1

OnlinePublicShaming:VirtuesandVices

WearewitnessingincreasinguseoftheInternet,particularsocialmedia,

tocriticize(perceived)moralfailingsandmisdemeanors.Thisphenom-

enonofso-called ‘onlinepublicshaming’couldprovideapowerful tool

forreinforcingvaluablesocialnorms.Butitalsothreatensunwarranted

and severe punishments meted out by online mobs. Drawing on the

workofJohnLocke,aswellasonrecentdiscussionsofsocialnorms,we

analyzethedangersassociatedwiththeinformalenforcementofnorms,

butalsohighlightthepromiseofthispractice.Wethenconsidertwocru-

cialconditionsthatonlinepublicshamingmustmeetinordertobejusti-

fiable:proportionalityandaccountability.Weargue that these require-

mentsareinfactfrequentlyviolated,renderingmostcasesofonlinepub-

lic shamingunjustified.While theuseof onlinepublic shaming against

others’ vices has some apparent virtues, it is currently rarely justified,

givenitsownvices.

Keywords:Accountability;Locke;proportionality;publicshaming;socialnorms

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1. Introduction

Thephrase“publicshaming”bringstomindstocks,pillories,androttentomatoes.

Butthephenomenonofpublicshaminghaskeptpacewithtechnologicalprogress.

Publicshaminghasgonedigital.TheInternetaffordsunprecedentedopportunities

tocriticizethoseweconsidertohavedonewrong.Ill-advisedtweets,photos,and

Facebook posts regularly go viral and attract streams of criticism. Moreover,

individualsregularlytaketotheInternettodenounceconducttheyhaveobserved

offline, and appeal to others to join them in their condemnation. The list of

(in)famous cases of online public shaming gets longer by themonth – from the

veryearlycaseof“dogpoopgirl”1toamorerecentexampleinwhichavideoofa

customerraciallyabusingapostofficeemployeeinLondonwasputonFacebook

andattractednearlyamillionviews.2

Manyofthosewhohavebeenthetargetofthiskindofonlinepublicsham-

inghave facedsevereconsequences–sufferingdeepdistress,havinggreatdetail

abouttheirprivate livesmadepublic,andlosingtheir jobs. Intellingthestoryof

LindseyStone,whowaspubliclyshamedforajokephotoinwhichsheappearedto

beactingdisrespectfullyatamilitarycemetery,JonRonsonreportsthatStone“fell

into depression, became an insomniac, and barely left home for a year” (2015a,

1“Dogpoopgirl”wasayoungwomaninSouthKoreawho,in2005,refusedtocleanupthe

messafterherdoghaddefecatedonasubwaytrain.See

http://knowyourmeme.com/memes/dog-poo-girl;Solove(2007,1-3).

2Thiswasthenpickedupbythemainstreammediaandreportedinmanymediaoutlets,

nodoubtcausingmillionsmorepeopletoseethevideo.SeeBBCNews(2018).

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202).3Theseverityoftheconsequencessufferedbythoseshamedonlineisoneof

themainthemesofRonson’sbookaboutthephenomenon,whichvividlyrecounts

severalshamingstories.

However,we should not be too quick to decry all online public shaming.

Thousandsofpeopleparticipateinthispractice,believingthatitcanbeaforcefor

good.Many consider themselves to be upholding valuable standards of conduct,

andrightlycensuringthosewhofallshortofthosestandards.Thiskindofinformal

sanctioning is essential to ensuring the continuation of these standards. Indeed,

somemightarguethatitwouldsurelybewrongtoallowracist,sexist,dangerous,

anddisrespectful conduct togounchallenged.Would thisnotbe toconnivewith

wrongdoing,andperhapsevenmakethosewhooverlooktheseoffencescomplicit?

Onlinepublicshamingcanbeaneffectivewaytocensurewrongdoing,drawatten-

tion to social ills such as racism and sexism, and deter future wrongdoers. As

SamratHanif,whoput the video of the post officeworker being racially abused

online,said,postingthevideowillhopefullymeanthat“thislady”–andothers,we

canassume–“willneverdothisagain”(quotedinBBCNews2018).

This justification for public shaming holds that it is an effective way in

which to enforce valuable social norms – rules of behavior that ought to govern

ourconductinrelationtooneanother.Publicshamingcanhighlightviolationsof

these norms, reaffirm the importance of compliance, help in causing the norm

violatortorepent,anddeterfutureviolations.

In some cases, at least, these beneficial results do indeed occur. In May

2015, Shauna Huntwas interviewing two sports fans live on-air, when shewas

3Ronson(2015b)alsotellsStone’sstory.

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interruptedbyamanwhosaidintohermicrophone“Fuckherrightinthepussy”.4

Withthecamerastillrolling,Huntproceededtoquestionagroupofmenwhohad

cheeredontheheckler.Askedtoexplainwhyhefounditsofunny,ShawnSimoes

responded: “It’s fucking awesome! You’re lucky there’s not a fucking vibrator in

your ear!” The footage was posted online, and went viral. After having been

shamedinthisway,Simoessentanapologylettertothejournalist,madeadona-

tion to amale-led group seeking tomakemen takemore responsibility to stop

violenceagainstwomen,andvoluntarilyattendedsensitivitytraining(seeHuffing-

ton Post Canada 2015). Irrespective of whether this instance of public shaming

was justifiedall thingsconsidered, itwouldbeamistake tooverlook theseposi-

tives.

Aswehavealready intimated,however, thingsdonotalwaysworkoutso

well.InDecember2013,onherwayfromNewYorktoCapeTowntovisitfamily,

Justine Sacco tweeted “Going to Africa. Hope I don’t get AIDS. Just kidding. I’m

white!”5Shemeant thisasan ironiccommentabout theattitudesofmiddle-class

white Americans towards AIDS, but many observers considered it racist.6Sacco

faced a barrage of online criticism,much of it threatening and abusive, andwas

firedfromherjob–allwhileshewasonaplane,andsounabletodefendherselfor

explainhertweet.

Variouscommentatorshavewarnedoftheexcessivenatureofthepunish-

mentsimposedthroughonlinepublicshaming.DanielSolovewritesthat“Internet

4OuraccounthereisdrawnfromGillis(2015).

5Sacco’sstoryistoldinRonson(2015a,63-77);Ronson(2015c).

6ForSacco’sexplanation,seeRonson(2015a,69).

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shaminghasatendencytobecomeoverzealous”(2007,95).Further,it“createsan

indelible blemish on a person’s identity. Being shamed in cyberspace is akin to

beingmarked for life…Peopleacquirepermanentdigitalbaggage” (2007,94). In

the same vein, Kate Klonick notes that “the punishments are both extreme and

endless and seem deeply uncalibrated to the transgressions” (2016, 1054). The

storiestoldbyRonsonclearlysupporttheseclaims.

So,whatarewetomakeofonlinepublicshaming,giventhatitsometimes

doesgood,yetsooften isoverzealousandexcessive?Ouraim in thispaper is to

drawupontheresourcesofpoliticalphilosophytoilluminatebothourreasonsto

welcomepublicshaming,duetoitsroleinenforcingvaluablesocialnorms,andthe

rather stringent conditions that we must meet in order for instances of public

shamingtobejustified.

Ourstartingpointisperhapsasurprisingone;itiswiththewritingsofJohn

Locke. While the kinds of public shaming with which we are concerned in this

paper use new technologies, the idea thatwemight haveworries regarding the

enforcementofmoralrulesthroughinformalsanctioningisnotanewone.Indeed,

it is a central insightwithin Locke’sSecondTreatiseofGovernment, and our first

taskwillbetoshowhowhisanalysishelpsustounderstandonlinepublicshaming

asaphenomenon.

Beforeturningtothat,however,itisimportanttonotetwolimitsofourin-

quiry.First,wefocusonthepotentialroleofpublicshaminginupholdingmorally

authoritativesocial norms – extant social norms with which individuals have a

duty to comply, such that violating them is wrongful. We say more about the

natureofsocialnormsandmoralauthoritativenessbelow(seeSection4.1).Butwe

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donotaddressthequestionofwhatexplainswhyparticularnormsareauthorita-

tive, or indeedwhy social norms can be authoritative at all. These deeper ques-

tionsinmoralphilosophyfallbeyondthescopeofourinquiry.Instead,wehopeit

isuncontroversialthattheexamplesthatweusedoinvolvemorallyauthoritative

norms,suchasnormsagainstracismandsexism.Ourfocusonmorallyauthorita-

tivenormsalsomeansthatwedonotdiscusscomplexitiesthatarisewhennorms

arecontested,orwhenpublicshamingisusedinanefforttoestablishnewsocial

norms.We recognize that this excludes an important range of cases, which are

worthyofsustainedattention.Butwethinkit iscrucial firsttoaddressthemore

straightforward cases of online public shaming directed at violations ofmorally

authoritative social norms. After all, if public shaming were always (or almost

always)impermissible,eveninthosecases,whenthetargetofshaminghasviolat-

edadutytocomplywithamorallyauthoritativenorm,thenitisveryunlikelyever

tobejustifiedinthemorecomplicatedcases.

Asecondlimitofourinquiryisthatwedonotexaminepreciselywhatcon-

stitutes ‘shame’orwhether ‘onlinepublicshaming’ is thecorrect termtouse for

our phenomenon of interest. These are interesting issues, but we lack space to

explorethemhere.Instead,weusetheterm‘onlinepublicshaming’inthewaythat

hasbecomecommon,i.e.torefertotheuseoftheInternettodrawattentiontoand

criticize(perceived)wrongdoing.Ouraimistoidentifyprotantoreasonsinfavor

ofsuchshaming,andtoconsidersomeofthestringentconditionsthatitmustmeet

inordertobejustified.Wearguethatusingonlinepublicshamingagainstothers’

vices has some apparent virtues, but that it is in fact currently rarely justified,

givenitsownvices.

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2. LessonsfromLocke

Locke argues that in the pre-political “state of nature” every individual has the

righttoenforcethelawofnature,whichisthemorallawthateachofusoughtto

follow.Whilethestateofnatureis“astateof liberty…it isnotastateof license”

(Locke1689,II.II.§6).7Itisgovernedbythelawofnature,accordingtowhicheach

individual isboundtopreservebothherselfandtherestofmankind.Thosewho

violatethelawofnature,forexamplebyharminganother“inhislife,health,liber-

ty, or possessions” (Locke 1689, II.II.§6),may be rightfully punished in order to

preservethesafetyandsecurityofall.Moreover,“Everymanhatharighttopunish

theoffender,andbeexecutionerofthelawofnature”(Locke1689,II.II.§8).With-

outrightsofenforcement,thelawofnaturewouldbeinvain.And,giventhatthe

stateofnatureisa“stateofperfectequality”(Locke1689,II.II.§7),ifanyindividual

hasarighttopunishoffendersthenallmusthavethatright.

Sensibly, Locke insists that theoffender’spunishment shouldnotbearbi-

traryorunlimited.Itmustbe“proportionatetohistransgression,whichissomuch

asmay serve for reparationand restraint” (Locke1689, II.II.§8). Inotherwords,

punishment has specific purposes: making reparations for harm to others and

deterringfutureviolations.Punishmentshouldnotgobeyondwhatisnecessaryto

fulfillthesepurposes(Locke1689,II.II.§12;seealso§§10-11).

Locke recognizes that there is a problem here, however, and he imagines

someoneobjectingtohisviewalongthefollowinglines:

7Bythis,wemeanBookII,ChapterII,§6.Weusethesamenotationalformatthroughout.

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Idoubtnotbutitwillbeobjected,thatitisunreasonableformentobe

judgesintheirowncases,thatself-lovewillmakemenpartialtothem-

selvesandtheir friends:andon theotherside, that ill-nature,passion

and revenge will carry them too far in punishing others; and hence

nothingbutconfusionanddisorderwillfollow(Locke1689,II.II.§13).

Locke readily admits that this is one of the great “inconveniences” of life in the

stateofnature.Variousaspectsofhumanpsychology,includingourvery“passion”

forexactingjustice,makeitlikelythatsomewillbeexcessivelypunished.Equally,

otherswillescapepunishment,duetoour“partiality” towardourselvesand“un-

concernedness”forothers(Locke1689,II.IX.§125).

ThisproblemisexacerbatedbytwofurthercomplicationsthatLockeover-

looks.First,thecontentofthelawofnatureiscomplex,suchthatevenindividuals

who act in good faith andwho do not exhibit partiality toward themselves and

unconcernedness towardotherswill sometimesdisagreeaboutwhethera trans-

gressionhastakenplace.8Thisisbecausethenatureofanindividual’sconductis

sometimesunclear,suchas inthecaseofSacco,whosecommentswereintended

asironic.Thispointisespeciallyforcefuloncewerecognizetheexistenceofwhat

JohnRawlscallsthe“burdensofjudgment”–thatis,themany“hazardsinvolvedin

thecorrect(andconscientious)exerciseofourpowersofreasonandjudgmentin

theordinarycourseofpoliticallife”(1996,55-56).Second,ratherthanunevenness

inpunishmentbeing fairlydistributed, it is instead likely to reflect racist, sexist,

8Inthisway,wearedoubtfulregardingLocke’sclaimthatthelawofnatureis“plainand

intelligibletoallrationalcreatures”(Locke1689,II.IX.§124).Lockeadmitsthatbiaswill

leadtodisagreement,butseemstooverlookreasonabledisagreement.

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and classist biases, and so be more targeted against members of marginalized

groups.Thosewhoaremorepowerful,andsoenjoygreatercapacitiesforretalia-

tion,arelesslikelytobepunishedthanthosewhoarecomparativelypowerless.

Allthreeofthesefeaturesareevidentincontemporaryexamplesofonline

public shaming, and so germane to our inquiry. First, those who engage in this

practice typicallydemonstrate “partiality” toward themselvesand “unconcerned-

ness” for others. Second, it is sometimes unclear whether the target has in fact

violated the relevant social norm. Third, participants often exhibit racist, sexist,

andclassistbiases.9

Lockeoffersthepressingproblemswithprivateindividualsenforcingrules

andnormsasacentralreasonthatindividualswouldchoosetoleavethestateof

nature and enter political society. The establishment of “civil government is the

proper remedy for the inconveniences of the state of nature” (Locke 1689,

II.II.§13). Crucially, government provides a “known and indifferent judge, with

authority to determine all differences according to the established law” (Locke

1689,II.IX.§125).Individualsgiveuptheirnaturalrighttopunishtransgressors,in

favor of establishing a centralized authority that promulgates and enforces laws

impartially.Privateenforcementofthelawofnatureisreplacedbygovernmental

enforcement.

Thissolutionisnotavailabletous,however,sinceweareexplicitlyfocused

upon informal sanctions to enforce social norms, rather than on state sanctions.

Social norms are rules that govern the attitudes and behavior of members of a

9Forexample,studiesalsorevealthatonlineabuseisdisproportionatelydirectedat

femalesandmembersofethnicminorities.SeeGardineret.al.(2016).

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group,specifyinghowmembersofthatgroupought(not)toact.10Theyspecifya

public standard to whichmembers expect one another to adhere. Social norms

concernawiderrangeofconductthanthatregulatedbylaw.Theyincluderulesof

etiquette, manners, fair play, respect, and so on. The norms that we are most

concernedwithareones that regulateconduct thatoughtnotbesubject to legal

regulation. In some cases, this is for principled reasons, such aswhen using the

coercive power of the state would be self-defeating. In other cases, this is for

practicalreasons,suchaswhenthelawistoobluntaninstrument,andsoitwould

be unduly costly to penalize violations of the norm. Informal sanctioningwithin

civil society through public shaming is a vital enforcementmechanismwith re-

spect to thesenorms.Aswith the lawofnaturewithinLocke’sstateofnature, if

individualslacktherighttoenforcesocialnorms,thenwemightfearthatthatthey

willceasetobeeffectiveregulatorsofbehavior.

Thisisnottosuggestthatthestatehasnoroleinregulatingpublicshaming.

Lawsagainstlibelandhatespeechcanpreventitsworstexcesses.The“righttobe

forgotten”mightprovideawaythatpeoplecanescapefrompastnormviolations

and live free fromthe fearof futuresanctions.11Weshouldalsoconsider further

innovative policy solutions, such as laws that provide employees with greater

protectionagainstbeingdismissedforactionsoutsideofworkthataredeemedto

10Forfurtherdiscussionofthenatureofsocialnormsandtheirimportancetowell-

functioningsocieties,seeBrennanet.al.(2013);McTernan(2014).

11TheEuropeanCourtofJusticeendorsedthe‘righttobeforgotten’in2014.SeeWarman

andBarratt(2014).

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damage their employer’s reputation and profitability.12Crucially, however, all of

these laws are ways to make informal sanctioning less severe or problematic,

rather than the state itself takingover the roleof sanctioning, in theway that it

does within Locke’s account. While the state can endeavor to prevent certain

wrongfulformsofinformalsanctioning,itcannotitselfbethesanctioner,precisely

becauseweareconsideringtheenforcementofinformalsocialnorms.

3. TheRoleofSocialNormsandPublicShaming

Wewill return to Locke later in the paper. The upshot of the previous section,

however, is that thoughLockehelpsus to identify thedangersof informal sanc-

tioning,hissolutionisnotavailableinourcontext.Thisseemstoleaveuswithtwo

options.Wecouldeitherabandonpublicshamingaltogetherorseektoimproveit.

Thefirstoftheseoptionsmightseemattractiveatfirst,sinceitmeansthatwedo

not face themany problems associatedwith this kind of individualized enforce-

ment.Butthiswouldalsobringconsiderablecosts.Inparticular,itrisksundermin-

ingvaluablesocialnorms,whichareessentialforensuringpeacefulandcoopera-

tivecoexistence.Toseewhythismightbeaproblem,wemustsaymoreaboutthe

roleofsocialnormsandthegoodsthatwecanrealizethroughtheirenforcement.

As Solove notes, “Norms bind societies together; they regulate everyday

conduct; they foster civility. They are the oil that reduces the friction of human

interaction… In short, norms are a central mechanism through which a society

exercises social control” (2007, 6). This kindof “social control” is crucial for the

smooth functioningof all societies.While lawsplay an important role in this re-

12WethankXXforthissuggestion.

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gard, they are not sufficient. We also need informal social norms, which create

stableexpectationsandfacilitatecooperationandconcord.Analysisofsexismand

racismhelpstoillustratethispoint.Eventhoughsexistandracistdiscriminationis

almost universally legally prohibited, pervasive social norms that unjustly privi-

lege the interestsofwhitemencontinuetoexist. It iswidelyacceptedthatover-

coming racial and gender injustices requires us to develop andmaintain better,

egalitarian,socialnorms.13

Externalsanctions,suchaspraise,blame,commendation,andcriticism,are

vitalformaintainingsocialnorms.Whennormsarefunctioningwell,membersofa

grouptakethemtobeauthoritativeorobligatory.Theyacceptandinternalizethe

norms,suchthattheyconsiderthemselvesduty-boundtocomplywiththem,and

are likely to feel guilt or shame if they violate them. Nonetheless, the internal

sanctionsgeneratedbythesemoralemotionsaregenerallyinsufficienttomotivate

compliance with the norms, especially over a longer period of time. External

sanctions are needed to fortify the moral capacities of individuals who cannot

reliably depend on internal sanctions doing the job.14It is this combination of

internalandexternalsanctionsenforcingsocialnormsthatmakes themeffective

as regulators of individuals’ behavior. As Emily McTernan notes, empirical re-

search shows that “social norms are powerful determinants of behaviour, and

securestablepatternsofbehaviourfromthemajorityofthosewhointernalisethe

norm”(2014,95).

13Forexample,seeGheaus(2012);Gheaus(2018).

14Fordiscussionoftheideaofmoralfortification,seeHoward(2017).

13

Publicshaming isone formofexternalsanctionthatcanupholdandrein-

force morally authoritative social norms. In doing so, it plays several valuable

roles.15Mostobviously,itmakestheoffenderawarethatshehasviolatedasocial

norm. Ideally, thiswill leadher to recognize that shehasactedwrongly, feel re-

morse, apologize, seek to make appropriate amends, and commit to complying

with the norm in future. This is the “reparative” role that Locke identifies. The

secondroleofpunishmentidentifiedbyLockeis“restraint”,ordeterrence.Public

shamingcanreducefuturenormviolations,byboththenormviolatorandothers,

since individualsare less likely todisobeysocialnorms if theywillbeexternally

sanctioned for doing so. In this way, public shaming helps to protect potential

victims against future violations. Further, it also demonstrates solidarity with

thosewhoarewrongedbyanormviolation,showingthemthatothersareunwill-

ing to let thewrongdoing go unnoticed and uncriticized. Finally, public shaming

provides a way that we can express our endorsement of valuable social norms,

thus strengthening our shared sense of commitment to those norms, and the

valuestheypromoteorrespect.

We can observe each of these points in the case of Shawn Simoes, who

made sexist remarks to ShaunaHunt live on-air. First, the public shaming of Si-

moeshelpedtoensurethathewasawareoftheseriousnessofhiswrongdoing,for

whichhelaterapologized.Second,hispublicshamingprovidesausefulreminder

of the fate thatan individualmaysufferbyacting in thisway.Nodoubt, thishas

deterredboth Simoes andothers fromacting similarly in the future, and, in this

15Wedisentanglethesedistinctrolesmorecarefullyandingreaterdepthinour[reference

removed].

14

way,ithashelpedtoprotectpotentialvictimsagainstsimilarkindsofsexistcon-

duct. Finally, thosewho shamedSimoeshavedemonstrated their solidaritywith

Hunt,aswellasstrengthenedtheirsharedcommitmenttostampoutthiskindof

sexistbehavior.

Partofwhatenablesonlineshamingtoplaythesevariousrolesisitspublic

nature.Clearly, shamingmustbepublic if it is tostrengthenoursharedcommit-

ment to the norm and deter other prospective violators. Further, holding unac-

ceptable behavior to public view and inviting others to affirm thewrongness of

thatbehaviorisperhapsmorelikelytocausetheoffendertofeelremorseandseek

tomakeamends,becausetheyarelikelytoexperienceagreaterdegreeofguiltand

shamethanwouldbethecaseotherwise.Privatecriticismcanalsoservesomeof

theseroles,ofcourse,andisanotherimportantmeansofsocialnormenforcement.

Butthepublicnatureofonlineshamingenablesittoservesomerolesmoreeffec-

tively,andtoserveotherrolesthatprivatecriticismcannot.

Theupshotofthisanalysisisthatwehavereasonstowelcomepublicsham-

ing, given theway inwhich it can enforce valuable social norms.Moreover, one

mighthavehighhopesforonlinepublicshaminginparticular.Moreinformationis

open to public view than ever before, andwe can disseminate that information

globallyandinstantaneously.Thisenablesordinarypeopletoholdoneanotherto

account,upholdvaluablesocialnorms,andpromotegoodconduct.Thedecentral-

izednatureofonlineshamingmeansthatitcanreflectvaluessharedbyordinary

usersoftheInternet,ratherthantheviewsofpowerfulelites.Onlinepublicsham-

15

ingmightappeartobeanegalitarian,orevendemocratic,formofpublicaccounta-

bilitythatcangivevoicetomembersofmarginalizedgroups.16

Thisrosypictureofonlinepublicshamingdoesnotseemtomatchpresent

reality, however. Nothing that we have said eliminates the worries that Locke

helpedustoidentifyorthatwesawinsomeoftheexamplesabove.Evenifpublic

shamingcanplayvaluableroles,thisdoesnotmeanthatitalways,orevenoften,

does.Weshouldstillhavegraveconcernsaboutthelargenumberofrecentcases

wherepublic shaminghasbeenexcessive, causedseveredistress, andseemingly

givenpeopleanexcusetoletouttheir“ill-nature”(touseLocke’sterm)byinsult-

ingandthreateningtheirtargets.Evenifpublicshaming,includingonlineshaming,

couldbeavaluablepractice,experiencesuggeststhatitisinfactadangerousone,

justasLockemighthaveexpected.Nonetheless,abandoningthepracticealtogeth-

erisnotanunambiguouslyattractiveoption,forthereasonswehavehighlighted

inthissection.

Theseremarkspointtothesecondoptionwementioned:wemightseekto

improve our practices of online public shaming, by developing principles and

guidelines to govern the practice and establishwhen, and inwhat forms, public

shamingisandisnotjustifiable.Inotherwords,thereisaneedforustodevelopa

moralframeworkthatwecanusetoassessthejustifiabilityofinstancesofonline

public shaming. The rest of this paper seeks to contribute to this endeavor, by

16Here,weputasideworriesrelatingtothefactthatmanywebsitesusealgorithmsto

structuretheinformationthatusersreceive,andsotheabilitytoshareinformationisnot

sodecentralisedasitmayfirstseem.Fordiscussion,seeHern(2016).

16

discussingtwoprinciplesthatwillbecentraltoanysuchframework:proportional-

ityandaccountability.

4. Proportionality

WesawearlierthatLockeheldthatthepunishmentofthosewhoviolatethelawof

naturemust beproportionate to the aims of that punishment. The same applies

withrespecttothepublicshamingofthosewhoviolatesocialnorms.Aninstance

of public shaming is justifiable only if it is proportionate. This requires that its

negative consequences are not excessive in comparison with its positive conse-

quences.Thepositiveconsequencesherearethosethatweidentifiedintheprevi-

ous section – causing remorse, deterring future violations, strengthening our

commitmenttoandcompliancewithvaluablesocialnorms,andsoon.Thenega-

tiveconsequencesincludethepsychologicalandreputationalharmstotheshamed

individual, aswell as anymaterial costs that follow, such as the loss of her job.

Klonick,Ronson,andSoloveallarguethatthesenegativeconsequenceshavebeen

disproportionate to the positive consequences in many cases of online public

shaming.

Determiningwhetherthisproportionalityrequirementisfulfilledinapar-

ticular case is a complex matter, which will depend on various contextually-

specific factors.Nonetheless, it remainspossible tomakeanumberofmoregen-

eralpoints.

4.1.Morallyauthoritativesocialnorms

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Publicshamingthatenforcesasocialnormcanbeproportionateonlyifthatnorm

ismorally authoritative. If the relevant social norm is notmorally authoritative,

thenthereisnovalueinitsenforcementorreinforcement,soimposingburdenson

people by shaming them is always disproportionate.17Social norms aremorally

authoritativewhenindividualsareunderadutytocomplywiththem.Somenorms

generatesuchdutiesbyreflectingpre-existingmoralprinciples.Forexample,we

can justifynormsagainstsexistandracistspeechon thegrounds thatsexistand

racistspeechisitselfwrongful.Ofcourse,whatcountsassexistorracistspeech–

for example,what epithets are sexistor racist –will oftenbedeterminedby the

particularsocialcontext.ThisispartofwhatmakesSacco’scasesodifficult.

Other norms relate to pre-existing moral principles in more complicated

ways.Forexample,wemight think that it ismorallydesirable,orevenrequired,

thattherebesomegenerallyrecognizedwayofdecidingtheorderinwhichpeople

willgetontobuses,sothatpassengersdonotcomeintoconflictwithoneanother.

Thereisnomoralrequirementthatthisorderbesetbyaqueuethatisformedona

first-come-first-servedbasis.Wemightimagineasocietyinwhichsomeotherfair

systemisused instead.However, if theprevailingsocialnormis indeedqueuing,

thenwe should take it asmorally authoritative, since it facilitates peaceful bus-

boarding.18Various norms of politeness and respect operate in this way: it is

17ThisconclusionparallelsJeffMcMahan’sclaimthatallunjustwarsaredisproportionate

(2016).

18Moreover,thisexamplealsoshowsthatnotallsocialnormsthataremorallyauthorita-

tivearemorallyrequired,orevenmorallyoptimal.Forexample,let’ssupposewewereto

discoveranewmethodofallocatingseatsonbusesthatwasmarginallyfairerandmore

18

morallydesirabletohavesomenormregardingwhatbehaviorispoliteorrespect-

ful in various situations, and compliance with whatever norm comes to prevail

withinaparticularcontextisthenmorallyrequired,providingthatnormplaysits

rolesufficientlywell.

Animplicationofthisdiscussionisthatdifferentnormscanbepresentand

morallyauthoritative indifferent contextsorwithindifferent communities.19For

example,theremightbedifferentnormsonlineandoffline.Thiscancreatedifficul-

ties when online public shaming is used in response to conduct that occurred

offline.Inorderforsuchshamingtobeproportionate,thenormthatwasbreached

musthavebeenmorallyauthoritativeinthecontextinwhichthetargetedindivid-

ualacted,ratherthanbeinganormthatisdistinctivetoonlineinteraction.Propor-

tionalityrequiresthetargetofpublicshamingtohaveviolatedaduty.

4.2.Narrowproportionality

Someinstancesofpublicshamingareproportionatebecausetheyimposeburdens

uponnormviolatorsthatthose individualsare liable tosuffer,duetotheirviola-

tion of the norm. This is narrowproportionality(McMahan 2009, 20-24; Tadros

2011,356-359).

Anormviolatorcanbeliableonlyifshehasculpablyviolatedthenorm.This

requiresthatshemusthavebeenabletogainknowledgeoftherelevantnormand

efficientthanqueuing.Thiswouldcallintoquestionwhetherthecurrentsocialnormis

morallyoptimal.Butitwouldnot–immediately,atleast–callintoquestionwhether

compliancewiththeexistingsocialnormismorallyrequired.

19SomeofthecomplicationsthatthiscreatesarediscussedinValentini(forthcoming).

19

that her conduct breached that norm in a way that she could have reasonably

foreseen.Herviolationof thenormcan thusbeconsidered toreflectan “illwill”

toward others. This culpability conditionwas clearlymet in the case of Simoes,

whoseconductwasuncontroversiallysexist,andthepostofficecustomer,whose

conductwasuncontroversiallyracist.Itislessclearthatitwasfulfilledinthecase

ofSacco,whosecommentswereintendedtobeironic.

When thinking about public shaming’s negative consequences, one factor

thatwillaffectthemagnitudeofthereputationalandpsychologicalharmsimposed

uponthenormviolatoristhesizeoftheaudiencebeforewhomsheisshamed,and

thenumberofpeoplewhothenparticipateintheshaming.Thoughwehavebeen

talking about public shaming in a generalway, it is important to recognize that

publicitycomesindegrees.Therearebigdifferencesbetweenanindividualbeing

criticizedinfrontofasmallgroupoffriendsorcolleaguesandherbeingchastised

beforethegeneralpublic,throughthemediaorInternet.Oneoftheprimarycon-

cernswithonlinepublicshamingisthefactthatitcanreachsuchalargeaudience,

wherebythousands,orevenmillions,ofpeopleknowaboutandcondemnanorm

violation. Many who have been the target of online public shaming describe a

senseofthewholeworldbeingagainstthem,andtheintenseshame,humiliation,

anddistressthatthiscauses(seeRonson2015a).Thesesevereconsequencesare

oneof the reasons that onlinepublic shamingwill oftenbenarrowlydispropor-

tionate.Evenifindividualsareliabletosuffersomenegativeconsequencesdueto

20

their norm violation, theywill rarely be liable to suffer the kind of distress and

humiliationthatonlinepublicshamingregularlybringsabout.20

Anotherfactorthatmakesasignificantdifferencetowhetherpublicsham-

ing is narrowly proportionate iswhether it is reintegrative.21ToniMassaro pro-

vides an account of shaming practices in pre-World War II Japan and colonial

America,inwhichshearguesthatshamingwas“notunderstoodinthesecommu-

nities as an expression of contempt that permanently renounces or expels the

shame[d]member” (1997, 682). Instead, it showed that norm violationswill be

criticizedandpunished,butwiththeaimofreconcilingtheviolatorandthecom-

munity. Indeed, “the bond between the community and the shamed member is

reinforced… rather than severed” (Massaro 1997, 682). Healthy forms of public

shaming aim at, andmake possible, the reintegration of the norm violator back

intothecommunity,ratherthanpermanentlystigmatizingthem.

Inthesamevein, JohnBraithwaitedrawsadistinctionbetweenreintegra-

tiveanddisintegrativeshaming inthecontextofstate-basedpunishment(2000).

Reintegrative shaming seeks, and is receptive to, repentance on the part of the

shamed.Itfunctionsasameansofmoraleducation,seekingtobringtheoffender

20Thereareimportantquestionsabouthowtounderstandnarrowproportionalityin

casesthatinvolvethesystematicaccumulationofsmallerharms.Wediscussthisissuein

our[referenceremoved].

21Inemphasisingthatreintegrationmakesadifferencetowhetherpublicshamingis

proportionate,wedonotmeantodenythatreintegrationmightalsobeimportantfor

otherreasonsorthatitservesasanindependentconstraintofjustifiablepublicshaming.

Indeed,weargueelsewherethatitisanindependentconstraint,aswellasacontributorto

proportionality.Seeour[referenceremoved].

21

toanawarenessofthewrongnessofherconductandtoproducereformation. In

contrast, disintegrative shaming stigmatizes anddegrades the offender, posing a

threattoherveryidentityandprovidingnomeansofreconciliation.

Onlinepublicshamingcanalienateitstargetsfrombothonlineandoffline

communities.22Itshouldthusmakepossiblereintegrationintowhichevercommu-

nitiesare relevant– that is, intoanycommunity inwhich the individualhas lost

theirgoodstanding.Thisalsoinvolvesreintegrationbothwiththeshamersthem-

selves andwith thewider audience inwhose eyes the individual’s standing has

beenlowered.23

Shamingwillalmostalwaysbenarrowlydisproportionatewhenitisnotre-

integrative.Yetonlinepublicshamingstrugglesinthisrespect,sinceinordertobe

reintegrative it must be carried out in a way that makes clear that it does not

constituteapermanentrejectionof the individual.Thereare limits tohoweffec-

tivelythiscanbedoneusingmediasuchasTwitter,whichseverelylimitthespace

forexplanationandarenotwell-suitedtonuance.Onlinepublicshamingalsooften

22Someonlinepublicshamingaffects its target’sstandingonly intheonlinecommunity,

evenwhentheshamedconductoccursoffline.Butoftenonlineshaminghasclearoffline

effectsaswell,aswehaveseen.

23Thereisafurtherquestionaboutwhetherpublicshamingshouldfacilitatethereconcili-

ationof anormviolator and thevictim(s)ofhis act.Toanswer thisquestion,wewould

needtoknowmoreaboutthemoralityofforgivenessand,inparticular,whetherthereare

dutiestoforgive.Wedonotcommittoapositiononthishere,beyondtentativelysuggest-

ingthatonlinepublicshamingshouldnotmakesuchreconciliationmuchmoredifficultor

costly.

22

involves abuse and threats, which further undermine reintegration, as well as

beingmorallyreprehensibleinthemselves.

Beyond this, thevery fact thatsomanypeopleparticipate in thecriticism

andexpresstheirdisapprovalmakesitharderforonlineshamingtobereintegra-

tive.Explanations, defenses, andapologies areoften caricaturedor gounnoticed

amongthetorrentofdenunciation.Overcomingthesebarrierstoreintegration is

essentialifonlinepublicshamingistobemoreoftenjustifiable.

4.3.Wideproportionality

Allofourcommentsthusfarhavefocusedonnarrowproportionality,inwhichthe

burdensfallonthosewhoareliable.However,publicshamingalsoimposesnega-

tive consequences on those who are not liable. Reputational and psychological

harms often fall on third parties, such as the norm violator’s associates (her

friends, family,employersetc.).Moreover, thenegativeconsequences that fallon

the normviolator can often exceed that towhich she is liable, aswe havehigh-

lighted.

Nonetheless, itcouldbethattheoverallgoodconsequencesofaninstance

of public shaming greatly exceed the negative consequences that are imposed

uponthosewhoarenotliable.Thismightjustifythepublicshaming.Inconsidering

whetherthisisthecase,weareexaminingwideproportionality.

Lockedidnotrecognize theneed foraseparatestandardofwidepropor-

tionality.However,itisanimportantcomponentofacompleteaccountofpropor-

tionality,sincesanctionsalmostalwaysaffect individualswhoarenot liable. It is

inevitablethatthefamilyandfriendsofasanctionedindividualwillsufferatleast

23

someharm.This is truewith respect to the state’s enforcement of laws (Tadros

2011,356-359), itwouldbe truewith respect to theenforcementofnatural law

withinLocke’sstateofnature,anditisalsotruewithrespecttopublicshaming.24

We should not conclude that sanctions can never be justifiablewhen they harm

third parties in this way, since this would render practically all enforcement of

laws and social norms impermissible. Instead, we should recognize a distinct

standard of wide proportionality, which compares the overall positive conse-

quencesofimposingsanctionstothenegativeconsequencesimposeduponthose

whoarenotliable.

Thestandard forwideproportionality ismuchmoredemandingthanthat

fornarrowproportionality.Thisisbecausenegativeconsequencesaremuchmore

difficult to justifywhenthey fallonthosewhoarenot liable.Thepositiveconse-

quencesofpublicshamingmustbemuchmorevaluablethanthenegativeconse-

quencesinorderforthemtobewidelyproportionate.

Thisisnottosaythatthisstandardisimpossibletomeet.Inatleastsome

casesofonlinepublicshaming,theharmstothirdpartiesmaybefairlysmall,and

the benefits with respect to the enforcement and upholding of valuable social

norms great. Similarly, these benefits might sometimes be sufficient to justify

imposingburdensuponthenormviolatorthatexceedthosesheisliabletosuffer.

Wesuspectthatsuchcaseswillbefairlyrare,butperhapsthisistrueinthecaseof

ShawnSimoes.

24Itisalsotruewithrespecttomilitaryactionsduringwar,whichisthecontextinwhich

muchcontemporarydiscussionofproportionalityoccurs.SeeMcMahan(2009,20-24).

24

There is a further importantworry regarding thewide proportionality of

onlinepublicshaming,however,whichconcernsitssystemiceffects.Evenifsome

individual instances of online public shaming initially appear proportionate, the

regularpracticeofpublic shamingmighthavea ‘chilling effect’.The ideahere is

thatthefearofbeingpubliclyshamedwillleadmanytoretreatfromonlineinter-

actions,ortorefrainfrompostinganythingthatcouldpossiblybeseenascontro-

versial.Theonlineenvironmentwouldthusbecomefarlessactiveanddiscursive,

inawaythatharmseveryone.ThiskindofworryhasbeenexpressedbyRonson.

Hequotes froma friendwhosaid thathewouldnotdarepostmanyofhis jokes

and observations online anymore. The friend told Ronson: “I suddenly feelwith

socialmedialikeI’mtiptoeingaroundanunpredictable,angry,unbalancedparent

who might strike out at any moment” (2015a, 268). The actor and comedian

Stephen Fry has also expressed this worry. In February 2016, Fry quit Twitter,

afterhefacedonlinecriticismforajokehetoldwhilepresentingtheBritishAcad-

emyofFilmandTelevisionAwards(BBCNews2016).Inablogpostexplaininghis

decision, Fry complained that Twitter had become “a stalking ground for the

sanctimoniously self-righteouswho love to second-guess, to leap to conclusions

and be offended – worse, to be offended on behalf of others they do not even

know”(Fry2016).

These concerns are especiallyproblematicwhen the chilling effect occurs

through the silencingofmembersofmarginalizedgroups (rather thanofupper-

class, white men, such as Fry). This is for two reasons. First, it is because it is

membersofthesegroupsthathavethemosttocontributeintermsofmakingour

online environment more discursive. Second, it is because the participation of

25

membersofmarginalizedgroups isvital toanydefenseofonlinepublicshaming

thatappealstoitscredentialsasanegalitarian,orevendemocratic,formofpublic

accountability.

Theideathattheover-zealousenforcementofsocialnormsmighthavethis

kindofchillingeffect,andultimatelylimitindividualityandfreeexpression,isnot

new. Indeed, it isoneof thecentralclaims in JohnStuartMill’sOnLiberty (1859,

especiallychapter III).Millarguesthat individual freedomis threatenednotonly

bytheencroachmentofthestate,butalsobycivilsociety’sinformalsanctions.He

writesthat

Itisnotbywearingdownintouniformityallthatisindividualinthem-

selves, but by cultivating it and calling it forth, within the limits im-

posedbytherightsandinterestsofothers,thathumanbeingsbecomea

nobleandbeautifulobjectofcontemplation(Mill1859,ChapterIII,§9).

For Mill, the development of individuality was being stifled by undue levels of

societal regulation, including through public shaming, in 19th century Britain.

Ronson and Fry both claim that these dynamics also pose a grave threat in the

contemporaryonlineworld.

Theseconcernsarisemainlybecausethereiscurrentlysuchahighvolume

ofonlinepublicshamingthatisdisproportionate.Ifshamingoccurredonlywhenit

was proportionate, then Mill’s and Ronson’s worries about its systemic effects

wouldhavelessforce.Thatis,theirwarningshaveforcelargelyduetothefactthat

there iscurrentlysomuchunjustifiedpublicshaming.But that is indeed thepre-

sentreality,andinthatcontextitmightwellbethateveninstancesofonlinepublic

shamingthatinitiallyappearproportionatearecontributingtoanoverallpractice

26

thathasextremelydamagingsystemiceffects,andisthusdisproportionate.Ifthis

is right, then online public shaming will be justifiable much less often than we

mightotherwisesuppose.

4.4.Implications

Muchcontemporaryonlinepublicshamingisdisproportionate,inboththenarrow

andwide senses.What canbedoneabout this? Inourview, themost important

responseshouldbeanincreaseinawarenessregardingtherisksofdisproportion-

ality,andthusofpublicshamingbeingunjustified.MillwroteOnLibertyinorderto

entreat his readers to recognize the proper limits on society’s control over the

individual.Similarly,wehopethatan increasedawarenessof therisksofdispro-

portionalitywillleadpeopletobemorehesitanttoengageinonlinepublicsham-

ing. Importantly, this hesitancy should extend even to caseswhere there clearly

hasbeenaculpablebreachofamorallyauthoritativesocialnorm.Even in those

cases,itmightwellbethataddingone’svoice(orre-tweet)tothecriticismofthe

norm violator will contribute to her and/or others suffering disproportionate

harms.

Inotherwords,weneednewsocialnormsregardingonlineactivity:social

normsthatencourageustobeslowtoconcludethatanindividual isculpable, to

showrestraint incriticism,torefrainfromseekingdisproportionatepunishment,

andtobewillingtooverlookpastinfractions,soastoallowpeopletoberestored

into the online community in good standing.While our concern in this essay is

withthedisproportionateenforcementofsocialnorms,itissocialnormsthatalso

providethemostpromisingsolution.

27

Greaterawarenessaloneisunlikelytobesufficient,however.Wealsoneed

toconsiderwhethercertainnegativeconsequencesarealmostalwaysdispropor-

tionate,andthusoughttoberuledoutcompletely–andperhapslegallyregulated.

Onesuchconsequenceisthenormviolatorlosingherjob.BothSaccoandSimoes

werefired,thoughthelatterwasre-hiredafteranarbitrationpurpose.Whileitis

perhapsunderstandable that firmswant todistance themselves fromemployees

whohavebeenshamed,thiswillalmostalwaysimposedisproportionateburdens

onthenormviolatorandtheirdependents.25Forthisreason,weshouldconsider

tighter legal regulation in this domain, granting employees stronger protection

againstbeingfired.

5. Accountability

Another concept that is central to justified public shaming is accountability –

specifically, the accountability of shamers. It is highly desirable that those who

shame others can themselves be held to account, taking responsibility for their

criticismand itseffects,andbeingopen toresponses,discussion,andcorrection.

Certainly,thetargetofshamingshouldhaveaneffectiverightofreply,andideally

otherindividualswilldotoo.

5.1.Locke,again

25Ofcourse,therearenotableexceptionstothis,suchaswhenanindividualviolatesan

importantprofessionalnorm.Thismayincludecasesinwhichadoctorviolatesconfiden-

tialitynormsoranacademichassexualrelationswithoneofhisstudents.

28

Accountability can help to mitigate the problems that Locke identified, since it

means thatnormenforcersmustbeprepared to justify their actions.Theymust

explainwhy thenormviolatorought tobecriticized,by showing thatavaluable

socialnormhasinfactbeenviolated.Theyalsomustlistentootherpointsofview,

andconsiderthepossibilitythattheymightbemistaken.Thishelpstocombatthe

“partiality” and “passion” that Locke considered central problemswith informal

sanctioning. Further, it acts as a safeguard against inaccurate and unwarranted

criticism,sinceitbothdeterspeoplefromengaginginsuchcriticismandmakesit

easierforerrorstobecorrected.

Indeed,accountabilityispartofLocke’ssolution.Lockearguesthatthein-

conveniencesofthestateofnaturewouldleadpeopletoestablishapublicauthori-

ty that laysdownclear lawsand thenenforces those laws in a transparentway.

Lawsareenforcedbyimpartialjudges,thoseaccusedofcrimesareabletooffera

defense,andthosewhoareconvictedareabletoappeal.Moreover,Lockeargues

thatifthepublicauthorityceasestogoverninafairwaythenthepeoplecanhold

ittoaccountbyrevoltingagainstit,andreplacingtheunjustgovernment.26

TheformalizedaccountabilitythatfeaturesinLocke’ssolutionisnotavail-

ableinourcontext,sincewearefocusingonthejustifiabilityofinformalsanction-

ingwithincivilsociety.Nonetheless,theideathatthosewhosanctionothersmust

themselvesbeabletobeheldtoaccountisanimportantone.Thisisafeaturethat

is often missing from contemporary online public shaming. Indeed, one of the

striking featuresofSacco’s case is thather tweetwentviralwhilst shewasona

plane, accompanied by the hashtag #HasJustineLandedYet (Ronson 2015c). She

26Fordiscussion,seeSimmons(1993,ch.5).

29

hadbeenthenumberoneworldwidetrendonTwitter,andlostherjob,beforeher

plane landed, and thus before she was able to offer any kind of explanation or

defense.

As with proportionality, increasing accountability within online public

shamingiscentrallyamatterofdevelopingnewsocialnorms.Weshouldseekto

create a culture inwhich thosewho engage in public shamingmake themselves

accountable toothers. Inotherwords, theyshould recognizeandrespectothers’

rightofreply,andespeciallythatofthetargetoftheircriticism.Thosewhoaccuse

othersofviolatingsocialnormsshouldbewillingtolistentotheothersideofthe

storyandconsiderwhethertheircriticismsmightbemisplaced.

5.2.Anonymity

Arguably, oneway to increase accountability online is to prohibit, or otherwise

prevent,anonymity.Anonymitymakesitmoredifficultfortheshamed,andothers,

toexercisetheirrightofreply,sinceanonymousshamersshieldthemselvesfrom

criticismbyconcealing their identities.Anonymousshamersarealso likely tobe

emboldenedinawaythatcanleadtoexcessivecriticism.Indeed,thereisempirical

evidence showing that thosewhowrite under the cloak of anonymity aremore

likely to be uncivil. Arthur Santana studied the comments on online newspaper

articles, and found that anonymous comments were significantly more likely to

includepersonalattacks,threats,abusiveorhateful language,epithets,andracist

sentiments.AsSantananotes,hisstudysupportstheconclusionsofrecentpsycho-

logical research, according to which “anonymity can foster a sense of impunity,

lossofself-awarenessandalikelihoodofactinguponnormallyinhibitedimpulses

30

in a way that is markedly inconsistent with a person’s offline self” (2014, 23).

Anonymityrunscountertothekindofaccountability-conducivesocialnormsthat

areneededinorderforonlinepublicshamingtobejustifiable.

Interestingly,someonlineforadonotpermitanonymity.Somenewspaper

websitesrequirecommenterstousetheirrealnames,andFacebookrequiresthat

usersusetheirauthenticnameandidentity.Facebookexplicitlyjustifythispolicy

onaccountabilitygrounds:“Whenpeoplestandbehindtheiropinionsandactions

withtheirauthenticnameandreputation,ourcommunityismoreaccountable”.27

Weshouldcertainlybeskepticalofthesincerityofthisjustification,giventheway

inwhich thispolicyenhancesFacebook’s ability togeneratemoreaccuratemar-

keting data. Nonetheless, the policy might serve to increase accountability. For

example,SamratHanifwaseasilyidentifiableasthesourceofthepostofficevideo,

and was asked to comment on his decision to post the video online by several

mediaoutlets.

However,therearealsoconsiderationsinfavorofanonymity.Theabilityto

writeanonymouslyallowsindividualstoexpressunpopularviewswithlessfearof

being personally attacked or criticized. People can have legitimate reasons for

wantingtobeabletoexpressviewsorrevealfactsaboutthemselveswithoutbeing

identifiable. Those who are more vulnerable might be more likely to interact

onlineiftheycandosoanonymously.Insupportofthis,thereisevidencethatlinks

anonymity to increases in the number of participants and the range of views

articulatedwithinonlinediscussions(McCluskeyandHmielowski2011).

27Facebook’s‘CommunityStandards’,availableat

https://www.facebook.com/communitystandards.

31

Perhaps ironically, theseconsiderations in favorofanonymityarepersua-

sive partly because online discussion and criticism is so often conducted in an

objectionableway.Therewouldbe lessneed for anonymity if disproportionality

werenotsorife.Thoughanonymityhasbeenshowntocontributetotheseprob-

lems, itmightalsobe justified in lightof thosesameproblems.At thevery least,

anonymity’sbenefitsaregreaterintheunjustworldinwhichwelive.

Insomecontexts,theremaybeamiddleway.Thepopularphilosophyblog

Daily Nous allows anonymous comments, but only on two conditions.28First,

anonymouscommentersmuststill submita realemailaddress,which isnotdis-

played publicly but is seen by thewebsitemoderator. Second, anonymous com-

mentersmustuseaconsistentname(or“handle”)inalloftheircomments.29These

conditions ensure that individuals can be associatedwith all of their comments

and that themoderator can contact even anonymous commenters, if necessary.

This policy attractively combines the benefits of anonymity with the virtues of

accountability.Anobviousdrawback,however,isthatitrequiresanactivemoder-

ator,whocanenforcethepolicy.Thismightnotalwaysbepossible.Nonetheless,

wewouldenhanceaccountabilityiftheprevailingsocialnormencouragedindivid-

ualstoadoptaconsistentonlineidentity.

5.3.CollectiveHarms

28Seehttp://dailynous.com/comments-policy/.

29Thispreventsso-called“sockpuppeting”.See

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sockpuppet_(Internet).

32

Even putting all of these problems aside, a further issue remains. Online public

shamingiscarriedoutbyalargenumberofdisparateindividuals,manyofwhom

dolittlemorethanre-tweetanother’scriticism.Whiletheoverallburdenssuffered

bytheshamedmightbegreat,thecontributionofeachindividualshamerisvery

small.WhereasLocke’spublic authorityprovides a single institution that canbe

heldaccountableforitsenforcementofthelaw,thedecentralizednatureofonline

publicshamingmeansthatnoparticularparticipantcanbeheldtoaccountforthe

fullextentofaninstanceofshaming.

Publicshamingisnottheonlyphenomenonthathasthisfeature.Incasesof

so-called“collectiveharms”,theactionsofalargegroupofindividualscauseharm,

yet the contribution of each individual is negligible (Kagan 2011; Nefsky 2012;

Spiekermann2014).Inmanycasesofcollectiveharm,itseemsthatnoindividual’s

actionmakesanydifferencetotheoutcome.Whetherornotonemoreindividual

participatesinonlinepublicshamingprobablymakesnoperceptibledifferenceto

thenegativeconsequencesfortheshamed.Yettheoveralleffectoftheseindividu-

als’ actions is large.As several philosophershavepointedout, someof themost

importantproblemsfacinghumanitytoday,suchasanthropogenicclimatechange

andunjustworkingconditions,sharethis“collectiveharm”structure.

Thereareat leasttwoquestionsthatarisewhenweconsidercasesofcol-

lective harms. First, can we hold collectives accountable for harmful outcomes

when they are not organized and lack structures for collective decision-making

(Miller 2007, ch. 5; Lawford-Smith2015)? Second, canwe view an individual as

havingactedwrongly incaseswhereawrongoccurredbuther individualaction

didnotmakeanydifferencetotheoutcomecausedbythegroupasawhole?We

33

lackspacetoexaminetherichphilosophicalliteraturediscussingthesequestions.

Sufficetosaythatthesedebatesarehighlyrelevanttoanormativeassessmentof

onlinepublicshaming,andone’sviewsonthesequestionswilldeterminewhether

onebelieves that shamerscanbeheldaccountable for theeffectsof instancesof

shaming. If they cannot be properly held accountable, then this might lead one

seriously to questionwhether online public shaming is ever justifiable. This is a

particularlystrongconclusionbecausethenatureofpublicshamingasacollective

harm is a structural feature of the practice, rather than something that can be

alteredthroughregulationorbettersocialnorms.Theimportanceofthecollective

harmissuewithrespecttopublicshamingshouldthusbeobvious.

6. Conclusion

Wehavenotbeenabletodiscussallofthenormativelysalientfeaturesofonline

public shaming in this paper.However,wehavehighlighted someof the central

elements that any assessment of online public shamingmust contain, and have

indicatedthewaysinwhichtheseelementsaffectthejustifiabilityofthepractice.

Aswehavesoughttoemphasizethroughout,socialnormsarevital toour

livingcivilizedlivestogether.Theirenforcementthroughpublicshaming,including

online,canservejustifiedpurposes,byupholdingvaluablenorms.However,online

public shaming also brings great risks of unaccountable, unrestrained, mob-like

attacks on individuals. Such condemnation can be disproportionate, and thus

unjustified, even if its target has culpably violated amorally authoritative social

norm.Creatingtheconditionswheresocialnormscanbeupheldonlineinvaluable

ways is itself a matter of creating new and better social norms regarding our

34

online conduct. Social norms could thus provide the solution to the problem of

theirownenforcement.Whethersuchnormswillinfactdevelop,however,isvery

difficulttopredict.Changingthepracticesofthousands,orevenmillions,ofpartic-

ipantsinonlineinteractionsisplainlyahugetask–butitisnotanimpossibleone.

Ifwearecorrect,then,oneofthecentralimplicationsofthispaperisthatfurther

researchintothewaythatonlinenormschangeanddevelopisurgentlyneeded.

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