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Open Sys. & Information Dyn. 7: 139–155, 2000 c 2000 Kluwer Academic Publishers Printed in the Netherlands 139 Physical and Information-Dynamical (Cognitive) Picture of the World Roman S. Ingarden Institute of Physics, N. Copernicus University, Toru´ n, Poland (Received: April 3, 2000) Abstract. After presenting by extensive quotations the views of prominent philosophers, White- head, Schopenhauer, Wittgenstein and Popper, concerning human picture of the world, the picture of the physical world represented in language is discussed. It is shown that the categorical lan- guage based on Boolean two-valued logic is not sufficient for the description of such basic physical concepts as energy, force, entropy (information), etc. Such modal concepts as possibility, necessity, potentiality, probability, are needed in addition. Relativity physics, as well as quantum mechanics and field theory, shifted physical theory more and more in the direction of nonclassical modal logic. But if we pass from physics to general information dynamics of open systems (cognitive dynamics), where, except of the physical world, also mental and cultural worlds (Popperian world 1, world 2, and world 3) are considered, the classical scheme of information channel is not suf- ficient. We define, therefore, a generalized language scheme in which the three sets fixing the general meaning, denotation (D), connotation (C), and emotional aspect (E), are essential. At the end some classifications of sentences and verbs (predicates) are presented, as examples of primary syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic categories. 1. Introduction. Philosophical Approaches In extensive quotations I will try to show coherent views of some selected important philosophers about the basic concepts of reality, physical and mental. They con- sider the human picture of the world as presented in language form by many-sided experience obtained in information channels in an open system of the universe. Being influenced to some extent by some writings of these authors I will then try to show the evolution of my thinking about information dynamics. First, let us quote some excerpts from the writings of Alfred North Whitehead (1861–1947), [37, pp. xiv, xiii, 6, 7]: In philosophical discussion, the merest hint of dogmatic certainty as to finality of statement is an exhibition of folly. [...] The positive doctrine of these lec- tures is concerned with the becoming, the being, and the relatedness of ‘actual entities’. An ‘actual entity’ is a res vera in the Cartesian sense of that term; it is a Cartesian ‘substance’, and not an Aristotelian ‘primary substance’. But Descartes retained in his metaphysical doctrine the Aristotelian domin- ance of the category of ‘quality’ over that of ‘relatedness’. In these lectures ‘relatedness’ is dominant over ‘quality’. All relatedness has its foundation in the relatedness of actualities, and such relatedness is wholly concerned with

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Open Sys. & Information Dyn. 7: 139–155, 2000c© 2000 Kluwer Academic PublishersPrinted in the Netherlands

139

Physical and Information-Dynamical (Cognitive)Picture of the World

Roman S. Ingarden

Institute of Physics, N. Copernicus University, Torun, Poland

(Received: April 3, 2000)

Abstract. After presenting by extensive quotations the views of prominent philosophers, White-head, Schopenhauer, Wittgenstein and Popper, concerning human picture of the world, the pictureof the physical world represented in language is discussed. It is shown that the categorical lan-guage based on Boolean two-valued logic is not sufficient for the description of such basic physicalconcepts as energy, force, entropy (information), etc. Such modal concepts as possibility, necessity,potentiality, probability, are needed in addition. Relativity physics, as well as quantum mechanicsand field theory, shifted physical theory more and more in the direction of nonclassical modallogic. But if we pass from physics to general information dynamics of open systems (cognitivedynamics), where, except of the physical world, also mental and cultural worlds (Popperian world1, world 2, and world 3) are considered, the classical scheme of information channel is not suf-ficient. We define, therefore, a generalized language scheme in which the three sets fixing thegeneral meaning, denotation (D), connotation (C), and emotional aspect (E), are essential. Atthe end some classifications of sentences and verbs (predicates) are presented, as examples ofprimary syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic categories.

1. Introduction. Philosophical Approaches

In extensive quotations I will try to show coherent views of some selected importantphilosophers about the basic concepts of reality, physical and mental. They con-sider the human picture of the world as presented in language form by many-sidedexperience obtained in information channels in an open system of the universe.Being influenced to some extent by some writings of these authors I will then tryto show the evolution of my thinking about information dynamics. First, let usquote some excerpts from the writings of Alfred North Whitehead (1861–1947),[37, pp. xiv, xiii, 6, 7]:

In philosophical discussion, the merest hint of dogmatic certainty as to finalityof statement is an exhibition of folly. [. . .] The positive doctrine of these lec-tures is concerned with the becoming, the being, and the relatedness of ‘actualentities’. An ‘actual entity’ is a res vera in the Cartesian sense of that term;it is a Cartesian ‘substance’, and not an Aristotelian ‘primary substance’.But Descartes retained in his metaphysical doctrine the Aristotelian domin-ance of the category of ‘quality’ over that of ‘relatedness’. In these lectures‘relatedness’ is dominant over ‘quality’. All relatedness has its foundation inthe relatedness of actualities, and such relatedness is wholly concerned with

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the appropriation of the dead by the living — that is to say, with ‘objectiveimmortality’ whereby what is divested of its own living immediacy becomes areal component in other living immediacies of becoming. This is the doctrinethat the creative advance of the world is the becoming, the perishing, andthe objective immortalities of those things which jointly constitute stubbornfact. [. . .] In modern philosophy Descartes’ two kinds of substance, corpor-eal and mental, illustrate incoherence. There is, in Descartes’ philosophy, noreason why there should not be a one-substance world, only corporeal, or aone-substance world, only mental. According to Descartes, a substantial indi-vidual ‘requires nothing but itself in order to exist’. Thus this system makesa virtue of its incoherence. But, on the other hand, the facts seem connected,while Descartes’ system does not; for example, in the treatment of the body-mind problem. The Cartesian system obviously says something that is true.But its notions are too abstract to penetrate into the nature of things. [. . .]. . . the philosophy of organism seems to approximate more to some of Indian,or Chinese, thought, than to western Asiatic, or European, thought. One sidemakes process ultimate, the other side makes fact ultimate.

I have quoted so much from the first pages of the famous book of WhiteheadProcess and Reality in order to show how well he approximates the modern sci-entific approach of physicists, biologists and psychologists who collaborate in recentdecades in developing information dynamics and the so-called cognitivism in thetreatment of the problems of brain theory. The book was written in 1929, thatmeans in the period when relativity theory and quantum mechanics were alreadyfully developed. A. N. Whitehead was a mathematician and philosopher, but hehad a good orientation in physics, too. His book became famous among philosoph-ers and scientists, but also among the religious circles, since in the last V-th part‘Final Interpretation’ the book contains the final chapter ‘God and the World’.In this chapter he presents God as ‘Unmoved Mover’ and as ‘the Kingdom ofHeaven’. The first definition is taken directly from Aristotle, the second from hisChristian faith (A. N. Whitehead was a son of an Anglican pastor). We shall notdiscuss the second formulation, only the first one. As we have seen, Whiteheadrightly criticized and discussed philosophy and physics of Descartes, as well asthose of Galileo and Newton, from the modern point of view, but finally he didnot recognize, as if, that the ancient Aristotelian concept of ‘Unmoved Mover’ isagainst the modern principles of classical and quantum mechanics, and that nowwe do not more angels any more for moving planets and other celestial bodies(except perhaps in the moment of creation). Therefore, here we shall not go intofurther details of Whitehead’s considerations, although in many points they arereally remarkable.

Speaking about other philosophers who also influenced me in my present study,I will first mention Arthur Schopenhauer (1788–1860) who died one year beforeWhitehead was born. He was also interested in Indian and Chinese thought, but hebelieved that not mere motion (velocity), but only force, i.e. acceleration and mass,

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is essential in dynamics of the real world, in accordance with Galileo and New-ton physics, and now even with quantum mechanics. He spoke more about mental“will” [27] considered by him as a result of a cosmic force which we feel in ourconsciousness as a direct manifestation of Kant’s Ding an sich. Therefore Schopen-hauer, similarly as Whitehead, considered experience as composed of two parts:mental (internal) experience and sensual (external) one. He said in his “Critisismof Kant’s Philosophy” (added to vol. 1 of his main work, in my translation fromthe Polish edition, [27, p. 643]):

. . . only through connection of internal and external experience, done correctlyand in a proper point, and obtained by the binding of those so heterogeneoussources of cognition, it is possible to solve the riddle of the world . . .

According to Schopenhaer the two sources of cognition show us directly the phe-nomena of the world as a whole: facts, states of affairs, events, happenings, situ-ations, processes, but not substances, souls, things, etc. (the latter are accordingto him only structures, relations of events, more or less persistent in time, butinstable and seeming). Schopenhauer was against Cartesian dualism of matter andsoul, and sympathized with the Buddhist concepts of anathma = ‘non-soul’ andadvaita = ‘non-dualism’ what does not mean ‘monism’, but rather a kind of ‘neut-ralism’, similar to that of Bertrand Russell, i.e. a position between idealism andrealism, or between spiritualism and materialism.

The point of view that the world is composed of events (facts), not of things wasexpressed explicitly by Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951) in his famous TractatusLogico-Philosophicus [38]. I quote the first sentences (thesises) of this work:

1. The world is all that is the case.

1.1. The world is the totality of facts, not of things.

1.11. The world is determined by the facts, and by their being all the facts.

1.12. For the totality of facts determines what is the case, and also whatever isnot the case.

1.13. The facts in logical space are the world.

1.2. The world divides into facts. [. . .]

2. What is the case — a fact — is the existence of states of affairs.

2.01. A state of affairs (a state of things) is a combination of objects (things).

2.011. It is essential of things that they should be possible constituents of statesof affairs.

We see that according to Wittgenstein not things are composed of facts, but, con-versely, facts are composed of things as “situations”, “states of affairs”. This ideahas been developed by Bogus law Wolniewicz, [39], [40], into “ontology of situ-ations”, studied also by Roman Suszko, [32], in connection with his “non-Fregeanlogic”, [33]. Wolniewicz pointed out, [39, p. 55–67 and Chaps. III and V], that

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Wittgenstein’s “facts” are not the same as “events”: facts are totalities of events(situations) in a given moment of time or a period of time, so they also containthings as parts, e.g., stars or trees. This interpretation is connected with the mere-ological (collective) sense of “totality” (as a “whole”), cf. below. But Wolniewiczalso adds, p. 67, that “frequently the mereologic interpretation of Tractatus’ onto-logy seems to be impossible on different reasons.” This was probably caused bythe simple fact that Wittgensten could not know mereology of S. Lesniewski pub-lished only (in German) in 1929. But the problem of things is very difficult indeed,and the nominalistic interpretation of Wittgenstein by Wolniewicz is perhaps toonarrow. Actually, the concept of individual thing (object) is very controversial, asquantum physics shows (cf. below). It is approximately good for the macroscopic(even mesoscopic, as macromolecular, etc.) approach, but wrong in the micro-scopic scale (elementary particles). In general, the relativistic connection of timewith space (cf. below) causes that all objects are instable, so their existence iscontradictory (they, as if, exist and not exist, they are only becoming, the prob-lem discussed by M. Heidegger and others). This leads to many-valued logic andto the so-called semi-consistent logic according to S. Jaskowski, J. Perzanowskiand others (with contradictions allowed within some limits), because of modalit-ies, also fuzzy-states, etc. This “modal” point of view was represented by easternBuddhist philosophers, as the ancient Indian Nagarjuna (I or II cent.) and themodern Japanese Kitaroo Nishida (1870–1945, cf. his essay, recently translatedinto Polish [20]).

I have yet to mention Karl Raimond Popper (1902–1994), which was so longour contemporary. Popper formulated a doctrine of three worlds: physical (world1), mental (world 2) and cultural (world 3) [25]. He presented this concept in 1967in the lecture “Epistomology without a knowing subject” at the 3rd Congressof Logic in Amsterdam in which he answered also to the possible criticisms [25,pp. 106–152]:

I might have challenged those who have heard of my adverse attitude towardsPlato and Hegel by calling my lecture ‘A theory of the Platonic World’, or ‘Atheory of the Objective Spirit’.

The main topic of this lecture will be what I often call, for want of thebetter name, ‘the third world’. To explain this expression I will point outthat, without taking the words ‘world’ or ‘universe’ too seriously, we maydistinguish the following three worlds or universes: first, the world of physicalobjects or of physical states; secondly, the world of states of consciousness, orof mental states, or perhaps of behavioural dispositions to act; and thirdly,the world of objective contents of thought, especially of scientific and poeticthoughts and of works of art.

Thus what I call ‘the third world’ has admitted much in common withPlato’s theory of Forms or Ideas, and therefore also with Hegel’s ObjectiveSpirit, though my theory differs radically, in some decisive respects, fromPlato’s and Hegel’s. It has more in common with Bolzano’s theory of a universe

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of propositions in themselves and of truths in themselves, through it differsfrom Bolzano’s also. My third world resembles most closely the universe ofFrege’s objective contents of thought.

It is not part of my view or of my argument that we might not enumerateour worlds in different ways, or not enumerate them at all. We might, espe-cially, distinguish more than three worlds. My term ‘the third world’ is merelya matter of convenience.

In upholding an objective third world I hope to provoke those whom I call‘belief philosophers’: those who, like Descartes, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Kant,or Russell, are interested in our subjective beliefs, and their basis or origin.Against these belief philosophers I urge that our problem is to find better andbolder theories; and that critical preference counts, but not belief.

I wish to confess, however, at the very beginning, that I am a realist: Isuggest, somewhat like a naive realist, that there are physical worlds and aworld of states of consciousness, and that these two interact. And I believethat there is a third world, in a sense which I shall explain more fully.

Among the inmates of my ‘third world’ are, more especially, theoreticalsystems; but inmates just as important are problems and problem situations.And I will argue that the most important inmates of this world are criticalarguments, and what may be called — in analogy to a physical state or toa state of consciousness — the state of a discussion or the state of a criticalargument; and, of course, the contents of journals, books, and libraries.

Most opponents of the thesis of an objective third world will of courseadmit that there are problems, conjectures, theories, arguments, journals, andbooks. But they usually say that all these entities are, essentially, symbolic orlinguistic expressions of subjective mental states, or perhaps of behaviouraldispositions to act; further, that these entities are means of communication –that is to say, symbolic or linguistic means to evoke in others similar mentalstates or behavioural dispositions to act.

Against this, I have often argued that one cannot relegate all these entitiesand their content to the second world. [. . .]

I consider two thought experiments:Experiment (1). All our machines and tools are destroyed, and all our sub-

jective learning, including our subjective knowledge of machines and tools, andhow to use them. But libraries and our capacity to learn from them survive.Clearly, after much suffering, our world may get going again.

Experiment (2). As before, machines and tools are destroyed, and oursubjective learning, including our subjective knowledge of machines and tools,and how to use them. But this time, all libraries are destroyed also, so thatour capacity to learn from books becomes useless.

If you think about these two experiments, the reality, significance, anddegree of autonomy of the third world (as well as its effects on the second and

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first worlds) may perhaps become a little clearer to you. For in the secondcase there will be no re-emergence of our civilization for many millennia.

This time I quoted much more than before since in Popper’s case there is adiscussion with adverse views and full arguments sufficiently clear and not toolong. Also the problem itself is rather hard and very crucial for understandingmy position. As Popper, I do not consider the three worlds in isolation: they arevery intimately connected through interaction. As we see, this interaction goesthrough language. Also animals have some means of communication, but they donot have any language functioning as a speech, and no writing as a material fixingthe speech. Therefore, animals have no culture in our sense, no third world, exceptperhaps a very modest one in the case of social animals, as some insects, corals,beavers etc. (But, of course, animals have also some specific culture, of completelydifferent dimension and character than that of human beings). In our study weshall discuss the impact of language on our pictures of the world as a whole, i.e.,the universe composed of the three Popper’s worlds.

2. Physical World and Language

In three publications, [8, 10], [9, Chap. 1], I tried to show how modality, i.e. aspecial conceptual method or style of speaking, influenced the existing physicaltheories, classical and quantum. The problem is, however, not only in the form,but also in the content and meaning of these theories. Now I will briefly presentthe results of these investigations. They had an independent precedent, althoughin a more narrow sense, in a series of papers and a monograph [36] by Bas C. vanFrassen. He discussed possibility and necessity as special, but classical in logic,types of modality in quantum mechanics. Now we will try to generalize all theseresults from a more general logical and linguistic point of view.

Let us consider the problem of information dynamics, [9, Chap. 4, p. 105],

I → T → O , (1)

where I is an input system, T is a transformation system (information channel)and O is an output system. The problem of language communication is a specialcase, where we consider the ordered triple representing an act of communication,[31, p. 10],

〈n, s, o〉 , (2)

where n is a sender (a person who speaks or sends a message, letter, etc.), s isa signal (words, messages, etc.), and o is a receiver or recipient (a person whoreceives the message). The set of all communication acts possible in a social group(society, not a group in the mathematical sense) G is called communication orlanguage in G and mathematically can be represented by a triple relation K∗ suchthat

K∗ ⊂ K = G× S ×G, (3)

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where S is the set of all signals s which can be understood (interpreted) by themembers of G. This is a very general definition (although it will be more developedand generalized in the next section), and we shall not go here into details ofcommunication (language) theory. For us it is essential that in this definition thereis explicitly shown the dependence ofK∗ on the group of personsG which should benot only nonempty, but also has to have at least two members (for one person thereis no communication). In such a way we expressed a very important philosophical“principle of objectivity (or intersubjectivity)” which has once been formulated byJozef Tischner, a famous Polish philosopher and a priest, in the words: “. . . it willbe enough if you say ¿¿ this what is absolute the second person ¡¡”, [15, p. 675].To understand well this point is crucial for overcoming and final defeating theideological controversy between idealism and realism, spiritualism and materialism,and, especially, to overcome the subjectivistic solipsism. Because of the languagewe are not alone in the world, we can communicate with others and thereforewe can recognize their mental feelings and sensory observations, to check andcontrol ours. Now the objects (things) of the objective world (as parts of situations,events, facts) can be observed simultaneously from different points of view, andwe can treat them as covariants or invariants of observations. This is the idea ofthe coordinate transformation method and the tensor and spinor calculi, the basicmethod of theoretical physics based on mathematical group theory and differentialgeometry.

But modern physics can add some additional arguments and motivations tothe mentioned philosophical controversy. According to relativistic and quantumphysics our physical concepts, as simultaneousness, mass, energy, velocity, force,etc. depend, in general, on observer’s coordinate system, more, they depend inthe quantum case also on the type of measurement done, e.g., on whether wemeasure position or momentum of a particle (the well-know Heisenberg uncertaintyrelations). But all this being governed by strict objective (probability) laws, isindependent of our arbitrariness or fantasy, except for the choice of measuringinstrument. Human beings are also parts of the physical world and can influencenature, as non-living parts can do. But humans have consciousness and innermental life which is caused by the neural system in the brain and the hormonalsystem of internal regulation, as well as external stimuli. In turn our mind as afunction of the brain system can influence our physical behaviour, speech, writing,etc. Therefore, we can seriously influence the physical world and create culture ofsocial groups, nations, and mankind. Abstract concepts (universals) are simplified,idealized descriptions of some fragments of the world in the general (3-fold) sense,and, in particular, they can approximate real physical objects, not conversly, aswas thought by Plato (as is well-known, Aristotle reversed this relation in hisphilosphy, against his master).

But what about physical objects, solids, crystals, fluids, gases, molecules, atoms,electrons, quarks, etc.? Are they real or not? Of course, they are, but not as some-thing eternal and non-destructible, something truly solid. All physical particles

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and their composed systems are only excitations of quantum fields. They can van-ish, annihilate, fall to their ground state of a vacuum, and be created, excitedanew (we have the respective operators of annihilation and creation in quantumfield theory). It is not the mass (rest mass) which is absolutely constant in thesequantum transformations in a closed system; it is energy, momentum, and angularmomentum (and sometimes other constants of motion), actually not as invariantscalars, but as covariant components of a 4-vector (for a particle) or a 4-tensor(for a field). In relativity theory rest mass is formally a scalar, but neverthe-less even there it has an analogy to potential energy with energetic equivalent ofkinetic energy by the famous Einstein equation E = mc2 (this formula is alsotrue for relativistic mass, cf. [12, Chap. VIII]). Rest mass, as is well known, canpartially or completely “explode” into kinetic or radiation energy in radioactivetransformations, particle collisions, in atomic bomb or a peaceful atomic reactorin a power station. Therefore, quantum particles are as if Wittgenstein’s things:they are parts or components of a physical fact, but not “hard” substances inthe Aristotelian sense. They can persist of some time in consecutive situations,but without their identity, i.e., they cannot be discriminated and distinguished(named) as individuals because quantum particles are indistiguishable. Indeed,quantum theory never guarantees the absolute identity of particles and their sys-tems. (The composite systems, as atoms or molecules, can be identified only asa structure, but not as composed of the same elementary particles, similarly asour body which, because of metabolism, changes all the time its material, butpreserves its structure.) From statistical point of view, no quantum particle hasthe “classical” identity, the so-called Boltzmann statistics, i.e. there is no possibleinformation about individuality of particles, only about their number, if this num-ber is measurable in a given quantum state. (There are quantum states in which thenumber of particles is indetermined, so we have in general indeterminism, not onlyof causality, in the quantum world). Particles and waves are only possible formsof matter and radiation, but not necessary forms. We have, therefore, no-identitystatistics of quantum particles: Bose-Einstein and Fermi-Dirac ones. When twoquantum particles collide, we never know “who’s who” after the collision. AmongFermi-Dirac particles, the fermions, we have particles and anti-particles, matterand anti-matter. When particles and anti-particles of the same kind collide, theyexplode, in general, into photons or other radiation, i.e., particles without restmass, pure radiation in vacuum, moving with the velocity of light. Thus physicalvacuum with radiation (without rest-mass particles, but with electromagnetic andgravitational fields) is, in general, full of energy and momentum, can be curvedpositively as a space-time continuum, then the matter is attracted, or curved neg-atively (black holes), then the matter near them vanishes in the black holes fromour sight, although its gravitational action is preserved. Recently, a new kind ofmatter with rest mass is suspected in the Universe, the so-called black matter, pos-sibly containing the lightest of the supersymmetric particles, not yet discoveredexperimentally, but expected by the newest theories. Maybe this black matter

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causes the repulsion effect represented by Eintein’s cosmic constant recently rein-troduced into relativistic cosmology to explain the observed accelerated expansionof the Universe. Such a repulsion effect was also expected by E. Cartan’s version(1923) of general relativity with spin (the so-called Einstein-Cartan theory, cf. [12,Chap. XVII]). But this problem is yet far from clarity.

Why particles and composed material objects are not absolutely permanent intime? (This was the main problem of the ancient Greek philosophers who usuallybelieved that the part of the world below moon is changable, while that abovemoon is absolutely constant, without birth and death, creation and annihilation.)Relativistic physics, cf. e.g. [23], gives an answer to this problem: the reason is thattime and space as dimensions of the world (they are not physical objects, but onlyforms of reality) are not mutually independent. They are entangled through theso-called light cone. General relativity theory has, therefore, no static solutions, noconstant universe (since gravitation is the only attractive force for a neutral, non-charged, matter, although now it is an open problem of the mentioned cosmologicalconstant which, maybe, gives also a repulsion force for “equilibration”, but this isyet controversial). So far we have no experimental evidence for possibility of staticsolutions, and the only known equilibrium is dynamical, stationary, as that of thesolar system.

What we said is widely known. Now we would like to add some new aspectsconnected with modality. In classical mechanics the concept of kinetic energy wasformulated by G. W. Leibniz (1646–1716) in the XVII century, but that of poten-tial energy much later by Hermann von Helmholtz (1821–1894) in 1847, after thedefinition of potential function and equation by Pierre-Simon Laplace (1749–1827)in 1782, and investigations of Carl Friedrich Gauss (1772–1855) on potential forcesof 1838 [6, p. 306]. Potential energy was defined by Helmholtz as a possibility tocreate kinetic energy. Thus potential energy is only possibility, not actuality. Insuch a way we can recall the Aristotelian distinction between assertive statementswhich say that something exists (as kinetic energy), problematic statements thatsomething can exist (as potential energy) — possibility, and apodictic statementsthat something has to exist (as a deterministic mechanical motion in classicalmechanics) — necessity, cf. [13, p. 185]. Thus in classical mechanics we have mod-al statements of possibility and necessity which are weaker or stronger than theusual assertive statements, and, actually, require a new logic (modal logic), differ-ent from the usual two-valued classical logic of Boole (Gorge Boole, 1815–1864).Such logic has been intensively developed only in the XX century (C. I. Lewis,J. Lukasiewicz and many others, from the twenties until now). It is timely sincequantum mechanics is based from the beginning on the concept of probabilitywhich is a special case of possibility, a little stronger, especially, when we yet intro-duce the quantum concept of the complex probability amplitude with the so-calledBerry phase. Now we can again mention the problem of vacuum (some analogy ofthe ancient Buddhist Nirvana) in quantum field theory. In vacuum there are noparticles and no radiation, but it is not simply “nothing” of classical logic, the mere

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non-existence. There is a so-called zero energy (different from zero), polarizationof the vacuum and also “virtual” (potential) particles and fields. Thus we see thatthe usual logic of only two possibilities, “yes” or “no”, two logical values of “true”or “false”, is not sufficient for modern physics. A Japanese Buddhist philosopher,Gadjin Nagao, writes [18, p. 4]: “Emptiness is not, however, simply nothingness.It is also immediately and necessarily the being of dependent co-arising.” We willnot go here into details of Indian and Japanese philosophy, but we only remindthat Whitehead and Schopenhauer had interest in old Indian and Chinese philo-sophy, similarly as earlier Leibniz, and later, in the XX century, physicists Einstein,Bohr, Schrodinger and Pauli. Now we consider the physical quantum vacuum assomething containing potentially all the past, present and future world, even thepossibilities of human beings, the human consciousness, mind and culture.

We will not go further into discussion of these problems, directing the inter-ested reader to the mentioned references concerning interpretation of quantummechanics, especially, [36] and [10].

3. Information Dynamics in Open Systems and Modal Categories ofVerbs

Let us now go to a more general world than the physical one, that of our compositecognitive experience which contains somehow all the three Popper worlds: world 1(physical), world 2 (mental), world 3 (cultural). In our consciousness they are notseparated, but rather entangled in a time process with many parallel informationchannels. The visual impressions give us mainly a space picture of the physicalworld, while the hearing impressions, especially those of speech, music, etc., aremore connected with our internal mental processes of thinking and feeling going,as if, more in time than in space. (That was the reason of the Cartesian distinctionof matter as a space substance and spirit as a time substance. But this divisionfalls when we see that by vision also time processes are perceived, and by hearingalso distances and directions, all the space. On the other hand, we also feel byour touching sense the space character of our body, and therefore we are consciousof living both in space and in time.) But, nevertheless, time and space are ratherseparated in our cognition. This was the reason that, when the famous experimentsof Michelson and Morley (1881-1887) showed without doubt that the velocity oflight is independent of the observer’s motion, it was considered, during more thantwo decades, as a great paradox, until it was solved by Einstein in 1905 by hisspecial theory of relativity. (It is a historical paradox that Einstein, when he pub-lished this paper, did not know the results of the Michelson-Morley experiment.He only heard that there are difficulties to show experimentally the existence ofether, but he started from the physical facts concerning electrodynamics of movingbodies, cf., e.g., [12, Chap. IV].) Einstein’s solution finally proved that human con-cepts of time and space are not unchangable as inner, therefore subjective, forms

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of our mental cognition, as Kant thought, but that we are able to change themfundamentally, according to our external experience and physical theory.

Modern cognitivism, based on progresses of molecular biology, biochemistry,neurophysiology and computer sciences, cf. e.g. [11, 19, 3], has explained manyaspects of human cognitive architecture and symbolic processing forming a phys-ical and structural base for our abilities of understanding, speaking and writing,intelligence, memory, learning and skill. We now know that the human brain is avery complicated computer with milions of parallel processors and that the linksconnecting the brain with the body organs and the external world are powerfulinformation channels of large information capacity. Therefore, we consider opensystems information dynamics as closely connected with the theory of the cog-nitive picture of the world. In the present paper we would like to concentrate onlogical and linguistic aspects of the cognitive picture containing physical, mentaland cultural elements, thus connecting three Popper worlds into one world of ourexperience. The connections between all three worlds go through semantics andpragmatics of language, i.e., through denotation and connotation, i.e., indexing ofwords and sentences (predicates). But the indexing of “indexicals” (modal expres-sions) refers not only to elements of world 3 (theoretical abstract concepts andother elements of culture), but also to states of our inner emotional world 2. Thiscan be studied by means of modern theoretical or logical linguistics.

Definitions of basic theoretical concepts of modern linguistics and logic can befound in many monographic and encyclopedic editions given in the bibliography(some of them in Polish, but there exist many similar publications in English):[16, 4, 26, 22, 1, 2, 34, 35, 5, 24] [14, Parts E–H]. We will give here only a fewdefinitions for fixing our terminology. According to Charles Morris [17] semioticsor linguistics is divided into three branches: syntax, semantics, and pragmatics.As Montague said, [16, p. 95]: “Syntax is concerned solely with relations betweenlinguistic expressions; semantics with relations between expressions and the objectsto which they refer; and pragmatics with relations among expressions, the objectsto which they refer, and the users or contexts of use of the expressions”.

Of course, this partition is sometimes too abstract and too conventional. Actu-ally, in practical cases of a usual speech or text, all three elements appear simultan-eously, and cannot be separated (then we speak about pragmatics). Ajdukiewicz,[2, p. 20], remarked that when members n, o of a social group G (cf. (1), (2), (3))speak with themselves, not only signals s ∈ S are essential, but also the meaningsof the signals. The meanings have, in general, three types of elements: not only theobjects to which the expressions refer, let us denote their set by D (denotations);but sometimes also a method of recognizing or fixing the objects (additional defini-tion or special reference in the given situation or context of use) C (connotations);and, possibly, but not necessarily, an emotional mental aspect of the speakingperson described by set E (emotions). An examples of the second situation is(Ajdukiewicz, [2, p. 21‘]) the name “hexagon” (a plane figure with 6 sides). Whenthe hearer not knowing Greek does not understand this name, then, e.g., two other

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definitions of this geometrical concept can be given: “a plane figure with 9 diag-onals”, or “a plane figure with the sum of inner angles 720◦”. All three definitionshave the same denotation, but different methods of identifying, therefore differentconnotations. Another well-known example (Gallin, [4] is: “the evening star” and“the morning star” (the planet Venus). Examples of different emotions are thoseconnected with the sentences: “the child goes to school”, “the child should go toschool”, “the child has to go to school”, “child, go to school!” “does the child go toschool?”. In such a way we have here not only elements of the real world (concreteconcepts, world 1) or of the idealized world (abstract concepts, world 3), but alsohuman mental states, our feelings, wishes, orders, doubts, estimates, beliefs, etc.(world 2). Therefore, we propose as the definition of language, instead of (3), thefollowing 6-part relation:

K∗ ⊂ K = G× S ×D × C × E ×G . (4)

Our definition (4) gives not only a syntactic, but also semantic and pragmat-ic aspects of the language. In special cases we may put C = Ø or/and E = Ø.Of course, C (methods) is a set composed of the elements of world 3, while E(emotions) is a set composed of the elements of world 2, and usually (but notnecessarily) the elements of set D are members of world 1 (facts or things). Wehave to point out that facts are described by sentences, while things by names.Therefore, they are of different ontological type, while the corresponding linguisticexpressions have different syntactic category. We cannot mix elements with differ-ent logical type in the same set, similarly as we cannot consider sets containingtogether, e.g., persons and numbers, or electrons and words (considered as rela-tions). As was mentioned above, it is sometimes necessary to distinguish collectivesets (wholes or mereological sets from Gr. meros ‘part’) as having parts, from dis-tributive sets (usual sets) as having elements. Mereology was first formulated byS. Lesniewski in 1916 (in Polish, while in German only in 1929), and later by A. N.Whitehead 1919, N. Goodman 1940 and others, cf. [14, p. 403]. As is well-known,the distributive sets (simply sets) are discussed since the paper by G. Cantor of1883. E.g., a finger is a part of a hand, but not an element of the set of hands,since in the latter case each finger would be a hand, cf. [2, p. 50]. Also an electronis a part of an atom, but an atom is not simply a set of electrons and a nucleus.We said that a relation between a situation (fact, state of affairs) and the thingsbelonging to it (in the sense of L. Wittgenstein) can be interpreted as a whole. Butit is also possible that this relation can be also interpreted in a more complicatedway, namely, similarly to that between a linguistic functor of predicate (transitiveor intransitive verb) and its arguments (nouns), the subject and the object. Itseems that we cannot say that in this case the subject and the object are partsof the predicate. The problem requires further investigation, as well as does theprecise meaning of Wittgenstein’s philosophy.

When a linguistic expression (word, phrase or sentence) has a meaning com-posed not only of D, but also of C and/or E, we call it an indexical as dependent on

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the context of use (R. Carnap, Y. Bar-Hillel, R. Montague) or a modal or intens-ive expression. A language with such expressions can be also called a modal orintensive or pragmatic language and can be represented by an ordered 5-tuple

〈G,S,D,C,E〉 . (5)

We can distinguish weaker and stronger modalities, the first ones, defined only byC, C-modalities, can be represented in the language, e.g., by deictic (egocentric)and anaphoric expressions, cf. e.g. [24], while those also with E, E-modalities, aredistinguished by an emotional aspect.

Now, as the last thing, we would like to present a preliminary classifications ofmodal sentences or predicates which can serve as the starting point for construct-ing different types of nonclassical many-valued modal logic. Such a list was firstproposed by G. H. von Wright (1951) with the well-known 4 types (or groups oftypes): alethic (different forms of truth), deontic (different forms of obligation),epistemic (different forms of verification) and existential (different forms of exist-ence). John R. Searle recently proposed, [29, p. 233] of the Polish edition, thefollowing distinction of 5 types:

1. assertive: gives an assertion of a sentence or its negation,

2. directive: gives a direction or command to do something,

3. commitive: gives an obligation to do something,

4. expressive: gives and expression of kindness, sympathy, condolence, etc.,

5. declarative: gives a declaration of some legal state.

In all the latter types we have a different logical value: true-false, done-undone,fulfilled-unfulfilled, proper-improper, legal-illegal, respectively. The two given clas-sifications partially overlap, but omit, or do not specify, some other importantcases:

6. erotetive (from Gr. erotema ‘question’): asks a question,

7. dynative (from Gr. dynaton ‘possibility’): expresses a possibility or probability,an estimation (while impossibility of a negation gives a necessity),

8. gnotive (from Gr. gnome ‘will’): expresses a will, a desire, a desiderative.

9. temporal (from Lat. tempus ‘time’): gives depedence on time,

10. passive (from Lat. passus ‘submitted’): expresses submission to some action,

11. patient (from Lat. patiens ‘suffering’): expresses suffering, adversity or mis-fortune,

12. negative (from Lat. nego ‘to deny’): expresses negation, but in a more generalsense than in classical logic (cf. Nagarjuna, Nishida, Nowak [21], non-classicallogic).

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There are languages, as Japanese, in which grammatical conjugation of verbsgives all these forms of sentences and many other ones (e.g., the recent textbook ofJapanese grammar in Polish by Romuald Huszcza et al., [7], gives 22 basic primaryforms of Japanese verbs). This problem requires, however, a separate investigation.In modern linguistics there is a tendency to consider modality in a very generalsense containing almost all forms (moods, voices, etc.) of verbs, since almost allof them have a different logical and grammatical function (different primary orsecondary syntactic category in the sense of Ajdukiewicz). This is in accordancewith the etymological sense of the word “modality” as originating from the Latinword modus ‘measure, quantity, rhythm, limit, restriction, end, method , way’. Thusthis is a method of existence or emergence of something in the consciousness ofnot only one person, but a social group.

Closing our considerations we remark that, to solve the problem of the cognit-ive picture of the world, not only methods of information dynamics are needed,but also those of open systems theory. Indeed, sets D, C and E are immersed inopen systems, while C and E represent the “context of use”, cultural and emo-tional (mental) one, of the more of less concrete set D (physical). Thus these setssymbolize an open system. We hope that in future the sets C and E could bemathematically treated by the methods of semantical model theory, and discussedby new versions of many-valued nonclassical logic.

4. Conslusion. Should mathematics be changed?

To end with we would like, as usually, “dot the i’s and cross the t’s” to avoidmisunderstanding. In such a general and difficult topic, however, this is not easy,especially, when there is not much place at our disposition. Therefore, we makeonly a few and short final remarks.

First of all, we confirm that our position in the problem of universals is onthe side of conceptualism which is perhaps nearer to conceptual realism than tonominalism and/or reism, but represents some compromise, i.e., it is not exactlyPlato’s position, but is nearer to that of Frege, Ajdukiewicz and Popper. Accordingto us, concepts are not mental facts, but their intersubjective intentional contents(connotations) belonging to Popper’s world 3 of cultural contents. Accepting Pop-per’s 3-worlds philosophy, we interpret the worlds in the cognitive sense, i.e., not asindependent, but interobjectivized and strogly interacting through language andobservation, thus being not one world, not two, and not three, but something inbetween. In analogy to Buddhist advaita this position can be called “non-trinitism”or “atrinitism”, i.e., not monism, not dualism and not trinitism. Modern quantumphysics seems to suggest that such a “non-trinitary world” has its projected “min-imal state” or “ground state” (as if Buddhist Nirvana) in the ground state ofquantum fields interpreted in the modal sense, i.e., not in world 1, but in world 3(as a religeous concept). This is a modal model of the physical vacuum as a “cosmicchaos” or “nothingness” (as if the state before the creation of the world, before the

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“big bang”) in a generalized non-classical sense containing potentially all possibleexcitations of the quantum fields which can “reconstruct” any real world, similaror dissimilar to our present world. Of course, this is only a theoretical hypothesisor phantasy which seems to be based on the present state of natural sciences, suchas physics and cognitivism.

Speaking about non-classical logic we mean mathematical logic, i.e., a part ofmathematics. Such a complete theory does not exist at present, but there are manypartial attempts in this direction. They are too numerous to be quoted here. Butall these proposed new theories (there may be many variants with different gener-ality) concern only higher logical levels, higher logical types, as if “supertheories”which can be superimposed on the existing logic or mathematics. So the presentmathematics and logic, as the “basic” one, should be preserved in principle. Thiscan be shown on the example of one existing type of such a modal theory, namely,the probability theory.

Up to ca. 1923 there was no clear mathematical formulation of probabilitytheory at all. It was a prevailing opinion that mathematics, as physics, shouldspeak only about “truth”, so probability as such does not belong to the domain ofexact sciences. Although already in 1900 David Hilbert in his famous Paris lectureproposed in his 6-th of 23 open problems of mathematics to formulate axiomatics ofprobability, there was no decisive progress up to the two preliminary papers in vol.4 (1923) of the new Polish mathematical journal Fundamenta Mathematicae. Theauthors were two Polish mathematicians from Lwow, Hugo Steinhaus (1887–1972)and Antoni Lomnicki (1881–1941). Their idea was to base the concept of probabiltyon the concept of measure, then Lebesgue measure. This idea was tried by UgoBroggi yet in 1907, but the paper contained an error (as Steinhaus showed), thatfrom the usual additivity of probability the σ-additivity of events would follow.Steinhaus assumed the σ-additivity and that was the decisive step because σ-algebra of events is now treated as basic for general probability. There are manypossible σ-algebras of sets, so there are also possible many types of probability inthe continuous case. Since the concept of continuity depends, on the other hand,on the types of topology, so in general probability is relativized to the type ofσ-algebra (e.g., Borel, Bear, etc.) and topology. Lomnicki added some points to“constructive” axiomatic formulation of the concept of probabilty measures. Theseideas were finally very elegantly formulated in the famous paper-review of 1933 byA. N. Kolmogorov (1903–1987) which is generally considered as the date of strictmathematical formulation of the concept of probability in mathematics. We seethat it appears to be a measure on a σ-algebra of events. Events (in this case inthe sense of facts or situations, not necessarily space-time points) correspond tosentences, so we have valuation of sentences by probability, not only by “true” or“false”. So that is the same as many-valued logic. Cf. also [28], Chap. 8.

How difficult these problems looked before 1923 it can be seen in the paper byMarian Smoluchowski (1872–1917) on the concept of chance in physics published intwo different versions (Polish 1916, German 1918, the second alredy after the death

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of the author [30]). In the German version he said about probability theory : “. . .no other mathematical discipline is built on so unclear and shaky fundaments.” Allthe paper is as if raging between sense and nonsense, objectivity and subjectivity.Of course, probability can be subjective, but, as with all the modality, can beobjectivized through interobjectivization by means of observation by many peopleand communication through language.

It is the problem of future how the example of probability can be followed byother modalities of the human language, in physics and in cognitivistics or generalinformation dynamics in open systems.

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