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On the Cognitive Significance of Indexicals Author(s): Eros Corazza and Jérôme Dokic Source: Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition, Vol. 66, No. 2 (May, 1992), pp. 183-196 Published by: Springer Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4320304 . Accessed: 28/06/2014 17:25 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. . Springer is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded from 46.243.173.176 on Sat, 28 Jun 2014 17:25:34 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

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Page 1: On the Cognitive Significance of Indexicals

On the Cognitive Significance of IndexicalsAuthor(s): Eros Corazza and Jérôme DokicSource: Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the AnalyticTradition, Vol. 66, No. 2 (May, 1992), pp. 183-196Published by: SpringerStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4320304 .

Accessed: 28/06/2014 17:25

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

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Springer is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Philosophical Studies: AnInternational Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition.

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Page 2: On the Cognitive Significance of Indexicals

EROS CORAZZA & JISROME DOKIC

ON THE COGNITIVE SIGNIFICANCE

OF INDEXICALS*

(Received 5 August, 1991)

In this paper, we shall focus on the following points: (i) According to an orthodox, Perry-inspired,' epistemological position, the following schema is valid for indexical expressions ("I," "here," "now," "that," "she," etc.) namely:

determines classifies S: Linguistic - - - - - - - Cognitive - . Mental

Meaning Significance States

(ii) Wettstein (1986) questioned the first relation in this schema, i.e. he tried to show that linguistic meaning cannot fully determine cognitive significance (or value); (iii) it could be thought, on the basis of Perry (1988), that a slight modification of the first relation suffices to reply to Wettstein's objection; (iv) however, we shall show that this suggestion may actually threaten the second relation, between cognitive signifi- cance and mental states; (v) we propose the outline of an answer to Wettstein's concern, which fits into the original schema as a whole.

1. THE ORTHODOX SCHEMA

According to the Perry/Kaplan2 approach, indexical utterances express singular (or Russellian) propositions, i.e. structured entities in which the referents themselves enter as constituents. However, singular proposi- tions cannot exhaust the cognitive value tied to such utterances. If, for instance, Laureen says, "I am happy," and Humphrey says, addressing her, "You are happy," they both express the same proposition, because "I" and "you" are used here as co-referring terms. Of course, they express this proposition in quite different ways. Hence, it is necessary to introduce at least "ways of cognizing" singular propositions to account for the phenomenon of cognitive significance.

Philosophical Studies 66:183-196,1992. C 1992 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

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A natural way to explain the different actions available to Laureen and Humphrey, on the basis of their utterances, is to postulate different belief states. Belief states are individuated by the epistemic role they play in the logical space of reasoning. Intuitively, when Laureen and Humphrey both say, "I'm happy," they are in the same belief state, while their beliefs have different truth-conditions, which are identified by the singular propositions expressed in each case. Belief states are, then, related to singular propositions in the same way as modes of presentation are related to their objects. What, however, exactly are the identity conditions of belief states?

Perry has a substantial proposal here. The use of indexical expres- sions is governed by linguistic rules, which determine their referent in varying contexts.3 These rules have to be mastered by any competent speaker of the language. In this sense, they are the linguistic meaning of the corresponding expressions. For instance, the rule conventionally associated with "I" can be roughly stated as follows: "'I' refers to the agent who produced the utterance." In brief, Perry suggests that the identity of the belief state Laureen is in when she says, "I'm happy," is determined by her use of this sentence. Hence, two people who use the same sentence in the same way should be in the same belief state. The cognitive mode of presentation is exhausted by the linguistic rule used by the speaker to speak and think.

2. WETTSTEIN'S SKEPTICISM

Wettstein argues that linguistic meaning cannot fully determine cogni- tive significance. It is quite easy, he thinks, to construct out a case in which two tokens of the same indexical have two different cognitive values. Hence, if we consider the taxonomy of belief states determined by their cognitive significance, these tokens may involve different belief states. If, for instance, Pierre, while standing at the same spot, first assents and then dissents to the sentence "Here is fine," he may not be irrational, for he may falsely believe that he has moved.4 Hence, by Fregean standards, the two tokens of "here" do not have the same cognitive value, and the same sentence can indicate different belief states. In short, we seem to have here a case in which the same linguis-

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tic rule is involved, the same referent is designated in each case (so that the same singular proposition is expressed), but in which the cognitive significance nevertheless differs.5

We have to make a choice. Either we definitely sever linguistic meaning from cognitive significance, or we modify the links between the two notions so that Wettstein's example can be accommodated. While Wettstein will pursue the first choice, Perry will choose the second one. To put it crudely, Wettstein's position is extremely skepti- cal. Indeed, his conclusion belongs to a more general argument accord- ing to which semantics for natural languages does not have to deal with cognitive significance. However, as we shall try to show, Wettstein's conclusion is not inevitable and the fact that this is so undermines his general argument.

3. PERRY'S SOLUTION

According to Perry, Wettstein's examples motivate a distinction be- tween the proposition expressed and the proposition created by an utterance (1988: p. 7). To these propositions correspond two different notions of truth-conditions. On the one hand, the proposition expressed by an utterance corresponds to what Perry (1990) calls the "incre- mental truth-conditions" of the utterance, i.e., the state of affairs literally depicted by the utterance. The incremental truth-conditions represents "what is said" by the utterance, and does not necessarily contains the utterance itself as a constituent. On the other hand, the proposition created by an utterance corresponds to its "pure truth- conditions." Propositions created are determined by the rule that gives, in a particular context, the conditions under which a given utterance is true. Hence, utterances themselves, and not their referents, become constituents of the proposition created. A created proposition is a singular proposition as well.

Let us take an example. The linguistic meaning associated with the sentence "You are spilling coffee" can, according to Perry (1988: p. 7), be specified as follows:

An utterance u of "You are spilling coffee" by an agent a at

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a time t in circumstances C expresses singular proposition PI

if There is an individual x such that (i) a's addressing x at t is part of C; (ii) P is the singular proposition that x is spilling coffee.

Some remarks have to be made. First, the linguistic meaning can be learned independently from any particular use of the expression. This feature is represented in the specification of the linguistic meaning, where no singular reference is made to an utterance, but only an existential quantification on utterances. Second, knowing the created proposition (which is nothing other than knowing a particularization of the linguistic meaning referring to the utterance) is not sufficient in order to know the proposition expressed. As Perry often claims, every competent speaker can interpret a particular utterance of "You are spilling coffee" but, in order to understand it, he has to know the relevant contextual factors, that is, he has to be able to identify the addressee. Hence, different levels have to be distinguished:

(1) the expression (as a type) (2) the utterance of the expression (which involves a token of

(1)) (3) the linguistic meaning associated with (1) (4) the pure truth-conditions of (2) (a particularization of (3),

which corresponds to the created proposition) (5) the proposition expressed (the incremental truth-conditions)

How can all this theoretical machinery deal with Wettstein's exam- ples? Perry's solution is to base the difference of cognitive values found in Wettstein's examples in the difference between the propositions created by the utterances. For instance, the two utterances of "Here is a nice place" have slightly different pure truth-conditions. The proposi- tion created the first time contains the first utterance of the sentence as a constituent, while the proposition created the second time contains a different utterance of the same sentence as a constituent.

Let us consider Wettstein's (1986: p. 195) original example involving

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a demonstrative reference. Imagine two utterances of "He is about to be attacked," where the same individual is being referred to twice. How- ever, the speaker and the hearer do not take both tokens of "he" to be co-referential. Hence, the cognitive significances of these two utterances are distinct, while the linguistic meaning is ex hypothesi the same. Here is what Perry (1988: p. 1 1) says about this example:

The cognitive significance of the two utterances of "He is about to be attacked" would be different. Basically, to accept the first utterance as true, the linguistically competent listener has to believe that the speaker is then referring to someone who is about to be attacked. To accept the second utterance as true, the linguistically competent listener has to believe that the speaker is referring, at the second time, to such a person. Even if the speaker is referring to the same person on both occasions, neither the linguistically competent listener nor the linguistically competent speaker need to believe that she is.

In conclusion, Perry's solution to examples similar to Wettstein's is that cognitive significance, since it is not fully determined by general linguistic rules, should be partly determined by applied linguistic rules, i.e. to the pure truth-conditions associated with particular utterances. Such a solution may be considered "meta-linguistic" in the sense that a reference to a token utterance is used to explain part of the cognitive value associated with an act of reference using precisely this same utterance. In order to know the proposition created, a subject has to know which token utterance has been expressed (be careful: not just which expression as a type has been used).

4. THE INDIVIDUATION OF MENTAL STATES

As far as we can see, there are at least two problems with Perry's solution to Wettstein's puzzle. From one point of view, the notion of proposition created can be seen to be too fine-grained to deal with the possible range of cognitive values of utterances, and from another point of view, it seems too coarse-grained. Let us examine each worry in its turn.

It could be said that Perry has saved one half of the orthodox schema, for while linguistic meaning does not directly determine cogni- tive significance, it seems to do so when applied. In other words, the following relation holds:

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188 EROS CORAZZA AND JIROME DOKIC

determines S': Applied Linguistic - - Cognitive

Meaning Significance

What about the other half of the original schema (i.e. the fact that cognitive significance classifies mental states)? If applied linguistic meaning determines the cognitive significance of utterances, it should be the case that mental states are identified by pure truth-conditions, in Perry's sense. We, however, think that this is rather implausible, for this cuts belief states all too finely, as finely as the utterances themselves.6 How could such a fine-grained classification reflect the epistemic possibilities available to a rational believer? In particular, it is worth noting that this account implies than a believer can never twice manifest the same belief state when indexical utterances are involved. In this view, no utterance of the form "Here = here" is trivial, at least relative to its conditions of truth. Of course, the fact that an utterance of the form "Here = here," or of the form "He = he," may be trivial, is just the other side of Wettstein's puzzle.7

It may be objected that we are looking for triviality at the wrong place, for it could be argued that an utterance like "Here = here" is trivial if and only if our subject is disposed to put in the same mental file the information he could have received from the places he was in at the times of his two utterances of "Here."8 Mental files are cognitive particulars identified in a relational way. The relation used to identity them, in Perry's view, is still partly determined by linguistic meaning.

This objection, though, concedes that the notion of proposition created is not sufficient to deal with every variant of Wettstein-style examples. Using only the notion of proposition created, we cannot differentiate the case where an utterance like "Here = here" is trivial from the case where another utterance of the same form is informative. True, Perry would claim that cognitive significance is itself a "vectorial concept," in the sense that different aspects of mental states are classi- fied by different kinds of cognitive significance, and ultimately explain different facets of behaviour. We have no objection, at this point, to this account. We are merely convinced that there is a more economical and natural way to deal with Wettstein's puzzle, as we shall see in the next section.

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Let us now turn to our second worry concerning the notion of proposition created. This is due to the fact that the propositions created are themselves singular propositions. Thus, it is ex hypothesi possible for a subject to have two distinct epistemic attitudes toward the con- stituents of a given proposition created. What is the relevance of this to Perry's view, given his insistence that a proposition created by an utterance is no part of what it expresses?

Note that in order to put forth a counterexample to that view, it is not sufficient to find out a case where different attitudes are possible toward the same token sentence (or symbol), for a token sentence, as Perry himself is aware of, can be involved in more than one token utterance. Propositions created have token utterances, not token sen- tences, as constituents.9 Hence, an example like the following poses no trouble to Perry's view. Suppose that the same token symbol, say a post sign with the message "I'll be back in 5," has been left on a door between 2 pm and 5 pm. If a subject reads the sign once at 3 pm, and once again at 4.15 pm, and believes that the referent of "I" is different in each case, he will adopt different attitudes toward the same token symbol. If different times are involved, though, Perry would claim that different propositions are created each time the subject reads the sign.

Token utterances, unlike most token symbols, are un-repeatable events. Token symbols are objects with spatial or temporal parts. Thus, utterances are identified at least by their time of occurence. But maybe it is possible to raise a puzzle to Perry's account of cognitive signifi- cance in terms of propositions created. Imagine someone, say John, making an utterance and hearing it at the same time. Imagine, more- over, that John is a bit confused, and does not take the utterance he heard to be the utterance he made. For example, John, falsely believing himself to be silent, is thinking, and in so doing is producing the utterance "That's my copy of Situations and Attitudes." In hearing his utterance, John thinks it was produced by Jon, who. is just sitting in front of him. If this situation is feasible, then the proposition created - the only one there is in this case - does not seem to exhaust the relevant cognitive possibilities open to John.

This conclusion can be avoided if it is claimed that the proposition created is, in some sense, "cognized " by the subject. If this is the case,

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then different "ways of cognizing" the proposition created can be invoked to deal with the supposed difference in the cognitive value of John's utterance. This claim, though, is implausible in most cases. It implies that we always think (propositionally) of our own utterances when we think and talk - and it is no consolation to add that these utterances do not litterally enter the content of what is thought or said.

It seems to us that to deal with John's situation within Perry's frame- work, the cognitive relations between the subject and the propositions created by its utterances need to be at least clarified. We now turn to the more economical solution we promised above.

5. ANSWERING WETTSTEIN'S SKEPTICISM

First, there are, in fact, two different puzzles behind Wettstein's cases, at least if we accept the Kaplanian distinction between demonstratives and pure (or essential) indexicals.

As Kaplan says, a demonstrative like "this," "that," or "he" in Wettstein's example, unlike a pure or essential indexical like "I," "here" or "now," is incomplete without a demonstration, e.g. a pointing gesture. For the linguistic meaning (the character or role) is not sufficient to fix a referent in every context of use. We accept this distinction in its general form, but we claim that a demonstrative, unlike an essential indexical, has to be completed by an act of perception. Thanks to this refined distinction, we are in a position to answer Wettstein's concern with demonstratives. We can explain how a rational being can assent to:

(1) He [pointing to Humprey] is F and he [pointing once more to Humphrey] is not F

That is, we can explain how the constancy of the linguistic meaning of "He" in (1) is compatible with the different cognitive significance associated with each use of the demonstrative: Each use is based on a different perceptual act.

The shift from utterances to token perceptions is not trivial, for, we can now easily resolve Wettstein's difficulties with an extremely fine- grained classification of demonstrations:10 An utterance of "'He=he" may be trivial, in our view, if it is based on the same perceptual act.

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The point is that we can be neutral here regarding the identity condi- tions of perceptual acts. For instance, Evans' notion of keeping track (cf. 1981) is compatible with our account. That is, we can suppose that a subject is not in a relevantly different perceptual state when he is keeping track of an object in his perceptual field. According to this view, his putative demonstrative thought would be based on the same perceptual act. On the other hand, if the perceiver loses track of the relevant object, so that his utterance of "He=he" is based on two different perceptual acts, such an utterance may well be informative.

The situation is, of course, more complicated in the case of essential indexicals. First, note that Wettstein's puzzle does not arise with all such indexicals. Indeed, it arises neither in the case of "I" nor in the case of "Now." For instance, no rational being can accept a sentence like "I am F and I am not F." Actually, the relevant difference between "I" and "Here" is that the referent of "I," for a given subject, cannot change over time, while the relevant difference between "Now' and "Here" is that the referent of "Now," for a given subject, always changes over time.

Second, Perry is right to introduce some kind of "'token-reflexivity" to solve Wettstein's puzzle, at least when essential indexicals like "here" are involved. In other words, a reference has to be made to a singular proposition where the utterance enters as a constituent. However, such a reference arises only when the subject himself reflects on the relation that obtains between his utterance, made at a certain time, and the world as it was at that time. In ordinary cases, the subject takes this relation for granted, and the role of his essential indexical is determined by its linguistic meaning. When, though, the subject has any doubt about the identity of the place where he is located over time and is unable to detect any difference in the context, he can use a meta- linguistic claim that allows him to create a difference in his epistemic attitude. Hence, when a subject rationally gives his assent to (2), he implicitly manifests some token reflexivity made explicit as the second conjunct in (3):

(2) Here is F and here is not F

(3) Here [first use] is F and here [second use] is not F and the

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place where "here" [first use] occurs is different from the place where "here" [second use] occurs.11

That is, in Wettstein's case, at least when "Here" is involved, the subject reflects on the relation that obtains between his utterances and the world, whence the meta-linguistic claim in (3). This is the only way, we think, for a subject to adopt distinct attitudes toward a single place referred to twice by "Here," if the subject has no evidence for or against a change of his location.

Briefly, our differences with Perry's 1988 account are as follows: (i) We accept a reference to tokens in the semantic treatment of

demonstratives. However, we maintain that such a reference is a reference to token perceptions, and not, as Perry argues, to token utterances.

(ii) Our view dispenses with Perry's notion of the proposition created. Perry requires that an important aspect of the cognitive significance of an utterance is determined by a singular proposition, which is created by the utterance itself. According to our solution, the cognitive value of an utterance need not be identified by a singular proposition, but merely by the linguistic meaning of the utterance or of an implicit meta-linguistic claim. We suggest that a subject expresses a proposition containing the tokens of the indexicals he uses only when he faces puzzling cases, i.e. when he takes two token symbols of the same essential indexical to differ in reference. In other words, when a meta-linguistic claim accompanies the use of an essential indexical, the utterance enters as a constituent of the proposition expressed. I2

(iii) Nonetheless, such situations are unusual. Consequently, in normal cases, when the identity of the referent through different utterances is unquestioned, we merely use the linguistic meaning to express singular propositions where the utterance need not enter as a constituent. In such cases, no background meta-linguistic belief is indicated.

(iv) Like Perry, we accept the notion of a mental file, but we give a slightly different interpretation of it. Remember that the notion of a mental file is used to explain the phenomenon of continued beliefs, and in particular, how it is possible that an utterance of the form

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"Here=here" may be in some sense trivial. One common answer is that each use of "Here" is grounded on the same mental file. This however, just sounds like a redescription of the phenomenon. Indeed, a new question now arises: What determines that the two uses are grounded on the same mental file? That is, why does the subject connect the uses to the same mental file? We suppose that in order to deal with the original phenomenon in a non-regressive way, we have to introduce the notion of a meta-linguistic claim. In our view, the phenomenon of continued belief can be described by means of the notion of a chain of meta-linguistic identity statements. We do not claim that the subject explicitly envisage in thought these identity statements: What is essential is that he be disposed to accept these statements, and it is in terms of this disposition that the notion of a mental file ought to be explained.

(v) Finally, we think that our account fits, in a more direct way than Perry's, Frege's intuition that a difference in the cognitive significance of an utterance entails a difference in the cognitive content of this utterance. For example, the different cognitive values associated to the two utterances in Wettstein's puzzle must be paralleled by a difference in the way the subject represents the referents of his utterances. When indexical reference is involved, this difference in cognitive significance is represented either by an act of perception (in the case of demonstra- tives), or by a meta-linguistic claim that the subject accepts or is disposed to accept (in the case of "Here"').13

6. CONCLUSION

We have tried to show that Wettstein's puzzle does not undermine the orthodox schema, at least when complete linguistic meanings are involved. As a consequence, belief states can be individuated by means of the linguistic rules associated to expressions as types. It is true that a subject sometimes uses a meta-linguistic claim when there is room for doubt about the identity of the referent over time. However, as we have shown, this cannot be the normal case. In short, Wettstein's examples involving essential indexicals exploit an implicit presupposition on the part of the subject.

To sum up, the philosophical situation is as follows:

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vs.

The phenomenon of The phenomenon of cognitive significance cognitive significance is irrelevant to is to be accounted for semantics. (Wettstein) by semantics. (Perry)

vs.

linguistic meaning linguistic meaning determines cognitive vs. significance cognitive significance

vs.

Perry's account conservative in terms of (meta-linguistic) propositions account created

Wettstein's strategy was to argue that linguistic meaning cannot play the role of individuating cognitive significance and that the cognitive problem is, properly speaking, neither linguistic nor semantic. Perry replied by claiming that applied linguistic meaning helps to determine, contra Wettstein, the relevant feature of the cognitive significance of utterances. As we have seen, though, there are some worries with Perry's solution to Wettstein's puzzle. We have tried to show that the equation between linguistic meaning and cognitive significance can be saved, in a conservative (still Perry-inspired) manner, while dealing with Wettstein's puzzle. Finally, our tentative solution answers part of Wettstein's skepticism about the relevance of cognition to the semantics of natural languages.

NOTES

* We would like to thank Ed Mares, John Perry, Howard Wettstein and an anonymous referee of this journal for their comments on an earlier version of this paper.

Cf. 1977, 1979, 1980. Perry's current position is more complex, as we shall see in Sections 3 and 4. 2 Kaplan argues this way in "Demonstratives" (1977). 3 Perry calls these rules "roles," and Kaplan "characters." 4 We suppose, of course, that he has no or little evidence that he has stayed at the same place. 5 To be sure, Wettstein states his "puzzle" using demonstratives. However, this may be a bit misleading, for there are really two "puzzles" here, as we shall see in Section 5.

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i Note that Perry should recognize that the constituents of the propositions created can also be parts of utterances. Indeed, Wettstein's puzzle does not depend on the fact that there is two utterances, as we shall see below. We use "utterance" to mean either an utterance or a part of an utterance. For example, we shall speak, a bit improperly, of an utterance of "Here." I Wettstein claims (1986: p. 196, n. 17): "An interesting suggestion, . . ., is that there is a broader notion than 'linguistic meaning' that deserves to be called 'meaning' - for it is very much tied to public communicative conventions - and yet may capture cognitive significance. One who understands a use of a demonstrative grasps not just the linguis- tic meaning, but rather the 'meaning' of the demonstrative-cum-ostension, ostension being a rule-governed practice. This broader notion of meaning can be pressed into cognitive service. Utterances will differ in cognitive significance if there is a relevant difference in the ostendings. This proposal captures something of the spirit of Kaplan's intuition that there is a kind of incompleteness to demonstratives ... as opposed to pure indexicals . .. , an incompleteness that requires a 'demonstration', e.g. a pointing gesture.... [T[his broader notion of 'meaning' is both too coarse-grained and, at the same time too fine-grained. It is too coarse-grained because the speaker might utter the same sentence on two occasions with the same (or relevantly similar) sort of pointing gesture and still the cognitive significance of the utterances might be obviously different. It is also too fine-grained. Take a case in which 'He=he' is trivial. It won't matter that the respective gestures were a bit different, or even very different." 8 Perry introduces the notion of a file, to deal with the persistence of our beliefs, in "A Problem About Continued Belief" (1980). 9 For a similar distinction than the one between "token sentence" and "token utter- ance," cf. Perry (1990: p. 189, note 12). 10 Cf.n.7. 1 1 Some readers will perhaps object to the form of (3), arguing that the place referred to by "Here" is the place where the speaker is located, rather than the place where the token of "Here" occurs, since it is easy to figure out cases where the two places are distinct. For the sake of the argument, though, we can be neutral about the exact formulation of (3), as long as there is a reference to a particular element of the context. 12 In the case of puzzling situations, the meta-linguistic claim is an unarticulated constituent of the proposition expressed, i.e., a constituent which is not itself the content of some expression in the sentence, and which is furnished by the surrounding context of the utterance. For the introduction of the notion of unarticulated constituent, and other applications of that notion, cf. Perry (1986).

3 We think that our solution answers Wettstein's (1989) criticism of Frege's intuition.

REFERENCES

Evans, Gareth, 1981, 'Understanding Demonstratives,' in Bouveresse, J. & Parret, H. (eds.), Meaning and Understanding, Berlin: W. de Gruyter, reprinted in Evans, G.: 1985, Collected Papers, Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 291-321.

Perry, John, 1977, 'Frege on Demonstratives,' The Philosophical Review, Vol. LXXXVI, No. 4, pp. 474-97.

Perry, John, 1979, 'The Problem of The Essential Indexical,' Nous, Vol. XIII, No. 1, pp. 3-21.

Perry, John, 1980, 'A Problem About Continued Belief,' Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. LXI, No. 4, pp. 317-332.

Perry, John, 1986, 'Thought without Representation,' Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol. LX, pp. 137-151 .

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Perry, John, 1990, 'Individuals in Informational and Intentional Content,' in Villanueva, Enrique (ed.), Information, Semantics and Epistemology, Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 172-189.

Kaplan, David, 1977, 'Demonstratives,' UCLA, now in Almog, J., Perry, J. and Wettstein, H. (eds.), Themes from Kaplan, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 481-663.

Wettstein, Howard, 1986, 'Has Semantics Rested on a Mistake?,' The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. LXXXIII, No. 4, pp. 185-209.

Wettstein, Howard, 1989, 'Cognitive Significance Without Cognitive Content,' in Almog, J., Perry, J. and Wettstein, H. (eds.), Themes from Kaplan, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 421-454.

Department of Philosophy University of Geneva 1211 Geneva 4 Switzerland

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