CHAPTER I

PATTERNS OF RELATIONSHIP BETWEN RELIGION AND POLITICS

Herberg Will, while writing on American religious life

in the wake of rise of Neo-Orthodox movement in the fifties,

remarked, "every aspect of contemporary religious life

reflects the paradox pervasive secularism and mounting

religiosity, the strengthening of the religiosity, the

structure in spite of increasing secularization. III "The

current revivalist trend throughout the greater part of the

world has confirmed Herberg's paradox - atleast for those who

predic~ed that the onward march of science and the process

of secularization will diminish the influence of religion in

public sphere and its potential to challange the rationale

for secular authority. Thus, Smith noted - "while religion, a

mass phenomenon in traditional societies, can play a useful

role in transitional secieties in making p~litics meaningful

to the apolitical masses, the general forces of

secularization of culture and society will in the long run

erode its political effectiveness". 2 Similarly, Daniel

Lerner" in the context of Islam, declared, "Whether from East

or West, modernization poses the same basic challenge - the

infusion of a rationalist and positivist spirit against

which Islam is absolutely defenseless. 3 These and other

1. Herberg Will, Protestant - Catholic - Jew: An Essay in American Religious Sociology (New York, 1955), p.l.4 ..

2. Donald Eugene Smith, ed, Religion. Politics and Social Change in the Third World (New York, 1971), p.4.

3. Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society (USA, 1958), p.45.

1

statements sum up the dominant mood of Western 'Modernist

School' on the complex issue of relationship between religion

and politics.

However, the emergence of phenomenon like Islamic

revivalism in Muslim populated region, Liberation Theology in

Latin America, the growing Hindu revivalism in Indian sub-

continent and fundamentalist trend in whole of South Asia,

* the NRM (New Religious Movement) in the industrialised West,

the religious resurgence in the earstwhile communist states

of the Soviet Union and East Europe. etc. have clearly

exposed the fallacies of the much acclaimed theory of social

change based upon the Modernization Model. This model has

been widely employed to understand, analyse and explain the

process of socio-cultural change and political development in

the Third World countries in post Second World War period.

The modernization theory operates on the assumption that the

society moves from 'traditional' to 'modern'. Secularization

is pre-requisite of modernization. It treats religion purely

as a reactionary force, a ritualistic dogma, a legitimising

instrument of the political system and as an anathema to

socio-economic development and political modernization.

Among the criteria that are generally employed to judge the

"degree" of modernity of any nation are the level of

industrialization, literacy, scope of the education system,

urban density, employment ratio, the administrative capacity

of the state ""and commitment to Western liberal democratic

* S~e, James A. Backford; New Religious Movement and Rapid Social Change (London, 1986)

2

values which include such factors as universalization of

political participation, rationalization of authority,

cul tural secularization and the structural differentiation.

Failing to reach these standards, a country's socio-

political- sturcture might be dubbed as static, oppressive,

monolithic and finally pre-modern. It was this theoritical

construct which led Hisham Sharabi, an orientalist, to

conclude that "the authentic modernity is only of Western

origin. 4

Scholars belonging to the modernization shcool have

tried to interpret the religious upsurge mostly in terms of

legitimacy crisis, identity crisis, cultural dualism or the

natural reaction of conservative forces to the modernizing

process in the period of transition. This is true atleast in

the context of Islamic revivalism. The theory lays great

emphasis on rural migrationS and views the phenomenon of

Islamic resurgence as a petty-bourgeois phenomenon-

symptomatic of productive urban middle class. Thus, Eric

Davis has remarked in the context of Egypt, "beyound the

urban middle class, it is difficult to see Islamic radicalism

extending to the industrial working class and peasantry which

4. Hisham Sharabi, "The Dialecties of Patriarchy", in Samih K. Farsoun, ed, Arab Society Countinuity and Change (London, 1985), pp.85-89.

5. Between 1960 and 1975 the rate of increase in the urban popultaion exceeded the grwoth of the industrial labour force in Egypt by 2%, Iran by 3%, Iraq by 8%, Jordan by 18%, Kuwait by 14%, Lebanon by 3%, Morocco by 10%, Saudi Arabia by 11%, Syria by 3% and South Yemen by 13%. See James P. Piscatori, Islam in a World of Nation States (Cambridge, 1986), p.27.

3

has traditionally ignored its appeal. ,,6 It treats religion

merely as a psychological device or spiritual niche towards

which an individual helplessly turns failing to cope with the

stress and strains of multiple crisis viz political

suppression, economic oppression and cultural regression

(losing of collective Islamic identity due to breakdown of

traditional values)- generated by the uneven process of

modernization that the Third World contries are undergoing.

Reactions to the modernization model are many and varied

especially on its emphasis on secularism as a pre-requisite

for a modern state. Eisenstadt has characterized the

literature on political modernization as ahistorical,

Western-centered, and poorly supported by the available

evidence - and tried to construct alternative models of the

modern state. 7 Dawa Norbu, in his significant study on

, Third World Nationalism' has strongly objected to the'

validity of Western concept to explain the non-Western

realities and demonstrated the positive role of tradition and

culture in evolution of Third World nationalism. 8 Nash came

6. Eric Davis, ." Islamic Radicalism in Modern Egypt" in Said Amir Arjoman'd, ed., From Nationalism to Revolutionary Islam (London, 1984), p.1S3.

7.

8 .

S.N. Eisenstadt, "Varieties of in S. N. Eisenstadt and Stein states and Nations. (Beverly p.41-48.

Political Development," Bakkan, ed., Building

Hills, 1973), Vol. I,

Culture and the Politics of Third World Dawa Norbu, nationalism and Ch-S.

(London & New York, 1992), specially Ch- I

4

to a similar conclusion about the role of Buddism in Burma,9

and William argued that Roman Catholicism is now a positive

factor in nation building in Latin America. 10

More recently a number of authors have reacted to the

widely discussed "Islamic revival" by arguing that Islam does

not act as a general obstacle to modernization in the Middle

East. 11 Much before, Maxim Rodinson showed that Islam did not

act as cultural obstacle in the development of capitalism. 12

Carroll has convincingly demonstrated that there is no

necessary relationsip between secularization and a

development of a modern state which implies the capacity to

undertake a range of large, complex tasks on a regular and

c.ontinuing basis and not to be confused with the liberal

democratic values of the West. 13 This definition of modern

state is applicable to all kind of its varities - Liberal,

pluralistic Marxist, Social democartic and Conservative. In

fact depending upon the religion of the people and the

9. Manning Nash, "Buddhist Revitalization in the Nation State' : The Burmese Experience," in Robert F. Spencer, ed, Religion and Change in Contemporary Asia (Minneapolic, 1971), pp.l0S-22.

10. Edward J. Williams Nation-State and Comparative Politics 1974), pp.261-77.

"The Emergence of the Secular Latin American Catholicism" , (New York), Vol. 12, no. 5 (Jan,

11. John L. Esposito, ed, Islam and Development : Religion and Socio-Political Change (Syracuse, 1980).

12. Maxim Rodinson, Islam and Capitalism (London, 1966).

13. Terrance G. Carroll, "Secularization And States of Modernity", World Politics (Princeton, N.J.), Vol. 36, no. 8 (April, 1984), pp. 362-82.

5

ideological character of the state elite, a modern state may

give primary importance to religion, it may be essentially

secular, or it may be at any point between these extremes. 14

Perhaps much of the failure of modernization school

stems from its understanding of secularism in terms of

'ideal' seperation of church from state as to be found in the

advanc~d industrial societies of the West. But as Glasner

has noted that ideal types are too often confused with

reality and has identified many of the different and

sometimes contradictory meanings to the concept of

secularization. 15 He concluded that religion does not play

the role assigned to it in the ideal-type traditional system

in any exisiting society as depicted by Smith, nor is any

existing society as completely secularized as the ideal-type

modern state. 16 In fact a cross-cultural study of pattern of

secula~ization process in diferent societies reveals that it

may take differnt forms in differnt countries depending upon

the nature of polity and socio-economy formation. As one

scholar noted, "Secularization is a many sided

phenomenon affecting different aspects of the social and

cuI tural structures of society in diverse ways and in

different sequences. 17 Majid Khadduri has noted the

14. Ibid, p. 363.

15. Peter E. Glasner, The Sociology of Secularization Critique of a Concept (New Delhi, 1977).

1~. Glasner, n. 15, pp.67-76

A

17. Jeffry Haynes, Religion in Third World Politics (Buckingham, 1993), p. 27. ,

6

possibility of four forms of secularization in the Islamic

co~text. These include the adoption of measures which have

little or nothing to do with Islam, the adoption of measures

which are in principle consistent with Islam but are not

dealt with in such detail as would fit existing conditions,

the adoption of measures which may substitute certain aspects

of Islam that have become obsolete and, finally, the

seperation of religion from the state. 18 Smith also opined

that "the dominance of poli ty over religious beliefs,

practices and ecclesiastical structures in itself is a form

of secularism. 19

A closer analysis of working of the ~merican political

system denies the principle of actual seperation of church

from state, though it exists in the legal form. The mutual

influence of religion and government in the United States can

be shown by a simple listing of some of the ways in which

they affect each other such as church interest and influence

in marriage and divorce laws and in birth control

legislation, the concern of many church groups with "social

legislation-child labour, social security etc., the interest

of some churches with processes in the courts and prisons;

government chaplainies and religous services in the armed

forces; required oaths, blasphemy laws; Sunday observance

laws; government observance of special religious days and

18. Majid ~adduri, Political Trends In The Arab World ,(Balitimore 1972) I p.2l4.

19. Dona 1 d Euge ne Smi t h , ~R:.::.e"-,l",-",=i..::g"""i"-,o=n,------,a=n:.::.d~_P~o,-"l:...,,l.,,,-· -=t~i:...:c""a~l Development (Boston, 1970),p.86.

7

occassions; concern of the churches over the "Bill of

Rights", which includes religious freedom and involves the

problem of censorship; Church interest in radio and

television, the protection of religion in progranuning and

granting of time to religous groups, inpart by legal

requirement. 20

It is notable that the supereme court has given it an

official sanction by declaring (in 1892 and at other times)

that the United States is a Christian nation in the broad

sense that christian principles underlie its laws and

values. 21 On the other hand one can find the widespread use

of religious values and symbols to try to win various kinds

of political struggles. Groups such as the Christian Front

and Spiritual Mobilization on the right and the Fellowship of

Christian Socialists on the left, are quite active in

claiming a religous mandate for various political policies.

In fact the roster of lobbyists in Washington working for

churches and other religious organizations is an extensive

one. 22

Hence Samuel Krislov, an American legal scholar,

expressed Skepticism on the point and remarked, "Seperation

20. See Stokes, in Myron J, Aronoff, ed., Religion and Politics (New Brunswick, 1984), pp. 52-62.

21. J. Milton Yinger, Religion. Society and Individual: An Introduction to the Sociologyof Religion (New York, 1957), p. 244.

22. Luke E. Ebersole, "Church Cap i tal" , ""'S-"'o=c=i""'a:..:l"--..... A....,c"""t""l.=:.· "",o=n pp.5-35.

8

Lobbying (London) ,

in the Vol. 22

Nation's (1981) ,

of church and state is an artificial concept not really

capable of easy implementation or logical achievment".23 Or,

as N.J. Demerath has put it, "The separation of chruch and

state is a construct of political theory rather than a

description of governing reality. ,,24 He also showed that

separation is a functional necessity of any modern state.

His case study of religious state such as Pakistan,

Indonesia, Thailand and Sweden, showed that they all share

more functional seperation of religion and government than

either their politics or their legal structure would

suggest. 25 United States of America is not unique in this

aspect.

While commenting on the concept of secularism Tamara

sonn also opined, "it is not an ideology, as such, or a claim

that the separation of the two orders religious and

polit:i,cal' is based on a metaphysical division or

compromise of divine unity or sovereignty. It is rather, a

practical response to the socio economic reality of

geographically limited states. Secularism developed out of 'a

need to find political legitimacy consistent with limited

geographical claims unlike the claims of the church. Once

23. Samuel Krislov, "Alternatives to Seperation of Church and State in Countries outside the United States," in James E. Wood, Jr; ed., Reli'gion and the State (Waco,

'Tex, 1985), p.56 .

24. . N.J. Demerath, Religions: Cross the Seperation (Cambridge), Vol.

25. Ibid, pp. 21-40

"Religious Capital and Capital - Cultural and Non-Legal Factors in of Church and State", Daedalus 120, no. 3 (Summer 1991), p.22

9

the separation had been articulated, a democratic and

therefore limited political legitimacy was substituted for

religous, potentially unlimited political legitimacy. And in

the exposition of democracy came development of secularism. 26

Max Weber, too, much before the present debate began, had

ruled out the the possibility of actual separation of church

from state and delineated three maj or types of relations

between ecclesiastic and secular power hierocratic,

theocratic and Caesaropapist. 27 In the first, secular power

is dominant but cloaked in religious legitimacy; in the

second, ecclesiastic authority is pre-eminent, and in the

third, secular power holds sway over religion itself.

Thus, it seems possible to conclude that in some cases

the ecclesiastical structure may be the dominant one while in

other cases political authority will dominate the Church,

but in either case Church and state will not be seperate.

Because the relationship between religion and politics are

imbedded in a whole social structure and will vary with

variat·ions in that sturcture. The nature of reconciliation

vary widely depending on the location of' political power, the

sturcture of the ecclesiastical organization, the needs of

the individual involved and the distribution of economic

power.

26. Tamara Sonn, Between Quran and Crown; The Challenge of Political Ligitimacy in the Arab World. (Boulder, 1990) p.28. '.

27. Max Weber, Economy and Soci~ty, (Berkeley, 1978), Vol. 2, pp.1159-60.

10

Though the empirical evidence supports the closer nexus

between the lower income group people and religious

revivalism., 28 by reducing the latter to urban middle class

phenomena' or merly socio-economic anomic the modernization

school has not only ignored the mass character of the

religio-political movement (as evident from revolution in

Iran, Ikhwan in Egypt and Liberation Theology in Latin

America) but has failed to recognize the in-built potential

for political mobilization which religion keeps in its

capacity as historically evolved cultural systems, rather

than merely as an ideology in Western sense. 29 For there is

no reason to suppose that the Wahhabis in the eighteenth

century, were impelled to their enthusiam by Adam Smith and

·Karl Marx. 30 Ashis Nandy, a noted third World Scholar, has

also criticized the Western oriented secularist for treating

religion as an ideology in opposition to the ideology of

modern statecraft and, therefore, needs to pe contained. He

further said that the Western brand of secularism has little

to say about >cultures - it is definitionally ethnophobic and

frequently ethnocidal, unless, of course, cultures and those

28. See, Chrles Y Glock & Rodney Stark, Religion And Society in Tension (Oxford, 1985), Ch-10, also Saad Eddin Ibrahim, "Anatomy of Egypt Militant Islamic Group

Methodology Notes and Preliminary Finding," International Journal of Middle East Studies (London), Vol.12, n.4, (December 1980), pp. 438-9. Robert wuthnow, "Understanding Religion and Politics," Daedalus, 120, no. 3, Summer 1991, p.14.

29. For difference between culture and ideology, see Norbu, n. 8, p .. 7.1.

30. Earnest Gellener, ed, Islamic Dilemma : Reformers. Nationalists and Industralization : The Southern Shore of the Mediterranean (New York, 1985), p.14.

11

living by cultures are willing to show total subservience to

the modern nation - state and become ornament or adjuncts to

modern living. 31

The recognition to the cultural power of religion in the

wake of its emergence as political force has led to shift in

the approach to t.he meaning, role, status and position of

religion in the society. Traditionally the sociology of

religion has narrowly focussed on the positive and

integrative fuctions of religion for both individuals and

societies. The question of power orientation and conflict

potentials of any universal religion has recently come up.·32.

Now even the Marxists, who hitherto dismissed religion as

metaphysical, non-scientific, ideological mystification of

reality, false consciousness etc. have now recognized the

'relative autonomy' of religion and its capacity to influence

the course of economic and political change. As Althusser,

the noted structuralist Marxist remarked, "religion like all

ideologies, enjoys an existence in its own right and is,

therefore, as real as material forces.,,33

The cultural aspect of religion and its autonomous role

has gained prominence in the recent writings. Indeed from

31. Ashis Nandi; "The Poli tics of Sec;ularism and the Recovery of Religious Tolerance," Alternatives (England), Vol. 13 (1988), p.179.

32. See, J.A. Backford, "The Restoration of "Power" to the Sociol0S-Y of Religion, " Sociological Analysis (Washington, D.C.), Vol.44, nO.l, (1983), pp.11-31.

33. Quoted ·in James A. Backford, Religion and Advanced Industrial Society (London, 1989), p.138.

12

Max Weber to George Simmel each analysed religon as a

reposi tory of fundamental cuI tural meanings through which

both individuals and collectivities are able to interpret

their conditions of existence, to construct identity for

themselves and to attempt to impose order on their

environment. Religion is regarded, in this perspective, as a

largely symbolic resource or code in terms of which meaning

is continuously produced, transmitted and contested.

Essentially the term religion is a multi faceted

concept with three distinct, yet interrelated meanings. First

the term includes religious establishment (including priests

and officials) and groups sponsored by religious

organization. Second, spiritually the term pertains to models

of social and indi vidual behaviour that help to organize

everyday life, it .is to do with the idea of transcendence,

i.e., it is associated with supernatural realities,with

sacredness, i. e. as a system of language and practice that

organizes the world in terms of what is deemed sacred, and

finally, it is to do with ultimacy i. e .. religion relates

people to the ultimate condition of their existence. 34

The ' Cultural power' of a religion can be defined as

"the capacity to use cultural resources to affect political

outcomes. These resources include symbols, ideologies, moral

authori ty and cul tural meaning. They can be used to

34. G. Moyser, "Politics and Religion in the Modern World: An Overview", in G Moyser, ed., Politics and Religion in the Modern World (London, 1991), pp. 9-10.

13

legitimate or delegitimate political outcomes or actions, to

keep some issues public and political and others out of the

public eye altogether, and to frame the terms with which

issue are dicussed when they are public.,,35.

However, the capacity of religion (or religious

groups/organization/authority) to exercise its cultural-power

will differ from country to country depending upon the ethos

of religion, the organizational nature of religious authority

and also the degree to which the 'social ethos of a society

has been liberalized. The greater the liberal ethos of the

society the +ess the role for reI igion to play in the

political affairs of the society and vice-versa. It is

because of the liberal ethos of the advanced Western nations

that religion does not play the prominent role in the

country's political affairs. In other words Christianty has

adjusted and compromised its role to the "private affairs" in

accordance with the needs of the emerging liberal democratic

secular political order in the West. The value system of

Third World societies including Muslim have not been fully

liberalized and hence not secularized. Secularism in

any society derives its strength from the internal liberal

social ethos of that society. Therefore, manifestation of

secularization in countries with a tradition of more or less

coercive religions conformity (like Middle East countries)

will differ from those of countries such as the u. S.A. or

35. Demarath and Rhys William, Bridging of Faiths; Religion and Power in a New England City (Princeton, J.992).' p.27.

J.4

There~ore, religion along with the tribal value system,

remains the strongest basis of social and political life in

that country.

As compared to Egypt, the liberal social ethos is less

stronger in Iran, but more stronger in comparison to Saudi

Arabia. Unlike Egypt, Iran escaped the direct political

domination of the West. Moreover the pecularity of Iranian

Shiism such as the institutionalized hierarchy of mujtahid,

its identification with nationalism and its close association

with t;.he petty-bourgeois merchant cormnunity acted as a

powerful deterrent to the outside influence. The ulama' S

participation in the brief constitutional movement of Iranian

history was not guided by the high ideals of Western liberal

political values. As a consequence religion remains a

dominant force in Iran.

The subsequent chapters will show how religion plays

different roles in each of these three countries depending

upon the differences in the socio-cultural, economic and

political structure of these countries.

It is now becoming clear that religion can still convey

symbqls of newly' perceived social relities. It can serve as

a language for representing powerful inspiration,

perceptions, sufferings, and aspirations even though the

users of this language not easily associate with any

religious organization.

resource or form which may

challange, or conservation.

16

It remains a potent

act as the vechile

Even in the West

cultural

of change,

where the

processes of industrialization has undermined the communal,

familial and organizational bases of religion, the religious

forms of sentiment, belief and action have survived as

relatively autonomous resources.

Essentially the relationship of the state, society and

religion are triadic. Role of religion in politics is thus

influenced by the specific kind of relationship between the

state and the society that obtains in a given historical

conjuncture. Religion provides the moral basis of the

state's authority, as well as an institutional and

metaphysical structure for social transaction. In turn,

religion is affected

and changing social

introduced into the

by the disposition of temporal power

norms and attitudes, some of which are

arena from outside. In this sense,

religion is not a static system of symbols shared by merbers

of a group or society. Religious values are formed and t.heir

salience rearranged within the political arena. Furthezo the

specific role attributed to religion at a given time and

place depends primarily upon the status of religion in the

constitutional framework and the social meaning attached to

it. On the basis of constitutional position of religion,

following pattern of relationship can be obtained between

religion and the state in modern period

HEGEMONIC. In this pattern the hegemony of a partie ular

religion co-exists with toleration of other religions. The

society defines interpersonal relations in terms of cc·rmnon

law and market transaction and religion is left very much as

17

a matter of personal faith. The Uni ted Kingdom and the

Scandinavian contries (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and

Sweden) can be put under this category. In U. K . the law

requires its Head to be a member of the Church of England.

The state provides protection not extended to other religions ,

to the church through the laws of blaspnemy. Similarly in

all five scandinavian countries the Lutheran State Church

dominates the religious life of the society.

THEOCRATIC : - A theocracy exists within a society which

construes interpersonal relations in terms of a specific

religion and enjoins the state to promote this religion. Art

2 of the constitution of Islamic Republic of Iran clearly

acknowledges "the Divine Revelation and its fundamental role

in determining the laws. Art 12 further states "the official

religion of Iran is Islam of the Ja.fari twelve Imam sect and

this article is inalterable in perpetuity. For Saudi Arabia

the Our' an itself is the constitution. The country has

monarchial regime in alliance with Wahhabism.

SECULAR: :- It includes those states which share the common

attributes of a legal seperation between the state and the

Church. France, U.S.A., Turkey, and communist states like

former. U.S.S.R. and Peoples Republic of China are examples of

this type. All communist states deny the legitimacy of

relgion altogether and make an expiticit attempt to replace

the values and institutions of religion with those of

materialism, the state and the communist party.

18

NEUTRAL. States lkie India officially maintain a neutral or

hands off attitude to religion in principle, but in practice

concede the convergence of the sacred and the secular out of

deference to the wishes of society. The state disengages

itself from any formal links with religion.

Lastly there are many countries who have declared

state's religion but are not governed solely by religious

perception. Under this falls most of the Muslm states, Sri

lanka, Burma, etc. It is typical of the most of the Third

World nations which in their post-colonial phase, adopted the

policy of state's religion in order to butterss the

legitimacy for the state and moral under pining for those

roles, necessary to political objectives. As Apte"r has

remarked, "religiosity in the political sphere is used,

however, to create system of instrumental means and secular

objectives rather than theocratic ones. In this respect

political religion "is at least partly employed for non­

religious objective.,,36

Van Moorseven and Van der Tan have summarised the

constitutional position of different religion based on the

survey of 142 national constitution -

According to that survey conducted in 1978, "Study of

written constitution indicated that forty three (or 30

percent) of those analyzable provided for a national religion

36. David A. Apter "Political Religion in the New Nations," in Clifford Geertz ed; Old Societies and New States (New Delhi, 1971), p.89.

19

and ninty-nine (or 70 percent) did not. Thirty-three

countries specified religion, mostly notably for the office

of religious minister. All but twenty had some reference to

church or rel igion. Sixty-one (or 43 percent) guaranteed

freedom of religion, while sixty-four (or 47 percent)

guaranteed both religious freedom and the right to be

affiliated religiously. Only ten (7%) have no constitutional

provision of this type. Provisions for freedom of religion

are much more common than provisions for freedom of thought

indeed the frequency is almost double that of

political freedoms.,,37

Thus, the legitimate role of religion, however, is by no

means a problem specific, except in the communist ruled

states. Every society has to work out an institutional

arrangement according to its cultural tradition and the

historical process within which it is placed. The experience

of the United Kingdom, France, Iran, Scandinavian Countries

and others suggest that the development of the triad of

state, society and religion is a continuous process in which

changes in the state structure and the social composotion are

eventually reflected by changes in or challenges to the

religious regime.

From the standpoint of the government, religion may be

both a source and an object of administration. It is a

37. Hen C. Van Moorseven and Ger Van Constitution: A Comparative Study 1978) .

20

der Tan, Written (Dobbes Ferry, N.Y.

source because it offers an institutional network whose

tentacles reach both deep and wide across the society. This

allows a variety of administrative efficiencies, ranging from

the Swedish census to Indonesia's golkar apparatus. Religion

may also be an administrative object when it represents a

potential base of counter mobilization which must be

dampened. As a cultural wild card in the frequently fixed

game of state politics, religion poses a threat to

established policies and policy makers. Perhaps, this is the

major reason why "state religions" are more common than

"religious states". Governments frequently "volunteer" their

offices and resources to "assist" with important religious

function, including religious publication and education,

pilgrimages such as the Islamic hajj to Mecca, and the

maintenance of churches, mosques and temples. Alliances

between government and religion frequently smack of.

cooptation, and religious .groups sometimes prefer to remain

outside of the political establishment and state apparatus to •

preserve their power potential. "j 6 7W~J ~ <1

h 1 · h' b 1" ~a 5""1" b T e re at~ons ~p etween re ~g~on an po ~t~cs ecomes

more complicated in socie.ties that are highly stratified and

have developed religious specialists. In isolated and

preliterate societies, where religious specialists have not

developed to an important degree there is close

identification of religious group with political group

membership. In such societies with fewer religious

specialist, there has been less development of a seperate

religious structure, a centre of power which might compete

THESIS 291.1787

AI117 Ro

1111111 II 111111 1111"1111 TH5792

21

with the political structure. And political authorities,

without such a system to manipulate, are themselves fully

circumscribed in their views by the beliefs of their own

society. Thus, they are ~nlikely to be able to use the

religious patterns to reinforce their own power beyond the

limits of the established norms. But in a developed and

stratified society, religion is looked upon as an instrument

of power. The political class sees in religion a means of

preserving order - an order that places them at the apex.

The political authorites may become so powerful that, rather

than having their use of coercive means limited and governed

by religious values, they may succeed in transforming the

religious institutions precisely into another instrument of

coercion. To the degree that this happens, religious belief

and practices become simply one manifestation of the

political situation, and their control over the phase of the

political problem' (preventing authorities from using their

power to their own advantage). This development implies a

change in the religious tradition and organisation, a

selective application of its doctrines, rites, and

structures, emphasizing those that enhance the power of the

rulers, denying or obscuring those that might restrain it. , The political use of religion makes it difficult to

distinguish between a situation in which religion reinforces

a stable social order and one in which religion is used by

those who possess political power to their own advantage in

violation of the norms of that order.

22

'.

On the other hand, there may develop a sharp tension

between religion and the political ·system. Religion may

exert power in state matters. Even where religion lacks

access to the political instruments of "structural power"

(whether coercion, votes, budgets, or networks of

influentials), it may wield considerable 'cultural power' as

defined earlier. The nature and the degree of the conflict

with the political authorities varies with the religious

tradition and with the structure of power in, society. The

religious instititution may themselves employ violence to

establish the supermacy of their claims over what they

consider to be merely political claims. This is not

uncommon, particularly in the history of Christianity and

l;slam. However, the degree of religious opposition to the

state authority also depends upon the authority of religious

structure itself. Thus within Christianity itself, there are

wide and obvious differences between "episcopal" top-down

structures, on the one hand and "congregational" bottom-up

models of local autonomy on the other. Within Islam, there

is a fundamental distinction between the more authoritatively

structured Shiites and the more locally autonomous Sunnis.

Hinduism is more centrally organized in Indonesia's Bali than

in India Budhism's Sangha in Thailand differs from

Buddhism's organizational form in Tibet, let alone withi-~

the "greater vehicle" of China or Japan. From the standpoi:nt I'

of sheer political potency, the combination with the great~st

potential is ethical prophecy embedded within and protecteJ

by a hierarchical ecclesiastical structure ·(for example

23

eighth-century Islam or pre-Reformation Catholicism)

Conversely the least likely source of political power is

emissary prophecy without organizational trappings (for

example, the Hindu guru). Ethical prophecy wi thout the

reinforcement of an organizational structure may amount to

spitting in the political wind. And an elaborate

ecclesiastical structure without an ethically prophetic spark

is particularly vulnerable to state cooptation. After all,

those who make it to the top of such ecclesiastical ladders

are selectively recruited, gradually socialized, and

generally rewarded for their loyalty to the political status

quo.

In a highly developed and stratified society the stage

is set for personal struggles for power between religious and

political leaders, for clashes in principle, for conflicts

between ecclesiastical and political organizations. These

struggles may be entirely political, involving only

disagreements over the use or distribution of secular power.

But they may represent the appearance of religious ideas that

are not. harmonious with the secular institutions, that

contradict their claims or values. Thus, the whole of

Islamic mass movements, be it in Egypt, Iran, Algeria,

Tunisia, Sudan and others and Liberation Theology movement

have strong power-orientation. They do aspire to capture the

political .power. Islamic opposition groups are products of

the very socio-political orders they oppose. At the same

time, those elites who attempt to buttress their own

legitimacy through reliance on institutional Islam are at

24

least as committed to political survival as they are to the

spritual values they so fervently espouse. Max Weber noted,

"the man who is concerned for the welfare of his soul and the

salvation of the souls of other does not seek these aims

along the path of politics. Politics has quite different

goals, which can only be achieved by force." 38 Though this

maximalist view may seem unduly cynical, the record of those

political elites in the ~ who rely on Islam for legitimacy

seem to verify Weber's insight. Can political leaders who

claim high levels of religiosity maintain the same level and

character of commitment to their core spiritual values while

in power? Certainly there are many in Saudi Arabia,

Pakistan, and the Islamic Republic of Iran who question the

II Islamicness" of their leaders. Khomeini the oppositionist

generated far more popular support in Iran and in the Umma

than does Khomeini the Head of state. Islamic doctrine in

the test tube is far better defined than is Islam as a guide

for state management. And Islam as an ideology becomes

significantly less important when it is confronted by the

imperatives of a state's national interest. As Weber has

pointed out lithe followers of a warrior of faith, once they

have achieved power, tend to degenerate into a thoroughly

commonplace class of office-holders. 39

38.

In fact, the religiopolitics is politics much like other

Max Weber, "Politics as a vocation," in W.G. Runciman, ed., Weber: Selection in Translation (New York, 1978), p. 223.

39. Ibid, p. 222

25

politics. The two influence one another, but claims by

religio-political activists to have some sort of special

mandata from God which raises them above politics tend not to

be persuasive. For as Weber also notes, "he who meddles with

politics, who in other words makes use of the instruments of

power and violence, concludes a pact with infernal powers".40

Religio-political actors generally exaggerate the religious

content of their actions, while denying the political

content. For instance, those trying to interpret the political

behaviour of Ayatollah Khomeini are subj ect to charges of

being anti-Islamic.

more difficult.

This make the task of secular somewhat

It is within this framework of power-struggle between

the religious organization and the political strucure that

the following propositions can be made for understanding and

comparing the role of religion in a variety of state

polities:

(1) Although religion is conventionally viewed as an element

of traditionalism, recent cases of religio-politics are often

the product of modernization and social change. They are

most likely to prosper during crisis of i~entity, ideology,

legitimacy and participation.

In societies undergoing rapid transformation, religion

frequently serves as a culturally authentic and spiritually

satisfying anchor to the familiar and the understood.

40. Ibid, p. 220.

26

Furthermore, " in light of the absence of conventional

participatory mechanisms, formalized religions organizations

can, and in the view of some religious leaders, should serve

as vehicles for improving the quality of life for their

adherents. ,,41 Such sentiments are recognized both by political

elites and counter elites.

(2) Religio-political is a common type of political

mobilization or countermobilization, not merely a theological

ritual. Thus Liberation Theology in Latin America, Islamic

movements in Muslim World, the Moral Majority in the United

states, Poland's Solidarity Movements etc are or were

inspired by religion with political belief being mediated

through man's spiritual relationship wi th God. Yet such a

mobilization is most definitely political mobilization for

the accomplishment of political goals.

Religion provides a particula.r perspective for

evaluating social, political and economic conditions. The

form of such politics is heavily influenced by religious

symbols, values and idioms. Thus religio-politics may be

analyzed in comparison or in contrast with other ideologies,

most of ,which are concerned with similar sorts of issues that

are perceived and addressed in different idioms.

Thus, religion is more than doctrine or liturgy and in a

political context functions as an ideology not unlike

secular ideologies. Religious activists are equally concerned

41. Jerrold D. Green, Revolution in Iran: The Politics of Counter-Mobilization (New York, 1982), p.150.

27

with social, economic, political and moral questions.

The political component of religio-politics becomes at

least as significant as the religious one as the goals of the

participants are not religious per se.

As religio-political activists increase their

involvement in the day-to-day political life of a polity, the

agenda of issues and problem with which they are confronted

is not; likely to be resolved on the basis of religious

doctrine alone. 42 Religious dogma provides guidance on

economic and political issues only in the most general terms.

Pursuit of the national interest is likely to supercede

strict adherence to religious canons. Religiopolitical

leaders, either consciously or subconsciously, will attempt

to 'obscure this exacerbation on the basis of the very

doctrinal factors on which they rely to enhance their

legitimacy. In a conflict between the profane and the

spiritual, particularly when questions of power and dominance

are at stake, the profane is likely to win, yet, in a fashion

that will be disguised, not highlighted.

Religio-politiCs redefines the criteria for and the

nature of elite legitimacy while changing the form more than

the context of governmental activity. Different symbols and

idioms are relied upon while the standards for elite

42. See, Charles E. Butterworth, "Prudence Versus· ~egitimacy: The Persistent Theme in Islamic Political Thought" in Ali. E. Hillal Dessouki, ed, Islamic Resurgence in the Arab World (New York, 1982), pp.84-144.

28

legitimacy will be modified. Yet, despite the emergence of a

new political elite, its appearance will differ for more than

will the context of its actions. Absolute religious

principles do not fit well in the "compromise" world of

actual governance. Theological constraints on state actions

do not sit well with elected officials who seek to preserve a

capacity for flexible policy responses to changing

circumstances. And,

law or state policy,

if religion must be incorporated into

most officials prefer very brief and

very general codifications which can be variously interpreted

as conditions warrant. Even where a nation's political

leadership is overtly religious, most governments depend upon

a sophisticated civil

unto i.tself, one that

cynical with respect

service that may become a

is frequently secular and

to its nation's traditional

conununity

sometimes

religious

pattern. As such, the problems confronting a society change

far less frequently than do the personnel managing it. The

rules of the political game may be transformed, but the game

remains basically the same.

Religio-politics brings an assortment of moral issues to

public life and then prpceeds to ignore many of them. Due to

the flexibility of religious doctrine and the complexity of

state management, the religio-political activist's stated

concern with moral issues are generally outstripped by his

eagerness to preserve his political power a power he

attributes to his moral superiori ty yet which is more

dependent on the use of force.

29

Religiopolitics is frequently an intense statement of

some form of nationalism and/or ethnicity. This proposition

is more applicable to the Third World Societies than to the

industrialized West. In the West,

basis of religious ideas and

systematically undermined and

the social and political

institutions had been

eroded by a series of

revolutionary changes since the sixteenth century, the

Renaissance, Enlightenment, Industrial Revolution, scientific

and rationalistic education etc. There the ground was much

better prepared for the rise of egalitarian politics, which

defined the main characteristic of Western nationalism.

Moreover, there were far fewer cases of imperialism, a

foriegn political system controlling various nationalities or

even nations in the West than in the Third World where

imperialism or colonialism became the maj or target of

nationalism. Whereas in the West the main issue before

nationalism was how to replace royal authority or monarchical

rule by various forms of popular mandate, in the Third World

colonies it was how to overthrow foreign colonial domination.

However, the Third World countries still face the challange

of Western imperialism in the field of economy and culture.

It is within these contexts that the relative absence of

religion eroding revolutionary changes in most of the Third

World countries meant that tradition was/ still is a live

social force that moved the hearts and minds of millions

which could be effectively manipulated for mobilization

purposes. That is why religion - induced culture has given

the basic orientation to Third World nationalism. The secret

30

of the Third World nationalism resides in this paradox :- the

politicization of the non-political (namely, culture) but

primarily for political ends -- the creation of the nation -

state, as the most efficacious instrument of defending and

promoting socially shared interest. 43

A pure World religion neither directly nor substantially

constitutes a national identity, it only provides the logical

framework within which national tradition is formed. Hence

pan-- religious statements and actions may seem to contradict

above proposition, all states, even those managed by clergy -.

politicians, feel that their interpretation of religion is

the best one and such interpretations become synonymous with

a particularistic ethnic or national interest.

In the context of Islam the rhetoric of pan- Islamism

has been used by various Muslim statesmen, leaders, regimes

arid opposition movements essentially to serve their own

specific political designs. The post Abbasid history of Islam

witnessed the political useof Caliphate especially to

legitimise the internal rule of various Muslim regimes. 44 It

was for this symbolic function that the Caliphate as an

institution was retained for many more years, despite the

destruction of the Abbasid Empire/Caliphate, until its formal

abolition by Kemal Ataturk in 1924. In modern times it was

deliberately used by Sultan Abdul Hamid II, the Ottoman

43. Norbu, n. 8, p.17.

44. IR. Thomas W. Arnold, The Caliphate (Oxford, 1934).

31

ruler, in order to enhance his prestig~ in the Muslim world

and also as a political strategy to deal with European powers

who were posing a serious threat to the territorial integrity

of the Ottoman Empire. Pan- Islami"sm also served as an

ideological instrument in the hands of Jamaleedin Afghani to

unite the Muslim population against European colonialism and

imperialism.

The aftermath of the abolition of Caliphate withnessed

the host of pan-Islamic activities ~ Sharif Husayn of Mecca

sponsored the Pilgrimage Congress in 1924 in Mecca to secure

the Muslim support to his 'caliphal' calims - a political move

aimed to counter the threat of Ibn-Saud and also to lay claim

to the sovereignty of Arabian peninsula. The Caliphate

Congress held in Cairo on 13 -19 May 1926 was meant to

strengthen the position of King Farouq in Egypt. Ibn Saud

organized the Islamic congress, held in Mecca on 7 June 1926,

in order to secure the recognition of his rule in the Arabian

Peninsula. The General Muslim Congress held in Jerusalem

in December 1951 under the auspices of Haji Amin al-Husayni,

the Mufti of Jerusalem, was aimed at meeting Mufti's

opposition among the Palestinians and also to mobilize the

Palestinian masses against the Zionists and the British

mandate. various nation- stat.es which emerged following the

collapse European colonialism indulged in the promotion of

pan- Islamic activities in order to gain the political

leadership of the Muslim world which also had the

implications of deriv·ing external Islamic leverage to

strengthen their domestic rule. The competition for political

32

/

leadership and the concern for Islamic legi·timacy has

traditionally formed the basis of what could be called 'the

intra-Islamic cold war/rivalry'which is also very much

apparent in the contemporary Muslim World. Thus, the pan-

Islamic activity has mostly been guided by the domestic

national consideration of the Muslim regimes. 45

45. Jacob M. Landau, The Politics of Pan-Islam: Ideology and Organization (Oxford, 1990)

33