Northern Ireland and Theories of Ethnic Politics

Northern Ireland and Theories of Ethnic PoliticsAuthor(s): Lee E. DutterSource: The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 24, No. 4 (Dec., 1980), pp. 613-640Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/173778 .

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Northern Ireland and Theories of Ethnic Politics

LEE E. DUTTER Department of Political Science University of Illinois at Chicago Circle

This article is an application to Northern Ireland of theoretical ideas about ethnic politics. Four sets of ideas are relevant: (1) the theory developed by Rabushka and Shepsle (1972); (2) "pluralist" theory, developed by a number of scholars; (3) "consociational democracy," developed by Lijphart (1977a, 1975a, 1969); and (4) "mobilization" theory, developed by Wolfinger (1965) and modified by Peleg and Peleg (1977). It is found that, on the whole, the Rabushka-Shepsle theory is the best of the four. Based on this analysis, it is concluded that the prospects for a political solution to the Northern Irish conflict in the foreseeable future are, at best, slim. While this conclusion could be drawn from unsystematic observation, we engage in theoretically informed discussion which places it on a much firmer logical foundation.

INTRODUCTION

Although always a topic of scholarly interest, the political relevance of ethnic identity has recently been receiving increased attention. A main reason for this has been the appearance of ethnic political movements in various areas of the world. In many early writings, the most severe consequences of such movements-rise of political entrepreneurs; growth of extremist parties; polarization of citizens; politically motivated demonstrations, strikes, riots, assassinations, coups, civil wars-were associated with either former colonies or economically developing countries (such as Cyprus, Lebanon, and Nigeria). Further- more, most theoretical writings focused on these, in attempting to explain both the actual course of events and how such consequences might be mitigated or prevented. Much of this work has had to be reassesed due to the continuing "fluid" state of politics in many of these societies and the growing political salience of ethnicity in some economically developed nations (Connor, 1977; Esman, 1977; Lijphart, 1977b). One such "nation," Northern Ireland, is the principal subject of

JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION, Vol. 24 No. 4, December 1980 613-640

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614 JO URNA L OF CONFLICT RESOL UTION

this article. While Northern Ireland's politics has been extensively scrutinized, surprisingly little research has been devoted to the direct application of relevant theoretical ideas. I In the next section, four sets of ideas are summarized. In subsequent sections, their applicability is assessed. This analysis is worthwhile for three reasons. First, it serves as an instructive exercise in the empirical application of theory to a concrete, real-world case. Second, in many societies, we find that political fragmentation precedes and often accompanies more violent forms of ethnic conflict. Thus, since Northern Ireland has experienced some of the worst consequences of such fragmentation-that is, evolution into an armed camp perpetually on the brink of civil war- theoretically informed discussion can help us to understand the preconditions of such consequences. Third, this analysis can help us to assess the prospects for a political solution to the Northern Irish conflict.

THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO ETHNIC POLITICAL ACTIVITY

Among the theoretical ideas about ethnic political activity, four are relevant to our analysis. These are: (1) the theory developed by Rabushka and Shepsle (1972), subsequently referred to as the RS theory; (2) "pluralist" theory developed by a number of scholars; (3) "consociational democracy," developed by Lijphart (1977a, 1975a, 1969); and (4) "mobilization" theory, developed by Wolfinger (1965) and modified by Peleg and Peleg (1977). Let us consider each in turn.

Rabushka and Shepsle (1972: 8-10, 21) define a "plural" society as one which "is culturally diverse and . . . its cultural sections are organized into cohesive political sections." They then specify a number of analytically useful assumptions. Their key assumption is that individuals' political preferences are "well-defined"-people know what they want out of the collective decision process. For instance, prefer- efices may concern matters such as the form and operation of political and governmental institutions; political parties and/or candidates; the status of economic and social groups within the society; specific issues of public policy; or some combination of these. Their theory specifies the logical structure of these well-defined preferences with three assumptions.

1. Notable exceptions are Budge and O'Leary (1973, 1971), Dutter (1974), Laver (1 976a, 1976b), Lijphart (1 977a, 1975b), Rabushka and Shepsle (1972), and Rose (1971).



Dutter / NORTHERN IRELAND 615

A. 1 Intracommunal consensus: The members of an ethnic community perceive and express preferences about political alternatives identically. Thus, all members may be represented by identical "ethnic preference functions."

A.2 Intercommunal conflict: Communities are in disagreement on all issues that face the collectivity.

A.3 Perceptual consensus: Alternatives are viewed according to a perceptual frame common to all actors.

A. 1 and A. 2 are interpreted to mean that one ethnic community's preference ordering is the inverse of the other's. For example, if one prefers alternatives a to b and b to c, then the other prefers c to b and b to a. A.3 means that every individual knows the nature of the alternatives (a, b, c) and their impact on his community. In this context, three subsidiary assumptions are made.

First, the law of contradiction is operative. This law states that societal adoption of one community's most preferred policies precludes adoption of the other's most preferred policies. Second, it is assumed that collective decisions are made through the mechanism of elections in which candidates/parties may espouse various policy alternatives in competing for votes and the winner is allowed to implement those policies. The third and most important assumption is that ethnic preferences are intensely held. This assumption goes beyond the simple assertion that each community cares a great deal about the realization of its goals. Logically, if an individual has intense preferences, this means that he values his most preferred alternative greatly when compared with all others.2 Finally, in its simplest form, the RS theory includes three assumptions of special relevance to Northern Ireland: (1) one dimension of conflict; (2) the division of society into two groups; and (3) the relevance of group proportions to the pattern of politics; namely, if one group is a large dominant majority, then it can effectively shut the other out of power.

Based on these assumptions, the RS theory articulates a "paradigm" of political behavior in the plural society. Its "steps" are:

(1) preindependence ethnic cooperation; (2) postindependence ethnic cooperation-ambiguity; (3) demand generation and the increased salience of ethnicity; (4) outbidding and the decline of the multiethnic coalition; and (5) electoral machinations and mistrust.

2. Here we seek to keep the discussion as nontechnical as possible. The mathemati- cally inclined reader, who desires a more formal explication of intense preferences, should consult Rabushka and Shepsle (1972: 43-55).



616 JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION

In their applications Rabushka and Shepsle (1972: 93-206) find that step 1 generally fits the preindependence history of many former colonies- that is, subordination of ethnic differences to the common goal of expelling the colonial ruler. However, it does not apply to that portion of Northern Irish political history relevant here and so warrants no further discussion. On the other hand, steps 2 through 5 do apply, and it is useful to describe how they are played out in an abstract plural society. Thus, suppose that we are examining a society which is culturally diverse but in which ethnicity has not yet emerged as the salient political issue. Incumbent political leaders, of course, are interested in main- taining their positions of power and must do so through the mechanism of elections. Let us further suppose that the society is composed of two groups, each with intensely held, mutually exclusive policy preferences. The problem facing the incumbent politician is to adopt an electoral strategy which will attract sufficient votes to win reelection. Here, a "strategy of ambiguity," subsumed under step 2 of the paradigm, on relevant issues is important.

Politicians who are ambiguous about their issue positions are not unique to any society, but in the plural society they are especially significant. For instance, suppose the multiethnic candidate says different things to different segments of the electorate. If an opponent adopts less ambiguous positions, then we can imagine some voter saying to himself: "The incumbent has been saying quite a lot lately, and I just can't pin down his positions on the issues, but I think I have a fairly good idea where his opponent stands. For whom should I vote?" The RS theory predicts a choice of the more ambiguous candidate (Rabushka and Shepsle, 1972: 62-92). An important feature of this process is its symmetry: Voters from both ethnic groups make the same choice. Continuing in the paradigm, ambiguous candidates are not expected to go on winning reelection indefinitely. Specifically, given that all candidates are free to adopt any issue positions, the ambiguous, multiethnic candidate can be outflanked at the extremes, a process subsumed under steps 3 and 4 of the paradigm. For example, if some candidate, a "political entrepreneur," adopts the policy alternatives which are the most preferred of one ethnic group, then those voters vote for him. Thus, the ambiguous, multiethnic candidate loses votes from this group and likewise from the other, if a second political entrepreneur adopts its most preferred alternatives. Eventually, the multiethnic candidate is left stranded with his strategy of ambiguity and few, if any, votes. Then, depending on the strength of his desire to remain in power, he may adopt "illegal" means to do so, subsumed under step 5 of the




paradigm. Similarly, if political entrepreneurs fail to achieve their goals, they and their followers may do the same. As a result, the initially democratic political system is likely to disappear and the society is likely to experience the violent, destabilizing consequences mentioned earlier.

Those portions of pluralist theory relevant to our discussion can be summarized in three "propositions" regarded as necessary for the survival of stable democracy. As noted by Lijphart (1975a: 1-15), these are: (1) plural societies pose grave obstacles to viable democratic government; (2) the existence of numerous secondary groups contrib- utes to stable democracy by providing checks and balances against governmental authority and preventing the atomization of society; and (3) cross-cutting affiliations make an additional contribution to stable democracy by attenuating the salience of any one cleavage. However, in applying these propositions, Lijphart found that a few societies which ought to be subsumed under the first proposition cannot be so placed (for example, the Netherlands). His solution to this anomaly is the idea of consociational democracy, whose key explanatory element is the mode of behavior of political elites. These elites may promote ethnic conflict or make "deliberate efforts to counteract the immobilizing and unstabilizing effects of cultural fragmentation" (Lijphart, 1969: 212).

Mobilization theory consists of a series of preconditions necessary for the appearance of ethnic politics (Peleg and Peleg, 1977: 178-179). These are (1) "identification"-that is, the amount of ethnic political activity relates directly to the intensity of ethnic identification in a society; (2) "issue relevance," in which the amount of activity observed depends on the issues involved; (3) "economic stratification," in which disadvantaged ethnic groups must have made some economic gains in order to become politically active; (4) "leadership"-that is, ethnic leaders are crucial in the "ethnic mobilizatory process"; (5) "reinforce- ment"-individuals in an ethnic group maintain loyalty to organizations which give them their initial success; (6) "defense"-groups will go to great lengths to hold the power and status they possess; and (7) "demand"-if differences between groups persist, then the probability of "forceful ethnic mobilizatory politics" increases and diversifies ethnic demands and extremist leadership are more likely to emerge.

Despite their relevance to similar phenomena, the above-mentioned ideas display some noticeable differences. For instance, the RS theory first focuses on the "masses": ethnic groups and their attitudes, beliefs, perceptions, and preferences. It then turns to consideration of elite behavior (the paradigm) and implicitly assumes that that behavior will eventually reflect divisions between society's groups. By contrast,




consociational democracy focuses primarily on elite behavior, which is assumed to be crucial in keeping the masses under "control." However, it has been shown (Dutter, 1978) that, both theoretically and empiri- cally, this central aspect of consociational democracy is subsumed by the RS theory's paradigm. Pluralist theory deals with more general, thus less focused, concerns. For this reason, and since the RS theory is largely a detailed elaboration of the first pluralist proposition, pluralist theory receives no additional attention. Mobilization theory also contains elements of the other three. Again, it has been shown (Seliktar and Dutter, forthcoming) that it is subsumed by the RS theory. In short, it is not necessary to assess the applicability to Northern Ireland of each theory. Instead, the RS theory is our operational framework.

NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE RS THEORY

PREREQUISITES

The RS theory has two prerequisites which must be satisfied before it can be applied. First, a society must be culturally or ethnically diverse. Second, this diversity must be politically relevant-that is, these different groups must constitute "cohesive political sections." However, this does not mean that all or most group members must belong to the same political organization(s) or manifest identical political behavior. Rather, it means that they must share a common set of political attitudes, beliefs, perceptions, and preferences as characterized by assumptions A.1, A.2, and A.3.

Northern Ireland clearly meets the first prerequisite.3 Each of its two groups is identified by each's leading attribute-religious affiliation. Protestants, approximately two-thirds of the population, are descen- dants of settlers brought from Britain (principally in the seventeenth century). Catholics, the other one-third of the population, are descen- dants of the early Celtic inhabitants of Ireland. Indeed, it may be technically more correct-especially if we consider each group's perceptions-to speak of the Protestant British and Catholic Irish communities. The second prerequisite is also met.4 In essence, the Northern

3. See Barritt and Booth (1972), Barry (19S75), Budge and O'Leary (1973, 1971), Doob and Foltz (1973), Elliott and Hickie (1971), Heslinga (1962), Jackson (1971), Laver (1976c), Lijphart (1975b), and Rose (1976, 1971).

4. See note 3; also Daniel (1976), Kelly (1972), Laver (1976a, 1976b), and McAllister (1976).




Irish conflict is a political struggle over who will govern and, most important, over the basic constitutional organization of the polity. "Unionists," hold that Northern Ireland should maintain its overt links to Great Britain as part of the United Kingdom. "Nonunionists" hold that Northern Ireland should drop those links in favor of a united Ireland. Moreover, consistent with the "law of contradiction," these two camps represent, in practical terms, mutually exclusive alternatives.

Owing to the historical origins of the conflict (Europe's religious wars), attitudes on this constitutional issue coincide with cultural divisions: Protestants support unionism; Catholics, nonunionism. For instance, in a 1968 survey, Rose (1971: 235) found that only 5% of Catholics supported the governing Unionist Party and less than 1% of Protestants supported the Nationalist Party, the main nonunionist party up to that time. Furthermore, political organizations follow sectarian lines (Rose, 1976: 35). In a similar vein, one Northern Irish politician, in response to this author's question on his early involvement in politics, remarked, "In Northern Ireland, you get your politics with your genes."

THE POLITICAL SETTING

Application of the RS theory requires detailed information on voter preferences and elite behavior. For Northern Ireland such data are available from its political history between March 1972 and May 1974. Hence, an important first step is a description of events during this period.

In March 1972 the British government dissolved the (Stormont) parliament and cabinet of the Northern Irish government primarily because it was unable to maintain social order or to implement reforms to win support from Catholics (Kelly, 1972). Direct rule by a London- appointed secretary of state was substituted. The following September, a conference was held at Darlington (England) to solicit the written views, published in October, of Northern Ireland's political parties on a new constitution for the province. These proposals evolved into a March 1973 White Paper and then the Northern Ireland Constitution Act (1973).5 The White Paper reflected three conditions which the British believed to be necessary for a political settlement: (1) assure Protestants that Northern Ireland would not be forced into a united

5. The Future of Northern Ireland. A Paper for Discussion (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1972); Northern Ireland Constitutional Proposals (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1973).




Ireland; (2) not foreclose Catholics' traditional goal of a united Ireland; and (3) give Catholics a tangible stake in the new government through "real" decision-making and administrative power.

Although somewhat ambiguous, four aspects of the White Paper emerged as most important. First, while a new parliament, called an "assembly," was elected and seated, the secretary of state would retain supreme authority in governing the province. Later, power would be transferred to the new government, called an "executive," on his recommendation. Furthermore, after the executive was installed, he would retain some powers (for example, optional veto of assembly- passed legislation). Second, a plebiscite would be held every ten years so that Nothern Irish voters could express themselves on the continuing constitutional status of the province. Thus, Protestants were assured that Northern Ireland would not join a united Ireland unless its voters wished to do so. On the other hand, Catholics could have a united Ireland if a sufficient number of Protestants were persuaded. The first poll, held in March 1973, resulted in overwhelming support (98.7%) for the existing links to Britain. However, as reflected in turnout (58.7%), most Catholics abstained. Third, "power-shariiig" between Northern Ireland's communities was required. The secretary of state was directed to appoint an executive from the assembly which was representative of its political makeup and would be likely to command widespread support in the province. In practical terms, this meant Catholics had to be included in any executive. Fourth, the so-called "Irish dimension" of the Northern Ireland problem was given explicit recognition. Specifi- cally, the Belfast and Dublin governments would be free to negotiate agreements on cross-border cooperation, and the British government pledged to support them.

The White Paper also contained provisions for election of the new assembly. It was to have 78 members chosen from 12 multimember districts by the single-transferable-vote method of proportional representation. In the June 1973 election 220 candidates competed. We focus on those of ten parties: three nonunionist parties-Republican Clubs, Nationalist, Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP); three "moderate" unionist parties-Northern Ireland Labour Party (NILP), Liberal, Alliance; Unionist, which controlled the previous government from 1921 to 1972; three "hardline" unionist parties-Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), Vanguard Unionist Progressive Party (VUPP), Loyalist, loosely affiliated with VUPP.

Since the election was held before the White Paper proposals became law, candidates and voters could not be certain how the new government




would eventually be structured. Nevertheless, all of the parties made their views reasonably clear. Only NILP, Liberal, Alliance, and Unionist expressed any degree of support for the proposals. However, Unionists were split into pro- and anti-White Paper factions. SDLP suggested that, under certain conditions, its support might be won. Strongly opposed were Republican Clubs, Nationalist, DUP, VUPP, and Loyalist. By contrast, division of opinion on the traditional constitutional issue was less: All seven unionist parties supported continuation of the links to Britain: all three nonunionist parties supported the goal of a united Ireland. The election did not produce a pro-White Paper majority. Explicitly pro-White Paper candidates won only 32 seats: NILP (1), Alliance (8), and Unionist (23). SDLP (19) emerged as the sole spokesman for the Catholic community. Finally, anti-White Paper unionists won 27 seats: Unionist (9), DUP (8), VUPP (7), and Loyalist (3).

By September, 9 (NILP, Alliance) assembly members supported the newly adopted Northern Ireland Constitution Act; 40 (pro-White Paper Unionist, SDLP) were probable supporters; and 27 (anti-White Paper Unionist, DUP, VUPP, Loyalist) remained opposed.6 A major development was SDLP's shift. It was not immediately clear how SDLP expected to achieve a united Ireland by support of the act. After some probing, this author discovered that Protestant consent to a united. Ireland was to be obtained by elimination of all other alternatives.7 The belief was that the "common sense" of Protestants would lead them to negotiate the best deal for themselves in the "inevitable" united Ireland. Three related reasons for support were also cited. First, additional

6. The pro-White Paper Unionist, SDLP total is 40 rather than 42, as one of the former was killed in an automobile accident and another was elected Assembly Speaker and, following British tradition, became neutral.

7. This and the following summaries of attitudes toward the act are based primarily on personal conversations with political activists and Assembly members in summer and fall 1973. The breakdown of informants was:

Group/Party Number of Informants

Republican Clubs 5 Nationalist 2 SDLP 8 NILP 3

Alliance, Liberal 11

pro-White Paper Unionist 11 anti-White Paper Unionist 9 DUP, VUPP, Loyalist 7




concessions might be won from the British (for example, an end to arbitrary internment of suspected terrorists). Second, for the first time, Catholics were to be given positions of power in a Northern Irish government. Third, the act recognized the Irish dimension of the Northern Ireland problem; that is, it allowed creation of a cross-border "council of Ireland." It was believed that such a council would rapidly evolve into an all-Ireland government because (1) a Catholic role in the new Northern Irish government would convince Protestants that they could be "trusted" politically and (2) consent to a united Ireland would be won by allowing Protestant representatives to veto actions of the council.

The moderate unionist parties, NILP and Alliance, gave unqualified support to the act. Furthermore, both supported the links to Britain mainly because of the material benefits (for example, of the welfare state) derived from them. Favorable comments were made about the possibility of a united Ireland, especially in the context of the European Economic Community, which Britain and Ireland had just joined and which, it was felt, would soon make the continuing division of Ireland superfluous.

As noted, the Unionist Party was split. In the pro-act faction, led by Brian Faulkner, the last prime minister of the previous government, attitudes ranged from sullen resignation to passive acceptance. Four reasons appeared to underlay these attitudes. First, the act guaranteed that Northern Ireland would not be forced out of the United Kingdom. Second, it was realized that the act contained Britain's terms for continuing the union: Take them or leave them. Third was the feeling that the "law of the land" should be obeyed until it becomes unworkable, at which point changes can be sought. Fourth, the act seemed to be a reasonable way to correct the major "flaw" in the pre-March 1972 system: its failure to involve Catholics in government.

Members of the anti-act faction stated three basic objections. First, the act was "undemocratic" as the elected representatives of the people were not free to form a government (that is, any executive formed by the Assembly parties had to be appointed by the secretary of state). Second, the proposed council of Ireland was criticized-not the idea itself, but in this context. It was perceived as a "backdoor" to a united Ireland; not only SDLP, but also the British were thought to view it as a vehicle for an all-Ireland government. Nevertheless, some informants did not rule out a united Ireland, but in a time frame of decades, not years as envisaged by SDLP and the British. Third, opposition to power-sharing



Duller / NORTHERN IRELAND 623

was manifested. This was indicated by the question, "How can one allow into positions of authority individuals whose sworn aim is the destruc- tion of that authority?" Moreover, it was felt that, even if SDLP leaders publicly affirmed support for the act (as they eventually did), partic- ularly its guarantee that Noithern Ireland would remain part of the United Kingdom so long as its people wished, they could not be believed.

Among hardline unionists (DUP, VUPP, Loyalist), opinions were strongly negative. Attitudes and objections were similar to those of anti- act Unionists, but more strident terms were used and more intensity of feeling expressed. However, these and all of the other unionists were opposed to a united Ireland in the short run. Where differences appeared, they concerned means, not ends. For instance, pro-act unionists regarded it as the best way to preserve the links to Britain. On the other hand, anti-act unionists saw it as a poorly disguised British attempt to dump the province into a united Ireland. Thus, especially for the hardliners, it had to be resisted; at first legally and constitutionally, then, if that failed, by other means.

Despite these difficulties, secret negotiations among pro-act parties on formation of an executive began in early October. In late November an "executive-designate" was formed. It would be a 16-man administration composed of SDLP (6), Alliance (3), and Unionist (7) Assembly members. In early December representatives of this executive-designate, the British government, and the Irish Republic met at Sunningdale (England) to discusss a council of Ireland. The various agreements reached, collectively called "Sunningdale," were mainly on basic principles. It was anticipated that additional meetings would be held in 1974 to work out relevant details, after which the agreements would be ratified by the two Irish governments and the Council would begin operation. In mid-December the British parliament approved a measure which would end direct rule on January 1, 1974 and hand over the governing of Northern Ireland to the executive-designate. On December 31 the secretary of state officially appointed the new administration, which assumed office the next morning.

Although a majority of informants expected an executive to be formed, an equal number doubted it would succeed, even though, as one put it, the British would "throw around money like a man with no arms" in an effort to make it work. Anti-act unionists unequivocally predicted the Executive's demise, believing that Faulkner, Chief Executive in the new government, would be unable to "sell" an SDLP-Alliance-Unionist




coalition and Sunningdale to either the Unionist Party or the Protestant community. Furthermore, some of the eventual coalition participants had expressed reservations. A few pro-act Unionists said that there was a marked lack of enthusiasm for the whole process among their colleagues but that unionists must not be blamed if it failed. Others, unionist and nonunionist, noted an absence of trust between the likely coalition partners, which would probably impair the functioning of any executive. Since many pro-act Assembly members had been antagonists in the pre-March 1972 parliament, some informants cited as additional impediments the personality conflicts and old grievances which could reemerge.

The first challenge to Faulkner came at a meeting of the Unionist Council, the central governing body of the Unionist Party, on January 4. Due to his leadership of a government containing "republicans" and negotiation of Sunningdale (whose terms could be interpreted as a weakening of Northern Ireland's links to Britian), a motion rejecting Sunningdale, implicitly Faulkner's leadership, passed 457 to 374. On January 7 he resigned as leader of the Unionist Party but pledged to continue in the Executive and to support Sunningdale. Following his resignation, the anti-act faction gained control of the party machinery.

A second challenge came in the British election in February. Although called for other reasons, it was contested in Northern Ireland on the Constitution Act/ Sunningdale issues. All of the anti-act/Sun- ningdale unionists joined together in an umbrella organization, the United Ulster Unionist Council (UUUC). UUUC candidates compiled 51.1% of the vote, up from a combined 35.4% of first preferences for their Assembly candidates, and won 11 of Northern Ireland's 12 seats in the British parliament. Another result of this election was that planning for the Council of Ireland ceased. Faulkner and his supporters now wanted a stronger statement from the Irish Republic on Northern Ireland's constitutional status than the one in Sunningdale, which was that no change could be made in that status without the consent of Northern Ireland's people. The requested declaration was forthcoming on March 13 by Liam Cosgrave, Prime Minister of the Irish Republic, who said, "The factual position of Northern Ireland is that it is within the United Kingdom and my Government accepts this fact" (Irish Times, March 14, 1974: 1). Nevertheless, the political deadlock continued.

The third and fatal challenge came in May. Earlier, the Ulster Workers Council (UWC), a Protestant organization formed in March,




had indicated that it would act if UUUC politicians continued to do nothing. When talks on the Council of Ireland resumed in late April and preparations for ratification of Sunningdale proceeded, UWC moved. On May 15, following UWC directives, Protestant workers began a general strike which soon brought Northern Ireland's economy to a halt. On May 22 the Executive announced that the Council of Ireland as outlined in Sunningdale would be shelved until after the next Assembly election, expected in mid-1977. Instead, a council would be formed to cooperate on matters of common interest to Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic, such as coordination of economic policies as Britain and Ireland entered the Common Market. However, the strike continued. Finally, on May 28, after troops failed to break the strike and the British government refused to negotiate with UWC, Faulkner and his supporters resigned from the Executive, followed by their Alliance and SDLP colleagues. On May 29 the Assembly was suspended and direct rule reimposed. On May 30 UWC called off its strike. Thus, Northern Ireland's only experiment in intercommunal government ended.

VOTER PREFERENCES

With the preceding background in mind, we can proceed to direct application of the RS theory. Here, we assess the degree to which Northern Irish voters possess the "well-defined" preferences characterized by assumptions A.1, A.2, and A.3. In its simplest articulation, the RS theory assumes that only one dimension is relevant to voters' electoral choices of candidates/ parties. This is illustrated in Figure 1 and allows a straightforward application to the Northern Irish case, which is displayed in Figure 2.8 Furthermore, the salience of the constitutional issue in the choices of Northern Irish voters has been well documented (Barritt and Booth, 1972; Kelly, 1972; McAllister, 1976; Rose, 1976, 1971). However, we are still faced with three problems: (1) identifying various positions on the issue; (2) ordering these positions, as well as candidates/parties, in a consistent, left-to-right fashion; and (3) securing information on voters' preferences for candidates/ parties. These problems are compounded by Northern Ireland's recent troubles, which, as noted by McAllister (1976: 462), rule out traditional data collection such as survey research. Thus, substitute instruments must be found, one of which is employed here.

8. This interpretation was first proposed by Dutter (1974). Similar, though needlessly complicated, formulations were later developed by Laver (1976a, 1976b).




Group A's Group B's Preference Preference

Function Function

Pro-A Policies Pro-B Policies

Ethnicity Issue

Figure 1: Simplest Articulation of an RS Theory Policy Space SOURCE: Rabushka and Shepsle (1972: 78).

Catholic Protestant

Community's Community's Preference Preference

Function Function

Non-Unionism Unionism

Constitutional Issue

Figure 2: The Northern Irish Policy Space




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) t f | ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ I I I

Republican SDLP Unionist DUP VUPP Clubs Alliance Loyalist

Nationalist NILP Liberal

(a) Approximate Party Positions on the Constitutional Issue

I I I I I I I Republican Nation- SDLP NILP Alliance Unionist DUP VUPP

Clubs alist Liberal Loyalist

(b) Relative Party Positions on the Constitutional/White Paper/Constitution Act Issues

Figure 3: Party Positions in the Northern Irish Policy Space

During an extended stay in Northern Ireland, this author constructed a set of seven positions on the constitutional issue through the content analysis of published candidate/party statements in 13 Northern Irish parliamentary elections (1921-1973).9 These are: (1) A united Ireland should be achieved by any means necessary. (2) There should be a united Ireland. (3) A united Irelandshould be achieved through the consent of the people of Northern Ireland. (4) The Border (with the Irish Republic) is not an issue; that is, Northern Ireland's constitutional position cannot be altered without the consent of its people. (5) The constitutional position of Northern Ireland as part of the United Kingdom should be maintained as long as this is the desire of its people. (6) The constitutional position of Northern Ireland as part of the United Kingdom should be maintained. (7) The constitutional position of Northern Ireland as part of the United Kingdom should be maintained by any means necessary.

A consistent left-to-right ordering of the positions along with approximate party positions is shown in Figure 3a. Furthermore, in order to capture better some of the idiosyncratic features of the 1973 election-especially voters' perceptions of candidate/ party positions on the White Paper/ Constitution Act-relative positions were also assigned, as shown in Figure 3b. Support for these orderings and

9. Newspaper accounts of campaigns were consulted. Details of this and subsequent procedures are available from the author upon request.



628 JO URNA L OF CONFLIC T RESOL UTION

assignments was obtained from secondary source materials, the author's interviews, and the results of a survey conducted among a nonrandom sample of observers of Northern Irish politics, political activists, officeholders, and students in political science courses at the Queen's University of Belfast. Specifically, a multidimensional scaling procedure applied to the results of this survey yields the position ordering of Figure 3a, as well as interpoint distances for each pair of positions. However, we employ the ordinal representation of Figure 3b, since it takes into account unique features of the 1973 election and, on the whole, yields stronger statistical results when spatial distance between candidates/ parties is involved. Finally, assuming that a candidate's party label is an indicator of his position, specific candidates were assigned to a position based on each's party.

Information on voter preferences is available as a consequence of the electoral procedure. The single-transferable-vote method followed these steps: (1) Each voter received a ballot paper listing the constituency's candidates alphabetically including name, address, occupation, and party affiliation. (2) The voter indicated preferences for candidates by writing the appropriate number next to each's name: 1 for first preference, 2 for second, and so on, up to the total number of candidates if the voter so desired. Indifferences were not allowed. (Such papers were declared invalid. For whatever reason, invalid ballots were only 2.3% of the total vote.) (3) On the first "count" of the ballot papers, candidates were ranked according to each's total first preferences. If a candidate exceeded the constituency's "quota," he was declared elected and his "surplus" votes distributed to the other candidates.'0 The number of votes "transferred" to a candidate depended upon his proportion of next preferences on all of the ballot papers of the elected candidate. (4) If no candidate reached quota on the first or a subsequent count, then the candidate with the fewest votes was eliminated and all of his votes transferred to the other candidates.

10. A constituency's quota was computed as follows:

total valid votes cast in the constituency

quota cast=inumbe onstited + 1 (any fraction of one being disregarded) number of seats allocated to the constituency

+ 1

11. The formula used in this calculation was:

number of votes to be transferred from elected number of all ballot papers

unelected or eliminated candidate of elected or eliminated candidate's = - - - x candidate with unelected share totalevte a m t candidate as the next lower

by elected or eliminted cadidate or available preference




(5) This process of transferring the surplus votes of elected or the total votes of eliminated candidates continued until all of the seats allocated to the constituency were filled.

Thus, although the ballot papers are not available, we can gain insight about the preferences of Northern Irish voters by examining published records of who received transfers after a candidate was elected or eliminated (Irish Times, July 2, 1973: 8-9; Lawrence et al., 1975). As his party position assignments differed only marginally from those in Figure 3, some findings by Laver (1976a) are relevant here. In Table 1 we see that, on each count, voters were quite consistent in allocation of their lower preferences. Overall, 75% of transfers went to candidates of the same party as that of an elected or eliminated candidate and 90% to those of the same or spatially adjacent parties. Although it is unlikely, these results could be fortuitous. Thus, additional evidence is desirable; this can be provided by an appropriate regression model. In this model, the dependent variable is the proportion of transfers (PT) received by a candidate when another was elected or eliminated. PT is computed by dividing the total transfers involved into the transfers received by the candidate. This quantity is equivalent to the proportion of next preferences which the recipient had on all of the ballot papers of the elected or eliminated candidate.

It should be noted that this definition of PT may introduce some correlation among observations on it and implies equal weighting across counts; that is, on later counts, declining numbers of voters listed a lower preference, and the total ballot papers involved were only a fraction of those on the first count, thus PT could be distorted. How- ever, neither problem proved serious. On the former, appropriate experimentation (for example, selection of subsets of observations de- signed to reduce any correlation) was conducted. Nevertheless, as is apparent to anyone who studies the raw transfers, the basic patterns were so strong that our results were hardly affected. On the latter, corrective measures (such as selection of transfers from early counts) Were also taken with a similar lack of impact on our findings. Thus, in what follows, all observations on PT are included.

Three independent variables are used. First is the relative distance (D), computed from Figure 3b, on the constitutional issue between the

For example, suppose that an elected candidate exceeded the quota by 200. If his total vote was 1000, and 300 of the 1000 listed an unelected candidate as the next preference, then he would receive 200/1000 x 300 = 60 transfers. For our purposes, the important point is that the number of transfers received by an unelected candidate was directly proportional to the total number of next preferences which he had among all of the voters of the elected candidate. See also Knight and Baxter-Moore (1972: 20-21).



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party of the elected or eliminated candidate and that of the recipient. For instance, if a Unionist candidate was elected or eliminated and a Unionist recipient was available, then D=O. However, if a DUP or Alliance candidate was the recipient, then D= 1; if a VUPP, Loyalist, or NILP, D=2. We expect D to be negatively correlated with PT; that is, the greater the distance between candidates' parties, the smaller the proportion of transfers a recipient should have received. A significant D is evidence for the salience of the constitutional issue in the candidate/ party preferences of Northern Irish voters. Furthermore, it should be noted that our model assumes an additive, linear relationship between PT and D, as well as our other two independent variables. It can be argued that such a model involves misspecification of the "true" relationships. These possibilities were investigated by experimentation with relevant transformations on the data. The results obtained displayed only slight differences. Thus, we retain the additive, linear assumption and report those findings.

The second independent variable is the number (N) of recipients still available from an elected or eliminated candidate's own party. To illustrate its relevance, suppose a Unionist candidate's vote was distributed to five recipients and two were Unionist (N=2). We would expect each to have received fewer transfers than if one were the sole recipient (N=1). Here, additional variables could be constructed to reflect the ballot position of these recipients and th6 number and positions of recipients of other parties. Some experimentation indicates the relevance of such variables; however, they neither weaken the significance of N, which assumes a random allocation of lower preferences, nor alter our overall results. Thus, to avoid needless complication, only results with N are reported. As implied, we expect PT and N to be negatively correlated. Moreover, a significant N indicates the degree to which voters assigned their lower preferences to candidates of the same party (that is, the consistency of their preference orderings).

The third independent variable is defined based on the party label (L) of a recipient. L is a dummy variable which takes on a value of 0 or 1 depending upon the party affiliations of an elected or eliminated candidate and a recipient. Table 2 specifies the conditions under which L is 0 or 1 for three important subcategories of transfers. To illustrate L's relevance, consider again transfers from a Unionist candidate. If no Unionist recipient was available, then, following from Figure 3b, we might expect transfers to have gone to Alliance and DUP recipients in roughly equal proportions. However, if voters who gave high prefer-




TABLE 2

Definition of Label Variable

Party of Elected or Eliminated Candidate Party of Recipient Value of L

Unionist Republican Clubs, Nationalist, 0 SDLP, Liberal, Alliance, NILP

Unionist Unionist, DUP, VUPP, Loyalist 1

DUP Republican Clubs, Nationalist, 0 SDLP, NILP, Liberal, Alliance, Unionist

DUP DUP, VUPP, Loyalist 1

SDLP NILP, Liberal, Alliance, Unionist, 0 DUP, VUPP, Loyalist

SDLP Republican Clubs, Nationalist, SDLP 1

ences to Unionist candidates felt intensely about their views on the constitutional issue (in other words, possess utility functions of the shape depicted in Figures 1 and 2), then it is more reasonable to expect that DUP recipients and those of other parties spatially to the right of the Unionist Party would have received a larger proportion than an Alliance or some other recipient to the left. 12 L, then, is an indirect measure of the intensity of feeling and the degree of polarization among supporters of Northern Ireland's three main parties. Furthermore, as is seen in Table 2, recipients of the same party as Unionist, DUP, and SDLP were also assigned an L value of 1 under the assumption that, for their supporters, these labels were powerful attractions in themselves beyond a D=O. Finally, we expect PT and L to be positively correlated.

In sum, we apply the following regression model:

PT = bo + bD + b2N + b3L + M .

Results obtained under the model are displayed in Table 3. We see that all coefficients are in the hypothesized directions and significant beyond the .05 level. Also, all three L coefficients are larger in magnitude than

12. An alternate interpretation (Dutter, 1974) of the fundamental nature of these preferences is possible. However, analysis of this possibility is beyond the scope of this study. In either case, the net effect is the same; that is, voters allocate their lower preferences in the manner described regardless of the spatial locations of the candidates/ parties.




TABLE 3

Proportion of Transfers to a Candidatea

Party of Elected or Eliminated Candidate Constant D N L R2

All Cases .267 -.070 -.021 - .284 (N = 1271) (.003) (.002)

SDLP .411 -.102 -.085 .187 .526 (N = 150) (.009) (.015) (.029)

Unionist .219 -.064 -.023 .080 .393 (N = 374) (.007) (.003) (.016)

DUP .168 -.032 -.093 .340 .602 (N = 104) (.012) (.019) (.036)

a. Each equation is read horizontally. Coefficients b1, b2, and b3 are below each independent variable. The numbers in parentheses are the standard errors of each coefficient.

the corresponding D coefficients, thus indicating intense preferences and significant polarization among supporters of Unionist, DUP, and SDLP candidates. Overall, these results strongly suggest that Protestant and Catholic voters were quite cohesive in allocating their lower preferences to candidates who represented each community's traditional goals and that the preference structure of the Northern Irish electorate is reasonably congruent with the relevant assumptions of the RS theory.

THE PARADIGM

The analysis described in the preceding section has provided evidence that the RS theory's preference assumptions apply to the Northern Irish electorate. We now proceed to the second phase of our application: the steps of the paradigm. As noted, step 1 has no relevance to recent Northern Irish politics, so we skip to 2, which is "postindependence ethnic cooperation-ambiguity." Here, "postindependence" is dropped and "ethnic cooperation" must be modified. Whereas the theory implies cooperation between ethnic groups at all levels, its attendant discussion and later analyses (Dutter, 1978; Seliktar and Dutter, forthcoming) focus principally on elite cooperation. Thus, modified step 2 is "elite cooperation-ambiguity," and it has relevance to recent Northern Irish politics.




British policy created a situation which facilitated intercommunal, elite cooperation by generating uncertainty in the political environment, and by giving Northern Irish politicians positive incentives to cooperate. Specifically, despite some input, these politicians and Northern Irish voters knew little of British plans until publication of the White Paper. However, important questions remained concerning how the new government would function (for example, power-sharing, the role of the secretary of state). By contrast, the positive incentives were more apparent. These took three main forms: (1) avenues (border poll, council of Ireland) for each community to pursue its traditional goals; (2) return to local autonomy and reduced British presence; and (3) positions of power in the new government.

Nevertheless, due to the new electoral ground rules and the unspeci- fied impact of the Assembly election results on the composition and policies of the new government, considerable uncertainty remained. In that election this residual uncertainty had two principal effects. First, candidates/ parties had an incentive to adopt a strategy of ambiguity toward the White Paper proposals, which many did (Laver, 1976a: 321- 324). Second, candidates/ parties emphasized their traditional positions on the constitutional issue in order to make as strong an electoral showing as possible (Laver, 1976a: 20). Following the election, secret negotiations on power-sharing began in October and culminated in the formation of a multiethnic governing coalition in November. During this time, the front presented to Northern Irish voters was an ambiguous one. Thus by December a situation had evolved which can be subsumed under step 2. However, recall that multiethnic candidates/ parties/ coali- tions are not expected to survive, a development which falls under the next step.

Step 3 is "demand generation and the increased salience of ethnicity." Here, the RS theory implies that, if a society has the requisite ethnic cleavages and elites find themselves in a situation subsumed under step 2, then political entrepreneurs/ ethnic parties are likely to appear and base their appeals on issues related to those cleavages. These entrepreneurs/parties may be new, or old ones emphasizing new themes, and "ethnicity" eventually comes to dominate political discourse. In North- ern Ireland, such entrepreneurs arose in the Protestant community and based their appeals on opposition to the White Paper, Constitution Act, and Sunningdale, which placed them in clear opposition to the multiethnic governing coalition. What happened next falls under step 4.




Step 4 is "outbidding and decline of the multiethnic coalition." "Outbidding" means that entrepreneurs successfully win electoral support. "Decline of the multiethnic coalition" means that incumbents experience a corresponding loss of support and consequently of their power base, which is accompanied by a sharp polarization of voters. Two events confirm the applicability of this step to Northern Ireland. First, Faulkner's defeat at the January Unionist Council meeting shows that Protestant entrepreneurs had won internal Unionist Party support for their anti-act/ Sunningdale cause. Second, UUUC, a broader coalition of entrepreneurs, won a significant proportion of Faulkner's electoral base in the February British election. Furthermore, Table 4, which displays the results of elections from 1965 to 1975, clearly demonstrates the success enjoyed by Protestant entrepreneurs in recruiting electoral support and reinforcing the polarization of North- ern Irish voters.

As noted by Rose (1976: 99), between 1973 and 1975 Protestant entrepreneurs were greatly aided by a reduction in the ambiguity of Faulkner's position.

A comparison of the [1975] result with... 1973 ... shows that the main political change ... resulted from a clarification of the position of the Unionists led by Brian Faulkner.... In 1973, [he] led the Official Unionists-albeit a party split by his leadership . . . by blurring his position on power sharing . . . and by leading the

historic governing party ... he was able to maximize his electoral support. In 1975, by being identified unambiguously with power sharing ... [he] lost the support of some he had led or misled in 1973. The apparent shift in the popular votefrom 1973 does not reflect any substantial change in public opinion. Instead, it reflects a clearer awareness of what the parties stand for and thus how an individual with constant opinions should mark his ballot [italics added].

In fact, as highlighted in Table 5, this loss of support can be detected as early as the February 1974 British election. The aggregate figures show a drop of about 14% in support for pro-act/ Sunningdale parties. However, the magnitude of the shift among unionist voters is hidden. Since SDLP was the only pro-act/ Sunningdale, nonunionist party in both elections, if we subtract its votes from each column, the remainder are votes for pro-act/ Sunningdale, unionist parties. Here we see a drop of nearly 100,000 votes, or about 42%, three times the aggregate shift. Finally, we note that nonunionist parties have benefited (see Table 4) from the activities of Protestant entrepreneurs. The principal reason for



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TABLE 5

The Swing Against Constitution Act/Sunningdalea

June 19 73 February 1974

Pro-A ct/ Anti-Act! Pro-Act! Anti-A ct! Sunningdale Sunningdaleb Sunningdale Sunningdaleb

Total Vote 393,000 (55%) 318,000 (45%) 295,844 (41%) 421,782 (59%)

SDLP Vote 159,473 160,437

Total Unionist Vote 233,527 135,407

a. Information above dashed line obtained from Fornight, An independent Review For Northern Ireland, March 8, 1974, 7. b. These totals include votes for anti-act!Sunningdale, nonunionist candidates.

this has been a decline in Catholic support for moderate unionist parties, especially NILP, which went from 20.4% of the vote in 1965 to 8.1 % in 1969, 2.6% in 1973, and 1.4% in 1975, despite an effort to recoup some Protestant working-class support by an anti-power-sharing position (Rose, 1976: 30, 96; Laver, 1976b: 43).

Step 5 is "electoral machinations and mistrust." This means that,, upon seeing their power base erode, multiethnic incumbents are likely to use "illegal" means to remain in power. Means may range from the gerrymandering of electoral districts, to tampering with voting lists or election results, to assassinations and coups. If political entrepreneurs/ ethnic parties are the specific targets, they are likely to respond in kind. In any case, the political system is likely to lose its "democratic" characteristics and to experience acts of politically motivated disruption and violence. However, due to the British presence, the multiethnic coalition, unlike the pre-1972 government, was never able to consider seriously any such actions. By contrast, no constraints existed for another group of Protestant entrepreneurs (UWC), and it initiated a politically motivated general strike which brought about the collapse of the multiethnic coalition, an event consistent with step 5.

CONCLUSION

Based on the preceding analysis, it is reasonable to conclude that the RS theory applies to Northern Irish politics. One question remains:




What are the prospects for a local, "democratic," political solution to the Northern Irish conflict? Regarding "theoretical" solutions, Rabushka and Shepsle (1972: 213-217) have identified (1) denial of independent, decision-making authority to indigenous political leaders; (2) restrictions on that authority; (3) restrictions on free political competition; (4) restrictions on the scope of government activity; (5) creation of a homogeneous society; and (6) creation of permanent external enemies. Since March 1972, British policy has contained elements of the first four. Direct rule is an example of (1); British control of Northern Ireland's police of (2); internment and bans on extremist organizations of (3); and the powers of the secretary of state of (4). In short, the RS theory yields an unambiguous, pessimistic prediction on the prospects for a solution. Rabushka and Shepsle (1972: 92) note:

The logic inherent in the process of democratic competition in plural societies is compelling, we believe. Democracy ... cannot be sustained under conditions of intense, salient preferences because outcomes are valued more than procedural norms. The plural society, constrained by the preferences of its citizens, does not provide fertile soil for democratic values or stability.

Nevertheless, the British have been tenacious in their search for a solution. For instance, another white paper was prepared and published in July 1974 (The Northern Ireland Constitution, London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office). It proposed that a convention be elected to write a constitution for the province. However, any document produced had to satisfy three conditions: (1) provision for power-sharing between Protestants and Catholics; (2) recognition of the "Irish dimension"; and (3) acceptance of the British parliament's right to decide if the document would be implemented as written. Space precludes a detailed examina- tion of subsequent events. Suffice it to note that an election was held in May 1975 under the procedures of June 1973 and that anti-act/ Sun- ningdale unionists won 47 of 78 seats. The Convention met several times in the latter half of 1975, but it was clear by early 1976 that the parties would not be able to agree on a single document. Thus, in March it was dissolved.

Following the August 1979 murder of Lord Mountbatten, the British government indicated that it would soon propose new political initiatives. Our analysis indicates that two formidable obstacles stand in the way of any initiatives. First, while most Protestants and Catholics do not participate in and many no longer condone or even sympathize with the continuing terrorism and violence, they are willing to cast their




ballots for candidates/ parties which represent each community's traditional goal. Second, if established political leaders publicly cooperate, as in the Executive, they (especially Protestants) will soon be replaced by new leaders who are unequivocally wedded to the traditional goals and strongly opposed to cooperation. Both obstacles will be reinforced if the British insist upon elections to select Northern Irish leaders and place no restrictions on peaceful political activity by candidates, parties, and voters. Indeed, in the short run, perhaps the status quo is the best that can be obtained: a "detached" government which attempts to treat all Northern Irish citizens in a reasonably equitable manner and the use of several thousand soldiers to supplement local police and to maintain a relative social peace. Although similar conclusions could be reached by direct observation (Rose, 1976: 139), our theoretically informed discussion places them on a much firmer logical foundation.

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Northern Ireland and Theories of Ethnic Politics