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OPEX at Canadian Nuclear Processing Facilities Peter Elder, Director General Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) 1

OPEX at Canadian Nuclear Processing Facilities · OPEX at Canadian Nuclear Processing Facilities Peter Elder, Director General Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) 1. Our Mandate

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Page 1: OPEX at Canadian Nuclear Processing Facilities · OPEX at Canadian Nuclear Processing Facilities Peter Elder, Director General Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) 1. Our Mandate

OPEX at Canadian Nuclear Processing

Facilities

Peter Elder, Director GeneralCanadian Nuclear Safety

Commission (CNSC)

1

Page 2: OPEX at Canadian Nuclear Processing Facilities · OPEX at Canadian Nuclear Processing Facilities Peter Elder, Director General Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) 1. Our Mandate

Our Mandate

2

The CNSC’s mandate is to

• Regulate the use of nuclear energy and materials so that the health, safety and security of Canadians and the environment are protected

• Implement Canada’s international commitments on the peaceful use of nuclear energy

• Disseminate objective scientific, technical and regulatory information to the public

Safety, Security, Safeguard and Environmental Protection

Page 3: OPEX at Canadian Nuclear Processing Facilities · OPEX at Canadian Nuclear Processing Facilities Peter Elder, Director General Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) 1. Our Mandate

Milling Refining Fuel fabrication CANDU reactor

Imports, exports and safeguardsControlled information, controlled material, controlled equipment

Mining Conversion Fuel assembly

CNSC Regulates all Nuclear-Related Facilities and Activities

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Blind River Refinery (Cameco)

Waste management

Key Lake Mill (Cameco), SK

Cigar Lake Mine

(Cameco), SK

Pickering

Point Lepreau

Bruce

Darlington

Uranium Conversion

Facility (Cameco),

Port Hope, ONNuclear FuelProcessing

Facility(GE Hitachi), Toronto, ON

Nuclear FuelFacility

(GE Hitachi), Peterborough,

ON

Nuclear Fuel Facility (Cameco Fuel Manufacturing

Inc.), Port Hope, ON

McArthur River Mine

(Cameco), SK

Rabbit Lake Mine

(Cameco), SK

McClean Lake Mill (AREVA

Resources Inc.), SK

Rabbit Lake Mill (Cameco), SK

Page 4: OPEX at Canadian Nuclear Processing Facilities · OPEX at Canadian Nuclear Processing Facilities Peter Elder, Director General Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) 1. Our Mandate

CNSC Offices

• Headquarters in Ottawa• 5 offices at nuclear power plants• 1 site office at Chalk River• 4 regional offices• Staff: ~800+• Resources: $140M (75% of costs

recovered)• Number of licensees: 2,500• Total number of licences: 3,300

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Saskatoon Uranium Mills and Mines Division Regional Office

CalgaryWestern Regional Office

Mississauga Southern Regional Office

Gentilly-2 Point Lepreau

Chalk RiverHQ

Bruce

Pickering – A and B

Darlington

Laval Eastern Regional Office

Page 5: OPEX at Canadian Nuclear Processing Facilities · OPEX at Canadian Nuclear Processing Facilities Peter Elder, Director General Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) 1. Our Mandate

Uranium Processing Facilities in Canada

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Blind River Refinery

GE Hitachi Peterborough

GE Hitachi Toronto

Port Hope Conversion Facility

Cameco Fuel Manufacturing

• Blind River Refinery– Conversion of Uranium

Concentrate (U3O8) to Uranium Trioxide (UO3)

• Port Hope Conversion Facility– Conversion of UO3 to UF6 or UO2

• GE Hitachi Canada - Toronto and Peterborough– Processing of UO2 fuel pellets

• Cameco Fuel Manufacturing– Processing of UO2 fuel pellets

Page 6: OPEX at Canadian Nuclear Processing Facilities · OPEX at Canadian Nuclear Processing Facilities Peter Elder, Director General Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) 1. Our Mandate

• Conversion of Uranium Concentrate (U3O8) to Uranium Trioxide (UO3)

• UO3 sent to Port Hope facility for conversion to UF6 or natural UO2

• Worlds largest commercial uranium refinery

Blind River Refinery

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Page 7: OPEX at Canadian Nuclear Processing Facilities · OPEX at Canadian Nuclear Processing Facilities Peter Elder, Director General Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) 1. Our Mandate

• Cameco Corporation’s Port Hope Conversion Facility

• Converts Uranium Trioxide powder to natural UO2 and UF6

• Started as a Radium Processing facility in the 1930s, located on Lake Ontario

Port Hope Conversion Facility

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Page 8: OPEX at Canadian Nuclear Processing Facilities · OPEX at Canadian Nuclear Processing Facilities Peter Elder, Director General Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) 1. Our Mandate

• June 2012 − depressurized when lid loosen by worker

• About 20 kg of Uranium Concentrate released to air within the facility

• Dose to the employee of approximately 1.7 mSv

• Root Causes (both at US Mill and Cameco facility)– Failure to identify hazards in

previous OPEX (US-NRC IN99-03)

– Failure to ensure that OPEX was shared between all stakeholders

Pressurized Uranium Concentrate Drum

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Picture of the drum which resulted in Uranium Concentrate release within the facility

Page 9: OPEX at Canadian Nuclear Processing Facilities · OPEX at Canadian Nuclear Processing Facilities Peter Elder, Director General Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) 1. Our Mandate

• Regulatory Actions

– Cameco required to isolate all concentrate from the same mill

– Cameco required to put in place immediate measures to protect workers

– Cameco required to develop methods to test for pressure and safely de-pressurize concentrate drums

– Inspections of all Canadian Uranium Mills for similar issues

Pressurized Uranium Concentrate Drum (Cont’d)

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Page 10: OPEX at Canadian Nuclear Processing Facilities · OPEX at Canadian Nuclear Processing Facilities Peter Elder, Director General Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) 1. Our Mandate

• US-NRC, CNSC, Industry working group to disseminate “lessons learned”– Survey results identified that pressurized drums instances were limited to mills

using a peroxide based process

– Drum pressurizations were a result of continued decomposition of dried uranium product and the production of oxygen after the drums have been filled and sealed

Pressurized Uranium Concentrate Drum – OPEX

10Figure 1: Dried Hydrogen Peroxide precipitated Uranium Concentrate reactivity with water

Page 11: OPEX at Canadian Nuclear Processing Facilities · OPEX at Canadian Nuclear Processing Facilities Peter Elder, Director General Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) 1. Our Mandate

• Recommendations from US-NRC working group– Increase cooling and venting time for facilities utilizing Hydrogen

Peroxide precipitation process

– Conducting visual inspections of the drums for signs of pressurization prior to shipment

– Facility operators should develop protocols to minimize the potential for organics, including oils and greases, to enter into Uranium Concentrate process circuits

Pressurized Uranium Concentrate Drum – OPEX (Cont’d)

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Page 12: OPEX at Canadian Nuclear Processing Facilities · OPEX at Canadian Nuclear Processing Facilities Peter Elder, Director General Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) 1. Our Mandate

• January 2014 - PHCF lost supervisory control of UF6 Plant

• Manual mode was required to re-establish plant control which resulted in eroding safety barriers

• No releases from the facility or exposures to workers

• Root Causes– Less than adequate management

practices

– Less than adequate policies and procedures

Port Hope Conversion Facility Loss of Supervisory Control

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H2 and F2 gas lines located in UF6 Plant atthe Port Hope Conversion Facility

Page 13: OPEX at Canadian Nuclear Processing Facilities · OPEX at Canadian Nuclear Processing Facilities Peter Elder, Director General Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) 1. Our Mandate

• Cameco was required to take the following actions

– Provide additional mitigation measures prior to the restart of the facility

– Explain why work was performed on safety critical processes during normal operations and what controls were in place to prevent such a situation

– Investigate why the Supervisory Control system required further intervention to bring the UF6 plant under a safe shutdown state

– Provide a root cause analysis of how this incident occurred and identify appropriate corrective actions to ensure the safety of the plant is maintained

– Identify a schedule for the implementation of the corrective actions

CNSC Staff Response to Cameco’sJanuary 2014 Event

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Page 14: OPEX at Canadian Nuclear Processing Facilities · OPEX at Canadian Nuclear Processing Facilities Peter Elder, Director General Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) 1. Our Mandate

• Recent events in Canada confirm the importance of international sharing of operating experience

• Operators need formal systems to share operating experience both internally and externally. This is part of the Canadian Management System requirements

• Fuel cycle facilities can learn intelligently from NPP events

Conclusion

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Page 15: OPEX at Canadian Nuclear Processing Facilities · OPEX at Canadian Nuclear Processing Facilities Peter Elder, Director General Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) 1. Our Mandate

We will never compromise safety…

it’s in our DNA!

Learn more at nuclearsafety.gc.ca

Facebook.com/CanadianNuclearSafetyCommissionYoutube.com/cnscccsn

Thank You

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