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A look at uses of military force during US presidential transition periods
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Master of Arts Dissertation
Politics, Party, and Power
An Investigation into Modern United States
Presidential Transition Violence
Submitted by:
Marcus Paul Williamson
A dissertation submitted to the University of Limerick in candidacy for
the degree of Master of Arts in Peace and Development Studies
Supervisors: Dr. Thomas Lodge and Dr. Gerard Downes
ii
Master of Arts Dissertation
Politics, Party, and Power
An Investigation into Modern United States
Presidential Transition Violence
Submitted by:
Marcus Paul Williamson
UL Student ID No. 0818321
iii
DECLARATION OF ORIGIONALITY
„I hereby declare that this submission is my own work and to the best of my
knowledge it contains no materials previously published or written by another person,
or substantial proportions of material which have been accepted for the award of any
other degree or diploma at the University of Limerick or any other educational
institution, except where due acknowledgement is made in the dissertation. Any
contribution made to the research by others, with whom I have worked at the
University of Limerick or elsewhere, is explicitly acknowledged in the dissertation. I
also declare that the intellectual content of this dissertation is the product of my own
work, except to the extent that assistance from others in the project's design and
conception or in style, presentation and linguistic expression is acknowledged.‟
Signed:
Marcus Paul Williamson
August 2009
iv
ABSTRACT
The circumstances that occur during the Presidential transition period between
Election Day and Inauguration are an interesting concern for the incoming executive,
particularly when the President-Elect is a member of the opposition party. While the
inclination to establish a positive legacy for posterity lingers, the reality exists that an
outgoing President has no reason to worry about popularity polls or the potential for
dangers that will be faced by the next President. The role of partisan politics taken by
leaders leaving office directly affects not only domestic responses but foreign policy
as well. Responses to these foreign crisis that occur during the time between Election
Day and the end of a new president‟s first 100 days often define the scope of the
remainder of their term in office.
United States foreign policy has traditionally been a non-factor in determining
potential election winners. In contrast, the actions taken by officials once they have
assumed office has played a large role in popularity with their constituency. This
investigation looks at the propensity of armed conflict during the United States
presidential transition period. With an eye towards the events surrounding the 1992
General Election and the subsequent transition period, this investigation discusses the
impacts of a military attack not only upon the United States, but by the United States
and its effects on the future of domestic electoral politics.
With the vulnerability that a state faces during times of governmental
transition, the ability lies with an outgoing President to establish a difficult situation in
foreign politics that the President-Elect and incoming Congress will be forced to face.
This establishes a condition that will potentially create a negative perception from the
United States constituency towards the new President. With this proposition, the
impacting nature of the outgoing President ability to influence worldwide affairs has
the potential to aid their party in future domestic elections.
v
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The support and encouragement of my family during this process, particularly that of
my parents Dr. Paul Williamson and Dr. Marvel Williamson. Without them this
endeavor would have been impossible.
My supervisors: Dr. Tom Lodge and Dr. Ger Downes, for their help in not only this
project but throughout my entire postgraduate education.
Mr. Jon Stonger, for using his abilities to assist me in the proof-reading and
development of this paper.
vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Abstract iv
Acknowledgements v
List of Tables and Figures vii
List of Abbreviations viii
Chapter 1: Introduction 1
1.1 The Turbulence of Electoral Politics 2
1.2 Patterns of Violence in US Presidential Transition 6
1.3 Dissertation Statement 11
1.4 Research Methodology and Objectives 13
1.5 Dissertation Overview 16
Chapter 2: Party and Transition 19
2.1 Transition as a Case Study in Presidential Uses of Force 20
2.2 The Presidential Transition Process and Potential 24
2.3 Political Parties as SFAs 28
2.4 The Process of Partisan Policy Development 30
2.5 Implementing Partisan Policy during Transition 32
Chapter 3: Fourth Generation Warfare and Post-Internationalism
in Power Crusades 35
3.1 Sovereignty Free Actor Influence on Warfare 37
3.2 Sovereignty Free Actor Influence on US Foreign Policy 38
3.3 Fourth Generation Warfare and US Foreign Policy 41
3.4 The Impacts of Electoral Issue Development through 4GW 44
Chapter 4: The Politics of 1992-1993 48
4.1 The Situations Surrounding the 1992 General Election 49
4.2 UNITAF and the Decision to Act 53
4.3 The Clinton Transition 56
4.4 26 February 1993 and 2/3 October 1993 58
Chapter 5: Conclusion 61
5.1 Preparing for Vulnerability during Presidential Transition 62
5.2 Party Politics and United States Foreign Policy 64
5.3 Predicting the Results of 2010 Midterms 66
5.4 Anticipating the Future of Transition 68
Bibliography 70
Appendix A: Pertinent Sections from the Constitution of the United States 76
Appendix B: The War Powers Resolution of 1973 81
Appendix C: U.S. Presidential Election Results, 1948 – 2008 86
Appendix D: United States Military Actions Initiated or Ongoing During
Presidential Transition, 1950 – 2000 88
vii
LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES
Pa ge
T A BL E S
Table 1.1 3
American Presidential Elections with Three Major Candidates
Since 1900
Table 1.2 11
Major US Military Involvement during Presidential Transition
Since 1950
Table 2.1 23
Selected International Incidents and Attacks on the US
and their Proximity to Election Since 1950
Table 2.2 34
United States House of Representatives Member Affiliation
by Party Since 1968
Table 4.1 53
1992 Presidential Election Popular Vote
Table 4.2 57
President Clinton’s Public Approval Ratings,
November 1992 through November 1994
FIGURES
Figure 2.1 25
Downs Equations on the Relationship between
Government Acts and Voter Utility Functions
Figure 4.1 54
1992 Electoral College Map
viii
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
9/11 11 September 2001 Attacks
CW Cold War
G.H.W. Bush George Herbert Walker Bush
G.W. Bush George Walker Bush
GWOT Global War on Terrorism
MOOTW Military Operations Other Than War
NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGOs Non-Governmental Organizations
SFAs Sovereignty-Free Actors
UN United Nations
UNC United Nations Charter
UNITAF Unified Task Force (Somalia)
UNSC United Nations Security Council
UNSG United Nations Secretary General
US United States
USFP United States Foreign Policy
WPA The United States War Powers Act
WW II World War Two
- 1 -
CHAPTER ONE
Introduction
When you go back and look at the number of incidents
that have occurred three or four months before an
inauguration to about 12 months out, back to the '50s,
it's pretty staggering the number of major incidents
which have occurred in this time frame.
-Admiral Michael Mullen (2008)1
The development of electoral systems in liberalized democracies has been one
of competition and persistence established on common beliefs. Formalized in many
cases to include the documentation of foundational principals, the procedure and fora
of these traditionally domestic acts of high politics has spawned numerous variations
that have been replicated and renewed in many situations in the modern world.
The ongoing movement toward establishing states that are governed through
the free and fair elections of leaders by a voluntary public has been portrayed as a
method of promoting peace and long term security with the establishment of
democratic peace theories such as those proposed by Doyle (1983). While the
development of liberalized nations has been an established effort by many in the
1 As cited in Gertz (2008).
- 2 -
western world, they are by no means the end-all solution to promoting permanent
safety around the globe.
The high politics events portrayed by the United States are an example of this
troubling reoccurrence in violence. While the process of electioneering is currently
relatively free of violent conflict on the home front, there is a situation that develops
as a reaction to post-electoral outcomes directly related to the democratic process that
is not passive. The escalation of violent conflict that surrounds this transitionary
period brings about a concern for the abilities of one faction of government and its
partisan ambitions to the influence of governing power ability represented by the next,
as shown in Table 1.2.
The establishment of violence inherent to Presidential Political transition may
not be one that is immediately apparent from the onset of investigation. This thesis
will show the violence intrinsic to the democratic electoral process and the influence
that this domestic occurrence has around the world.
1.1 The Turbulence of Electoral Politics
Establishing a level of conflict inherent to electoral politics is not a new
procedure. With direct competition come multiple levels of non-violent conflict
through discussion, debate, and other methods of direct engagement. This established
rhythm is known to be healthy, and is an expected result that underlies the devotion to
ensuring the ability of all sides of an issue to voice their opinion.
- 3 -
In the United States, this situation has been ongoing every four years for over
two centuries. As the end of a presidential term approaches, the possibility to remove
the sitting president from power through electoral consent arises. This potential
ability to remove a leader from their position of authority has a long history of rivalry
and competition, but has developed into a process that nearly exclusively involves
representatives from two major parties as potential victors. Indeed, there have been
only six elections since 1900 that have involved a major third party candidate as a
potential winner outside of these two established parties (Table 1.1). As such, the
direct head to head competition that fuels the establishment of party policy upon the
system has been developed toward that situation. The disruption that this causes
enables for any other person with little chance of securing the necessary electoral
votes to rise to the office to win the election and become the next President of the
United States.
Table 1.1 2
American Presidential Elections with Three Major Candidates
Since 1900
Election Year Candidate Candidate Candidate
1912 W. Taft (I)
(Republican)
W. Wilson*
(Democrat)
T. Roosevelt
(Progressive)
1924 C. Coolidge (I)*
(Republican)
J. Davis
(Democrat)
R. LaFollette
(Progressive)
1948 H. Truman (I)*
(Democrat)
T. Dewey
(Republican)
S. Thurmond
(Dixiecrat)
1960 J.F. Kennedy*
(Democrat)
R.M. Nixon
(Republican)
H. Byrd
(Democrat)
1968 H. Humphrey
(Democrat)
R.M. Nixon*
(Republican)
G. Wallace
(American
Independent)
1992 G.H.W. Bush (I)
(Republican)
W.J. Clinton*
(Democrat)
H.R. Perot
(Independent)
(I) denotes incumbent, * denotes winner of election
2 A major candidate is defined as one that received Electoral College votes or at least 15% of the
popular vote.
- 4 -
The two party system has evolved to include the persuasion of voters toward
this arrangement, allowing for the direct analysis of voting behavior and expectations
through choice patterns. The development of analyzing rational choice theory has
been discussed at length by the seminal work of Anthony Downs in An Economic
Theory of Democracy (1957). As discussed further in Section 2.2, the study of
evaluating the treatment of optimizing the voting behaviors within an electorate
established precedence for understanding how the actions of parties within
government affect future returns in the election booth. With an of idea how the
manipulation of issues will lead to a rational choice by voters, an ability to influence
the development of future events by party actors on key voting issues allows for
potential policy shifts to take place late in the electoral season.
The organization of Rational Choice Theory allows for the prediction of
voting tendencies in fixed time periods. This analysis sees the electoral cycle as a set
time period that ends on the date of the election. Understanding the „perfect‟
situations that are required to assist in developing predictable outcomes, it is
understandable as to why such set timetables in the electoral cycle must be
established. Such an optimal scenario does not exist in real-time politics, however.
The ability for a political party to begin instituting the tone of future policy issues for
the next electoral cycle does not need to wait for the newly elected president to
assume office.
The 1992 elections are a case study in this phenomenon of US Presidential
politics. With the major voting issues of this specific election surrounding the
domestic effects of economic recession that were surmounted with the inclusion of the
- 5 -
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), a volatile financial climate, and
the future of a post-Cold War foreign policy, the debate throughout the country
allowed for independent candidate H. Ross Perot to gain major consideration pulling a
large percentage of the vote away from incumbent President George H. W. Bush.
This situation opened the door for William Clinton, then governor from Arkansas, to
win the election. This case study is investigated further in Chapter Four.
The troubling aspect of third party candidates in recent power shifting
elections has caused concern in the two major parties in United States Politics. The
ability to rely on certain voting populations to remain faithful to their historical
allegiances had weakened. The rise of political movements through the „New South‟
as well as the force behind what has become known as „The Religious Right‟ have
also spun interesting developments into the future of United States elections (Hill and
Rae 2000).
As the tendencies of the voting public have become less reliable than before,
the tactics of the majority parties to win elections have changed as well. The ability
to influence public perception of federal office holders has become a more important
factor for campaigners to consider while holding office. The need to influence future
voting behavior has become a necessity to ensure continued success. That is, the
policy that is implemented planned while in office, but executed while not in office
will bring the voting public back to their parties in future elections. The use of
foreign policy to meet that end has been a popular method in the United States for
many years. The aspect that comes from this tool lies both with its accessibility and
its historical lack of voting importance with the American public.
- 6 -
1.2 Patterns of Violence in US Presidential Transition
The traditional acts of major United States military violence have been those
where the US portrays itself as a victim of violent attack from outside forces during
this fragile time. The responses to attacks in the Gulf of Tonkin (1964), Pearl Harbor
(1941), the sinking of the Lusitania (1917), and the bombing of the USS Maine (1898)
have all led the US into major military engagements in the last century. With the
vulnerability inherent to presidential transition, the issue of security with particular
regard to this timeframe has gone through an intensive review, particularly since 9/11
(Rollins 2008).
There is another common form of violence in United States foreign policy,
one that develops during presidential transition. While the documentation of outside
attack upon the United States during transition has been well investigated, the
frequency of attack conducted by the United States during this time period is one that
has not received the amount of attention that such a topic deserves. While responding
to an attack against the state from an outside actor is understood as a necessary
reaction, the aggressive action of developing and executing a foreign military strategy
is typically not. The element of actions taken against the state as compared with
actions taken by a state is one that causes a note of concern as to the reasoning behind
these measures, particularly due to the common occurrence during this particular
period. The instigation of violent military conflict by the US has been rampant during
presidential transition.
- 7 -
Planning for a war is not something that can happen on a whim. Established
by The Constitution of the United States (1787, Appendix A), a president cannot
declare war without the consent of Congress, but under the War Powers Act (1973,
Appendix B) can commit the United States military to engagements for up to 60 days.
While the constitutionality of this action has been contested by every president since
becoming law over the veto of President Nixon due to the role of the president as
„Commander in Chief‟ (Grimmet 2007), the ability to act on the short term without
the consent of Congress regarding military actions leaves an opening for force to be
enacted post-election, but left to the president-elect to deal with the outcomes.
Chapter Three will discuss this aspect in greater detail.
Looking at the history of violence enacted upon a state by an outside actor, it
is understandable why transitions are taken with a high level of precaution. While
administrators prepare for this outside aggression, the ability for presidents to use
force around the globe is one of planned aggression, not of reaction. Contingency
plans are established for many different possibilities, the act of executing them in
reactionary setting causes a „rally around the flag effect‟3. While war is typically
undesirable, the response by the public is on average nationalistic and supportive of
the government during times of war and has a tendency to draw public attention away
from the flaws of a President (Smith 1996; De Rouen 2000), and particularly used in
times of low public opinion (Brule 2008). As pointed out by Karl Rove (2008),
George W. Bush was the first American President since the 1930‟s whose party
gained seats in both the House of Representatives and the Senate during the first
midterm elections under their administration due to the national reaction to 9/11.
3 Common name given to the nationalistic sociological effects experienced within a state as a response
to an attack by an outside force.
- 8 -
Despite the positive public reaction, the use of violence by a sitting president
is seen by some as a negative in the election booth (Brulé and Mintz 2005). While the
question of how force affects voting behavior before an election has been discussed,
military action after the votes have been cast is additionally influential (Halchin
2008). Understanding how the policy of force can have negative consequences for a
party prior to an election raises the question of if a party can benefit from the use of
international military force following an election? The potential outcome for a
president involved in a military action that they did not begin and has low levels of
approval with the voting public and the non-state actors that they support (James and
Hristoulas 1994) has the direct possibility of leading to a negative downturn at the
election booth (Aldrich et Al. 2006).
An initial investigation into the causes of violent conflict quickly shows the
tendency for the outbreak of conflict during periods of rapid transition. This fact has
been established by Organski (1958) and built upon in the study of global relations.
Organski‟s Power Transition Theory was the first framework to clearly define the idea
of violent conflict as a result of the shifting of power. Outlined here are the basic
principles that list the possibility of violence related to the shifting political ability of
differing groups. The internal and external volatility that is created by these unstable
situations are a prime ground for an outside actor to play a role, who will usually do
so with force due to the nature of the newly governing group. With this comes a
different dimension of the Power Transition Theory, showing that one does not have
to be directly related to the change in power to exert influence on a situation.
- 9 -
Examples of post-revolutionary conflict have been well investigated by both
historians and political scientists alike. The inherent backing of a group to achieve
the status to overthrow a reigning governing power shows the potential for continuing
engagement in the near future. This is partly due to the ability of the newly coronated
group, but also has the possibility displayed by regional actors who may not see the
new government as a potential working partner in the region. This distrust is often
backed by an attack by the regional powers that see an advantage in attacking the new
government during its infancy (Walt 1992). While the matters of establishing a
permanent state are at the forefront of the victor‟s mind, a good possibility to oust
them exists, and is often tested by the military strength of others.
Power transitions are the key reason behind several large violent conflicts in
the last 100 years. In times of rapid change, pre-emptive conflicts are likely to follow.
(Eckstein 1980). While the idea of shifting power has long been behind conflict, the
resolution to engage these new powers is something that has come to distinct
recognition in the post-colonial era. Power transitions tend to lead to uncertainty in a
region that shifts the previous relationships that groups shared. With an upstart group
that is inherently aggressive in nature, the potential for a violent region to spread to
other areas, due to the new governing power or from outside actors, is a likely
possibility. As shown by Levy (1987) and Walter (1997) in many different scenarios,
the actions are fairly commonplace as the adjustments that come with power shifts
occur. While the new power groups are trying to establish themselves in a new
government situation, they are vulnerable to outside attack. This scenario is not
limited to new states and infant governments, but has developed with the onset of
Fourth Generation Warfare.
- 10 -
The recent examples of uses of force taken by non-state actors against
established governments experiencing electoral transitions have been a growing trend
in Fourth Generation Warfare for various reasons. The 26 February 1993 and 11
September 2001 attacks in the United States which happened one and eight months
following oppositional transition respectively, the 11 March 2004 attack in Spain that
came three days before the general elections which had a oppositional party heavily
favored to win the majority, the 13 September 2004 siege at Beslan coming a little
more than three months after the new Russian Duma was inaugurated, and the 7 July
2005 attacks in the United Kingdom during the transitional period following the 5
May 2005 elections have all shown the propensity of attack during this vulnerable
period in established democratic governments.
While much of the literature concerning transitional conflict focuses on
situations experiencing regime change, there is a precedence established for conflict
coming during periods of executive transition in established governments as well.
Violent conflict in US presidential transition periods provides insight into state
security in the emerging world of post-international conflict, as shown in Table 1.2.
Understanding that established governments are not immune to attack during
these executive transitional periods, it is plain that the US has also experienced this
situation. The restrictions of involvement are not limited to direct attack. There have
been major conflicts that the US has been engaged in that have directly affected the
administrations of two or more presidents. While these major engagements have been
well addressed, there is another factor that must be attended to when investigating
- 11 -
Table 1.2
Major US Military Involvement during Presidential Transitions
Since 1950
Date
Begun Situation Location
Date
Ended
Presidents
Affected
June
1950 Korean Conflict
Korean
Peninsula
July
1953
Truman,
Eisenhower
December
1960 Cuba
Caribbean
Sea
October
1962
Eisenhower,
Kennedy
August
1964 Vietnam Conflict S.E. Asia
April
1975
Johnson,
Nixon
December
1992
Operation Restore Hope
(UNOSOM I) Somalia
May
1993
G.H.W. Bush,
Clinton
December
1998 Operation Desert Spring Kuwait Ongoing
Clinton,
G.W. Bush
September
2001
Operation Enduring
Freedom
Multiple
Locations Ongoing
G.W. Bush,
Obama
March
2003 Operation Iraqi Freedom Iraq Ongoing
G.W. Bush,
Obama
violence throughout transition. While conflict may be introduced at any time during
the administration of a particular president, there is a high likelihood of new conflict
being introduced at some point in the transition itself.
1.3 Dissertation Statement
The ability of a single actor in global affairs, such as the United States, must
bring about an academic discussion of particular reasons that its international policy is
created. With the history of influence that reactionary and Realist Theoretical
strategy has had on many previous discussions, it is the aim of this paper to move
away from the consideration of those ideas which may skew the outcomes of this
investigation.
- 12 -
The post-Cold War setting has brought about two major shifts in the area of
international violence and military action: Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW) and
Sovereignty Free Actors (SFAs). These two elements have moved away the standards
that were consistent with elements of Détente and Game Theory. To use an academic
theory that was unable to even remotely predict the massive collapse of the Soviet
system has little use to us in this investigation of sub-national orientated interstate
conflict.
To properly look at the role of SFA violence inherent in the US Presidential
system, we must be clear on the goals of our investigation. The transitional period that
comes in the United States Electoral Cycle is a time of optimism, uncertainty, lowered
accountability, and vulnerability. As such, the process has come under review in the
past, but the need exists to examine this phenomenon again. This time, it must be
applied to the prospects of engaging this policy under the auspices of 4GW and the
modern electoral situation. Therefore, this paper‟s research question is: Can future
elections be influenced through foreign policy and military actions implemented by
the departing administration during the vulnerable United States Presidential
Transitional Period?
The study of this prospect is important to the continued study of international
relations, particularly conflict resolution and international development.
Understanding the tendencies of one of the major players in global affairs will help to
assess the probabilities of future military engagement, and how the former policies of
this nation will continue in the future. While the link may not be a direct cause and
effect result, investigating the potential of this occurrence is necessary.
- 13 -
This question also helps to develop the „long war‟ conflict with respect to
4GW4. While there have been many examples of this type of warfare in the past two
decades, the initial reporting on it has been decidedly one sided due to nationalistic
influences. Adding new perspectives to the impacts of this new level of conflict will
help to dissect the situation behind electoral processes, as well as bringing to light the
direct application of United States electoral politics and its relationship to global
security. With all the interest surrounding this period in the cycle of government, the
determination of this policy must be addressed with greater detail and the specifics of
this phenomenon should be scrutinized with further investigation.
1.4 Research Methodology and Objectives
The methodology used to investigate this research question is essential to the
development of the paper, and will directly affect the results that are found. While the
bulk of political science research has been conducted with the motive of some version
of theoretical Realism in mind, the premise of this paper will shift from that paradigm
and attempt to shed some light on these new processes and explain them where
previous efforts have not been able to predict their occurrences or outcomes.
Post-internationalism is a theory presented by James N. Rosenau in his book
Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity (1990). The ideals
listed in this work specify the essential tenants of Post-internationalism: the shifting
continuity of international relations (p 67), the issues with fixed theories that only
work in the current established international system (p 21), the rising power of
4 Fourth Generation Warfare is discussed at length in Chapter Three.
- 14 -
Sovereignty Free Actors (SFAs) (p 114), and the development of relations between
groups of all sizes and levels globally (p 141).
The challenge to sovereign states has come from many different locations.
With the modern incarnation of globalization, the ability for businesses to venture
globally and affect trade has increased. There are also players that come into
participation through militia groups, religious groups, and other forms that command
ability and influence across national boundaries. This investigation is aided by the
research of Chong (2002) with respect to the level of influence that players outside of
the nation state possess. In understanding the legitimacy of these players, we must
shift our perception of what foreign policy entails and how it must be investigated in
the future.
Ferguson and Mansbach (2007) help us to further understand this thought.
SFAs have major advantages that states do not. Primarily, states have a responsibility
to their populace and communities. The responsible role of government in these
sovereign states is to protect their citizens and provide security socially,
economically, and militarily. SFAs do not have any of these burdens. They have no
mandate to be accountable to any large group and maintain a specific set of standards
for their followers. There are obvious exceptions. For example, businesses must
acquire a profit for their shareholders, and religious groups must provide moral and
spiritual security. This ability to act much more freely without the constraints that
come with the responsibility of common government allow for specific agendas to be
set and acted upon that are relatively more extreme than those required by states.
- 15 -
SFAs and their abilities to challenge states are one of the direct evolutionary
steps that have expanded their strength in the modern age. While the study of global
politics has been taught under the common nomenclature of International Relations,
the truth is that nations and states are not the only considerations that need to be taken
into account when reviewing all political interactions around the world. These actors
need to be taken into greater reflection in investigating the relationship between these
ever emergent players and their role in global affairs.
With differing objectives, UN peacekeeping actions and other liberal
internationalistic actions are typically seen as positive at home and dismissed by most
naysayers as „legacy building.‟ The interesting truth behind the situation is that the
domestic political party that is playing through the Office of the President is much
different in order to control the issues focus for future voter utility. This leads to
some direct questions:
How important are the roles that US political parties play in influencing
presidential decision making, particularly during the final transition period?
Is this trend towards violence coincidental or a direct ploy by party leaders
planning the next round of elections?
How does a newly elected president deal with these situations into which they
are forced?
If this seeming coincidence is in fact a trend, how can the international
community protect itself from the political games that may influence them in
the future?
- 16 -
1.5 Dissertation Overview
This dissertation will investigate each of the major points reviewed above in
turn, with respect to their relationship with each other. Understanding how they
interact and affect communities is the central point to understanding of how the
United States Electoral Cycle plays out in the modern world of 4GW. Using the
specific case example of the 1992-1993 transitional period and its impact both within
the realm of military conflict and the resulting influence on the 1994 midterm
elections, Chapter Two will investigate the historical turbulence that occurs during
presidential transition. With particular focus on the ideas of public opinion and the
resulting action by the voters at the poll every two and four years, the case will be
shown that presidential transition is a particular case study to be focused upon for
causes of international violence.
Chapter Three will build from the principals of transitional violence and
partisan maneuvering through established tendencies of voter manipulation through
the fora of global affairs, applying the framework of heightened SFA abilities through
4GW as an essential facet. Modern conflict in application to voter manipulation has
evolved from the Cold War nuclear threat to include the „politics of fear‟ and other
national safety concerns to become a major consideration within rational choice
behavior by individual voters.
Chapter Four looks at the particulars of the unique situation presented during
the 1992 presidential election. With the inclusion of a major third party candidate, the
rising influence of a relatively new block of voters arose in the form of the „New
- 17 -
South‟. Along with their impact, the discussion of recession during this period had a
significant impact on the outcome of this election. Chapter Four will continue to look
at the violence that came as a direct outcome of the transitional period. With the
removal of George H.W. Bush after a single term in office, the political decision to
use military force in Somalia was declared during the period of transition. The
outcomes of Operation Restore Hope had lasting affects not on the G.H.W. Bush
Administration that implemented the action, but upon the Clinton White House that
followed. With this transition also came an attack upon the United States itself
through a terrorist action in New York City, a direct consequence of the vulnerability
experienced during transition. The combined effects of these actions had serious
repercussions on the actions taken by the Clinton administration and the rest of the
world. Following that, it will look at the direct impacts that the actions taken by the
G.H.W. Bush Administration during transition had upon the next congressional
election in 1994, which reversed in Democratic advantage in drastic fashion.
Chapter Five concludes this dissertation with an analysis of preventative
measures taken by the United States during times of transition. Understanding the
vulnerability that comes with this period, specific measures have been taken to protect
the nation at home. While the national defense has been increased due to lessons
learned in the past, the impact of military actions taken under the impetus of partisan
politics is not. With popular approval no longer an issue for the outgoing president,
military actions taken during this time have direct consequences that must be met by
the president-elect. If the lessons of the past have been learned, then we can predict
the impact of US foreign policy, particularly military, upon the results of the midterm
electoral cycle. The conclusions established by fully realizing the influence that
- 18 -
transitional violence enacted by a departing president allows for a „blowback effect‟5,
skewing the potential issues of an upcoming election towards a more favorable
establishment for the exiting party.
5 Phrase coined by Chalmers Johnson (2000) to refer to the unintended consequences of actions taken.
- 19 -
CHAPTER TWO
Party and Transition
[T]he whole art of statesmanship is the art of bringing
the several parts of government into effective
cooperation for the accomplishment of particular
common objects, and party objects at that.
-Woodrow Wilson (1908)
The presidential electoral season in the United States is an interesting time of
change and development that is observed by many around the world with interest.
The two party system that exists within the government allows for a game of sorts that
resembles the head to head competition experienced in sports. With the excitement
surrounding the hype and drama of the election season fueled by the international
reach of modern media outlets, hopes for the future of the United States and its
relationship with the world are ignited.
When the incumbent party is electorally removed from office, the resulting
transition of executive power typically presents a perceived shift in agenda for the
nation as a whole. While the practiced administration of one party is replaced by the
inexperienced administration of another, the opportunity arises for manipulation,
irresponsible reaction, and the venture of damaging policy to be set as the transition
period takes place.
- 20 -
The partisan agenda that is established outside of the complications of direct
governmental control revels that planning an implementation of policy to be used as
tactics to develop favorable results in upcoming elections. The best opportunity of
initiating those situations comes not once the new members of Congress and the
Executive Branch have assumed office, but during the eleven week period
immediately following election and before inauguration.
2.1 Transition as a Case Study in Presidential Uses of Force
The United States federal election process is a situation that involves electing
leaders to both the Executive and Legislative branches of government. As such, the
relationship between the two does not begin and end on Election Day, but continues
well past that important date. As the abilities of one are strongly dependent upon the
other through „checks and balances‟ established throughout the Constitution of the
United States, the agendas established by the two major parties are subject to having
control of both of these branches.
With the lengthy process of modern electioneering, the popular emotion
surrounding Election Day is similar to the end of a major war. This is not the case, as
each election is merely another battle in securing control of the federal government.
With the end of one election cycle, planning for the next one arises (Hastedt and
Eksterowicz 2001)6. When a particular party loses control of a branch of government,
6 The Constitution of the United States of America, 20
th Amendment set the date of Presidential
Inauguration at 20 January and Congressional Inauguration to 3 January, moved from the first
Wednesday of March, due to the lengthy period of Transition. As noted by S. Rep. 26, 72d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1932), „[W]hen our Constitution was adopted there was some reason for such a long intervention
of time between the election and the actual commencement of work by the new Congress. . . . Under
- 21 -
planning for reclamation of those offices begins immediately with the introduction of
new policy implemented during the „lame duck‟ period between Election Day and
Inauguration Day (Howell and Mayer 2005). These policies have long term impacts
both domestically and globally.
The transitional policy of the United States is one that is difficult to
comprehend in its immensity, perplexing in its method, and difficult for foreign
peoples to predict. With this stage of transition come new expectations, fresh
relationships, and sometimes old fears. While the period of changeover technically
lasts only the time between Election Day and Inauguration Day, planning for this
event comes long before this period and continues until well after (Hastedt and
Eksterowicz Ibid.).
Three main events happen during the period of transition. 1) The conclusion
of the previous administration and their policies, 2) the implementation of a new
administration and its officers, and 3) executing the policies of the new administration
and fulfilling promises made during campaigning. The world does not stop for the
United States, and instances happen around the globe that may require attention by
only one president at a time (CNN 2008). Preparedness to take charge from Day One
is an essential focus of preparing for the new administration during transition.
present conditions [of communication and transportation] the result of elections is known all over the
country within a few hours after the polls close, and the Capital City is within a few days' travel of the
remotest portions of the country. . . Another effect of the amendment would be to abolish the so-called
short session of Congress. . . . Every other year, under our Constitution, the terms of Members of the
House and one-third of the Members of the Senate expire on the 4th day of March. . . . Experience has
shown that this brings about a very undesirable legislative condition. It is a physical impossibility
during such a short session for Congress to give attention to much general legislation for the reason
that it requires practically all of the time to dispose of the regular appropriation bills.‟
- 22 -
Ensuring the process of a smooth transition is essential to the security of the US at
home and abroad.
The influence of SFAs at this point of vulnerability is at one of its highest
levels. If we recognize the individual political parties as SFAs in their own right, then
the stakes become even higher. With continued influence through campaign funding,
the ability to manipulate events outside the control of a sovereign nation, and any
number of other factors, the perceptions developed by these groups is more impactful
(Farnham 2004).
With the „uncertainty‟ of new administrations into this period, several cases
have presented themselves as crises that develop and require the new president to take
command just months after taking office (Table 2.1). This repetition of pattern has
two direct consequences, both of which are discussed below. The first is the
repetition of planned force during the transitional period, and the second is the level
of response taken by the newly inaugurated president.
Regardless of the experience that a new president brings into office with them,
the likelihood that an event of foreign nature will demand attention is a certainty
(Table 2.1). While the time on the job is not a subject of debate, the ability to handle
this situation is directly related to his or her experience in foreign policy. While there
is no real qualification that permits for any pre-training by a president before taking
office7, the response that they give to foreign affairs is directly related to their
7 As outlined by The Constitution of the United States, Article II, Section 1, the president must be
native born, thirty-five years of age, and lived at least fourteen consecutive years in the United States.
- 23 -
Table 2.1
Selected International Incidents and Attacks on US
and their Proximity to Election Since 1950
Situation Location Date Proximity to
Transition
RB-47
Incident/Hostage
Crisis
Barents Sea 1 July 1960 –
25 January 1961
4 Months Prior
through
Transition
Gulf of Tonkin Coastal Vietnam 2 August 1964 3 Months Prior
EC-121 shoot
down incident Sea of Japan 15 April 1969
3 Months
Following
Hostage Crisis Iran 4 November 1979 –
20 January 1981
1 Year Prior
Through Transition
World Trade
Center New York City 26 February 1993 1 Month Following
11 September
Attacks Multiple Locations 11 September 2001
8 Months
Following
Maersk Alabama
Hijacking Gulf of Aden 8-12 April 2009
10 Weeks
Following
previous experience globally, establishing a system of weak foreign policy (Potter
2007). Two major examples of this exist within recent US history: 1993 and 2001.
The United States during the transition period from George H.W. Bush to
William Clinton, and then from Clinton to George W. Bush provide the dichotomy of
two opposite responses to foreign policy crisis during their first year in office. For
William Clinton, the causes of this began during this 11 week period, when the US
involved itself in UNITAF through Operation Restore Hope in Somalia. The
implementation of this was issued by one president, but executed in large part by his
successor. The transfer of power from a president of one party to another led to
political disaster and a „gun-shy‟ policy that affected both the 1994 Midterm
Congressional election (Hill and Rae 1996) and US involvement in UN and NATO
security missions throughout the 1990‟s, but had the exact opposite effect in response
- 24 -
to 9/11, as the administration of President George W. Bush announced the unilateral
ability to defend the nation from terrorist attacks (Yoo 2001).
The aspects of the active and passive presidencies were initially gauged by
Barber (1992), and determined the tendencies of individual presidencies and their
reaction to crises both foreign and domestic. Judging them further by classifying
them as positive and negative in situational conditions, the proper reaction by a
president to these situations has been the guiding line of popular approval by all fora
of review. The positive passive reactions of one administration may be reviewed as
negative passive in another. On the same principles the positive active actions of one
administration may be reviewed as negatively active in another scenario.
2.2 The Electoral Process and Survival
In post-Cold War conflicts by the US with many of these SFAs, the necessary
state coalition to engage these players on sovereign territory has led to a rift being
formed in its global relations. However, with an ability to directly affect the UN, the
United States has a tool to use in implementing domestic policy over the global
community. While international policy does not historically list as a major voting
concern of the American public, the ability to influence negative opinion is always
present. The unpopular actions taken by the United States during the Vietnam and
Iraq conflicts were a major component in shaping the overall perception of the
Presidents in office at the time of election. Understanding this, national
electioneering tries to avoid making major foreign policy shifts, particularly military
ones, during the twelve months preceding an election. That attitude changes
- 25 -
monumentally during the eleven weeks that come between Election Day and
Inauguration Day.
The work of Anthony Downs (1957, Figure 2.1) deciphers the importance in
issue relation to voting functions. The study makes the determination that control of
the pertinent issues to voters can influence the power of both a majority and minority
Figure 2.18
Downs Equations on the Relationship between Governmen t Acts
and Voters’ Utility Functions
8 Taken from Downs (1957).
t stands for the whole election period.
V stands for actual votes cast for the incumbents.
V' stands for expected votes the government feels will be cast for it.
A stands for government actions.
U stands for voters‟ utility incomes from government action
e stands for the date of the election at the end of period t.
P stands for the strategies of the opposition parties.
f1 is the incumbent party.
1. The actions of the government are a function of the way it expects voters to vote
and the strategies of its opposition:
2. The government expects voters to vote according to changes in their utility
incomes and the strategies of opposition parties:
3. Voters actually vote according to changes in their utility incomes and
alternatives offered by the opposition:
4. Voters‟ utility incomes from government activity depend upon the actions taken
by government during the election period:
5. The strategies of opposition parties depend upon their views of the voter‟s utility
incomes and the actions taken by the government in power:
- 26 -
party. As such, the power of polling the electorate on their needs and importance has
led to a shift in the way campaigns are run. Controlling the focus of discussion and
debate by the candidates and their review in popular media to the issues that match
majority public opinion to the candidate and their party platform has become the
norm, apart from historical deciding factors based on support through shifting
ideologies and transient policy statements on popular issues.
The final few weeks in office for a departing President have normally been
viewed as a „farewell tour‟ with little policy being done. The exception to this rule is
the always controversial Presidential Pardoning9, which has plagued the potential
legacy of many different presidents in recent times (Moore 1989). The truth is that
many different actions take place during this final period. These measures are not
limited to the Executive and their officers, however. The teams of political party
strategists always have their eye looking to future elections have a major influence
with how policies that are implemented during their last opportunity can affect their
rivals who will assume office over the next few years.
Ability to influence negative policy to harm elected presidents from opposition
party during the transition period is one that may seem an unlikely strategy, but there
are a number of factors that make this an ideal time to implement such a tactic. The
first thought toward the future are the next round of national elections, which take
place for the full 435 member House of Representatives10
and one-third of the Senate
9 The Constitution of the United States of America, Article II, Section 4
10
The Constitution of the United States of America, Article I, Section 2
- 27 -
every two years11
. This gives the public a chance to review the direction that the
recently elected government has taken the country. If they are forced to deal with
situations that were set in place by others who intentionally set negative policy that
would influence public opinion and focus the issues control, then they are required to
deal with those crises and not the promises that were given to their constituents during
their individual campaigns. This inability to act on new policy gives challengers from
the opposition party a leverage point to campaign on during the next round of voting.
Secondly, the opportunity to produce a potentially negative public policy
comes from the natural lack of focus the public has on the outgoing administration.
The excitement that has been built around the newly elected President steals the
spotlight and focuses it on the possibilities for the future. This reduces the scrutiny
that the public has on the exiting president. The desire to control the news cycle is
typically a major focus of the White House, but during this time it is increasingly
difficult to do. Using this to its advantage, the administration is able to act „below the
radar‟ and outside the public perspective while the dénouement is taking place.
Third, foreign policy can be implemented without congressional approval over
the short term. With the Congress on winter recess until January12
, the November
through December window gives the ability for the Executive Branch to execute
policy while the „lame-duck‟ congress is out on recess and shifting through a
transition of their own. While this policy is implemented, Congress cannot reconvene
11
The Constitution of the United States of America, 17th Amendment
12
„Adjournment sine die‟ for the U.S. Congress is not identified by a specific date on the calendar, but
rather is determined yearly by the Speaker of the House and the Senate Majority leader and approved
by a vote in each body. The date of adjournment sine die for the past 10 Congressional Sessions in
election years has ranged between 9 October (102nd
Congress, 1992) and 19 December (105th Congress,
1998) (United States Congress 2007).
- 28 -
without a quorum or by direct call of the President in times of emergency13
. This
temporary leave of one of the „Constitutional Checks‟ allows for the opportunity to
implement a new policy.
Fourth, foreign policy takes longer to execute, and usually will not be
implemented until the president is no longer in office. Giving this responsibility to
the incoming administration and its new officers allows for a „pass the buck‟
mentality that eases the direct focus on the exiting president. This ability to announce
executive decision, but not face the requirement of actual execution, allows for the
future to be faced by another president.
2.3 Political Parties as SFAs
With the spotlight of the nature of human security shifting its global focus
onto the realm of terrorism over recent years, the role that the United States has
played in driving the events surrounding this area of security has risen significantly.
The state with the highest building capacity in the world in regards to military
capability has shifted its focus onto the areas of terrorism since 9/11 has led to the
shifting impact around the globe in the interest of this power and their intent to spread
the issue of hegemonic control in any fora that it wishes.
Following the events of 9/11, the government of the United States has dictated
its policy through various means, such as the 2002 State of the Union which outlined
terrorist states and the 2002 National Security Strategy that defined what came to be
13
United States Constitution, 20th Amendment
- 29 -
known as the „Bush Doctrine‟14
. These policies were formally implemented by the
Government of the United States, and supported by the agencies and institutions
therein.
With such a large state dictating a policy that influences actors around the
globe and requires at the minimum a measuring of reaction by the United States in
terms of sovereign policy, it is important to understand the development of such a
Doctrine by the United States. Now more than ever, as the policy begins to shift
following the 2008 elections, which brought about a new executive that promised
change in all areas of government, it is important to understand where these policies
originate from.
While the standard foreign policy of the United States is a planned measure
that carefully takes into account the needs of different aspects of the nation and assess
them against potential threats and needs, the events since 2001 have not been
„business as usual‟. The unpredicted crisis that evolved due to 9/11 has propelled the
United States‟ interests in a reactionary format. The Bush Doctrine was not a long
planned evolving policy, but a reaction to the crisis itself resulting in a lack of
significant planning for the road ahead. This type of reaction directly displays
Barber‟s idea of active v. passive presidencies, and their reaction to situations that
were begun before their administration took office.
14
The Bush Doctrine is a major work but focuses its priorities on three main tenants: 1) Protective
measures for United States and its citizens, 2) The spread of democracy and its values throughout the
world, and 3) the willingness to pursue these elements unilaterally and/or pre-emptively if necessary.
- 30 -
As such, the question arises as to who actually dictates the United States‟
policy, particularly with regards to human security and terrorism. With manipulation
from government agencies, foreign actors, and the institutions that exist at home,
there are many influences that could account for any action taken by the government.
However, it is the position of this chapter that the most influential actor in
determining public policy in terms of terrorism comes not from groups within the
government, but non-governmental organizations (NGOs), specifically political
parties acting as SFAs.
2.4 The Process of Partisan Policy Development
Political parties play a major role in politics of the United States. With 99% of
the members of Congress registered with either the Democratic or Republican Party,
the ability to influence individuals is massive (United States Senate 2009; United
States House of Representatives 2009). What is not as obvious is how the parties
themselves develop policy. The mandate of a political party itself is clear: to have
their members elected to government office. Without this the political party loses
influence and dies. As such, there are three main factors that attribute themselves to
deciding policy: influencing their base of voters, influencing swing or moderate
voters, and the influence of the opposition party with regards to such policy.
The development of the base of voters is the first and key element in
determining the policy of a political party. It is the foundation upon which politicians
are elected to office. With the planning of future elections, it is essential that the
interests of these people are taken into consideration. With massive polling
- 31 -
information conducted, the viewpoints of the voters are assessed. After the will is
understood, parties modify their viewpoints to not only meet these needs, but devise a
strategy that will incorporate the largest percent of the population possible to be
included with them. Without the strength of the base of voters behind the party, the
mandate of the party is lost, and officials will not be elected to office.
The second thought that political parties must take into consideration when
developing policy is the will of the independent or moderate voter. For people who
are undecided upon an issue, policy must dictate to them that their partisan political
view is the correct one. With $1,600,000,000 spent by all candidates on influencing
this section of the population in the 2008 Presidential Election Cycle alone (Federal
Election Commission 2009), they are a key element that can decide the outcome of
voting. With so many elections in recent electoral cycles being determined by the
slimmest of margins, they hold the element that can turn a massive victory into utter
defeat.
The third influence on determining the course of public policy for a political
party is the influence of the opposition. While change has become the motto for the
recent election in 2008, prior elections have often rallied behind the mantra of
„different‟. This policy becomes announced in stump speeches across the nation had
the air of „we‟re better than our opponents‟, and then they would list why. In a two
party system such as the one in the United States, it is incredible to think that there are
only two sides to an issue. Regardless, the stance of establishing a policy that differs
from the opposition is the third essential element in determining a political policy by a
party.
- 32 -
2.5 Implementing Partisan Policy during Transition
The period following the election can result in joy, defeat, or a combination of
feelings as certain representative members running on a coalition‟s behalf win and
lose. In the zero-sum format of two party electoral systems, there are finite
expectations as to the results that can realistically be assumed as an outcome of the
election process. As the consequence of voter behavior is analyzed, the strategizing
begins to establish policy to promote a higher potential of success in the future.
With the instant ability enabled by exit polling and other means of immediate
analysis available, the development of strategy can begin at a very fast rate.
Establishing weaknesses within party policy as established by voting behavior betrays
the failures and successes of previous campaign plans and enables the practical and
physical truth behind the needs of the voting public. Since this direct information is
easily processed and analyzed, the structure of policy in an electorally ousted
president can be influenced. The knowledge that the future of government will be
dominated by a new party with differing thought on policy leads to a rush of activity
to finish the job before the clock runs out.
Understanding Downs‟ theorem (ibid.) on issues and voter utility
manipulation, the obvious answer for a majority party in office who will be the
minority party in the next electoral cycle is to focus the issues that will arise for the
next round of voting. While the most obvious method for executing this plan comes
- 33 -
throughout the manipulation of media and spin15
, the power that comes with a
relatively unchecked president and their staff during the exiting transition provides for
many levels of actions, particularly if that president is especially skilled in foreign
affairs.
Party manipulation has been successful in bringing about change during the
first midterm election cycle historically. As shown in Table 2.2, the immediate shift
away from the president‟s party has occurred in every first new presidential
Congressional Election since 1968 with the exception of George W. Bush. The focus
on the major issue of national security in 2002 matched the profile of existing party
policy as announced during the president‟s previous campaign. As the spotlight on
issues is positive for the sitting president, the coattails extended by their popularity on
pertinent issues carries to the Congress.
Imposing these positive issues during transition is not an easy task,
particularly with regard to foreign affairs. Heads of state around the world recognize
this lame duck situation and view the departing president‟s abilities as relatively weak
(Walker and Franklin 2009). As major multi-lateral action with these states these are
non-possibilities, this leaves unilateral abilities to remain. As these are limited
without Congressional approval, aside from prisoner pardoning, the extreme unilateral
ability of the US foreign power remains. When a mandate of unilateral action has
been established previously in an administration, this task becomes relatively simpler.
However, the action of engaging in multi-lateral affairs using the
15
The long discussed issue of opinionated news outlets who have the tendency to side with particular
parties or candidates is a direct consequence of the relationship between certain media groups and
political agendas.
- 34 -
Table 2.216
United States House of Representatives
Member Affil iation by Party, 1968-2008
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350Democrat Republican Independent/ 3rd Party
influence available through the UN or NATO traditionally provides for a lower level
of outcry from the international community, and the ability to shift the center of focus
at home. (Walker and Franklin Ibid.)
The engagement of such policy is not the same in recent years as it was in the
past. With the growing power of SFA influence and ability to act, combined with the
changing face of warfare itself, the usage of such actions that once would seem
simply irresponsible now plays out as insanity. The long war effects of engaging a
SFA for short term political gain leads to massive impacts and blowback that ripple
around the globe. The affairs of an active or passive president can disrupt the ability
of the US in international affairs, and lead to disastrous outcomes for many elsewhere
in the world, but only a few within the US itself.
16
Looking at only the House of Representatives party affiliation and not the Senate allows for a more
immediate reaction of voter opinion on party policy, due to the lesser overall impact of only 1/3 of the
Senate eligible for re-election every two years.
- 35 -
CHAPTER THREE
Fourth Generation Warfare and Post-
Internationalism in Power Crusades
You can‟t say civilization don‟t advance – for in every
war, they kill you in a new way.
-Will Rogers (1929)
The face of warfare is changing. The methods of the past have mainly
consisted of interstate and intrastate violent conflict, but the world of today now sees
aggression in a new form. This advance in the ways that wars are waged, the actors
who are involved, and the way in which the conflict is manifested have brought about
new challenges that are just beginning to be fully understood. The development of
these factors have been investigated and discussed at great length as their importance
has become immediately relevant in understanding modern global warfare. Gone are
the days of two armies facing each other down on fields of the countryside, locked in
personal combat to determine the future of their people. So too have the clearly
drawn battle lines of the World Wars of the 20th
Century. Weaponry has improved,
intelligence and electronics have been employed, and tactics have adapted to meet the
abilities of the modern warrior.
- 36 -
As such, wars are no longer simply a game of „capture the flag‟. It is simply
not enough to conquer the capital city of the enemy and institute stipulations of
unconditional surrender. The advancement of warfare has led to the development of
grass roots movements. Much as guerilla fighters are able to defeat a massive and
traditional force, the structuring of a demographically weaker force to defeat massive
armies has developed into a modern mobile unit able to move with speed and stealth.
Tactics have changed. No longer limited to standard military engagements,
wars now encompass the previously disregarded aspects of economic, social,
environmental, emotional, political, and media interests. These have become main
elements developed in defeating the will of a violent opponent. It is no longer the end
game to capture an enemy, but it has developed into one that demands moral defeat,
political change, and social reconstruction.
This chapter will focus on two main tenants of modern global security: Post-
internationalism and Fourth Generation Warfare17
. Establishing an understanding of
these concepts is vital to developing the modern impact that electoral politics in the
United States can have on global security issues around the world. By looking at the
SFA influence on modern warfare, we can further see the development of 4GW
through this understanding. The characteristic of United States foreign policy
following the end of the Cold War has been directly influenced by this manufacturing
of 4GW incidents. With the direct manipulation of partisan politics on foreign policy,
17
The first three generations of warfare have been identified by Lind et al. (Ibid) as: 1st Generation:
tactics of line and column; which developed in the age of the smoothbore musket. 2nd Generation:
tactics of linear fire and movement, with reliance on indirect fire. 3rd Generation: tactics of infiltration
to bypass and collapse the enemy's combat forces rather than seeking to close with and destroy them;
and defense in depth.
- 37 -
the presumption of SFA ability is shown with specific regard to the Neo-Conservative
movement of the 1990‟s which was then implemented during the 2000‟s.
3.1 Sovereignty Free Actor Influence on Warfare
The rise of actors outside the traditional sphere of state-centered governance
has increased in international relations. As the roles that business, philosophical, and
trans-national organizations play in the current phase of globalization renew
themselves, their growing influence has forced a shift in the reality that they bring to
global issues and policy.
The main tenet of Post-internationalism (outlined in Section 1.4) stresses the
shifting focus from states as being the only dominant actors in global exchanges.
Since the time of Westphalia in 1648, states have been treated as the dominant actor
in determining global affairs, and with good reason. Their ability to command
military, economic situations, and enact diplomacy has been the direct relationship of
sovereign states. However, the ability of states has been directly challenged since the
industrial revolution, with specific powers coming into play following WWII and
even more so since the end of the Cold War.
The development of SFAs has certainly impacted the current affairs of human
security, particularly with respect to violent conflict. Indeed, it has been noted that
the only wars that the United States has lost were not in the traditional war methods of
history, but modern conflicts undertaken through this new method (Hoffman 2006).
4GW has been effective in defeating Soviet influences in Afghanistan, a long time
- 38 -
consideration in insurgency around the globe, and a portrayer of violence as new
groups rebel against established state regimes.
Violent conflict through 4GW has shifted the methods and aims necessary to
declare victory through war. The elusiveness of an SFA to develop its base of
operations anywhere around the globe allows for this mobility to remain from the
traditional captivity and restrictions placed on state-centered organizations. This
provides a method that is more cost effective and produces results.
The rise of SFAs has been increasingly influential not only upon state actors,
but also with their relationship to each other. By establishing themselves as elements
of a formal state, they then have the opportunity to work through the system and
influence one another. Some branches of SFAs have taken it upon themselves to
engage state players either economically or politically, not through traditional head to
head competitions but by influencing their branches already established in the
challenging state. Along these lines, there have been numerous examples of SFAs
„making or breaking‟ the local economy of individual states or engaging states
democratically, with no respective central base of operations for states to respond to
with traditional diplomacy and political response.
3.2 Sovereignty Free Actor Influence on United States Foreign Policy
As SFAs have the ability only to act internationally and within state
boundaries, we see an influence that we are more accustomed to in the study of
political science. The networking of different non-governmental organizations
- 39 -
(NGOs) and their relationship to national policy is something that has been reviewed
at length. There is no doubt that the ability for a NGO to work influentially upon their
government has had a lasting impact. This relationship extends to foreign affairs as
well. The ability for focused NGOs with specific agendas to influence these groups is
particularly engraining when the relationships go not only to a specific government,
but to actions within those governments18
.
The relationship between NGOs and branches of the United States government
is not the beginning or ending point of the relationship. Different NGOs align
themselves with specific political parties as well. As representing specific interests
within the electoral constituency within the voting public, politicians are likely to take
into consideration the effects of lobbyists and other interest groups and enact
particular parts of their policy into law and action.
There is an extension of SFA action within the United States government.
While special interest groups and NGOs have a major vested interest within the state,
political parties fall under the auspices of a SFA. Their influence and agenda are not
regulated directly by governmental law, and their agenda to ensure favorable actions
to help with future planning is essential to recognize. The relationship between SFAs
and political parties does not end at the internal government, but actually extends into
the realm of global security.
18
To understand the difference between NGOs and SFAs, Rosenau (2006) notes that NGOs typically
establish single issue concerns and reactions while SFAs tend to shift their focus on various issues to
meet the needs of a recognized agenda, thereby advancing their goals and desires.
- 40 -
The ability of an individual political party in the United States to affect global
security is one of specific concern. While the structure of government is established
with a strong relationship of checks and balances, there is a major gap for
international action to be initiated by the Executive, or Presidential, branch of
government. With institutions such as the Department of State (foreign affairs) and
Department of Defense at their disposal, presidents are able to assign policy and
influence around the world without direct regulation from Congress.
While these abilities are relative to the popularity and strength of the President
in office, the potential rests with them to enact such change. As a member of one
specific party or another, they are able to place Secretaries in Cabinet positions that
are of a like mind and have similar agendas as the president. This ability puts into
power the influence of one party, and their NGO and interest group affiliation, into
the driver‟s seat of foreign policy. These groups and their agendas now have extreme
potential to enact global policy, with respect to the responsibilities towards the
citizens of the United States and checked by the alternate branches of the government.
An interesting cycle happens within these presidential administrations. With
the movement of parties in and out of power in the Executive and Legislative
branches of government comes cycles in the response, ability, and momentum of
foreign policy. This cycle flows over the four years of a presidential term, with
specific respect to the majority in Congress and the timing within the four year cycle
of electoral politics itself.
- 41 -
Realizing the influence that SFAs have upon the foreign policy of the United
States, it is important to look at the interests of how global SFAs have changed the
face of warfare itself in modern engagements. As the old global superiority of state
sovereignty is being challenged with its individual authority, so too are the traditional
values of warfare. This action has antiquated the former policy of military
engagements on large battlefields with a front line to a new generation of warfare
which engages states and SFAs into a multilevel approach that encompasses the new
level of global security.
3.3 Fourth Generation Warfare and US Foreign Policy
Following the end of the Cold War, the western powers, particularly the
United States, had the capability to spread hegemonic ideology around the world and
pacify many troubled situations with the intention of a single unifying „New World
Order‟. This policy discussed at length by the G.H.W. Bush Administration
established the mandate for the use of force in the 1991 Gulf War, and brought about
a sense of unity and pressures for peace by the UN focus19
(Butros-Ghali 1992).
Despite these intentions, the Realist perspective drew upon the necessity for
states to adopt policy in agreement with the US hegemon. In the unipolar conditions
left in the wake of the Cold War, many single states that stood opposed to the
principles of a US centric world eventually adapted policy that were included within
this vision. Through the development of coalitions, states have bound together on
specific issues to provide a balance in international policy. However, where state
19
This topic is discussed at greater length in Chapter Four.
- 42 -
security is concerned, the martial ability of the United States allow for the far
reaching policy of pro-US military policy to remain the norm in global affairs.
This point is where the Realist theoretical perspective fails to accurately
present the true situation at hand. The expectation from a Realist world would be that
violent conflict should fail due to the necessity of state survival. It is in effect not the
case. The level of violent conflict has been on the rise as of late. It has not been the
state on state violence of history, but the development of state on SFA violence that
have become the established quo of current affairs (Lind 2004).
The UN has had a shifting definition with regards to its role in peacekeeping
since 1992. With the combined effects of the end of the Cold War and UNITAF, the
tendency has moved toward humanitarian interests, and shifted from the original
outline of state security in the global setting (Murphy 1996). This has presented a
new look at the task outlined in the UNC (Article 2) and brought about the
implications given in the treaties formed during and following WWII defined
throughout Chapter V of the UNC. Looking at this shift through a Post-
internationalist view, it will become clear that the current situation of state security is
legally protected not by the UN, but by individual states and collective security
agreements.
The role of states is central to the research to these actions that are taken
within transition. The relatively new idea of „Failed States‟20
has been determined to
20
„Failed States‟ are reviewed and published annually by Foreign Policy Magazine. These numbers
are also reviewed by The Fund for Peace, and have been written about extensively by Chomsky (2006),
Ghani and Lockhart (2008), and Hoffman (2006).
- 43 -
result in the enlargement of international violent conflict. This theory has some merit,
but it tends to ignore the development of a new actor in the field of worldwide
relations. The rising influence of actors outside the realm of states and governments
has taken shape, and are more recognized in modern global politics.
Also recognized is the factor of the changing face of global warfare itself. The
theory of Fourth Generation Warfare has been identified by Lind et Al. (1989) and
Benbow (2008). The main points of this growing identification of warfare are the
essential shifting from the strengths of state led militaries to developing a form of
conflict that strikes at many different levels of the establishment. Hammes (1994)
outlines the tactical traits to 4GW. He notes that 4GW tends to21
:
Be fought in a complex arena of low-intensity conflict.
Include tactics/techniques from earlier generations.
Be fought across the spectrum of political, social, economic, and military
networks.
Be fought worldwide through these networks.
Involve a mix of national, international, transnational, and sub-national
actors.
With a general inability to fight a war effectively on the levels of major state
powers, deflecting the focus of conflict to violent military engagement to factors more
favorable to smaller actors. The development of this type of engagement will prolong
the planned effects of engagement made by the major state and result in a lower
21
While including the principles of Asymmetric Warfare, 4GW extends the discussion beyond simply
the divergence of military capabilities between groups to include soft and hard conflict strategy using
methods that directly affect the society, economy, religion, and other aspects of involved groups.
- 44 -
estimation of a cost to benefit ratio. Making the traditional battlefield irrelevant shifts
these SFAs into a stronger position, more likely to achieve their goals.
With this, the US military has made adaptations to this evolving type of
warfare. Artelli and Deckro (2008) have made notice of the change in the US
Doctrine for Joint Operations to re-align the timing of certain phases of the „Military
Operations Other Than War‟ (MOOTW), including the essential development of
defining war itself into a broader perspective that includes aspects previously
described as „situations short of war that require US military forces.‟ Barno (2006)
realizes the challenges to future military engagements, noting the idea of a „long war‟
that will challenge the willingness of democratic actors to engage in conflict over a
period of many years. This perception has been the defining component of United
States foreign policy for the entirety of the 21st Century.
3.4 The Impacts of Electoral Issue Development through 4GW
“We will work with the U.N. Security Council for the necessary
resolutions. But the purposes of the United States should not be
doubted. The Security Council resolutions will be enforced -- the just
demands of peace and security will be met -- or action will be
unavoidable. And a regime [Iraq] that has lost its legitimacy will also
lose its power.”
-George W. Bush (2002)
The idea of United States unilateral action has been presented throughout
current United States foreign policy, particularly in respect to the actions in
Afghanistan since 2001 and Iraq since 2003. The previously, the standard was for the
United States to shift consideration between isolationism and participation. Now that
- 45 -
consideration has shifted to the thought of unilateralism versus multilateralism
(Anderson 2004). Now commonly referred to as the „Bush Doctrine‟, this strategy
has been implemented not only in reaction to the attacks on the United States on 11
September 2001, but as a reaction to repeated acts against the United States for many
years (Cooley 2002). The results of previous engagements through Cold War proxy
battles had left a strong SFA that had taken its mission abroad, built on the
foundations of what Pakistani Ambassador to the UN Shamshad Ahmad referred to as
a „Kalashnikov culture‟ (Risen and Miller 2001).
The thought of 4GW has embraced both the tenants of Post-internationalism
and the Bush Doctrine. As international relations shifts from the nation state status
quo that has been in effect since 1648, the continuous change that is a standard
acceptance of many differing theories now must be adapted to include not just „sub-
state actors‟, but SFAs (Mansbach 2004). At the end of the Cold War, the United
States redeveloped a policy enacted since the end of World War II that was devoted
toward the idea of multilateral engagements with problem states. The idea that states
could be better influenced through relations by many member nations, formed
typically in collective security groups such as the UN or NATO, usually was enacted
through strict sanctions against organized states that possess formal governmental
leadership. By doing this, the idea of threat could be a deterrent towards actors that
might possibly enact irrational behaviors that endanger outside groups of people. As
stated by the United States National Security Council (2006):
“[T]he first duty of the United States Government remains
what it always has been: to protect the American people and American
interests. It is an enduring American principle that this duty obligates
the government to anticipate and counter threats, using all elements of
national power, before the threats can do grave damage. The greater
- 46 -
the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction – and the more compelling
the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if
uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy‟s attack.”
Along with the idea of a preventative mission against potential enemies, the
United States has included a stance on promoting democracies in nations that are
currently under a style of unbalanced totalitarian regime. With this, the American
Government has left the clause purposefully vague as to be redefined time and time
again to fit the needs of specific situations. With the current war against terrorist
insurgencies that threaten the fledgling Iraqi democratic government, the United
States has determined to maintain a military presence in the area in order to ensure the
safe development of this pro-American democratic government. As the theory that
fair and impartial democracies are inherently peaceful toward each other, the hope is
that the favorable governments that replace irrational and imbalances tightly
controlled ones will pose a smaller threat towards the United States and their
economic interests in the region22
.
Preventative war policies that the United States has decided to enact are an
announcement to the world that it is now willing to take on anyone who may stand in
its path. Without the needs of collective security groups, the United States feels as
though a unilateral course of action is the best way to ensure its long term security
around the world. Its role in these groups has long been as the major contributor in
arms, supplies, and manpower to aid in actions that are requested by the UN (United
Nations Secretariat 2008). As such, the international community has reacted with a
22
The continuing discussion behind the Democratic Peace Theory is too voluminous to cover here, but
Jervis (2002) leads us to excellent summaries of the situation as covered by Ray (1995, 1998), Russett
(1993), and Russett and Oneal (2001 Chaps. 2 and 3); for critiques see Gowa (1999) and Mares (2001,
Chap. 4).
- 47 -
level of distrust, particularly by those who are not in step with the current policies
enacted by America. While the lone superpower idea had an air of potential peace
building for the future, the reality is that it has not concluded as such. The United
States will only feel secure as long as the rest of the world matches their vision for the
entire world, and will stand by with force if it is not met.
- 48 -
CHAPTER FOUR
The Politics of 1992-1994
There is nothing more difficult to take in hand, more
perilous to conduct or more uncertain in its success than
to take the lead in the introduction of a new order of
things.
-Niccolo Machiavelli (1532)
The election of a United States President demands consistency, a lot of hard
work, and a bit of luck. Following the strong Electoral College successes of the
Reagan administration during the 1980‟s, the Republican Party had secured a measure
of maturity throughout the entire process. The election of Reagan‟s Vice President
into the number one position in 1988 was a continuation of the positive perception by
the American people onto the legacy established by Ronald Reagan. With the
maintenance of the Reaganist stratagem, America eased its way from the Cold War
persona that it had developed since World War II, and into the „End of History‟
(Fukuyama 1993) as the lone remaining global superpower.
Despite these positive perceptions by the American people, the heir apparent
to the Reagan Dynasty was not able to hold on to the Oval Office for the full two
terms allowed by the 22nd Amendment. Being voted out of power following a single
term, the political turbulence surrounding the events of the 1992 General Election in
- 49 -
the United States provided a series of unique encounters that were not appropriately
dealt with by the Republican Party prior to Election Day, resulting in the rise of
William Clinton.
This chapter will show that the transition to the Clinton Administration was
not one without troubles. With development of violent conflict striking at both home
and abroad, the first year on the foreign policy front of the Clinton Presidency was
mired with situations that began long before the oath of office was given. The
reactions to these strikes defined the passive presidency that proved to be the course
of action for the following seven years, resulting in a major lack of action in future
crises in locations such as Rwanda, the Balkans, and elsewhere around the world.
4.1 The Situations Surrounding the 1992 General Election
The presidency of George H.W. Bush began with an optimistic outlook on the
perception of America around the world. With the ending of the Cold War and the
development of new relationships between emerging democracies, the realm of
international relations was seen as a positive viewpoint for major powers to use their
ability to come together and influence change in some traditionally troublesome areas
of the world.
The presidency of G.H.W. Bush was defined by his foreign policy. With a
massive shift in global affairs from demonstrations in China to the collapsing of
Communism in Europe and Asia, the height of the President‟s foreign action came
with the reaction to Saddam Hussein‟s Iraqi military invasion of Kuwait in 1991. As
- 50 -
the coalition of international response formed under Operation Desert Shield to
protect the sovereignty of Saudi Arabia and transformed into the invasion of Iraq and
Kuwait in Operation Desert Storm, the ability for the world to come together against
troubling regimes was shown. As this international solidarity was forming, other
problems were developing at home during the same time
The domestic reaction to the invasion of Iraq was initially positive. As the
overwhelming force was able to route the fourth largest army in the world
(International Institute for Strategic Studies 1993), the idea of regime change was
never realized. The removal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait had been seen to be action
enough, and the power within Iraq remained with Saddam Hussein.
The economic front was a situation that developed as a transformation for the
positive aspects of the G.H.W. Bush administration. With declines in the power of
the United States economy as well as poor leadership by the administration, obvious
factions were seen to develop within the Republican Party itself. In the run for re-
election in 1992 President Bush was challenged in the primary by Pat Buchanan, the
first time a sitting president had been challenged by a member of his own party in a
primary since Senator Edward Kennedy challenged President Carter in 1980.
The redistricting of the nation following the decennial 1990 census put a new
shift on the Electoral College math that had been established in the 1980‟s. The
development of these problems created massive unrest around the nation as new
representatives took Congress, and established a weakening position in the
presidency. Further domestic unrest was seen as major race riots erupted across Los
- 51 -
Angeles following the Rodney King trial, and entrenched the distance that the White
House had with the real domestic issues facing urban America.
The establishment of the religious movement of by Pat Robertson and Jerry
Falwell‟s Christian Coalition was another factor that split the Republican Party in the
1992 elections. The establishment of conservative issues based within the Christian
faith pushed new issues of religion into the arena of Presidential politics. This
movement that brought about a new focus of morality into the national races, the
underlying definition of presence brought about by the strength of the Evangelical
Christian Movement defined themselves as a new and formidable force across the
nation.
With so many new and defining factors at play during this Presidential
Election race, the ultimate straw that may have broken the camel‟s back was the loss
of Lee Atwater in 1990. As the lead political strategist in earlier Republican races, his
untimely stroke proved to be fatal and lead to a power vacuum in the Republican
Party structure. As leadership shifted to William Bennett and Clayton Yeutter,
eventually was Sam Skinner and Robert Tetter led the campaign to re-elect the
President.
On the other side of the political spectrum of American politics, the
Democratic Party was not showing major signs of strength either. In a primary field
that was devoid of a bright candidate, a vigorous battle emerged that resulted in
William Clinton taking the eventual nomination. The race was defined by campaign
manager James Carville‟s memo that outlined the simplistic focus of the Clinton
- 52 -
talking points; the motto of „It‟s the Economy, Stupid‟ became the mantra that
epitomized the tone of the entire campaign season, as well as bumper stickers that
read „Saddam Hussein still has a job, do you?‟ (Woodward 1994).
The lack of strong candidates from either of the major parties opened the door
to allow a serious contention from a third candidate, and that person developed as
billionaire H. Ross Perot founded a campaign centered around the issue of the
economic downturn, and specifically on the international policy established by the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), to which Perot vigorously
objected. With self-paid thirty minute „infomercials‟ to introduce him to the
American public, the development of this candidate played a major factor in the
electoral results on 5 November 1992.
With some 19% of the vote, Perot undoubtedly made a major impact on the
outcome of the election. Clinton earned 43% and Bush 38% (Table 4.1), but the
results of the Electoral College gave Clinton a clear win earning 370 votes and Bush
receiving only 168 (Figure 4.1). Perot did not win a single state, but should not be
regarded as a non-factor. The demonstration of a major third party candidate showed
that a new page had been turned in national politics, and that the situation was ripe for
direct actions that could be manipulated with drastic political strategy that could
contain the massive amount of new issues on the scene, as Downs had shown some 40
years previously, resulting in positive outcomes for the newly electorally reduced
minority Republican Party.
- 53 -
Table 4.1
1992 Presidential Election Popular Vote Results
Candidate Number of
Votes
Percentage of
Total
States
Won
Electoral
College Votes
George H.W.
Bush 39,104,500 37.7% 18 168
William J.
Clinton 44,909,806 43%
32 +
D.C. 370
H. Ross
Perot 19,743,821 18.9% 0 0
4.2 UNITAF and the Decision to Act
With the election of William Clinton to the White House, the lame duck
presidency of G.H.W. Bush was in full effect. Voted out of office under unusual
circumstances, the influence of the outgoing president was severely compromised. As
such, the ability of the president was limited in its course of action and capacity to
influence future policy in American relations.
These limited abilities, as discussed in Section 2.2, showed the potential
avenues still available to the sitting president. With the focus of the nation upon the
newly elected leader, there were very finite possibilities of action that could be
undertaken. The power vacuum situation in Somalia had presented itself as a
humanitarian crisis, as the transition between leaders of clan factions had developed a
civil war that was plaguing the Horn of Africa, and potentially demanded attention
from the international community.
- 54 -
Figure 4.1
1992 Electoral College Results Map
By mid-1992, the importance of such engagement was being displayed
regularly through the American press. Calls for action were coming from all fora, and
eventually the UNSC agreed that the situation had become impossible to ignore.
Following the loss of the 1992 election, President Bush agreed that the time had come
to act. As Mayall (1996) noted „[o]nce he lost the election, he was, in any case, no
longer constrained by domestic considerations. Moreover, as the architect of the
„New World Order‟, he evidently felt it incumbent on him to „do something‟.‟
The decision to act was not one that happened instantly, but did develop with
rather quick execution. On 25 November, US Secretary of State Lawrence
Eagleburger met with UNSG Butros-Ghali and informed him that the United States
Clinton (D) = 370 Bush (R) = 168
- 55 -
was ready to act and assist under a Chapter VII mission. The resulting action was the
UNSC‟s adoption of Resolution 794 by unanimous vote on 3 December 1992. The
recommendations of the Pentagon demanded the strongest possible force based upon
what was known as the „Powell Doctrine‟ which advocated such strength as had been
used during Operation Desert Storm the previous year. Code named „Operation
Restore Hope‟, UNITAF‟s mission in Somalia was deployed by a „two-division joint
task force to deploy to open the Mogadishu warehouses and the highways into the
Somali interior for food shipments‟ (Clarke 1997 in O‟Leary 2002).
Despite the possibility of engaging the United States in another „Vietnam‟
situation, by 7 January 1993 the United States had deployed some 21,000 soldiers
under UNITAF (O‟Leary 2002). O‟Leary continues: „Within a few weeks, UNITAF
had deployed in 40% of the country and had succeeded without great difficulty in
opening up food distribution centers in the main towns, and in getting through to most
of the needy areas‟. „There were a few scuffles and shootouts…The roads to the
interior were opened and the famine was raised…Humanitarian aid flowed in‟
(Parsons 1995 in O‟Leary 2002).
The initial action of UNITAF had appeared successful, but the humanitarian
crisis was not adverted. The possibility of further violent conflict over the issue of
leadership within Somalia had brought about the real possibility of a long-term threat
to the area. The ideology of 4GW had taken control over the area, and „long-war‟
possibilities were in full effect. With the United States‟ commitment to the action, it
was obvious that the future of its involvement in the situation was not to be led by
President Bush, but transferred to President Clinton as soon as he took the Oath of
- 56 -
Office on 20 January 1993. This shift in power brought about understandable
problems, but the exceptionally weak transition by the Clinton Administration made
this situation even more vulnerable to negative effects in the future, leading to
positive issue development by the Republican Party for the 1994 midterms.
4.3 The Weakness of the Clinton Transition
The first inaugural address of William Clinton in 1993 brought about the
thought of a better American future. The line „[t]here is nothing wrong with America
that cannot be cured by what‟s right in America‟ rang true in the ears of millions of
Americans. The ability to address what the Clinton Administration thought was
wrong with the United States proved to be more difficult than originally thought, and
showed a transitional White House in disarray.
The importance of the first 100 days of a president‟s tenure in office cannot be
underestimated. The development of policy and confirmation of officers defines the
tone of the administration. Traditionally, the approval ratings rise significantly from
election to inauguration as the nation is optimistic about the leadership of a new
president, but those numbers will typically fall by the end of May as shown in Table
4.2. Pages of campaign promises are whittled down to a precious few, and encompass
the majority focus of the Executive Branch. As President Clinton was elected with
only 43% of the popular vote, his public mandate and political capital were relatively
thin. The difficult transition into power was mired by confirmation difficulties,
particularly that of Zoe E. Baird to Attorney General, whose failed nomination
embodied the entire process in its confusion and mismanagement (Jehl 1994).
- 57 -
Table 4.223
William Clinton’s Public Approval Ratings,
November 1992 through November 1994
With the difficulties of meeting the necessary expectations of assuming office, the
implementation of many domestic policies was not reviewed with any particular
enthusiasm either. Reporting on the inclusion of homosexual soldiers into the
military resulted in a compromise of „don‟t ask, don‟t tell‟. The public perception of
the new president went from 43% on Election Day to 58% on Inauguration Day to
37% by June 1993 (Gallup 2009).
The weakness of the transitional phase was not limited to the appointments of
the president‟s nominees to office, however. There were many other aspects of the
administration‟s purpose that had been compromised in the change from candidate
Clinton to President Clinton. The troubles of economic downturn that had been one
of the core issues of the election had not been resolved with the expediency that the
23
Data from Gallup (2009), arranged by author.
Battle of Mogadishu Rwanda Genocide
- 58 -
public had demanded, and the threat of a New World Order that had been promised
under the G.H.W. Bush presidency had not been fully realized, as they were still
under operation.
The failing of this transitional period was an obvious weakness to many, and
with such vulnerability under consideration the situation was primed to make an
attack on the United States more impactful. This damage did happen, and led the
nation into serious crisis. At both home and overseas, these assaults lead to
uncertainty, and defined the remainder of the Clinton Administration.
4.4 26 February 1993 and 3/4 October 1993
The vulnerabilities of the transitional process played out in the American
context in two major situations. The domestic front was directly assaulted as the
World Trade Center in Manhattan, New York, was car bombed by members of a then
relatively unknown group lead by Osama bin Laden. This action on the morning of
26 February 1993, 36 days after William Clinton assumed the presidency, killed six
and injured nearly 1,000. The foreign crisis came during the execution of UNITAF,
as two UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters were shot down, resulting in the overnight
firefight with 18 US and one Malaysian soldier killed and an additional 82 wounded.
Sources on Somali casualties range from 500 to 1500 killed with an additional 3000 to
5000 wounded (O‟Leary 2002). The First Battle of Mogadishu presented the Clinton
Administration with another international relations crisis based on events created by
the decision of G.H.W. Bush to involve the US some ten months earlier in the Somali
crisis.
- 59 -
These points in history presented a state of crisis for the Clinton
Administration. The reaction to these situations would define the remainder of his
term in office as the President said much, but did very little. The results of Clinton‟s
inaction meant that nearly nothing was done with regard to attacking terrorism around
the world, or to aid in the „New World Order‟ that had been promised during the
previous administration. The inactions encouraged further attacks on United States
interests by terrorism from both foreign and domestic sources in places such as
Oklahoma City, Kenya, Tanzania, the Port of Aden, and elsewhere. At the same time,
due to its pacific tendencies, the Clinton Administration sat idly by as the Great Lakes
region of Africa entered what has been referred to as its first „world war‟, and the
situation in the Balkans went relatively unchecked by the United States for the better
part of a decade. This resolution of the negative passive presidency has plagued the
Clinton legacy ever since and possibly allowed the defining crisis of the G.W. Bush
administration with the attack on 9/11.
The reasoning behind the lack of action by the Clinton Administration can be
found in two major areas: election and ability. First, elections show the inherent high
politics that develop with the office of the presidency as leader not only of the nation,
but of their party as well, presents considerations that flow far beyond the traditional
boundaries of human decency and desire. Bringing about the balance that is
necessary for foreign actions to take place rely on the ability to institute political
capital, and bring about popular support towards policy that does not directly affect
the domestic population. That backlash was seen directly in the response by the
- 60 -
American public in 1994, as the midterm elections were heavily won by the
Republican Party, and changed the dynamic of voter issue control (Buckley 1994)24
.
The crisis period that developed as a direct relation to the actions instituted by
the previous administration affected the public opinion of job approval for the next
term. Whether the implication was that of international humanitarian support, the
inexperience of a new administration to assume control of an established situation
brought about a major public backlash that seriously hampered the ability for the lone
superpower to act in a manner that would live up to its self-imposed mantra of
„leaders of the free world‟. While the military option is the only true way for an
action to occur to institute the active possibilities that exist in the modern American
political arena, the consequences of such transitional action have shown that they can
be a key factor in future partisan success.
24
Buckley (Ibid) notes the shift of regional issues control and the movement of demographic voting
tendencies relation the 1994 midterm election to those seen in the elections of the 1980‟s. Major shifts
in national voting tendencies were directly seen in 1994, but when broken down into individual
congressional (regional) elections, the low Democratic Party mandate from 1992 shifted slightly
toward the Republicans and resulted in major losses for the Democratic Congressional delegation.
- 61 -
CHAPTER FIVE
Conclusion
Violence as a way of gaining power...is being
camouflaged under the guise of tradition, national
honor [and] national security.
-Alfred Adler
By understanding that the presidential transition period is one of extreme
uncertainty and vulnerability, questions suggested by academic processes begin to
develop. Concerning the two major types of conflict discussed in Chapter One, the
following represents a cognitive analysis of predicting future events that might occur,
as well as how they may best be anticipated and directed.
Recognizing the impact that 4GW plays upon influencing the factors of
domestic political issues through the usage of foreign policy is vital for the projection
of this paper‟s hypotheses onto future events. Indeed, even the recent electoral
process in 2008 developed into a transitional situation ripe for manipulation of 4GW
as actions in Iraq and Afghanistan took center stage. The development of new issue
areas, such as the outbreak of major violence in the Gaza Strip Christmas Day 2008,
had the coincidence of ending 18 January 2009, with Israeli withdrawal by 21
January, surrounding the day Barack Obama was sworn in as President of the United
States (BBC 2009).
- 62 -
The vulnerabilities that develop during this situation can be measured in
hindsight. The true value of the analysis can only come with the ability to predict
future outcomes to similar situations. As the United States is at the beginning of
another presidential cycle sixteen years after the inauguration of the Clinton
Administration, many possible parallels can be drawn between the two. This
conclusory chapter will look at those situations, first with a view to preparing for the
vulnerability that comes with presidential transition from both home and abroad.
Defining the future of partisan influence on 4GW will next be addressed, searching
for potential measures and methods that may be used to determine the full extent of
such actions. The defining test of this theory will be the 2010 midterm elections, the
results of which will reflect the opinion of the first two years of the Obama
administration as viewed by the American public, based upon situations established
by the previous George W. Bush administration.
5.1 Preparing for Vulnerability during Presidential Transition
The understanding that the United States is susceptible to foreign attack during
these transitional periods has not gone unnoticed. Following the events of 9/11, many
different government agencies have taken precautions to establish contingency plans
if another event were to take place with such a large and immediate impact. The
development of these plans takes into consideration the violent and quick attack by
small insurgent groups, but does not predict a massive attack on any level that could
potentially occur.
- 63 -
9/11 changed the way that security is managed in the US. While previous
measures had been effective in preventing the influence of a major power from
overthrowing or attacking during this period, the re-occurrence of attack from smaller
and more direct attacks is always at hand. With the 9/11 attack, the ability of 19
people armed with only box cutters to end the lives of some 3000 people was
demonstrated, and billions around the world were affected either directly or indirectly.
With this newly recognized threat from smaller but equally capable groups of
SFAs comes a direct shift in the way that the US defends itself. Indeed the Rollins
Report (2008) shows the levels of action that was implemented in preparation for the
2008 electoral period by many agencies within the US Government. Whether a play
by the partisan base to continue driving the „politics of fear‟ that dominated the
security issue surrounding that election is the truth or not, the end result is a direct
reaction by the US to step up defensive measures at that time in order to maintain long
term stability from attack.
While it remains to be seen if the heightened security developed from post
9/11 actions remain a permanent fixture of transitional security, the trend has
continued in presidential exercising of force just prior to leaving office. The issues do
not directly pose threats to the American public; they are forerunners to issue
development in the 2010 and 2012 elections.
With the heart of American military strength focused on the continuing actions
in Afghanistan and Iraq, many issues of international policy development were
enacted during this transition, but three of major military consideration: heightened
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military engagement in Afghanistan, the Israeli invasion of the Gaza Strip, and the
massive developments of extended aggression in Central Africa. The United States
played a direct role in two of these engagements, and indirectly in the third. The
ability for these situations to occur was a direct violation of the realist perspective of
US national interest, but played directly into defining the issues for the future race of
the 2010 midterms and beyond toward the Republican strength issue of National
Security.
5.2 Party Politics and United States Foreign Policy
The continuation of partisan influence on the foreign policy of the US did not
end with the failure of re-electing a Republican candidate to the White House in 2008.
Indeed, the ongoing struggle for party power has continued before and after 4
November 2008 to include a wide range of tactics to influence the issues struggle in
the coming electoral cycles.
This has not gone unnoticed. As Brose (2009) mentions, the policies enacted
under the G.W. Bush Administration will continue to affect President Obama for the
foreseeable future. The shift in power does not come with instant reform in the
established institutions in Washington, D.C. The truth of entrenched determination
within the structure of the US Government presents a difficult challenge to the new
president if the campaign promises of change are to come to fruition.
Neo-Conservative actors who portrayed their ability and will through the
auspices of the Project for a New American Century in the 1990‟s and took the ability
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to lead during the G.W. Bush Administration, have themselves not abandoned the
stage. With the development of the Foreign Policy Initiative in early 2009, the names
Kristol, Kagan, Senor, and others are still enacting partisan public opinion on US
international interests (Maddow 2009). The focus of these gains have re-established
the desire to influence future ability through the unassuming auspices of a think tank,
publishing partisan material as academic discourse to influence future policy
decisions.
Indeed, Kagan‟s re-occurring role as opinion columnist for the Washington
Post has brought with it the idea of preserving many of the neo-conservative ideals
developed in the 1990‟s, stating that the implementation of strategy with regard to
foreign policy has failed, not the theory presented by the neo-conservativism itself
(Kagan 2009). So too has Fukuyama rebounded with the idea that the failed
implementation was to blame for the difficulties of US foreign policy since 9/11, and
not the ideals that were develop before the active presidential reaction to crisis was
executed (Fukuyama 2006).
The typical silence that comes with the transitional period by an exiting
administration has been breached as well. The outspoken nature of former Vice
President Richard Cheney has resulted in a massive media focus on the issues of
security. In March of 2009, Mr. Cheney reported in the New Yorker Magazine about
the influence of the transitional period of 2008-2009 on the Gaza Strip conflict.
Through this breaking of silence, he inferred that the actions allowed by the G.W.
Bush Administration were denounced in private conversations by Obama officials
regarding the future of the conflict under a new administration (Hersh 2009). With
- 66 -
the implications of those accusations, it is possible to infer that the Bush
Administration turned a blind eye to the conflict and was upset when the Obama
council stepped in. The influence of conflict by Israel has had a direct effect on the
Israeli Parliamentary elections of February 2009, voting into office a conservative
coalition strong on security, but played important roles with the historically Jewish
community in the United States (Rudeneh 1972), with potential voter impact
particularly on the traditionally Democratic state of New York and the swing state of
Florida.
These issues of national interest are sure to endure through to the foreign
policy focus of the first two years of the Obama Administration. Those combined
with the current economic climate, the continued actions in Iraq and Afghanistan, plus
unforeseeable crises to develop will be the central issue focus for the 2010 midterms.
5.3 Predicting the Results of 2010 Midterms
The first national approval ratings following transition released in late January
2009 showed a public approval rating of 64% for newly inaugurated President Barack
Obama (Gallop 2009). Despite this high number, that was nearly 12% higher than his
electoral victory, the national approval rating for the Democratic Party led Congress
bottomed out in the low 20% range (Ibid). This direct difference of national approval
ratings does not show the individual popularity of Congress people from within their
particular representative districts, but can illuminate the overall displeasure of a body
that had just been popularly elected. This being noted shows the volatility of
American public opinion, and the unknowns of what may happen in future elections.
- 67 -
Predicting from the evidence presented earlier in this dissertation, it is possible
to draw some general assumptions regarding trends for the 2010 midterm elections.
Along with these previous factors of domestic and foreign issue development in the
influence of voter utility as determined by Downs, a second factor must come into
consideration. As stated in the US Constitution25
, a census must be held every ten
years in order to determine the districting of representative areas for future election.
As such, the boundary lines will be re-drawn and assessed for elections allowing for
the possibility of gerrymandering at the local level and the re-assessment of Electoral
College votes for the coming decade, much as they did in 1990 for the 1992 election
of William Clinton.
The trend in first presidential mid-terms is clear: the president has only gained
seats in the House of Representatives once since World War II: 2002 (Rove 2008).
The strong focus of national security had presented measures that culminated in the
passing of H.J.R. 114 that gave the president the authority to use military force in Iraq
in October 2002, or some three weeks before the 2002 midterm elections. The current
electoral climate in the United States is no different. The actions of violent aggressive
potential that lie at large will have a massive impact on the future of elections within
the US.
5.4 Developing the Future of Transition
The future of presidential transition is one that can be amended to make the
best possible outcomes to prevent future violence from both within the United States
25
The Constitution of the United States of America, Article I, Section2.
- 68 -
and from without. There are two major avenues of progression that can take place: 1)
changing the period of time between Election Day and Inauguration Day, and 2)
restricting the president‟s ability to act unilaterally in foreign affairs. Both have
admitted strengths and weaknesses, but their consideration deserves further discussion
than what can be given in this section.
The idea of prolonging the transitional period is one that has historical ties in
the US. While initially the inauguration date was set in March until 1932, the lame
duck period was a massive inconvenience that presented problems for presidents.
Allowing for the halting of legislation and political power meant a more difficult time
in achieving goals established by newly elected congresspersons. With the earlier
recommendations for setting a shorter transition period by the US Senate in 1932, the
possibility may need to come under review again.
Another major factor that would come with extending the transitional period
for the American president is the ability for outgoing presidents to influence the
policy of the United States. With the 11 week gap between events already sufficient
time for crises to arise and be developed, the inherent problems that come with this
solution are not sufficient to alleviating the problems that arise with political
transition.
The other aspect to this would be to shorten the transitional period between
Election Day and Inauguration Day. The 11 week period has the potential to be
shortened, missing the Thanksgiving and Christmas recesses, and beginning in a
matter of days following election. This shortened period would nearly eliminate the
- 69 -
„lame duck‟ period, reduce the likelihood of significant distraction between
conflicting governments, and allow for the new administration to successfully take
over policy in a timely manner without the delay.
The second avenue available to allowing a smoother presidential transition
period is to either limit the ability of an outgoing president to enact foreign policy or
to engage the incoming president with a more direct role in shaping the events that
will directly affect their administration. With this ability to define the scope of US
foreign policy a challenge will present itself in the form of a disintegration of the need
for only one president at a time, but could have the end result of bringing about a
more harmonious switch from one executive to the next.
The development of presidential transitional violence in the American system
is cause for concern, both domestically and globally. The eventual situation that
arises from such crises is one that needs immediate attention and deserves further
review. With the implications of such actions of distress for international affairs, the
interconnectedness that comes with the ability of the United States to influence global
security is a matter of concern for all nations to recognize and anticipate. With the
inherent domestic partisan politics that influences the ability of the President to
effectively lead the nation in global affairs, the potential for future excursions into
unilateral and ineffective policy can be more plainly handled. This ability to correctly
ascertain the influences of political impact upon the foreign policy of the United
States will lead to a more productive element in the era „beyond history‟, and reduce
the impact that such events will have on global security in the future.
- 70 -
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APPENDIX A
Pertinent Sections from the Constitution of the
United States
Note: Repealed text is not noted in this version. Spelling errors have been corrected
in this version.
We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union,
establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defense,
promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our
Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.
Article 1.
Section 2
The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every second
Year by the People of the several States, and the Electors in each State shall have the
Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State
Legislature…
Section 3
The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State,
chosen by the Legislature thereof, for six Years; and each Senator shall have one
Vote.
Immediately after they shall be assembled in Consequence of the first Election, they
shall be divided as equally as may be into three Classes. The Seats of the Senators of
the first Class shall be vacated at the Expiration of the second Year, of the second
Class at the Expiration of the fourth Year, and of the third Class at the Expiration of
the sixth Year, so that one third may be chosen every second Year; and if Vacancies
happen by Resignation, or otherwise, during the Recess of the Legislature of any
State, the Executive thereof may make temporary Appointments until the next
Meeting of the Legislature, which shall then fill such Vacancies…
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Section 4
The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives,
shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at
any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Place of Choosing
Senators.
The Congress shall assemble at least once in every Year, and such Meeting shall
be on the first Monday in December, unless they shall by Law appoint a different
Day.
Section 8
The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and
Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defense and general Welfare
of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout
the United States;
…To define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and
Offenses against the Law of Nations;
To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning
Captures on Land and Water;
To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a
longer Term than two Years;
To provide and maintain a Navy;
To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces;
To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress
Insurrections and repel Invasions;
To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the Militia, and for governing
such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving
to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of
training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress;…
Article 2.
Section 1
The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America.
He shall hold his Office during the Term of four Years, and, together with the Vice-
President chosen for the same Term, be elected, as follows:
Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a
Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives to
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which the State may be entitled in the Congress: but no Senator or Representative, or
Person holding an Office of Trust or Profit under the United States, shall be appointed
an Elector.
The Electors shall meet in their respective States, and vote by Ballot for two persons,
of whom one at least shall not lie an Inhabitant of the same State with themselves.
And they shall make a List of all the Persons voted for, and of the Number of Votes
for each; which List they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the Seat of the
Government of the United States, directed to the President of the Senate. The
President of the Senate shall, in the Presence of the Senate and House of
Representatives, open all the Certificates, and the Votes shall then be counted. The
Person having the greatest Number of Votes shall be the President, if such Number be
a Majority of the whole Number of Electors appointed; and if there be more than one
who have such Majority, and have an equal Number of Votes, then the House of
Representatives shall immediately choose by Ballot one of them for President; and if
no Person have a Majority, then from the five highest on the List the said House shall
in like Manner choose the President. But in choosing the President, the Votes shall be
taken by States, the Representation from each State having one Vote; a quorum for
this Purpose shall consist of a Member or Members from two-thirds of the States, and
a Majority of all the States shall be necessary to a Choice. In every Case, after the
Choice of the President, the Person having the greatest Number of Votes of the
Electors shall be the Vice President. But if there should remain two or more who have
equal Votes, the Senate shall choose from them by Ballot the Vice-President.
The Congress may determine the Time of choosing the Electors, and the Day on
which they shall give their Votes; which Day shall be the same throughout the
United States…
Section 2
The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United
States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of
the United States; he may require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in
each of the executive Departments, upon any subject relating to the Duties of their
respective Offices, and he shall have Power to Grant Reprieves and Pardons for
Offenses against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment.
He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make
Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur; and he shall nominate,
and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors,
other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other
Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided
for, and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the
Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in
the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments…
- 79 -
Amendment 12
The Electors shall meet in their respective states, and vote by ballot for President and
Vice-President, one of whom, at least, shall not be an inhabitant of the same state with
themselves; they shall name in their ballots the person voted for as President, and in
distinct ballots the person voted for as Vice-President, and they shall make distinct
lists of all persons voted for as President, and of all persons voted for as Vice-
President and of the number of votes for each, which lists they shall sign and certify,
and transmit sealed to the seat of the government of the United States, directed to the
President of the Senate;
The President of the Senate shall, in the presence of the Senate and House of
Representatives, open all the certificates and the votes shall then be counted;
The person having the greatest Number of votes for President, shall be the President,
if such number be a majority of the whole number of Electors appointed; and if no
person have such majority, then from the persons having the highest numbers not
exceeding three on the list of those voted for as President, the House of
Representatives shall choose immediately, by ballot, the President. But in choosing
the President, the votes shall be taken by states, the representation from each state
having one vote; a quorum for this purpose shall consist of a member or members
from two-thirds of the states, and a majority of all the states shall be necessary to a
choice. And if the House of Representatives shall not choose a President whenever the
right of choice shall devolve upon them, before the fourth day of March next
following, then the Vice-President shall act as President, as in the case of the death or
other constitutional disability of the President.
The person having the greatest number of votes as Vice-President, shall be the
Vice-President, if such number be a majority of the whole number of Electors
appointed, and if no person have a majority, then from the two highest numbers on the
list, the Senate shall choose the Vice-President; a quorum for the purpose shall consist
of two-thirds of the whole number of Senators, and a majority of the whole number
shall be necessary to a choice. But no person constitutionally ineligible to the office of
President shall be eligible to that of Vice-President of the United States.
Amendment 20
1. The terms of the President and Vice President shall end at noon on the 20th
day of
January, and the terms of Senators and Representatives at noon on the 3d day of
January, of the years in which such terms would have ended if this article had not
been ratified; and the terms of their successors shall then begin.
2. The Congress shall assemble at least once in every year, and such meeting shall
begin at noon on the 3d day of January, unless they shall by law appoint a different
day.
3. If, at the time fixed for the beginning of the term of the President, the President
elect shall have died, the Vice President elect shall become President. If a President
shall not have been chosen before the time fixed for the beginning of his term, or if
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the President elect shall have failed to qualify, then the Vice President elect shall act
as President until a President shall have qualified; and the Congress may by law
provide for the case wherein neither a President elect nor a Vice President elect shall
have qualified, declaring who shall then act as President, or the manner in which one
who is to act shall be selected, and such person shall act accordingly until a President
or Vice President shall have qualified…
Amendment 22
1. No person shall be elected to the office of the President more than twice, and no
person who has held the office of President, or acted as President, for more than two
years of a term to which some other person was elected President shall be elected to
the office of the President more than once. But this Article shall not apply to any
person holding the office of President, when this Article was proposed by the
Congress, and shall not prevent any person who may be holding the office of
President, or acting as President, during the term within which this Article becomes
operative from holding the office of President or acting as President during the
remainder of such term…
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APPENDIX B
The War Powers Resolution of 1973
Public Law 93-148
93rd Congress, H. J. Res. 542
November 7, 1973
Joint Resolution
Concerning the war powers of Congress and the President.
Resolved by the Senate and the House of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled,
SHORT TITLE
SECTION 1. This joint resolution may be cited as the "War Powers Resolution".
PURPOSE AND POLICY
SEC. 2. (a) It is the purpose of this joint resolution to fulfill the intent of the framers
of the Constitution of the United States and insure that the collective judgment of both
the Congress and the President will apply to the introduction of United States Armed
Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is
clearly indicate by the circumstances, and to the continued use of such forces in
hostilities or in such situations.
(b) Under article I, section 8, of the Constitution, it is specifically provided that the
Congress shall have the power to make all laws necessary and proper for carrying into
execution, not only its own powers but also all other powers vested by the
Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any department or officer
thereof.
(c) The constitutional powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief to introduce
United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent
involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, are exercised
only pursuant to (1) a declaration of war, (2) specific statutory authorization, or (3) a
national emergency created by attack upon the United States, its territories or
possessions, or its armed forces.
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CONSULTATION
SEC. 3. The President in every possible instance shall consult with Congress before
introducing United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into situation where
imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, and
after every such introduction shall consult regularly with the Congress until United
States Armed Forces are no longer engaged in hostilities or have been removed from
such situations.
REPORTING
SEC. 4. (a) In the absence of a declaration of war, in any case in which United States
Armed Forces are introduced--
(1) into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is
clearly indicated by the circumstances;
(2) into the territory, airspace or waters of a foreign nation, while equipped for
combat, except for deployments which relate solely to supply, replacement, repair, or
training of such forces; or
(3) in numbers which substantially enlarge United States Armed Forces equipped for
combat already located in a foreign nation; the president shall submit within 48 hours
to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and to the President pro tempore of
the Senate a report, in writing, setting forth--
(A) the circumstances necessitating the introduction of United States Armed Forces;
(B) the constitutional and legislative authority under which such introduction took
place; and
(C) the estimated scope and duration of the hostilities or involvement.
(b) The President shall provide such other information as the Congress may request in
the fulfillment of its constitutional responsibilities with respect to committing the
Nation to war and to the use of United States Armed Forces abroad
(c) Whenever United States Armed Forces are introduced into hostilities or into any
situation described in subsection (a) of this section, the President shall, so long as
such armed forces continue to be engaged in such hostilities or situation, report to the
Congress periodically on the status of such hostilities or situation as well as on the
scope and duration of such hostilities or situation, but in no event shall he report to the
Congress less often than once every six months.
CONGRESSIONAL ACTION
SEC. 5. (a) Each report submitted pursuant to section 4(a)(1) shall be transmitted to
the Speaker of the House of Representatives and to the President pro tempore of the
Senate on the same calendar day. Each report so transmitted shall be referred to the
Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and to the Committee
on Foreign Relations of the Senate for appropriate action. If, when the report is
transmitted, the Congress has adjourned sine die or has adjourned for any period in
excess of three calendar days, the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the
President pro tempore of the Senate, if they deem it advisable (or if petitioned by at
least 30 percent of the membership of their respective Houses) shall jointly
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request the President to convene Congress in order that it may consider the report
and take appropriate action pursuant to this section.
(b) Within sixty calendar days after a report is submitted or is required to be
submitted pursuant to section 4(a)(1), whichever is earlier, the President shall
terminate any use of United States Armed Forces with respect to which such report
was submitted (or required to be submitted), unless the Congress (1) has declared war
or has enacted a specific authorization for such use of United States Armed Forces,
(2) has extended by law such sixty-day period, or (3) is physically unable to meet as a
result of an armed attack upon the United States. Such sixty-day period shall be
extended for not more than an additional thirty days if the President determines and
certifies to the Congress in writing that unavoidable military necessity respecting
the safety of United States Armed Forces requires the continued use of such
armed forces in the course of bringing about a prompt removal of such forces.
(c) Notwithstanding subsection (b), at any time that United States Armed Forces are
engaged in hostilities outside the territory of the United States, its possessions and
territories without a declaration of war or specific statutory authorization, such forces
shall be removed by the President if the Congress so directs by concurrent resolution.
CONGRESSIONAL PRIORITY PROCEDURES FOR JOINT RESOLUTION OR
BILL
SEC. 6. (a) Any joint resolution or bill introduced pursuant to section 5(b) at least
thirty calendar days before the expiration of the sixty-day period specified in such
section shall be referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives or the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, as the case may
be, and such committee shall report one such joint resolution or bill, together with its
recommendations, not later than twenty-four calendar days before the expiration of
the sixty-day period specified in such section, unless such House shall otherwise
determine by the yeas and nays.
(b) Any joint resolution or bill so reported shall become the pending business of the
House in question (in the case of the Senate the time for debate shall be equally
divided between the proponents and the opponents), and shall be voted on within
three calendar days thereafter, unless such House shall otherwise determine by yeas
and nays.
(c) Such a joint resolution or bill passed by one House shall be referred to the
committee of the other House named in subsection (a) and shall be reported out not
later than fourteen calendar days before the expiration of the sixty-day period
specified in section 5(b). The joint resolution or bill so reported shall become the
pending business of the House in question and shall be voted on within three calendar
days after it has been reported, unless such House shall otherwise determine by yeas
and nays.
(d) In the case of any disagreement between the two Houses of Congress with respect
to a joint resolution or bill passed by both Houses, conferees shall be promptly
appointed and the committee of conference shall make and file a report with respect to
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such resolution or bill not later than four calendar days before the expiration of the
sixty-day period specified in section 5(b). In the event the conferees are unable to
agree within 48 hours, they shall report back to their respective Houses in
disagreement. Notwithstanding any rule in either House concerning the printing of
conference reports in the Record or concerning any delay in the consideration of such
reports, such report shall be acted on by both Houses not later than the expiration of
such sixty-day period.
CONGRESSIONAL PRIORITY PROCEDURES FOR CONCURRENT
RESOLUTION
SEC. 7. (a) Any concurrent resolution introduced pursuant to section 5(b) at least
thirty calendar days before the expiration of the sixty-day period specified in such
section shall be referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives or the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, as the case may
be, and one such concurrent resolution shall be reported out by such committee
together with its recommendations within fifteen calendar days, unless such House
shall otherwise determine by the yeas and nays.
(b) Any concurrent resolution so reported shall become the pending business of the
House in question (in the case of the Senate the time for debate shall be equally
divided between the proponents and the opponents), and shall be voted on within
three calendar days thereafter, unless such House shall otherwise determine by yeas
and nays.
(c) Such a concurrent resolution passed by one House shall be referred to the
committee of the other House named in subsection (a) and shall be reported out by
such committee together with its recommendations within fifteen calendar days and
shall thereupon become the pending business of such House and shall be voted on
within three calendar days after it has been reported, unless such House shall
otherwise determine by yeas and nays.
(d) In the case of any disagreement between the two Houses of Congress with respect
to a concurrent resolution passed by both Houses, conferees shall be promptly
appointed and the committee of conference shall make and file a report with respect to
such concurrent resolution within six calendar days after the legislation is referred to
the committee of conference.
Notwithstanding any rule in either House concerning the printing of
conference reports in the Record or concerning any delay in the consideration of
such reports, such report shall be acted on by both Houses not later than six calendar
days after the conference report is filed. In the event the conferees are unable to agree
within 48 hours, they shall report back to their respective Houses in disagreement.
INTERPRETATION OF JOINT RESOLUTION
SEC. 8. (a) Authority to introduce United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into
situations wherein involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances
shall not be inferred--
(1) from any provision of law (whether or not in effect before the date of the
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enactment of this joint resolution), including any provision contained in any
appropriation Act, unless such provision specifically authorizes the introduction of
United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into such situations and stating that it is
intended to constitute specific statutory authorization within the meaning of this joint
resolution; or
(2) from any treaty heretofore or hereafter ratified unless such treaty is implemented
by legislation specifically authorizing the introduction of United States Armed Forces
into hostilities or into such situations and stating that it is intended to constitute
specific statutory authorization within the meaning of this joint resolution.
(b) Nothing in this joint resolution shall be construed to require any further specific
statutory authorization to permit members of United States Armed Forces to
participate jointly with members of the armed forces of one or more foreign countries
in the headquarters operations of high-level military commands which were
established prior to the date of enactment of this joint resolution and pursuant to the
United Nations Charter or any treaty ratified by the United States prior to such date.
(c) For purposes of this joint resolution, the term "introduction of United States
Armed Forces" includes the assignment of member of such armed forces to command,
coordinate, participate in the movement of, or accompany the regular or irregular
military forces of any foreign country or government when such military forces are
engaged, or there exists an imminent threat that such forces will become engaged, in
hostilities.
(d) Nothing in this joint resolution--
(1) is intended to alter the constitutional authority of the Congress or of the President,
or the provision of existing treaties; or (2) shall be construed as granting any authority
to the President with respect to the introduction of United States Armed Forces into
hostilities or into situations wherein involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by
the circumstances which authority he would not have had in the absence of this joint
resolution.
SEPARABILITY CLAUSE
SEC. 9. If any provision of this joint resolution or the application thereof to any
person or circumstance is held invalid, the remainder of the joint resolution and the
application of such provision to any other person or circumstance shall not be affected
thereby.
EFFECTIVE DATE
SEC. 10. This joint resolution shall take effect on the date of its enactment.
CARL ALBERT
Speaker of the House of
Representatives.
JAMES O. EASTLAND
President of the Senate pro tempore.
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, U.S.,
November 7, 1973.
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APPENDIX C
U.S. Presidential Election Results Since 1948
Year Candidates Political Party E.C.
Votes Popular Votes
1948
Harry S. Truman
Thomas E. Dewey
J. Strom Thurmond
Henry A. Wallace
Norman Thomas
Democratic
Republican
States' Rights Dem.
Progressive
Socialist
303
189
39
0
0
24,179,345
21,991,291
1,176,125
1,157,326
139,572
1952 Dwight D. Eisenhower
Adlai E. Stevenson
Republican
Democratic
442
89
33,936,234
27,314,992
1956 Dwight D. Eisenhower
Adlai E. Stevenson
Republican
Democratic
457
73
35,590,472
26,022,752
1960 John F. Kennedy
Richard M. Nixon
Democratic
Republican
303
219
34,226,731
34,108,157
1964 Lyndon B. Johnson
Barry M. Goldwater
Democratic
Republican
486
52
43,129,484
27,178,188
1968
Richard M. Nixon
Hubert H. Humphrey
George C. Wallace
Republican
Democratic
Am. Independent
301
191
46
31,785,480
31,275,166
9,906,473
1972
Richard M. Nixon
George McGovern
John G. Schmitz
Republican
Democratic
American
520
17
0
47,169,911
29,170,383
1,099,482
1976
Jimmy Carter
Gerald R. Ford
Eugene J. McCarthy
Democratic
Republican
Independent
297
240
0
40,830,763
39,147,973
756,631
1980
Ronald Reagan
Jimmy Carter
John B. Anderson
Republican
Democratic
Independent
489
49
0
43,899,248
36,481,435
5,719,437
1984 Ronald Reagan
Walter F. Mondale
Republican
Democratic
525
13
54,455,075
37,577,185
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1988 George H. Bush
Michael S. Dukakis
Republican
Democratic
426
111
48,886,097
41,809,074
1992
William J. Clinton
George H. Bush
H. Ross Perot
Democratic
Republican
Independent
370
168
0
44,909,889
39,104,545
19,742,267
1996
William J. Clinton
Robert J. Dole
H. Ross Perot
Democratic
Republican
Reform Party
379
159
0
47,402,357
39,198,755
8,085,402
2000
George W. Bush
Albert A. Gore
Ralph Nader
Republican
Democratic
Green Party
271
266
0
50,456,002
50,999,897
2,882,955
2004 George W. Bush
John F. Kerry
Republican
Democratic
286
251
62,028,285
59,028,109
2008 Barack Obama
John McCain
Democratic
Republican
365
173
66,862,039
58,319,442
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APPENDIX D
United States Military Actions Initiated or Ongoing
During Presidential Transition
1950 - 2000
Taken from: Grimmett, R.F. (2008), Instances of the Use of United States Forces
Abroad, 1787-2007, RL32170, Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service.
„The following list reviews hundreds of instances in which the United States has
utilized military forces abroad in situations of military conflict or potential conflict to
protect U.S. citizens or promote U.S. interests. The list does not include covert actions
or numerous instances in which U.S. forces have been stationed abroad since World
War II in occupation forces or for participation in mutual security organizations, base
agreements, or routine military assistance or training operations. Because of differing
judgments over the actions to be included, other lists may include more or fewer
instances (from Grimmett, Ibid).‟
1950-53 Korean War. The United States responded to North Korean invasion of
South Korea by going to its assistance, pursuant to United Nations Security Council resolutions. U.S. forces deployed in Korea exceeded 300,000 during the last year of
the conflict. Over 36,600 U.S. military were killed in action.
1950-55 Formosa (Taiwan). In June 1950 at the beginning of the Korean War,
President Truman ordered the U.S. Seventh Fleet to prevent Chinese Communist
attacks upon Formosa and Chinese Nationalist operations against mainland China.
1959-60 The Caribbean. 2d Marine Ground Task Force was deployed to protect U.S.
nationals during the Cuban crisis.
1962-75 Laos. From October 1962 until 1975, the United States played an important
role in military support of anti-Communist forces in Laos.
1964-73 Vietnam War. U.S. military advisers had been in South Vietnam for a
decade, and their numbers had been increased as the military position of the Saigon
government became weaker. After citing what he termed were attacks on U.S.
destroyers in the Tonkin Gulf, President Johnson asked in August 1964 for a
resolution expressing U.S. determination to support freedom and protect peace in
Southeast Asia. Congress responded with the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, expressing
support for “all necessary measures” the President might take to repel armed attack
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against U.S. forces and prevent further aggression. Following this resolution, and
following a Communist attack on a U.S. installation in central Vietnam, the United
States escalated its participation in the war to a peak of 543,000 military personnel by
April 1969.
1976 Lebanon. On July 22 and 23, 1974, helicopters from five U.S. naval vessels
evacuated approximately 250 Americans and Europeans from Lebanon during
fighting between Lebanese factions after an overland convoy evacuation had been
blocked by hostilities.
1976 Korea. Additional forces were sent to Korea after two American soldiers were
killed by North Korean soldiers in the demilitarized zone between North and South
Korea while cutting down a tree.
1980 Iran. On April 26, 1980, President Carter reported the use of six U.S. transport
planes and eight helicopters in an unsuccessful attempt to rescue American hostages
being held in Iran.
1981 El Salvador. After a guerilla offensive against the government of El Salvador,
additional U.S. military advisers were sent to El Salvador, bringing the total to
approximately 55, to assist in training government forces in counterinsurgency.
1988 Panama. In mid-March and April 1988, during a period of instability in Panama
and as pressure grew for Panamanian military leader General Manuel Noriega to
resign, the United States sent 1,000 troops to Panama, to “further safeguard the canal,
U.S. lives, property and interests in the area.” The forces supplemented 10,000 U.S.
military personnel already in Panama.
1989 Libya. On January 4, 1989, two U.S. Navy F-14 aircraft based on the U.S.S.
John F. Kennedy shot down two Libyan jet fighters over the Mediterranean Sea about
70 miles north of Libya. The U.S. pilots said the Libyan planes had demonstrated
hostile intentions.
1992 Somalia. On December 10, 1992, President Bush reported that he had deployed
U.S. armed forces to Somalia in response to a humanitarian crisis and a U.N. Security
Council Resolution determining that the situation constituted a threat to international
peace. This operation, called Operation Restore Hope, was part of a U.S.-led United
Nations Unified Task Force (UNITAF) and came to an end on May 4, 1993. U.S.
forces continued to participate in the successor United Nations Operation in Somalia
(UNOSOM II), which the U.N. Security Council authorized to assist Somalia in
political reconciliation and restoration of peace.
1993 Iraq. On January 19, 1993, President Bush said in a status report that on
December 27, 1992, U.S. aircraft had shot down an Iraqi aircraft in the prohibited
zone; on January 13 aircraft from the United States and coalition partners had
attacked missile bases in southern Iraq; and further military actions had occurred on
January 17 and 18. Administration officials said the United States was deploying a
battalion task force to Kuwait to underline the continuing U.S. commitment to
Kuwaiti independence.
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1993 Iraq. On January 21, 1993, shortly after his inauguration, President Clinton said
the United States would continue the Bush policy on Iraq, and U.S. aircraft fired at
targets in Iraq after pilots sensed Iraqi radar or anti-aircraft fire directed at them.
2000 East Timor. On August 25, 2000, President Clinton reported to Congress,
“consistent with the War Powers Resolution,” that the United States was currently
contributing three military observers to the United Nations Transitional
Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) that is charged by the U.N. with restoring
and maintaining peace and security there. He also noted that the U.S. was maintaining
a military presence in East Timor separate from UNTAET, comprised of about 30
U.S. personnel who facilitate and coordinate U.S. military activities in East Timor and
rotational operations of U.S. forces there. U.S. forces currently conduct humanitarian
and civic assistance activities for East Timor‟s citizens. U.S. rotational presence
operations in East Timor are presently expected, the President said, to continue
through December 2000.
2000 Yemen. On October 14, 2000, President Clinton reported to Congress,
“consistent with the War Powers Resolution,” that on October 12, 2000, in the wake
of an attack on the U.S.S. Cole in the port of Aden, Yemen, he had authorized
deployment of about 45 military personnel from U.S. Naval Forces Central Command
to Aden to provide “medical, security, and disaster response assistance.” The
President further reported that on October 13, 2000 about 50 U.S. military security
personnel arrived in Aden, and that additional “security elements” may be deployed to
the area, to enhance the ability of the U.S. to ensure the security of the U.S.S. Cole
and the personnel responding to the incident. In addition, two U.S. Navy surface
combatant vessels are operating in or near Yemeni territorial waters to provide
communications and other support, as required.
2000 Yugoslavia/Kosovo. On December 18, 2000, President Clinton reported to
Congress, “consistent with the War Powers Resolution,” that the United States was
continuing to provide approximately 5,600 U.S. military personnel in support of
peacekeeping efforts in Kosovo as part of the NATO-led international security force
in Kosovo (KFOR). An additional 500 U.S. military personnel are deployed as
the National Support Element in Macedonia, with an occasional presence in Albania
and Greece. U.S. forces are assigned to a sector centered around Gnjilane in the
eastern portion of Kosovo. The President noted that the mission for these U.S.
military forces is maintaining a safe and secure environment through conducting
“security patrols in urban areas and in the countryside throughout their sector.”
