Political Warfare in Sub-Saharan Africa: U.S. Capabilities and Chinese Operations in Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, and South Africa

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POLITICAL WARFARE IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA:U.S. CAPABILITIES AND CHINESE

OPERATIONS IN ETHIOPIA, KENYA,NIGERIA, AND SOUTH AFRICA

Donovan C. Chau

March 2007

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FOREWORD

Africa today has emerged as a continent of strate-gic consequence. Domestic and international terrorismaside, the two great powers of our time, the UnitedStates and the Peoples Republic of China (PRC), arevying for inuence over African governments andpeople. Not unlike the Cold War, the primary means ofexerting inuence in Africa is through the use of non-violent instruments of grand strategy.

In this monograph, Dr. Donovan Chau considers onenonviolent instrument of grand strategy in particular,political warfare. Retracing the origins and mischarac-terizations of political warfare, Dr. Chau suggests thatthe PRC has used political warfare as its leading grandstrategic instrument in Africa. The monograph offers a

concise, detailed overview of U.S. capabilities to con-duct political warfare in Africa. It then examines PRCpolitical warfare operations in four regional anchorstatesEthiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, and South Africa.

What emerges from Dr. Chaus analyses is the Chi-nese use of political warfare intentionally targetingU.S. interests in Africa. Unless the U.S. Governmentrecognizes the utility of political warfare and reorientsthe federal bureaucracy to employ it effectively, he in-timates that future U.S. inuence in Africa will waneto the benet of a country that understands politicalwarfare and uses it seriously.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.DirectorStrategic Studies Institute


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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

DONOVAN C. CHAU is an Adjunct Faculty memberand member of the University graduate faculty in theDepartment of Defense and Strategic Studies, MissouriState University. He was a Subject Matter Expert in theCounter-Terrorism and Preparedness Solutions Divi-sion of AMTI, An Operation of SAIC. Dr. Chau washired by AMTI as the area specialist responsible for su-pervising and conducting research on terrorist threatsin and emanating from the continent of Africa. In thiscapacity, he was a lead author for the Department ofHomeland Securitys Universal Adversary programand the National Planning Scenarios. Prior to joiningAMTI, Dr. Chau was a Professional Staff Member onthe Committee on Homeland Security, U.S. House of

Representatives. He conducted policy oversight aswell as research and analysis on border and transpor-tation security issues. In addition, he worked directlywith the Committee Staff Director to write, coordinate,and edit Committee Chairman Christopher Coxs re-port, Freedom Defended: Implementing AmericasStrategy for Homeland Security. Dr. Chau earned aDoctorate of Philosophy in Politics and InternationalRelations from the University of Reading (UnitedKingdom). Under the supervision of Dr. Colin S. Gray,he wrote a dissertation entitled Grand Strategy intoAfrica: Communist Chinas Use of Political Warfare,1955-1976. He earned an M. S. in Defense and Strate-gic Studies from Missouri State University and a B.A.in Literature/Government from Claremont McKenna

College.


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SUMMARY

Today, as in the past, the Peoples Republic of Chi-na (PRC) exerts inuence on the African continent.Unlike the United States, which also attempts to swayAfrican nations and people, the PRC uses an instru-ment of grand strategy called political warfare as itsprimary means of inuence. What is political warfare,and how is it being employed in Africa today? Howdo U.S. capabilities compare to PRC operations andcapabilities in Africa? The monograph answers theseand other questions to inform the current national se-curity debate among U.S. policy and decisionmakers.For while the struggle against international terrorismwill continue indenitely, the U.S. Government mustnot overlook other grand strategic challenges currently

taking place around the world.The monograph explains political warfare in its

historic context and offers a current denition. Simply,political warfare is a nonviolent instrument of grandstrategy, involves coordinated activities, and resultsin tangible effects on intended targets. In operationalterms, political warfare includes economic aid and de-velopment assistance, as well as training, equipping,and arming military and security forces. Exchange vis-its and public pronouncements are secondary politicalwarfare operations, supporting and facilitating prima-ry operations. Political warfare offers distinct advan-tages to other instruments of grand strategy, making ita desirable means of exerting inuence. Vis--vis otherinstrumentsparticularly military powerpolitical

warfare is economical. Though results may not appearimmediately, using political warfare has grand strate-gic benets, from information-gathering to relation-


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ship-building. Moreover, political warfare may poten-tially garner prestige and a positive reputation around

the world.The U.S. Government possesses numerous political

warfare capabilities, though they may not be viewed assuch. From the U.S. Army and other armed services tothe State Department and the Agency for InternationalDevelopment, U.S. capabilities exist but are not beingused to their full potential or in a coordinated manner.Meanwhile, another country is intentionally targetingU.S. policy in Africa through the use of political war-fare.

Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, and South Africa are con-sidered regional anchor states according to U.S. na-tional security policy. Since 2000, the PRC has expand-ed political warfare operations in these four countries.The monograph examines PRC political warfare op-

erations in each country. The rst case highlights how the PRC used po-

litical warfare to gain access to and develop op-portunities in Ethiopia. Using donations to theEthiopian government and people as well as tothe African Union (and its predecessor), Beijingattained government contracts, signed agree-

ments, and cultivated bilateral relations. The PRC used political warfare to move rela-

tions with Kenya to a higher level. PRC opera-tions expanded Chinas reach into the informa-tion, education, and infrastructure developmentareas of Kenya.

PRC operations were diverse and directed at

inuencing the people and government of Ni-geria, particularly state governments. PRC po-litical warfare operations affected all aspects of


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Nigerian society, furthering PRC interests inthe country.

Gaining South Africas allegiance had the ben-et of weakening Taiwans global diplomaticstatus, which was part and parcel of the pri-mary objective of Chinese grand strategy. PRCoperations in South Africa were used to attaincooperation in technical and scientic elds.

Comparing PRC operations and U.S. capabilities,the monograph underscores the lack of political war-fare in Americas current grand strategy. Educatingand deploying the U.S. military to conduct politicalwarfare in Africa is an immediate, short-term solution.In the long term, however, a civilian U.S. Governmentagency must lead the political warfare charge abroad.This will require political leadership as well as prudentpolicy. Most importantly, national security policy anddecisionmakers must come to the realization that howoperations are conducted is as important as what op-erations are performed


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POLITICAL WARFARE IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA:U.S. CAPABILITIES AND CHINESE

OPERATIONS IN ETHIOPIA, KENYA,NIGERIA, AND SOUTH AFRICA

Introduction.

In October 2005, U.S. Naval Mobile ConstructionBattalion THREE began rebuilding and construct-ing water wells in Ethiopia. Being in a place like thiswhere water is so hard to come by and knowing weregiving people water whove never had water before. . . this is a really rewarding mission to be on, saidSteel Worker Third Class Jared M. Perry.1 That samemonth, U.S. troops on patrol nearby discovered twocheetah cubs tied up with ropes around their necks at

a restaurant, where the cubs were forced to ght eachother for the amusement of patrons and village chil-dren. The soldiers alerted the Ethiopian government,the U.S. Embassy in Ethiopia, and a U.S.-based cheetahrescue organization, eventually ying the two cubs tothe National Palace in Addis Ababa. This is the rstkind of rescue of animals, let alone cheetahs, that wehave done, said Army Sgt. Leah Cobble.2 The follow-ing month, a U.S. Army Civil Affairs team held a 3-dayclinic to treat the sick from six villages surroundingGode, Ethiopia. We treated everything from minorinjuries such as cuts to severe long-term injuries, saidArmy Staff Sgt. John Dominguez, a civil affairs med-ic.3

Meanwhile, about the same time west across the

African continent, it was reported that the Peoples Re-public of China (the PRC or Beijing) would help Nigeriadrill 598 boreholes in Nigerias capital, Abuja, as well


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as 18 statesall as a free aid project. The free watersupply project was aimed at providing clean drink-

able water to ordinary Nigerians living in out-of-the-way areas, said PRC Ambassador to Nigeria WangYongqiu.4 Nigerian Minister of Water Resources AlhajiMuktar Shagari later remarked, the project is a typicalexample of bilateral cooperation between Nigeria andthe PRC, and appealed to other countries to learn fromChina.5 Also in October 2005, it was reported that Bei-jing donated $3 million worth of military equipment toNigeria. The equipment included two special vehicles,emergency runway systems, bullet proof helmets andvests, communication gadgets, computers, uniformsand diving devices.6 Ambassador to Nigeria Wanglater mentioned that 21 Chinese experts would ar-rive in Nigeria in November to train Nigerian soldierson how to use the equipment.7

What do these actions by the United States and PRCgovernments mean, and why are they relevant today?These events in two strategically-located countriesin East and West Africa are examples of governmen-tal efforts to conduct an instrument of grand strategycalled political warfare.8 Both the United States and thePRC were using nonviolent means in a coordinated (orsemi-coordinated) manner to directly affect the tar-geted population. They were using political warfare toachieve their national objectives. But what is politicalwarfare, and why is this instrument of grand strategybeing used by two of the worlds dominant powers onthe African continent today?

Political Warfare: What It Was and What It Is.

The term political warfare was rst used by theBritish during World War II.9 During the war, theBritish established the Political Warfare Executive to


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help defeat Nazi Germany. The Executives primarymission was the creation and dissemination of propa-

ganda, particularly beyond enemy lines.10

In modernparlance, the British have continued to dene politi-cal warfare as overt and covert forms of informationmanagement.11 At the conclusion of the war, the Brit-ish government disbanded the Political Warfare Exec-utivethe term and concept falling into disuse.

Across the Atlantic Ocean after the war, GeorgeKennan, head of the newly established State Depart-ment Policy Planning Staff, attempted to invigoratethe post-war U.S. Government with a paper concern-ing the inauguration of organized political warfare.12Although his attempt to codify political warfare intothe U.S. national security establishment ultimatelyfailed, Kennan offers a sound basis from which to de-ne political warfare and understand its utility to the

United States.13

In his State Department Policy Plan-ning Staff memorandum, Kennan drew on the Britishexperience in World War II to dene political warfare.In broadest denition, Kennan wrote, political war-fare is the employment of all the means at a nationscommand, short of war, to achieve its national objec-tives.14 Kennan made a distinction between overt andcovert types of political warfare. Moreover, he con-sidered overt operations the traditional policy activi-ties of any foreign ofce enjoying positive leadership,whether or not they are recognized as political war-fare.15 Unlike any American policymakers before him,Kennan advocated the use of this instrument of grandstrategy.

From Kennans memorandum, three signicant

concepts relevant to a sound denition of political war-fare may be deduced. First, political warfare, accordingto Kennan, was an instrument of grand strategy thatinvolved all the means of a nation-state, short of war.


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While broadly applicable, this concept implies the util-ity of all nonviolent instruments of grand strategy, as

well as the utility of coordinating them together. Sec-ond, Kennans denition of political warfare states ex-plicitly that this instrument is used to achieve nationalobjectives. This concept may appear self-evidentbe-ing an instrument of grand strategybut it is crucialto understanding political warfares ultimate aim. Fi-nally, Kennan mentions in passing the importance ofpositive leadership in a foreign ofces traditionalpolicy activities. He may have been simply suggestingthe importance of leadership in foreign affairs. At thesame time, one may interpret positive leadership tomean the ability to connect meansas wholeto ends,which is political warfare at its best.

A clear, concise, and contemporary denition ofpolitical warfare is neededfor this study and for U.S.

national security today. Based on past denitions anduses, political warfare is an instrument of grand strat-egy. The purpose of political warfare is determined byan actors objectivesits intent. Any actor with the ca-pabilities and intentions may employ political warfareas an instrument of grand strategy. And the use of po-litical warfare is not conned by an actors specic cul-ture. Used by state or nonstate actors, political warfaretargets groups and individuals.16 Overt or covert, it isa nonviolent instrument of grand strategy comprisinginterrelated activities that are tangible (or, at least, au-dible or legible).17 Therefore, the mind and the bodyare both targets; and political warfare operations oftenhave a direct effect on peoples lives. Therefore, opera-tions include targeted economic aid, development proj-

ects, exchange visits, and public pronouncements, aswell as the training, arming, and equipping of militaryor security forces.18 While nonviolent, political warfare


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operations may sometimes support or result in violentactivities. In order to be effective, political warfare op-

erations must be based on detailed, factual informa-tion about the targeted group, including knowledge ofpeoples and cultures.19

To summarize, political warfare is a nonviolentinstrument of grand strategy, involves coordinatedactivities, and results in tangible effects on intendedtargets.20 Primary political warfare operations includeeconomic aid; development assistance; and training,equipping, and arming military and security forces.Exchange visits and public pronouncements are sec-ondary political warfare operations because they sup-port and facilitate primary operations. Political warfareoffers distinct advantages over other instruments ofgrand strategy. Vis--vis other instrumentsparticu-larly military powerpolitical warfare is economical;

it does not require a vast amount of nancial resourc-es and, thus, may be readily used around the world.Though results may not appear immediately, usingpolitical warfare has grand strategic benets, from in-formation gathering (to understand different peoplesand cultures) to relationship building (to prevent fu-ture conict). Political warfare, if used appropriately,may potentially result in much-needed prestige and apositive reputation around the world, which is dif-cult to gain and even more difcult to preserve.21 Thesebenets help explain why political warfare is currentlybeing used by the United States and the PRC in Africa,and why understanding it is vital for the U.S. military,policymakers, and Congress.

Monograph Scope.

This monograph examines Beijings use of politicalwarfare on the African continent.22 The central ques-


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tion asks: to what extent has the PRC achieved the cen-tral objective of its grand strategy in Africa. The PRC

is examined because of todays lack of sound grandstrategic analyses of Beijings actions, particularly inAfrica. Since early 2004, attention has been paid tothe PRCs involvement in Africa. While some analystshave focused narrowly on PRC interests in raw ma-terials (hydrocarbons, in particular), others have rec-ognized Beijings broader interests on the continent.23As in the past, the PRC has continued to emphasize itshistoric ties, shared common experiences, and peacefulcooperative relations with African nations.24 Also as inthe past, however, Western assessments of PRC opera-tions in Africa have been awed. U.S. intelligence ana-lysts, policymakers, and senior diplomats have citedBeijings recent increased interest and engagementin the region and identied its objective of attaining

status as a major player on the world stage.25

How-ever, their commentaries have demonstrated a generallack of knowledge and understanding pertaining to thePRCs grand strategy. This monograph will provide acurrent assessment of PRC actions in Africa based onrecent historical evidence and an understanding of anessential instrument of PRC grand strategy, politicalwarfare.

Because Beijing is currently operating (or has oper-ated) in nearly every country on the African continent,it is beyond the scope of this monograph to examine allof its operations in detail. Instead, Beijings use of po-litical warfare will be highlighted in four sub-SaharanAfrican countries: Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, and SouthAfrica. These countries were chosen due to their impor-

tance to U.S. policy in Africa. As the 2002 National Se-curity Strategy stated, [C]ountries with major impacton their neighborhood such as South Africa, Nigeria,


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Kenya, and Ethiopia are anchors for regional engage-ment and require focused attention. . . .26 Based on

historical relations, the United States has maintainedclose ties with these countries. Examining the PRCsoperations in these four African anchor states willreveal the extent to which it has intentionally targetedU.S. Africa policy in addition to furthering its grandstrategic objectives. While it will be necessary to drawfrom historical bilateral relations, the focus of this se-lective study will be on Beijings 21st century politicalwarfare operations in the four African anchor statesEthiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, and South Africa.27

In addition to examining Beijings use of politicalwarfare in Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, and South Africa,the monograph will provide an overview of U.S. po-litical warfare capabilities in Africa. This overview willserve as a comparative reference point vis--vis PRC

operations and will enlighten analysts, policymakers,and diplomats on some of the political warfare capa-bilities of the U.S. Government. Therefore, with a focuson the four anchor states, U.S. political warfare capa-bilities will be highlighted before examining the PRCscentral objective and its operations. The concludingchapter will answer the central research question,compare the PRCs capabilities with U.S. capabilities,and offer policy recommendations to the U.S. Army,Department of Defense (DoD), and the U.S. nationalsecurity establishment.

U.S. Political Warfare Capabilities in Africa:An Initial Assessment.

This section provides an overview of U.S. politicalwarfare capabilities on the African continent.28 The fo-cus is on U.S. Government organizations and agencies


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that have the ability to provide economic aid and de-velopment assistance, as well as to train, equip, and

arm military and security forces. Secondarily, orga-nizations and agencies that conduct exchange visitsand make public pronouncements will be mentionedas they pertain to supporting political warfare opera-tions. U.S. nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)with political warfare capabilities will be included inthis overview as well. When assessing U.S. politicalwarfare capabilities, it is necessary to discuss the agen-cy or organizations missions and roles, in addition toproviding concrete examples of operations. The break-down of U.S. political warfare capabilities necessarilyvaries by contextdependent on the country and therequirements of U.S. foreign policy, as well as the pur-pose and functions of the organizations. Moreover, it iscrucial to bear in mind the various competing interests

among U.S. Government organizations and agencies ineach country.29 It will become evident that the UnitedStates possesses a robust (but latent) political warfarecapability across the African continent.

The U.S. military possesses many political warfarecapabilities, though they may not be viewed as such.The U.S. military conducts primary and secondary po-litical warfare operations. It conducts operations onthe African continent through three combatant com-mands: U.S. European Command (EUCOM), U.S. Cen-tral Command (CENTCOM), and U.S. Pacic Com-mand (PACOM).30 Directed by the President throughthe Secretary of Defense, the authority and resourcesto conduct political warfare lie in the hands of the com-batant commanders (COCOMs). COCOMs oversee

and coordinate overall operations within their areas ofresponsibilities.

The U.S. Army has a wide range of political warfarecapabilities that have been used in Africa. At the fore-


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front of these capabilities in Africa is the 3rd SpecialForces Group, U.S. Army Special Forces Command.

Special Forces political warfare capabilities includeForeign Internal Defense, as well as collateral activi-ties such as humanitarian assistance and de-mining. In2000, for example, 3rd Special Forces Group trained twoNigerian battalions in peacekeeping duties for UnitedNations (UN) initiatives in West AfricaSierra Leone,in particular. Nigeria was also given $42 million inmilitary hardware, including ries, mortars, machineguns and ammunition, as well as vehicles and medicaland communications gear.31 Another element of ArmySpecial Operations Command that conducts politicalwarfare in Africa is the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion,U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological OperationsCommand. Working with civil authorities and civilianpopulations, the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion conducts

a multitude of political warfare missions from locat-ing civil resources to support military operations toestablishing and maintaining liaison with civilian aidagencies and civilian commercial and private organi-zations.32 Together, 3rd Special Forces Group and the96th Civil Affairs Battalion represent the most activeand versatile political warfare capabilities within theArmy.

The Army also possesses unique political warfarecapabilities outside of the Special Forces community.Within U.S. Army Europe/Seventh Army, EUCOMsArmy resources, support elements, and medical pro-fessionalssuch as the 30th Medical Brigadehaveconducted political warfare operations in Africa. In2002, a team of U.S. soldiers (including a civil affairs

unit and professionals from the 30th Medical Brigade)helped destroy and dispose of thousands of unexplod-ed ordnance pieces in Nigeria.33 In addition to theater


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resources, the Army possesses a range of multi-missionforces that have the ability to conduct political warfare

in Africa. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers has valu-able construction capabilities that could be leveragedacross Africa. The Armys Security Assistance Train-ing Management Organization (SATMO) also providesa wide spectrum of training and technical assistancethat falls within the realm of political warfare. Thoughwidely unrecognized, SATMO has deployed securityassistance teams to all four anchor states in Africa overthe past 20 years.34

The Army Reserve and State National Guardsplay signicant political warfare roles in Africa. Forexample, in September 2004, military equipment andpersonnel from the New York Air National Guardparticipated in a South African air show. The NewYork National Guard is partnered with South Africa

through the State Partnership Program (SPP), a reservecomponent initiative that aligns U.S.-based Guard andReserve units with militaries of other nations to en-hance professional relationships and mutual under-standing amongst the participating nations.35 Estab-lished by the National Guard Bureau in 1993, the SPPfosters economic, political, and military ties betweenU.S. states and partner nations. It does so using a three-tiered approach to build military-to-military, military-to-civil, and civil-to-civil relations. This simultaneousapproach is designed to evolve from strictly militaryrelations to robust civilian interactions.36 By buildingrelationships in an all-around fashion, the SPP is oneof the U.S. Governments key political warfare mecha-nisms.

The U.S. Navy and Marine Corps also have demon-strated political warfare capabilities in Africa. U.S. Na-val Forces Europe/U.S. Sixth Fleet has long been active


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along the Atlantic Ocean seaboard of the African conti-nent. Since 1978, the Sixth Fleet has deployed ships on

regularly scheduled West African training missions. In2005, for example, the USS Emory S. Land (AS 39) par-ticipated in a Gulf of Guinea deployment. The pur-pose of the deployment is to enhance security coopera-tion between the U.S. and participating Gulf of Guineanations by providing the opportunity to interact andimprove familiarization with how we operate in real-world environments, said Vice Adm. Harry Ulrich,Commander, U.S. Sixth Fleet.37 The U.S. Naval Con-struction Forcepopularly known as the Seabeesisanother political warfare capability within the U.S.Navy. For example, Naval Mobile Construction Battal-ion THREE and Underwater Construction Team ONEcompleted the Manda Bay boat ramp project in March2006, which allowed the Kenyan Navy smoother ac-

cess to patrols along coastal and international waters.The Kenyan Navy and surrounding communities willbenet greatly from this ramp, said Major General P.O. Awitta, commander of the Kenyan Navy. Werevery thankful to the coalition for helping us completethis important project, which will enhance our trainingand capabilities in the region.38 Marine Corps SpecialOperations Command (MARSOC) was established in2006, adding nearly 2,600 personnel to U.S. SpecialOperations Commands total end strength. Like ArmySpecial Forces, MARSOC possesses a valuable politi-cal warfare capability in its Foreign Military TrainingUnit.39

The U.S. Air Force also possesses political war-fare capabilities. With responsibility for Sub-Saharan

Africa, U.S. Air Forces in Europe has sent personneland equipment to Africa. In 2004, for example, over500 U.S. and South African military doctors, dentists,


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technicians, and support personnel participated in amilitary medical exercise known as MEDFLAG. Ini-

tiated in 1987 between EUCOM and various Africannations, MEDFLAG exercises offer the chance to con-duct health care and disaster relief training and to pro-vide rare medical and dental care to the local Africanpopulations.40 Like the Army, the Air Force possessesa range of political warfare capabilities within its sup-port units.

Finally, various multi-service components of theU.S. military possess political warfare capabilities.Some of these componentslike Special OperationsCommand Europehave overlapping resources andcapabilities within the services. Others, like Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), aresemi-autonomous entities that draw from the variousservices and COCOMs to conduct political warfare ac-

tivities. Established in June 2002, CJTF-HOA is uniqueamong U.S. military political warfare capabilities be-cause of its stated post-September 11, 2001, mission:to wage peace across the region, to deny the enemya safe haven, to increase the capacity of host nationsto provide services for their people and combat terror-ism.41

Outside of the U.S. military, a civilian political war-fare organization within the U.S. Government is the De-partment of State. U.S. embassies represent sovereignU.S. territory abroad. In the four sub-Saharan Africannations examined in this monograph, this is certainlythe case. U.S. embassies represent U.S. policy as direct-ed by the White House through the Chief of Mission.Operating on annual timelines, political warfare capa-

bilities of U.S. embassies vary from country to country.For example, U.S. Embassy Addis Ababa, Ethiopia,dispersed grants to expand classrooms in Amhara, to


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purchase and install a grinding mill in Gambella, toconstruct antenatal, delivery, and postnatal wards at

a health center in Oromiya, and to discourage femalegenital cutting in the Somali region, while U.S. Em-bassy Abuja, Nigeria, provided a collection of books,CD-ROMs, and magazines on American history, litera-ture, education, culture and law, as well as educationaladvising materials as part of the American CornerKaduna.42 The State Department also provides foreignassistance through various funding mechanisms suchas International Narcotics Control and Law Enforce-ment (INCLE) and Non-proliferation, Anti-terrorism,Demining, and Related Programs (NADR). The pro-grams and initiatives from these mechanisms providevarious forms of training, equipment, and technicalassistance, which may be categorized as political war-fare.43

In contrast to its foreign ofces, the State Depart-ment has ofces in Washington, DC, that perform po-litical warfare as well. These include the Ofce of theUnder Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Af-fairs, which is charged with formulating a policy forrepresenting the United States abroad. Two organiza-tions that directly support this effort are the Bureauof Educational and Cultural Affairs (ECA) and theBureau of International Information Programs (IIP).ECAs mission is to foster mutual understanding be-tween the people of the United States and the peopleof other countries around the world, while IIP in-forms, engages, and inuences international audiencesabout U.S. policy and society to advance Americas in-terests.44 More recently, the Ofce of the Coordinator

for Reconstruction and Stabilization was established in2004 to work across the U.S. Government and withthe world community to anticipate state failure, avert it


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when possible, and help post-conict states lay a foun-dation for lasting peace, good governance and sustain-

able development.45

In some respects, this ofce wasintended to act as a coordinator of political warfareoperations. The State Department, while ideally posi-tioned within the federal bureaucracy to lead and coor-dinate such activities, conducts mostly secondaryorsupportingpolitical warfare operations.46

The U.S. Agency for International Development(AID) is the leading non-military political warfare or-ganization within the U.S. Government. Established in1962, AID has provided disaster assistance aid, helpedalleviate poverty, and engaged in global democratic re-forms. AIDs focus has evolvedfrom a basic needsapproach in the 1970s to stabilization and restructur-ing in the 1980s to greater attention on failing statesnow and greater responsibility for developing nations

(e.g., through the Millennium Challenge Account,MCA, and the Presidents Emergency Plan for AIDSRelief, PEPFAR).47 Throughout its history, AIDs eldofces (or missions) have represented the strength ofthis political warfare organization. Like U.S. embassies,the priorities of AID eld ofces vary from country tocountry. For example, the mission in Kenya focuseson goals such as raising the living standards of thepoor, helping to prevent the spread of HIV/AIDS,and fostering better management of Kenyas naturalresources.48 The mission in South Africa, on the otherhand, identied sustainable transformation as theofces overall goal.49 Field ofces formulate multi-year (often 4 years) strategic plans based on in-depth,in-country research and analysis. In this manner, AID

shares similar qualities with the military; both are in-terested in the realities on the ground. By the same to-ken, AID and the military can be considered do-ers;


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rather than being response driven, both organizationsfocus much of their attention on prevention.50 In Octo-

ber 2005, the similarities between these organizationsled to the establishment of the Ofce of Military Af-fairs within AID. Based in Washington, DC, this ofceis intended to function as a focal point for AID rela-tions with the military, among its various tasks.51

Finally, within the U.S. Government, various agen-cies with interests abroad perform political warfare-like functions. While these agencies pursue their agen-cy responsibilities abroad, they serve in each countryat the behest of the chief of mission, who ostensiblyretains overall authority for all ofcial U.S. Govern-ment activities within the country.52 Organizationssuch as the Peace Corps have long had interests insending volunteers abroad to assist targeted coun-triesfor example, in Kenya where key areas include

economic and small business development, education,and public health; and in South Africa, where volun-teers provide advice on computer use and technology,classroom management, and English, math, and sci-ence lesson plan development.53 The Peace Corps canbe considered a political warfare organization. Simi-larly, the various agencies within the U.S. IntelligenceCommunity (IC) also maintain a strong internationalpresence, though not directly related to political war-fare.54 Other U.S. agencies, such as the Departments ofAgriculture, Health and Human Services, and Justiceplay specialized political warfare in terms of devel-opment and health projects, as well as the training offoreign security forces.55 Most recently, the 2003 estab-lishment of the Department of Homeland Security cre-

ated a large bureaucratic organization with interestsabroad. Again, however, this organization only playsan indirect role in political warfare operations vis--visthe U.S. military and AID.


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Outside of the U.S. Government, several U.S. non-government organizatiions (NGOs) conduct political

warfare operations in Africa. NGO missions rangefrom emergency relief services that assist people af-icted by conict or disaster to sustainable communitydevelopment projects that integrate agriculture, health,housing and infrastructure, economic development,education and environment, and local management.While some are faith-based organizations, U.S. NGOsreceive funding from public and private donations andgrantsincluding funds from the U.S. Government.Thus, NGOs warrant mentioning in this examinationof U.S. political warfare capabilities in Africa.

Founded in 1970, Africare is a leading U.S. NGO thatprovides aid to Africa; it also is one of the oldest andlargest African-American organizations specializing inAfrican aid. A pioneer in village-based rural develop-

ment in Africa, Africares programs address needs inthe principal areas of food security and agriculture, aswell as health and HIV/AIDS. Africare also supportswater resource development, environmental manage-ment, basic education, microenterprise development,governance initiatives, and emergency humanitarianaid. Africares ve principal areasfood, water, theenvironment, health, and emergency humanitarianaidfall under the rubric of political warfare opera-tions.

Catholic Relief Services (CRS) was founded in 1943by the Catholic Bishops of the United States to assistthe poor and disadvantaged outside the United States.While policies and programs of the agency reect andexpress the teaching of the Catholic Church, CRS as-

sists persons ostensibly on the basis of need, not creed,race, or nationality. Some of CRSs programs that canbe considered political warfare involve agriculture,


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HIV/AIDS, community health, education, and emer-gency response. An example of CRS operations oc-

curred after violence erupted in the northern Nigeriancity of Kano. In 2004, CRS responded to the violence byproviding affected families with basic nonfood itemsthat were lost or destroyed during the crisis, as wellas food distributions to help cover the anticipated 2-month hunger period.56

Another U.S. NGO is Mercy Corps. Founded in1979, Mercy Corps was among the rst humanitar-ian groups to use relief and development programs tostrengthen civil society. In Africa, Mercy Corps is work-ing with agro-pastoralists in the West Hararge Zone ofEthiopia to support recovery from drought and fosterways to minimize the effects of future crises. The WestHararge Livestock Program will benet 75,000 peopleby vaccinating over 200,000 head of cattle and camels

against several livestock diseases.57

The program willalso establish a plant nursery to grow improved stocksof forage for livestock and provide two new veteri-nary clinics to develop better preventative animal care.Mercy Corps is known nationally and internationallyfor its quick-response, high-impact programs.

The U.S. Government and NGOs have operated onthe African continent for centuries. Between the late18th and early 19th centuries, the United States wasembroiled in a conict with Barbary pirates and NorthAfrican authorities, which led to the establishmentof the U.S. Navy and the freedom of seas principle.58Throughout the 19th century, the American Coloniza-tion Society sent free African-Americans to Africa asan alternative to emancipation in the United States.

The society established a colony in West Africa in 1822;this colony became the independent nation of Liberiain 1847.59 Nevertheless, Robert Kaplan has asserted,


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Despite what African rulers say, the lack of an impe-rial tradition in the United States has hindered, rather

than helped, its ability to be a force for positive changein Africa.60 In contrast, however, a nation with an im-perial tradition that is operating in Africa today is thePRC, whose ties to the African continent date back asearly as the 15th century.61

The PRC in Africa: History and Objectives.62

The Peoples Republic of China became engaged inAfrica issues as early as 1955.63 At the Bandung Con-ference on Afro-Asian solidarity, delegates from Egyptintroduced the PRC to the independence struggle inFrench Algeria.64 From that point forward, the PRCprovided support for Algerian independence andused Cairo as a central node from which to conduct

operations around the continent.65

From the very be-ginning, Beijings operations were multifaceted, fromfriendship tours to economic assistance to weaponstransfers. The PRCs relations with Africa were alwaysmore than support for revolutionary movements andmore than an ideological struggle with Soviet Union.66Throughout this period, Beijings relations with Africawere based on the central objective of its grand strat-egy. And its central objective in Africa was part andparcel of its central objective globally. Examining paststatements and analyses reveals the continuity of thePRCs central objective.67

Chairman Mao Tse-tung delivered a speech at thePreparatory Committee Meeting of the Chinese Peo-ples Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) that

stated in plain terms the central objective of the forth-coming Peoples Republic; though pronounced overa half-century ago, this statement encapsulates accu-


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rately the central objective of the PRCs current grandstrategy. On June 15, 1949, Mao said, We will build

up an entirely new, strong, and prosperous PeoplesDemocratic Republic of China, not only in name but infact.68 This was a clear statement of Beijings central,grand strategic objective. Eleven years later, SinologistHoward L. Boorman assessed the PRCs central objec-tive along similar lines: Internationally, revitalizedChinese national power, under Communist control,has signaled Pekings primary foreign-policy goal:recognized status as a major world power on its ownterms.69 Boormans analysis was later echoed in themainstream media: Chinas long-run objective is tobecome the most important power on this planet tocorrespond with the fact that it has the largest popu-lation of any nation.70 While these words may seemdated, the PRCs central aims remain the same.

Since the mid-1980s, Chinese security analystshave debated the future security environment andtheir countrys role within it.71 This has had an indirectbearing on Beijings central objective. One of the majorthemes that emerged was a trend toward a multipo-lar world after a period of turbulence and transition.The PRC, it has been debated, will emerge as one ofthe poles.72 This view of the world reafrms previousanalyses that the PRC desires to become a major worldpower on its own terms. Beijings 1998 National De-fense white paper was even more explicit in identify-ing its central objective. Mankind is about to enterthe 21st century of its history. It is the aspiration of theChinese government and people to lead a peaceful,stable and prosperous world into the new century.73

Beijing released a White Paper entitled Chinas Peace-ful Development Road in December 2005. In it, the PRCidentied its goal for the rst 20 years of the century:


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to build a moderately well-off society in an all-roundway that benets over one billion people, further de-

velop Chinas economy, improve democracy, advancescience and education, enrich culture, foster greater so-cial harmony and upgrade the quality of life of the Chi-nese people.74 A month later, Beijing released its rstofcial government paper on its policy toward Africa.The paper stated, China, the largest developing coun-try in the world, follows the path of peaceful devel-opment and pursues an independent foreign policy ofpeace.75 The goal of building a moderately well-offsociety in an all-round way and the independentforeign policy being pursued by the PRC today havethe same central objective as enunciated by Mao in1949to achieve great power status.

The central aim of the PRCs grand strategy is to be-come a global power, restructuring the world order

including the African continentto achieve this objec-tive. It seeks to wield the inuence of a global power,receiving the concomitant favors and privileges asso-ciated therewithincluding freedom of action, accessto natural resources, and respected authority aroundthe world. While other interestsincluding diminish-ing Taiwans diplomatic presence worldwide as wellas seeking greater access to raw materials and energyresources worldwideno doubt play some role in thePRCs grand strategy, they are too often overempha-sized at the expense of recognizing Beijings primaryobjective of becoming a global power.76 Furthermore,these secondary interestssome of the favors andprivileges associated with being a global powermaybe subsumed under the PRCs primary objective. Un-

derstanding its central objective and viewing its opera-tions in a grand strategic context, therefore, Beijingsrecent operations in Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, and


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South Africa demonstrate continuity with past objec-tivesnot a renewed or drastically divergent focus on

the continentand a continuation of the use of politi-cal warfare as an essential instrument of grand strat-egy. How successful has the PRC been in achieving itscentral objective? We begin by examining PRC politi-cal warfare operations in two Horn of Africa countries.Each case highlights PRC political warfare operations,followed by discussions of PRC gains in each country.

In-Roads: PRC Political Warfare Operationsin Ethiopia.

The PRC established diplomatic relations withEthiopia in 1970. Cultural contact between the twocountries, however, predated the formal establishmentof diplomatic relations when an Ethiopian music and

dance group rst visited Beijing in 1960.77

Bilateral re-lations between the two countries were limited untilthe mid-1990s. Reciprocal high-level visits by PrimeMinister Meles Zenawi and President Jiang Zemin oc-curred in 1995 and 1996. This led to a series of agree-ments between the two countries, including the PRCprovision of free assistance to Ethiopia for a period of 5years (June 1, 1996, to May 31, 2001). Agreements alsoencouraged the establishment of cooperation projectsand service centers in order to facilitate the develop-ment of trade, economic and technical cooperation,and exchanges between the two countries; advocatedexchanging and training necessary technical personnelto implement the agreed upon cooperation projects;and promoted holding exhibitions and fairs in each

country.78 Using this comprehensive agreement as aspringboard, the PRC used political warfare to gain ac-cess to and inuence Ethiopia.


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In December 1999, the PRC donated $100,000 tothe Organization of African Unity (OAU, predeces-

sor to the African Union) peace fund. PRC Ambas-sador to Ethiopia Jiang Zhenyun recalled that Beijinghad always admired Africas efforts in their liberationstruggles and pledged his countrys full support tothe OAUs endeavors to solve African problems withAfricans themselves.79 Similarly, the PRC donated an-other $200,000 to the OAU peace fund in April 2000.Ambassador to Ethiopia Jiang handed over the moneyto OAU Secretary General Salim Ahmed Salim in Ad-dis Ababa, saying his government attached great im-portance to the role of the OAU in maintaining peaceand stability on the continent.80 By providing the OAU,headquartered in Ethiopia, free funds, the PRC dem-onstrated a commitment to peace and security in Ethi-opia and, more broadly, in Africa as a whole. Next, the

PRC turned directly to the Ethiopian government andpeople.

In April 2000, the PRC donated $200,000 to Ethio-pia to support the countrys effort to save millions ofpeople facing starvation due to prolonged drought.Ambassador to Ethiopia Jiang stressed that the do-nation reected the goodwill of the Chinese peopletowards the Ethiopian people.81 In October 2000, thePRC donated ofce equipment worth $24,000 to theEthiopian Ministry of Information and Culture on theeve of the 30th anniversary of the establishment of dip-lomatic relations between the two countries. The ofceequipment included computers, printers, and televi-sion sets. This PRC donation was the fourth of its kindto the Ethiopian Ministry of Information and Culture.82

Beijing, by providing free nancial contributions at op-portune times, used political warfare to demonstrateChinese support for the Ethiopian people and possiblygain benets in the future.


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In October 2000, a low-cost housing project, aidedby the PRC government and completed by Chinese

constructor workers, was delivered to the Addis Aba-ba city government. The project, with the rst phaseconsisting of ve blocks, was implemented under thegrant of the Chinese government in accordance withthe Exchange of Letters signed by the governmentsof China and Ethiopia in October 1997. The houses,which could accommodate a total of 85 families, wentinto construction in June 1999 and were completed inAugust 2000.83 Using government funds and a state-owned construction rm, this was a tangible exampleof PRC support to the people of Addis Ababa. Yet thePRC continued to use political warfare to gain a favor-able impression.

In December 2001, the PRC donated deminingequipment worth more than $100,000 to the Ethiopian

government. The donation of the equipment was partof an international demining cooperation program, ac-cording to the new PRC Ambassador to Ethiopia, AiPing.84 Two years later, the PRC donated $300,000 tothe newly formed African Union (AU) peace fund.Ambassador to Ethiopia Ai made the donation, whilethe chairperson of the AU Commission, Professor Al-pha Omar Konar, expressed appreciation to the PRCfor the nancial gesture that demonstrated the strongpartnership and mutual friendship existing betweenChina and Africa.85 Beijing used a combination of -nancial contributions to the Ethiopian government andthe AU as political warfare. While the contributionswere not particularly large, they demonstrated Bei-jings support. These types of ploys would continue.

In April 2005, the PRC donated $400,000 to the AUin support of its peace efforts. Making the donation onbehalf of his government, PRC Assistant Minister of


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Foreign Affairs Lu Guezeng said the donation was tosupport the African Unions peace efforts, particular-

ly in Darfur, Western Sudan. Receiving the donation,Chairperson of the AU Commission Konar expressedappreciation to the PRC for its continuous support,indicating that the donation was yet another demon-stration of Chinas determination to assist the AU inresolving conicts on the continent.86 While the nan-cial donations were not sizeable, they showed the PRCwillingness to assist the African people achieve peaceand security.

The PRC also used its own people and culture asforms of political warfare. For example, a three-mandelegation from the Ethiopian Ministry of Educationvisited the PRC in December 2005. Ethiopian Educa-tion Minister Dr. Sintayehu Wolde-Michael told apress conference that Chinese teachers would arrive in

Ethiopia to share their experiences in various elds ofstudy.87 The next month, speaking at an exhibition ofpictures of Beijing and the art of Weifang Kites from thePRC, the new PRC ambassador to Ethiopia, Lin Ling,said the bilateral relations and understanding betweenthe peoples of China and Ethiopia was consolidatingon the basis of mutual respect and benet. EthiopianState Minister of Culture and Tourism MohammadAhmed Gaas said cultural exchanges between the twocountries were of immense signicance in consolidat-ing relations of the peoples and governments of thetwo countries, which he said shared similar ancientcivilization, history, and culture.88 By sending Chineseteachers and exhibiting Chinese culture, the PRC at-tempted to inuence the Ethiopian people directly.

PRC political warfare operations resulted in tan-gible benets as well. In December 2003, the Gotera-Wollo Areas Road Project, located south of Addis Aba-


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ba, was inaugurated by high-ranking Ethiopian andChinese ofcials. The 2.2 kilometer road, named the

Ethio-China Friendship Avenue, was completed in80 days at the cost of 30 million birr. The cost was cov-ered by the PRC. Inaugurating the avenue, Ato ArkebeUqubay, the mayor of Addis Ababa, said the avenuereected the ever growing bonds of friendship betweenChina and Ethiopia. PRC Foreign Minister Li ZhaoXing, who attended the inauguration ceremony, saidBeing proud of the ever increasing co-operation, wewould work for more partnership and mutual trust.89The PRC and Ethiopia also signed a memorandum ofunderstanding on cooperation in water resources de-velopment in May 2004. The memorandum, signed byvisiting PRC Water Resources Minister Wang Shuchengand Ethiopian Minister for Water Resources Develop-ment Shiferraw Jarso, expanded existing Sino-Ethiopia

cooperation in utilization, management, and sustain-able development of water resources and establisheda long-term cooperative relationship. In line with thememorandum, the PRC would provide various sup-port, including capacity building in the areas of ruralwater supply, irrigation development, hydro-powergeneration, and water resources management, as wellas technological transfer and training of manpower.90These are examples of the PRC paving roads and at-taining water for the Ethiopian people, conducting op-erations that directly affected Ethiopians lives. Sincelate 1999, these examples of PRC political warfare ledto fruitful opportunities at the grand strategic level inEthiopia.

Military-to-military relations were an important

fruit of PRC operations. In November 2002, PRC De-fense Minister Chi Haotian met with Ethiopian De-fense Minister Abadula Gemeda to further strengthen


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military cooperation and contribute to transformingthe capacity of the Ethiopian army to a better stan-

dard. Noting that consolidation of military-to-mili-tary relations was one way to further strengthen thegrowing relationship between his country and Ethio-pia, Defense Minister Chi, who was also vice chairmanof the Central Military Commission, said his meetingwith Gemeda focused on military cooperation.91 PRCVice Foreign Minister Yang Wenchang, who was in-terviewed later that month, declined to reveal the typeof military assistance the PRC was providing to Ethio-pia, although he insisted it would help them improvetheir defense capacity and make their countries moresecure.92 In another example from August 2005, PrimeMinister Zenawi Meles told a visiting PRC militarydelegation led by the commander of the Nanjing Mili-tary Region, Lieutenant General Zhu Wenquan, that

Ethiopia wanted mutual cooperation in military train-ing, technology, and peacekeeping expertise. Wenquansaid strengthening bilateral ties between Ethiopia andChina will contribute a lot toward ensuring peace andstability at a global level.93 An ofcial from the Ethio-pian Ministry of Defense, who attended the talks, saidEthiopia and China had long-standing cooperation inmilitary training.94 PRC political warfare operations al-lowed such grand strategic relations to ourish.

Political warfare operations have helped the PRCachieve the central objective of its grand strategy inEthiopia.95 This case highlights how the PRC used po-litical warfare to gain access to and develop opportuni-ties in Ethiopia. Using donations to the Ethiopian gov-ernment and people as well as to the OAU and, later,

the AU, Beijing attained government contracts, signedagreements, and cultivated bilateral relations.


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Steady Growth: PRC Political Warfare Operationsin Kenya.

After Kenya gained independence, the PRC estab-lished diplomatic relations with the new nation-stateon December 14, 1963. Leading up to the end of the20th century, the two countries already maintainedclose relations. For example, in August 1991, on a visitto the PRC, Kenyan Foreign Minister Wilson NdoloAyah met with PRC Foreign Minister Qian Qichen andagreed to increase the number of technical scholar-ships to Kenya.96 General Lieu Jingsong, commanderof the Lanzhou Military Zone, headed the rst Chinesemilitary delegation to visit Kenya in December 1996.Two Kenyan military delegations visited the PRC in1997. One was led by then Chief of General Staff Gen-eral Daudi Tonje, and the other by the then Kenya Air

Force commander, General Nick Leshan.97

In April1997, Kenya received a batch of six 17-seat Y-12 air-craft manufactured by Harbin Aircraft ManufacturingCorporation.98

PRC political warfare operations had already re-sulted in tangible gains. The China Road and BridgeCorporation (CRBC) was involved in a massive ir-rigation project underway in Kenyas Tana RiverDelta. Also, CRBC was working on over $100 millionworth of ongoing projects, including 200 kilometers ofcoastal road and 150 kilometers of Kenyas most im-portant transport route, the A-109 road from the portof Mombasa to the capital, Nairobi. Based in Nairobisince 1984, CRBC was controlled entirely through thePRC Ministry of Communication.99 In December 1999,

the PRC provided Kenya a $6 million interest-free loanearmarked for a road project. Visiting PRC AssistantMinister for Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation


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Xu Bingjin and Kenyan Finance Minister ChristanusOkemo signed the agreement in Nairobi. The loan was

used to build a 54-kilometer section of road in Kenya100

Despite its past successes, the PRC continued to usepolitical warfare to further its interests in Kenya.

Twelve performers from the Tianjin AcrobaticTroupe of China conquered Kenyans with their ex-quisite acrobatic performances from September 18 toOctober 2, 2000. They presented Kenyans with a range ofacrobatic programs like the juggling of umbrellas withtheir feet and spinning small red carpets on their toes.The PRC performers gave a total of 14 performances,attracting an audience of 100,000 during a half-monthtour of Kenya. The troupe not only acted as envoys ofChinese culture but also helped raise about $30,000 fornearly 3.3 million Kenyan people in drought-strickenareas.101 To help solve the power shortage in rural ar-

eas, the PRC donated $160,000 to implement a pilotsolar energy program for Kenya in November 2000.The project came at a time when power rationing waswide-spread in Kenya due to the severe drought; it alsoprovided a source of new, clean energy in a countryheavily dependent on hydropower.102 Using a combi-nation of cultural performance, fund-raising, and solarpower, Beijing attempted to inuence Kenyan publicopinion.

In May 2001, China Central Television (CCTV),Beijings national television station, agreed to autho-rize Kenya Broadcasting Corporation (KBC) to useprograms from CCTVs Channel 4 and 9, both for in-ternational services. According to the Kenyan minis-ter for information, transport and communication, this

broadcasting cooperation enabled Kenya to have morenews sources instead of concentrating on Western me-dia.103 In addition, the two countries signed a docu-


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ment for CCTV to donate to KBC a set of equipment toreceive satellite signals from CCTV. The PRC director

of the State Administration of Radio, Film and Televi-sion, who led the visiting delegation, noted that radioand television were crucial in mass mobilization andexpressed the hope that bilateral relations betweenboth countries would be boosted through the technicalcooperation.104 In June 2001, the $60,000-donated setof equipment to receive satellite signals was xed andput into operation by KBC.105 In July 2001, the Kenyanminister for tourism and information and the presi-dent of Xinhua News Agency signed an agreementunder which Xinhua donated equipmentincludingcomputers, printers, and a fax machineto the Ke-nya News Agency.106 CCTV later donated additionalTV equipment worth approximately $154,200 to KBC.The equipment included a nonlinear editing system, a

digital video recorder, and a monitor.107

China RadioInternational (CRI), Beijings sole operating overseasradio station service, launched an FM radio service inNairobi in January 2006. The FM radio station, knownasAfrica Express, began providing 19 hours of CRI pro-grams a day in English, Swahili, and Chinese to the es-timated 2 million residents in Nairobi.108 PRC politicalwarfare operations used information to inuence theKenyan people.

Beijings operations targeted various sectors of theKenyan populace. The All-China Federation of TradeUnions (ACFTU), for example, donated a batch of com-puters to its Kenyan counterpart to help the latter im-prove its capacity in information technology in January2003. The computers were handed over to the Central

Organization of Trade Unions of Kenya (COTU) at itsheadquarters by Counsellor Guan Ruoxun of the PRCembassy to Kenya. The computers would be used to


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launch a computer training center at the Tom MboyaLabor College in Kenyas western city of Kisumu to

train labor movement personnel.109

The followingmonth, Beijing donated 32 military vehicles to the Ken-yan military. Valued at approximately $1.2 million, the32 vehicles included 12 buses, 12 mini buses, and eightambulances. PRC Ambassador to Kenya Du said dur-ing the handover ceremony, What we are seeing heretoday is true testimony of the cordial relations that hasbeen in existence for the last 40 years since the twocountries established diplomatic ties.110 By the end of2003, the PRC was expected to deliver an additional 26vehicles to the Kenyan military.111 The PRC also pro-vided the Kenyan military with 103 vehicles at the endof 2000.112

In February 2003, the PRC donated agriculturalmachinery worth approximately $64,900 to help Ke-

nya in its agricultural development. The equipmentincluded eight walking tractors, 20 diesel engines, and20 maize crushers. During the handover ceremonywith PRC Ambassador to Kenya Du, Kenyan DeputyAgricultural Minister Joseph Munyao said, Kenyacan no longer continue depending mostly on the westfor mechanization technologies.113 The explicit preju-dice against the West was signicant. The followingmonth, the China Red Cross Society, through the PRCembassy in Kenya, donated relief goods worth $10,000to Kenyan ood victims. Purchased locally, notably,the donations included blankets, mosquito nets, soap,and other necessities. Zhongxing TelecommunicationEquipment Corporation, a major PRC telecommunica-tion company operating in Kenya, also donated relief

goods worth $5,000.114 Through these actions, the PRCdemonstrated concern with the health and well-beingof the Kenyan people.


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The PRC also focused operations on the provisionof medical supplies. The PRC donated $23,219 worth

of medical equipment and contraceptives to Kenyain August 2003. The donation included an ultrasonicmachine, a digital video imaging machine, and an in-frared therapy machine. PRC Ambassador to KenyaGuo Chongli, on behalf of the State Family PlanningCommission of China, donated the equipment andcontraceptives to Kenyan Minister for Planning andNational Development Peter Nyongo.115 The followingmonth, the PRC donated $50,000 worth of anti-malariadrugs to Kenya.116 In November 2002, the PRC donated100,000 bottles of an anti-tuberculosis drug to Kenya tohelp ght the disease. The $900,000 of pasiniazide wasdonated by the PRC ambassador to Kenya on behalf ofthe China Society for Promoting Guangcai Program, aChinese entrepreneurial NGO in the private sector, to

the Kenyan Ministry of Health.117

To celebrate the 40th anniversary of the establish-ment of Sino-Kenyan diplomatic relations, the PRCembassy in Kenya and the Kenyan Ministry of Gender,Sports, Culture, and Social Services sponsored an 8-day photograph exhibition entitled Beautiful Chinain December 2003. The exhibition recorded various as-pects of the PRC, serving as a guide to explore a verydiversied country.118 The Kenyan National Assem-bly also called for closer parliamentary cooperationwith the PRC National Peoples Congress (NPC). Cel-ebrating the 40th anniversary of the establishment ofdiplomatic ties, the NPC also granted $48,000 worth ofofce equipment to the Kenyan parliament.119 The fol-lowing month, the PRC Ministry of Education, through

the PRC embassy in Kenya, donated books and audio-video materials to the Egerton University, one of theleading public universities in Kenya. Focused mainly


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on Chinese language teaching, the books and materialsincluded cassettes, video tapes, and CD-ROMs.120

PRC political warfare operations continually tar-geted the Kenyan people. In August 2004, the PRC do-nated 60,000 kg of maize worth $20,000 to help oodvictims in Budalangi in western Kenya. Emphasizinglong-term measures, the PRC also offered to help Ke-nya develop water conservation facilities to enable thecountry to harvest and store rain water for use duringthe dry spells.121 That same month, the PRC pledged atotal of KSh 4.8 billion to upgrade the distribution ofKenyas electrical industry.122 The All-China Youth Fed-eration donated $25,000 worth of ofce equipmentin-cluding 40 computersto the Kenya Youth Service inSeptember 2004. Speaking at the handover ceremony,PRC Ambassador to Kenya Guo Chongli said, Theyare not only a gift from All-China Youth Federation to

Kenya Youth Service, but also a symbol of friendshipthat millions of Chinese young people cherish towardtheir Kenyan peers.123 Also in September, Roads andPublic Works Minister Raila Odinga announced thatthe PRC would build a road network around Lake Vic-toria. The roads were expected to greatly boost shingand other activities in the region.124

In response to the January 2005 Indian Ocean tsu-nami, Beijing provided the Kenya government with adonation of $100,000 in support of its disaster relief ef-forts. The tsunami killed one Kenyan, damaged over200 shing boats, and caused more than 12,000 lost jobs along Kenyas coastline.125 Later that month, thePRC donated an additional $1.31 million in relief ma-terials to Kenya as a result of the tsunami. The relief

materials included tents, power generators, medicines,food, and daily necessities.126

Political warfare operations gave Beijing inuencein Kenyas education system. For example, a 5-year


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bilateral agreement between the two countries aimedat boosting manpower development in the country. In

July 2003, PRC Ambassador to Kenya Guo Chongli saidselected universities would receive assistance under anagreement. Assistance would go towards upgradingfacilities at universities, improving research capacity,and creating direct linkages between local and statefunded universities in the PRC.127 Ambassador Guomade his remarks during a send off ceremony for nineKenyan students on PRC scholarships. According toKenyan Senior Deputy Director of Education GilbertLengoibone, the PRC provided scholarships to about30 Kenyan students annually.128

Furthermore, the PRC and Kenya signed a memo-randum of understanding in June 2004 regarding uni-versity-level Chinese language instruction in Kenya.The University of Nairobi and Egerton University

would establish a Confucius Unit offering Chineselanguage courses. PRC Minister of Education Zhou Jisaid China would post lecturers to the two universitiesin addition to providing facilities and teaching materi-als.129 Less than 2 years later, the PRC opened its rstConfucius Institute in Nairobi. Designated by the Na-tional Ofce for Teaching Chinese as a Foreign Lan-guage (NOCFL) and planned by Tianjin Normal Uni-versity, the Institute was designed to popularize theteaching and learning of Chinese language and cultureworldwide.130

PRC political warfare operations also affected infra-structure construction in Kenya. For example, the PRCspent approximately $3.8 million in July 2004 to reno-vate and equip Kenyatta National Hospital in Nairobi,

the countrys largest referral hospital. The economicand commercial counsellor of the PRC embassy in Ken-ya, Ju Sichuan, also said the PRC would fund the con-


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struction of the Serem-Shamakhokho road in westernKenya for $19 million and a maize processing mill in

Bomet in the Rift Valley Province for $76,000.131

In Janu-ary 2006, it was announced that the PRC would nanceconstruction of two high voltage power lines in Kenyaat a cost of $19 million. Constructing the lines, ChinaCAMMC Engineering Company would establish linesfrom Chemosit in Kericho to Kisii and from Kamburuto Meru.132 By using political warfare, the PRC was ac-tive throughout Kenyan society.

PRC operations affected the political and militaryestablishment in Kenya as well. Kenyas parliament andgovernment voiced support for Beijings anti-secessionlaw in March 2005. Kenya, as a friend of China, hasalways supported the one-China policy and will neversupport Taiwans secession from China, said Speakerof the National Assembly of Kenya Francis Ole Kapa-

ro.133

The PRC and Kenya held military discussions re-garding the possible purchase of military hardware forthe Kenyan DoD in the summer 2005. The deal for PRCmilitary vehicles included troop-carrying vehicles andarmored personnel carriers.134 A PRC military delega-tion visited the country in June for talks with KenyasDoD. The PRC team, led by Vice Minister for Logisti-cal Affairs Lieutenant General Wang Xian, was in thecountry for 5 days.

The PRC used political warfare to move relationswith Kenya to a higher level. Prior to 2000, Beijing al-ready had access to Kenya, from military relations towater and road projects. Its operations since 2000, how-ever, expanded the PRCs reach into the information,education, and infrastructure development areas of

Kenya. Unlike its operations in neighboring Ethiopia,the PRC focused on furthering its already close rela-tions with Kenya through the use of political warfare.


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East to West: PRC Political Warfare Operationsin Nigeria.

Diplomatic relations between the PRC and Nige-ria were established in 1971. Trade and interactionbetween the two countries, however, dated back to1960.135 Bilateral relations grew leading up to the 20thcentury. In October 1989, for example, Nigerias chiefof army staff made a 10-day ofcial visit to France andChina to explore military cooperation.136 PRC Vice For-eign Minister Tian Zengpei visited four West Africannations, including Nigeria, in the summer of 1994. PRCagreed to assist in socio-economics and political stabil-ity; Nigeria, along with the three other West Africannations, agreed to support the PRC on the one Chinapolicy.137 Three years later, Premier Li Peng visited Af-rica for 2 weeks. Visiting Nigeria, Premier Li placed

emphasis on the positive, long-standing relationshipbetween the PRC and Africa.138 Nigerian PresidentOlusegun Obasanjo even visited the PRC in 1999. ThePRC, however, did not have signicant political, eco-nomic, or military access to Nigeria; its political war-fare operations would change this.

As with the Horn of Africa countries, a focus ofPRC political warfare was the health and well-being ofthe Nigerian people. For example, a well-known PRCpharmaceutical company donated $50,000 worth ofanti-malaria drugs to Nigeria in May 2000. Etim Oyo-soro, Managing Director of Churchbells Pharmaceuti-cals Ltd, the marketing agency for Cotecxin drugs inNigeria, presented the drugs to the Minister of HealthTim Menakaya. Beijings COTEC New Technology

Corporation produced and donated the anti-malariadrug Cotecxin to Nigeria.139 The PRC also donated 300medicine-treated mosquito nets to Nigeria to mark theAfrican Malaria Day. The PRC provided Nigeria with


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approximately $3.5 million free aid, which was report-edly to be used to buy medicine-treated bed nets and

other malaria drugs.140

In December 2000, the PRC andNigeria agreed to establish a tropical infections diseasecenter to promote Chinese techniques of infectious dis-ease diagnosis in Nigeria. The center would also trainNigerians in the application of diagnoses in China, no-tably, and provide Nigeria free amounts of diagnosticreagents and equipment.141 The PRC donated addi-tional drugs for malaria control worth approximately$2.4 million to Nigeria in May 2003. The drugs donatedincluded cartons of malaria drug Cotecxin, bales con-taining child-size mosquito nets, and bales of family-size mosquito nets. The donation also included insecti-cide for treatment of the nets.142

Typical of its operations, the PRC exploited the localsituation in Nigeria. In February 2002, the PRC donat-

ed emergency relief assistance to Nigeria after a blastat a military armory in Lagos. Vice Mayor of Shang-hai Zhou Muyao indicated the PRC pledged the sumof $120,000 to Nigeria to alleviate the sufferings of thevictims. He said even though this amount was small,it was a symbolic gesture to show that both countriesfeel concern for each other.143 Later the year, the PRCdonated $120,000 worth of relief supplies to the vic-tims of the January 27 bomb blast in Lagos. Donated onbehalf of the PRC by its ambassador to Nigeria, LiangYinzhu, the items included blankets, wax print, andtowels. The ambassador explained that the donationwas in recognition of the cordial relationship betweenChina and Nigeria and pledged the continued coop-eration of the governments and peoples of both coun-

tries.144PRC political warfare operations were also direct-

ed toward the Nigerian government. In May 2000, the


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PRC Ministry of Science and Technology donated 40computers and 21 laser printers to the Federal Minis-

try of Science and Technology of Nigeria. The minis-ters of science and technology had previously madereciprocal visits to each others countries.145 The origi-nal agreement was amended in August to provide twoadditional laser printer toners. In December 2001, thePRC, through its embassy in Nigeria, presented of-ce equipment as cultural aid to the Nigerian FederalMinistry of Culture and Tourism. PRC Ambassador toNigeria Liang Yinzhu said the donation was a gestureof the PRC government to further cement the good re-lationship between the two countries. Items presentedto the ministry included computers, printers, fax ma-chines, toner cartridges, and two copy machines.146

The cultural aspect of PRC operations, while notprominent, was also present. Anniversaries, in par-

ticular, were exploited. In October 2001, a 6-day photoshow entitled Photo Album of the Peoples Repub-lic of China (2000-2001) and the third Nigeria-ChinaArts and Crafts International Exhibition were held atthe National Theater in Lagos as part of the activitiesto commemorate the 52nd anniversary of the foundingof China. The events were also held to celebrate the19th anniversary of the signing of the Cultural and Ed-ucational Cooperation Agreement between two coun-tries.147 A pictorial exhibition titled World Heritage inChina was held in Abuja in December 2001 to markthe 30th anniversary of the restoration of Chinas le-gitimate seat in the United Nations.148

PRC operations also targeted Nigerias agriculturaland educational sectors. In September 2003, the PRC

provided Nigeria with a $2.5 million grant. Althoughthe grant was not tied to any specic projects, it wasbelieved discussions were aimed at formalizing PRC


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agriculture assistance to Nigeria.149 The followingmonth, it was reported that Chinese entrepreneurs ex-

pressed interest in investing in agricultural industriesin Nigerias northwestern state of Kebbi. Chinese en-trepreneurs had decided to invest in the developmentof rice, onions, and sugar.150 In February 2005, the PRCembassy in Nigeria donated teaching aids and accesso-ries to the department of languages at Nnamdi AzikweUniversity, Awka. Mrs. Tina Okoye, head of the de-partment, announced that the department was set tobegin teaching the Chinese language. Items donatedincluded a compact disc player, cassettes, books, jour-nals, and magazines.151

Given its inuence in the region, Nigerias militarywas also a focus of PRC operations. The PRC granted$1 million to Nigeria to upgrade the countrys militaryfacilities in the summer 2001. Disclosing the grant in

Abuja, PRC Deputy Chief of Defense Staff General WuQuanxu said the gesture was part of his countrys con-tribution to the development of democracy in Nige-ria. Heading a high level visiting military delegation,General Wu said China had much respect for Nigeriafor participating in peace missions and contributing tosub-regional peace efforts.152 During the announcementmeeting, Chief of Defense Staff Vice-Admiral IbrahimOgohi thanked the PRC delegation for the 30 Nigerianofcers undergoing courses in various Chinese militaryinstitutions, with another 11 to start in September.153 InSeptember 2004, the PRC donated digital equipmentto the regional intergovernmental body, the EconomicCommunity of West African States (ECOWAS) secre-tariat. PRC Ambassador to Nigeria Wang Yongqiu pre-

sented the equipment in Abuja and said the donationwas a symbol of Chinas interest in the subregion.154Valued at $123,000, the items included computers, fax


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machines, copiers, and satellite phones.155 In October2005, the PRC donated $2 million worth of military

equipment to the Nigerian Armed Forces. A team of21 Chinese was expected to train Nigerian personnelin Nigeria in the use of equipment such as computers,air eld sweeper vehicles, emergency navigational andlight vehicles, and deep sea diving equipment. PRCAmbassador to Nigeria Wang Yongqiu said the ges-ture was mainly to facilitate Nigerias effort in its vari-ous responsibilities that included peacekeeping opera-tions in West Africa.156

The fruits of PRC political warfare operations be-gan on the provincial level. Nigerias Gombe State andChinas Shandong Province agreed to six developmen-tal projects in September 2000. The areas included die-sel engine assembly, textiles, real estate, tricycle andtractor assembly, and the agricultural sector. The gov-

ernor of Gombe, Abubakar Habu Hashidu, also solic-ited the assistance of Shandong Province in the areasof education, water supply, rural development, andcommunication.157 In June 2001, the Akwa Ibom Stategovernment and Beijing signed an agreement to builda renery and an independent power plant at a costof $1.5 billion.158 The Kogi State government signed a$60 million loan agreement with the PRC governmentfor the establishment of a sugar factory in the state inApril 2004. The state governor, Alhaji Ibrahim Idris,who disclosed this on his return from an economic tripto the PRC, said the loan package also covered the pro-vision of water schemes as well as the establishment ofvocational centers for training unemployed youths.159

In the agricultural sector, the PRC made consider-

able gains. Nigeria and the PRC agreed to embark ona $22.2 million project in the eld of agriculture underthe South-South Co-operation Initiative and within the


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framework of a Special Program on Food Security inOctober 2002. Areas identied for cooperation includ-

ed small holder irrigation, production and marketingof eld crops and horticulture, livestock production,aquaculture, and farm mechanization. The leader ofthe PRC delegation, Quan Dieng, further said Chinahad a considerable comparative advantage and exper-tise in these areas and would be willing to provide thenecessary experts and eld technicians.160 In May 2003,the rst group of PRC agricultural experts arrived inNigerias northern Kano state to support farming ac-tivities under a 4-year program with the Food andAgriculture Organization (FAO). The PRC planned tosend 20 experts and at least 500 eld technicians withexpertise in various elds of agriculture to spend 3years in Nigeria. They would work alongside Nigerianexperts in 109 sites all over the country and live in the

farming communities to which they are assigned.161

Tohelp revitalize Nigerias agriculture sector further, thePRC sent 393 experts in agriculture and related disci-plines to provide assistance to farming communitiesacross the West African country. At a 1-day seminarentitled Poverty Alleviation Through Bamboo-basedDevelopment in Agriculture: China Experience, it wasreported that PRC experts would work directly withfarmers in 109 communities across Nigeria.162 Later inthe year, 496 PRC experts were reported to be in Nige-ria assisting in various technical elds such as watercontrol and sheries.163

The PRC acquired numerous infrastructure agree-ments in Nigeria. In March 2002, China Machinery andEquipment Import and Export Company (CMEC) and

Shandong Power Construction Company agreed to a$390 million deal with the Nigerian Ministry of Powerand Steel to build two gas-red power plants with a


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total capacity of 670 megawatts. CMEC President LiShuzhi said the plants would help ease the electricity

shortage in Nigeria and promote economic and tradecooperation between the two countries.164 In March2005, the PRC agreed to construct 598 boreholes in 18of the 37 Nigerian statesincluding the capital, Abu- jato support the countrys water supply program.The aim of the free-aid water project was to provideclean drinkable water to ordinary Nigerians living inout-of-the-way areas.165 Nigeria also accepted anotheroffe

Documents

Political Warfare in Sub-Saharan Africa: U.S. Capabilities and Chinese Operations in Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, and South Africa