempts to seize the popular spirit and filling it with ideas of loyalty”:
Credibility as the key to public legitimacy
!Field research found that Tunisian activists are credible both because they have
become public figures through extensive media attention after the revolution, and
because they have managed to sustain trust among their audience. As such, it seems
the visibility acquired during the revolution made cyber-activists popular public
figures – a popular support which confers them legitimacy, and, therefore, a certain
authority over public issues. These two elements (legitimacy stemming from past
actions and public visibility) mainly enabled them to remain heard as thousands of
new “facebookers” joined the online agora.
Trust thus seems to stem mainly from the constancy of their engagement, the
apolitical nature thereof, and the quality of the content shared. This professional
stance on activism was already the ethos under the regime, but its importance
significantly magnified with the Revolution, the freed Internet, the unique role
Facebook came to play in the media’s economy, and the current interest for political
content stemming from the population. Besides, because of their professionalization
in the media, what is mediatized is partly left to their appreciation. As such, I argue
activists’ niche professions (web journalists, web-experts, institutions monitoring…)
enable them to be perceived as experts on often political topics. This confers to them,
if not a moral, at least a professional authority over their network and audience.
Audiences’ preference for verified, thus credible, information potentially
empowers activists in “seizing the popular spirit”. Data suggests that activists try to
“democratically” engage people with politics, i.e. by ensuring transparency, fostering
accountability, and presenting arguments and facts – qualities they first and foremost
apply to themselves. Far from being in a comfortable position of “opinion brokers”,
! 82!
activists are under extreme scrutiny from the wider public, whose trust can be easily
lost. As such, because they are in position of seizing the popular spirit, they might be
shaping audiences’ preference for a particular kind of political communication, and,
by extension, a particular kind of political practice (i.e. “filling it (the popular spirit)
with ideas of loyalty”). This particular political ethos (transparency, accountability) is
intrinsically suited to democracy, and in blatant opposition to what Ennahdha’s public
communication seem to be.
As such, it may be said that activists’ outreach efforts differ from Ennahdha’s
both on ideas conveyed and the type of discourse used. Thus, Tunisian activists,
through continuous and direct outreach to their audience and to marginalized
population, hope to shape the transition’s outcome - not by winning the popular
“hearts and minds” over a program, an ideology or a person; but by fostering a sense
of informed citizenship among the population, notably by setting the example of what
informed power contestation should be. Therefore, the same way bloggers and
activists raised political awareness under the regime (i.e. by doing rather than
discussing), they are trying to impose core democratic values in the public mind.
However, because the economic crisis throws already vulnerable populations into
destitution, the “loyalty” is not yet won “on the field”, where Islamic charities and
Salafist outreach campaigns might have more weight than “democracy”.
C. “Control over at least some of the instruments of imagination”: freedom of
speech
Section IV has shown that activists have gained credibility and legitimacy because
of their engagement’s constancy, notably on the issue of freedom of expression.
! 83!
Interviews have outlined the youth’s attachment to freedom of speech, recognized as a
major gain of the Revolution, and activists are currently pushing for the right to be
enshrined in the Constitution.
As such, activists seem to have the lead, credibility-wise, because they were the
public proponents of the “anti-censorship” movement. It seems that activists have
been entrusted with the “revolution spirit” and are still heard among the population,
especially the youth, because of the latter’s sensitivity to freedom of expression.
The government, marked by Ennahdha’s visions, proposes a model of society
fundamentally different from what the Revolution had claimed, notably by leveraging
religion as an element of imagination control. Resistance to Ennahdha’s attempts at
redefining national identity seems to come from the younger, tech-savvy and active
population that refuses to cede on the core democratic values they fought for.
While Islamists took part in the Revolution, activists were mediatized and thus
won the battle over publicity. Besides, Islamist public figures were either in exile, or
in detention, thus they did not personally take part in the events – which matters,
legitimacy-wise. As such, it may be argued that activists embody the “spirit of the
Revolution”, strive to remind the public of its goals, and convince them that the latter
are still attainable.
Freedom of speech has thus become a value among the audience, and the activists,
as historically public defenders of the right effectively “control” one symbol of
imagination.
What might be taken from the current situation is that Tunisian activists do not
fight for a space to voice their opinions - the space has been won. It is now the
maximization of their position in the vaguely defined political and legal realms that
will define both the sustainability of their position and the outcomes of their actions.
! 84!
Namely, it is the citizen’s attention and receptivity that will determine if activists
can influence the post-transition “normality”, for which they strive.
D. Conclusion: Linking field results to the theoretical framework
!Coupled with the data collected, recent examples suggest that activists have
managed to preserve their popularity among their audience. As such, activists are
effective “sellers” in the market for loyalties and embody the “Revolution spirit”
which has come to constitute the essence of the identity they sell (i.e. democracy,
human rights, accountability, transparency). Accounts of increasing popularity tend to
suggest audiences are “loyal” to them. The extent to which the “identity” is
effectively bought by audiences however needs to be investigated through further
research.
As such, activists have control over a crucial element of “imagination” - namely,
they are still the revolutionaries that ousted Ben Ali out of the country, which grants
them legitimacy and endows them with a sense of historical responsibility in the
transition period.
The activists’ importance in the political scene can be inferred from the reactions
their actions have spurred at the governmental level. Their “shuffle for allegiances” is
indeed perceived as a threat by the ruling Islamist party Ennahdha, which is itself
taking part in the “market for loyalties”. Activists, especially those involved in
prominent civil society structures (e.g. Nawaat, Al Bawsala), conceive of their
“shuffle for allegiances” as constitutive of the democracy to-be. By setting the
example and reaching out to otherwise marginalized populations, activists aim at
educating people about politics. Thus, they hope to be providing them with the tools
necessary to hold the power accountable. Outreach efforts (i.e. “shuffle for
! 85!
allegiances”) aim at fostering a mindset prone to spurring adherence to a certain type
of values, suited to pluralism and democracy, and loyal to the grievances expressed
during the Revolution. Activists are able to do so in the current context because they
have politicized Internet use and thus paved the way for alternative political
engagement and social practices, embedded in the horizontal and asynchronous
networks of the interactive web.
!!
3. Conclusions: Summarizing Arguments and Answering Research
Questions
A. Have Tunisian activists been empowered through their use of new
communication technologies?
Research question 1 (RQ1) asked whether Tunisian activists were politically
empowered through their use of new communication technologies.
Hypothesis 1 (H1) contends that Tunisian activists have been politically
empowered through their use of new communication technologies because they have
managed to engage as leaders in a shift in mentality, namely the "fall of the wall of
fear".
Data gathered seems to support this hypothesis, and fieldwork found that activists
not only actively incited their audience to dissidence under Ben Ali’s regime, but
successfully managed to continue engaging people with politics two years into the
transition process.
I argued (Argument 1, A1) that the shift in mentality, as well as active citizens’
engagement in politics has not been achieved through discussions and debates; rather,
! 86!
by setting the example, activists have normalized the political use of the social
web. As such, activists managed to shift online social practices and citizens’
understanding of politics, thus shaping the latter’s expectations over the transition’s
outcome (i.e. democratic or not). Whether these expectations translate into reality in
the next elections’ results will determine activists’ future space and role.
As such, I conclude (Conclusion 1, C1) that because this political use was, at the
time of the Revolution, newsworthy in itself, Tunisian activists’ gained paramount
visibility on the new political scene, becoming public figures. Activists were
politically empowered through their (political) use of the social web - not thanks
to its alleged organizational capacities, but because this use ensured them access to
publicity.
“During the revolution, people did not organize on Facebook, like “let’s do this
and that tomorrow”. They could not, they could be killed. Rather, going home in
the evening, they shared what they had done. That’s where the real power lies”
(M.)
Furthermore, hypothesis 2 (H2) contended that activists’ political empowerment
stems from the fact that the medium they are using has “become the media”.
Data indeed outlines the fact that news is flowing from the web into the media,
making mainstream media outlets dependent on information shared online, and in
need of “translators”, i.e. web experts, to understand “online politics”. As the majority
of activists possess some kind of web expertise, they have become both the privileged
“hubs” (i.e. sources) of information online, and professional web journalists feeding
the media with credible online content.
! 87!
As such, I argued (A2) that because activists have invested niche professions
(web journalists, web-experts, institutions monitoring…), their public
interventions often qualify them as “experts” on a given topic. This confers to
them, if not a moral, at least a professional authority over their (well-connected and
large) network.
However, hypothesis 3 (H3) contended that institutionalization of action is not
necessarily the best way to ensure entrance in the “market for loyalties”.
Consensus over this question is not reached among interviewees. Some argue their
recent professionalization has multiplied their audience, and thus their outreach –
testifying to an increased feeling of political efficacy, if not of political effectiveness.
Others mention this new public position has diminished the freedom anonymity
granted them – because “everything is political” discussions are embedded in (and
burdened by) many layers of symbolism. Still others refuse to give in to a structure
they deem illegitimate, preferring their independence to professionalization, and
acknowledging the personal sacrifices that result from this choice. However, overall,
it seems that those activists who play prominent roles in media outlets and civil
society organizations (i.e. in the “institutionalized” realm) are more capable of
gaining popular support and fostering adherence over political issues and values than
those who refuse to engage with “the system”.
As such, I argued (A3) that activists’ public and institutionalized position
confers them the kind of power that shapes realities in certain directions rather
than others, i.e. they are in position of influencing the public opinion, notably
through their media presence.
! 88!
Therefore, I conclude (C2) that activists’ expert position in public interventions
enables them to say not only how the political transition is going, but to work towards
and publicize how the process should be going. As such, it is indeed activists’
(political) use of new information technology that has empowered them to have a say
in public and political affairs.
B. Is this empowerment of a sustainable nature?
!Research question 2 (RQ2) asked whether this empowerment is of a sustainable
nature, i.e. whether the public momentum activists gained in the aftermath of the
Revolution enabled them to play an active role in the transition process – and if so, if
this position is currently threatened by exogenous factors.
Hypothesis 4 (H4) argued the sustainability of activists’ prominence in public
affairs is threatened by the politicization of the social web, and the use of online
platforms by political parties, notably Ennahdha.
Fieldwork results tend to reject this hypothesis. Data indeed suggests activists
have managed to maintain their prominent position in spite of the increased use of
online platforms by both the public and political parties in the aftermath of the
revolution. Interviewees attest to an increased interest for political content among
their audience, and thus testify to the fact their popularity has not waned.
As such I argued (A4) that it is notably the web’s politicization (i.e. the use of
the web for political ends) that has contributed to the furthering of activists’
political engagement since the Revolution. Hence, the online platform’s
politicization has empowered Tunisian activists.
Therefore, I conclude (C3) that the political empowerment activists have
witnessed since the revolution has not only been sustained, but has increased
! 89!
with activists’ popularity, both on the web and as public figures. Their popularity
enabled them to be merely challenged, rather than threatened, by Ennahdha’s use of
online platforms for political purposes.
H4 has also argued the sustainability of activists’ empowerment might be
threatened by the exclusivity of the platforms used: should activists not be able to
adapt to technical evolutions, they risk losing control over their main outreach tool.
Data gathered overall confirms H4. Adapting to technology and making the most
innovative use out of it has often been mentioned as “challenging” and potentially
disempowering. However, another, maybe more substantial, point of concern lies in
the public’s interest for political content; normalization of the current status quo is
feared, as winning the public mind over the political process is only possible if
citizens are interested in the type of content shared and the matters discussed.
As such, I argue (A5) that activists’ capacity at sustaining the population’s interest
for politics will determine whether the empowerment they have witnessed over the
past two years will be furthered as the political transition unfolds.
Therefore, I conclude (C4) that the innovative use of online platforms for
political purposes is definitively a determinant variable in activists’ capacity in
keeping the public engaged with a sometimes tedious and lengthy political
process. Activists indeed hope to shape the public opinion so as to constitute a
democracy: their goal is to empower citizens in claiming their rights and holding
those in power accountable. This is the only way, according to them, for the
“Revolution spirit” to be realized. As such, activists aim at embedding their visions in
the very structure of the Tunisian democracy-to be, pushing for rights and freedoms to
! 90!
be enshrined in the Constitution, and educating citizens in taking and being a full part
of the new system.
As such, their political empowerment does not yet mean political power, and
should they lose this battle over the very nature of the system that is being put in
place, the space they secured might as well be lost. However, given the current legal
instability and State’s weakness, activists still have a good chance to reinvent
democracy by shaping the way people think about politics – a challenge they have to
meet before the next elections are held, and which risks to be critically impeded by
the economic hardships that increasingly pauperize vulnerable populations – thus
making them less receptive to political speech.
!!
APPENDIX 1 : SUMMARY OF RESEARCH !Research Questions Hypotheses Data
Arguments (Analysis)
Conclusions
Methodology: Snowball sampling, 16 interviewees, see Annex 2 for description
RQ1: Have Tunisian activists been politically empowered through their use of new communication technologies?
H1: Tunisian activists have been politically empowered through their use of new communication technologies because they have managed to engage as leaders in a shift in mentality, namely the "fall of the wall of fear" H2: Activists’ political empowerment stems from the fact that the medium they are using has “become the media”
D1: Activists not only actively incited their audience to dissidence under Ben Ali’s regime, but successfully managed to continue engaging people with politics two years into the transition process. D2: News is flowing from the web into the media, making mainstream media outlets dependent on information shared online, and in need of “translators”, i.e. web experts, to understand “online politics”.
A1: The shift in mentality, as well as active citizens’ engagement in politics has not been achieved through discussions and debates; rather, by setting the example, activists have normalized the political use of the social web. A2: Because activists have invested niche professions (web journalists, web-experts, institutions monitoring…), their public interventions often qualify them as “experts” on a given topic.
C1: Because this political use was, at the time of the Revolution, newsworthy in itself, Tunisian activists’ gained paramount visibility on the new political scene, becoming public figures. Activists were politically empowered through their (political) use of the social web - because this use ensured them access to publicity. C2: Activists’ expert position in public interventions empowers them to have a say in public and political affairs
RQ2: Is this empowerment of a sustainable nature?
H3: Institutionalization of action is not necessarily the best way to ensure entrance in the “market for loyalties” H4: Sustainability of activists’ prominence in public affairs is threatened by the politicization of the social web, and the use of online platforms by political parties, notably Ennahdha.
D3: Consensus over this question is not reached among interviewees. However, overall, it seems that those activists who play prominent roles in media outlets and civil society organizations (i.e. in the “institutionalized” realm) are more capable of gaining popular support and fostering adherence over political issues and values than those who refuse to engage with “the system”. D4: Data indeed suggests activists have managed to maintain their prominent position in spite of the increased use of online platforms by both the public and political parties in the aftermath of the revolution.
A3: Activists’ public and institutionalized position confers them the kind of power that shapes realities in certain directions rather than others, i.e. being able to influence public opinion A4: It is notably the web’s politicization (i.e. the use of the web for political ends) that has contributed to the furthering of activists’ political engagement since the Revolution. A5: Activists’ capacity at sustaining the population’s interest for politics will determine whether the empowerment they have witnessed over the past two years will be furthered as the political transition unfolds
C3: The political empowerment activists have witnessed since the revolution has not only been sustained, but has increased with activists’ popularity, both on the web and as public figures C4: the innovative use of online platforms for political purposes is definitively a determinant variable in activists’ capacity in keeping the public engaged with a sometimes tedious and lengthy political process.
!
APPENDIX 2: QUESTIONNAIRE
I. Background questions
Assessing identity, self-representations and nature of activity
Background Questions
1. Tranche d’âge
2. Lieu d’origine, lieu d’habitation
3. Niveau d’étude ; domaine d’étude
4. Exposition internationale?
Self-awareness, political biography
1. Comment définiriez-vous votre activité ? Vous-même ?
a. C’est important de faire une distinction ? (oui) : Pourquoi ?
b. Pourriez-vous me décrire votre activité aujourd’hui ? ( considèrent-ils qu’ils
« font de la politique » ?)
2. Votre engagement est-il une activité à temps plein ?
o (oui) : depuis quand ?
o (non) : quel est votre activité principale ?
3. Est-ce que la Révolution a changé votre manière de concevoir votre engagement ?
o (oui) : De quelle manière ?
4. D’où vous vient votre intérêt pour la politique ?
a. Qu’est-ce qui vous a amené à vous engager ?
b. Vous investissez-vous au sein d’un parti ?
o (oui) : Depuis quand ?
o (non) : Pourquoi ?
Use of the internet
1. Votre travail aujourd’hui pourrait-il se faire sans internet et les réseaux sociaux ?
(Internet est-il essentiel à leur activité, i.e. fait-il partie des facteurs propices à la
« sustainability » de leur action?)
a. Est-ce que cela a changé avec la Révolution ?
o (oui : b.)
o (non) : Internet n’a donc jamais été qu’un « plus », un outil
remplaçable ?
b. De quelle façon ? (positif, négatif ?)
2. Pourquoi avoir choisi ce médium plutôt qu’un autre pour vous exprimer?
3. Quelles sont les plateformes en ligne que vous utilisez le plus pour diffuser votre
activité ? Pourquoi ?
Evolution of the nature and the scale of their work after the Revolution.
1. Quelle a été l’évolution des visites sur votre blog/page facebook/site web depuis
la révolution? (demander de la documentation en fin d’interview)
2. Combien de personnes vous suivent-elles chaque jour?
3. Quel a été le plus grand changement dans votre manière de travailler depuis la
Révolution?
o Comment l’expliquez-vous?
4. Vous avez réussi à mobiliser énormément de personnes durant la Révolution.
Serait-il possible de relancer un mouvement de cette ampleur aujourd’hui?
o (oui): de la même manière qu’avant la révolution?
o (non): qu’est-ce qui a changé?
5. Qu’avez-vous appris en termes de techniques de mobilisation avec la Révolution ?
a. Utilisez-vous ce savoir acquis aujourd’hui ?
o (oui) : est-ce efficace ?
o (non) : Pourquoi ?
II. Evolution of their relations with the mainstream media
Are they progressively gaining control over the traditionally government-owned
channels of communication? How? (i.e. are they effectively selling their identity?)
Nature of relationship with the media
1. Comment vous informez-vous?
2. Quel a été l’évolution du paysage médiatique tunisien depuis la chute de Ben
Ali ?
a. Considérez-vous que les médias nationaux sont plus fiables depuis la
chute de Ben Ali ?
b. Vos rapports avec les médias nationaux ont-ils évolué depuis la
Révolution ? En quoi ?
3. Faites-vous l’objet d’une attention médiatique de la part de médias nationaux ?
a. Sont-ils réceptifs aux messages et aux idées que vous défendez ?
b. Collaborez-vous avec des journalistes ?
4. Peut-on se fier aux informations que l’on trouve sur Internet aujourd’hui ?
a. Comment faites-vous la part des choses ?
b. Quels sont vos rapports avec la communauté des bloggeurs, des cyber
dissidents ?
5. Quels sont vos rapports avec les médias internationaux ?
a. Collaborez-vous avec des journalistes internationaux ?
b. Ces rapports ont-ils évolué depuis la révolution ?
“Be the media”
1. En 2008, la grève des ouvriers du bassin minier de Gafsa, qui a quand même
duré 6 mois et n’a pas été franchement pacifique, est pratiquement passée
inaperçue parmi les tunisiens alors qu’à l’international ça a été bien médiatisé.
Il n’y a que trois ans entre les deux événements. Qu’est-ce qui a changé depuis
les soulèvements de Gafsa, en 2008, et les soulèvements de 2011 ?
a. Le rôle d’Internet et des réseaux sociaux là-dedans ?
2. Comment avez-vous interagi avec les médias pendant la révolution ?
a. Etait-ce une stratégie délibérée ?
o (non) : On peut donc parler de spontanéité?
o (oui) : Avez- vous été formé pour ?
3. L’émergence de nombreux blogs, profils facebook, l’utilisation de ces mêmes
médias par les personnes à qui vous vous opposez et qui réussissent elles aussi
à fédérer de nombreux adhérents… Arrivez-vous à vous distinguer ? (oui : a.)
(non : 4).
a. Comment expliquez-vous votre visibilité ?
4. J’ai souvent entendu : « il y a une cyber-guerre pour l’information ». C’est
votre avis ?
o (oui) : Et qui gagne la guerre ?
o (non) : Comprenez-vous qu’on puisse le penser ?
III. Evolution of their relations with the political institutions
ASSESSING “LEGITIMACY” (do they see themselves as part of the market for
loyalties? Do they see themselves as media, or credible sources of information?)
On their relations with the authorities: are they tolerated, censored or accepted? i.e.
what is the “strategy” of the government towards them (referring to Price)
1. J’ai souvent entendu : « l’acquis indéniable de la révolution, c’est la liberté
d’expression ». Etes-vous d’accord ?
a. Quelle est la plus grande avancée, d’après vous, de la Révolution ?
2. Vous sentez vous libre dans vos actions ?
o (oui) : à quel niveau ? par rapport à quand ?
o (non) : pourquoi ?
3. Quel rôle souhaiteriez-vous avoir dans cette transition démocratique?
a. Est-il possible d’atteindre vos (ces) objectifs dans le contexte politique
actuel?
o (non ) Pourquoi?
4. Comment définiriez-vous votre rapport avec les autorités?
a. Comment décririez-vous l’attitude du gouvernement par rapport à vos
actions ?
b. En quoi ces rapports diffèrent-ils de ceux que vous pouviez avoir sous Ben
Ali ?
5. Quelle est la principale difficulté que vous rencontrez dans votre travail
aujourd’hui?
a. En quoi cela diffère-t-il d’avant la Révolution ?
b. En quoi la nature des difficultés que vous rencontrez a changé ?
6. Y a –t-il quelque chose qui menace vos activités actuellement ?
On their relationship to politics
1. J’ai souvent entendu « les islamistes, ce n’est pas nous, on n’est pas comme ça
en Tunisie ». Etes-vous d’accord ?
a. Comment expliquez-vous l’arrivée au pouvoir d’Ennahda ?
b. Quelles sont vos espérances pour les prochaines élections ?
c. Quel rôle entendez-vous jouer dans la préparation de celles-ci ?
2. Vous sentez-vous inclus dans le processus politique ?
o (oui) : Est-ce dû à vos activités ?
o (non) : Aimeriez-vous l’être ? Pourquoi ?
3. Avez-vous l’impression que vos revendications sont entendues au niveau
gouvernemental ?
o (oui) : C’est dû à quoi d’après vous ? Vous avez un exemple ?
o (non) : Si pas entendues, avez-vous l’impression que vos activités sont
du moins respectées ?
4. J’ai souvent entendu : « on nous a volé notre révolution ». Est-ce votre
sentiment ?
a. Qu’entendez-vous exactement par là ?
5. Pour quoi militez-vous ? Quel est votre idéal ?
a. Depuis la révolution, quel a été le moment où vous vous êtes senti(e) le
plus investi ?
b. Le plus désespéré ?
6. Contre quoi vous battez-vous ?
a. Contre qui ?
b. Jusqu’où êtes-vous prêts à aller ?
7. Quel est l’enjeu de la réussite de vos actions?
a. Que représenterait un échec pour vous?
b. Comment qualifiriez-vous un succès?
APPENDIX 3: INTERVIEWS (16) Code Details (A.) Founder of NGO Al Bawsala. The interview was lead on May 10th, 2013, in French, at A.’s
place, in La Marsa (Tunis). Duration: two hours (Az.) Part of the “hard core” activists’. Contributed to organizing and mediatizing massive
protests during the Revolution. Independent. Interview lead in two parts; first on April 12th, 2013, in Menzel Bouzaienne (Gafsa Governorate), at his place. Second on May 1st, 2013, in a bar in Tunis. Duration: two hours
(B.S) Web expert, hacker and web journalist. Played an active role under Ben Ali. Interview lead on May 4th, 2013, in French, at a café in Tunis. Duration: two hours
(D.) Member of a communist party. Active online before and during the Revolution. Interview lead on May 9th, 2013, in French, at a café in Tunis. Duration: two and a half hours.
(Hy.) Prominent radio journalist, popular public figure. Interview lead on May 1st, 2013, in French, at Mosaique FM. Duration: one hour.
(H.) Web-engineer and journalist. Interview lead on May 22nd, 2013, in French at Nawaat. Duration: two and a half hours.
(J.) Human rights activist. Active online, before and during the revolution. Now in charge of organizing media workshops for the youth. Interview lead on April 30th, in French, at a café in Tunis. Duration: One and a half hours.
(Kh.) Prominent blogger before the revolution, still successfully engaged online. Medical doctor. Interview lead on April 21st, 2013, in French at a café in Tunis. Duration: two hours.
(K.K) Web-expert, blogger, created an association that organizes blogging workshops for the youth. Interview lead on May 6th, 2011, in French, at a café in Tunis. Duration: one and a half hours.
(K.B) Hacker, active before and during the revolution, professor of sociology at the University of Tunis. Organizes trainings in political communication. Interview lead on May 8th, 2013, in French, at a café in Tunis. Duration: two hours and a half.
(L.) Active before and during the revolution, ex-French teacher now journalist. Interview lead in French in two parts; first on May 7th, 2013, at a café in Tunis; second on May 10th, at Nawaat.
(M.) One of the founders of web-based media Nawaat. Very active before, during and after the Revolution. Interview lead on May 2nd, 2013, in French, at Nawaat. Duration: One hour
(Ma.) Prominent blogger, and jurist. Live-blogs (on Facebook) NCA’s plenary sessions. Interview lead on April 22nd, 2013, in French, at a café in Tunis. Duration: two hours
(Me.) Ex-blogger, now journalist, active before and during the revolution. Interview lead on May 8th, 2013, in French, at a café in Tunis. Duration: one hour.
(S.) Prominent hacker and Facebook user, independent. Worked for a TV show right after the revolution. Interview lead on April 8th, 2013, in French, at a café in Tunis. Discussed topic several times. Duration: two hours.
(W.) Web-engineer, hacker, now working in communication. Very active during the Revolution, still engaged in civil society initiatives. Interview lead on May 5th, 2013, in French, at a restaurant in Tunis. Duration: one hour and a half.
CONFERENCES AND WORKSHOPS ATTENDED March 26th – 30th, 2013. World Social Forum. Tunis April 15th, 2013. Bondy-Blog Tunisie, journalism workshop. Gafsa. April 27th, 2013. Securiday 2013: CyberWar. Conference organized by INSAT (Institut national des sciences appliquées et de technologie), Tunis. Panelists: ministry of defense and ministry of interior representatives. Blogger (S.) and journalist (Hy.). May 18th, 2013. Political communication workshop for Association Tunisienne des Femmes Démocrates. Organized by K.B. June 12th, 2013. New Arab Debates: Is Tunisia’s economy sinking the Revolution? Panelists: CPR (Congress for the Republic) and Al Joumhouri representatives.
APPENDIX(4(:(EXAMPLES(OF(ONLINE(INTERACTIONS(AND(INFORMATION(FLOW:(The(Example(of(“Weld(El(15”(Affair((June(2013)(!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!
!!
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