PEACE, SECURITY, AND THE MOVEMENT OF PEOPLE

Western governments are increasingly seeing the issues of refigees and migrants in t ern o f national security. This article surveys the changing paradigm used to understand and respond to forced migmth, including humanitm’ademergency appnmches, foreign policy. human rights, development, and the emerging Mlional security paradigm. The artkle qlains some of the reasons for the emergence o f this security paradigm and outlines the security concern of hostgovemments. The consequences of a fmuon security are ernmined and the alternative of an appmach based on c o m n security is explored The article concluaks that an emphasis on c o m n security and peace Mers many advantages in dealing with both the c u e s and the comequences of forced migration.

PEACE, SECURITY, AND THE MOVEMENT OF PEOPLE

by Elizabeth G. Fems

As the cold war fades into memory, Western governments are reassessing their foreign policies and redefining their understanding of national security. Economic interests and regional political stability are emerging as primary concerns for Western govements in the post-cold war era. But other issues are also being identified as new threats to Western security, including drug trafficking, terrorism, environmental problems, and above all, unwanted migration. In most respects, of course, these threats are not new; rather, with the demise of traditional enemies, they are perceived as more important. The way in which governments identify and respond to these challenges will play a major role in shaping the future security order and the “possibilities for a future peace order.”’

For decades, refugees and asylum-seekers were seen primarily in humanitarian terms, whereas issues of migration were usually analyzed in terms of domestic economic considerations.z However, today Western governments increasingly perceive the flow of migrants as a security threat. This article examines the changing paradigms regarding the question of refugees, analyzes the emerg- PEACE &CHANGE. Vol. 19 No. 4. October 1994 399416 0 1994Peace History sodctyand CoarOrtium on Peace Research, Education and Development

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ing security concerns of host governments, and suggests that ap- proaching issues of refugees and migration in terms of common security offer better prospects for both meeting the humanitarian needs of uprooted people and addressing the causes that provoke their migration.

THE PRESENT SCENE

The end of the cold war has wrought major changes in the global situation of refugees and asylum-seekers. On the one hand, hope that long-standing conflicts will be peacefully resolved has given rise to ambitious plans to repatriate millions of refugees in such countries as Cambodia, Afghanistan, Angola, Mozambique, and Eritrea. But the safe return of refugees long advocated by the various actors in the international refugee system is proving to be more difficult than anticipated. In El Salvador, for example, the Frente Farabundo Madde la Liberacih Nacional (FMLN) is arguing against repatriation: the economic costs are simply too high. In Cambodia, the refugees have returned, and yet there are serious questions about the durability of the UN-brokered peace. In Af- ghanistan, some repatriation has taken place, but few would argue that conditions in that country augur well for the returnees. At the same time, the other traditional paths for refugees-local integration and resettlement to third countries-are also becoming more difficult. Local integration of refugees in countries of first asylum has both political and economic costs for the concerned governments, as will be discussed below. Resettlement programs are being questioned as governments seek to adapt their programs to the realities of the post-cold war world and as they are confronted with increasing numbers of asylum-seekers showing up on their doorsteps.

At the same time that solutions to the needs of the refugees created by the cold war are becoming ever more elusive, there is a growing realization that the end of the cold war is unleashing new, primal forces in world politics. Nationalist and ethnic movements for self-determination are leading to new conflicts and to new waves of uprooted people in places as diverse as Zaire, former

Ferris I PEACE & SECURITY 401

Yugoslavia, and Tajikistan. Even as the system struggles to resolve the plight of existing refugee populations, new influxes are occur- ring. One of the important trends that is shaping the Western response to these challenges is the increase in the number of as y lum-seekers .

For the last decade, European countries have experienced dramatic increases in the number of people arriving on their borders in search of asylum. In 1983, about 30,OOo people requested asylum in Europe, North America, and Australia. By 1993, that figure had jumped to 600,000.3 This increase is the result of ongoing wars in the South, political and economic instability in the East, deteriorating conditions for refugees in countries of first asylum, improved transportatiop and communication systems, and the inadequacy of provisions for legal immigration.

The challenges of heightened forced migration are not limited to Western countries; indeed, refugee issues have become contro- versial in all regions. Repatriation of rejected asylum-seekers to Vietnam, the plight of Bosnians along the Croatian border, the political impact of Afghan refugees in Pakistan, and the return of Guatemalan exiles from Mexico are all highly politicized issues. New or renewed conflicts in Somalia, Sudan, Central Asia, Peru, Liberia, and Angola are displacing large numbers of people, many of whom face little welcome in neighboring countries.

Although this article focuses primarily on Western perceptions of refugees as an emerging security threat, the consequences of such changing perceptions are felt throughout the world. The focus on security concerns weakens the international refugee system created to respond to uprooted people in humanitarian terms. Govemments in other parts of the world that host far larger numbers of uprooted people with fewer available resources begin to question their generosity and to emulate the Western response by closing national borders.

APPROACHES TO UPROOTED PEOPLE

The forced migration of people has acquired greater political si&icance in today’s interdependent international system. Con-


temporary refugee migrations involve millions of people on all continents and affect political processes in diverse regimes. Gov- ernments of industrialized and developing countries alike struggle to formulate coherent policies toward refugees, migrants, and displaced people. Both democratic and authoritarian regimes seek to contain the socioeconomic fallout resulting from the arrival of masses of displaced people. Refugees have become both a symbol of social change and a human reminder of the violence that per- vades the contemporary world.

Until the last decade, political scientists paid little attention to refugees and displaced people, largely interpreting such migrations as marginal to the central processes of the world system. In the great debates over war and peace, refugees usually have been seen as the tragic but politically irrelevant by-products of conflict. This study begins with a different premise: that uprooted people have a significant political impact and that the study of the national and international response to their plight is important for global peace and security.

Government officials and scholars alike have approached the question of refugees and displaced people in different ways; the manner in which the issue is defined shapes the nature of the response. The traditional paradigm has seen uprooted people as victims of wars or other man-made disasters with the appropriate international response motivated by humanitarian concerns. By focusing on the individuals involved, this approach has been able to build significant political support for refugedemergency issues. But those seeing displaced people only in the context of humanitarian need and emergency response have been less able to see the patterns of their movement. The uprooting of people is viewed as a sporadic, temporary situation. There is thus less effort to study the cause of the uprooting or to take measures to prevent population displacement.

This paradigm was the dominant approach to refugee issues from the early days of the'Leajpe of Nations, when the initial attempts were made to develop an international response-and an international responsibility40 people uprooted by forces beyond their control. Although such remains the preeminent mode for the

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United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) working with refugees, the traditional model is being increasingly challenged as the number of refugees continues to increase, as people are uprooted for longer periods of time-sometimes for generations-and as the reasons for uprooting become more complex. People leave their homes not only because they are caught in the cross fire of a civil war or because of a knock on the door in the middle of the night. They also leave because of economic and political pressures that act in more subtle ways. Kosovo Albanians leave their country because of a dismal economic situation, deteriorating human rights conditions, and fears that the war will spread to their communities. European governments reject their claims for asylum and send them back to Kosovo, arguing that (for the moment at least) their country is safe. Haitians seek to leave their country not only because of the escalating political violence but also because of the devastating effects of the economic embargo, long-term environmental degradation, and poverty. Throughout the former Soviet Union, Russian minorities living in newly independent republics are fearful of future persecution, but Russia faces its own serious problems and is unable to absorb their influx.

Increasingly too there is a call from international governmental and NGOs to address the causes that force people to flee. However, addressing the causes is usually a political act, such as confronting a dictator or mediating a civil war, which challenges the very notion of refugees and displaced people representing a humanitarian, nonpartisan issue.

The idea that response to uprooted people is best explained by humanitarian concerns has been challenged by scholars who have analyzed national policies toward refugees and migrants in terms of the foreign policy interests of host governments. The way in which a government responds to refugees from a neighboring, or even a distant, nation will be affected by relations between the governments and will, in turn, greatly influence future ties between those countries. At the same time, policies toward refugees of another nation reflect the domestic economic and political tensions of the host country. Thus Malaysia’s reactions to Vietnamese asy-


lum-seekers has less to do with state-to-state relations than with Malaysian political concerns over upsetting a delicate national ethnic balance. Or as Gil Loescher and John Scanlan persuasively demonstrate, U.S. treatment of refugees was determined largely by foreign policy considerations. More than 95 percent of the refugees admitted to the United States between 1950 and 1985 came from countries with communist or leftist governments! Hence, refugee policy was not a simple humanitarian response to people in need. The statistics of the mid-1980s for Central American asylum- seekers make this clear: although the violence in El Salvador and Guatemala resulted in widespread suffering and high civilian casu- alties, less than 3 percent of asylum claims from Salvadorans and Guatemalans were approved by the U.S. government. Yet, 80 percent of Nicaraguan asylum request claims were granted.

Others have looked at forced migration as a human rights issue at several levels. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) states that individuals have a fundamental right to live free of governmental persecution and to leave their country of origin. It is not, however, considered a basic human right that individuals be accepted by the governments of other nations. The right to grant asylum is a right reserved to governments, not to individuals, no matter how persecuted. Although there have been some efforts in recent years to move toward recognition of individual rights to apply for asylum, such a right is far from being recognized by the international community. Academics and activists using a human rights approach study the ways in which refugees and asylum-seekers are treated by host governments; especially now that the International Conven- tion on the Rights of Migrants has been passed by the UN General Assembly and is open for ratification, human rights standards are being used to evaluate treatment of economic migrants as well. Yet, in spite of international norms upholding individual rights, viola- tion of such norms is unfortunately common among the world’s governments. Thus, victims of one government’s violence may be at the mercy of another capricious regime for protection and security.

Unlike those who see the displacement of people as a humanitarian/ emergency situation, growing numbers of scholars and political leaders are looking at the underlying causes and consequences of


forced migrations as development issues. Most of the world’s refugees have come from and stayed in the South. The pressures they placed on host governments, as their exile stretched into years, were sometimes severe. Developing countries face overwhelming difficulties in providing for their own populations; the presence of large numbers of refugees-particularly when international assistance is insufficient-xacerbates such difficulties. Adevelopmen- tal approach is particularly relevant given the fact that refugees increasingly stay for long periods of time. They no longer require assistance for a year or two and then go back home. Rather, they typically remain as refugees or internally displaced people for years; emergency assistance is therefore an inadequate solution. Thus the International Conference on African Refugees and Assis- tance (ICAR4 I and II) in Africa brought together governments, the United Nations, and NGOs to analyze ways in which refugee assistance could be undertaken in light of developmental needs and priorities in African states. In recent years, the environmental causes and consequences of migration have become important political and academic issues.

THE EMERGING NATIONAL SECURITY PARADIGM

Today, as the bipolar world recedes and leaves in its wake increasing numbers of asylum-seekers, Western scholars and politicians alike are looking at migration in terms of national security. Thus the International Institute of Strategic Studies in London has embarked on a project to analyze the security issues involved in the displacement of people. As Gil Loescher argues, there is growing awareness that mass migrations are the result of a breakdown of the old order and that they pose a fundamental challenge to the security of nations? Clearly, the potential movement of massive numbers of people from South to North and from East to West must be dealt with as a foreign policy priority.

What are the security concerns? First, there is the demographic pressure of poor people seeking to move to rich countries. Pres- ently, 20 million immigrants live in Western Europe, 35 percent of


whom come from developing nations. Given population growth in developing countries, 35 million new jobs would have to be created each year during the next fifteen years just to keep pace with the net increase in the working-age population. As Jonas Widgren illustrates, if only 5 percent of Africa’s population growth over the next twenty years (estimated to be 550 million out of a total African population of 1 billion) migrates northward, Europe could be faced with another 25 million immigrants.6

This demographic pressure has obvious security implications not only for Europe but also for the countries of the South, because more mobile, better-educated people are more likely to turn to migration. As A. Adepoju observes, “The stressful socio-economic environment, declining real incomes as a result of structural adjust- ment programmes, expanding educational opportunities out-of- tune with employment opportunities and political fragility and instability of governments which hinder productive intellectual participation and creativity, have combined to exacerbate the exo- dus of higher level manpower.”’ By 1987, nearly 70,000 of Africa’s skilled workers-r 30 percent of the highly skilled manpower stock-had left sub-Saharan Africa to migrate to the countries of the European Community.* Thus governments both North and South have a security interest in preventing the migration of large numbers of skilled workers.

A second fear of European governments is potential large-scale uncontrolled migration from the countries of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Such migration could occur as a result of economic dislocation, political instability, and new (or renewed) outbreaks of ethnic fighting. As shown by recent events, these fears are not groundless. Presently, unofficial estimates indicate that there are more than 1 million internally displaced people in the former Soviet Union, including Armenians, Azerbeijanis, Assyrian Turks, Georgians, and Tajiks. By October 1992, for example, more than 100,OOO Tajiks had been displaced by the violence in Tajikis- tan; more than 100,000 Russians had left the country; and, accord- ing to the head of the Russian Migration Society, about 90 percent of the remaining Russians in Tajikistan wanted to leave?


Most of those uprooted by violence or socioeconomic instability have remained within the borders of the former Soviet Union, and, so far, a massive westward movement has not occurred. Most of the 400,000 people leaving the republics of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) every year are members of particular ethnic groups migrating to a particular country (e.g., Israel, Germany, Greece). On the other hand, some observers note that 2 million people left the Soviet Union in the aftermath of the 1917 revolution and that similar levels of migration may be ex- pected as a result of the current far-reaching upheavals.” The prospect of high-volume migration from the East is a security concern of both Western and Central European governments. Re- gimes in Poland, Hungary, and the Czech and Slovak republics remain fragde. Presently, Central European officials are fearful that the burden of controlling East-West migration has shifted from governments of the West to governments of the East.”

A third security concern of host governments is the cultural and political effect of large numbers of immigrants or asylum-seekers. The most dramatic case is Germany where riots against the presence-and the “differentness”+f foreigners has become a regular occurrence. Athough German politicians restrict the laws on asylum and seek to reduce the entry of foreigners, the number of asylum-seekers continues to rise. By October 1992, 60,000 asylum-seekers per month were entering Germany, more than those taken in by the rest of Europe combined, leading Chancellor Helmut Kohl to assert that this influx is “leading to unbearable conditions in our cities and towns. If we do not act, we face the danger of a deep crisis of confidence in our democratic state, yes, even a national state of emergency.”’2

The dramatic increases in arrivals of asylum-seekers throughout Western Europe have become quite expensive. Presently, the costs of processing and caring for such people have risen to more than $6 billion per year -a tenfold increase over 1983 and a figure exceeding the total general budget of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, who is responsible for the care of some 17 million refugees world~ide.’~

408 PEACE & CHANGE / October 1994

There are other concerns as well. Alasdair Stewart writes that ethnic groups are particularly involved in organized crime in Ger- many, exploiting their links with home countries. Citing German government sources, Stewart notes that there are presently some 3,650 Arab organizations in Germany (of which 3,460 are “core” Organizations, 80 are “subsidiary” ones, and 180 are “influenced organizations”) and that Islamic extremist groups have 17,450 members. In Cologne, officials estimate that 40,000 of the city’s 90,000 Muslim residents are extremist^."'^ Governments are also concerned that the presence of large numbers of foreigners may draw them into international conflicts (as exiles try to undermine the regime back home). l5 Although concerned governments con- tinue to follow deterrence policies designed to keep asylum-seekers from reaching their territories (through visa requirements and airline sanctions, for example), they are working both formally and informally to coordinate their responses to new arrivals.

CONSEQUENCES OF A FOCUS ON SECURITY

The dominant mode for responding to uprooted people is thus shifting from a humanitarian approach, which put the individual refugee in the forefront, to a national security paradigm in which the interests of the host state are paramount. This focus on security has been more apparent in governments of the North than of the South, the latter expressing greater concern about the economic costs of providing for refugees. However, although less openly voiced, Southern governments have also seen refugees as security risks. Thus Chileans fleeing the repression of the Pinochet regime were regarded with suspicion in neighboring countries. Cambodian refugees along the Thai border were definitely viewed as strategic actors by both the Cambodian resistance movements and Thai authorities. In Pakistan, the Afghan refugees were seen from the beginning in terms of their ties to the fedayeen and their possible role in compromising Pakistani security planning. When the United States announced it was sending troops to Somalia for humanitarian reasons, neighboring countries promptly voiced their womes that

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the armed gangs would spill over into their territory. The Kenyan government was quite assertive in pointing to the threat posed by the presence of so many Somali refugees.

Further, it is clear that the emphasis on security in the North can incite racism and xenophobic feelings. As Dan Smith says, “If security policy is justified on essentially racist grounds, that will feed back to strengthen racist currents in society.”’6 Hence official concerns about Arab extremist organizations have translated at the popular level into a fear of Arab immigrants-a reality that is evident in the growth of right-wing nationalist groups throughout Europe.

Most important, by looking at asylum-seekers and immigrants in terms of security, the natural governmental response is to devise new ways of keeping them out rather than to devote energies to addressing the causes that led them to leave their home communities. As Loescher points out, “Simply building barriers to deter the movements of people will not make the problem of mass migrations go away. In the long run, the only effective way of dealing with the problem is to address concretely the conditions that create mi- grant~.”’~ The evidence suggests that when legal channels of immigration are restricted, illegal immigration increases.

The United Nations has called for better early warning of potential mass exoduses, but this will be of little value unless accompanied by preventive actions. Certainly there are now ample signs of such mass movements of people in many regions of the world, from Kosovo to Tajikistan, from Peru to China. But addressing the causes is difficult. Aid and investment are needed; however, this is not sufficient. “Indeed, high rates of emigration have often been asso- ciated with high economic growth rates.”’8 Moreover, processes of democratic transition can accelerate migration as restrictions on permission to leave are eased and as political conflict may increase, at least for the short term.

The relationships between economic and political change on one hand and migration and refugee flows on the other are complex. As Reginald Appleyard concludes, there is “no serious, systematic thinking taking place at the international level on the linkage between large-scale internal and international migration, popula-


tion increase, regional inequality and global security. . . . Maintain- ing the status quo is the best way to invite the next wave of international migration to the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] countries, which, in turn, would further stimulate extreme political reaction^."'^

UPROOTED PEOPLE AND COMMON SECURITY

Unlike a focus on national security in responding to refugees and migrants, a focus on c o m n security leads to exploration of the interrelationships between so-called sending and receiving countries. It also invites analysis of the complicated mix between economic and political factors that force people to leave their homes. Common security, at least as it emerged in the debates over the last decade, sees peace as the central component, which can only have positive repercussions. If refugee issues are thus reconcep- tualized, it may be possible to create a new rationale for humanitarian assistance. During the cold war, Western governments sometimes justified their expenditures on refugees as part of their concern with security. Thus did the U.S. government commit hundreds of millions of dollars to resettling refugees from communism in support of its foreign policy objectives. But what happens when communism is no longer a threat? Where is the constituency for refugee assistance and/or resettlement? Why should uprooted people have a privileged claim on the resources of govemments-in comparison, for example, with victims of floods, starvation, or earthquakes?

Amit Pandya, a staff member in the U.S. House of Repre- sentatives, noted that for fiscal year 1993, the total American contribution to overseas refugee assistance was approximately $685 million. In comparison, the U.S. contribution to international peacekeeping activities for fiscal year 1993 neared $460 million.” He went on to urge those interested in larger expenditures on refugees to tap into peacekeeping and reconstruction initiatives that represent “larger pots of money.” Pandya observed, “It’s much more justifiable for us to be spending $30 million on Cambodian repatriation in the context of a $600 million Cambodian contribu-

Ferris / PEACE & SECURITY 41 1

tion than it is to take $30 million for Cambodian repatriation out of a worldwide budget that is supposed to meet refugee needs every- where, including ones that haven’t yet come into being.”2’ But a focus on peace and common security is more than a way of repackaging refugee issues. It also addresses the fundamental linkage between humanitarian assistance, security, and peace. As Jan Eliasson, uy&jAened-=secretary of the United Nations for Hu- manitarian Affairs, says, “In Somalia, for instance, how can we have security without food? On the other hand, how can we have food without security?’u

Much more can be done to strengthen the relationship between humanitarian assistance and conflict resolution and security. Al- though humanitarian assistance must be impartially distributed and should not be used to promote specific policy goals, it must be accompanied by parallel diplomatic efforts. As Peter Shiras argues in the case of Somalia, “Neither humanitarian assistance nor military operations can substitute for diplomacy which seeks to resolve the underlying cause of the h u d t a r i a n crisis. Once the ‘humanitarian problem’ was dealt with in Somalia by sending in the troops, diplomatic efforts to bring peace lost the urgency they had had previously, precisely when they were most needed.”=

A focus on common security leads to thinking about common responses-not just in terms of coordinated policies to keep asylum-seekers at arm’s length but also in terms of developing multilateral means to address the root causes of migrations. Strengthened mechanisms for preventive diplomacy, as urged by UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, could prevent conflicts from escalating into bloodbaths and prevent people from being uprooted from their communities.”

Multilateral approaches to humanitarian assistance when an emergency does arise can strengthen the ability of national and supranational institutions to deal with other conflicts. As Jan Eliasson explains, “If we handle the emergency relief organization well, if this signal to the United Nations fromthe membeGhip could be translated into concrete action, we could do something very fine. We could show that the United Nations at the end of the Cold War can produce results in an era of interdependence. . . . And if we can


deal with the emergencies, if we can deal with the refugee problems in a decent and practical way, then we can make a very important contribution to strengthening multilateralism, giving the United Nations this role that it now has the historic chance to fulfill.”?5

Moreover. a focus on peace and common security emphasizes the importance of addressing refugee issues in bringing about an end to conflicts. Refugees are often a part of the peace process and an impetus for concomitant accords. In Central America and Cam- bodia, for example, questions about the repatriation of refugees were a catalyst for peace negotiations. Governments and insurgents alike could delay agreements on cease-fires and the composition of new military forces for a long time, but the matter of rehgees- what to do with them, how to ensure their safety-steadily pushed the negotiations forward.

Finally, a focus on peace and common security rather than national security leads to concerns with supporting and sustaining peace agreements. We know that peace is a fragde process that requires nurturing and sustained attention. When soldiers are de- mobilized following a cease-fire but do not have homes or land, renewed conflict becomes more likely. When the fighting stops, but the legacy of land mines prevents reconstruction, stability is difficult to maintain.

A COMMON SECURITY POLICY

What would an approach based on common security look like? First of all, governments need to realize that they have a collective interest in preventing conflicts from reaching a point where mass migration occurs. There is no shortage of suggestions for using preventive diplomacy during the initial stages of a crisis. But for such diplomacy to be used more effectively, resources will have to be made available. At the moment, the emergency response units of governments, the United Nations, and NGOs alike are over- whelmed with the task of responding to ongoing crises. To take a proactive role in preventing future crises, governments must make preventive diplomacy a priority and support it with the necessary


frnancial and human resources. Although it is difficult to mobilize resources before a crisis is full-blown, there are positive examples of such action. In 1991 and 1992, reports of a drought in Southern Africa predicted massive food shortfalls and widespread suffering. United Nations agencies, working in a coordinated fashion, were able to mobilize the resources necessary to prevent a famine. Although the South African drought rarely made it to the front pages of Western newspapers, there was sufficient commitment from the major actors (the United Nations, Western governments, and NGOs) that carefully implemented assistance averted a trag- edy. Similarly, in the case of incipient conflicts, the major actors could agree on the need to prevent the escalation of conflict and work together on both the diplomatic and assistance tracks to make warfare less likely. Thus, within a framework of common security, reports of deteriorating conditions in Zaire would trigger high-level discussions of steps that could be taken to prevent widespread violence and massive refugee flows. It is in the best interests of all of the actors involved to take such measures; a relatively smal l commitment of funds to prevent the escalation of conflict could prevent mounting large-scale emergency relief operations later.

When such preventive measures are not used or are not success- ful, a sharp rise in refugee flows must be taken as a serious warning that early internationallregional action is needed to address the causes that have provoked the migration. In addressing the immediate needs of those displaced by violence, a system based on common security would include burden-sharing among host countries, support for regional and international institutions, and a recognition of the consequences of the migration for both the host and sending countries. I suggest four elements that would be basic to such an approach:

1. The first element is movement toward an international con- sensus that true security cannot be attained by a national government acting alone. Just as we are beginning to understand that no single nation can deal with transnational environmental issues, we need to move toward a common understanding that forced migration demands a collective response. Now governments implement policies to restrict the admission of refugees primarily for domestic

414 PEACE& CHANGE/October 1994

reasons, including economic as well as racist/xenophobic considerations. Yet such policies are shortsighted if they do not address the underlying causes of the migration and may be of limited effectiveness as desperate people find ways of circumventing border controls. In fact, by limiting the ability of asylum-seekers to seek protection through legal channels, governments make it more likely that criminal elements will profit.

2. An expanded concept of burden-sharing is needed, with strengthening of international and regional forums for sharing information and developing common positions. There are signs that this is beginning to take place at a regional level, as evidenced in the southern EuropeadNorth African discussions in which Euro- pean governments are committed to providing support for initiatives that will make economic migration from North Africa less likely. Once a refugee flow has begun, governments need a forum to plan a joint response for both meeting immediate human needs and supporting initiatives to end the conflict. The lack of such a forum for coordinating policies toward those uprooted by the war in Bosnia Herzegovina has led to inconsistent and ad hoc responses by European governments. Such international agencies as the UNHCR, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and the International Organization for Migration are in a position to con- vene such meetings and to suggest the outline of a response based on common security.

3. Migration issues must be seen in the broader framework of North-South relationships as well as efforts to build peace in situations of recurrent conflict. The mechanisms being discussed in the United Nations and other organizations for early intervention in situations of conflict-whether through expanded use of fact- finding missions, regional human rights monitors, or distinguished statespeople serving as “global elders”-need to be tried and implemented. Migration issues must be deliberately linked not only to development but also to peace initiatives, with the concomitant commitment to support peace processes over the long term.

4. Efforts to improve humanitarian assistance, which increasingly involve concerns with sovereignty, must be seen in the context of addressing and preventing the displacement of people.

Ferris I PEACE & SECURlTY 415

Much more can be done, as Jan Eliasson has pointed out, to strengthen “humanitarian diplomacy.” Although assistance should not be used for overtly political reasons and must retain its commitment to aiding victims on all sides of a conflict, humanitarian agencies must consider the relationship of their relief work to the underlying causes of the conflict. At the present time, decisions about such assistance are made primarily on the basis of human need assessment, logistical capabilities, and available resources. A focus on common security would lead aid providers to consider also the impact of assistance on the resolution of the conflict. The political and ethical difficulties of supplying humanitarian aid to people in former Yugoslavia has brought these questions to the fore.

In sum, a common security approach to issues of uprooted people requires an understanding that international rather than national issues are involved, that appropriate responses must be made at the international level, that mass migration must trigger automatic international consideration of the situation and appropriate action, that migration has consequences on both the sending and receiving countries, and that early intervention could not only reduce the flow of people but also alleviate human pain.

NOTES

1. Bjom Hettne, “Security and Peace in the PostCold War Europe,” J o u d of Peace Research 28, no. 3 (1991): 279.

2. Discussion of migration questions always brings up the thorny question of definitions. Current estimates are that t h e are 45 million to 70million mime in the world, of whom half considered “irregular migrants,” that is, without approval of the govemmnt of the host country. Refugees are thosc who are forced to leave their countries because of fear of persecution or because of the generaked conditions of war. The definition of refugees as formulated in the 1951 UN Convention includes those who ~IE outside their countries of origin and who fear persecution because of their race, ethnic origin, membership in a social group, religion, or political opinions. This definition was developed in the aftermath of World War II to respond to the needs of those displaced as a consequence of that conflict. Although the definition was formally expanded in 1%7 to apply to all geograpbicregions, and although the definition has been expanded in practice. serious shortcomings remain.

3. U.S. Committee for Refugees, 1993 World Refugee Survey (Washington, DC U.S. Committee for Refugees. 1993).

4. Gil Loescher and John Scanlan, W u l a t e d Kindness: Refigees and America’s Hd’Open D w z 1945 to the Pmsent (New Yo* F ~ e e Press. 1986).


5. Gil Loescher, “Refugee Movements and International Security,” Adelphi Papers 268 (Summer 1992).

6. Jonas Widgren, “South-North Migration and Its Political and Humanitarian Impli- cations for Europe” (paper presented at the International Conferen= “Refugees in the World The European Community’s Response,” The Hague, December 1989).

7. A. Adepju, “South-North Migration: The African Experience,” International Mi- gration 29, no. 2 (June 1991): 208.

8. Ibid., 211. 9. ‘Tajikistan: Internally Displaced, Refugees and Ethnic Minorities at Risk,” MondCTy

Developments, October 12, 1992, reporting on a visit by Hiram A. Ruiz of the U.S. Committee for Refugees.

10. Andreas Park, “Change and Migration in the Post-Soviet Republics” (paper presented at the meeting of the International Refugee Advisory Panel. Oxford University, London, January 3, 1992).

11. Gil Loescher, “Mass Migration as a Global Security Problem,” World Refugee Survey-I991 (Washington, DC U.S. Committee for Refugees, 1991). 12.

12. Cited in International Herald Tribune, October 27,1992. 13. Loescher, “Mass Migration,” 12. 14. Alasdair Stewart, Migrants, Minorities and Securify in Europe (London: Research

Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, 1992). 16. 15. For more on this point, see Myron Weiner, “Security, Stability and International

Migration” (Harvard University, mimeo, 1991). 16. Dan Smith, ‘The New Landscape of European Security,” in Paradigm Lost: The

Post Cold War Em, edited by Chester Hartman and Pedro Villanova (London: Pluto Press, 1992). 31.

17. Loescher, “Mass Migration+” 14. 18. Weiner. “Security,” 41. 19. Reginald T. Appleyard, InternationalMigrarion: Challenge for the Nineties (Geneva:

International Organization for Migration, 1991), 83. 20. Cited by Women’s Commission for Refugee Women and Children, Going Home:

The Prospect of Repatriation for Refugee Women and Children (New Yo&: International Rescue Committee, 1992). 30.

21. Ibid., 31. 22. Ibid., 41. 23. PeterShiras,‘~e~ssonsofSomali~”MondayD~elopmenrs,Aprilll, 1994,9-10. 24. An A g e d for Peace: Preventive D i p l o w , Peacemaking and Peacekeeping,

Report of the secretary-general of the United Nations to the. General Assembly, June 17, 1992, A/47/277I2/24111.

25. Ibid, 43.

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