On

Tusculanarum Disputationum

Liber I

Dividing the Body and Soul

An examination of the physics and ethicsin Cicero's Tusculans Book I,On the contempt of Death

© Steve Kennedy, 2006Dissertation for MA in Theology (Ethics, Religion, and Society)

quod prima disputatio Tusculana te confirmat sane gaudeo; neque enim ullum est perfugium aut melius aut paratius

Letters to Atticus, 15.2.1

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Table of ContentsAbstract............................................................................................................3Abbreviations...................................................................................................4

Introduction.............................................................................................................51. Style and Form in the prima disputatio..............................................................82. That Souls Remain After Death.........................................................................213. They are not miserable who lack sensation ....................................................42

I. Sensation...................................................................................................43II. Separation and Want................................................................................47

4. Conclusions on Goods and Evils........................................................................52Appendix - A reference for Cicero's Translations..............................................55Bibliography......................................................................................................56

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Abstract

This dissertation examines the oratorical form and philosophical content of Cicero's Tusculan Disputation Book I. I argue that the work differs significantly enough from Cicero's other philosophical writing to warrant a unique interpretation. The ideas are expounded with the grace of an orator, and not the slow and careful progress of a dialectical philosopher. Cicero's accustomed skepticism appears to fade into the background when he aims at certainty that our death is not to be mourned, but welcomed and enjoyed as a reprieve from the injuries and hardships of life. I unravel the Stoic and Epicurean arguments that Cicero sometimes blends into an interesting and inventive formulation. His arguments regarding immortality, sensation, and desire are carefully arranged to give a new poignant turn to the old contentious arguments. They are not reconciled, but adeptly maneuvered to reinforce each other, at the hand of a trained and expert lawyer, who aims not for an acquittal that death is an evil, but for an absolute conviction that is a positive good.

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Abbreviations

KRS - Kirk G.S., Raven J.E., Schofield M. The Presocratic Philosophers. 2nd ed.

SVF - Stoicorum vetereum fragmenta / collegit Ioannes ab Arnim (Also found in A.A. Long, D.N. Sedley, The Hellenistic philosophers. Vol.1, Translations of the principal sources with philosophical commentary)

DV - Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker : griechisch und deutsch / von Hermann Diels. Edition 6

HP - A.A. Long, D.N. Sedley, The Hellenistic philosophers. Vol.1, Translations of the principal sources with philosophical commentary (Cambridge, 1987)

Douglas, or Pohlenz - Unless otherwise noted, refering to their editions of the Tusculan Disputations Book I

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Introduction

Written with such balanced elegance, refinement, and clarity, it is a

misfortune that scholars have generally neglected the first book of the Tusculans

as a work uninspired and unoriginal. Yet a careful reading of the Tusculans Book

would prove otherwise; within this simple, yet graceful work, there is a display of

a profound knowledge of philosophical thought on the topic of the soul. In these

disputations, Cicero abandons his accustomed approach to philosophy which has

been hitherto theoretical, and here exerts himself with the full strength of his

eloquence towards ethics on a practical matter, is death an evil. His earlier

works, such as De finibus, Academica, and De Republica are largely explorative

and theoretical, yet it is these earlier works which supply him with an abundance

of material he uses here in the Tusculans as he turns to practical ethics.

I use the term practical ethics because Cicero is considering how we ought

to act. If death proves not to be an evil, then we may be free from fear, anxities

and trepidation. Until the Tusculans, Cicero's previous works in the field of

ethics have been mainly controversial in style, each proponent of the various

schools in turn defending and propounding their own view. These earlier

'dialogues' are characterized mainly by their few interchanges and marked

lengths of exposition. There is something, however, that seperates the Tusculans

from the others; Douglas is right to label them “dialogues with a difference”, but

I disagree that the difference is to be found in the imputation that Cicero shows

an “evident desire to seek reconcilliation” between the various doctrines.1 I

suggest in my first chapter that there are indications in style and form in this

dialogue that do more than simply recall Cicero's habitual forensic style, and

though it shows influence from Greek style, it is more than simply an epideidetic

speech or diatribe.2 What we have here in something unique. Cicero purports

an Academic view and confesses that at best he follows after only those ideas

which seem most probable -- but this will not accomplish his goal. A sceptic

1 Douglas, 1985, p. 16-17.2 Douglas, 1995, p. 120-5

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demolishes, but Cicero's main thesis is non modo malum non esse, sed bonum

etiam esse mortem, to show that death is no evil, and in addition to prove its

opposite. For this proof of innocence, he needs an unanimous jury. With this in

mind, the doctrines of the Stoics and of the Epicureans, like witnesses at court,

need only corroborate the question at hand, and not each other. This means that

philosophically, it is of little concern to Cicero that the two physical systems

harmonize; the fact they resound in agreement that death is free from pain is of

greatest use. In the first chapter, I argue that Tusculans Book I is not intended,

like Cicero's others, to be treated as simply a philosophical work; there is a

great amount of courtroom oratory at hand, and that a careful examination of the

preface and evidence from throughout the 'dialogue' shows that care went into

its construction as an oration and defense.

Following the preface, there is a playful repartee between the two main

interlocutors, wherein the problems and difficulties associated with existence

and predication are expounded. How can we be miserable in death if we don't

exist? (non esse) The logical difficulties are laid bare, but they are hardly

convincing; I will not seperately examine these arguments, since a discussion of

theories of existence (I have in mind the problems of Parmenides) lies outside the

scope of this dissertation. Nevertheless, they do have some connection with

Cicero's later discussion of Epicurean theories, and I will return to them in

Chapter 3.

I do not want to give the wrong impression of Tusculans I; even though it

may appear more oratory than discursive philosophy, Cicero does not intend to

persuade us by simple paradoxes, but give us positive proof that death is no evil.

It is on this account that Cicero has recourse to the complex arguments offered

by both the Stoic and the Epicurean schools of philosophy. Death is defined as

seperation of the soul and body, and like the body, the soul can either continue

to live, or else die with the body -- there is no third option. And so in pursing his

case that death is no evil, Cicero considers each position in full. I have given a

chapter to an analysis of each avenue of argument. In my second chapter, I

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argue that Cicero, although he draws heavily upon Plato and the Stoics in his

lengthy and detailed exposition on the immortality of the soul, shows

considerable inventiveness in expression and originality as a Stoic thinker. The

ethical question is momentarily placed aside when Cicero enters into a physical

discussion of the soul. Now, the Tusculans have often been subject to the same

criticism as Epicurus, that the philosophy is unintellectual, the ethical questions

were given too much emphasis, and aim at persuasion, while logic and physics

which respond to science and reason were more largely neglected.3 Indeed, the

intricacies of the physical systems for Cicero remain, like Epicurus, largely to

serve the purpose of his ethical goal: to free mankind from his fear of death. In

depth arguments of physics would only serve to hamper Cicero's virtuosity as an

orator. I argue in my second chapter that it is not the specifics of the systems,

which Cicero largely borrows, but his amalgamations that should interest us. I

unravel the synthesis of theories Cicero uses and find that he offers us a few

innovative thoughts.

In chapter 3, I continue my examination into Cicero's use of Epicurean

argument for the complete destruction of the soul. For if death is a complete

annihilation, then how are we to reproach death, when we do not even exist?

Sensation is more closely inspected by Cicero, how it ties to the soul, and how it

relates to our existence. It is clear that the Epicurean atomic system of physics

is never adopted, and so I explore some of the problems Cicero encounters when

trying to explain Epicurean theories of sensation with a Stoic materialism.

But the purpose of the Tusculans is never strays far from Cicero's mind.

He wants to convince us that not only should we not fear death, but we should

gladly embrace it when it comes, like Apollo's swans, cum cantu et voluptate

moriamur, it is the reward for all learned and good men to sing with pleasure at

their passing.

3 Long, A.A. HP, Ch. 2 in passim.

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1. Style and Form in the prima disputatio

An examination of the style and arrangment of the Tusculans will show

that there is a marked difference from Cicero's previous philosophical works

which sets it apart, and with this paired with a closer examination of the

concepts set therein, we may discover that in this prima disputatio, Cicero

accomplished something decidedly different in his Tusculans. Firstly, Douglas

has, I think rightly, claimed that this book is a "dialogue with a difference,"4

although does not expand what he means by the phrase. But to classify this

difference as forensic is unjustified Douglas argues, and for three main reasons:

we are not justified by the presence of forensic vocabularly, which heavily

pervades the rest of Cicero's writtings; further, such style is found among his

other philosophical works and which renders it in no way unique to the

Tusculans; lastly, there is a poetical element lying in the language which places

the dialogue squarely outside the courtroom. But, in contrast, the tone of the

work is dissimilar to earlier philosophical dialogues, since it is not written with a

similar dialectical style which characterize Cicero's other philosophical writings.

In those, arguments on a given subject are paraded and contrasted in otio5 at a

Roman villa, each presented by a speaker from a different and opposing sect of

philosopy for the purpose both of erudition and enjoyment. But we find a

different arrangement in the Tusculans I. The introduction of the topic is unique,

the presentation of arguments is not in keeping with Cicero's Academic leanings,

there is more oratory and persuasion than there are solid grounds of reasoning.

I think there is ample evidence to show that the Tusculans more clearly fit into

the genre of an oration than of a philosophical work.

Tusculans Book I can quite clearly be arranged into four distinct parts, and

it seems best to discuss these each in turn. The preface and introduction to the

work, running from 1.1-8, has a great deal to tell us; the exordium, which

contains a brief 'brachologia' or rapid interchange of interlocutors, runs from

4 Douglas, p. 16.5 It should be recalled that sxolh/, schola, where we get the word school, is Greek for leisure,

Latin otium.

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1.9-17, both reveals the thesis of the work, and sets the context of the remainder

of the dialogue. The narratio, narration or continuous speech, follows from 1.18-

111, which contains all the major arguments Cicero wishes to present in the

case, which are arranged in a two fold manner. From 1.112-119, an assortment

of myths (fabella) are enumerated to further persuade before Cicero makes his

final conclusions.

Attached to the beginning of most books in Cicero's philosophical works

are prefaces, and the Tusculans are no different. The preface is formulaic, and

repeats a number of ideas that are often found elsewhere in his corpus.6 For

example, there is the usual defense of Roman talents against those of the Greeks,

Roman poetry is praised, music, and so forth; however, in the case of Book I,

Cicero's main aim of this preface is to examine the role of eloquence in

philosophy, the topic of which immediately distinguishes it from the other

prefaces in the Tusculans, whose purpose is limited generally to the praise of

philosophy itself.7 Cicero complains that Roman philosophers have fine

sentiments, but are unable to adorn them with fine words or clarify their

thoughts or attract readers. Cicero intends to obviate this error, which he finds

to be one of the most wide spread in Roman philosophy.8 This already is an early

indication in the preface that Cicero intends to use the full force of his eloquence

in expounding his philosophical views. Indeed, there are a few times, as I

indicate later, that often the philosophy in the Tusculans gives way to the

oratory. There is a difficulty in combining philosophy with a great deal of

eloquence, and this is a problem that has often been taken up in Plato's writing.

The oratory that Cicero uses quickly finds demonstration in his exordium; the

syllogistic reasoning, and fine phrases do not seem to convince, haec enim

spinosiora, prius ut confitear me cogunt quam ut adsentiar -- Cicero's friend

complains that he is compelled to admit the defeat, although he remains

unconvinced of the conclusions. We find his often in Plato, for example in

6 Cf. Letters, Cicero had a stock of prefaces which he chose from, and he admits in his letters that he had once attached the same preface twice.

7 For example, cf, 2.5, 2.13.8 1.6

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Hippias Minor, 369b-c, where Hippias counts each successive step as true, but

cannot abide the conclusion; again in the Laws, 903, Hipparchus, 232b,

famously in the Ion 533c, where Ion finds himself in a spot where he is still

unconvinced, but is unable to offer any conclusive counter arguments; the

thought recurs again in Plato's Republic, 487c, where dialectic is compared to a

game of draughts. Mouths are stopped up with words, says Plato; even still, the

words may compel assent, but they surely do not affect the truth of the matter.

Cicero is fully concious of this as he begins his little book 'On the Soul'. How,

then, does he combine his oratory and his philosophy, so that he may offer

persuasive as well as conclusive arguments?

He declares to follow two notable Greeks and use them as a model for his

own venture to join philosophy to oratory; Cicero cites Aristotle and Isocrates,

each representive of the contending Greek schools of philosophy and rhetoric,9

and we should be aware of the meaning of this. The extent of the rivalry

between the Aristotle and Isocrates10 cannot be precisely known; but there

certainly was a standing battle between philosophy and rhetoric as to who had

the proper right to argue on general topics.11 Here, Cicero claims explicitly that

philosophy is the the greater and wider science (arte), and oratory stands

second.12 Aristotle, Cicero says, impelled by renown of Isocrates, began to join

philosophy with eloquence, and to teach his students to speak well.13 The fact

that Cicero mentions Isocrates is telling for a number of reasons. Isocrates began

his career as a logographer, a speech writer for the courtooms of Athens, and of

whose speeches more than 60 were available in Roman times, and Cicero must

have been aware of them. The Isocratean school, and the Greek schools similar

9 Cicero calls Isocrates a rhetor, not an orator, but it seems from Cicero's view, the terms were practically interchangable.

10Or even that between Plato and Isocrates. 11For the Roman perspective, cf. Brutus, 48. De Ora. 1.52. On the other hand, cf, Tusc, 2.9

where Cicero seperates the practice of rhetoric in the mornings, and philosophy in the afternoons.

12Cicero first voices this idea in Ora. 158. 13Aristotle's works on rhetoric are well known, but I do not here go on to examine the extent of

the influence they had on Cicero. Cf. Brutus 46-48, where Cicero uses Aristotle mostly as a historical source. Also Cf. Cooper, “Rhetoric, Dialectic, and the Passions”, p. 175-198

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to it, would have sessions to practice the art of declamation, the dominant form

being controversia of legal matters, (scholastica in Greek). However, the term

could also be applied to prepared discourses by philosophers.14 The practice of

declamation in the time of Isocrates had become very artifical, and on this

account had often been railed against.15 Moreover, it was held in very little

esteem by Romans, who were generally dismissive of these pedantic and

contentious philosophical debates.

Nonetheless, as Douglas rightly points out, in Rome during Cicero's time,

the practice of declamation was still held in high repute, and considered a

serious pursuit for the improvement of public speaking.16 But how closely did

Cicero want to be attached to the Greek manner? One piece of evidence that

could be cited to show that Cicero styled Book I as an epideictic speech in the

Greek fashion would be 1.7, ut iam etiam scholas Graecorum more habere

auderemus, where Cicero claims that he even dared to hold a school in the Greek

fashion. However, rarely does Cicero use audere (to be bold) with the harmless

meaning of simply 'to venture', as Douglas translates it,17 but rather more with a

sense of heedlessness or unrestraint. In fact, Cicero is particularly fond of using

it of philosophers who hold outlandish positions.18 It appears more likely that by

this phrase Cicero wishes to distance himself from the scene of a schola. His

eagerness for philosophy carried him away far enough to dare to hold a schola.

But what really is this schola? Cicero uses it in a variety of senses: it may mean

a disputation over a thesis; sometimes in a manner like Aristotle's dialectics,

arguing on both sides; also, in the manner of Carneades, who argues against

every thesis.19 It seems to be an all encompassing term, and I do not find it

convincing that its use by Cicero offers us any definite understanding on how it

should be interpreted, nor is there any indication that it may not be more than a

14Cf, Tusc, 1.113, iudicia solent in scholis proferre de morte. Also Douglas, p. 93, 94.15For example the famous attacks by Plato. Cf. Petronius Satires 1.2, Seneca, Contra. 3.12,

Martial, 6.19. 16Douglas, p. 93. Bonner, p. 1-2. Glucker, p. 161. 17Though I think he attempts to convey the meaning by single quoting 'schools'.18Cf, for example, De fin. 5, 28, 84; de Or. 3. 24, 94, 126.19Cf, Graver, p. xxxiii, n. 16 and n. 17.

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literary term.20 Contrarily, Cicero wishes minimize the view that he is seriously

following the Greek style; and this is very clear from his claim that he is trying

to bring Greek philosophy to a sterner Roman audience, less accepting of Greek

culture. Cicero seems to be conscious of a general suspicion of these Greek

schools, and does not want to appear to embrace them fully. In 1.8, he again

seems dismissive of the idea and appends scholas, ut Graeci appellant, schools as

the Greeks call them, almost apolgetically for the use of the term. We have later

in the Tusculans II, a description of the philosophers (or those who profess

themselves philosophers), qui iam conticuerunt paene ab ipso foro inrisi, who are

almost laughed out of the Roman forum. It is not then surprising to see that

Cicero wishes to give his philosophical endeavours as much an air of Roman

seriousness as possible when he imbues philosophy with Latin style. Of course,

there is the less suggestive phrase, at the conclusion of the Tusculans, where

Cicero writes, num igitur etiam rhetorum epilogum desideramus?, surely we

don't want to hear an epilogue like those of the rhetoricians (of the scholae)?

Cicero goes on to give the epilogue anyway; but by claiming first that nobody

wants hear it, we see another indication that Cicero is trying to play down the

similarities that this work has to the Greek schools.

To return to Isocrates, there are two main ideas from Isocrates' oratorical

school which can be readily identifiable and which are carried over into Cicero's

approach to philosophy in Book I. First, Iscorates' strength lied in his application

of language to practical problems, specifically in cases where the absolute truth

could not be obtained.21 We can see Isocrates exert his influence on Cicero here

in the Tusculans; the practical problem underlying Book I is the theme of death

where the absolute truth of any position cannot ultimately be proved, and Cicero

approaches this problem with rhetoric first, philosophy second. The Academic

scepticism in Cicero makes him hesitant to assert with conviction anything which

cannot be proved true, and there are many instances in the Tusculans where

Cicero admits that the best he can do is closely approximate the truth (veri

20Cf, Douglas, 1995, where he tries to define more closely the meaning of the term; Graver seems to agree, but I remain unconvinced it is ever used in a thoroughly serious manner.

21Cf. Bryant. 1969.

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simile). But Cicero is aiming at certainty on the practical problem: the questions

of physics cannot be empirically proved, but we may know for certain that death

is no evil. Second, it was a strongly held view of Isocrates that an orator should

have a wide liberal education in the arts, particularly in philosophy. Isocrates

would join philosophy to rhetoric and it was the latter view which would prevail

among the Romans. Cicero admits that the Romans at first embraced an orator

adept at speaking, and only later did they begin to esteem a speaker who was

also learned.22 It is then in the preface that we find some early hints from Cicero

that we should not expect a purely philosophical treatise as much as we should

enjoy an oration. Theoretical philosophy is to determine what is, while practical

philosophy is to understand what ought to be. The physical theories that Cicero

expounds in this book could be doubted, but the absolute truth of practical

question he argues can be found. Therefore, Cicero handles the question in the

manner of Iscorates; for he is a much better lawyer and defendent of a case who

remains a whole hearted orator making the strongest argument than he who, like

a Socratic philosopher, is left questioning his own arguments.

On the other hand, after the scathing attacks by Plato, sophists like

Isocrates were considered illegitimate philosophers and tricksters. And so to

avoid this accusation, Cicero here sets out the method he proposes to use: the

Socratic method. It is important to notice that Cicero is very careful to define

what he considers to be the Socratic method: it is the method of examining

another's opinion on a topic to discover what most resembles the truth.23

However, we should not always take what Cicero says of his own work

completely at face value. This statement of the Socratic method is almost a

platitude in Cicero,24 others abound in his other writings which are almost

identical to the one found there. However, the formulation of the method found

22Tusc, 1.5, At contra oratorem celeriter complexi sumus, nec eum primo eruditum, aptum tamen ad dicendum, post autem eruditum. Cf. Cic.Tusc. 1.2 honos alit artes and Plato, Republic 8.551a

23Tusc, 1.8 vetus et Socratica ratio contra alterius opinionem disserendi. nam ita facillime, quid veri simillimum esset, inveniri posse Socrates arbitrabatur.

24Cf, for example, at ND, 2.11, Acad. 1.4., etc.

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in the Tusculans (both here and in 5.11) has a small, but I think important

difference. Cicero writes in other places in his philosophical works that the

Socratic method is, ratio contra omnia disserendi nullamque rem aperte

iudicandi25, and dubitanter de omnibus rebus.26 In these phrases, Cicero wishes

to stress that there always remains a state of doubt about the question at hand

and that nothing is ever wholly revealed as true. The difference between these

and the method described in the Tusculans is that the Socratic method is

stressed, but not the Socratic conclusion. There is no reference to a state of

aporia. Cicero wishes to make a solid conclusion when it comes to the ethical

question. The Socratic method for Cicero, and its use in the Tusculans, is the

method by which various opinions are analyzed so that the true may more easily

appear. What these opinions are appear later when Cicero begins to discuss the

various philosophies of the Stoics and Epicureans. The individual philosophies

are never scrutinized in and of themselves, nor are they compared -- and that is

because they are used as pieces of evidence that death is no evil. The Stoic

theories are brought forth; if they are neither convincing, nor pleasing, they are

abandoned and there is return to the inital question -- very similar to the Socratic

method.27 The question is then examined a second time, except now Epicurean

philosophy is employed to answer it. The important difference though in Cicero's

use of the Socratic method, is that we are always lead to the same answer.

There is more evidence that Cicero does wish to make a positive

statement in the Tusculans I in a passing comment he makes regarding Socrates

at his trial in the Apology. He claims that Socrates in fact knew that death was

no evil, even though he maintained his common position that he knows nothing

as certain.28 Socrates might not have known for sure whether he would live on

after death, or be wholly extinguished, but he was convinced of the truth that it

would be no evil. This is the same conviction that Cicero wishes to evoke. For

an oration that is designed to persuade and convince, it would be impossible to

25Cicero, ND, 2.11.26Cicero, Acad, 1.4.27Consider the methodology used by Socrates in the Laches in passim.28Tusc, 1.99, quod praeter deos negat scire quemquam, id scit ipse

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complete its objective if we are left in a state of doubt. Moderation is of course

another meaning that Cicero intends when he uses the phrase Socratic. There is

little modesty in poor writers; phrases like intemperanter, temperavert, (1.2, 6,

etc.) show that Cicero favoured a cautious and restrained approach to

philosophy, like that of Socrates. On the other hand, Cicero has no difficulty in

giving us positive asssertions, like in 1.55, ego vero facile sim passus ne in

mentem quidem mihi aliquid contra venire, I could not allow any contrary thing

even to enter my mind. There is a formal pretense to the Socratic method, but

when we examine the actual contents of the book, we find very little 'question-

and-answer' dialectical method used. We should not, therefore, think that Cicero

holds such sceptical views on the soul as he professes.29

Following the preface, there is a brief dialogue between the two unnamed

speakers. Lack of names is a characteristic of the 'schola', and this is what

differs from the other philosophical dialogues, and what immediately strikes us.

In his other philosophical works, names play an important role, and the speakers

have names of well-respected Roman citizens. This is done to instil some respect

into the dialogue, since in Cicero's time philosophy, particularly philosophy

which distracted from political or public business, was considered an idle trifle.30

In Cicero's De Natura Deorum, a work that comes after the Tusculans, the

sceptic view, which had some harsh criticisms for typical Roman religious

practices, was given to Cotta, at the time pontiff, and soon (at least in terms of

the setting of the dialogue) to be consul. His influence and authority endowed

the arguments with some respectibility. But there are no names given to the

speakers in the Tusculans; manuscripts mark them only as 'A' and 'M', and there

are some conjectures about the meanings. A for adulscens, M perhaps for

Marcus (Cicero) or magister (teacher). It is unlikely that M could stand for

Cicero himself, since he never places himself in any speaking capacity, except for

a few short phrases here and there.31 It does seem wise that Cicero would

29Tusc, 1.17. Cf, Douglas, p. 96, n. 17. Cicero speaks here as a neo-Academic, but his actions differ from his words. I think Douglas is wrong to connect this passage here with the phyical epistemology of the Stoics.

30Levine, p. 148-9.31Cf, Cicero, ND, 3, conclusion where Cicero gives his approbation of the Stoic Balbus.

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exlude his own name from Tusculans Book I, because it does criticize Roman

funeral rituals and rights, and attacks Roman myths of the underworld and

afterlife. But it is never made clear why no names are given.

The brief dialogue that does occur stands noticably apart from the rest of

the work. I find similarity between it and the first book of Plato's Republic, and

Cicero may have had this in mind. 'A' tries to convince us that death is an evil;

there is a brief span of questions and answers as 'M' tries to demolish the

argument by using paradoxes of predication to something which doesn't exist

(non esse). We cannot be miserable, 'M' argues, because when we die, we no

longer are. 'A' rightly complains that he is not convinced and urges 'M' to leave

behind the questions and answers to give a lengthy oration. Again, we find

similarities to Plato's Republic. After Socrates deflates Thrasymachus and his

argument, he is urged himself to give a positive statement of what Justice is. In

the dialogue of the Tusculans, the speaker poses the question to himself. The

parallel is even more noticable when Cicero playfully writes, quid, si te rogavero

aliquid, nonne respondebis? -- what, will you not respond if I ask something?,

clearly mimicing the diffidence that Socrates felt in the Republic when he was

asked to abandon his accustomed method of inquiry; and like Socrates in the

Republic, the speaker in the Tusculans goes on to give a lengthy speech asking

very few questions.

Cicero himself calls his first book of the Tusculans both a declamatio and

an oratio.32 This certainly is not strange because the majority of the work is a

continuous speech. I think it is clear that Cicero himself saw the Tusculans I as

more of a court case than a philosophical dialogue. He writes at Tusc, 1.7, in the

preface, that ut enim antea declamitabam causas, sic haec mihi nunc senilis est

declamatio33, he will declaim in the style he is used to (that is, in the style of a

court or forum). There is even a stronger evidence for this at 1.11; 'M' is

surprised: surely, we do not believe that there is an infernal region where our

souls are racked with tortures, for not even an old woman would believe that.

32Tusc, 1.5, 1.7, 1.16, 1.60, 1.73, 1.108, and 1.112.33Tusc, 1.7.

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He smiles, how eloquent he could be against such a case; who couldn't? quia

disertus esse possem, si contra ista dicerem. quis enim non in eius modi causa?

'Causa' is the formal Roman term for a courtroom case, declamo causam the

technical term, as it were, for pleading at the bar. These are more than just

passing comments. They are self-referential in a sense, Cicero knew that even in

his philosophical works there was an advocate making the case.

Another interesting aspect of the Tusculans I is the manner in which Cicero

cites authority. The character references are most numerous here in the

Tusculans I. In his later De Natura Deorum, Cicero reprimands the

Pythagoreans for being too eager to refer questions to an authority, sine ratione

valeret auctoritas, Pythagorus' authority was weighty, even without reason.34

Cicero may be guilty of some of the faults he accuses in others. Plato, for

example, is a number of times invested with almost unquestionable authority by

'M'. At, 1.55, any philosopher who disagrees with Plato is at best mediocre;35

and more explicity, at 1.49, when it is said that, even without any reason given,

Plato's authority is great enough to overpower his best reasons.36 There is a

whole passage translated by Cicero from Plato's Phaedro in the main section of

the narration,37 certainly another gross indication of the amount of influence

Plato had upon this work of Cicero. Philosophers are almost brought in as

witnesses to a stand. There is no lack of proper argument on Cicero's side,

however, a number of points are passed by with a simple appeal to authority:

Socrates authority is relied upon to confirm the very case Cicero tries to prove.38

Unlike his other dialogues, Cicero is pleading a one sided case, and appeal to

authority takes on whole new meaning. In his other works, the appeal to

authority is used more as a citation; but in the Tusculans, Plato is more than just

34Cicero, ND, 1.10. Also, non enim tam auctoritatis in disputando quam rationis momenta quaerenda sunt.

35Tusc, 1.55, plebei philosophi —sic enim ii, qui a Platone et Socrate et ab ea familia dissident, appellandi videntur

36Tusc, 1.49, ut enim rationem Plato nullam adferret —vide, quid homini tribuam —, ipsa auctoritate me frangeret

37See Appendix.38Tusc, 1.116, his et talibus auctoribus usi confirmant causam.

17

cited, his name is also meant to be an argument.

Cicero makes a great effort to present us with the widest and fullest range

of arguments he can find. But like any great lawyer, Cicero passes over a

number of areas.39 The narration contains a lengthy discussion of the soul both

from Stoic and Epicurean viewpoints. He concludes that death is not an evil:

either our soul is immortal and we rise to the aether and live with the gods, or

else our soul is completely destroyed and we cease to exist. It may seem strange

then that Cicero never talks about the gods at all; the purpose of his conclusion

of course is to free man from his fear of death. This 'therapy' that Cicero offers

his fellow man is extremely similar to the famous expression Epicurus uses in

expressing the purpose of his own examination into theology, “to free men from

their superstitions." The gods -- at least in the Tusculans I -- are not described at

all, but are simply located in the aetherial world. If our souls our immortal, we

will join them, but on the whole Cicero remains silent about the whereabouts, or

even existence of the gods. Why is such an important discussion of the gods

missing? I think it would serve well to recall how Cicero handles a similar

problem when writes in De Natura Deorum, 3.19,

Itaque maximae res tacitae praeterierunt, de divinatione, de fato, quibus

de quaestionibus tu quidem strictim, nostri autem multa solent dicere,

sed ab hac ea quaestione, quae nunc in manibus est, separantur

And so matters of the highest importance will pass by in silence, matters

of fate, of divination, questions on which you briefly speak, though on

which we are accustomed to speak at length; but for the moment they are

not apart of the question at hand.

Of course, Cicero also produced works by the name of de divinatione and

de fato, and it is clear from this passage he intended them to be used as

39Cf, Tusc, 1.6, and Cicero's omission of any direct reference to Lucretius. See with Douglas, p. 92, André, 'Cicéron etc Lucrèce: loi de silence et allusions polémiques.' Mélanges Boyancé (Rome, 1974), p. 21-38.

18

supplemental works to his work on the gods. The question at hand in the

Tusculans is about the soul; a disgression would be lengthy and distract from the

question at hand, and so Cicero left out the discussion of the gods for another

work entirely to be used as complimentary to the Tusculans.

But there is an interesting point to make on those few occurences of god in

the Tusculans. Twice Cicero claims that gods in the infernal regions are mere

inventions of false reasoning, exacerbated by bad poets: we can detect some

influence by Plato. Like in the Republic, Cicero also agrues that the concept of

an evil or hurtful god is a false idea, which he attributes to poets. Poetic ability

(like in Plato's Ion) for Cicero is a divine ability, but it does not spare us or our

reason from making errors. Poets are not given as harsh a treatment at the

hands of Cicero as they do at Plato's, but their 'fictions' are reviled as meddling

and hurtful to mankind. Nonetheless, Plato could not forebear quoting Homer,

and Cicero quotes frequently Euripides, Ennius, and other poets in an approving

manner.

It may also be helpful to recall that Cicero's courtroom speeches were

revised to be read in a literary manner. What we have received is certainly

nothing like what would have been delivered in person. It would be interesting

to find out how much of the 'defense of poetry' found in his Pro Archia would

have been delivered in the courtroom, how much of it appended afterwards. For

just as much as Cicero's forensic speeches were inbued with a literary turn, so

too may his philosophical arguments be colored with a forensic style. It is clear

that just as in a courtroom with a defendent on trial, Cicero wants the outcome

of this trial to be judged by the facts.40 The language in his closing remarks is

strikingly similar to the close remarks of a barrister, their presence here in the

Tusculans should encourage it to be viewed as a forensic speech.

40Tusc, 1.116.

19

Douglas argues to place the Tusculans outside the genre of the forensic

style, but I have argued that Cicero refers to the Tusculan several time as a

oration or declamation; the presence of forensic terms is more than

metaphorical or common place, and often times self-referentual. I'm not

convinced that the appellation of schola is enough to set it apart as its own style,

for there indications that Cicero was not completely comfortable using the term.

The Tusculans demonstrate a stronger mixture between the two genres of

forensic and philosophical style than any other work by Cicero.

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2. That Souls Remain After Death

The first book of the Tusculans is often called "On the Contempt of Death";

this reflects the ethical significance of the discussion at hand. The Tusculans in

general were written with a general theme of consolation. Cicero, in these five

books aims through philosophy to remove the fear and grief from the lives of

men. The aim, then, of first book is to remove our fear of death. Yet, in the

course of the discussion, the ethical question seems to give way to metaphysics,

and so the majority of this rather lengthy book focuses directly on the soul itself.

We would, then, be not far off calling it simply, "On the Soul." In the Tusculans I,

Cicero attempts to answer a practical ethical question: "ought we to fear death",

by first attempting to answer a physical question, "is the soul immortal." But

even before this, he finds he needs to discover "what the soul is." These

questions certainly are not new to philosophical discussion. Following the usual

methodology of a trained Academic, Cicero borrows answers from other schools

which, to Cicero's mind, are most likely to approximate to the truth. A

smattering of views from other philosophical schools is presented. Perhaps most

interestingly, these views do not necessarily oppose each other in answering

Cicero's question. In his other works, theories were presented, opposed, and

criticised in turn, and each was judged how close to the truth they could come on

a philosophical topic. He does not intend to reconcile them now; rather he

employs the arguments of each school not in contradictory mode, but rather

complimentary in order to provide man a formidable bulwark of reasoned

arguments why he should not fear death.41

My analysis will follow the same division that Cicero himself makes when

he discusses the soul. Cicero's discussion of the various schools of philosophy

leads him to two conclusions which I will now scrutinize: firstly, that the soul is

immortal, eternal, continues to live on after death, without pain, or fear, in a

41Douglas, 96, n. 19, writes "[Cicero's] aim is so to classify opinions as to emphasize the measure of agreement, at least in their logical consequences."

21

peaceful afterlife; secondly, that the soul is wholly extinguished along with the

body upon death, nothing remaining, and by its complete dissolution we are free

from any pain or fear. For Cicero, these two responses are an either/or, there is

no third option.42 These are the only two eventualities for our soul when we die,

and from this Cicero tries to convince us that either outcome will force us to

accept the conclusion that death is not an evil.43 Accordingly, in this chapter I

will first examine the metaphysical arguments Cicero arrays, and then secondly

their significance on the ethical question.

In order to answer the question "what the soul is", Cicero surveys a wide

variety of philosophical schools, from the reputable and well-known, to the less

credible and renowned. A plenitude of names is paraded; strangely however,

and quite surprisingly, in this arrangement and list of philosophers the foremost

influences and figureheads of the schools are passed over. Some of those from

the major schools are never mentioned by name: of the Academic school

Carneades is not mentioned (whom Cicero mentions frequently elsewhere in the

Tusculans44); of the Stoic school Posidonius is never once mentioned (who, it is

quiet probable, bore influence on the Tusculans45). Zeno is mentioned once,

appearing early but only as a brief authority that the Stoics conceived the soul

fire;46 Chrysippus too is mentioned once in passing, near the end, and almost

slightingly as a story teller.47 Finally Panaetius, mentioned by name twice, once

as an authority stating that the Stoic school contrived the soul a fiery pneuma,

and second, scornfully when Cicero reproves his views that soul procreates

soul.48 Epicurus is mentioned only once, and merely in connection to Democritus

and atomic physics.49 There are, however, plentiful references to Socrates, Plato

and Aristotle, who, in Book I of the Tusculans, are the most referenced

42Tusc, 1.81.43Tusc, 1.23. quaecumque vera sit earum sententiarum quas eui, mors aut malum non sit aut sit

bonum potius44Tusc 3.54, 59; 4.53; 5.11, 83, 87, 88, 120.45Long, p. 255. See also Edelstein and Laffranque.46Tusc, 1.19. 47Tusc, 1.108.48Tusc 1.42, and Tusc, 1. 79, 81. 49Tusc, 1.82.

22

authorities.50 Cicero himself admits that he has a stronger inclination to the

philosophical theories of the older generation of philosophers, such as Plato and

Socrates, than he does to the more recent thinkers.51 He appeals to Socrates

more frequently here than any other work, excepting Book III of De Oratore;

Plato is mentioned by name here more often than anywhere else in Cicero's

writing.52 From this we can say that it should not be surprising to find much that

is Platonic in character in this book.53

Cicero begins his continues speech with a doxography of the varying views

of the different schools. He sketches the physical systems of a wide selection of

philosophers in rapid succession, but he cannot call them anything but opinions.

How, then, are we to respond to the proposition that death is not an evil, if we

cannot understand what the soul is. This causes Cicero to alter the course of his

argument. What is death? He defines it as a separation of the soul from the

body,54 defined later more specifically as the separation of 'ourselves' from our

body.55 In any case, whether there is a 'split', a 'separation' or 'disentanglement',

Cicero does not identify the body with 'us', rather that it is the soul which is 'us'.

If we were nothing more than our body, then it is obvious to see that once our

body dies and with it the whole faculty of sensation, then we too are extinguished

and have no need to fear death.56 Contrary to this Epicurean view, the Stoics

50Plato is referred to by name sixteen times, Aristotle, eighteen, Socrates, ten. Aristotle at Tusc 1.2,7,13,19,22, 24,27,40,41,46,51,65,66,70,80,94,115,116. Plato at Tusc, 1.20,22,24,39,40, 53,55,57,58,63,69,70,79,84,97. Socrates Tusc 1.7,8,53,55,57,71,74,97,100,102.

51Cf, Tusc, 1.26. uti optimis possumus, quod in omnibus causis et debet et solet valere plurimum, et primum quidem omni antiquitate, quae quo propius aberat ab ortu et divina progenie, hoc melius ea fortasse quae erant vera cernebant. See also, Valente, Intro, XIII, a full discussion of Cicero's sources; however, my hopes were dashed when I found he passed over Book I in his examination of the Tusculans.

52 I have tabulated the numbers, but do not include them here for sake of space. Plato is mentioned here more often than even in De Off, 1, which is fifty chapters longer than Tuscs. 1. Whole passages are lifted by Cicero from Plato's works and transplanted into the Tusculans, see for example, Appendix.

53Cf, also Douglas, p. 110-111, n.57 for a brief discussion of Cicero's "respect" for Platonic authority.

54Tusc, 1.18. discessum animi a corpore putent esse mortem. Chrysippus, SVF 2.790. 2.604. 55Tusc, 1.75. secernere autem a corpore animum nec quicquam aliud est mori discere. quare

hoc commentemur, mihi crede, disiungamusque nos a corporibus, id est consuescamus mori.56Cf. Epicurus, K.D., ii. Ep. Hdt., 65 and 81. Also Luc. De Re.Nat. 3.830-51. Long, 1974, p. 52.

Compare this to Cic, ND. 3.29. Cotta attributes the argument to Carneades, who says cumque omne animal patibilem naturam habeat, nullum est eorum, quod effugiat accipiendi aliquid

23

connected the faculty of sensation to the heat of the soul; the body was a vehicle

through which the soul received and acknowledged sensation, but it was never

affected itself, in which case, it was eternal. This immediately divides the

question into two divisions, either that the soul has physical form, and so is

extirpated with the body, or that it is without form, and lives beyond death. And

so with the divide firmly created, Cicero broaches both halves in turn.

His first task is to prove the existence of the soul, and he does this by an

appeal to authority, conservative tradition and man's own 'nature'. Certainly it

was not an uncommon practice in ancient philosophy to appeal to the customs

and traditions of one's forefathers. Cicero cites Ennius, (as many Greeks would

Homer), and claims that traditional customs such as the pontifical rites and

funeral rituals are evidence that men believed that the soul lived on after death.57

He argues that the universal (or near universal) account of mankind attending to

their dead is proof of a life after death. The appeal to the sentiments of mankind

(the consensio omnium) is identical to the Stoic line of argument in De Natura

Deorum, wherein the Stoic Balbus argues for the existence of the gods because

of a universal agreement by mankind for their existence.58 What kind of

argument is this though? Surely, we could agree and be persuaded to believe in

life after death, but could not on that account hold it as incontrovertibly true.59

There is a great difference between inquiring into the truth of the existence of

the soul, and whether there are men who think it true. Nonetheless, Cicero

employs the argument here with vivacity and eloquence, calling it the most

secure argument he can find -- why? because he claims it is an argument of

natural law.

extrinsecus, id est quasi ferendi et patiendi, necessitatem et si omne animal tale est, inmortale nullum est.

57Our evidence for the earliest Roman beliefs is slight. Douglas, p. 99, n. 27. See Toynbee. For example, libations to appease the gods, and custom of placing coins on the eyes of the dead to pay Charon.

58Cic, ND, 2. 4. adsensu omnium dicere Ennius "aspice hoc sublime candens, quem invocant omnes Iovem, etc; it is interesting to find that the Stoic Balbus too employs Ennius as an authority.

59Cic, ND. 3.17. sed non id quaeritur, sintne aliqui, qui deos esse putent: di utrum sint necne sint, quaeritur

24

Cicero maintains that there is no race so savage or barbaric that it does not

have a concept of gods.60 This recalls the Epicurean argument that every man is

capable of 'grasping' by the intellect the concept of the gods.61 Epicurus argued

that man came to believe in gods because they receive 'impressions' of the gods,

both while awake and when asleep.62 These 'impressions', like all other

sensations, must come from something with objective reality through their

atomic 'confluences' or 'effluences' which are received into the mind.63 In a

similar manner, Cicero argues that just as man does not arrive at his concept of

the gods because of laws or customs, neither does man come to his belief in the

afterlife because of laws or customs.64 Instead, there is an 'immediate

apprehension by the mind'65 of the soul (a self-recognition) which gives rise to its

concern for an afterlife. Cicero also writes that as we come to know God, though

we perhaps remain ignorant of his place or form, in the same way we know of the

existence of soul.66 Nevertheless, it is more than simply a preconception that

man receives as it seems nature herself leads man to discover a soul.67 What the

exact definition of this nature is remains unclear. We may have here a blend of

60Tusc, 1.30, nulla gens tam fera, nemo omnium tam sit inmanis, cuius mentem non imbuerit deorum opinio, Cf. Long, 1967, p.59-90.

61Velleius in Cic, De. Nat. Deo. 1.43. Quae est ennim gens aut quod genus hominum, quod non habeat sine doctrina anticipationem quandam deorum, quam appellat prolhpsi/n Epicurus. Cf. Polhenz, p. 60, n. 30., "wird dort diese Beweisführung als Gemeingut der Philosophen bezeichnet." See also Long,1974 p. 14-69; Rist, p. 2-10; Long, 1971, p. 114-33; Kerferd, 1971, p. 80-96.

62Tusc, 1.29, iisque maxime nocturnis, ut vide rentur ei, qui vita excesserant, vivere. Cf. Luc. De Re Nat. 4.794-806, and 976-7, in somnis animos hominum frustrata tenere etc.

63Cic. De. Nat. Deo, 1.45-46. Epi. Ep. Men, 123-4. Luc. 5.1175-82. Long, 1974, p. 45-46.64The argument itself is not very convincing, indeed few people would find it so; nontheless,

Cicero employs it here multiple times. Long complains that Epicurus offered few adequate arguments in favour of 'divine images', citing De Nat. Deo, 1.43-55. Long, 1974, p. 25. Cf, also Douglas, p, 101-102, n.30. Cf. Tusc, 1.35, and 1.36, ut deos esse natura opinamur; and sic permanere animos arbitramur consensu nationum omnium.

65Cf, Sex. Emp, Adv math, vii, 212-13 (Us. 247). Epicurus, Ep. Hdt. 51 and K.D. xxiv. Cicero renders the phrase here, at Tusc, 1.30, cuius mentem non imbuerit deorum opinio, "imbues" earlier at Tusc, 1.27, haereret in eorum mentibus mortem non interitum esse. "the opinion sticks in the mind" Cf. my note 21 above, receiving 'effluences' into the mind. Cicero raises the same point later at Tusc, 1.52, animo ipso animum videre, "the soul itself see the soul."

66Tusc, 1.70, ut deum noris, etsi eius ignores et locum et faciem, sic animum tibi tuum notum esse oportere, etiamsi ignores et locum et formam. Cf. 1.51.

67Tusc, 1.29, ea quae multis post annis tractare coepissent physica didicissent, tantum sibi persuaserant, quantum natura admonente cognoverant.

25

Stoic theory; for closely related, we find that the Stoics argued that men were so

constituted by nature that they held a proper concern for their well-being,68 and

so it would certainly be natural and appropriate for man (oikeios) to have

concern for one's soul. Although there is no immediate sense-perception of the

soul (e.g., of seeing it), the Stoic would argue that man's governing-principle,69

his rationality, which does not develop until later in life,70 and which does not

destroy or replace those initial impulses to the conception of a soul, guides us to

an understanding that our souls exist. Other indications exist as well. Cicero,

like Plato, suggests that the soul is capable of perceiving its own motion71 or

capable of seeing the activity of a soul in another, and these are signs we cannot

miss for the existence of the soul. These are the arguments to sustain its belief.72

It is the Stoic view that "human nature is so constituted that it develops from

something non-rational and animal-like into a structure which is governed

throughout by reason."73 In any case, Cicero's appeal to the existence of the

soul, based upon consensus of mankind would be palatable to both an Epicurean

and Stoic.74

The argument by universal argreement that the soul exists shows only that

the belief is natural -- how does Cicero try to establish its truth? Cicero responds

by an appeal to natural law. He phrases it omni autem in re consensio omnium

gentium lex naturae putanda est,75 that in every case, the agreement of all men

68SVF, iii, 178-188; D.L., vii, 85; Long, 1974, p. 172.69Translating hêgemonikon as Long, 1974, p. 171-3.70Sen, Ep. 124, 9.71A careful distinction should also be made between 'perceiving' and 'seeing', Cicero sentiat,

other places, intelligat, and cognitet, etc; At one point, Tusc, 1.67, Cicero denies that the soul can physically 'see' (videat) itself. Cf, Cicero, Tusc, 1.53, sentit igitur animus se moveri; interestingly Plato, Phaedrus, 245c, yuxh~j fu&sewj pe/ri qei/aj te kai\ a)nqrwpi/nhj i0do&nta pa&qh te kai\ e1rga, the soul can physically see its own manifestations in its affects and effects.

72D.L., vii, 86. Cf. Long, 1974, p. 173.73Long, 1974, p. 173. This is why Cotta can believe in the gods without any reason, when he

scoffs at Balbus, a te enim philosopho rationem accipere debeo religionis, maioribus autem nostris etiam nulla ratione reddita credere Cic. De Nat. Deo. 3.6. He thinks authority a perfectly acceptable argument, but cannot hold it to be absolutely true, appropriately Sceptic.

74Cf. De. Nat. Deo. 3.12. Itaque inter omnis omnium gentium summa constat; omnibus enim innatum est et in animo quasi inscriptum esse deos.

75Tusc, 1.30

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(nations of men) ought to be considered a natural law.76 What does Cicero mean

or intend here when he writes that such universal agreement is natural law, and

therefore true? Cicero follows Epicurus who in turn avails himself of Aristotle's

argument of the consensus omnium when he tries to argue the objective validity

of the existence of gods, "that about which all agree must be true,"77 and it is in a

similar vein that Cicero tries to convince us of the objective existence of the soul.

Douglas construes the passage thus, "Cicero is here arguing that anything

universally accepted by humanity must be 'natural' to human beings, is indeed a

'law' of nature; not in the sense of an observable regularity in the physical

Universe, but as something imposed on human beings by their very nature as

human."78 But it is more than this; the natural law envisioned by Cicero must

extend into the 'physical Universe', he is attempting to establish the existence of

the soul as true. I argue that Cicero find evidence for the soul in this regular

observable phenomena in man: he is so constituted by a law in nature as to

recognize the existence of his soul. Epicurus denied a "natural law", that is, he

argued that there is no final "purpose" which things found in the world were to

fulfill.79 This is difficult to harmonize with what Cicero means. On the other

hand, we have the Stoic divine (universal) nature or logos. We have some

evidence that Cicero has in mind the Stoic idea of natural law. He writes that

there are many men who have foolish ideas of the gods;80 these

misinterpretations of the gods by man are not the fault of the gods, who manifest

themselves in all things and who make themselves clear, but rather the

shortcoming of human beings who are unable to perceive these things.81 If it is

not self evident to a man that he has a soul, then this is not a fault of nature, but

rather a result of a vitioso more, pernicious environment, by which Cicero

76This is the only occurence of the phrase lex naturae I can find in the entire corpus of Cicero; elsewhere Cicero seems to phrase the concept either as vera lex naturae congruens, as in Rep. 3.33; or iure naturae, at ND 3.45.

77Long, 1974, p. 45, loosely rendering Aristotle's N.E., 1173a1, a(\ ga\r pa=si dokei=, tau=t' ei)=nai/ famen.78Douglas, 1985, p. 102, n. 30.79Long, 1974, p. 40. Lucretius himself finds the world profoundly imperfect, though he admits

scilicet id certa fieri ratione necessust that everything happens for a certain reason (by a certain cause). Lucr. De Re.Nat. 3.710.

80Tusc. 1.30, multi de diis prava sentiunt; 81De. Nat. Deo, 2.12. signa ostenduntur a dis rerum futurarum; in his si qui erraverunt, non

deorum natura, sed hominum coniectura peccavit.

27

renders the diastrofh/ of the Stoics.82

Let us compare Cicero's other formulations of natural law. In De republica

Cicero formulates his conception of a natural law strongly in accordance with the

Stoic conception83. He writes there, est quidem vera lex recta ratio, naturae

congruens, diffusa in omnis, constans, sempiterna, true law is right reason,

according to nature, found in everything, firm, and eternal. When we compare

further to his De legibus, where he writes, lex est ratio summa, insita in natura,

... eadem ratio, cum est in hominis mente confirmata et perfecta, lex est, we find

and even a fuller definition of how Cicero conceives natural law -- a law of the

highest reason, anchored (insita) in natura, the same reason found in the minds

of men; this definition is wholly Stoic in temperment.84

Mankind is by nature made to recognize the existence of its own soul, and

also to weep at its death. We lament our dead naturally, Cicero writes, without

impet from custom or tradition. It is wholly natural in us to grieve at the passing

of family or friend, and this is further evidence that the soul recognizes the soul

in another, atque haec ita sentimus, natura duce, nulla ratione nullaque

doctrina,85 we do this with nature as our guide, not by reason (i.e., conscious

thinking) or teaching. He is refering to the Stoic doctrine that it is nature who

binds us together, and causes us to form familial bonds and relationships.86 By

nulla ratione, he does not separate nature from reason, but rather by this

expression emphasizes all the more how universal the belief in the soul is;87 it is

not an impulse that we learn or are taught. Instead, it is by this silent judgment

of nature that our soul exists that we weep for our family and friends (nulla

ratione, naturam tacitam, nature is silent when we have no need of formal

reasoning) and that we conceive of a soul. Therefore, I think it more correct here

82SVF, iii, 228ff. Polhenz, p.61. 83Cf. Douglas, p. 102, n.30; Polhenz, p. 61; Bréuget, p. 67. Büchner, p. 315-6.84Cf, Büchner, p. 315. He cites, Polhenz, Stoa, II,S.35 and SVF 3.4, where Chrysippus defines

koino\v no/mov as o)rqovlo/gov dia\ pa/ntwn e)rxo/menov. Cf. also Zetzel, p. 71.85Tusc. 1.3086Zeller, p. 293, and Cicero Fin, 3.64-66; De Off. 1.12. Marc. Aur, 9.9; 12.30. Sen, Ep. 95.5287Cf, earlier quam hoc late patet Tusc, 1.29.

28

to find that Cicero intends the Stoic definition of natural law.

Our concern for our future, and our posterity, which again he claims to be

a natural 'impulse' in the soul, is the greatest argument Cicero offers us in favor

of immortality, and these reasons have a throughly Roman flavor.88 We see the

orator in Cicero come to the foreground. A Roman would be easily swayed by

arguments for posthumous fame, for which there existed a strong drive.89

Nonetheless, the arguments presented here are rightly called ambivalent.90 The

pursuit of fame and glory are supposed to be indications in man of an immortal

soul, but Cicero engages the same argument at 1.91, declaring that even for men

who do not think their soul immortal, posthumous fame is an impulse.91 Here, as

at other times in Tusculans Book I, strict philosophical rigor gives way to

oratory; and for this we can forgive Cicero -- for what he is seeking, and what

this half of the argument requires, is not irrefutable proof of the immortality of

the soul, but simply to persuade us to a belief in it. Cicero admits upfront that

the physical theories he offers for the immortality may not be necessarily proven

true,92 and yet despite this, he believes that the answer to the ethical question

can be surely known. He needs only persuade us for the moment that the soul is

immortal. That having been accepted, he can go on to give us proof that, if this is

the case, then death is not an evil. If we are not convinced by these arguments

for immortality, the main drive of the ethical question at stake is not lost, and

Cicero simply reverts, as he does later, to the second option, that the soul is

utterly extinguished. In fact, at 1.39, he even suggests we give up a belief in

immortality! But this is a rhetorical turn that prompts an outburst from his

interlocutor, and Cicero would expect the same outburst from us.

88Cf, Brutus, 61, nonnullae mortuorum laudationes forte delectant; Also Sen, 81. nec victoriam sperant nec reditum; ille locus illis sepulchrum futurus est, and passim.

89For example, in their funeral masks, which ensure that even the face remains known to their ancestors, not just their name.

90Douglas, p. 103. n. 33.91Douglas, p .103, n. 33 rightly points out that some thought that posthumous fame was a

genuine kind of immortality, not simply a shadowy replacement. He cites Cumont, 133, and Cic. Paradoxa, 2.18. Mors terribilis iis, quorum cum vita omnia extinguuntur, non iis, quorum laus emori non potest. Compare Cicero's passage at Tusc, 1.110. See my Chp II,3.

92Tusc, 1.23.

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Thus, by man's own nature, we discover that the soul both exists, and is

immortal. Unlike our implicit knowledge of the existence of the soul, we are not

given by nature a proper grasp of what it is (qualis sit), therefore formal reason

is the only way through which we can come to understand what the soul is. By

the lack of proper reasoning on this matter, argues Cicero, man invented fables

of the underworld and the terrors that are found there; and these were only

made worse by the poets.93 Cicero now launches into both an interesting and

lengthy discussion of the physical properties of the soul. The physical theories

used by Cicero are broad, and for the most part only sketched in outline.94 Many

of the arguments that he uses are drawn from both Epicurean and Stoic

teachings. Nonetheless, statements which may seem simple often draw upon, or

at least indicate, a finer knowledge of the different physical systems, though for

the physical makeup of the immortal soul, Cicero follows quite closely orthodox

Stoic doctrine. He argues that the soul is without form or shape, and exists

apart from the human body, spirits whose own being gives them life,95 and

implies that while the soul does hold the seat of sensation, it cannot receive any

without the body. Cicero also uses the universal theory of the four elements96

and he follows almost exactly the Stoic doctrine of the the movements of the

elements. He places the earth in the center of the universe,97 while the denser

watery and earthy elements sink to the center of the earth because of their

weight, and the lighter fiery and airy elements fly up to the heavens, from their

own internal impulse or because lighter substances naturally rise.98 In any case,

says Cicero, the soul, upon separation from the body, rises upwards to heaven,99

93Tusc, 1.10. Cf, Luc. 3.978-1023, for mythical torments. Also Plato, Republic 3 and 10 for poets and Hades. Cicero seems to have Plato more in mind, though, than Lucretius.

94Long, 1974, p. 230.95Tusc, 1.37, animos enim per se ipsos viventis96Cf. Zeller, p. 187. The stoixei~on of Aristotle. Meta. 1.3. 97Cf, Zeller, p. 191. Douglas, p. 40. KRS, p. 342-344 and the citations of Philolaus. Cf. also

Aristotle, Cael. 2.13, 293a. DK, 44a16. Cf, Cic, ND, 2.98, terra universa cernatur locata in media sede mundi. Also, Cf, ND 2.115, De republica 6.16 (Dream of Scipio); De Ora. 3. 178. Though Luc. 5.534, terra universa cernatur locata in media sede mundi.

98Stob, Ecl, 1.346. Plut, De Sto. Rep. 42. Cf, Zeller, 189. 99Zeller, p. 190, says Zeno calls that part of the Universe most remote from the Earth 'heaven',

in Ach. Tac, Isa, 130a. ou)rano\v ai)qe/rov to\ e!sxaton . Cf, Diog. 138;

30

since it is made either fiery or airy elements,100 (because we breath, our breath is

hot) and certainly not of earthy or watery elements (which are what compose the

body).101 Cicero summarily rejects the atomistic doctrines of Democritus out

hand.102 If the soul is (like the Pythagoreans surmise) a number, or if Aristotle's

'fifth element', then it is lighter still, and rises nonetheless. So far, Cicero is

closely following standard Stoic doctrine. We accept that all things are composed

of the four elements,103 the soul necessarily must then be composed of 'heated

breath' (inflammata anima, Cicero's rendering of the Stoic term pneuma), though

he declines to give any reasons, stating simpy, 'it is agreed'.104 If the soul is this

fire and air, then it rises above the earthy and watery elements, and even the

courser and denser air (ex hoc aëre) which encompasses the earth where the

clouds reside (for these, say Cicero, not inaccurately, are water exhalations). It

further rises up towards the regions of 'thin' (tenuis) air; what Cicero means, of

course, is that the soul rises up to the Stoic 'aether'. His addition of ex adore

solis makes it seem that he was more favorable towards Cleanthes' formulation

of the aether,105 over other interpretations. This is further evidenced by Cicero's

formulation of the soul at 1.42, ardore animi concalescunt, bodies are warmed by

the heat of the soul, which follow closely the definitions Cicero later gives us in

his work on the gods.106

100Cf, Polhenz, p. 70. The Stoic term pneu~ma combined the ides into a 'fiery breath'; cf. Long, 1974, p. 150. Sex. Emp, 9.71, there may be present an influence from Posidonius, certainly Panaetius. Tusc, 1.42. Cf, 2.84. An academic doesn't disagree, cf, Cic, ND, 3.36.

101 Tusc, 1.40, 42.102He offers reasons for this at Cic, ND, 1.110 and 2.94. 103SVF 2.413 (Stobaeus 1.129,2-130,13) Cicero names Panaetius as his authority. Cf, Polhenz, p.

71, th\n de\ yuxh/n, h#n Panai/tiov au)to/v, ei!per e)k tw~n tessa/rwn stoixei/wn sune/sthxen, pneu~ma puroeide\v e(autw|~ dokei~n ei~)nai/ fhsin, a!nw fe/resqai a)na/gkh.

104By authority of Panaetius. Tusc 1.42 is evidence that Panaetius thought that the soul was heated breath, following Chrysippus. Cf. Zeller, p. 199. Zeno conceived it simply as fire. Posidonius that the soul was pneu~ma su/mfuton, pneu~ma e!nqermon. Diog, 7.156. See also, SVF 2.714-16; SVF 2.879; SVF 2.178-88; also Long, 1974, p. 156ff, and 171ff.

105Cf, Sen. Nat Quae. 6.16.2. Zeller, p. 156, and 190. There is some dissent between the Stoics regarding what this 'aether' is, or what kind of 'fire' comprised it. Cleanthes classifies the aether as flo\c (fire as an element, cf also Parm.12.2; and Empod. 85) while Chrysippus labels it au)gh/ (light of the sun, cf. Chrys. Stoic. 2.186; the meaning may be any bright light, cf Homer, Od. 6.305) Also, Douglas, p. 106, n.40 and KRS p. 2-3. Of course ardor may be used to represent either Greek term. Cf, also HP, p. 287-9.

106Cic, ND 2.23-5; 28-30. He mentions Cleanthes, specifically attributing to him there the doctrine here followed. See HP p. 281.

31

Cicero enters upon a particularly beautiful passage in Tusc, 1.43, which

offers us in several ways some originality for Cicero as a Stoic thinker. As I

showed earlier, Cicero rejects the identification of the 'soul' with the 'body',

although he does not deny that the soul is, in a sense, 'corporeal'.107 The soul,

then, for Cicero is a 'fiery' or 'heated' breath, which, upon separation, leaves

behind the heavier and courser elements below as it rises into the aether, almost

by a sense of buoyancy108, until it arrives at a region that it is similar to itself,109

of equal heat and levity, where the souls are sustained and nourished just as the

stars themselves.110 The soul is ascribed both a sense of natural impulse, and a

sense of mechanism. The aether is the home or 'resting place' for the soul,111 that

is, there is a impulse on the part of the soul to rise up and join itself to what it

had been separated from when it was below in the denser regions on the earth.

On the other hand, there is at work a certain mechanism, as if a system of

pulleys and weights, which push or pull the soul from the deeper regions back

into the lighter regions, and when the balance is struck, the soul no longer

moves, but remains without motion in the aether. In this one small section,

Cicero enlarges the microcosm of the elements into the macrocosm of the world,

the philosophical systems become vivid when addressed as natural phenomena.

The earthy elements become our body, the watery elements, the clouds and

storms, the airy elements the winds and sky, and finally, the fiery element of our

soul rises further to bask in the heat of the sun. In Cicero's formulation of the

balance of equal weights I find a very striking, and I think original, metaphor. It

alludes firstly to the Stoic doctrine that our souls are not ultimately 'at home' in

our bodies,112 that in the balance, our earthy bodies weight us down. Secondly, it

alludes to the 'even balance' that comes to represent a natural harmony; though

107 He denies the soul is the human body, but he does not deny the soul is fashioned of some material. 108Tusc, 1.43, paribus examinatus ponderibus109Tusc, 1.43, sui similem contigit et agnovit and sui similem et levitatem et calorem110Cicero too, along with the Stoics, placed the stars in the aether. Cf. Zeller, p. 190-1. Cf, Cic.

De Re Pub, 6.15.iisque animus datus est ex illis sempiternis ignibus, quae sidera et stellas vocatis etc. Cf. Plato, Phaedrus, 246e.

111Plato, Tim 42b discusses the kinship of souls to the astral bodies. 112Tusc, 1.51ff. Sen. Ep. 65.17,22. and Tusc. 1.52. Sen, Ep. 77, 81. Sen. Cons. Marc. 23.2. Cic.

Tusc, 1.74. De Re Pub, 6.14. Tusc, 1.58. Also Plato,Meno 82a-86a, and Phaedo, 72c-77a. But also cf. Lucr, 3.440,555, 5.138.

32

we are weighed down by our bodies, our soul still strives to regain what it had in

the aetherial regions when it was free from worry. Cicero develops the metaphor

when he argues that the true nature of the soul, then, can be found when our

bodies are free from concern, desire, worry and at rest.113 When we are at

leisure, and unaccosted, there is in us by nature, an impulse to the pursuit of

contemplation and investigation,114 an almost insatiable desire to discover the

truth. And this is a sign that the soul is trying still to restore the 'balance'. The

beauty of the earth, and the heavens calls the soul to the study of philosophy,115

and philosophy is the soul's one recourse to lift itself upward even when in the

darkness of the deeper regions.116

Having established the existence of the soul, its immortality, and its

nature, Cicero now goes on to examine the faculties of the soul. We are led to

posit that if the sensations are not dissolved with the soul, then they must

remain. If sensation remains, then could we not still feel pain after death?

Cicero claims that the faculty of sensation is like that of contemplation, a

property of the soul. The body's organs, the eyes, ears, nose, and so forth, are

only 'windows' into the soul -- the body does not have the power of sensation

itself.117 Instead, the body often is a barrier to true contemplation of the truth,

since the soul becomes clogged by the earthy materials. It is only when our souls

rise up to the aether that we will be free to contemplate the truth without

encumbrance.118 However, our sensations are conducted through the five

senses, our pain or pleasures the soul can feel only through the 'conduit' or

'window' of the body. The body afflicts the body, as it were, with sensation; if the

soul assents to the sensation, then we feel something, otherwise, we feel nothing.

If we are lost in our thoughts, we forget our injured foot. The soul in this case

113 Douglas, p. 106, n. 44. claims too that it "is not traceable in any specific Greek source." Cf. Fin, 2.46, 4.12, 18. 5.48-50. Off, 1.13. Sen, 65.15-22.

114Tusc, 1.44. natura inest in mentibus nostris insatiabilis quaedam cupiditas veri videndi115Cf. Sen. Cons Helv. 20.2. Plato, Republic 3.116Tusc, 1.45.117Cf. Cic, ND 2.138. Illa potius explicetur incredibilis fabrica naturae, and then goes on how the

soul is carried throughout the intricacies of the body. 118Tusc, 1.46. quae patent ad animum a corpore, and cum autem nihil erit praeter animum,

nulla res obiecta impediet, quo minus percipiat, quale quidque sit.

33

does not assent to the sensations passed on to it by the body.119 Cicero asserts

any pain, which could be conducted through the body to the mind, is at once

done away with when the soul leaves the body behind and is no longer harassed.

Even if our souls should descend into Hades (they won't argues Cicero, the

nature of the soul makes it rise into the aether), even then, we have no bodies

through which we could feel pain.120

I cannot agree with Douglas that at this point Cicero beings an attack on

Epicurean doctrine.121 Instead, Cicero uses a wry ad hominem attack to bolster

his own argument. For Epicureans boasted that their philosophy had freed them

from the terrors of death. Cicero scoffs, you needed teaching to discover this?

You foolish philosophers, it was your ignorance which first taught you to fear

these things!122 Cicero cleverly plays off the Epicurean system to further justify

our own conviction is his argument, but he is far from attacking them. Despite

his obvious favor for the Stoic doctrines over the Epicurean, he has no difficulty

here in embracing the Epicurean doctrine if it suits his purpose at hand.123

Ethically, Cicero and the Epicureans are striving to achieve the same end, to free

man from his fear of death. Cicero simply smiles at the Epicureans for their

child like simplicity in overcoming those fears of the afterlife which he earlier

explained away as caused only by an ignorance of the true nature of the soul.

People have imagined punishment after death, only because nequeunt qualis

animus sit vacans corpore intellegere et cogitatione comprehendere, they are

unable to grasp or understand what the soul is without a body, and therefore

119Cf, Tusc, 1.44. Cumque corporis facibus, the body passing many thing to the soul, though the soul can ignore them. Cf, Tusc, 1.46 and 1.80, where ipsi animi magni refert quali in corpore locati sint the body affects the soul, but the soul must still 'be aware' or 'be present'; the philospher is able to bring his mind to ignore the affectations of the body.

120Cf, Tusc, 1.37, ea fieri apud inferos fingerent, quae sine corporibus nec fieri possent nec intellegi.

121Douglas, p. 108, n. 48.122Tusc, 1.36. cuius ignoratio finxit inferos easque formidines. About the boast, Cicero, Tusc,

1.50. quid habet ista res aut laetabile aut gloriosum? 123Tusc, 1.36, quod ut ita sit —nihil enim pugno. Cicero here alludes to the fact that he later on

takes up Epicurean physics as further evidence against a fear of death. It must be admitted that Cicero was generally adverse to Epicureanism (cf. King, p. xi, and Tusc. 5.78), but there are a few passages in Tusculans I, notably here at 1.36, and 1.77 where Cicero (without irony) nods at the Epicureans.

34

have been lead to this unnatural belief in the infernal regions.

Cicero admits that the question of what the soul is in the body is a much

more difficult and obscure question than whether it exists. He reaffirms the

existence of the soul, despite the fact there is difficulty understanding its form.

Nonetheless by its own nature the soul knows that it itself exists and it does this

by an innate recognition of itself. Another piece of evidence Cicero uses to prove

that the soul exists is the fact that the soul has its own impulse to motion.

The argument we are presented with is almost word for the word the one

presented by Socrates in the Phaedrus, but Cicero's use (and translation) is

worth a closer examination.124 In the Phaedrus, Socrates argument first relies

upon the fact that the soul shares in the immortality of the gods,125 just as they

share in some other aspects, like divinity.126 The argument runs as follows: what

is always in movement is immortal; what is moved by something external, ceases

to exist when the external force ceases; therefore, only that which is self-moved

never ceases to move, because it never abandons itself (that is, cannot be

separated from itself, implying the soul is simple and indivisible); the soul is self-

moved by definition, therefore, the soul is immortal.127 The argument is may

stand on its own, but this does not yet establish the eternal motion of the soul.128

Neither should we suspect an inconsistency on Cicero's part. The fiery soul rises

to the aetherial regions where it only stops rising -- Cicero does not mean it stops

moving altogether. In order to prove he soul is eternally moving, Plato weaves a

very subtle argument based on origins. In the Phaedrus, the argument is that a

first principle cannot have an origin, for if it did, then its origin would be the first

principle, and so on. Therefore, every first principle is unoriginated.129 If it is not

124See the Appendix I, where I provide the relevant excerpts from Plato's Phaedrus and Cicero's translation of it from the Tusculans. One may also refer to King, p. 551.

125Cf, Plato, Phaedrus, 246c.126Tusc, 1.65-67.127Cf, Zeller, p. 134-5.128Rowe, p. 175. and Sharples, R.W. Liverpool Classical Monthly, 10.5 (May 1985), 66, loc. cit.129a)rxh/ as used by other Greek physists to mean origin or beginning; Cf Lucr. 3.31-34; for

motion, cf, Cic, ND, 2.4, omnia motu regentem.

35

created, then it cannot be destroyed; for everything comes from a first principle

and if this first principle perished, the universe would halt, nor could it begin

again, since the first principle is without origin. The soul is not moved from

outside, but is self-moved, and what is self-moved is eternal, therefore the soul is

immortal. I do not agree with Douglas130 that Cicero misinterprets Plato's subtle

argument. A careful distinction between Cicero's use of origo and principium,

makes it clear he follows Plato closely. He makes a careful translation here, and

shows that he is well aware of Plato's argument.

We can see Cicero weaving the argument for the immortality of the soul

back and forth between the self-perception of the soul (from nature), and its

sense of perception (from faculty); then, drawing upon Plato, he proves the

immortality of the soul from its own self-movement (from nature). This leads to a

discussion (if the soul moves and is eternal) of its travels between the airy

regions of the heaven, and the denser regions of the earth. There is no formal

declaration of the transmigration of the soul by Cicero, although it is difficult to

avoid the reference. For Cicero argues the immortality of the soul from the

faculty of its memory, and again expounds Platonic theories, drawing mostly

from the Meno and the Phaedo. Cicero summarizes both dialogues; his main

point in this is to show that our faculty of memory is nothing more than a

'recollection', that is, there are conceptions or notions (notiones, e)nnoi/av Tusc

1.57) that are in our soul, and this is evidence for two conclusions: first that the

soul is immortal, because it came to be born with these ideas already implanted

in it, and secondly, in order to have acquired these ideas, it must have actively

sought contemplation and investigation before it entered the body.131 There are

some who think that Cicero is confusing, or at least mixing the theories, between

Plato and the later Stoics; however, I am of the opinion that Cicero explicitly

sides with Plato and not the Stoics, particularly regarding the theory of memory,

and its further implication that in the afterlife the soul is occupied with

130Douglas, p. 109.131Tusc, 1.57. Cf, the earlier passage at Tusc, 1.44 and my note 77. Hirzel, p. 366ff.

36

learning.132 Moreover, Cicero openly rejects the Stoic notion of the tabula rasa.133

e1nnoia here used by Cicero implies both the innate ability of the mind to form

general concepts (i.e., its own ability to learn, which the Stoics posited), as well

as all the other innate notiones of any great value (Cicero uses the phrase rerum

tantarum but does not continue on to give examples of what he means);134 these

the Stoics denied.135 Cicero is trying to make a greater point with Plato's theory

of recollection. It is my view that Douglas is wholly wrong when he claims that

Cicero treats Plato's theory of anamnesis simply as a hypothesis.136 When Cicero

uses the phrase in communi hominum memoria137 he is not talking about a

memory common to every man, that is, the capacity for every man to remember,

but rather a much grander and more pregnant view. Cicero's communis memoria

could be construed as a 'universal recollection', where a soul, still in the aether,

contains within it innumberable notiones and the real truth of all matters. This is

in keeping with Cicero's view that it is the memory and its recollection that is

most indicative of the soul's divity.138 The most inspiring aspect of the memory, is

not its ability of recollection, but the quantity that it can recall. Cicero dimisses

as weak the power of an individual to remember, for what is it in comparison to

the recollection of the universal that is displayed by all mankind?139 What

impresses Cicero the most is that mankind in general, and not the individual,

can remember so much of what they knew when their souls were suspended in

the aether. No man could remember everything alone,140 but if we survey the

132Tusc, 1.58, ita nihil est aliud discere nisi recordari133SVF, 2.3. Tusc, 1.57, nec vero fieri ullo modo posse, ut a pueris tot rerum atque tantarum

insitas et quasi consignatas in animis notiones; Cf, also Tusc, 1.61. and Plato, Theaet. 191c, 197d; Cf. Aesch. PV, 789.

134Perhaps, like the Stoic, that of morality and divinity, cf, Sandbach, p. 23. Sex. Emp. Adv Math, 9.124, SVF 2.1017.

135Cicero's formulation is very similar to Phaedo, 73c. 136Douglas, p. 112, n. 59. "Cicero makes it quite clear that he does not believe it [the theory of

recollection.]" I disagree, Plato's authority is bowed to frequently (for example, Tusc, 1.55), and Cicero often approvingly cites memory as a sign of the soul, at Tusc, 1.58, 59,61 (where he rejects the tabula rasa), 64 (cf, for instance Plato's Ion), 65, and 67, etc.; Cicero elsewhere rejects other Stoic tenets, Tusc, 1.78, in preference to a Platonic view.

137Cf, the Stoic koinh/ e!nnoia. See Sandbach in Long, p.22-23.138Tusc, 1.60, eum iurarem esse divinum139Cf, Zeller, p. 255, on the Stoic perception of the general foolishness of mankind. Cf, Plut, Sto.

Rep. 31.5.140On the other hand, Cf, Tusc, 1.13, ego autem non commemini, ante quam sum natus, me

miserum; tu si meliore memoria es, velim scire, ecquid de te recordere. Ita iocaris, with a

37

knowledge of mankind has as a whole, the whole collection of memory (that is,

the communis memoria) is astoundingly enormous, almost limitless; that just as

the individual boy in Plato's Meno, who remembers his knowledge of geometry in

stages and steps, so too does mankind in general move from cruder knowledge,

like building homes and growing crops, to a refinement of knowledge, like

poetry, astronomy, sculpture, and philosophy.141 Douglas' note is worthy, that

"The Epicureans preferred to see mankind as a whole taking hints from natural

phenomenon",142 Cicero would surely agree, but would maintain that these 'hints'

from natural phenomena are in no way different from a teacher who simply asks

the right questions, helping us to recall what we already know.143

Cicero never offers us a firm account of the physical composition of the

soul; but he continues to heap up evidence for the fact that the soul exists, is

eternal, and finally, divine -- and this is all he wants to prove.144 In section 1.64,

it is either breath or fire, but certainly divine; in 1.65, he says that if the gods are

slight smile. Cicero didn't expect the soul to recall everything. Cf, Phaedo 75d,76c-d, Cicero's earlier comment doesn't affect his current meaning. Cf, Plato's myth of Er and the River of Forgetfulness before rebirth, Republic 10.621a, me/tron me\n ou}n ti tou~ u#datoj pa~sin a)nagkai=on ei]nai piei=n, tou_j de\ fronh&sei mh_ sw|zome/nouj ple/on pi/nein tou~ me/trou: to_n de\ a)ei\ pio&nta pa&ntwn e0pilanqa&nesqai. There is also in the Phraedrus, 248e, a plain of 'truth'. Cf, Dieterich p. 122 and Adam's note on Republic 10.621b, where he cites Proculus, quoting a fragment from Aristotle's 'On the Soul', fhsi\ ga_r ou}n [ o( A)ristote/lhj] kai\ au)to_j e0k me\n u(gei/aj ei0j no&son o(deu&ontaj lh&qhn i1sxein tina_j kai\ au)tw~n tw~n gramma&twn w{n e0memaqh&kesan, e0k no&sou de\ ei0j u(gei/an i0o&nta mhde/na pw&pote tou~to pa&sxein. e0oike/nai de\ th_n me\n a!neu sw&matoj zwh_n tai=j yuxai=j kata_ fu&sin ou}san u(gei/a|, th_n de\ e0n sw&masin, w(j para_ fu&sin, no&sw|. zh~n ga_r e0kei= me\n kata_ fu&sin au)ta&j, e0ntau~qa de\ para_ fu&sin: w#st' ei0ko&twj sumbai/nein ta_j me\n e0kei=qen i0ou&saj e0pilanqa&nesqai tw~n e0kei=, ta_j de\ e0nteu~qen e0kei=se tw~n e0ntau~qa diamnhmoneu&ein. The tradition of forgetting the afterlife also in Roman myth, Virg. Aen. 6.714.

141Tusc, 1.62, qui vestitum, qui tecta, qui cultum vitae, qui praesidia contra feras invenerunt, a quibus mansuefacti et exculti a necessariis artificiis ad elegantiora defluximus. Contrast Plato's evolution of society in Republic, 2.369-372. Cicero is in no way claiming that every man is capable of recollecting everything, but that it belongs to great men to discover (recall) such ideas and increase the common memory. Cf, Brut. 205, homo eruditissimus ... et in inventis rebus et in actis; Pliny, NH, 7.191; Virgil, Aen. 6.662.

142 Cf. Douglas, p. 112, n. 62, citing Lucr, 5.925-1457. 143 Cf, Plato, Meno, 82a-86a. Cf, Douglas, p. 111, n. 58, where he has an overall balanced view, though, I think, draws some incorrect conclusions. Cf, also, Sandbach, p. 25-37. "Cicero used metaphors which imply that the 'notio' contains the whole truth but is but dimly seen, through being in darkness or covered up." Cf, Tusc, 1.64 and following, [philosophia] ab animo tamquam ab oculis caliginem dispulit, ut omnia supera, infera, prima, ultima, media videremus, "Philosophy dispels ignorance from our soul, as if darkness from our eyes, so that we may see things above, below, things first and last, and everything in the middle." I think makes it quite clear that Cicero believed, at least here, in the theory of recollection.144Tusc, 1.67, qua facie quidem sit aut ubi habitet, ne quaerendum quidem est.

38

breath or fire, then so is the soul; in 1.66, he writes, the soul is neither breath

nor fire, it is unique and seperate from four elements altogether; our soul is like

god, who is alone free from all mortal elements, but encompasses all those

divine, such as memory, mind, and thought.145 Just as God can be seen through

the harmony of the celestial bodies, and the observation that all things are

divinely arranged for the good of mankind, so we can recognize the soul and its

own divinity through its memory and power of mind.146

As I conlude this chapter, there is one final issue that Cicero treats in his

discussion of the immortal, eternal, and divine soul, and that is the idea of the

punishment of vice and the reward of virtue. Elsewhere, in Tusculans 5, Cicero

expends great effort in arguing that virtue is its own reward, but in the

Tusculans 1, the idea of a punishment is obviously avoided since it is quite

against the theory that death is not an evil. Cicero fancies that Socrates in the

Apology and Phaedo did not fear death because he did not know what it was, but

because he knew that he was ascending into heaven.147 On the other hand, at

1.72, Cicero presents, but carefully distances,148 himself from a view argued by

Socrates in the Phaedo. This is one of two references (the other being at 1.75)

that Cicero even makes to any punishment in the afterlife for wickedness and

vice in our earthly life.149 Cicero has arrayed his arguments in a fashion so that

we believe in the existence, immortality and divinity of our soul. He would

destory his argument if he were to admit in death there may remain punishment

of the soul. We need not fear death, argues Cicero, for through it we are released

145 Tusc. 1.65 Homerus et humana ad deos transferebat: divina mallem ad nos. Cf, Plato, Republic 6.501b and Cicero, ND 1.90, non ergo illorum humana forma, sed nostra divina dicenda est

146Tusc, 1.70.147Cf, Plato, Phaedo, 117d, a)ll' eu!xesqai/ ge/ pou toi=j qeoi=j e1cesti/ te kai\ xrh&, th_n metoi/khsin th_n e0nqe/nde

e0kei=se eu)tuxh~ gene/sqai "I may and must pray to the gods that my departure hence be a fortunate one." But famously the Apology, 42a, a)lla_ ga_r h!dh w#ra a)pie/nai, e0moi\ me\n a)poqanoume/nw|, u(mi=n de\ biwsome/noij: o(po&teroi de\ h(mw~n e1rxontai e0pi\ a!meinon pra~gma, a!dhlon panti\ plh_n h@ tw?| qew?|. "But now the time has come to go away. I go to die, and you to live; but which of us goes to the better lot, is known to none but God." [Fowler's translation].

148At 1.72, where Cicero is careful to show that it is Socrates' view, not his own; and later at 1.74, when he dismisses the theory as 'old' and 'Greek.'

149Douglas, p. 116, n. 72. On the puzzling passage of 1.73, I give some comments on in Appendix II as they are not immediately pertinent to the topic at hand.

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from the fetters of our bodies, which keep us from our rightful place among the

heavenly aether. There is no underworld. For Cicero, the more philosophical we

are on earth, the more we attain to that which we were in the aether, and so

when it comes time to be released from our boddies, the more we have practiced

philosophy, that is, the more we have contemplated the seperation of ourselves

from our bodies, the swifter our souls will rise. But the more we have been

weighed down by our body, by its pains and its pleasures, the more reluctant and

slowly our soul will rise, as if limping slowly from being bound too long in

chains.150 In either case, Cicero would have every soul return to its origin, the

upper regions heated by the rays of the sun.151

There is no punishment in the afterlife: firstly, our ideas of an afterlife are

unfounded, there is no infernal region, and these are mere inventions of the mind

from poor reasoning. Secondly, through a contemplation of the sensation of the

soul, we can rest assured that we can feel no pain, since we will have no body

through which the soul could receive it. Thirdly, the divinity of our soul proves

that when we die, we will return to the our origin, which lies with the gods in the

heavenly aether. Cicero argues that verear ne homini nihil sit non malum aliud

certius, nihil bonum aliud potius, that death may even be the greatest good for

man,152 passing a moral judgement upon it quite unlike the Stoics, who claim that

death is morally indifferent.153 Why do we feel dissatisfied with the answer that

Cicero gives? It is because regardless for a good man or an evil man, death is

not an evil. Socrates would argue that, since no evil can befall a good man, and

death comes even to good men, death is not an evil to a good man. But precisely

this is what is lacking from Cicero's argument, there is no moral distinction given

to man, only to his death. Even Plato, after having constructed one of the

greatest edifices of morality in his Republic feels it necessary to present us the

150The imagery of the chains is a common one. Tusc, 1.75, 118. Plato, Phaedo 62b, Cratyl, 400c, Cicero, Rep 6.13, Div, 1.110, Sen, Ep. 65,16-21.

151Douglas p. 117 doubts of the sincerity of Cicero's thought. Indeed, it is inspired by Plato, esp. Phaedo. Cf, Cicero's earlier comment in 1.24, evolve diligenter eius [Platonis] eum librum, qui est de animo: amplius quod desideres nihil erit.

152Cf, Tusc 1.83, and 1.114, where Cicero recalls the famous and commonplace story of the capture of Silenus. Hdt, 8.138, and Soph. Oed. Col. 1124-1227. Plut. Cons. Apoll. 115b-e.

153Cf, Zeller, p. 319-320.

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myth of Er, where good men are rewarded, wicked men punished in the afterlife.

What is virtue, what vice, if in the end, death makes us all equal? Unlike later

Stoics, e.g., Seneca,154 there is no purification for good or evil souls in Cicero, for

there is no distinction between the blessed and the wicked.155 He states, in 1.45,

that all of us will be blessed (beati) when we have left our earthy bodies behind,

but the wicked will have a slower time ascending to heaven -- which is certainly

no strong reprimand against vice. Further, while Seneca, the most Platonic of

the Stoics,156 has the future life as a great stimulus to moral conduct on earth,157

Cicero seems to to destroy this foundation for earthly morals: but by doing so,

he emphasizes all the more strongly the Stoic doctrine of innate goodness of

virtue; and this as conclusion which can be drawn from the immortality of the

soul.

154Sen, Cons. Marc.155On account of this, I find Zeller is incorrect in construing Tusc, 1.42 as an indication that the

aetherial regions are alloted to the blessed, because Cicero makes no distinction at all between the blessed and others, since all souls arrive at the same place. Cf, Zeller, p. 206.

156Zeller, 208.157Sen, Ep. 102,29.

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3. They are not miserable who lack sensation

There are some, says Cicero, who do not approve of the immortality of the

soul, but what does it matter?158 Cicero does not intend to leave us, though we

doubt of immortality, to still doubt that death is not an evil. As we have seen

from the previous chapter, Cicero first argues for the immortal soul, and

concludes that the soul, if not a fiery substance, will in any case either join the

aether or become like gods.159 Tusc. 1.76 is the hinge of the argument, where

Cicero leaves the immortality behind, and turns to the Epicurean theory that the

soul is wholly dissolved with the body. There are numerous indications that the

main speaker 'M' highly approves of the theory of immortality, so highly in fact,

that in the slow change to the Epicurean theories, even further arguments for its

immortality are offered by way of rejecting those Stoics who, like Panaetius,

argued for the eventual dissolution of the soul, even in the afterlife. Cicero uses

on a larger scale the oratorical technique of praetermittendo; he pretends to

pass over the theme of immortality, while in the course of doing so, he continues

to add arguments in its favor. Thus in order to smoothly join the Epicurean

arguments for the dissolution of the soul, to the Stoic arguments Cicero used in

the first half of the book, he deftly interweaves the Epicurean and Stoic

arguments here on a smaller scale to form a patchwork to ensure a smooth

transition. If death is not an evil if we are immortal, then surely, can it be an evil

if we are winked out of existence? In this second section, there are three main

themes which I will treat each in turn: firstly, Cicero examines the theory of

sensation in the soul; secondly, of separation, lacking, and want; and thirdly,

158Tusc, 1.76. As a textual note, Pohlenz, along with Douglas, p. 118, n. 76, and other commentators assign 'Quid refert?' to 'A', M's interlocutor. But the phrase almost never stands alone. It must be that its use here is to join the contrasting thought which follows; certainly, quid refert , like Cicero's use of autem in his philosophical works (Cf, Tusc, 1.99), is a conjunctive and possibly influenced by Greek style. I would (if I may boldly do so) assign the words to M and not A. What Cicero is saying here is, "They disagree with me over my proposition of immortality; it is of little importance. Let's agree with them! for, even then, death is no evil."

159The immortal soul lives forever. Tusc, 1.77, Cicero dismisses as absurd the claim of the Stoics that the soul eventually dies in the afterlife; he feels that if the soul survives death, it must logically survive forever. Cf, Zeller, p. 206. Zeno, in Lact, Inst. 7.7.20, and Chrysippus, in Diog. 156, both claimed that the souls of the foolish would not survive eternally.

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the goods and evils in a human life.

I. Sensation

If the soul is not immortal, then the soul perishes with the body. The steps

are small, and brief, which Cicero takes to transition the argument to his own

version of Epicurean beliefs which are uniquely presented. Before I show why

this is, a brief overview of the Epicurean concept of the soul and its formulation

by Lucretius will help understand the differences in Cicero's argument. Epicurus

separated the soul into two parts, the rational (to\ logiko\n me/rov) and the irrational

(to\ a!logon me/rov) part. The first was located in the chest, the second was found

throughout the body. In Lucretius, animus and anima are used to represent the

two terms respectively, but there is an interesting problem; Lucretius has no

word by way of which to represent the soul (Greek, yuxh/) in its unity. At De

Rerum Natura 3.421-4, Lucretius discusses the soul's mortality. He uses either

animus or anima interchangeably to embrace both parts of the soul.160 Cicero,

when talking of the soul, conceives it as unified, single, and simple,161 and claims

that it alone is wholly responsible for the faculty of sensation. The 'irrational'

part Cicero disjoins from the soul, and assigns it to the body, which only acts as a

conduit through which the soul can contemplate external objects, which in turn

leaves the soul as a completely rational being. Cicero uses animus consistently

to represent the soul, and he only ever uses anima where he intends the

definition of breath. There is, in Latin then, an ambiguity in the language that

Cicero exploits when he is formulating his own version of the Epicurean

argument. For Cicero represents the Stoic Panaetius (and we are left only with

Cicero's own authority for this)162 as using Epicurean arguments to show the soul

can perish as a consequence that the soul can feel pain.163 In Lucretius, 3.455-

160Brown, p. 10; see note loc. cit. Lucr , 3.421, tu fac utrumque uno subiungas nomine eorum etc.

161Tusc, 1.71, nihil sit animis admixtum, nihil concretum, nihil copulatum, nihil coagmentatum, nihil duplex

162Brown, p. 150 and Munro, p. 200. 163Panaetius conjectures that what can feel pain can fall ill; what can fall ill can also perish; the

soul feels pain, therefore, the soul can perish. Tusc, 1.79; cf, Carneades, in Cic. ND, 3.32, uses a similar argument, quod autem dolorem accipit, id accipiat etiam interitum necesse est; omne

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70, two parallels are struck between the mind and the body. First, to an

Epicurean, the mind (animus) and the body (anima) both feel pain, and so the

painful emotions are akin to bodily diseases;164 and just as the body perishes, so

too does the mind, therefore the soul is extinguished at death. But Cicero rejects

this formulation at Tusc, 1.46, when he says that even a wandering thought may

distract us from our senses as easily as the effect of a disease. Blindness only

closes up the 'window' through which the soul perceives thing, it doesn't destroy

the sense of sight. Cicero even goes as far as to claim that the causes of

emotional stress are found in the body, and not in the rational soul.165 He blames

all the torments of the soul on the 'inflammations', the firebrands of pleasure and

pain of the body. He identifies the mind with the soul, the 'thinking us' opposed

to our bodies; but it is the body, and not the mind which is harassed with

passion and emotion, or more accurately the body effects the mind to pay heed

to those sensations. For if our minds wander and we are lost in contemplation

(for Cicero, the natural pursuit of the soul), the bodily senses are ignored, and

we forget about our pain or pleasure. The body is construed as a conduit

through which the soul takes notice of outside influences, influences which may

simply be the body itself. Thus, if we turn the mind away from the body, we may

free ourselves from pain. Cicero was very sensitive to this thought. For it was

after he lost his daughter, and was at the lowest ebb of his political influence

that he turned to philosophy for consolation; he writes in his letters that

contemplation turned his mind away from his own pains, and though it did not

cure him wholly, nonetheless it was a pleasurable distraction for him.166 Cicero

claims that the mind is wholly free from all turbulent emotions,167 that anger,

lust, sorrow, and so forth are wholly separate from the mind belonging entirely

to the body.168 It is then, that when the soul leaves the body behind, it no longer

igitur animal confitendum est esse mortale. Cf also Cic, ND, 3.32.164Brown, p. 150, n. 459. Also cf, Luc, 3.548, where the mind is considered an organ, and 3.670-

83, where the soul is born with the body, and not inserted.165Tusc, 1.44, Cumque corporis facibus inflammari soleamus ad omnis fere cupiditates eoque

magis incendi etc.166Cf, his letters to Atticus, 12.16.167Tusc, 1.80, de mente dici, quae omni turbido motu semper vacet168Douglas, p. 63, translates 'pathological', which I think leads to some ambiguity and confusion.

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is affected, and feels no pain when it is engaged in its eternal contemplation.169

The second point to contrast is that Lucretius argues the faculty of

sensation is incorporated and wholly engrossed in the body, as if it grew with it,

and not placed inside it, and so the soul cannot be a prisoner in the body.170 But

Cicero does not, like Lucretius, have the soul infuse the body with sensation,

instead, the soul is simply situated in the body.171 This is consistent with his view

that the soul is like a prisoner in the cage of the body. If the souls grows in the

body, it must be born from somewhere. And this leads us to the further reason

that souls are not immortal, argued by Panaetius in 1.79, and that is because

souls are born through other souls, as can be observed by the resemblance of

offspring to their parents. Whatever is born, must come to die, therefore, souls

eventually die. The argument itself receives little serious reflection by Cicero.

He admits that the body does have an effect on the soul, and so the physical

similarities between offspring and parents would logically indicate that there

would be similarities between the soul. For example, we can see in animals,

which are devoid of reason, and most identical in their physical appearances,

that their souls are most identical. On the other hand, Cicero gives evidence of

the opposite in humans, and counters the argument by joking that Africanus'

great nephew most resembled him in bodily form, but his reprobate soul was

nothing like his great uncle.172 The Lucretian position is interesting, for the poet

writes at 3.713-40 that, just as a dead body decays, its body rearranged to form

the bodies of maggots, so too does the human soul rearrange to form soul which

animates the maggots. Cicero rejects both foundations that this argument is

based on: that the soul and not the body feels pain and that division implies

destructibility. However, there remains a third basis for the argument that souls

are born, and this is the proposition that any change can imply destructibility.173

169Tusc, 1.43.170Lucr, 3.678-681, praeterea si iam perfecto corpore nobis \ inferri solitast animi vivata

potestas \ tum cum gignimur et vitae cum limen inimus171Lucretius says diffusa, Cicero insita.172Tusc, 1.81. Cf, Val. Max, 3.5.2.173Lucr, 3.519-20, nam quod cumque suis mutatum finibus exit \ continuo hoc mors est illius

quod fuit ante. A recurrent Epicurean maxim, also at Lucr, 1.670-1, 792-3, and 2.753-4.

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The criticism is put forth by Lucretius at 3.435, where it is argued that, if the

body is the container, when it is shattered and the soul escapes from its frame,

what continues to hold the soul together? Of course, the change that Lucretius

speaks of requires an unchanging substratum of matter, in this case atoms and

void: this is the physical system Cicero rejects outright,174 claiming that fire or

air or whatever material the god is made of is the material of the soul, a unified

substance, and indivisible. What Cicero does leave unanswered though is

Lucretius' argument that if the soul has sensation after the body dies, we must

imagine the soul to be equipped with the five senses.175 But this is absurd, for the

eyes cannot exist separate from the body for the benefit of the spirit, therefore

spirits are incapable of sensation. Cicero's response is subtle. He carefully

assigns sensation to the soul, but affirms that the body too has its 'senses' in its

physical organs. These senses are the means by which the soul perceives the

external world, but they too are earthy. Our physical senses are constrictive and

impeding. The faculties in our soul will be even greater when we are free from

our bodies. We will see still be able to see, but without eyes, and will cast our

eyes over the whole of the earth.176 There can be no otherworldly tortues of the

body, because there remains after death no body to torture, and so there is no

need to fear those tortures depicted by the poets.177 Cicero does not go into

further details. The fact that sensation is found in the soul, and not the body

nonetheless further emphasizes the Epicurean position of complete destruction

of sensation when the soul perishes. What if our souls are dissolved along with

our bodies? If we feel no pain when our bodies dissolve, how completely free of

pain will our death be when our soul and our whole faculty of sensation dissolves

with it! It may seem like a digression, but it is a digression with a poignant

174At Tusc, 1.22 and 1.42, sed levibus et rotundis corpusculis efficientem animum concursu quodam fortuito, omittamus; nihil est enim apud istos, quod non atomorum turba conficiat, Cf Brown, p. 156.

175Lucr, 3.624-33, Brown, p. 167. Cf, Cicero, ND 1.68-72; and the famous Epicurean phrase Non est corpus, sed quasi corpus etc. They don't have body, but a kind of body,

176Tusc, 1.68-69. Cicero uses the word cernere, a verb which signifies both physical sight, and mental apprehension.

177Tusc, 1.37, ea fieri apud inferos fingerent, quae sine corporibus nec fieri possent nec intellegi. Cf. Cicero ND, 1.92. Habebit igitur linguam deus et non loquetur, dentes, palatum, fauces nullum ad usum, quaeque procreationis causa natura corpori adfinxit, ea frustra habebit deus; nec externa magis quam interiora, cor, pulmones, iecur, cetera, etc.

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effect, and adds a rhetorical flourish: num igitur aliquis dolor aut omnino post

mortem sensus in corpore est? The point Cicero is stressing is just as there is no

sense left in our body when it dies, then when soul dies, how much more

completely is sensation destroyed. Cicero heightens the effect by still striving to

maintain the separation between the 'sense' of the body, and the faculty of

sensation in the soul. There is no pain in the destruction of the soul, since the

entire faculty of sensation is removed. Death, then, is no evil, since it takes place

with no sensation. Cicero punctuates his thought with Socrates' authority, when

he cite us a lengthy portion from the Apology, where Socrates says that death is

the soundest of sleeps, without any sensation and without any dreams.178

II. Separation and Want

That the dead are wretched because they are in want of life is offered as a

second reason why death is an evil, and Cicero responds to this in a two ways.

He claims that the soul can lack nothing when it is at home in the aether, writing

nulla re egens. The logical opposite is that when the soul does lack anything, it

must be when it is in an earthly body. We have seen evidence for this when we

consider that the soul struggles still to contemplate the truth, and that it longs to

rise upwards again, to regain the clarity of things it lost when it entered the

body. 'A's original proposition, that the dead are miserable because they are in

want of life is turned upside down by Cicero. He claims that haec quidem vita

mors est, this life is, as it were, a death for the soul,179 for it cloudies the clarity

of thought, and removes it from its natural home: death of the body is really the

birth of the soul.

The first explicit mention of the dead lacking anything is 1.12, hac luce

careant, which is the typical Latin idiom for the dead,180 i.e., those who lack the

light. At the beginning of the Tusculans, 'A' is entangled in a strange web of

17840c-41d, giving an accurate rendering. Cf, Douglas, p. 122, n. 97.179Cf, Augustine's famous, in istam dico vitam mortalem an mortem vitalem? Confessions, 1.6.7.180Cicero is careful to define 'egere', which expresses poverty, or 'want' in a non-desiring

fashion, and 'carere', which denotes a subjective desire.

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arguments by 'M', and complains that he is unable to express clearly what he

means. What 'A' seems to be aiming for here is the idea that the soul, after it has

seperated from its body, still longs for life and those 'goods' that one can

attribute the living and lead to happiness, such as authority, influence, and

wealth. The question here, at least informally posed by 'A', is whether the living

remain miserable because they fear an inevitable deprivation of life. In his

response, Cicero seems to incorporate three separate arguments. 'A's argument

assumes that the soul continues on after death, but his meaning and use of esse

(to be) is really to mean vivere (to live).181 'M's counter-arguments are simply

logical in response and rest upon the fact that anything that is non esse cannot

be predicated because there is in existence nothing left that may be attributed

the act of lacking.182 In addition, Cicero appends the absurd argument that even

if the dead did exist, life would not be natural to them. Man does not naturally

have horns since he hass no need (and therefore no want) of them. In the same

fashion, the dead do not have need of life, and therefore have no want of one.183

Another argument intertwined is that the act of lacking requires first the faculty

of sensation in order to know that something is lacking. However, in the case of

the complete destruction of the soul, there is no sensation remaining, so the

dead can have no means of knowing that they lack anything. Cicero follows this

line of reasoning up with a blur of definitions.184 He feels it necessary to show

'carere' includes the desire for something which happens to be missing, (egere

eo quod habere velis, to lack something you want), unless of course a special

idiom is used, the example used is 'febri carere', to be rid of a cold (lit. be in

want of a fever). In this case, says Cicero, another meaning is attached, that

there is knowledge of an absence, but there is no desire for the absent. The

passage is obscure, despite the fact that Cicero insists that what he is talking

181Tusc, 1.11, et tamen miseros ob id ipsum quidem, quia nulli sint.182Tusc, 1.87, de mortuis loquor, qui nulli sunt. But Cicero does not enter explicity into the

problem of 'being' and predication. For the troublesome problem of being and non-being, cf, KRS <pages>

183Commentators (Pohlez, p. 106, Douglas, 120) cite Plutarch, Adv Stoicos, 20.1068C, kera/twn kai\ ptepw~n ou)dei\v e)ndeh\v a!nqropo/v e)stin, o#ti mhde\ dei~tai tou/twn. "No man lacks horns or wings because there is no need of them."

184The translations of these passages into English are often more confusing than helpful, but this is unavoidable.

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about is the case where the soul is completely destroyed. The premise is 'A's: to

lack a good, is an evil; life is a good; therefore, because the dead are sensitive of

a lack of life, they are miserable. The simple syllogism, In mortuo nullus sensus

est, carere sentientis est, ergo carere igitur in mortuo non est185 at 1.29 is

ambiguous and it must be carefully read. It must be remembered that Cicero

does not wish it to appear that the immortal soul, which continues to have a

faculty of sensation, can lack or need anything. The obscurity in the passage

appears to come from the fact that the argument -- though Cicero does not

explicitly say so -- is written to apply to both cases, both when the soul survives

and when it is completely destroyed. What Cicero intends to mean by carere in

morte non dicitur is that in either case, it makes little sense to say that the dead

lack anything. The soul in the aetherial regions nulla re egens (at 1.43), is in

need of nothing when separate from the body (it is missing nothing of what is

proper to it, and so it has no want). Thus, we may construe the verb carere to

have Cicero's second definition. It is possible that the soul would recognize that

it no longer has a body, but it has no want for one, and like febri carere, the soul

is glad to be rid of it. In the second case, if the soul is destroyed with its faculty

of sensation, then again the verb makes no sense, because any sense of desire

for life will be destroyed along with its sensation, therefore, carere enim

sentientis est must carefully be taken to mean sentientis corporis, incorporating

the physical senses that Cicero distinguishes as corporis facibus at 1.44, since it

is body which causes in us any desire.186 Thus, when the physical sensations are

destroyed, there is nothing left to propel the soul into desiring anything, and in

the case where the faculty of sensation is wholly destroyed with the soul, there is

nothing in existence left capable of having or desiring anything. The point is

made only slightly clearer in 1.99 when Cicero writes, qui nec careat nec

185There is no sensation in death, to lack anything is the property of a thing with sensation, therefore you cannot feel a lack/want in death.

186One may object that the soul has a natural longing or innate desire to philosophize, but one has only to recall Tusc, 1.45, haec enim pulchritudo etiam in terris ... philosophiam cognitionis cupiditate incensam excitavit, that this longing of the soul is caused by being first shut up in the body, and second that it is by the natural beauty of the world and heavens, ie, seen through the eyes, that the soul is lifted upward towards the contemplation of the heaven.

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sentiat,187 where he means that nothing is possibly lamentable in that person who

neither lacks anything, nor thinks he does. He equates the loss of sensation with

the destruction of the soul, and whenever the faculty of sensation is destroyed,

the soul must necessarily be destroyed too.

Following this difficult passage, Cicero again tries to take in hand the spiny

problem of existence; the full annihilation (literally, to stop breathing) of the

soul along with the body is, as it were, the same as if it never existed. This is

curiously phrased, animo et corpore consumpto totoque animante deleto et facto

interitu universo illud animal, quod fuerit, factum esse nihil,188 the soul and body

extirpated, the whole living being laid waste, and by an all encompassing death

what the creature had been is brought to nothing. The strangeness of the

phrasing is found in factum esse nihil that it is brought to nothing. Cicero is not

clear what this nothingness is, whether the material of the soul, like Lucretius

simply takes on a new form, bearing no likeness to what it was, and in that sense

no long existing, or whether Cicero sincerely means that the existence of the

animal (breathing living being) truly comes to nothing.

If he does mean that factum esse nihil means to become nothing, then the

destruction of the soul to nothingness is no different from its nothingness (or

non-existence) at any other time; the arguments presented by Cicero are very

close to those of Lucretius.189 This immediately brings to mind the position

maintained by 'A' in Tusc, 1.11-13; there, the dead are consider wretched

because they no longer exist (quia nulli sint, the implication of course that they

know they no longer have life). Cicero at first parried the remarks by recourse

to the logical difficulties in predicating anything to which existence is denied.

We now receive a fuller response in terms of the faculty of sensation. The

difficulty we find with Cicero's formulation is the relationship between sensation

and existence. Existence is a necessary cause of sensation; everything that has

sensation exists (esse), but not everything that exists has sensation. Cicero

187Cf, Tusc, 1.92, quid curet autem, qui ne sentit quidem?188Tusc, 1.90.189Lucr, 3.830ff.

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couldn't be arguing that there is any material destruction: instead, what he must

mean by destruction is the end of its form, though this is not said explicitly. The

phrase, quod fuerit, factum esse nihil must refer to the form of the soul, i.e., the

form of the soul (whatever that is) comes to nothing, and like Lucretius, quod

mutatur enim, dissolvitur, interit ergo, what changes, dissolves, what dissolves,

must die. Cicero never seems to discuss his physical theory in the case that the

soul dies. It is clear that he doesn't share the same atomic structure inherent in

Lucretius. Therefore, when he conceives the soul as a fire or breath, he believes

it will remain eternal; if the soul dies, then it is a breath that can be dissipated,

or a fire can be quenched.190 In the end, however, Cicero's scepticism has little

effect on the question at hand: if the soul is fire and not extinguished, we will

rise to the aether; on the other hand, if the fire is quenched, no sensation

remains. There is such a drastic change in form, our soul is changed to be no

different from the other inanimate objects around us. In the end, the destruction

of the soul (that is, its dissipation) makes us no different from the rocks we might

be buried under.191

Cicero has completed his two pronged argument. Death is no evil, because

we are either immortal without any longings or desires to vex us in the afterlife,

or else we are so wholly changed and destroyed as to leave no trace of our soul

behind, and so our future non-existence may come as a comfort to us. Cicero is

not content though to leave us with a comfort of a peaceful afterlife. He also

wants to show us that it is a boon even to die. The famous pronouncement of

Epicarmus is still in his mind, emori nolo, sed me esse mortuum nihil aestimo. I

don't wish to die, but I don't worry about being dead. Cicero has certainly

proved the later part of the question, we have no need to concern ourselves for

the afterlife. Cicero feels that by establishing death as a good, we may also even

come to welcome death with desire and open arms.

190Tusc, 1.24, si anima est, fortasse dissipabitur; si ignis, extinguetur;191Tusc, 1.107, non ipsa saxa magis sensu omni vacabunt quam ille etc.

51

4. Conclusions on Goods and Evils

When trying to prove that death need not be feared, Cicero tries to show

that not only is death not an evil, but in fact the greatest good that can happen to

a person.192 There are only a few passing references to the ethical question of

bona et mala, but I this theme of goods and evils in Tusculans I Cicero must

connect in same fashion to the soul, since by undercutting any punishment or

reward in the afterlife, he must reaffirm our connection to virtue and vice.

It should be clear that for the majority of the book, Cicero has focused on

whether we can continue to suffer in the afterlife. Accepting that pain is an evil,

he has striven to prove that we cannot fall prey to any hardships or sufferings in

the afterlife. Nevertheless, Cicero also tries to show that the very act of death

will not only not take us into any evils,193 but that it will free us from life's pangs

and sorrows as well, and anything that removes pain is a good. There are two

opposing views, one, that death robs of us of pursuing goods in life, the other

that death saves us from a life of evils. 'A's argument that death is an evil stems

from his view that the dead remain orphaned from the advantages (commodis) of

life.194 Cicero claims that this is foolishness, and maintains a very dour view on

life. The 'advantages' of life (wealth, influence, authority) are those which Cicero

used as examples to show that the soul is immortal: taking care for posterity,

creating laws, planting trees, procreation, adoption, etc. But for Cicero, they

are incommoda which may cause the most grievous pains in life.195

In Tusc, 1.83-85, Cicero claims that in life we are grieved when we are

departed from these good things in life, but after we die we have no need for this

192Tusc, 1.16, Ut doceam, si possim, non modo malum non esse, sed bonum etiam esse mortem. Cf, Tusc, 1.23, and most clearly, 1.76, nihil bonum aliud potius, etc.

193Tusc, 1.15, calcem, ad quam cum sit decursum, nihil sit praeterea extimescendum, cf, Tusc, 1.26. carere omni malo mortem

194Tusc , 1.30, eos orbatos vitae commodis195Tusc, 1.87.

52

grief. Can these things be called good if they are the cause of so much evil?

Cicero pours forth myths and stories to show what evils men have endured in life

attempting to procure these goods. Hegesias writes that someone, upon their

death bed, claimed that life was no advantage to anyone (vivere expedire

nemini), Cicero sharpens the points, etiamne nobis expedit? Is it even to my

advantage? What good can come from living? If we die, we are sure to go to

heaven; and if we do not go to heaven, we become as if nothing -- being our

only source of unhappiness, it appears that life can be complained of with justice

and truth.196 Cicero had lost his daughter and been marginalized in public and

private life, he makes a bitter complaint, that had he died earlier, he would have

been freed from those injuries. Priam had his sons and daughters killed, himself

cut down in violence; if had died early, he would have been spared this

misfortunes. Pompey fell ill but recovered, only to lose his house, wealth, army

and life in a miserable fashion. Again, had he died early, he would have been

considered -- fortunate?197 It is surpising to find that Cicero does not make any

explicit references to the famous saying of Solon, despite his insistence that the

goods in life are only fortunate.

"We cannot admire any man's happiness that may yet, in course of time, suffer change.

For the uncertain future has yet to come, with every possible variety of fortune; and him

only to whom the divinity has continued happiness unto the end we call happy" 198

Death not only brings us a reprieve from suffering, but also protects us

from a future suffering, even if that future suffering is only a possibility. The

hope for a good future is not a wise thing says Cicero; it is wiser to fear what

can happen in our future than hope what might happen. The uncertainties of

chance (there is nothing certain in human affairs except death) bring us daily

moments of misfortune and evils. Cicero says that nothing is evil which is given

by nature to all; and since all living things must die, death is not only a good, but

fortunate. It seems then that life offers us only evils, except for one thing, says

196Tusc, 1.83. quid ego nunc lugeam vitam hominum? vere et iure possum;197Cf, Tusc, 1.97, what Socrates says of his own death, quis me beatior?198Plutarch, Solon. 27.6-7. ... ou)k e0a?| toi=j parou~sin a)gaqoi=j me/ga fronei=n, ou)de\ qauma&zein a)ndro_j eu)tuxi/an

metabolh~j xro&non e1xousan. e1peisi ga_r e9ka&stw| poiki/lon e0c a)dh&lou to_ me/llon: w{| d' ei0j te/loj o( dai/mwn e1qeto th_n eu)praci/an, tou~ton eu)dai/mona nomi/zomen.

53

Cicero, wisdom, and there is nothing more pleasant in life. Philosophy is what

gives us wisdom, and that is nothing different than learning how to die.

Like the lack of discussion on the topic of the gods, Cicero also leaves out

any discussion of virtue and vice, although he ultimately connects the life and

virtue, nemo parum diu vixit, qui virtutis perfectae perfecto functus est munere,

no one has lived too short a life who has fulfiled the duties of perfect virtue. But

we should not on this account feel that the Tusculans I are lacking or incomplete.

As the discussion of the gods was left to their own treatise, so to does Cicero

here gives hints of the inherent value of virtue that he later more fully expands in

De Officiis.

The Tusculans are not meant to be a complete philosophical whole, but as

an oratorical consolation, the ethical question is answered: in the end, we feel

that we do not need to fear death, even though by answering thus, Cicero raises

even further questions which remain outside the scope of this work.

54

Appendix - A reference for Cicero's Translations

Phaedrus, 245c199

[yuxh_ pa~sa a)qa&natoj.] to_ ga_r a)eiki/nhton a)qa&naton: to_ d' a!llo kinou~n kai\ u(p' a!llou kinou&menon, pau~lan e1xon kinh&sewj, pau~lan e1xei zwh~j. mo&non dh_ to_ au(to_ kinou~n, a#te ou)k a)polei=pon e9auto&, ou!pote lh&gei kinou&menon, a)lla_ kai\ toi=j a!lloij o#sa kinei=tai tou~to phgh_ kai\ a)rxh_ kinh&sewj.

Tusculans, 1.53

Quod semper movetur, aeternum est; quod autem motum adfert alicui quodque ipsum agitatur aliunde, quando finem habet motus, vivendi finem habeat necesse est. solum igitur, quod se ipsum movet, quia numquam deseritur a se, numquam ne moveri quidem desinit; quin etiam ceteris quae moventur hic fons, hoc principium est movendi.

Phaedrus, 245d

a)rxh_ de\ a)ge/nhton. e0c a)rxh~j ga_r a)na&gkh pa~n to_ gigno&menon gi/gnesqai, au)th_n de\ mhd' e0c e9no&j: ei0 ga_r e1k tou a)rxh_ gi/gnoito, ou)k a@n e1ti a)rxh_ gi/gnoito. e0peidh_ de\ a)ge/nhto&n e0stin, kai\ a)dia&fqoron au)to_ a)na&gkh ei]nai. a)rxh~j ga_r dh_ a)polome/nhj ou!te au)th& pote e1k tou ou!te a!llo e0c e0kei/nhj genh&setai, ei1per e0c a)rxh~j dei= ta_ pa&nta gi/gnesqai. ou#tw dh_ kinh&sewj me\n a)rxh_ to_ au)to_ au(to_ kinou~n. tou~to de\ ou!t' a)po&llusqai ou!te gi/gnesqai dunato&n, h@ pa&nta te ou)rano_n pa~sa&n te gh~n ei0j e4n sumpesou~san sth~nai kai\ mh&pote au}qij e1xein o#qen kinhqe/nta genh&setai. a)qana&tou de\ pefasme/nou tou~ u(f' e9autou~ kinoume/nou, yuxh~j ou)si/an te kai\ lo&gon tou~ton au)to&n tij le/gwn ou)k ai0sxunei=tai. pa~n ga_r sw~ma, w{| me\n e1cwqen to_ kinei=sqai, a!yuxon, w{| de\ e1ndoqen au)tw?| e0c au(tou~, e1myuxon, w(j tau&thj ou!shj fu&sewj yuxh~j: ei0 d' e1stin tou~to ou#twj e1xon, mh_ a!llo ti ei]nai to_ au)to_ e9auto_ kinou~n h@ yuxh&n, e0c a)na&gkhj a)ge/nhto&n te kai\ a)qa&naton yuxh_ a@n ei1h.

Tusculans 1.54

principii autem nulla est origo; nam e principio oriuntur omnia, ipsum autem nulla ex re alia nasci potest; nec enim esset id principium, quod gigneretur aliunde. quod si numquam oritur, ne occidit quidem umquam; nam principium extinctum nec ipsum ab alio renascetur, nec ex se aliud creabit, siquidem necesse est a principio oriri omnia. ita fit, ut motus principium ex eo sit, quod ipsum a se movetur; id autem nec nasci potest nec mori, vel concidat omne caelum omnisque natura consistat necesse est nec vim ullam nanciscatur, qua a primo inpulsa moveatur. cum pateat igitur aeternum id esse, quod se ipsum moveat, quis est qui hanc naturam animis esse tributam neget? inanimum est enim omne, quod pulsu agitatur externo; quod autem est animal, id motu cietur interiore et suo; nam haec est propria natura animi atque vis. quae si est una ex omnibus quae se ipsa moveat, neque nata certe est et aeterna est.

199Plato. Platonis Opera, ed. John Burnet. Oxford University Press. 1903.

55

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