SECOND DIVISIONPhilippine LongDistance Telephone Company [PLDT],Petitioner,- versus -Roberto R. Pingol,Respondent.G.R. No. 182622Present:CARPIO, J., Chairperson,NACHURA,PERALTA, ABAD, andMENDOZA, JJ.Promulgated:September 8, 2010

X -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- XD E C I S I O NMENDOZA, J.:This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court filed by petitioner Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT) which seeks to reverse and set aside: (1) the December 21, 2007 Decision[footnoteRef:2][1] of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. SP No. 98670, affirming the November 15, 2006[footnoteRef:3][2] and January 31, 2007[footnoteRef:4][3] Resolutions of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC); and (2) its April 18, 2008 Resolution[footnoteRef:5][4] denying the Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner. [2: [1] Rollo pp. 134-140. Penned by Associate Justice Japar D. Dimaampao with Associate Justice Mario L. Guaria III and Associate Justice Sixto C. Marella, Jr., concurring. ] [3: [2] Id. at 126-129. ] [4: [3] Id. at 131-132.] [5: [4] Id. at 141-142.]

THE FACTSIn 1979, respondent Roberto R. Pingol (Pingol) was hired by petitioner PLDT as a maintenance technician. On April 13, 1999, while still under the employ of PLDT, Pingol was admitted at The Medical City, Mandaluyong City, for paranoid personality disorder due to financial and marital problems. On May 14, 1999, he was discharged from the hospital. Thereafter, he reported for work but frequently absented himself due to his poor mental condition.From September 16, 1999 to December 31, 1999, Pingol was absent from work without official leave. According to PLDT, notices were sent to him with a stern warning that he would be dismissed from employment if he continued to be absent without official leave pursuant to PLDT Systems Practice A-007 which provides that Absence without authorized leaves for seven (7) consecutive days is subject to termination from the service.[footnoteRef:6][5] Despite the warning, he failed to show up for work. On January 1, 2000, PLDT terminated his services on the grounds of unauthorized absences and abandonment of office. [6: [5] Id. at 18. ]

On March 29, 2004, four years later, Pingol filed a Complaint for Constructive Dismissal and Monetary Claims[footnoteRef:7][6] against PLDT. In his complaint, he alleged that he was hastily dismissed from his employment on January 1, 2000. In response, PLDT filed a motion to dismiss claiming, among others, that respondents cause of action had already prescribed as the complaint was filed four (4) years and three (3) months after his dismissal. [7: [6] Id. at 124-125.]

Pingol, however, countered that in computing the prescriptive period, the years 2001 to 2003 must not be taken into account. He explained that from 2001 to 2003, he was inquiring from PLDT about the financial benefits due him as an employee who was no longer allowed to do his work, but he merely got empty promises. It could not, therefore, result in abandonment of his claim.On July 30, 2004, the Labor Arbiter (LA) issued an order granting petitioners Motion to Dismiss on the ground of prescription, pertinent portions of which read:As correctly cited by (PLDT), as ruled by the Supreme Court in the case of Callanta vs. Carnation Phils., 145 SCRA 268, the complaint for illegal dismissal must be filed within four (4) years from and after the date of dismissal.Needless to state, the money claims have likewise prescribed.Article 291 of the Labor Code provides:All money claims arising from employer-employee relations accruing from the effectivity of this Code shall be filed within three (3) years from the time the cause of action accrued, otherwise they shall be forever barred.WHEREFORE, let this case be, as it is hereby DISMISSED on the ground of prescription.SO ORDERED.[footnoteRef:8][7] [8: [7] Id. at 136.]

Pingol appealed to the NLRC arguing that the 4-year prescriptive period has not yet lapsed because PLDT failed to categorically deny his claims. The NLRC in its November 15, 2006 Resolution reversed the LAs resolution and favored Pingol. The dispositive portion thereof reads:WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the instant appeal is GRANTED and the Order appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.Accordingly, let the entire records of the case be REMANDED to the Labor Arbiter a quo for further proceedings.SO ORDERED.[footnoteRef:9][8] [9: [8] Id. at 129.]

PLDT moved for reconsideration but the same was denied by the NLRC in its Resolution dated January 31, 2007.Unsatisfied, PLDT elevated the case to the CA by way of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC in issuing the assailed resolutions. The CA denied the petition in its December 21, 2007 Decision, the fallo of which reads:WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is hereby DISMISSED. The Resolutions dated 15 November 2006 and 31 January 2007 of the National Labor Relations Commission are AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.[footnoteRef:10][9] [10: [9] Id. at 139.]

PLDT moved for reconsideration but the same was denied by the CA in a Resolution dated April 18, 2008.THE ISSUESNot in conformity with the ruling of the CA, PLDT seeks relief with this Court raising the following issues:THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A WAY NOT PROBABLY IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS DEPARTED FROM THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS AS TO CALL FOR AN EXERCISE OF THE POWER OF SUPERVISION.[footnoteRef:11][10] [11: [10] Id. at 31.]

The issues boil down to whether or not respondent Pingol filed his complaint for constructive dismissal and money claims within the prescriptive period of four (4) years as provided in Article 1146 of the Civil Code[footnoteRef:12][11] and three (3) years as provided in Article 291 of the Labor Code,[footnoteRef:13][12] respectively. [12: [11] Art. 1146.The following actions must be instituted within four years:(1)upon an injury to the rights of the plaintiff. xxx ] [13: [12] Article 291.Money claims. All money claims arising from employer-employee relations accruing during the effectivity of this Code shall be filed withinthree years from the time the cause of action accrued, otherwise they shall be forever barred.]

Petitioner PLDT argues that the declaration under oath made by respondent Pingol in his complaint before the LA stating January 1, 2000 as the date of his dismissal, should have been treated by the NLRC and the CA as a judicial admission pursuant to Section 4, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Court.[footnoteRef:14][13] According to petitioner, respondent has never contradicted his admission under oath. On the basis of said declaration, petitioner posits that the LA was correct in finding that Pingols complaint for illegal dismissal was filed beyond the prescriptive period of four (4) years from the date of dismissal pursuant to Article 1146 of the New Civil Code. [14: [13] Sec. 4.Judicial admissions.An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.]

In his Comment,[footnoteRef:15][14] respondent Pingol counters that petitioner PLDT could not have sent those notices with warning as that claim has never been supported by sufficient proof not only before the Labor Arbiter but likewise before the Court of Appeals.[footnoteRef:16][15] He further alleges that his dismissal is likewise unsupported by any evidence. He insists that both the NLRC and the CA correctly stated that his cause of action has not yet prescribed as he was not formally dismissed on January 1, 2000 or his monetary claims categorically denied by petitioner. [15: [14] Rollo pp. 62-76.] [16: [15] Id. at 70. ]

THE COURTS RULINGThe Court finds the petition meritorious.Parties apparently do not dispute the applicable prescriptive period. Article 1146 of the New Civil Code provides: Art. 1146.The following actions must be instituted withinfour years:(1) Upon an injury to the rights of the plaintiff;xxxxxxxxxAs this Court stated in Callanta v. Carnation,[footnoteRef:17][16] when one is arbitrarily and unjustly deprived of his job or means of livelihood, the action instituted to contest the legality of one's dismissal from employment constitutes, in essence, an action predicated "upon an injury to the rights of the plaintiff," as contemplated under Art. 1146 of the New Civil Code, which must be brought within four (4) years. [17: [16] 229 Phil. 279, 289 (1986).]

With regard to the prescriptive period for money claims, Article 291 of the Labor Code states:Article 291.Money Claims. All money claims arising from employer-employee relations accruing during the effectivity of this Code shall be filed within three (3) years from the time the cause of action accrued; otherwise they shall be barred forever.The pivotal question in resolving the issues is the date when the cause of action of respondent Pingol accrued. It is a settled jurisprudence that a cause of action has three (3) elements, to wit: (1) aright in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff.[footnoteRef:18][17] [18: [17]J Marketing Corporation v. Taran, G.R. No. 163924, June 18, 2009, 589 SCRA 428, 440, citing Auto Bus Transport Systems, Inc. v. Baustista, 497 Phil. 863 (2005). ]

Respondent asserts that his complaint was filed within the prescriptive period of four (4) years. He claims that his cause of action did not accrue on January 1, 2000 because he was not categorically and formally dismissed or his monetary claims categorically denied by petitioner PLDT on said date. Further, respondent Pingol posits that the continuous follow-up of his claim with petitioner PLDT from 2001 to 2003 should be considered in the reckoning of the prescriptive period. Petitioner PLDT, on the other hand, contends that respondent Pingol was dismissed from the service on January 1, 2000 and such fact was even alleged in the complaint he filed before the LA. He never contradicted his previous admission that he was dismissed on January 1, 2000. Such admitted fact does not require proof. The Court agrees with petitioner PLDT. Judicial admissions made by parties in the pleadings, or in the course of the trial or other proceedings in the same case are conclusive and so does not require further evidence to prove them. These admissions cannot be contradicted unless previously shown to have been made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.[footnoteRef:19][18] In Pepsi Cola Bottling Company v. Guanzon,[footnoteRef:20][19] it was written: [19: [18] Damasco v. NLRC, 400 Phil. 568, 586 (2000), citing Philippine American General Insurance Inc. v. Sweet Lines, Inc., G.R. No. 87434, August 5, 1992, 212 SCRA 194.] [20: [19] 254 Phil. 578, 586 (1989).]

xxx that the dismissal of the private respondent's complaint was still proper since it is apparent from its face that the action has prescribed. Private respondent himself alleged in the complaint that he was unlawfully dismissed in 1979 while the complaint was filed only on November 14, 1984. xxx (Emphasis supplied. Citations omitted.)In the case at bench, Pingol himself alleged the date January 1, 2000 as the date of his dismissal in his complaint[footnoteRef:21][20] filed on March 29, 2004, exactly four (4) years and three (3) months later. Respondent never denied making such admission or raised palpable mistake as the reason therefor. Thus, the petitioner correctly relied on such allegation in the complaint to move for the dismissal of the case on the ground of prescription. [21: [20] Rollo, p. 124.]

The Labor Code has no specific provision on when a claim for illegal dismissal or a monetary claim accrues. Thus, the general law on prescription applies. Article 1150 of the Civil Code states:Article 1150.The time forprescriptionfor all kinds of actions, when there is no special provision which ordains otherwise, shall be countedfrom the day they may be brought. (Emphasis supplied)The day the action may be broughtis the day a claim starts as a legal possibility.[footnoteRef:22][21] In the present case, January 1, 2000 was the date that respondent Pingol was not allowed to perform his usual and regular job as a maintenance technician. Respondent Pingol cited the same date of dismissal in his complaint before the LA. As, thus, correctly ruled by the LA, the complaint filed had already prescribed. [22: [21] Anabe v. Asian Construction, G.R. No. 183233, December 23, 2009, 609 SCRA 213, 221.]

Respondent claims that between 2001 and 2003, he made follow-ups with PLDT management regarding his benefits. This, to his mind, tolled the running of the prescriptive period. The rule in this regard is covered by Article 1155 of the Civil Code. Its applicability in labor cases was upheld in the case of International Broadcasting Corporation v. Panganiban[footnoteRef:23][22] where it was written: [23: [22] G.R. No. 151407, February 6, 2007, 514 SCRA 404, 411-412, citing Laureano v. Court of Appeals, 381 Phil. 403, 412, (2000).]

Like other causes of action, the prescriptive period for money claims is subject to interruption, and in the absence of an equivalent Labor Code provision for determining whether the saidperiod may be interrupted,Article 1155 of the Civil Codemay be applied,to wit:ART. 1155. The prescription of actions is interrupted when they are filed before the Court, when there is a written extrajudicial demand by the creditors, and when there is any written acknowledgment of the debt by the debtor.Thus, the prescription of an action is interrupted by (a) the filing of an action, (b) a written extrajudicial demand by the creditor, and (c) a written acknowledgment of the debt by the debtor.In this case, respondent Pingol never made any written extrajudicial demand. Neither did petitioner make any written acknowledgment of its alleged obligation. Thus, the claimed follow-ups could not have validly tolled the running of the prescriptive period. It is worthy to note that respondent never presented any proof to substantiate his allegation of follow-ups.Unfortunately, respondent Pingol has no one but himself to blame for his own predicament. By his own allegations in his complaint, he has barred his remedy and extinguished his right of action. Although the Constitution is committed to the policy of social justice and the protection of the working class, it does not necessary follow that every labor dispute will be automatically decided in favor of labor. The management also has its own rights. Out of Its concern for the less privileged in life, this Court, has more often than not inclined, to uphold the cause of the worker in his conflict with the employer.Such leaning, however, does not blind the Court to the rule that justice is in every case for the deserving, to be dispensed in the light of the established facts and applicable law and doctrine.[footnoteRef:24][23] [24: [23] Maribago Bluewater Beach Resort, Inc. v. Dual, G.R. No. 180660, July 20, 2010.]

WHEREFORE, the petition isGRANTED. The assailed December 21, 2007 Decision and April 18, 2008 Resolution of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 98670, areREVERSEDandSET ASIDE and a new judgment entered DISMISSING the complaint of Roberto R. Pingol.SO ORDERED. JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA Associate JusticeWE CONCUR:ANTONIO T. CARPIOAssociate JusticeChairpersonANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA DIOSDADO M. PERALTAAssociate Justice Associate JusticeROBERTO A. ABADAssociate JusticeA T T E S T A T I O NI attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.ANTONIO T. CARPIOAssociate JusticeChairperson, Second DivisionC E R T I F I C A T I O NPursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.RENATO C. CORONA Chief Justice

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaSECOND DIVISIONG.R. No. 156367 May 16, 2005AUTO BUS TRANSPORT SYSTEMS, INC., petitioner, vs.ANTONIO BAUTISTA, respondent.D E C I S I O NCHICO-NAZARIO, J.:Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision1 and Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals affirming the Decision3 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). The NLRC ruling modified the Decision of the Labor Arbiter (finding respondent entitled to the award of 13th month pay and service incentive leave pay) by deleting the award of 13th month pay to respondent.THE FACTSSince 24 May 1995, respondent Antonio Bautista has been employed by petitioner Auto Bus Transport Systems, Inc. (Autobus), as driver-conductor with travel routes Manila-Tuguegarao via Baguio, Baguio- Tuguegarao via Manila and Manila-Tabuk via Baguio. Respondent was paid on commission basis, seven percent (7%) of the total gross income per travel, on a twice a month basis.On 03 January 2000, while respondent was driving Autobus No. 114 along Sta. Fe, Nueva Vizcaya, the bus he was driving accidentally bumped the rear portion of Autobus No. 124, as the latter vehicle suddenly stopped at a sharp curve without giving any warning.Respondent averred that the accident happened because he was compelled by the management to go back to Roxas, Isabela, although he had not slept for almost twenty-four (24) hours, as he had just arrived in Manila from Roxas, Isabela. Respondent further alleged that he was not allowed to work until he fully paid the amount of P75,551.50, representing thirty percent (30%) of the cost of repair of the damaged buses and that despite respondents pleas for reconsideration, the same was ignored by management. After a month, management sent him a letter of termination.Thus, on 02 February 2000, respondent instituted a Complaint for Illegal Dismissal with Money Claims for nonpayment of 13th month pay and service incentive leave pay against Autobus.Petitioner, on the other hand, maintained that respondents employment was replete with offenses involving reckless imprudence, gross negligence, and dishonesty. To support its claim, petitioner presented copies of letters, memos, irregularity reports, and warrants of arrest pertaining to several incidents wherein respondent was involved.Furthermore, petitioner avers that in the exercise of its management prerogative, respondents employment was terminated only after the latter was provided with an opportunity to explain his side regarding the accident on 03 January 2000.On 29 September 2000, based on the pleadings and supporting evidence presented by the parties, Labor Arbiter Monroe C. Tabingan promulgated a Decision,4 the dispositive portion of which reads:WHEREFORE, all premises considered, it is hereby found that the complaint for Illegal Dismissal has no leg to stand on. It is hereby ordered DISMISSED, as it is hereby DISMISSED.However, still based on the above-discussed premises, the respondent must pay to the complainant the following:a. his 13th month pay from the date of his hiring to the date of his dismissal, presently computed at P78,117.87;b. his service incentive leave pay for all the years he had been in service with the respondent, presently computed at P13,788.05.All other claims of both complainant and respondent are hereby dismissed for lack of merit.5Not satisfied with the decision of the Labor Arbiter, petitioner appealed the decision to the NLRC which rendered its decision on 28 September 2001, the decretal portion of which reads:[T]he Rules and Regulations Implementing Presidential Decree No. 851, particularly Sec. 3 provides:"Section 3. Employers covered. The Decree shall apply to all employers except to:xxx xxx xxxe) employers of those who are paid on purely commission, boundary, or task basis, performing a specific work, irrespective of the time consumed in the performance thereof. xxx."Records show that complainant, in his position paper, admitted that he was paid on a commission basis.In view of the foregoing, we deem it just and equitable to modify the assailed Decision by deleting the award of 13th month pay to the complainant.WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 29 September 2000 is MODIFIED by deleting the award of 13th month pay. The other findings are AFFIRMED.6In other words, the award of service incentive leave pay was maintained. Petitioner thus sought a reconsideration of this aspect, which was subsequently denied in a Resolution by the NLRC dated 31 October 2001.Displeased with only the partial grant of its appeal to the NLRC, petitioner sought the review of said decision with the Court of Appeals which was subsequently denied by the appellate court in a Decision dated 06 May 2002, the dispositive portion of which reads:WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit; and the assailed Decision of respondent Commission in NLRC NCR CA No. 026584-2000 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. No costs.7Hence, the instant petition.ISSUES1. Whether or not respondent is entitled to service incentive leave;2. Whether or not the three (3)-year prescriptive period provided under Article 291 of the Labor Code, as amended, is applicable to respondents claim of service incentive leave pay. RULING OF THE COURTThe disposition of the first issue revolves around the proper interpretation of Article 95 of the Labor Code vis--vis Section 1(D), Rule V, Book III of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Labor Code which provides:Art. 95. RIGHT TO SERVICE INCENTIVE LEAVE(a) Every employee who has rendered at least one year of service shall be entitled to a yearly service incentive leave of five days with pay.Book III, Rule V: SERVICE INCENTIVE LEAVESECTION 1. Coverage. This rule shall apply to all employees except:(d) Field personnel and other employees whose performance is unsupervised by the employer including those who are engaged on task or contract basis, purely commission basis, or those who are paid in a fixed amount for performing work irrespective of the time consumed in the performance thereof; . . .A careful perusal of said provisions of law will result in the conclusion that the grant of service incentive leave has been delimited by the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Labor Code to apply only to those employees not explicitly excluded by Section 1 of Rule V. According to the Implementing Rules, Service Incentive Leave shall not apply to employees classified as "field personnel." The phrase "other employees whose performance is unsupervised by the employer" must not be understood as a separate classification of employees to which service incentive leave shall not be granted. Rather, it serves as an amplification of the interpretation of the definition of field personnel under the Labor Code as those "whose actual hours of work in the field cannot be determined with reasonable certainty."8The same is true with respect to the phrase "those who are engaged on task or contract basis, purely commission basis." Said phrase should be related with "field personnel," applying the rule on ejusdem generis that general and unlimited terms are restrained and limited by the particular terms that they follow.9 Hence, employees engaged on task or contract basis or paid on purely commission basis are not automatically exempted from the grant of service incentive leave, unless, they fall under the classification of field personnel.Therefore, petitioners contention that respondent is not entitled to the grant of service incentive leave just because he was paid on purely commission basis is misplaced. What must be ascertained in order to resolve the issue of propriety of the grant of service incentive leave to respondent is whether or not he is a field personnel.According to Article 82 of the Labor Code, "field personnel" shall refer to non-agricultural employees who regularly perform their duties away from the principal place of business or branch office of the employer and whose actual hours of work in the field cannot be determined with reasonable certainty. This definition is further elaborated in the Bureau of Working Conditions (BWC), Advisory Opinion to Philippine Technical-Clerical Commercial Employees Association10 which states that:As a general rule, [field personnel] are those whose performance of their job/service is not supervised by the employer or his representative, the workplace being away from the principal office and whose hours and days of work cannot be determined with reasonable certainty; hence, they are paid specific amount for rendering specific service or performing specific work. If required to be at specific places at specific times, employees including drivers cannot be said to be field personnel despite the fact that they are performing work away from the principal office of the employee. [Emphasis ours]To this discussion by the BWC, the petitioner differs and postulates that under said advisory opinion, no employee would ever be considered a field personnel because every employer, in one way or another, exercises control over his employees. Petitioner further argues that the only criterion that should be considered is the nature of work of the employee in that, if the employees job requires that he works away from the principal office like that of a messenger or a bus driver, then he is inevitably a field personnel.We are not persuaded. At this point, it is necessary to stress that the definition of a "field personnel" is not merely concerned with the location where the employee regularly performs his duties but also with the fact that the employees performance is unsupervised by the employer. As discussed above, field personnel are those who regularly perform their duties away from the principal place of business of the employer and whose actual hours of work in the field cannot be determined with reasonable certainty. Thus, in order to conclude whether an employee is a field employee, it is also necessary to ascertain if actual hours of work in the field can be determined with reasonable certainty by the employer. In so doing, an inquiry must be made as to whether or not the employees time and performance are constantly supervised by the employer.As observed by the Labor Arbiter and concurred in by the Court of Appeals:It is of judicial notice that along the routes that are plied by these bus companies, there are its inspectors assigned at strategic places who board the bus and inspect the passengers, the punched tickets, and the conductors reports. There is also the mandatory once-a-week car barn or shop day, where the bus is regularly checked as to its mechanical, electrical, and hydraulic aspects, whether or not there are problems thereon as reported by the driver and/or conductor. They too, must be at specific place as [sic] specified time, as they generally observe prompt departure and arrival from their point of origin to their point of destination. In each and every depot, there is always the Dispatcher whose function is precisely to see to it that the bus and its crew leave the premises at specific times and arrive at the estimated proper time. These, are present in the case at bar. The driver, the complainant herein, was therefore under constant supervision while in the performance of this work. He cannot be considered a field personnel.11We agree in the above disquisition. Therefore, as correctly concluded by the appellate court, respondent is not a field personnel but a regular employee who performs tasks usually necessary and desirable to the usual trade of petitioners business. Accordingly, respondent is entitled to the grant of service incentive leave.The question now that must be addressed is up to what amount of service incentive leave pay respondent is entitled to.The response to this query inevitably leads us to the correlative issue of whether or not the three (3)-year prescriptive period under Article 291 of the Labor Code is applicable to respondents claim of service incentive leave pay.Article 291 of the Labor Code states that all money claims arising from employer-employee relationship shall be filed within three (3) years from the time the cause of action accrued; otherwise, they shall be forever barred.In the application of this section of the Labor Code, the pivotal question to be answered is when does the cause of action for money claims accrue in order to determine the reckoning date of the three-year prescriptive period.It is settled jurisprudence that a cause of action has three elements, to wit, (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff.12To properly construe Article 291 of the Labor Code, it is essential to ascertain the time when the third element of a cause of action transpired. Stated differently, in the computation of the three-year prescriptive period, a determination must be made as to the period when the act constituting a violation of the workers right to the benefits being claimed was committed. For if the cause of action accrued more than three (3) years before the filing of the money claim, said cause of action has already prescribed in accordance with Article 291.13Consequently, in cases of nonpayment of allowances and other monetary benefits, if it is established that the benefits being claimed have been withheld from the employee for a period longer than three (3) years, the amount pertaining to the period beyond the three-year prescriptive period is therefore barred by prescription. The amount that can only be demanded by the aggrieved employee shall be limited to the amount of the benefits withheld within three (3) years before the filing of the complaint.14It is essential at this point, however, to recognize that the service incentive leave is a curious animal in relation to other benefits granted by the law to every employee. In the case of service incentive leave, the employee may choose to either use his leave credits or commute it to its monetary equivalent if not exhausted at the end of the year.15 Furthermore, if the employee entitled to service incentive leave does not use or commute the same, he is entitled upon his resignation or separation from work to the commutation of his accrued service incentive leave. As enunciated by the Court in Fernandez v. NLRC:16The clear policy of the Labor Code is to grant service incentive leave pay to workers in all establishments, subject to a few exceptions. Section 2, Rule V, Book III of the Implementing Rules and Regulations provides that "[e]very employee who has rendered at least one year of service shall be entitled to a yearly service incentive leave of five days with pay." Service incentive leave is a right which accrues to every employee who has served "within 12 months, whether continuous or broken reckoned from the date the employee started working, including authorized absences and paid regular holidays unless the working days in the establishment as a matter of practice or policy, or that provided in the employment contracts, is less than 12 months, in which case said period shall be considered as one year." It is also "commutable to its money equivalent if not used or exhausted at the end of the year." In other words, an employee who has served for one year is entitled to it. He may use it as leave days or he may collect its monetary value. To limit the award to three years, as the solicitor general recommends, is to unduly restrict such right.17 [Italics supplied]Correspondingly, it can be conscientiously deduced that the cause of action of an entitled employee to claim his service incentive leave pay accrues from the moment the employer refuses to remunerate its monetary equivalent if the employee did not make use of said leave credits but instead chose to avail of its commutation. Accordingly, if the employee wishes to accumulate his leave credits and opts for its commutation upon his resignation or separation from employment, his cause of action to claim the whole amount of his accumulated service incentive leave shall arise when the employer fails to pay such amount at the time of his resignation or separation from employment.Applying Article 291 of the Labor Code in light of this peculiarity of the service incentive leave, we can conclude that the three (3)-year prescriptive period commences, not at the end of the year when the employee becomes entitled to the commutation of his service incentive leave, but from the time when the employer refuses to pay its monetary equivalent after demand of commutation or upon termination of the employees services, as the case may be.The above construal of Art. 291, vis--vis the rules on service incentive leave, is in keeping with the rudimentary principle that in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of the Labor Code and its implementing regulations, the workingmans welfare should be the primordial and paramount consideration.18 The policy is to extend the applicability of the decree to a greater number of employees who can avail of the benefits under the law, which is in consonance with the avowed policy of the State to give maximum aid and protection to labor.19In the case at bar, respondent had not made use of his service incentive leave nor demanded for its commutation until his employment was terminated by petitioner. Neither did petitioner compensate his accumulated service incentive leave pay at the time of his dismissal. It was only upon his filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal, one month from the time of his dismissal, that respondent demanded from his former employer commutation of his accumulated leave credits. His cause of action to claim the payment of his accumulated service incentive leave thus accrued from the time when his employer dismissed him and failed to pay his accumulated leave credits. Therefore, the prescriptive period with respect to his claim for service incentive leave pay only commenced from the time the employer failed to compensate his accumulated service incentive leave pay at the time of his dismissal. Since respondent had filed his money claim after only one month from the time of his dismissal, necessarily, his money claim was filed within the prescriptive period provided for by Article 291 of the Labor Code.WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 68395 is hereby AFFIRMED. No Costs.SO ORDERED.Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur.

Footnotes1 CA-G.R. SP No. 68395, dated 06 May 2002, penned by Associate Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr. with Associate Justices Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. and Mario L. Guaria, III, concurring. 2 Dated 12 December 2002.3 NLRC NCR CA No. 026584-2000 (NLRC Case No. RAB CAR 02-0088-00), dated 28 September 2001.4 NLRC Case No. RAB-CAR-02-0088-00.5 Rollo, pp. 46-47.6 Rollo, pp. 52-53.7 CA Decision, p. 10; Rollo, p. 24. 8 See Mercidar Fishing Corporation v. NLRC, G.R. No. 112574, 08 October 1998, 297 SCRA440.9 Cebu Institute of Technology v. Ople, G.R. No. L-58870, 18 December 1987, 156 SCRA 629, 672, citing Vera v. Cuevas, G.R. No. L-33693, 31 May 1979, 90 SCRA 379.10 06 April 1989; Rollo. p. 20.11 Rollo, pp. 45-46.12 Baliwag Transit, Inc. v. Ople, G.R. No. 57642, 16 March 1989, 171 SCRA 250, citing Agric. Credit & Cooperative Financing Administration v. Alpha Ins. & Surety Co., Inc., G.R. No. L-24566, 29 July 1968, 24 SCRA 151; Summit Guaranty and Insurance Co., Inc. v. De Guzman, G.R. No. L-50997, 30 June 1987, 151 SCRA 389; Tormon v. Cutanda, G.R. No. L-18785, 23 December 1963, 9 SCRA 698.13 See De Guzman, et al. v. CA and Nasipit Lumber Co., G.R. No.132257, 12 October 1998, 297 SCRA 743.14 See E. Ganzon, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 123769, 22 December 1999, 321 SCRA 434.15 Fernandez v. NLRC, G.R. No. 105892, 28 January 1998, 349 Phil 65.16 Ibid.17 Ibid., pp. 94-95.18 Abella v. NLRC, G.R. No. L-71813, 20 July 1987, 152 SCRA 140, citing Volkschel Labor Union v. Bureau of Labor Relations, G.R. No. L-45824, 19 June 1985, 137 SCRA 43.19 Sarmiento v. Employees Compensation Commission, G.R. No. L-68648, 24 September 1986, 144 SCRA 421, citing Cristobal v. Employees Compensation Commission, G.R. No. L-49280, 26 February 1981, 103 SCRA 329; Acosta v. Employees Compensation Commission, G.R. No. L-55464, 12 November 1981, 109 SCRA 209.

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