Police Ethics and Integrity: Breaking the Blue Code of Silence

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Police Ethics and Integrity: Breakingthe Blue Code of SilenceLouise WestmarlandPublished online: 19 Aug 2006.

To cite this article: Louise Westmarland (2005) Police Ethics and Integrity: Breaking the Blue Codeof Silence, Policing and Society: An International Journal of Research and Policy, 15:2, 145-165,DOI: 10.1080/10439460500071721

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Police Ethics and Integrity: Breakingthe Blue Code of SilenceLouise Westmarland

This article analyzes evidence from a survey of police officers who were asked about their

attitudes towards police corruption, unethical behaviour and minor infringements of

police rules. It reveals that most of the officers who took part in the study regard certain

actions, such as those involving the acquisition of goods or money, as much worse than

behaviour involving illegal brutality or bending of the rules in order to protect colleagues

from criminal proceedings. It also reveals that officers who responded to the survey are

relatively unwilling to report unethical behaviour by colleagues unless there is some sort

of acquisitive motive or outcome predicted. Overall the findings support the existence of

cultural ‘‘blue code’’ and ‘‘Dirty Harry’’ beliefs systems surrounding police rule bending,

but also provide an initial study of a small sample (n�/275) that point to the value of

further investigation.

Keywords: Integrity; Corruption; Blue code; Ethical policing; Police brutality;

Occupational culture

A New Ethical Agenda?

Given the increased attention being given to ethics, integrity and corruption in

policing, it might be supposed that some evidence of cultural change might be

apparent. As Neyroud (2003) suggests, there has been an increasing interest in policy

and academic circles about what might be termed ‘‘professional ethics in policing’’.

Change is difficult to assess, however, because although there has always been a great

deal of interest shown in what the police do, how they do it has not always been

considered to be of equal concern. So despite the series of cases that Newburn (1999:

1) describes as ‘‘public scandals’’, the introduction of sexual equality laws in Britain,

Louise Westmarland is with the Open University. Correspondence to: Louise Westmarland, Faculty of Social

Sciences, Open University, Walton Hall, Milton Keynes MK7 6AA, UK. Tel.: (�/44) 1908 652462; E-mail:

[email protected]. The author would like to thank the research force and in particular the Chief and

Deputy Chief Constables and Judith Marshall for help with data analysis.

ISSN 1043-9463 (print)/ISSN 1477-2728 (online) # 2005 Taylor & Francis Group Ltd

DOI: 10.1080/10439460500071721

Policing & Society, Vol. 15, No. 2, June 2005, pp. 145�/165

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the Equal Opportunities Commission and the Commission for Racial Equality, and

more recently the Human Rights Act of 1998, little attention has been paid to ethics

and ‘‘feet on the street’’ policing. It is debateable therefore whether a more ‘‘ethical’’

climate for police officers exists, despite new demands to consider issues such as the

right to family life, privacy and freedom from ‘‘discrimination’’ much more explicitly,

which Neyroud and Beckley (2001: 54) argue has created a ‘‘new agenda in policing’’.

The survey that is analyzed in this article combines questions of integrity,

corruption and the ‘‘blue code’’ or ‘‘blue curtain’’ of silence with tensions created by

police culture. It uses empirical evidence, both quantitative and qualitative, to assess

serving police officers’ attitudes towards various types of behaviour varying from

minor rule breaking such as accepting a free cup of coffee to taking fairly large

amounts of cash or goods as ‘‘perks’’ in the course of their duties. Questions of police

brutality and covering up the illicit or illegal behaviour of colleagues are also

addressed. It seems this is the first time this type of research has been conducted in

Britain, which is surprising given that integrity appears to have been on the public

policing managerialist agenda. This has been illustrated by the way ‘‘ethical’’ policing

has been debated and discussed in the United Kingdom. Several major books and

reports have been published over the past five years, in tandem with codes of ethics

being proposed, reports on ethical behaviour and an Association of Chief Police

Officers (ACPO) committee to discuss how to take these issues forward. In addition,

the Home Office has been conducting research and publishing findings on corruption

(Newburn, 1999), integrity (HMIC, 1999) and ethical policing (Miller, 2003). Most

recently, Miller’s report explains that not only is corruption difficult to define, it is

almost impossible to quantify. In his study of police professional standards units, he

concludes that ‘‘between about half and one percent of police staff (both officers and

civilians) were potentially (though not necessarily) corrupt’’ (Miller, 2003: ii).

Method

The questionnaire used to conduct the survey discussed here employs a number of

scenarios to ask about officers’ attitudes towards certain unethical behaviour. This

approach has certain drawbacks, as Table 1 illustrates, as the questions may elicit

responses illustrating the difference between ‘‘what people say and what they

otherwise do’’ (Deutscher, 1973: 2). Hence, rather than attempting to analyze cases of

‘‘potential’’ corruption, which Miller (2003) notes is difficult to predict, the

questionnaire addresses what police officers think about violations of the rules. It

also raises the issue of not telling when someone breaks the rules, and whether this is

just as bad as the original misbehaviour, and which behaviour the respondents feel

they would definitely report and which they would not. Respondents are also asked to

indicate what they think would be the punishment for each sort of behaviour and

whether they think this is justified (see Appendix). In effect, the survey asks questions

about so-called ‘‘noble cause corruption’’ (Klockars, 1983) versus acts with acquisitive

motives or violent outcomes and whether the respondents would report these

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behaviours. Respondents were also provided with a short section at the end of the

questionnaire where they could record any further comments they felt were relevant.

This survey was originally designed to survey North American police officers as

part of a national study. This later became an international survey of police integrity

published in a volume comparing police officers’ attitudes in 14 different countries,

including Britain (Klockars et al., 2003). Responses analyzed here are from the British

part of that study (Westmarland, 2003). Data were gathered by questionnaire that had

been ‘‘translated’’ to be compatible with discipline codes and police expressions in

England, and delivered through the internal mail system of a large force in the

southeast of the country. Printed questionnaires were distributed within three

command areas of the research force. In total, 275 of the original 1,000 questionnaires

that were distributed came back, representing a response rate of 28 per cent. Due to

the data being collected from only one police force, with a fairly low response rate,

Table 1 The Questionnaire

1. A police officer runs a private business in which he sells and installs security devices, such asalarms, special locks, etc. This work is done during off-duty hours.

2. A police officer routinely accepts free meals, cigarettes and other items of small value fromshopkeepers on his beat. He does not solicit these gifts and is careful not to abuse thegenerosity of those who give gifts.

3. A police officer stops a motorist for speeding. The officer agrees to accept a personal gift forhalf of the amount of the fine in exchange for not issuing a summons.

4. A police officer is widely liked in the community, and on occasions such as Christmas localshopkeepers and restaurant and bar owners show their appreciation for her attention bygiving gifts of food and alcohol.

5. A police officer discovers a burglary of a jewellery shop. The display cases are smashed and itis obvious that many items have been taken. While searching the shop, he takes a watch,worth about two days pay for that officer. He reports that the watch had been stolen duringthe burglary.

6. A police officer has a private arrangement with a local vehicle body shop to refer the ownersof the cars damaged in the accidents to the shop. In exchange for each referral, he receives apayment of 5% of the repair bill from the shop owner.

7. A police officer, who happens to be a very good car mechanic, is scheduled to work duringsome planned forthcoming holidays. A supervisor offers to authorize these days off, if heagrees to tune-up the supervisor’s personal car. Evaluate the SUPERVISOR’S behaviour.

8. At 2am, a police officer, who is on duty, is driving a patrol car on a deserted road. She sees avehicle that has been driven off the road and is stuck in a ditch. She approaches the vehicleand observes that the driver is not hurt but is obviously intoxicated. She also finds that thedriver is an off-duty police officer. Instead of reporting this accident and offence, shetransports the driver to his home.

9. A police officer finds a bar on his beat which is still serving drinks an hour past its legalclosing time. Instead of reporting this violation, the police officer agrees to accept a couple offree drinks from the owner.

10. Two police officers on foot patrol surprise someone who is attempting to break into a car. Heruns off. They chase the suspect for about two streets before apprehending him by tacklinghim and wrestling him to the ground. After he is under control, both officers punch him acouple of times in the stomach as punishment for fleeing and resisting.

11. A police officer finds a wallet in a car park. It contains the amount of money equivalent to afull-day’s pay for that officer. She reports the wallet as lost property, but keeps the money.

Policing & Society 147

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claims to the overall generalizability of findings is clearly limited. Nevertheless, as an

exploratory study of an under-researched area, the data represent an important first

step to understanding police attitudes and behaviour.

The sample comprised 216 men and 43 women with the remainder declining to

answer the question about gender. Hence the fact that 16 per cent of the sample was

women is a reasonable representation of both this force’s gender composition and

that of police in the United Kingdom in general. From the demographic data, around

10 per cent of the respondents were probationers, with between one and two years

service. There were 171 police constables, 40 sergeants and 24 officers of inspector

and above. A few officers failed to answer these questions, but as might be expected,

the majority of the sample was patrol officers with 151 identifying themselves as

fitting this category. In addition, 55 respondents were working as detectives, 23 in

special operations, 13 in administration and 19 classifying themselves as ‘‘other’’, with

a few data missing. Overall, 64 respondents classed themselves as being in supervisory

positions, which means that about three-quarters of the sample (74 per cent) are not

supervisors. In total, 72 respondents contributed qualitative comments regarding

their answers or the questionnaire design.

Findings

In the following discussion, the data are analyzed by combining a number of the

scenarios officers were questioned about in terms of types of behaviour or rule

breaking, rather than in the order they appear on the questionnaire. Each of the

scenarios is placed in one of three categories for the purposes of the analysis as they

have certain similarities. The first category is about administrative or internal

disciplinary infringements, what is sometimes described as ‘‘rule bending’’. In the

second category, ‘‘noble cause’’ rule breaking is about behaviour that does not have an

apparent financial motive for the officer. The third collection of scenarios is placed in

the category of acquisitive crimes involving goods or money. Comparing the

scenarios in this way allows for distinctions to be made between what officers might

regard as contrary to force policy, but perhaps not especially contrary to the principle

of police ‘‘integrity’’, with behaviour that they or their colleagues might regard as

‘‘very serious’’. Indeed it appears from the data that with one exception most of the

acts the police officers considered to be in this latter category did involve the

acquisition of money or goods. In effect, officers had quite sophisticated methods of

grading their colleagues’ corruption on a monetary scale if they perceived that the

action was ‘‘theft’’. On the other hand, where favours, meals or drinks were received,

the findings were more ambiguous as the monetary value did not always equate to the

seriousness they attached to the act. This is a point that is developed in the discussion

below and also in the analysis of the qualitative data in the form of the comments

respondents made at the end of the questionnaire.

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‘‘Administrative’’ or Internal Disciplinary Infringements

The first set of scenarios from the questionnaire are grouped to analyze beliefs and

opinions about what police officers might regard as a petty rule breaking or minor

disciplinary matters. These include questions about an officer running a private

business in their own time, accepting meals on duty, gifts of food and alcohol, a

supervisor giving days off in return for car repair and an officer taking a couple of

drinks rather than reporting the pub being open after hours (Table 2). From these

cases, respondents generally thought that the most minor category or ‘‘least serious’’

form of deviant behaviour was Scenario 1: the question about a private business

being run during off-duty hours. Here, although almost 50 per cent knew it was

against force policy or ‘‘definitely against it’’, most thought it in the ‘‘not at all

serious’’ category (41 per cent) and a further 24 per cent described it as ‘‘not serious’’.

In the next scenario, which describes accepting meals and gifts, most officers thought

this was contrary to force policy, but were less certain about whether or not it was

‘‘serious’’, with only 11 per cent saying they thought it was not at all serious, and

around 30 per cent of the respondents around the median and 14 per cent saying they

thought it very serious behaviour.

Similarly, the officer in Scenario 4 who accepts gifts at Christmas is not regarded as

doing anything ‘‘very serious’’, but 36 per cent of those who answered were certain

that it was contrary to force policy. One of the reasons for the officers’ lack of censure

is perhaps that the respondents could visualise this as a rare occurrence, in special

circumstances such as Christmas, and one that they had experienced themselves. In

this particular example, 37 per cent said that they would definitely not report such

behaviour and they thought that only about one-quarter of their colleagues would do

so. In a similar set of circumstances*/namely Scenario 9, where officers were asked

about the behaviour of a colleague who accepts a couple of drinks in return for not

reporting after hours drinking in a public house*/there is a slightly different

response. The ‘‘bribe’’ on offer (i.e., a couple of drinks) is of a similar monetary worth

to those in scenarios 2 and 4, but now 63 per cent of the respondents think it is ‘‘very

serious’’ and 27 per cent think it is ‘‘serious’’ (Table 3). It seems that the respondents’

responses to whether they would report this behaviour are in line with their increased

Table 2 Seriousness of Behaviour (percentage)

Not serious 2 3 4 Very serious

Scenario 1: Police officer runs privatebusiness in off duty hours

41.0 24.0 17.0 11.0 5.0

N�/267

Scenario 2: Accepts free meals and gifts 10.5 18.0 29.0 27.0 14.0N�/271

Scenario 4: Officer accepts gifts atChristmas

21.0 33.0 29.0 12.0 4.0

N�/270


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perception of seriousness in that only 4 per cent said that they would definitely not

report it. Also, in this case, they thought only 2 per cent of their colleagues would not

report the behaviour.

Another question that fits into the little or no financial gain category is Scenario 7

describing a supervisor who bestows a favourable leave allocation in return for a car

tune up. Here the respondents were asked to rate the behaviour of the supervisor, with

30 and 42 per cent saying it was ‘‘very serious’’ or ‘‘serious’’, respectively (Table 4).

Around 60 per cent thought it was definitely against force policy and 32 per cent said

they would report it. This relatively minor ‘‘internal’’ disciplinary matter, with no

major financial gain for either party (other than the money the supervisor saves on

having the car tuned), appears to attract the censure of a significant number of

respondents. It was viewed as more serious than some of the actions that appeared to

have ‘‘acquisitive’’ motives in the sense that gifts or free drinks have a quasi-monetary

value. The officer receiving the holidays he or she wanted presumably has no financial

benefit, but was perhaps considered more serious because the sample was largely non-

supervisors with 74 per cent of the respondents identifying themselves as such.

In the part of the questionnaire where respondents could write comments, a

significant proportion of the remarks referred to Scenario 1 concerning the police

officer who runs a private business out of duty hours. There were about 25 written

statements associated with the point that in this particular research force permission

can be granted to do this in some circumstances, so respondents said they were

unclear as to whether this was strictly against the rules. Some of these also pointed

out that the option of ‘‘demotion in rank’’ was superfluous as a constable (to whom

many of the scenarios could apply) could not receive this punishment.

Noble Cause Corruption/Blue Code Silence

In this second category of scenarios are the behaviours that could be viewed as more

significant in their potential for outcomes such as dismissal, but still do not involve



Scenario 9: Accepts free drinks fornot reporting late bar opening

0.0 2.0 8.0 26.5 62.5

N�/271



Scenario 7: Supervisor grants days offin return for car tune-up

0.4 4.0 22.0 41.5 30.0

N�/270

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any direct financial gain for the officer involved. One way of describing this type of

action in terms of police misbehaviour is to describe it as ‘‘noble cause’’ corruption

(Klockars, 1983). As Ransley (2002: 26) suggests, this behaviour is sometimes the

result of police ‘‘tunnel vision’’ where the accused is seen as guilty and bureaucratic

rules prevent their conviction. In the ‘‘war’’ against crime, deviation from the rules

may be in the interests of ‘‘justice’’ and in the case of brutality, Klockars (1996: 26)

argues, some ‘‘tough cops’’ view their role as crime control and the ‘‘citizenry’’ as

anti-police, leading to closer identification with police cultural values and ‘‘in dealing

with the realities of the street . . . curbstone justice is sometimes appropriate and

effective’’. Discretion in dispensing justice can also involve leniency, as illustrated by

one of the two scenarios that were posed to test noble cause or ‘‘street justice’’. It

concerned a case where a drunk driver was involved in an accident, was found to be a

police officer, and colleagues take him home to avoid being charged. The second

‘‘noble cause’’ corruption case involves an assault on a suspect who is punched after

he had been caught having attempted to evade arrest.

To take the first of these two scenarios, about the officers who take a colleague

home to prevent them being arrested for drunk driving; in addition to being classed

as ‘‘corrupt’’ behaviour, this could also an example of the ‘‘blue code’’ or the

protection of, and covering up for, police co-workers. In this case the ‘‘noble’’ part of

the corrupt behaviour is that the officers might justify the action in terms of the

greater good of the organisation and society in general. Police officers often view

themselves as being the ‘‘thin blue line’’ protecting society. As such they might view

losing a valued colleague through a ‘‘minor’’ or isolated case of stupidity as being

against the interests of the public good. Officers might also think, in noble cause

terms, that their colleague would be punished more severely than an ‘‘ordinary’’

member of the community, and therefore deserves some protection. In effect the

officer would probably lose his or her job and receive a drink driving conviction, and

thus might find it difficult to secure similar employment. So in this case, although

almost all respondents said that it was contrary to force policy (93 per cent) and, as

Table 5 shows, almost 90 per cent thought it ‘‘serious’’ or ‘‘very serious’’ (23 and 66

per cent, respectively), only 50 per cent would definitely report it and thought that

only 30 per cent of their colleagues would.

The second question in this noble cause/blue code category is about officers

punching a suspect who resisted them during an arrest (Table 6). Regarding the

behaviour of these officers, 92 per cent of respondents knew that it was against force

policy and 66 per cent thought it was ‘‘very serious’’, with 54 per cent saying they



Scenario 8: Takes home drunkdriver colleague

1.0 2.5 6.5 22.5 66.0

N�/271


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would report or ‘‘definitely’’ report this behaviour. Overall, 5 per cent said that they

would definitely not report it and 4 per cent said that they thought that colleagues

would not report this sort of behaviour. So although most commentators might not

regard assaulting a suspect as very ‘‘noble’’, it fits within the cultural ‘‘working rules’’

(Reiner, 2000) explanation that argues policing is a difficult and dangerous job where

authority must be upheld. Furthermore, as this noble cause involves solidarity

between colleagues and the ‘‘corrupt’’ behaviour here is the maintenance of the blue

code of silence, to report it would be to violate this code.

In the qualitative section of the questionnaire where respondents were asked to add

any comments they felt important, there were ten officers who made remarks

qualifying their answers relating to this ‘‘noble cause’’ set of scenarios. Quite a few of

these respondents (around 50 per cent) complained that it was difficult to answer

such questions because of their ambiguity. A number of respondents said, for

example, that they needed ‘‘more context’’ or to know the ‘‘home circumstances of

the officer involved’’. It might be expected of course that questionnaires regarding

integrity and corrupt behaviour of police officers would raise some difficult issues.

Many of the questions demand the respondent to struggle with thoughts surrounding

‘‘what if?’’, but given the number of officers raising this as a problem, it is clear that

officers are certainly capable of, and even used to, considering their actions and

beliefs in terms of ethics and integrity.

Acquisitive Corruption

As might be expected, and as Table 7 suggests, it seems that the third category of

behaviour involving actions concerned with straightforward monetary gain are those

that respondents were most likely to regard as ‘‘serious’’ or ‘‘very serious’’ in the

survey. In addition, officers said that these were the misdemeanours they would be

most likely to report and thought other colleagues would report. Findings from this

survey suggest that actions involving straightforward ‘‘stealing’’ of cash or theft of

expensive goods such as a watch are the ones most obviously and clearly regarded as

deviant or blameworthy. In this final category, there are four scenarios that fit this



Scenario 10: Officers punch arrestee 1.0 4.0 10.5 17.5 65.5N�/270



Scenario 5: Officer takes watch after burglary 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 98.5N�/270

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‘‘acquisitive’’ corruption model. Referring back to Table 1, the scenarios include:

taking money from a found wallet; a speeding motorist who gives money to the

officer in return for not being reported; being paid a percentage to refer crashes to a

particular body repair shop; and taking a watch from a shop that has been burgled.

Taking the watch after a burglary is seen as ‘‘very serious’’ by 98.5 per cent of the

respondents*/in fact all those who answered this question. Similarly, the officer who

takes money from a found wallet is regarded as committing a ‘‘very serious’’ act by a

high proportion of respondents at 97 per cent (Table 8). Although they thought

taking the money was ‘‘very serious’’, not all said they would report it (88 per cent),

with 74 per cent saying they thought others would report such actions. These slight

differences between perceptions of taking money from the found wallet and taking

the watch might be seen as the opposite to expectations because removing ‘‘goods’’ or

property may not be seen as quite so ‘‘dirty’’ as taking money from the found wallet.

Although none of the qualitative remarks on the completed questionnaires

mentioned this distinction, it is an interesting point that would be useful to follow

up in later studies. It could also possibly be surmised that the officer who takes the

watch may think it would be covered by insurance, and the same reasoning that

supposes conventional shop theft is ‘‘victimless’’ could apply here. In the case of

taking money from the wallet, where 97 per cent, thought that the behaviour was

‘‘very serious’’, 95 per cent said they would definitely report it and thought that 86 per

cent of their colleagues would also report this behaviour.

Although it is difficult to assess the amount of money involved, as Table 9

indicates, with regard to the officer who was receiving a percentage of the repair bill

from a vehicle body shop, 65 per cent thought this was ‘‘very serious’’ behaviour and

27 per cent thought it ‘‘serious’’. So about 30 per cent thought that obtaining money

this way was less serious than taking a watch or money from a found wallet. Most

respondents thought it was a violation of force policy at 91 per cent, but only 61 per

cent said they would ‘‘definitely’’ report and 20 per cent said they would report.

Perhaps the lower numbers (about 30 per cent fewer thought this very serious) relates

to the ‘‘service’’ element of the action. So although there is an acquisitive motive, it

might be viewed as being within ‘‘normal’’ business practice to obtain a fee for

arranging, or a commission for recommending, a customer. Conversely, Table 10

shows that in the scenario where the officer takes half the fine in return for not

reporting the offence, 95 per cent thought that this was ‘‘very serious’’. All

respondents who answered this question thought it was against force policy, with

82 per cent saying they would definitely report it and 63 per cent thinking colleagues



Scenario 11: Officer takes moneyfrom found wallet

0 0 0 1 97

N�/270


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would also report this sort of behaviour. Hence the purely ‘‘public police’’ nature of

fining someone for breaking the law, in effect bribing them not to take forward a

potential conviction, is viewed much more seriously (around 30 per cent) than a

‘‘referral’’ to a legitimate profit-making business, even though the amounts of money

involved could be similar.

Summary of Findings

Officers responding to the survey were therefore quite discriminating in what they

thought was most serious, especially where the behaviour was clearly contrary to

police regulations and potentially criminal in the wider legal sense. As might be

expected these last four scenarios with their acquisitive motives are regarded as the

most serious by most respondents. Although the amount of money taken is difficult

to compare in each case (such as in the frequency of the money received through the

backhander from the body repair shop), the watch was described as worth two days

pay, the money from the wallet one day, and the speeding fine would certainly only

amount to a part, perhaps a maximum of half of an officers’ day’s pay. Despite these

methodological problems, in order of seriousness, the respondents classed taking the

watch at the burglary as the most serious, the money from the wallet next, then a

bribe from the speeding motorist and finally the backhander from the repair shop.

So it is difficult to decide, from the data, whether it is the way the money or goods

are taken or the financial value that is significant for the respondents. Although the

money taken from the wallet was equal to one day’s pay and half the financial value of

the watch, they are both regarded as similar in terms of seriousness and likelihood to

report. Clearly, officers in the sample have selected as most serious, and the ones they

are most likely to report, those involving the acquisition of money or property, but

the actual value does not make that much difference. In the discussion that follows,

some suggestions as to why this might be the case are raised, as is the punishment

that might follow, and how this might have had an effect on what the respondents


Sc Not serious 2 3 4 Very serious

Scenario 6: Officer takes backhanderfrom vehicle repair shop

0 2 4 27 65

N�/271



Scenario 3: Officer takes bribe for notreporting speeder

0 0 0 3 95

N�/271

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thought was serious and whether or not they would report their colleagues’

behaviour.

Blue Codes and Outcomes of Unethical Behaviour

As this survey is about professional ethics, if integrity is viewed as the enactment of

personal morals, police occupational culture is obviously a factor that should be

taken into account when analyzing such data. Due to the demands of cop culture,

such as those surrounding solidarity and loyalty, in some cases a close professional

‘‘partner’’ or mate might not be reported for misbehaviour. If an officer behaves in a

way that is out of character due to some sort of life crisis or finds some incident

particularly stressful for a personal reason, it could be considered mitigating

circumstances by colleagues. Hence, the working partnership that develops between

officers over time could affect how the officer would reply to the questions of

reporting corrupt acts, as would individual circumstances and context. In some

scenarios where respondents said they thought the behaviour ‘‘very serious’’ but a

significant number said they would not report, it could be supposed that either

circumstances or comradeship, or perhaps other forms of resolution, such as telling

the officer to give the money back, might have been envisaged. This issue of

individual circumstances was raised frequently in the section where officers added

their own comments at the end of the questionnaire.

Despite some reservations about whether officers filled in the questionnaire

truthfully and could make judgements although they felt there were a number of

ambiguities, in terms of the findings of the survey it is clear that officers have no

difficulty in identifying wrongdoing in their colleagues (Table 11). They are also clear

about what is against the rules of their particular force and have little difficulty with

determining which behaviour is ‘‘serious’’ or ‘‘very serious’’ when it involves

acquisitive motives. As explained above, these were the cases of the officer taking a

bribe of half the value of the speeding fine, (95 per cent) taking the watch at the scene

of the burglary (99 per cent) and taking the money from the wallet (97 per cent).

These three categories of behaviour were regarded by the respondents as very serious

and in each case there were high levels of positive responses to the question of

Table 11 Whether Respondent would Report Behaviour (percentage)

Definitely not 2 3 4 Definitely yes

Scenario 5: Officer takes watch after burglary 0.0 0.0 0.4 3.0 95.0N�/271

Scenario 3: Officer takes bribe for notreporting speeder

0.0 0.7 4.0 13.0 81.5

N�/271

Scenario 11: Officer takes money fromfound wallet

0.0 0.4 1.5 9.0 88.0

N�/270


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whether they would report the behaviour. In the case of the speeding fine, 82 per cent

said they would definitely report it; for the burglary, 95 per cent said they would; and

for the wallet incident, 88 per cent said they would report. The only other scenarios

that came near to these three in terms of seriousness and likelihood of reporting was

the question about the officer taking a percentage from the vehicle repair shop, with

65 per cent saying they thought it very serious and 61 per cent saying they would

report it; and the question about the drink driving colleague at 66 per cent in terms of

seriousness.

The three cases that involve an acquisitive outcome are especially interesting in

terms of beliefs about integrity and motivation. To concentrate first on officers’

perceptions of the seriousness of the offence and whether they would report, it is clear

that there is a link between these two elements, as might be expected; in effect, how

the punishment that an officer would or should expect may affect the respondent’s

likelihood of reporting the behaviour. It could be supposed that in some cases

reporting a colleague would lead to a punishment that an individual may not feel they

would want to initiate. So, for example, in the case of the officer receiving the cut

from the body repair shop, 51 per cent thought that the punishment would and

should be dismissal, which might affect their willingness to report their colleague.

This consideration appears to be overridden, however, when the offence becomes

serious enough, as in the case of the watch, wallet and speeding fine scenarios where

in the latter case, 79 per cent thought that dismissal should follow and 76 per cent

thought it would, if discovered. Similarly, in the watch scenario, 93 per cent thought

dismissal should be the consequence and 92 per cent thought it would be the case. In

the wallet scenario, 90 per cent of respondents thought that dismissal was appropriate

and 87 per cent thought this would be the outcome (Table 12).

So these ‘‘worst case’’ scenarios illustrate high levels of agreement between

perceived seriousness and reporting despite the likelihood that their colleague would

be dismissed and the responsibility for that may lie with the person blowing the

whistle. It may be that the respondents felt that the behaviour was so reprehensible

that they would have no qualms about what they had to do and that someone with

such low moral standards should not serve as a police officer. One aspect it would be

Table 12 What the Punishment would be (percentage)

None Verbal Written Fine Demotion Dismissal

Scenario 3: Officer takes bribe fornot reporting speeder

0.7 0.4 6.0 12.0 1.0 76.0

Scenario 5: Officer takes watchafter burglary

0.4 0.7 0.0 2.0 1.0 92.0

Scenario 6: Officer takesbackhander from vehicle repairshop

0.7 2.5 10.0 23.0 5.0 50.5

Scenario 11: Officer takes moneyfrom found wallet

0.4 0.7 1.5 2.0 3.0 87.0

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interesting to examine in further research is the difference the relationship between

the offender and the reportee could make. As explained earlier, however, this survey

was concerned only with what officers believed they would do in any given

circumstance. It raises some interesting questions with these most serious actions

and behaviours and those on the margins of seriousness and likelihood of reporting.

As described in the findings above, there were numerous minor ‘‘administrative’’

infringements of the rules that respondents said they would not report. Typically the

punishment or sanctions were minor and tended to be in agreement with what the

officers thought should happen to the person concerned. In other words, respondents

said that the offences would attract a fine or a verbal or written warning, which

seemed to be generally in line with what they thought should happen. Where the

ambiguity arises, however, is in the marginal cases where the ‘‘crime’’ is less clear in

terms of its outcome. Two important exceptions to the agreement between what

officers thought should and would happen are the drunk driving police officer and

the assault of a prisoner. Although the questionnaire did not allow questions about

occupational culture to be addressed surrounding the relationships between the

players, it is clear that some sort of ‘‘blue code’’ is evident here. Respondents in the

survey who said they would definitely not report such behaviour in the drunk driver

case was 6 per cent and, regarding other colleagues reporting, 3 per cent. Similarly, in

the prisoner assault, 5 per cent said they would definitely not report and 4 per cent

thought their colleagues were unlikely to do so (Tables 13 and 14).

Therefore, one possible explanation for these levels of non-reporting is the

punishment that the officers thought would follow was regarded as excessive,

unnecessary or inappropriate. In the case of the drunk driver, for example, 59 per cent

thought the officer who covered up the offence would be dismissed, and for the

assault, 61 per cent thought this would be the outcome. In the remarks made in the

qualitative section of the questionnaire, some respondents remarked that the ‘‘home

circumstances’’ of the officer would make a difference as to whether they would

report. In the case of the drunk driver, 48 per cent of the sample thought that

dismissal should be the punishment and 10 per cent fewer than thought it would be

the outcome; whereas for the assault, 52 per cent though this should happen, a

difference of only 4 per cent (Tables 15 and 16). The difference between perceived

seriousness of assault and drunk driving is also an interesting occupational cultural

issue that might not be replicated in other occupational groups. Such small

differences between what respondents perceived the punishment should and would

Table 13 Whether Respondent would Report Behaviour (percentage)


Scenario 8: Takes home drunk driver colleague 6 6 15 22 50N�/271

Scenario 10: Officers punch arrestee 5 8 15 17 53N�/269


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be may have influenced decisions about whether they would report colleagues, but

this is unclear from the data.

As Tables 15 and 16 illustrate, the punishment perceived as suitable and as

probable, for some versions of what might arguably be described as ‘‘noble cause’’

corruption differ by about 10 percentage points. As explained in the section above,

the most serious and punishable offences, in the view of the officers who responded,

were the actions and behaviour that could result in financial gain for the individual.

Behaviour condoning and potentially reproducing actions such as driving under the

influence of alcohol, and perhaps being quite intoxicated as the event resulted in an

accident, was not seen as serious as taking a watch. Here financial gain is seen as

much more serious than reporting a potentially lethal driver. In a similar way, a

speeding motorist might be seen as a threat to public safety, but this is seen as

less serious than taking the money from the wallet worth one day’s pay and

similarly taking a bribe from the car repairer is also considered worse than the officer

who covers for a colleague who has had an accident while drunk driving. It could

be argued of course that the behaviour being judged is that of the officer who covers

up for the offender that is under consideration. If the question had been posed

about direct reporting of an officer who had the accident, the results may have

been different. Nevertheless, the consistent responding to the category of

Table 14 Whether Respondent Thought Colleagues would Report Behaviour (percentage)



2.5 6.0 26.5 32.0 31.0

N�/271

Scenario 10: Officers punch arrestee 4.0 11.0 28.0 23.0 31.0N�/268

Table 15 What the Punishment should be (percentage)



1.0 5.0 10.0 18.0 10.5 48.0

Scenario 10: Officers punch arrestee 2.0 8.0 10.5 13.5 8.0 52.0

Table 16 What the Punishment would be (percentage)



0.4 1.5 9.0 16.0 7.0 59.0

Scenario 10: Officers punch arrestee 0.7 5.0 8.0 11.0 5.0 61.0

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‘‘very serious’’ and ‘‘would definitely report’’ is reserved for the four acquisitive

crimes.

To turn to the punishment the offenders would and should receive, perhaps the

obvious penalty would be to expect an officer who has gained financially to be offered

the chance to pay back the money, and be fined or perhaps demoted, which would

also involve financial loss. In the three scenarios where officers could gain financially,

however, the overwhelming majority of respondents*/over 90 per cent in each

case*/felt that the officer should be dismissed. This is an interesting ‘‘moral’’

judgement because the seriousness here seems to be based on a lack of trust rather

than what the officer has gained by his or her actions. It seems that taking something

when no-one is around somehow violates the unwritten ‘‘code’’ of moral or ethical

behaviour expected of the police by their colleagues. Indeed, of the 72 qualitative

remarks made by respondents, 3 referred to the ‘‘morals’’ of the officers described in

the scenarios, with one remarking that ‘‘[d]ishonesty should never be tolerated’’ and

another said that ‘‘any criminal act or action to pervert the course of justice would be

reported’’. There were also a further 27 respondents who supplied qualitative data

either pertaining to the questionnaire, their responses or to those of their colleagues.

These included a number who referred to the answers of some officers being affected

by worries about anonymity. Some said that officers who would tend to break or

bend the rules would be unlikely to either admit it or answer truthfully about their

actions.

A significant number of the remarks the respondents felt important to make were

about the level of acquisition of goods or money, whether the officer had been caught

before and whether there were mitigating circumstances. Indeed, a large proportion

of the remarks of the 27 respondents who made comments specifically about how

they had answered the questionnaire and why said that the discretionary powers of

officers would come into play in their reporting of colleagues. Furthermore, many

respondents thought that due to the ambiguity of the circumstances in the scenarios

or what one described as ‘‘other circumstances to be taken into account which should

affect the final outcome’’. These responses concerning the ambiguity of situations

facing whistle blowers also reiterates a point made earlier in this article regarding the

relationship between what Deutscher (1973: 3) describes as ‘‘sentiments and acts’’. In

an excerpt by LaPiere (1934�/1935, quoted in Deutscher, 1973: 20) concerning the

way questionnaires can be unreliable, a number of ‘‘ethical precepts’’ and ‘‘moral

judgments’’ are raised. Arguing that ‘‘ethical precepts’’ are ‘‘something more than

verbal professions’’, LaPiere claims that there is little point in asking questions, for

instance, about whether belief in God makes respondents less likely to commit a sin

because: ‘‘Of course it does*/on paper.’’ On the other hand, ‘‘moral attitudes’’, he

argues, cannot predict what people will do when faced with a particular situation,

while ‘‘disparities between talk and action’’ are quoted as being the ‘‘central

methodological problem of the social sciences’’ (Mills, 1940, quoted in Deutscher,

1973: 41).


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Integrity and Cop Culture

As explained earlier, a Home Office report by Miller (2003) found that ‘‘corruption’’

is difficult to define and almost impossible to quantify. In his study of professional

standards units (PSU), misconduct and whistle blowing, three types of behaviour

were identified as being of concern*/namely, ‘‘corruption’’, ‘‘other forms of police

criminality’’ and ‘‘misconduct/disciplinary offences’’ (Miller, 2003: 2). Miller’s

difficulty with defining ‘‘corruption’’ is clearly a common problem. As ‘‘morals’’,

‘‘ethics’’ and ‘‘integrity’’ are all interrelated concepts, it is difficult to make

distinctions between the terms, as other authors have explained. Furthermore, it is

always going to prove difficult to arrive at an agreement as to their meaning. In their

international study of police integrity, Klockars et al. (2003) explain that although

integrity is a problematic concept to define and describe, in practice many

professional groups with the power to make decisions, such as the police, have to

confront it. They provide six aspects of professional integrity that apply to such

groups:

Normativeness. a shared belief which is morally charged, combined with an inclination to behave

in accordance with that belief.

The Inclination to Resist. attitudes are not always predictive of behaviour as people of integrity may do

things that they know are wrong, although a requirement to be honest may cause

the adoption of a belief in the virtues of integrity.

Police as an Individual or a Group. definitions of integrity may differ when describing police as individual or a group.

Temptations. police officers work in differing environments and police misconduct that is

motivated by gain from that which is not (such as the excessive use of force for

instance).

Abuse of Office. includes accepting gifts as gestures of goodwill and using legal discretion, such as

whether or not to arrest or issue summonses to friends.

The Rights and Privileges of the Occupation. an occupation ripe for misconduct with unsupervised working, and a ‘‘code of

silence’’ to protect the corrupt. (Adapted from Klockars et al., 2003: 2�/6)

This useful categorisation by Klockars et al. will be drawn upon for the purposes of

the following discussion which uses the term ‘‘integrity’’ to refer to the way personal

morals*/sometimes called ‘‘ethics’’*/are described or put into action in professional

life in the sense that such behaviour can be described in terms of, for instance, a

disciplinary code. So an example of this is where Kleinig quotes Davis (1991) in his

discussion of the value of professionals’ moral codes in explaining that they demand

that: ‘‘Police are to treat people with courtesy and respect, to be honest and to exhibit

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integrity; they are not to use unnecessary force or act inequitably’’ (Kleinig 1996:

240).

Although defining ‘‘integrity’’ and ‘‘corruption’’ is problematic, ‘‘police culture’’ is

also an ambiguous and contested term despite Reiner’s much quoted ‘‘non

monolithic cop culture’’ explanation. He argues that their occupational culture

reflects society’s social structure and is based on danger and authority, including the

need to produce results where it ‘‘develops a set of adaptive rules, recipes, rhetoric

and rites’’ (Reiner, 2000: 88�/89). Commentators on the police from all over the

world have attempted to define and analyze all aspects of police life in terms of

occupational culture and its effect on operational behaviour. As the focus of this

article is the tension between police culture and integrity, for the purposes of the

following discussion the most relevant arguments concerning police solidarity and its

resulting ‘‘blue code’’ will be the main issue. This discussion references aspects of

police culture that refer specifically to the tensions between professional integrity and

issues of police secrecy and the blue code or curtain of silence.

Indeed, tensions mostly arise where demands or expectations of certain behaviour

is ‘‘ethical’’ or ‘‘cultural’’ but the two are in opposition such as in policing where

‘‘individual integrity and group loyalty are simultaneously expected’’ (Kleinig, 1996:

67). This obviously leads to situations such as observing a colleague’s misbehaviour

being especially problematic. So although Kleinig (1996: 69) argues that the ‘‘blue

wall of silence’’ has ‘‘gone the way of the Berlin Wall, and, particularly in an era of

community policing, police officers have become partners with the communities they

serve’’, it seems from the survey analyzed here this might not be the case. Clearly, the

pressure to produce results is one factor that leads to an ‘‘us and them’’ situation,

strengthening internal solidarity, but also inappropriate loyalties or secrecies. Newton

suggests that this is one of the main drivers in misconduct in modern police forces.

She argues that ‘‘the police are constantly involved in the thankless task of trying to

reconcile pressure from the media as the ‘voice’ of the public to do something about

rising crime’’ (Newton, 1998: 56). Internal pressures for results also exist as peer

admiration is reliant on the ‘‘product of policing’’*/namely, the arrest of suspects*/

as ‘‘the means by which the arrest is effected, even in non-violent situations, . . . is of

special relevance to individual status and sense of self ’’ (Westmarland, 2001a: 6).

So the sense of solidarity and peer approval is a strong and not altogether negative

aspect of police culture, encouraging work rate competitiveness and colleague and

individual respect and support (see Westmarland, 2000). What the Mollen

Commission (1994: 51�/52) into New York’s City Police argued, however, was that

by ‘‘setting a standard that nothing is more important than the unswerving loyalty of

officers to one another’’, corruption could flourish. Other cultural pressures that are

potentially in opposition to behaving with integrity also linked to the blue code

include a number of ‘‘postulates’’ or principles that Kappeler et al. identify from

numerous sources of police cultural theories (including Opler, 1945). Most of these

are about not ‘‘giving up another cop’’, ‘‘watching out for your partner’’, ‘‘if you get

caught off base, don’t implicate anybody else’’, ‘‘don’t look for favor just for yourself ’’,


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‘‘protect your ass’’ and ‘‘don’t trust bosses to look out for your interests’’ (Kappeler

et al., 2001: 307�/311).

On a number of levels here the tension between police culture and integrity is clear.

There are requirements to be loyal and not snitch on colleagues, not to trust the

bosses to back up the individual whistle blower and finally, the claim to a higher

abstract moral ideal even where it might be encoded in a set of professional rules. It

seems that officers in this survey knew the difference between the three forms of

corruption that Miller (2003) outlines, but the difficulties of overcoming the tensions

presented by police culture seem harder to deny. Only where direct ‘‘theft’’ or taking

for personal gain, and then particularly in the more public physical domain (such as

in the case of the speeding driver and the drinks in the bar) are these concerns

overridden. As Chan (2003) found in her study of new recruits, they were very

quickly being socialised into a culture of not telling, internal resolution and

discovering that unless the offence was considered serious enough by a wide variety

of colleagues (e.g., the case of straightforward stealing), to blow the whistle was

extremely unadvisable. Most respondents preferred to talk to a trusted immediate

supervisor rather than risk going to the authorities, such as the ombudsman.

Although her respondents did not talk about police culture unless prompted, the

reasons they gave for not reporting unethical behaviour were clearly based on

universally recognised aspects of it (Chan, 2003: Chapter 7).

Conclusions

In a discussion about police loyalties, Punch (1985: 125) argues that some officers he

interviewed felt that to discuss police deviance or to express worries about corruption

was to appear ‘‘weak’’ or ‘‘soft’’. Some officers he talked to were unclear about

whether certain gifts, such as bunch of flowers to say ‘‘thank you’’ to an individual

cop, were acceptable (Punch, 1985: 126�/127). It seems futile therefore to discuss

police professional integrity without reference to certain beliefs about solidarity and

the ‘‘blue code’’ that are embedded in their occupational culture. Police officers often

have to make the best decision they can based on what they might describe as

‘‘professional experience’’ or ‘‘gut instinct’’ (Westmarland, 2001b) rather than an

explicit code of ethics. Furthermore, once ‘‘means justifies the end’’ principles*/often

described as the ‘‘Dirty Harry’’ syndrome in police literature*/are applied, most

‘‘dubious’’ actions can often be justified by the potential outcome in police cultural

terms (Westmarland, 2000). In this survey, however, although limited by the small

sample size drawn from only one force, the findings suggest that officers view

acquisitive crime (i.e., taking money or property) as very serious and not acceptable,

even where the amounts of money are relatively small, such as in the case of the late-

serving pub, illicit speeding fine or repair shop backhanders. This is the behaviour

they would be quite likely to report. Other behaviour, such as excessive force and

bending the law to protect a drunk driving colleague, is regarded as serious, but they

would be less likely to report it than some of the larger financially rewarding corrupt

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behaviour. As argued above, this might be simply due to the internal and external

pressures of police culture and the demands for results, or some other concerns about

the level of punishment their colleagues would receive.

As explained above, the findings are limited in terms of their generalizability, but

these are all issues that need further investigation as this is the first survey in the

United Kingdom to ask these questions. Overall the respondents displayed high levels

of understanding of what professional integrity requires of them; they know the

‘‘rules’’ and have firm beliefs about some types of behaviour being ‘‘very serious’’. This

survey of officers’ attitudes towards integrity and certain types of rule infringements

provides evidence that research into the motivations behind the reporting of ‘‘very

serious’’ behaviour is needed. In effect, why acquisitively corrupt behaviours are seen

as so serious compared to actions such as assaulting a suspect or allowing a drunk

driver to go unpunished are also areas of research that could be developed from this

study. Perceptions about police officers’ acceptance of unnecessary brutality, bending

the rules by accepting small gifts or favours, seem to be reinforced by the findings

here, but the motivations, actual occurrence of such behaviour and the reasons

officers do not report others’ misdemeanours remains unanswered.

Appendix

1. How serious do YOU consider this behaviour to be?

Not at all Very

serious serious

1 2 3 4 5

2. How serious do MOST POLICE OFFICERS IN YOUR FORCE consider

this behaviour to be?

Not at all Very

serious serious

1 2 3 4 5

3. Would this behaviour be regarded as a violation of official policy in your

force?

Definitely Definitely

not yes

1 2 3 4 5

4. If an officer in your force engaged in this behaviour and was discovered

doing so, what, if any, discipline do YOU think SHOULD follow.

1. NONE 4. FINE

2. VERBAL REPRIMAND 5. DEMOTION IN RANK

3. WRITTEN REPRIMAND 6. DISMISSAL/REQUIRED TO RESIGN


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5. If an officer in your force engaged in this behaviour and was discovered

doing so, what, if any, discipline do YOU think WOULD follow.

1. NONE 4. FINE

2. VERBAL REPRIMAND 5. DEMOTION IN RANK

3. WRITTEN REPRIMAND 6. DISMISSAL/REQUIRED TO RESIGN

6. Do you think YOU would report a fellow police officer who engaged in

this behaviour?


not yes

1 2 3 4 5

7. Do you think MOST POLICE OFFICERS IN YOUR FORCE would report

a fellow police officer who engaged in this behaviour?


not yes

1 2 3 4 5

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Documents

Police Ethics and Integrity: Breaking the Blue Code of Silence