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This article was downloaded by: [Flinders University of South Australia] On: 06 October 2014, At: 04:22 Publisher: Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK The RUSI Journal Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rusi20 Pakistan: Adrift Once Again Ahmad Faruqui Published online: 08 May 2009. To cite this article: Ahmad Faruqui (2009) Pakistan: Adrift Once Again, The RUSI Journal, 154:2, 12-16, DOI: 10.1080/03071840902965539 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03071840902965539 PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the “Content”) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content. This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

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Page 1: Pakistan: Adrift Once Again

This article was downloaded by: [Flinders University of South Australia]On: 06 October 2014, At: 04:22Publisher: RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 MortimerStreet, London W1T 3JH, UK

The RUSI JournalPublication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rusi20

Pakistan: Adrift Once AgainAhmad FaruquiPublished online: 08 May 2009.

To cite this article: Ahmad Faruqui (2009) Pakistan: Adrift Once Again, The RUSI Journal, 154:2, 12-16, DOI: 10.1080/03071840902965539

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03071840902965539

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the “Content”) contained in the publications onour platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to theaccuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are theopinions and views of the authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content shouldnot be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liablefor any losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever or howsoevercaused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content.

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction,redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms& Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

Page 2: Pakistan: Adrift Once Again

THE RUSI JOURNAL

The current poli cal crisis in Paki-stan was unexpected only in itsming. The seeds of instability

were planted by the hurried manner inwhich the previous ruler, General PervezMusharraf, exited the poli cal stage a erserving at the helm for the equivalent oftwo US presiden al terms.1 Even thoughparliamentary elec ons were held withina few months of the general’s departure,and a civilian government led by thePakistan People’s Party (PPP) had takenoffice, things were anything but normal,even by Pakistani standards.

Since November 2008, the countryhas been preoccupied with a series ofincreasingly virulent crises. While it wass ll reeling from the damaging effect ofthe Mumbai bombings on its rela onswith India, terrorists staged the mostbrazen day me a ack in the country’shistory by firing on the Sri Lankan cricketteam right in the heart of the culturalcapital, Lahore. There was a strong suspi-cion that the twoa ackswere carried outby an outlawed jihadi group, the Lash-kar-e-Taiba, which has sworn not only toliberate Kashmir from India but to createsuch difficult condi ons that India wouldul mately dissolve into Pakistan.

In the fron er province, the SwatValley con nues to experience thesavage onslaught of the Taliban who arebusy blowing up girls’ schools, behead-ing opponents, lashing men who shavetheir beards, and carrying out suicidebomb a acks in the rest of the country.Despite the change in administra on inWashington, the US military con nues

PAKISTANADRIFT ONCE AGAIN

AHMAD FARUQUI

Ahmad Faruqui tracks the latest poli cal crisis in Pakistan, arguing that President Zardari’scredibility is on the line. Looking ahead, he proposes a five point plan to bring stabilityand security to the country, and outlines three scenarios to help frame the debate onPakistan’s future.

its policy of using Predator drones (andlately the even more heavily armedReaper drones) to launchmissiles againstsuspected Al-Qa’ida targets in the feder-ally administered areas of Waziristan,o en accidentally killing civilians, includ-ing women and children.

Largely as a consequence of thesea acks, an -American sen ment in thecountry remains high. The a acks alsocut into the credibility of PresidentAsif AliZardari, who has claimed that, unlike hisuniformed predecessor, he will protectthe country’s sovereignty at all cost. Themedia has begun to portray Zardari in thesame unsympathe c terms as Musharraf– as an American puppet. In addi on,the deepening economic crisis con n-ues to inflict misery on the vast majorityof Pakistanis, especially since Pakistan’seconomic growth was already weak longbefore the global recession arrived.

Against this hos le backdrop, thelast thing that anyone expected wasthe president to precipitate a ‘do ordie’ conflict with former Prime MinisterNawaz Sharif. Zardari had earlier formeda coali on government with Sharif,whose Pakistan Muslim League (PML-N)party held the provincial government inPunjab, the country’s largest province.On the death of his wife, Benazir Bhu o,Zardari ascended to the co-chairmanshipof the PPP along with his son Bilawal.Zardari jus fied these ac ons by tracingthem to Bhu o’s hand-wri en will whichwas apparently in his possession.

What seems to have ignited thepoli cal powder keg was a decision by

the Supreme Court, packed with Mush-arraf appointees and favourably disposedtoward President Zardari, to ban NawazSharif and his brother, Shahbaz Sharif,from holding elected office because oftheir past ‘criminal records’. As soonas this judgment was announced, thepresident dissolved the government inPunjab, headed by Shahbaz Sharif, andimposed Governor’s Rule. This has effec-vely reduced it to the status enjoyed by

the federally administered tribal areas inWaziristan.

The Long March on IslamabadCapitalising on the approaching two-yearanniversary of the dismissal of the ChiefJus ce of the Supreme Court, I ikharMuhammad Chaudhry, Sharif decided tojointly lead a Long March on the capital,Islamabad, with Aitzaz Ahsan, the presi-dent of the Supreme Court Bar Associa-on and amember of the PPP. The osten-

sible purpose of the march was to forcePresident Zardari to honour his electoralpledge from 2008 to restore all the judg-es who had had been dismissed fromtheir posts by General Musharraf whenhe declared a state of emergency on3 November 2007. In reality, the marchwas designed to throw down the gaunt-let to challenge Zardari and strip him ofany ves ge of poli cal legi macy.

As momentum for the marchbuilt up, all roads leading to the capitalwere blockaded by the emba led Zard-ari government. The Presidency wassurrounded on all sides by cargo contain-ers. A newspaper ran a photograph of

DOI: 10.1080/03071840902965539© RUSI JOURNAL APRIL 2009 VOL. 154 NO. 2 pp. 12–16

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this rather unusual arrangement andcap oned it with a statement that thepresident had put himself under housearrest. Intelligence agencies brought thenews to the Army Chief, General AshrafPervez Kayani, a Musharraf appointeeand a former director of the Inter-Servic-es Intelligence, that the marchers werecoming out in force and that it would beimpossible to stop them without large-scale bloodshed. Nawaz Sharif, who wasnow calling for revolu on, was himselfplaced under house arrest. A mob ofhis supporters, strongly outnumberingthe police detachment posted aroundhis house, liberated him, effec velypping their hats to Sharif’s revolu on-

ary claims.Faced with the makings of a large-

scale melt down of law and order, Gener-al Kayani held extensive discussions withthegovernmentsof theUnitedStates andthe United Kingdom about the unfoldingcrisis. Both appear to have expressedtheir concern that the crisis posed a seri-ous threat to the prosecu on of the Waron Terror. Based on his assessment of thepoli cal order of ba le, Kayani decidedto throw in his lot with the prime minis-ter, Yousuf Raza Gilani. Gilani, despite

belonging to the PPP, publicly stated thathe was not opposed to the Long Marchsince he considered the right to protesta normal part of the democra c poli calprocess. This was not the first me Gilaniand Zardari had found themselves atopposite ends of a major poli cal issue.Gilani’s comment effec vely legi misedthe Long March and ratcheted up thelooming conflict between himself andZardari.

The ins tu onal conflict betweenthe offices of the president and theprime minister has now entered a newphase. This conflict is nothing new; itwas evident during the nineteen yearswhen the country was ruled by GeneralsZia and Musharraf, both of whom firedtheir hand-picked (civilian) prime minis-ters at various mes. The difference thisme around is that the president is a

civilian and that he and the prime minis-ter belong to the same poli cal party.

Gilani did something that no primeminister had dared do before. In hiscapacity as the head of government, hedecided to move against the wishes ofZardari, the president and head of state.Gilani issued an order reinsta ng JudgeChaudhry as the Chief Jus ce on the date

the term of Chief Jus ce Abdul HameedDogar was due to expire. This diffusedthe crisis and Sharif called off the LongMarch.

The biggest loser in the crisis wasZardari. He s ll carries all the plenipo-ten ary powers that Zia and Musharrafvested in the presidency, including mostnotably the power to fire the primeminister. But he lost not only the powerstruggle with Sharif, who emerged ashis arch nemesis, but also the powerstruggle with his own prime minister, aman he had plucked from obscurity andappointed to what most considered acare-taker posi on.

What led Zardari to undertake thisimpetuous move will be debated foryears to come. It seems to have crip-pled him and may well finish him off asa poli cal force. Only a year earlier, hehad formed a coali on government withNawaz Sharif. During the twilight of the‘Musharraf Raj’, Sharif and Benazir Bhut-to signed a Charter for Democracy call-ing for the removal of military rule. All ofthat goodwill evaporated in a ma er ofdays.

It is unlikely that the taciturn Gilanicould have acted on his own without

How long will he wait? General Ashraf Pervez Kayani, Chief of the Army Staff of Pakistan. Photo courtesy of ISAF.

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the firm backing of the army. The crisisconfirmed once again that the army,whether or not it is officially occupyingthe presidency, is the main power brokerin Pakistan.2 Indeed, Stephen Cohen ofThe Brookings Ins tu on has called it‘Pakistan’s largest poli cal party’.

What Lies Ahead?The situa on is fluid and pregnant withambiguity. It will take a while to stabilisesince the basic equilibrium between thekey players has been disturbed. Besidesthe army, these include the two majorpoli cal par es, the PPP and the PML-N, the minor poli cal par es such as thePML-Q (previously affiliatedwith GeneralPervezMusharraf); theethnicMQMpartycomprised of Indian immigrants with itsbase in the urban areas of the southernprovince of Sindh; and the secular ANPin the fron er province. These par esexercise their influence formally throughthe legislature and informally throughtheir ‘street power’. There is also the restof civil society, led at least in the short-term by a orneys and consis ng of avariety of human rights organisa ons.The wild card in the poli cal equa on,of course, is the amalgama on of terror-ist groups which, besides the immediatedamage they can inflict on the vic ms bytheir odious acts, have the poten al forseverely disrup ng the poli cal equilib-rium in the en re country.

Given this backdrop, it is hard toknow what lies ahead. One is remindedof Winston Churchill’s observa on, ‘Thefuture, though imminent, is obscure’. Butenough is known to consider the possi-bili es. Three scenarios can be envis-aged.

Scenario OneThe situa on stabilises in a few months.Zardari accepts the new poli cal order,slips into poli cal obscurity and eventu-ally goes into exile. He is replaced by anominal head of state. Gilani emerges asa key power broker in the new poli calalignment and the office of the primeminister becomes the most powerfulpoli cal office in the country, represent-ing a matura on of the poli cal ins tu-onalisa onprocess. He is able tomuster

enough votes in parliament to annul therash of amendments conferring plenipo-

ten ary powers on the president. Underthe restored Chief Jus ce, an independ-ent judiciary begins to emerge. The armyretreats to the barracks and is comfort-able with performing a purely militaryrole. The country is finally back on thesecular democra c path envisioned byits founder, Jinnah.

Scenario TwoThe situa on worsens and turmoil andinstability return to the streets. Zard-ari a empts to get Gilani removed asprime minister through a parliamen-tary subterfuge. He aligns himself withPML-Q and some of the minor par es.This new coali on a racts some dissent-ers from the PPP as well. It is able togarner enough votes to carry a voteof no confidence against Gilani in theNa onal Assembly. Problems ensue asGilani dissolves parliament and calls fornew elec ons. A few months later, elec-ons are held under army supervision.

The PML-N returns to power with NawazSharif as the Prime Minister. Gilani isgiven a senior ministerial appointmentand the situa on stabilises. The armystays on the sidelines, ready to interveneif the situa on deteriorates.

Scenario ThreeThe situa on shows no sign of stabilisingand the crowds spill out in the streets asthe poli cal clash widens; the economygrinds to a halt. Fearing a total melt-down, the army steps in and promises tohold new elec ons. But as the monthsprogress, none are held. No clear poli -cal leader emerges and the army is reluc-tant to pursue an electoral process withan uncertain outcome. TheWar of Terrorprevents a return to civilian rule. Oppo-nents of military rule are arrested inlarge numbers. Empowered by militaryac on and civilian loss of life, terroristsspread fear and anarchy throughout theland. It seems like the Musharraf era hasreturned.

The Long ViewWhat can be said about the long-termfuture of Pakistan? Some would arguethat it is impossible to predict anythingabout a country with such a complex andchao c past. But some things are prede-termined by past events.

It is fairly certain that Pakistan isfacing a popula on me bomb. By theyear 2050, it is likely to become thefourth most populous na on in theworld. The burden of feeding such a largepopula on can be terribly destabilisingfor any country, especially one that hasexperienced uneven economic growthduring the six decades of its existence.It is unlikely that Pakistan will be ableto easily absorb large numbers of youngpeople into the job market.

Besides the popula on explosion,there are several other areas for concern.A recent report from the US Joint ForcesCommand paints a gloomy picture. Inits Joint Opera ng Environment (JOE)report, the Command lays out its worstcase scenario for Pakistan.3 This projects‘a rapid and sudden collapse’ for Paki-stan. The only other na on for whichsuch a scenario is projected is Mexico,which is in the throes of figh ng organ-ised drug cartels.

In the JOE scenario, Pakistansuccumbs to a ‘violent and bloody civiland sectarian war’, made more danger-ous by concerns over the country’snuclear arsenal. One has to assume thatof the many threats probably keepingPresident Obama awake at night, the lossof Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal to terroristorganisa ons must be at the top of thelist.

David Kilcullen, an Australiananthropologist who advises US CentralCommand (CENTCOM) commanderGeneral David H Petraeus and is cred-ited with helping to develop the surgestrategy in Iraq, has recently urged USpolicy makers to focus their a en onon Pakistan. He argues that a failure ofthe Pakistani state could have devastat-ing consequences for the en re interna-onal community.

In an interview with the Washing-ton Post, Kilcullen said that Pakistan wasimportant because it has ‘173 millionpeople, 100 nuclear weapons, an armybigger than the US Army, and al-Qaedaheadquarters si ng right there in thetwo-thirds of the country that thegovernment doesn’t control’.4 And, headded, one could derive scant comfortfrom the fact that the Pakistani militaryand intelligence services do not takedirec ons from the civilian government.

pakistan – adrift once again

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They cons tute a state within a state andare not subject to the usual pressuresthat elected governments have to oper-ate under.

Another dire predic on is from theNa onal Intelligence Council (NIC), abranch of the CIA which conducts suchassessments every four years. In ‘GlobalTrends 2025: A Transformed World’, weencounter the following scenario:5

The future of Pakistan is a wildcard ...the North-West Fron er Province andtribal areas will con nue to be poorlygoverned and the source or supporterof cross-border instability. If Pakistan isunable to hold together un l 2025, abroader coalescence of Pashtun tribesis likely to emerge and act together toerase theDurand Line,maximizing Pash-tun space at the expense of Punjabis.

Eight years ago, just as Pervez Musharrafwas arriving on the scene, the NIC hadsketched a bleak future, which said bythe year 2015:6

Pakistan will not recover easily fromdecades of poli cal and economicmismanagement, divisive policies,lawlessness, corrup on and ethnicfric on. Nascent democra c reformswill produce li le change in the face ofopposi on from an entrenched poli calelite and radical Islamic par es. Furtherdomes c decline would benefit Islamicpoli cal ac vists, who may significantlyincrease their role in na onal poli csand alter the makeup and cohesionof the military – once Pakistan’s mostcapable ins tu on. In a climate ofcon nuing domes c turmoil, the centralgovernment’s control probably will bereduced to the Punjabi heartland andthe economic hub of Karachi.

Nevertheless, toward the end of theMusharraf era, the prime minister waspain ng rosy scenarios about the socio-poli cal situa on. Even as the poli calchaos was reaching a crescendo, Shau-kat Aziz declared 2007 ‘The Year of theTourist’. Once Musharraf suspended theChief Jus ce on 9 March 2007, however,the bloom on the rose faded abruptly.

Pakistan’s current situa on – notjust the dystopian futures painted in the

two American reports – is a far cry fromthe vision of its founding fathers, Iqbal-and Jinnah. They envisaged a na on thatwould unite Muslims, not divide them.Jinnah laid out a clear prescrip on forge ng there:

If we want to make this great State ofPakistan happy and prosperous, weshould wholly and solely concentrateon the well-being of the people, andespecially of the masses of the poor. Ifyou will work in coopera on, forge ngthe past, you are bound to succeed.

Alas, the advice to focus on the futurewas not taken as the na on plungedinto reliving the ba les of the past. Itseems that Pakistan is des ned to lurchfrom crisis to crisis. That was in fact howHerbert Feldman cap oned his history,which surveyed developments between1962–69. A man who made his markduring that period was Zulfikar Ali Bhut-to, father of Benazir Bhu o. He came toprominence in the early 1960s as thecountry’s strongly na onalis c foreignminister. He became the president andthen the prime minister a er the army,which had then ruled the country forfourteen years, was decisively defeatedby the Indian Army in December 1971.Confronted with a host of troubles,Bhu o got used to saying that he was ‘aman of crises’. Unfortunately, even withall his poli cal experience, his advanceddegrees, and his command of the spokenand wri en language, the crises gotthe be er of him. The seven es, whenhe ruled, was the worst decade in thena on’s history.7

Thirty years later, the situa onhas gone from bad to worse.8 So it isnot surprising to see that an increasingnumberof experts donot expect Pakistanto survive by the me 2025 rolls around,at least not in a form that even remotelyresembles the na on that exists today.

A Five-Point AgendaIt is me for Pakistan’s leaders to ponderthree fundamental ques ons: Is a melt-down avoidable? Is it possible to envi-sion a rosy future? And what will it taketo get there?

While it will take serious delibera-ons to find answers to these fundamen-

tal ques ons, a broad five-point agendathat encompasses security, economics,energy, polity and society would appearto be an overarching necessity.

SecurityThis includes local, provincial, na onaland interna onal security. Local securitymeans that individuals in a communityor neighbourhood are free to go abouttheir daily lives without fear of assault,robbery, kidnapping or murder and thatbusinessmen can operate without fearof being held hostage or being forced tobribe government officials.

Without local security, life comesto a stands ll. But one cannot just havelocal security and func on produc vely.The next level involves the ability to liveand to do business at the provincial andna onal levels. Without this, movementof people across different parts of thecountry is stymied and inter-regionalcommerce cannot be op mised.

Finally there is the interna onaldimension of security. Pakistan has to co-exist with its neighbours, most notablyAfghanistan, India and Iran. It also hasto co-exist with the Arab world, Chinaand most importantly, the United States.The most immediate manifesta on ofthis concern is the need to resolve theproblems in the areas bordering Afghan-istan and rein in the terrorists who areunleashing the biggest wave of suicidebombings in the country’s history.

EconomicsThis subdivides into managing budgetand trade deficits, a rac ng foreigninvestment and raising the domes csavings rates. The budget deficit is spin-ning out of control and currently clocksin at over 7 per cent of GDP. This, alongwith a global shortage of food and fuels,has pushed the rate of infla on above 25per cent.

Pu ng bread on the table hasbecome a herculean task for the typicalfamily man. Government spending hasto be lowered but how does one do thatwhen subsidies for food and fuel compro-mise a large por on of the budget?

Elimina ng subsidies will imme-diately trigger a poli cal backlash. Thetransi on has to be managed by nego-a ng foreign aid on favourable terms

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from friendly countries and interna onalbanks.

In the long run, unproduc vegovernment expenditures have to becurtailed, including those on defence.The military needs to be reconfiguredfor its new mission: counter-insurgencyopera ons. The war with India is over.There is no need to maintain a force inexcess of 600,000 supported by a simi-larly large number of reservists.

Loopholes inthetaxcollec onmech-anism need to be closed off by bringingthe black market into the mainstreameconomy, by extending the reach of thetax system to encompass agriculturalincomes and by stringent enforcement ofthe exis ng tax code. Policies need to beformulated to raise the domes c savingsrate. This is a long-term challenge.

With regards to trade, imports arerunning far ahead of exports, and theimbalance on the current account is at9 per cent of GDP. As budget and tradebalances are restored, and securityreturns to the streets, the current flightof capital will be stalled. The country willnot only be able to keep its capital butwillalso be able to a ract new investment,both public and private. This would putballast back in the stock market whichhas fallen by more than 40 per cent indollar terms since the start of the year.

EnergyPower shortages currently beset theelectrical grid, causing load shedding,brownouts and blackouts. These arevery costly to businesses and demeanthe quality of life at home. What isrequired is a two-pronged approachwhich builds power plants to expandsupply and ra onalises prices to conservedemand.

PolityAll thedeposed judgesshouldberestoredand the rule of law brought back intothe polity. There are three branches ofgovernment and each has to respect therights of the other two. The checks andbalances that are essen al to democra cgovernment have to be ins tu onalisedso that division of power and not unity ofcommand becomes the opera ve para-digm. And under no condi ons shouldthe military be considered a fourthbranch of government.

SocietyA culture of tolerance and respect fordiversity that cuts across ethnic, sectar-ian and gender lines must be incubated.Emphasis should be placed on educa ngthe popula on, especially children. Andthe ger of popula on growth must betamed.

Even under the best condi ons, the five-point agenda cons tutes a tall order.However, it is difficult to see how Paki-stan can survive its myriad challenges,let alone survive as a na on state, unlessthe agenda is a ended to. The US haspromised large-scale financial assistanceto Pakistan over the next five years. Pres-ident Obama plans to spend some $2.8billion in aid for the Pakistani military inaddi on to delivering some $1.5 billion ayear for five years in economic aid. Themilitary spending will be part of a new‘Pakistani Counterinsurgency CapabilityFund’.9 The US military will closely trackthis fund and also be tasked with ensur-ing that the money is not used by thePakistani military to enhance its capacityto a ack another country such as India.

By now it should be evident thatfundamental changes in the policymatrixmust originate from within Pakistan.No one else can save the country fromdestruc on since much of the damageis self-inflicted, arising from a misguidedpercep on of its na onal security. ■

Ahmad Faruqui, an Associate Professorof the Pakistan Security Research Unit atthe University of Bradford, is the authormost recently ofMusharraf’s Pakistan,Bush’s America and the Middle East(Vanguard Books).

pakistan – adrift once again

NOTES

1 Musharraf had made no plans for anorderly succession of power. The proofcan be found in his memoirs which coverthe first six years of his rule: PervezMusharraf, In the Line of Fire (Simon &Schuster, 2006).

2 There a number of new books on therole of the army in Pakistani poli cs,economy and society. See, for example,Mazhar Aziz,Military Control in Pakistan:The Parallel State (Oxford: RoutledgeAdvances in South Asian Studies, 2008);Husain Haqqani, Pakistan: BetweenMosque and Military (New York:Carnegie Endowment for Interna onalPeace, 2005); Shuja Nawaz, CrossedSwords: Pakistan, its Army and the WarsWithin (Oxford University Press, 2008);and Ayesha Siddiqa Agha,Military,Inc.: Inside Pakistan’s Military Economy(Pluto, 2007).

3 United States Joint Forces Command,‘The Joint Opera ng Environment (JOE)2008: Challenges and Implica ons forthe Future Joint Force’ (Suffolk, Virginia:Center for Joint Futures), <h p://www.jfcom.mil/newslink/storyarchive/2008/JOE2008.pdf>, (accessed 17 April 2009).

4 Carlos Lozada, ‘A Conversa on withDavid Kilcullen’,Washington Post, 22March 2009.

5 US Na onal Intelligence Council (NIC2008- 003), ‘Global Trends 2025: ATransformed World’, November 2008,<www.dni.gov/nic/NIC_2025_project.html>.

6 US Na onal Intelligence Council (NIC2002-02), ‘Global Trends 2015: A Dialogueabout the Future with NongovernmentExperts’, December 2000.

7 For a discussion of the Bhu o period,and of the military rule that came beforeand a er his period in government, seeAhmad Faruqui, Rethinking the Na onalSecurity of Pakistan (Aldershot: AshgatePublishing, 2003).

8 For a historical narra ve, see AhmedRashid, Descent into Chaos: The UnitedStates and the Failure of Na on Buildingin Pakistan, Afghanistan, and CentralAsia (Viking, 2008). Also consult theessays by Pakistani social scien sts inAhmad Faruqui and Syed Farooq Hasnat(eds), Pakistan: Unresolved Issues ofState & Society (Lahore: Vanguard Books,2008).

9 Jus n Fishel, ‘Obama to propose $2.8billion in military aid to Pakistan’,FoxNews.com, 30 March 2009.

© RUSI JOURNAL APRIL 2009

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