Nova Scotia Politics: Clientelism and John Savage

Société québécoise de science politique

Nova Scotia Politics: Clientelism and John SavageAuthor(s): Jeffrey MacLeodSource: Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue canadienne de science politique, Vol. 39,No. 3 (Sep., 2006), pp. 553-570Published by: Canadian Political Science Association and the Société québécoise de science politiqueStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25165992 .

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Nova Scotia Politics: Clientelism and John Savage1

Jeffrey MacLeod Mount Saint Vincent University

The world breaks everyone and afterwards many are strong at the

broken places, but those it will not break?it kills. It kills the

very good, and the very gentle, and the very brave, impartially.

Ernest Hemingway, A Farewell to Arms

Introduction

This paper argues that the theory of clientelism2 is a useful explanatory framework for interpreting the challenges faced by the Nova Scotia Liberal government led by Dr. John Savage from 1993 to 1997.3 The

hypothesis presented is that Nova Scotia's political culture supports an environment in which clientelism flourishes. Since the clientelistic

dyadic relationships and networks are deeply rooted in the cultural mores

of Nova Scotia, they cannot be easily challenged and dismantled by any single political actor or even a government. Therefore, Premier

Savage's objective of "eradicating patronage in Nova Scotia"4 through his government's attempt to capsize this long established cultural prac tice is advanced as the prime reason for its failure to endure as a viable administration. That is to say, Savage's general approach to governing

and, more specifically, his failure to incorporate clientelistic networks

(primarily from the Nova Scotia Liberal party and relevant interest

groups) in his policy development process severely eroded his political base of support, paralyzed his government's ability to implement policy, and ultimately forced his resignation.5

Clientelism and Noel's Stage Model

This analysis is based on the premise that clientelism is an appropriate model for examining Nova Scotia politics. Nova Scotia supports a clien telistic political culture, which can be traced historically to colonial British

Dr. Jeffrey MacLeod, Assistant Professor, Department of Political and Canadian Stud

ies, Mount Saint Vincent University, Halifax, Nova Scotia; [email protected]

Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue canadienne de science politique 39:3 (September/septembre 2006) 553-570 ? 2006 Canadian Political Science Association (l'Association canadienne de science politique) and/et la Soci?t? qu?b?coise de science politique



554 Jeffrey MacLeod

North America. In fact, Gordon Stewart argues that John A. Macdonald used patronage as the political "glue" to forge clientelistic networks that became essential to guiding Canada's development during the early years of Confederation. Moreover, Stewart maintains that Joseph Howe and other Nova Scotia political notables emulated their federal cousins in practis ing the art and mechanism of forging clientelistic networks in order to build political support (1986: 88-95). In addition, much of the literature on contemporary Maritime politics and political culture supports the claim that clientelistic-like structures characterize the life of the dominant polit ical and social institutions in this region (for example, Smith and Con

ley, 1984; Stewart, 1993; Dyck, 1996; Bellamy, 1976; Simeon and David J. Elkins, 1980; Adamson and Stewart, 1996; Simpson, 1988).

In the Canadian context, S.J.R. Noel's work on Ontario politics describes clientelism as "'core vertical solidarities' which evolved grad ually from simple patron-client dyads into progressively more complex forms of brokerage and machine politics" (1990: 310). The stages of cli

entelism, Noel argues, are not mutually exclusive; rather, they should be viewed as analogous to geological strata: "each changing the surface con

figuration but also metamorphosing with the one below" (1990: 317). Several themes emerge from Noel's work and from other writers on Cana dian clientelism (for example, Langford and Tupper, 1993). First, the gen eral conduit through which contemporary clientelistic relationships form are through political parties. The political party provides a forum through which private transactions between patron and client can occur. Although these transactions are private in character, they eventually assert them selves in the public sphere. Moreover, parties provide a sense of identity and form a sense of community to what would otherwise be marginal ized individuals and groups. Second, there is a form of accountability between both client and patron. Clients will accept a certain amount of submission to the patron, with the proviso that the patron remains acces

sible; this is seen to have some tangible relationship to the client's col

lectivity. Clearly, there is a power relationship that allows the patron to

have a dominant voice, yet clients are capable of collective action to dis

place the patron. Although this action would be collective, it is primarily motivated by particularistic concerns. For example, political activities such as leadership reviews, supporting alternative candidates for the party nom

ination, and a common consensus among a group of clients to withhold election campaign services are all methods by which clients can take col lective action to send the message that the patron has fallen from favour.

Generally, these types of actions are not taken to protest impersonal pol icy, but rather to redress some real or perceived grievance between the clients and the patron, which is personal in nature.

A perceptible theme in the literature on clientelism in modern

political behaviour is its link with immorality and corrupt behaviour.



Abstract. This paper is a test of clientelism as an explanatory framework for the challenges faced by the Nova Scotia Liberal government led by Dr. John Savage, 1993-1997. Clientelism, as an explanatory theoretical framework, is a useful tool for interpreting the political events

that drove Premier Savage from office only four years after leading his party to a significant

majority in the Nova Scotia legislature. The hypothesis presented is that Nova Scotia's political culture supports an environment in which clientelism flourishes. Since the clientelistic dyadic

relationship and networks are deeply rooted in the cultural mores of Nova Scotia, they cannot

be easily challenged and dismantled by any single political actor or government. Therefore, the

Savage government's attempt to capsize this long-established cultural practice is advanced as

the prime reason for its failure to endure as a viable administration.

R?sum?. Cette communication est un test de client?lisme qui tente d'expliquer le cadre dans

lequel s'inscrivent les d?fis auxquels a ?t? confront? le gouvernement lib?ral de Nouvelle

Ecosse men? par le Dr John Savage de 1993 ? 1997. Le client?lisme, en tant que cadre th?orique

explicatif, est un outil utile qui permet d'interpr?ter les ?v?nements politiques qui ont fait per dre son poste de Premier Ministre au Dr Savage quatre ans seulement apr?s qu'il ait men? son

parti vers une majorit? significative ? l'assembl?e l?gislative de Nouvelle-Ecosse. En fin de

compte, l'hypoth?se est que la culture politique de Nouvelle-Ecosse favorise un environnement

dans lequel le client?lisme est florissant. Du fait que la relation dyadique client?liste et les

r?seaux sont profond?ment ancr?s dans les traditions culturelles de Nouvelle-Ecosse, il est peu

probable qu'un acteur unique ou un simple gouvernement puisse facilement les mettre au d?fi

et les d?manteler. En cons?quence, nous sugg?rons que la tentative du gouvernement Savage de

renverser cette pratique culturelle de longue date est la raison principale pour laquelle ce gou vernement n'a pas r?ussi ? survivre en tant qu'administration.

Clientelistic practices are described by some as elitist, forming patterns of domination between the patron and client that create an unhealthy dependency, which is sometimes fortified by coercion and material sanc tions. The often pejorative terms in which clientelism is discussed are balanced by the observation that clientelism is a natural or more familiar

pattern than the more antiseptic or modern forms of state authority. Although a patron/client relationship is in some sense exploitative and

arbitrary, it can be preferred to impersonal bureaucratic models. In short, the patron/client dyad, for good or ill, places a "human face" on poli tics. Individuals can become quickly overwhelmed by the sheer size and complexity of modern state activities, yet the simple relationships formed to access government largesse remain familiar, and can provide a sense of comfort and identity; a local poll-captain, a municipal coun

cilor, a prominent member of a riding executive, are all examples of conduits through which clients can access patrons to deliver "the

goods." Even David Siegel, in his scathing condemnation of small town

politics in Canada and its reliance on clientelistic practices, admits that the patron/client relationship is a more personal one than the associa tions formed by the larger, and more distant, bureaucracies that operate on allegedly universal and merit-based systems: "When federal and

provincial law-makers consider legislation, they usually have a general idea of which broad groups in society will benefit from the legislation, although even this is sometimes unclear. When a municipal council is



556 Jeffrey MacLeod

making decisions, it is frequently very clear which individuals and groups will benefit from a decision" (1993: 219).

To help in identifying and examining the Savage government's cli entelistic structures, I have used the "stage model" framework developed by S.J.R. Noel for examining clientelism in Canadian provincial politics (for example, Noel 1990, 1987, 1976).

In brief, stage 1 defines the basic patron/client dyad. Stage 2 is a more

complex form of this dyadic relationship, which introduces the "broker" as the intermediary who is most visible in the structures of political par ties. Stage 3 introduces government bureaucracies into the mix by sug

gesting that complex bureaucratic networks also develop between patrons and clients. I have added a "stage 4" to this model. Since the 1960s, pres sure groups have taken their place as legitimate organizations for gather ing and steering political resources in Canada. It is apparent that pressure groups, like bureaucracies, form clientelistic ties to political actors in gov ernment (patrons). Therefore, it is appropriate to expand Noel's stage model to incorporate the patron/client dyad to include interest groups (see Table 1).

This analysis focuses on clientelism as seen in stages 2 and 4, since evidence suggests that the two complex series of networks identified with these two stages wreaked the most havoc on Savage's tenure. In addition,

analyzing these two stages provides some methodological advantages. First, the patterns of behaviour that these networks exhibit are easier to

identify and measure. Second, there is enough evidence from the activi ties of stage 2 and 4 networks in this case to support the hypothesis.

Moreover, no strong evidence supports bureaucratic networks (stage 3)

mobilizing to oust Savage, although they were undoubtedly outraged by the 3 per cent wage rollback, and Savage did replace nine deputy minis ters in his first six months in office. However, senior civil servants left

standing after the initial purge did enjoy an unprecedented level of auton

omy because of Savage's refusal to allow overt political interference in the managing of departments. Yet the government's deep reforms upset

many of the long-established departmental procedures, rattling some net

works. Also, public-sector unions in health care and education threat

ened strike action in protest of government legislation. However, as the

following sections will argue, stage 2 and 4 networks were the most overt

in mobilizing in reaction to the Savage government's reform agenda.

Stage 2 Clientelism: The Nova Scotia Liberal Party and John Savage

The Savage government provides an interesting test for the clientelist

model because Premier Savage provides such a stark contrast to the men

that preceded him in terms of his clearly negative stance toward patron



Nova Scotia Politics 557

Table 1

Four Stages Of Clientelism

Stage 1 Patron/client dyad

Stage 2 Patrons/brokers/clients (political parties)

Stage 3 Patrons/brokers/bureaucrats/clients (government/administrative) Stage 4 Patrons/brokers/bureaucrats/interest groups/clients (policy communities/policy

networks)

Source: Adapted from Noel, 1976. Stage 4 clientelism is my own contribution to this model.

age, and his disinterest in forming a personal network within the political party to which he was elected leader. For Savage, implementing policy, even at the expense of maintaining clientelistic dyads, motivated his polit ical activism. Therefore, Premier Savage was inclined to favour the devel

opment of policy initiatives that suited his value system rather than

carefully building coalitions and compromising on issues. Moreover, his ascension to the leadership of the Nova Scotia Liberal party (NSLP) was

fairly effortless in comparison to what others have faced in reaching this

goal. Prior to becoming premier, he never served in a provincial legisla ture. Moreover, Savage left the management of the leadership campaign to others and took little interest in building personal contacts with the

party through his campaign organization. As a result, he did not have to

personally construct a significant clientelistic network to get elected as leader.

According to Noel's "stage model," a political leader must form

patron/client relationships with the political party he/she leads in order to maintain political support. However, Savage's relationship with the Nova Scotia Liberal party, particularly after the election in 1993, never really developed beyond a transactional character. That is to say, he never devel

oped a cadre of Liberal party "brokers" whom he could draw on to pro vide him with a personal connection to his party. The majority of his senior campaign staff were ignored after the government was formed, thus shattering the dyads that had been formed between Savage and his senior campaign team; even the few dyadic relations Savage did seek to form with his campaign team did not endure for long. For example, the

most prominent member of this team to be given a significant post? Dennis James, the premier's first chief-of-staff?left the post within six

months, allegedly because of frustrations in dealing with the premier. By not developing a "back room" of Liberal party partisans, Savage sent the

message that he was not interested in developing a consistent connection with the NSLP through a dyadic clientelistic network. Compound this with the government's attempt to not only eradicate party patronage (the "fairness in government" policy), but also for the premier to frequently



558 Jeffrey MacLeod

remind Liberals in public of this goal, only served to emphasize the

message to many longstanding Liberals that Savage was not prepared to

develop the critical clientelistic networks that party activists expected from their leader. Thus, by not including members of the NSLP in his inner circle and not demonstrating any willingness to compromise his rigid stance on patronage, Savage ignored the foundations for building a suc

cessful clientelistic network. These two variables, in combination, pro voked a dramatic confrontation between Savage and significant networks in the NSLP during the leadership review.

It should be noted that the electorate of Nova Scotia never defeated John Savage while he was the provincial Liberal leader. The institutional

pressures that drove him from office were primarily manifested in the Nova Scotia Liberal party. The most damaging attacks, which directly threat ened his leadership, came from Liberal party members as well as those who sought to exploit the internal democratic practices of the NSLP to

undermine Savage's ability to lead the government. A senior member of the Liberal party governing apparatus during the Savage years observed: "I have always been convinced that it was Liberals who abandoned John

[Savage] first and then the population." For example, by 1994 the Liberal

party office was averaging 55 phone calls a day, with the vast majority coming from Liberals who were complaining that they had been aban doned by the elected officials whom they had helped get elected (inter view, July 2000). Ian Stewart seconds this sentiment in his analysis of the Liberal party under Savage's leadership: "Many rank-and-file Liberals con cluded from Savage's attack on patronage practices that their leader was

out of touch with the grassroots.... Even well-connected Liberals com

plained that they were unable to contact Savage by telephone" (2000: 45).6 I argue that the leadership review process was a manifestation of

the tensions that developed in the NSLP almost immediately after the

Savage government was formed. As one senior party official observed, there was a division between Savage and the Liberal party that started "on the first day of the campaign" (interview, July 2000). This chasm

deepened after the Savage government was sworn in, and eventually led to a full-scale public confrontation between Savage and several riding association executives, caucus members, senior party members and grass roots Liberals.

At the Liberal annual meeting at the Westin Hotel in Halifax in

November, 1993, delegates passed a constitutional amendment inserting a leadership review clause that would require Savage's leadership to be reviewed at the next annual meeting. This was a little surprising given that the government had been sworn in only five months earlier. Clearly, a significant portion of the rank-and-file Liberals were losing patience with their new leader. At this meeting, Savage did apologize for past mis takes and promised to be more communicative with party members. His




office established a 1-800 line and hired additional party staff to com

municate with party members, but this did little to soften the blow of the

deep reforms that the Savage administration was pushing. Only a few

days before the annual meeting, the Liberals lost a by-election to the

Progressive Conservative candidate Brooke Taylor, who defeated the Lib eral candidate John Tilley in the riding of Colchester-Musquodoboit Val

ley. The Liberals had been expected to win this seat, but polls indicated that Savage's reversal on his "no new taxes" pledge in the mini-budget released in September helped sway voters of the riding in the direction of the Tory banner. This by-election defeat contributed to the sour mood of many of the Liberal delegates to the annual meeting.

The Nova Scotia Liberal party executive was concerned about the

impact on their public reputation both of the trade unionists'7 member

ship drive, and of the growing number of Liberals publicly complaining about the leader and the government. The executive committee responded cautiously. It decided to delay the vote for nine months and created a constitutional review committee to present options on how the leader

ship review vote should be conducted. As Ian Stewart notes: "By any measure, the decision to delay their annual meeting was a public rela tions fiasco and a step back from party democracy" (2000: 47-48). Rela tions between Savage and his party had become so tenuous that many of his staff concluded that if a vote had been held in the fall of 1994, he would have been defeated.

While the constitutional review committee deliberated, Savage con tinued to meet resistance from members of his caucus and party mem bers. For example, Savage suspended Russell MacKinnon (Liberal MLA

Cape Breton-West) for voting against a government bill. The Cape Breton West Liberal Association reacted by demanding an immediate review of the leader. That call was echoed by the mayor of Halifax, Walter Fitz

gerald (a former Liberal cabinet minister in the government of Gerald

Reagan). After consulting Liberals across the province, the constitutional

review committee reported to the provincial executive and announced its recommendations on April 28, 1995. It advised the NSLP to hold its lead

ership review vote through balloting in individual constituencies, and it recommended that final vote results not be released. In addition, they also recommended changes to the party's constitution that would, among other things, only require leadership reviews following an election defeat. The party executive accepted the recommendations of the review com mittee and even considered just counting votes until a majority was reached in the leadership review vote. This idea was subsequently shelved in the face of strong caucus opposition.

The actual leadership review vote was held on June 24 at polling stations in each of the 52 constituencies. Party members were asked two



560 Jeffrey MacLeod

questions on the ballot: one asked whether the party should hold a lead

ership convention, and the second gauged their support for new consti tutional amendments being proposed by the party executive. The result of this vote was released at the Liberal party's annual meeting, held at Dalhousie University on July 7; the party president, John Young, announced that Savage had received a majority and that the constitu tional amendments passed with a 55 per cent plurality.

Although Savage passed the leadership review, the process the party adopted received heavy criticism. Specifically, the decision not to make the final results public was vigorously resisted by the media and by some

party members. Parker Barss Donham asserts that the vote was rigged: "Who could call that a vote? It was no vote. It was a cynical exercise in damage control.... [John] Young and [Jack] Graham have already demonstrated their belief that the end of keeping their patron in power justifies whatever means are necessary to skew the vote" (1997). More

over, a dozen constituency associations registered their disapproval with the party office in Halifax about suppressing the release of the vote totals.

Although Savage technically won the review, he emerged from the

process politically wounded. His caucus continued to be restless, but did not revolt in an open manner. Savage determined, in the spring of

1997, that his support within the party and with the general population had eroded to the point that he could no longer lead. Most damaging was the erosion of his administration's capacity to realize policy change, which I maintain was a direct corollary of the government's lack of interest in maintaining and building clientelistic networks

with interest groups arrayed around critical policy communities (stage 4). In the end, Savage was left with few options, so he decided to retire from his post as premier and leader of the NSLP after only four

years in office. Savage's own commentary on the leadership review sug gests that the patronage issue was the driving irritant for many party members:

There's no question the Leadership review had the party very worried. Although much of it was fuelled by the entrance into the party of the Henley's [trade

unionist].... Fortunately, most of them never came to the convention up in Dal

housie. But a lot of them did. And a lot of them, the people who came, were

[upset] by the way in which many Liberals felt they had lost out as a result of the return of the Liberal government. And there was a genuine feeling among

many Liberals that they were not getting their fair share. My response [was] that the 'fair share' was no longer a legitimate way to do it.... I remained

unrepentant. But I understood and would accept the responsibility for what

people did in the sense that they wanted a more satisfied party. The party was

unsatisfied with me as a leader, for a variety of reasons. (Dr. John Savage,

in-person interview, Dartmouth, Nova Scotia, July 2000)




The evidence seems to support Savage's view that the party was unsat isfied with him, considering that he barely won the leadership race even

though it was initially thought to be a coronation. His main opponent, Don

Downe, was cast as the underdog but, in the end, Downe came within 400 votes of capturing the leadership.8 Remarkably, Savage did not interpret this result as a message that he needed to build stronger bridges with the

party. Instead, during the election campaign, he adopted a rigid stance on

patronage that further eroded his support within the party, especially amongst rural Liberals. Yet, after forming the government it became clear that the no-patronage policy was implemented in an uneven manner. While Liberal party members in rural constituencies were denied jobs in high way construction and the like, some party members with professional cre

dentials were appointed to prominent board positions and senior

government posts; Ian Stewart dubbed this practice "

'white collar' patron age" (2000: 30-53). As a result, some party members complained that white-collar patronage had not been expunged to the same degree as rural based or "blue-collar" patronage. Significant divisions developed and the Leader never successfully reconciled these tensions.

White-collar patronage was evident in appointments to government agencies, boards and commissions (ABCs). Initially, the Savage admin istration took some steps to make these appointments more transparent.

Ministers lost the power to make appointments through their own fiat, and all appointments were vetted through the Priorities and Planning Com mittee of cabinet, then the full cabinet, and finally forwarded to the all

party Human Resources Committee, a standing Committee of the House of Assembly. In addition, the government publicly advertised a list of all ABC vacancies, inviting all Nova Scotians to submit applications.

Premier Savage was not averse to appointing prominent members of other political parties to ABCs. For example, he said that he had to con vince his cabinet to accept Wayne MacKay, a high-profile member of the NDP, as a member of the Human Rights Commission. However, the evidence suggests, and many interviewees confirm, that as the pressure mounted from the leadership review process, the appointments to ABCs became more overtly partisan. As one Savage minister suggests, as the

leadership review issue became more imminent, they "blinked" on the

patronage issue (interview, July 2000). In short, partisan Liberals were

appointed with more frequency to ABCs after 1994. Savage, however, bristled at the suggestion that he compromised in this area:

[T]here were some people who were indeed appointed politically. It was impos sible for me with 17 members of cabinet to know who was coming up at each

meeting. Look at the number of times, you can ask Bill McDonald [secretary of the cabinet], you can ask the chief-of-staff, how many times we sent back

Boards [recommended by individual ministers] because they didn't contain



562 Jeffrey MacLeod

enough women, recommendations from individual ministers, but they didn't

contain any blacks, that they didn't contain any Aboriginal people. Yes, it was

not a 100% record, but do people have any remembrance of what it was like

in those last five years with [Buchanan] and to be fair, Cameron started some

of this. Donny Cameron and I shared some views on this. (John Savage, July

2000)

Despite Savage's commitment to equity, it is clear this did not trans late into an eradication of partisan Liberal appointments. For example, appointments to the four 14-member regional health boards were based on recommendations from Liberal caucus members, and the names were vetted through the minister of Health's office, the caucus research office, and finally the names were approved by the premier's chief-of-staff before

being submitted to the formal process. Virtually every member of these boards had a tangible connection with the NSLP. Moreover, a member of the premier's political staff was dedicated to maintaining a database on board appointments. Executive assistants to ministers sought advice and tacit support from this staffer on almost all potential board names that

were submitted to priorities and planning for approval. At the same time, former political staff seemed to find civil service

positions after their political service was concluded. For example, Diane Stillman left the office of Human Resources Minister Eleanor Norrie to

join the priorities and planning secretariat, as did Ann Buchanan, who had served as Minister Guy Brown's executive assistant. Colleen Mac

Donald, a staffer in the Premier's Office, was named the director of the Protocol Office, despite ranking second in a civil service competition for the position. Finally, Heather Robinson was appointed to the Utilities and Review Board (a $70,000 a year post) after serving a brief period as

Savage's chief-of-staff. Robinson would later be appointed a justice to the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia.

It is not difficult to understand why the Savage government had to

compromise and appoint more Liberal party members to ABCs and pub lic service posts; it is likely that this compromise helped the premier dur

ing the leadership review process. Through the lens of clientelism, it would seem clear that the pressure to maintain support for the government from

dyads within the governing political party would be contingent on net works in the party having more direct input and having some members receive some sort of reward for their political service. The political dif

ficulty for Savage was two-fold: first, the patronage issue was one by which he was measured in terms of his success as premier. He set a

high standard for himself: "the eradication of patronage in Nova Scotia"; ultimately, it was a standard that he could not meet because it denied the political culture and practice of the province. As a result, he lost

credibility on this signature issue that he had created for himself. The sec




ond political problem resulted from remaining firm on disbanding blue-collar patronage but allowing white-collar patronage, creating a sig nificant division in the Liberal party. This fissure occurred along rural/ urban and socio-economic lines. As Parker Barss Donham noted: "Savage continued to rub salt in rank-and-file wounds by passing out plum, high level jobs to undeserving friends such as Heather Robertson, chairwoman of the Nova Scotia Review Board" (2000). Both of these political prob lems contributed to the premier's difficulties in establishing clientelistic networks within the Liberal party, a goal he did not, in any case, embrace.

Premier Savage did field a valiant rearguard action against the NSLP in an attempt to save his premiership. This effort began in earnest after he shuffled his cabinet in June of 1996. Ministers in key portfolios were

changed, and the health minister was sent to the backbench. Yet this did little to thwart mounting pressure from the caucus for the premier to

resign. Almost all of the interviewees for this paper state that there was not an overt caucus revolt to remove Savage; however, the evidence sug gests that there was a whisper campaign amongst disgruntled backbench ers and some members of cabinet. Apparently this discontent crystallized at a caucus retreat held at the Oak Island Inn on the South Shore. As one member of caucus recalls, Savage asked each member around the table at the meeting a blunt question: "'Do you have a better chance of win

ning your seat with me or without me?'" He asked the question. And I think his decision, made shortly after that?two or three weeks after, was based on his reflection [ofthat meeting]" (interview, July 2000). Reports from that meeting reveal that some members suggested it might be better if he resigned; however, Savage recalls that the meeting was supportive in that he received an endorsement from the caucus as a whole:

What they said was, 'we want you to stay. We think it will be harder to win

with you, but we don't want you to go." That was what the caucus chair and

the members of caucus gave me. They gave me a standing ovation but there

was no doubt that there was a distinct feeling that I was not the attractive win

ner that I looked in '93, if I may be so bold as to paint myself with such illus

trious colours, (interview, John Savage, July 2000)

Only a few weeks after this caucus meeting, a poll was released show

ing the Liberal party trailing the Progressive Conservatives 25 to 32 per cent; the premier's personal popularity was at 19 per cent. Less than a week after the release of this unfavourable poll, on March 20, 1997, Sav

age abruptly announced his resignation. His staff says that it was a sur

prise to most. He called his personal staff into the premier's office around five in the evening and told them as a group that he would be retiring. It was an emotional meeting; many were crying and quite upset. He also told them that they needed to be supportive of the Liberal party and the next leader:



564 Jeffrey MacLeod

The one thing he did say to us?'there is going to be a leadership coming up" and he said, "no matter what happens I am leaving but I don't want you to

hold this against any candidate that is running and I don't want you to be bit

ter." He was very strong about that. He goes, "you are still Liberals. This is

still a Liberal party and you have to keep fighting. Just because I am not going to be leading it, I'll be supporting whoever's the next leader 100%" and he

goes, "you guys have to too. You can't take your personal issues out of this

room." (Staffer, in-person interview, Halifax, Nova Scotia, July 2000)

It seems ironic that the last message he would give to his staff was to be supportive of the Liberal party, when you consider his tumultuous

relationship with that organization. At Province House the following day, Thursday, March 21, it took

only four minutes for Savage to read a prepared statement to the media

announcing his resignation. He did not take questions and he quickly exited the room. Reflecting back on the experience, Savage says he left

politics because he was tired and he felt he should turn the party over to a younger person:

The last two or three years have undoubtedly taken their toll. And if I had

been 45 I think I might have taken ten days holidays somewhere and come

back and said, that's it, I am going to fight this election.

So around that time ... I did a lot of soul searching. I looked at it. And a num

ber of factors came into play. One, that I was unpopular. And never mind if it

was justified or unjustified, the point was that I was at something like 19%.

But the point was, I was unpopular and many of the policies that were associ

ated with the government that was not working or had created political tur

moil were identified with me. I was also close to 65 ... I also was beginning to

not sleep. And the personal abuse and the personal attacks took their toll. But

the interesting thing is, nobody, and I've stated this before, nobody in the Lib

eral party asked me to go. There was no caucus revolt, no cabinet revolt. Cab

inet was flabbergasted when I resigned that morning at cabinet meeting.... What

I did was to consult with five people (people like my son, Michael and Jack

Graham) and they felt that it was probably going to be better for the party if I

resign.

My staff in the premier's office, senior staff, were absolutely against me retir

ing because the changes that occur have a damaging impact on staff when you

resign because then everybody; whoever comes in needs a new staff, etc. There

was a vested self-interest in their keeping me there anyway, (interview, John

Savage, July 2000)

The fallout from Savage's resignation was severe for the NSLP. The

party reacted against Savage's tenure by attempting to remove his legacy in a variety of ways. For example, his chosen successor, Bernie Bou

dreau, was defeated in the leadership race to succeed him. Boudreau




resigned from the caucus and was followed by four other key ministers in the Savage government?Mann, MacEachern, Norrie and Jolly (Stew art, Bragg and Abass preceded these ministers). In the next election

(March 24, 1998), under the new leader and premier, Russell MacLellan, the party was reduced to minority status. On July 27, 1999, the MacLel lan government went to the polls again, only to be defeated by the Pro

gressive Conservatives, led by John Hamm. The NSLP is now the third

party in the Nova Scotia legislature. This is the first time in the party's long history that it has not been the government or the official opposi tion. It is likely that Savage's tenure is responsible for some of the party's lingering misfortunes.

Stage 4 Clientelism: Policy Communities, Policy Networks and John

Savage

Stage 4 clientelism is my contribution to Noel's "stage model." It pro vides further insight into the demise of the Savage government by incor

porating the role of interest groups in undermining the regime. I posit that within policy communities,9 policy networks form. Within these net

works, pressure groups with similar interests to political actors in the

government structure form patron/client relationships amongst the polit ical actors and the leadership of the relevant interest groups. Both patron and client rely on this dyadic relationship to maintain stability in the pol icy network and, indeed, the overall policy community. Therefore, when one of the partners (patron/client) in this relationship begins to act errat

ically, it upsets this equilibrium and makes the linkage vulnerable to

opposing interests. A government may be able to disturb the balance in a few policy networks during the course of its mandate; however, when too many of these networks become unstable, the government loses

legitimacy. In reference to the Savage government, viewed through the lens of

stage 4 clientelism, the evidence suggests overwhelmingly that Savage and his cabinet simply alienated too many critical dyads situated in core

policy communities, such as fiscal, health, education, and municipal affairs. The most damaging aspect of the Savage government's reform

agenda was its fiscal policy. The four-year plan of significant cuts in

virtually all departments accentuated disruptions that spread through pol icy networks connected with cabinet ministers of the large portfolios.

Moreover, the Savage front bench was not satisfied with just implement ing this massive budgetary restraint measure; particularly in the minis tries of health, education and municipal affairs, the cabinet authorized the introduction of legislation that restructured and reallocated depart

mental resources, which shifted the power relationship in key policy



566 Jeffrey MacLeod

communities. In all three of these cases, reforms in these departments were implemented rapidly and were grossly insensitive to the policy net works that were dependent on these government departments. In response, powerful interest groups acted in a defensive manner and threatened the

government through political action. In the health sector, for example, the Nova Scotia Medical Society

launched a large province-wide advertising campaign attacking the health minister and the premier for their proposal to cut physicians' wages. Also, nurses' unions in Halifax threatened strike action over the government's legislation to create the QE II Health Sciences Centre. In the education

sector, the government fought a pitched battle with the Nova Scotia Teach ers' Union over changes to the Education Act. Finally, the premier aban doned a campaign pledge to the municipal affairs policy community to not impose amalgamation in Halifax and Cape Breton. When the Savage government announced its intention to proceed with amalgamation, the

municipal affairs policy community was shattered and some of Savage's strongest supporters immediately became his most virulent critics (for example, Clancy, Bickerton, Haddow and Stewart, 2000).

This is not to say that the Savage government should not have pur sued any type of government reforms, rather, I posit that it needed to be

more strategic in deciding what policy networks it was going to desta bilize. In short, Savage needed to pick his battles more carefully, with an eye toward managing the damage to the clientelistic dyads in the

policy networks affected. The evidence shows that the Savage govern ment showed little appreciation for the affected policy communities and it expected support because it was "doing the right thing." The cabinet

pursued its aggressive reform agenda with an almost messianic fervour and it expressed only self-righteous indignation to groups that did not

give their unquestioning support to the government's proposal. This atti

tude, which was held by Savage and most of his key ministers, reveals a blindness to clientelism; there was a huge political cost to the deci sion to do "what was right" without sensitivity to ongoing practice.

Conclusion

This analysis does not support the conclusion that, in order to remain in

power, Savage needed to engage in unrestrained patronage for party mem

bers, or compromise his beliefs on policy issues. Rather, by adopting a more incremental approach and establishing a more subtle public posi tion on patronage and other public policy issues, he could have man

aged the opponents in the party and in pressure groups much more

effectively and constructed enduring dyadic networks, consistent with

stage 2 clientelism.




Ultimately, Savage needed to establish and nurture dyadic networks within the party. He needed to recruit a group of party activists who were

personally loyal to him and then construct a dyadic relationship with them and the NSLP, related to the broker function described in Noel's stage 2 clientelism. His inability and unwillingness to do this is the prime factor in explaining his turbulent relationship with the NSLP.

One would expect that a premier and a party leader would have a

stronger connection to the party. Certainly, Savage expended a lot of per sonal energy meeting with riding associations and making phone calls to

party members. Yet, the reading of the evidence is clear. Savage's con nection to the NSLP was always tenuous. Critics of his approach to party matters maintain that he reacted to party member complaints on a case

by-case basis in the sense that he met with riding associations and party members in response to a grievance that was expressed to his office. In

essence, his approach was tactical in nature rather than strategic. Savage moved to redress an individual issue, but he never parlayed that narrow action into a long-term alliance.

In reference to stage 4 clientelism, I argue that interest groups and the executive branch of the government of Nova Scotia form dyadic rela

tionships. That is to say, in general, interest groups and governments form

symbiotic relationships, and often they rely on each other for mutual sus

tainability. For example, the Nova Scotia Medical Society represents indi vidual physicians who were remunerated by a process established in consultation with the Nova Scotia Department of Health. The provincial government oversees the allocation of resources to the province's doc

tors, not unlike the way patronage is used to maintain party/patron rela

tionships in stage 2 clientelism. This pattern of mutual dependency is evident with the teachers', municipal leaders' and nurses' unions. All of these groups rely on the provincial government for material resources

(usually financial), and the political executive of the provincial govern ment depends on the support of these groups to maintain its political legitimacy.

The case of the Savage government illustrates that the premier did not appreciate these complex interdependencies, and as a result he did not let them influence his approach to setting public policy. The Savage administration pursued an aggressive public policy agenda that assaulted

long-established clientelistic networks; they adhered to principles of

responsible management at the expense of the dyadic relations so signif icant in these policy areas. In so doing they lost the support of groups committed to ongoing policy formulated through their long-standing link

ages to government.

This paper provides a thumbnail sketch of how stage 4 clientelistic networks operated in several high-profile public policy arenas and dem onstrates how the Savage government acted in opposition to the expected



568 Jeffrey MacLeod

pattern of behaviour that the dominant groups in key policy communi ties had come to expect from provincial government political actors. Thus, it contributes to the overall argument that Savage and his cabinet often

acted, to their own detriment, to immobilize or ignore clientelistic net works that included the Nova Scotia Liberal party (stage 2), and promi nent interest groups (stage 4).

In the final analysis, it is clear that Savage, as Liberal leader, vio lated the sacred relationship enshrined in the patron/client dyad, which is the cornerstone of the political structure in Nova Scotia politics. The

model of clientelism gives clear insight into the underlying machinations of the political culture of Nova Scotia. Savage's refusal to incorporate the tenets of this model is the prime reason his administration was so

abruptly undermined.

Unfortunately, his failure to appreciate the forces which were

released by his administration's aggressive pursuit of policy at the

expense of clientelistic networks became more than the government could endure. Savage sacrificed his political career, and the internal cohesion of the political party he led, in order to advance policies that he felt would restore Nova Scotia's reputation as a credible province in the Canadian federation. Savage's focus on what he felt had to be done for the province missed the broader dependencies of the clientelistic

political culture evident in Nova Scotia. The result was criticism from those suffering from disrupted patron/client dyads. Ultimately, this resistance proved more powerful than Savage's search for support in

appealing to Nova Scotians to embrace his broader notion of the public good.

Notes

1 I am thankful for the guidance and support I received for this project, particularly from Dr. A.K. MacDougall, University of Western Ontario, Dr. Michael MacMillan,

Mount Saint Vincent University and the late Dr. John Savage. This paper is a revised

and abridged version of research conducted between 2000 and 2002 for my doctoral

dissertation.

2 Generally, clientelism is a model that identifies a pattern of patron/client relation

ships that has at its core a patron dispensing rewards, which are most often described

as patronage, in exchange for political support and fidelity from a client. There is a

form of accountability, even dependency, between both client and patron. Clients

will accept a certain amount of submission to the patron, with the proviso that the

patron remains accessible; clearly, there is a power relationship that allows the patron to have a dominant voice, yet clients are capable of collective action to displace the

patron. Although collective, such action is primarily motivated by particularistic con

cerns. For example, political activities such as leadership reviews, supporting alter

native candidates for the party nomination, and a common consensus amongst a

group of clients to withhold election campaign services are all methods by which

clients can take collective action to send the message that the patron has fallen from

favour.




3 The Savage government was elected on May 25, 1993. It captured 40 of the 52 avail

able seats; returning the Nova Scotia Liberal party to power after 15 years on the

opposition benches. I wish to identify my bias in that I served in the Savage govern ment as the executive assistant to the minister of Health, from 1993 to 1996.

4 This was Dr. Savage's publicly stated policy objective during his 1992 Nova Scotia

Liberal leadership campaign, and the provincial general election in 1993.

5 Dr. Savage resigned as premier of Nova Scotia on March 21, 1997, after only four

years in office.

6 This paper draws heavily on personal interviews with Nova Scotians involved with

the Savage government to inform its analysis. These interviews were conducted using an open-ended format, were electronically recorded and conducted over a two month

period (July and August, 2000) in Nova Scotia. Former Premier John Savage requested,

during the interview process, that his remarks be attributed, and he offered over seven

hours of commentary. All of the other interviews are confidential, as was agreed between the author and the interviewees; they include seven former cabinet minis

ters, a former chief-of-staff, three former executive assistants, three former senior

party officials, three former staffers to the Premier and two former members of oppo sition political parties.

7 Over 900 trade unionists joined the NSLP with the publicly stated purpose of remov

ing Savage from office. This was in response to government legislation focused on

reform in the construction industry. This bill was dubbed the "Steen" decision, and remained a source of political unrest throughout the review process.

8 Savage defeated four other candidates to win the Liberal party leadership: Donald

Downe, George Hawkins, John Drish and Kenneth Mclnnis. Savage won on the sec

ond ballot, polling 3,688 votes against Downe's 3,311. Initially, the Liberal Leader

ship Convention of 1992 was billed as a coronation for Savage, as his main rival, Don Downe, was considered a "last minute" candidate, put forth in order to create a

viable race. Yet, it quickly became clear that although Savage started as the front

runner, his campaign quickly lost momentum and Downe came within a slim 400 votes of victory.

9 What is evident in the current literature on policy communities is that there is no one

clear definition of what comprises a policy community or a policy network. This

ambiguity produces much debate; however, some common traits do emerge, which can provide a general conception that will allow us to construct a common frame of reference for this analysis: a policy community is a cluster of groups, government

agencies, and departments, media, academics, and other individuals who coalesce around a policy field. These actors are linked by a common concern for a policy field and generally understood codes of conduct. Actors in a policy community do not necessarily share similar views on policy issues. Yet, all members of a policy community must share some connection to each other and the policy field. A policy community is distinguished from a policy network in that networks form inside a

policy community amongst groups and individuals who share similar interests and

goals in resolving issues in the policy field.

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Documents

Nova Scotia Politics: Clientelism and John Savage