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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Vol. LXIV, N o. 2, March 2002 Self-presentation , Representation and the Self“ KEITH LEHRER University f Arizona and University of Graz Chisholm held that some states of o urselves are self-presenting and provide a stopping place in the quest for justification. The justification we have for accepting that we are in those states is transparent to us in a way that enables us to answer questions about justi- fication. Representation enables us to apprehend such self-presenting states through themselves i n a representational l oop. It is a loop of ex emp larization wherein the state i s used as an exemplar to represent t he kind of state it is. The result is that the representa- tion of the state prov ides the su bje ct with a kind of rep rese nta tion th at loops back onto itself escaping the bondage of stratified mentality. This form of representation by exemplarization i s shown to resolve problems and paradoxes concerning subjectivity, consciousness and the self raised by the writings of Hume, Kierkegaard, Ferrier, Sartre and Frank Jackson. Chisholm held that some states o f ourselves are self-presenting. Seeking for a place where t h e quest for justification might find a stoppin g place, C hisholm writes, Sextus Em piricus remarked that every object of apprehension seem s to be apprehended either through itself or through another object. Those things, if there are any that are “apprehended through themselves” might provide us with a stopping pl ace.’ He introduces the terminology of the self-presenting b y attributing it to Meinong as follows: Borrowing a technical term of Meinong, let us say that what is directly evident to a man is always some state o f affairs that “presents itself to him”.2 Chisholm goes on to remark that thoughts, including appearings and under- takings, are among those states that ar e self-presenting. Chisholm was espe- cially concerned with the claim that when a person is in such a state, then it Editor’s note: This special symposium, containing this paper an d the two that follow it, derives from a memorial conference in honor of Roderick M . Chisholm held at Brown University in the year 2000. Roderick M. Chisholm, Theory o f Knowledge, (Englewd Cliffs: Rentice-Hall, 1966), 26 . Chisholm, Theory ofKmwledge, 28 .

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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research

Vol. LXIV, No. 2, March 2002

Self-presentation, Representation and

the Self“

KEITH LEHRER

University of Arizona and University of Graz

Chisholm held that some states of ourselves are self-presenting and provide a stopping

place in the quest for justification. The justification we have for accepting that we are inthose states is transparent to us in a way that enables us to answer questions about justi-

fication. Representation enables us to apprehend such self-presenting states through

themselves in a representational loop. It is a loop of exemplarization wherein the state is

used as an exemplar to represent the kind of state it is. The result is that the representa-

tion of the state provides the subject with a kind of rep resenta tion that loops back onto

itself escaping the bondage of stratified mentality. This form of representation by

exemplarization is shown to resolve problems and paradoxes concerning subjectivity,

consciousness and the self raised by the writings of H ume, Kierkegaard , Ferrier, Sartr e

and Frank Jackson.

Chisholm held that some statesof ourselves are self-presenting. Seeking for a

place where the quest for justification might find a stopping place, Chisholm

writes,

Sextus Em piricus remarked that every object of apprehension seem s to be apprehended either

through itself or through another object. Those things, if there are any that are “apprehended

through themselves” might provide us with a stopping place.’

He introduces the terminology of the self-presenting by attributing it toMeinong as follows:

Borrowing a technical term of Meinong, let us say that what is directly evident to a man is

always some state of affairs that “presents itself to him”.2

Chisholm goes on to remark that thoughts, including appearings and under-

takings, are among those states that are self-presenting. Chisholm was espe-

cially concerned with the claim that when a person is in such a state, then it

Editor’s note:This special symposium, contain ing this paper and the two that follow it,

derives from a memorial conference in honor of Roderick M. Chisholm held at Brown

University in the year 2000.

Roderick M. Chisholm, Theory of Knowledge, ( E n g l e w d Cliffs: Rentice-Hall, 1966),26 .

Chisholm,Theory ofKmwledge, 28 .

412 KEITH LEHRER

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must be evident to the person that he is in such a state. H e modified his

formulation in later work, but the claim that self-presenting states are directly

evident remained central to his view.

My concern in this paper is with those states that are apprehended through

themselves. Chisholm initially, in Perceiving, was inclined toward the view

that it would make no sense to suppose that a person was mistaken in believ-ing that he was in a self-presenting state.3 However, over time he sought to

disconnect his theory of evidence from both considerations of truth and

p s y ~ h o l o g y . ~evertheless, there is something about the character of self-

presenting states that allows us to apprehend them through themselves in a

way that m akes it difficult to see how we could be in error in believing that

we are in such states. This feature of such states has, of course, been of

considerable interest in the philosophy of mind as well as epistemology.

Chisholm sought to distance himself in his epistemology from questionsabout how we apprehend such states through themselves and was content to

simply note that when we are in such states, and understand what it means to

be in them, it is evident to us that we are in those states. Nonetheless, such

questions remain germane to Chisholm’s thought.

I am convinced that Chisholm remained convinced that there was some-

thing about those states and about us that explained how we could apprehend

them through themselves, even if his allergy to psychologism and naturalism

ledhim to turn away from such questions. Moreover,

Iam also convincedthat he remained convinced that our apprehension of those states through

themselves protected us from error concerning them even if, as he turned

away from questions abou t truth toward questions of rationality, he turned

away from that the issue of how they protect us from error.

Representation of Self-presenting States. My concern, however, is with

how we represent those states that are self-presenting. There are, Chish olm

affirmed, states of ourselves, consc ious states, Hume’s impressions and ideas,

that are self-presenting, immediate and directly evident. My claim is that it is

something about the way we represent those states that explains how we can

apprehend them through themselves. Such an explanation of how we

represent those states also explains why we are secure from error in our r e p -

sentation, though not beyond the logical possibility of error, as many have

noted, and how we are justified in accepting that we are in such states when

we represent them in the way that makes them self-presenting.

I shall explain why the justification we have for accepting that we are in

those states is transparent to us in a way that enables us to answer questions

Roderick M. Chisholm, Perceiving: A Philosophical Srudy, (Ithaca: Cornell University

Press, 1957), 67 .

Cf. “My Philosophical Developm ent,” in The Philosophy of Roderick M. Chisholm, Lewis

Edwin Hahn, ed., (Chicago:Open Court, 1997). 3-41.

SYMPOSIUM 413

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about justification when we are justified in accepting that we are in such

states. The equation of justification with being able to answer questions

about how we are justified and how we know , is not a confusion of levels, as

Alston suggested: but, rather the result of a manner of representation. Repre-

sentation enables us to apprehend such self-presenting states through them-

selves in a representational loop . I have suggested that the representationalloop is a loop of exemplarization, wherein the state is used as an exemplar to

represent the kind of state it is. The result is that the representation of the

state provides the subject with a kind of representation that loops back onto

itself escaping the bondage of stratified mentality.

Problems and Paradoxes. I shall propose that this form of representation,

exem plarization, enables us to solve a number of problems about the repre

sentation of consc ious states and the representation of the self. The first prob-

lem is that the experience of conscious states fails to include the representa-tion of them. The representation of such states is left over as a kind of residue

of representation. I call this the representation problem . Th e second problem

concerns the impossibility of representing the subjectivity of consc ious states

and the conscious self. This problem is the mirror opposite of the representa-

tion problem in that it affirms that any representation of conscious states and,

therefore, of the conscious self, will fail to include the subjective knowledge

of the activity of consciousness. Representation will always leave out this

remainder of subjective knowledge. I call this the problem of subjectivity.Finally, there is the paradox involved in combining the problems of represen-

tation and subjectivity to account for our know ledge of consciousness and the

consc ious self. The paradox is that consc iousness transcends the subjectivity

of consciousness to yield the representation of it required for subjective

knowledge while at the sam e time consc ious transcends any representation of

it. I call this the problem of transcendence. These problems, I shall argue,

admit of solution in terms of representation by exem plarization, but first let

us formulate the problems.

The Representation Problem: Reid versus Hume. Consider the problem

of the representation of self-presenting states, consc ious s tates. The best

articulation of the problem is to be found in the 18th century dispute between

David Hume and Thomas Reid. Hume said that the perceptions of the mind

divide into impressions and ideas. Impressions are conscious states. Hume

says that as the force and vivaciousness of impressions fade, they become

ideas, indeed, ideas of the initial impressions! Now Hume is fam ous for his

attem pt to account for our belief in the external world in terms of impres-

5

6

414

William Alston, “Levels-Confusions in Epistemology,” in Midwesf S f d i e s in Philosophy,

P.A. French, T.E. Uehling and H.K. Wettstein, eds., (Minneapolis: University of Minne-

sota Press, 1980).

David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, L.A. elby-Bigge, ed., (Oxford Clarendon

Press, 1888), 1-8.

KEITH LEHRER

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sions, even if he finds n o line of reasoning to d e f d the existence of the

external world starting from premises restricted to impressions and ideas.

Reid, his opponent, a f f i e d that no external object or quality thereof even

resembles an impression. Hume’s attempt to account for our belief in exter-

nal objects and the qualities thereof in terms of impressions is, Reid thought,

doom ed from the outset.’Reid does not leave his criticism of Hume at this level, however, but

proceeds instead to a deeper and more fundam ental criticism . The c riticism is

that Hume cannot account for our belief in the existence of impressions and

ideas themselves. Hence, even if, per impossible, Hume could succeed in

giving an account of our belief in the ex istence of external objects and their

qualities based on only our belief in the existence of impressions and ideas,

Hum e’s project would falter at the initia l step of giving an account of our

belief in the ex istence of im pressions and ideas themselves. The reason is thatthere is a critical distinction between an impression, on the one hand, and a

belief and conception of the im pression, on the other.’

Take, for example, a sensation, the sensation of taste one experiences

upon drinking the first cup of coffee in the morning . The sensation is one

thing and a conception of it, a though t of it, is another. Reid contended that

the claim becomes more obvious when the sensation is past, when I remem-

ber the sensation I experienced upon drinking the cup of coffee. For now the

sensation is past, but the conception of it and the belief that i t existed aresomething present. The past sensation is obviously not identical with the

present thought of it on the grounds that nothing that is past can be identical

with something present. The fundam ental point, however, is that the concep-

tion, thought or belief concerning the sensation, whether past or present,

must be distinguished from the sensation itself. Consider another example,

that of pain. It is one thing to feel a pain, and it is another to have a concep-

tion, thought or belief concerning the pain. Reid says that the pain is the

immanent object, what we would after Brentano call the intentional object, ofthe conception, thought or belief. The pain must be distinguished from the

thought about it. The reason is that the pain may have no immanent object,

no intentional object, while the thought of the pain has the pain as the

immanent or intentional object of it? So, if the impression has no immanent

object and the conception, thought or belief of the pain does have an imma-

nent object, namely, the pain itself, then the conception, thought or belief of

the pain m ust be distinct from the pain. In general, put in modern terms, the

point is that im pressions lack the intentional structure of concep tion, thought

’ Thomas Reid, The Works of Thomas Reid, Eighth Edirion, Sir William Hamilton, ed.,

(Edinburgh: James Thin, 1895). 105.

Reid, Works. 356-57.

’ Reid, Works, 183.

SYMPOSIUM 415

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and belief, which have immanent or intentional objects. Hence, Reid

concluded, Hum e, starting with impressions alone cannot give us an account

of our conception, thought or belief concerning even impressions. Hume's

philosophy leaves us with an unexplained residue of representation beyond

impressions, namely, our conception, thought and belief about them.

The Represenration o f f h e Self. This problem leads to a second problemof a representation for Hume, one concerning the self. H ume says that when

he turns in upon himself and perceives what he is pleased to call him self, he

always perceives som e impression or idea and nothing else. He concludes that

he must be composed of impressions and ideas." The problem is that when

Hume turns in upon himself and perceives his impressions and ideas, there

seems to be something omitted, namely, the perceiver of those impressions

and ideas. This argument suggests that the perceiver is a substance, and might

beg the question against Hume.However, even if we do not assume that the perceiver is a substance ad

acknowledge that it migh t be a collection of impressions and ideas, there

remains at least the perception of those impressions and ideas, when Hume

looks into himself in order to represent what he is, left dangling beyond the

impressions and ideas perceived. The perceptionof the impressions and ideas,

even if that is nothing but another impression, appears to be left outside the

bundle of impressions and ideas perceived. Any attempt, therefore, by a self

to represent the self as a bundle of impressionsand

ideas will leave theperception of those impressions and ideas dangling outside the bundle. That

perception will be unrepresented and not included in the representation of the

bundle of impressions and ideas constituting the self. The attempt to repre

sent the self by observ ing the impressions and ideas composing it is self-

defeating.

These are problems about the representation of impressions and, conse-

quently, about the representation of the self in terms of the representation of

impressions and ideas. The two problems constitute the problem of represen-

tation. I shall eventually argue that the solution to the problem of representa-

tion is contained in Hume's own work, but it is important to notice the

relationship between this problem and other problems concerning conscious-

ness and evidence implicit in the doctrine of the self-presentation of our

conscious states. For, if Reid is correct in his argument, then it appears that

the psychological doctrine of self-presentation, of consc ious states appre-

hended through themselves, cannot be correct." The apprehension of the

10

I I

416

Hume, Treatise.252.

This problem is not a problem about the completeness of a representation of the states of

the self which may fail to be achieved because of the complexity of the bundle or, as

Hume himself noted, difficulties specifying the relation between the impressions and

ideas that make them a self. It is a more elementary problem, namely, that the very

KEITH LEHRFR

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conscious state, the pain, must be distinguished from the conception, thought

or belief about it . Consider a thought about a sensation or other conscious

state. We must distinguish the thought about some state, even a thought

about a thought, from the state itself. For the thought about a state has that

state as an intentional object, it is about that state, and hence must be distin-

guished from it.”Transparency of Consciousness. As a doctrine in philosophy of mind, a

doctrine about the psychology of consciousness, this might seem harmless

enough. Indeed, RosenthalI3and P01lock’~ ave thought that this doctrine has

the simple consequence that consciousness is metamental ascent to a next

level to obtain representation of a state. The ascent beyond the first level is

consciousness of them, and consciousness of a state at any level takes you up

a level to obtain the conscious representation of the state. Why not be satis-

fied with simply accepting Reid’s objection and this consequence of it? Firstof all, the doctrine of self-presentation has a point. Conscious states do seem

to present themselves to the subject in a way that makes the representation of

those states immediately transparent to us. The phenomenology may, of

course, be misleading. But they do seem to be apprehended through them-

selves. One might object that this phenomenology is simply the result of the

state playing a causal role in their representation. However, the existence of

many objects plays a causal role in our representationof them, so self-presen-

tation is missing from the account. Moreover, though this is controversial,the account that takes us to a higher level to obtain a conscious representa-

tion of a state always leaves us with an unrepresented level. We might, of

course, move up a level, but, once again, we are left at any point with an

unrepresented residue. The controversial but interesting feature of conscious-

ness is that the thought of a conscious state seems representationally trans-

parent. Consciousness seems, at least in some especially clear and salient

instances, a toothache, for example, to be representationally transparent all

the way up, down and through.

When we turn to the question of evidence the point iterates. Some

philosophers, Alston originally, have suggested that we may be justified in

believing that we are in some conscious or self-presenting state or, like

attempt to represent the bundle by perceiving what is in the bundle defeats the represen-

tation of the self as a bundle by leaving a perception unrepresented.

I t should be noted that when Reid wrote about consciousness he suggested that conscious

states signified or were signs of themselves as well as of other things. Nevertheless, he

distinguished between the sensat ion and the thought of the sensation. The sensation may

give rise to the thought of it and be a sign of it in that way, but the thought and the sensa-

tion giving rise to i t are distinct.

David Rosenthal, “Two Concepts of Consciousness,” Philosophicd Studies 49 (1986).

329-59 and “Consc iousness and Metacognition,” in Meturepresentutions: A Multidiscipli-

nary Perspective, Dan Sperber, ed., (Oxfo rd Oxford University Press. 20 00) , 265-98.

John Pollock, How to Build u Person: A Prolegomenon, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1986).4

SYMPOSIUM 417

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C h i ~ h o l m , ’ ~hat it might be evident to us that we are in such states, even

though we cannot give any answer to the question of how we are justified.

Indeed, Alston has gone so far as to suggest that the supposition that we need

to be able to answer the question of how we are justified in order to be justi-

fied, of how such states are evident to us in order to be evident to us,

involves confusing one level with another.16 It is advantageous in dealingwith skeptical challenges to be able to claim that one is justified and to be

able to answer the query, “How are you justified?’ by saying, “I just am, nd

I don’t have to say how I am justified in order to be justified.” But the answer

is unsatisfying. The object of philosophy is to provide explanation, other-

wise the point of it is lost. And when asked for an explanation, if one

answers, “I don’t have to answer,” one may be right, but one loses credibility

in philosophical inquiry. Finally, however, the unsatisfying answer seems

unnecessary because there is a correct and satisfying answer that I can give,namely, “I can tell whether I am in pain because the exis tence of the pain is

transparent to me in a way that provides me with justification for accepting

the existence of it.” The pain presents itself to me in a way that makes the

existence of it transparent to me. The pain provides me with an explanation

of how I am justified in believing that I am in pain because of the way I

apprehend it. There is no confusion of levels, because, contrary to the stan-

dad view, the justification is transparent in the way the representation is. I

am justified all the way up, downand

through the state. But how is thispossible? It might argued that justification like representation always leaves

us with a residue of justification at another level jus t as representation always

leaves us with a residue of representation at another level. This argum ent is a

fundamental philosophical mistake, however.

The Problem of Subjectivity. Before turning to the solution, which is

suggested in Hum e, let us consider the way in which the problem of subjec-

tivity has inserted itself into discussions of consciousness. Another Scot,

James Frederick Fem er,” who had the distinction of introducing the term

“epistemology” along with the opposite “agnoiology” into English, picked

up on the point that Reid made against Hume concerning representation and

the object of thought. He used it to argue against materialism. His argum ent,

starting with Reid’s point, is simple. Consider the subjective activity of

conscious thought. Now when I think of a material thing, it is an object of

thought, and has a kind of objectivity, with no aspect of it lost or omitted.

But when I direct the sub jective activity of thought toward something, toward

I’ Chisholm,Theory of Knowledge, 26-30.

l 6 Alston, “Levels-Confusions n Epistemology.”” James Frederick Ferrier, Introduction to the Philosophy of Consciousness (1938-39) PIS.

I-VII in Lectures on Greek Philosophy and other Philosophical Remains, vol. 11, Sir

Alexander Grant and E. L. Lushington, eds. (Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood

and Sons, 1866).

418 KEITH LEHRER

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some object, the object of that subjective activity is not itself a subjective

activity of thought but rather the object of the subjective activity. The object

must be distinguished from the subjective activity directed toward it. Femer’s

point was not merely an objection to materialism but to any attempt to give

an objective account of the subjective activity of consc ious thought. We

may, of course, think about our thought, but then we will be thinking aboutsom e past thought rather than som e present subjective activity of thinking .

That sub jective activity is always left as a remainder.

The argument concerning subjectivity recurs in Kierkegaard’* who claims,

in a witty moment, that Hegel, in a moment of cosmic absentmindedness,

forgot to include something when he was thinking about his absolute system

of the totality of objective reality. He forgot to include Hegel, and, moreover,

Hegel engaged in the subjective activity of thinking about the total system of

objective reality. Kierkegaard, hot in pursuit of Hegel and his total objectivesystem, asks us to imagine a man, call him for our convenience, Joe, who

spends his life studying love objectively. Joe has never felt the subjective

experience of love. So, Kierkegaard says, for all his objective study and

knowledge of love from a third person objective perspective, Joe lacks the

subjective truth about love, that is, he does not know what love is subjec-

tively for all his objective kn ~ w le d g e. ’~magine, to reinforce the point, that

Joe, having done his research, wonders what the subjective experience of love

is like, what it feels like to be in love. Imagine further that he subsequentlyfalls in love. He might well say, “So that is what love is. Now I know what

it is like.” (For those of you who do not think that love is a feeling, it will

suffice to substitute having an orgasm for being in love in the example and

imag ine that Joe , though he studied the orgasm never experienced one . And

then he did.)

Kierkegaard’s point is that there is a kind of knowledge of an experience, a

kind of subjective knowledge that remains beyond any objective account and

all objective knowledge. So, once again, there is the claim that conscious

experience leaves a remainder whenever one attem pts to represent that experi-

ence. Like Ferrier, he claims that any attempt to give an objective account of

subjec tive consc ious experience will fail. Of course , Kierkegaard places great

emphasis on the subjective experience for knowledge of it. But Kierkegaard

would agree that thought about an experience is distinct from the experience,

as Ferrier insisted, and, therefore, any thought of an experience will leave out

a way of knowing the experience, by having it , by being the experiencing

subject. The primary claim of Kierkegaard, however, was that any objective,

~~

I ’

l 9 Ibid., 51.

Seren Kierkegaard, Concluding CJnscienriJicPosfscript, D.F. wenson trans., (Princeton:

Princeton University Press. 1941). 267, 271, 273.

SYMPOSIUM 419

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that is, third person account of subjective experience leaves a remainder of the

subjective knowledge of it.

There is an interesting similarity between the example from Kierkegaard

and the twentieth century argument from Jacksonzoagainst materialism based

on subjective experience. The exam ple is too well know to rehearse in detail,

but it is the exam ple of a scientist, Mary, who comes to know all that thereis to know about physics and physical phenomena in an advanced state of

scientific knowledge. However, Mary has spent her life in a monochromatic

room to date, and so, though she knows all there is to know about the

physics of red objects and how they interact with the human body, she does

not know what it is like to experience the color red. She has never done so.

Imagine that she now leaves the room and perceives an object she knows to

be red. Now she knows what red is like. So all her objective knowledge

leaves a residue of something to know by having the consc ious experience ofred.

A Paradoxical Theory: S a m e . Two other twentieth century philosophers,

Sam e2’ and Nagel” have insisted that conscious experience gives us knowl-

edge of what something is like, indeed, what it is like to be the person or

subject of consciousness one is. Sartre, in some remarks reminiscent of

Ferrier, claims that this knowledge of consc iousness by consc iousness creates

an opposition because the intentional object of knowledge cannot be the

conscious activity. An object cannot be the same thing as a subjective activ-ity. Nevertheless, Sartre claims that consciousness contains within itself

knowledge of consciousness in some primal and imm ediate way that does not

make consc iousness an intentional object of consc iousness. Rather than say-

ing that the conscious state involves consciousness of consciousness, imply-

ing that consciousness is an intentional object of itself, Sartre suggests we

should recognize the reflexive character of consciousness giving us knowledge

of consciousness by speaking somewhat ungrammatically of consciousness

(of) consciousness. This gives us a way of expressing how consciousness

gives us subjective knowledge of consciousness without making it an inten-

tional object of itself. The problem of the remainder of subjective knowledge

appears to be treated in Sartre by accepting the paradox of saying that

consciousness gives us knowledge of consciousness without making it an

intentional object. Thus, according to Sartre, consciousness both is and is not

the object of consciousness in giving us knowledge of what it is like.

Sartre also offers us a paradoxical account of the self to accommodate the

problem of the residue. Suppose I reflect on what I am. I must reflect, he

2o

2’

22

Frank Jackson, “Epiphenomena1 Qualities.” Philosophical Quarterly, 32 (1982). 127-36.

Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, Hazel E. Barnes, trans., (New York:Philose

phical Library, 1956). Introduction, 3-21.

ThomasNagel, The V iewf rom Nowhere, (New York Oxford University Press, 1986).

420 KEITH LEHRER

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thought, perhaps following Hume, on my conscious states. So following

Hume, I might say that those conscious states are what I am. What else could

I say I am? But my consciousness projects beyond those conscious states, and

so that is not what I am. It is what I am and is not what I am. As Sartre puts

the matter paradoxically, I am what I have been, those conscious s tates of

me, in the mode of not being them. I am that in the mode of not being it. Ofcourse, Sartre is concerned with projection into the future from the present

and not just with the residue of representation of those conscious states

dangling outside of them. But consciousness would suffice for knowing all

that I can know about what I am as consciousness. Given the residue of

representation of consciousness, on the one side, and the remainder of subjec-

tive knowledge of consc iousness on the other, I can know what I am as a

conscious being in the mode of not being it. I am, o put the matter in

Humean terms, a bundle of impressions in the mode of not being it.There is depth in the Sartrian formulation, though, as I shall argue, we

need not settle for the paradoxical conception of the self. It is an honest

attempt to deal with the problems of the residue of representation and the

remainder of subjective knowledge concerning the self derived from Hume

and, indeed, from Kant. Some might be inclined to prefer a conception of the

self as som ething I know not what, an unknown and unrepresented some-

thing, a simple substance, a monad, which has the conscious states. But that

leaves us with a conception of the self as a surd, something incapable ofrational explanation. What reason is there to prefer a surd to a paradox in

philosophy?

Thomas Nagel, influenced by Sartre, has argued that consciousness, and,

indeed, the form of consc iousness peculiar to us is what it is like to be what

we are.23One might doubt the assumption of Hume, Sartre and Nagel that

what we are or what it is like to be what we are consists of our conscious

states. I would be inclined to say that however salient and essential conscious

states are to my being what I am and to what it is like to be me, that is not

the whole story about me. Of course, what it is consciously like to be me

consists of my conscious states, but there may be more to me, the uncon-

scious and many material aspects of me, which are part of me and what is

like to be me, though, of course, not what it is consciously like to be me.

However, those parts of me can be represented by myself or another, in prin-

ciple , if not in fact, without residue. It is consc iousness that leaves a residue

in the representation of the self.

The Problem of Transcendence. What we find in Sartre is the combina-

tion of the problem of representation and the problem of subjectivity in a

paradox. The two problem s are mirror opposites. The p roblem of representa-

tion affirms that any conscious state is distinct from the representation of i t

23 Ibid.

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and thus leaves a residue of representation. The representation is som ething

beyond the conscious state. The problem of subjectivity a f f i s that any

representation of the consc ious state is distinct from the consc ious state and

thus leaves a remainder of the subjectivity of the conscious state. Suppose,

then, that you attempt to represen t the self. The conscious state leaves a resi-

due of representation and representation leaves a remainder of sub jectivity.So, according to Sartre the representation of the conscious self is the r e p

sentation of consciousness without a residue of representation and a remainder

of subjectivity. That representation must be paradoxical. The paradox is that

what I am transcends any representation I can give of my conscious self at the

same time I transcend representation as a conscious self to know what I am.

That is the problem of transcendence. I can only represent myself as being

what I am not and not being what I am.

Exemplarization: A Solution. We have confronted the problems of repre-sentation, subjectivity and transcendence. Some will be impressed with them,

others may not. I am impressed with them. As I reflect on the history of the

discussion of the representation of the se lf, I consider the proposal of Sartre

that the self is paradoxical a natural outcome of the problems of representa-

tion and subjectivity. However, both problems have a solution. The basis of

the solution is the apprec iation of the way in which a state, even a subjective

activity, can function as an exemplar or model to represent a class of states,

including itself. This process of representation I have called exemplarization.My fundamental thesis is that we exemplarize our conscious states automati-

cally, or, at least, most of them unreflectively. Once one notices the possibil-

ity of exemplarization, the solution to the problem s we have considered will

become transparent. A conscious state serving as a vehicle to represent

consc ious states, including itself, will leave no residue of representation, for

it functions as a representation. A representation of a conscious state will

leave no remainder of subjective activity or subjective knowledge of it,

because the representation is the subjective activity.

Exemplarization is familiar enough as Goodmanz4 as taught us. Consider

an instance. You have heard of a song, Twinkle Twinkle Little Star, for

exam ple, and you ask me what song that is. I accommodate you by singing

the song. My singing of the song represents singings of the song . It is an

exemplar of a singing and represents singings , including , of course, itself.

This is representation by exemplarization. If I sing th e song, and you object

that I have not represented the singing of the song because I have just

provided an exemplar of a singing, I answer that the singing of the song is an

exemplar of singing which represents singings of the song at the same time

that it is a singing of the song.

24 Nelson Goodman, hnguages ofArr, (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Menil l, 1968).

422 KEITH LEHRER

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Solving the Problem of Subjectivity. Exemplarization solves the problem

of subjectivity. Suppose I have a feeling , a feeling of pain, for exam ple. Now

i t might appear that any representation of the feeling will be an objective,

third person, representation and will leave out subjective knowledge of what

the experience is like in the way in which loveless Joe, who has lived a love-

less life, will not know what the feeling of love is like no matter what objec-tive knowledge of love he has obtained. Similarly, monochromatic Mary,

who has lived in a monochromatic room all her life, will not know what the

sensation o f red is like no matter what objective materialistic representation

of color she has. Does this drive us to the conclusion that feeling and sensa-

tion cannot be represented without leaving out the remainder of subjective

knowledge of what these states are like?

Exemplarization reveals the way in which representation avoids the

remainder. Suppose that Mary leaves her monochromatic room and sees Joe’sred tee shirt or that Joe sees Mary and is suffused with feelings of love for the

first time. Let us remain with the simpler case of Mary who has the sensa-

tion of red for the first time. Mary now knows for the first time what the

sensation is like which is subjective knowledge that transcends her previous

objective representation of knowledge about the color red. Though others

have objected, it seems clear to me that Mary knows something in a new

way, know s what the sensation of red is like in a new w ay, which she did not

know before. We explain Mary’s new knowledge of the sensation of red bysupposing that she exemplarizes it. The sensation of red becomes an exem-

plar of a class of sensations. The exemplarized sensation represents the class

of sensations including , of course, itself. By exem plarizing the sensation, the

sensation is at the sam e time represented and representa tiona l. Her new

knowledge of what the sensation of red is like represents the sensation by

exemplarizing it. The sensation which is new to her becomes a new represen-

tation of a class of sensations by being used to represent a class of sensations

of which it is a member. The exemplarized sensation becomes a generalrepresentation of a class of sensations. The particular becomes conceptual as a

result and represents a class of particulars of which it is a mem ber.”

It may occur as an objection to some that a concept is general and that

there are many ways to generalize from a particular, from a particular sensa-

tion, for example. That is obviously a correct point. Two observations avoid

converting an obviously correct point into a difficulty. The first is that

animals generalize in their responses jus t as we do, and how they and we

generalize is in some cases determined by our biology and in others by

tutelage. We do not need to formulate a rule in order to generalize any more

2 5 Exemplarization is here treated as using a particular to represent a class. For the

purposes of this paper it could be construed as using a particular to represent a kind or

sort. I chose the more nominalistic construal to harmonize with Hume.

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than other creatures do. The second observation is that the ability to general-

ize is a necessary though not sufficient condition for exemplarization. For

one might respond to a class of particulars in the same way without using

any of the particulars in the class to represent the rest, or, for that matter to

represent anything else. However, when one exemplarizes, one uses a particu-

lar to represent a class.26Finally, it should be noted that we use activities torepresent a class of activities, that is, we exemplarize activities. Thus the

problem of subjectivity is solved when the new sensation is exemplarized and

becomes, while remaining a subjective activity, a representation of the sensa-

tion in the new knowledge of it.

Solving the Problem of Representation: Hume’s View. Does this solve

the problem of representation raised by Reid against Hume? It does. The

exemplarized sensation, the impression, represents the impression becoming

an idea of it. There is no residue of representation beyond the sensation whenthe sensation is exemplarized. It is, I think, important to note that Hume

insists that when impressions fade they become ideas of the original impres-

sion. Thus, i t is open to Hume to reply to Reid that the impression becomes

an idea as it is exemplarized to represent a class of impressions including

itself. Is this Hum e’s view? There is no doubt that Hume held that particular

ideas, faded impressions, are used to stand for a class of ideas and become

general. As for the reflexive character of exemplarization whereby the exem-

plarized impression becomes an idea that represents the impression, Humeremarks at the beginning of the Treatise,

The first circumstance, that sbikes my eye, is the g reat resem blance betwixt our own impres-

sions and ideas in every other particular, except their degree of force and vivacity. The one

seems to be in a manner the reflexion of the other; so that all the perceptions of the mind are

double, and appear both as im pressions and ideas.”

When noting that we use general terms to stand for a class of objects, Hume

indicates that he regards it as obvious that the particular is used to stand for

the class. He writes when discussing abstract ideas and general terms,

However this may be, ‘ t is certain rhaf we form the idea of individuals, whenever we use any

general term; thar we seldom or never can exhaust these individuals; and rhnr those, which

remain, are represented by means of that habit, by w hich we recall them, whenever any

present occasion requires it?’

As for the power by which we bring to mind the other impressions repre-

sented by a particular, Hume admits that,

26

2 1

2a

424

Whether the exemplarized particular can be used to formulate a rule may be controver-

sial. However, the rule to the effect that the particular should be used to stand for

members of the class it represents is at least implicit in function of exemplarization.

H u m , Treatise.on page 2. The italics on the word reflexion are Hume’s.

Hume, Treatise,22.

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Resemblance suggests further ideas to us when they become useful or necessary. One would

think the whole world of our ideas was at once subjected to our view. There may not, be any

present, beside those very ideas, that are thus collected by a kind of magical faculty in the

~ 0 ~ 1 . ~ ~

My intention here is not to defend an interpretation of Hume, however, but

rather to ind icate that the resources for h is defense and the solu tion of theproblem of representation are contained explicitly in his work.

Solving the Problem of the Representation of the Self. Does the exem-

plarization of impressions solve the problem of the residue in the representa-

tion of the self? The problem was that when Hume turns into himself and

perceives his impressions and ideas, that perception of the impressions and

ideas is not represented as part of the bundle of impress ions and ideas. Hence,

there is always an unrepresented perception outside the bundle of impressions

and ideas. So, it appears that what Hume ca lls himself canno t be that bundlesince Hum e’s perception of the impressions and ideas is left dangling outside

the bundle. Exem plarization solves this problem as well. When H ume looks

into himself and perceives his impressions and ideas that is a perception of

the mind, that is, an impression. Assume that impressions are exemplarized.

Then Hume’s perception of his impressions and ideas is itself exemplarized.

The exemplarized perception represents itself as well as the other impres-

sions. So the unrepresented perception le ft dangling outside the represented

bundle is an illusion. As Hume looks into himself and represents himself tohimse lf, that perception, assum ing it to be exem plarized, represents itself at

the sam e time that it represents other states. Impressions are exem plarized and

avoid the problem of representation by looping back onto themselves. The

perception of the other impressions and ideas of the self is also exemplarized

and represents itself as well other impressions and ideas. Consequently, the

perception of the other perceptions in the bundle is itself represented and

included in the representation of the bundle. The representation of that percep-

tion is not left dangling outside the representation of the bundle but is itselfrepresented as part of the bundle.

First Person Representation: The Loop of Exemplarization. Notice,

however, that the solution to these three problem s does not in any way reduce

the representation of the self to a third person representation or description of

the self or conscious states of the self. If I exemplarize a state of myself, I

may also describe the sam e state in a third person manner as you might

describe it. The subjective point remains, nonetheless, that in exemplarizing

the conscious state I represent the state in a different way, in a uniquely first

person way, by exemplarizing my own conscious state. You may represent

my state, but you canno t represent it in the same way that I do when I exem-

plarize a conscious state of myself so that it represents itself. This accounts

2q Hume, Treatise,24.

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for and explains the limitation of third person representation of first person

states and the limitations of third person knowledge based on such representa-

tion and description. Another can know a great deal of what it is like for me

to have a feeling, for he can represent that feeling to himself in words or in

terms of his own feelings. When another feels something she thinks is what I

am feeling and says , “Now I know how Lehrer, feels, he feels this way,” sheis then exemplarizing a feeling she has, using it to represent feelings, includ-

ing my feelings. However, she is still not representing the feeling, whether

of love or pain, or both, in exactly the way that I represent it and know it

when I exemplarize my own feelings. She may, in principle, represent the

sam e feelings by exemplarizing her feelings as I represent by exemplarizing

my feelings, but she does not represent them in exactly the sam e way that I

represent them. Her vehicle of representation is her pain, and my vehicle of

representation is my pain. The state represented may be the same fo r us both,but the thing representing the state is differen t for each of us.

If the other person represen ts the subjective state in terms of words rather

than by exemplarizing the s tate, a state of feeling , for example, because she

has not experienced that state, then she does not represent the state with even

the same kind of vehicle of representation that I do when I exemplarize the

feeling. I represent that subjec tive state by exemplarizing that state, while she

represents it with a conventional symbol, a word. Furthermore, we can take

this difference home to the first person. I can represent feelings of love withthe word “love” or by exemplarizing the fee lings of love. When I represent

those feelings by exemplarizing them, I have immediate knowledge of what

the feeling is like. The feeling represents feelings including itself in exem-

plarization. So the represented state is used to represent what it is like, and

that is a different way of representing what the state is like than by using

som e words to describe it.

Thus, the problems o f representation, subjectivity, and transcendencemsolved by bringing the alleged residue of representation and remainder of

subjectivity into the loop of exemplarization. But do we exemplarize our

conscious states, our impressions and ideas? The question is an empirical

one, and the claim that we do so a conjecture. The major advantage of the

assumption that we exemplarize our conscious states, other than solving the

problem s of representation, subjectivity and transcendence, is that it explains

in what way our consc ious states are imm ediately known and self-presenting.

To use the language of Hume, impressions and ideas must come to us repre

sented for them to be immediately known self-presenting states. This doctrine

of the self-presenting character of impressions, of their apprehension through

themselves, is explained by exemplarization. Otherwise we are threatened

with a regress of one impression representing another ad infiniturn to obtain

the representation of any impression by another impression.

426 KEITH LEHRER

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Solving the Paradox of Transcendence. Finally, consider the issue of

transcendence that Sartre raised. He argued that the subjectivity of the

consciousness is lost as it becomes an object. The attempt to make

consciousness an object of consciousness, whether this is an attempt of the

other or oneself, undermines the subjectivity of consciousness. There is, he

affirms, some primal consciousness (of) consciousness, some reflexivity ofconsciousness that gives as subjective knowledge of it. But Sartre a f f i s

that this cannot be consciousness of consciousness mak ing itself an object of

consciousness. The problem of transcendence, which leads Sartre to a para-

doxical representation of the self is that it appears that the self m ust transcend

itself, consciousness must be consciousness of consciousness to yield

conscious knowledge, at the same time that it is not an intentional ob ject of

conscious knowledge. However, exemplarization allows us to obtain an

account of the conscious self without paradox. The conscious self can repre-sent itself without loss of subjectivity. The subjectively conscious activity

can be exemplarized and represent itself as it remains subjective activity.

Exemplarization explains the reflexivity of conscious without supposing that

the conscious self must be conscious of itself at the same time that i t does

not become an intentional object of conscious knowledge.

Moreover, from the theory of exem plarization we obtain an explana tion of

the importance of the subjective perspective. It provides us with a way of

representing our states and, therefore, with a knowledge of what those statesare like that is different from other kinds of knowledge even if it is knowledge

of the same states. It is a different, first person and subjective way of know-

ing. It accounts for what existentialists and subjectivists have insisted, that

there is a way of knowing that is different from the third person objective

way of knowing. Monochrom atic Mary knows what red is like in a new way

when she exem plarizes the sensation.

It is crucial, however, to notice that such an observation cannot prove that

any fact is om itted in a third person or, for that matter, m aterialistic represen-

tation of the self and the conscious states of the self. When I exemplarize a

conscious state, pain, for example, my pain represents pain for m e. What the

nature of pain is remains an open question of metaphysics. It may be that

loveless Joe and monochromatic Mary exemplarize sensations of love and

color which thus represent material states without knowing this is the case.

New knowledge does not always reveal a new kind of fact. It may only

express a new and unrecognized way of knowing an old fact. Epistemic

contexts are opaque. A person who knows that she is drinking water may fail

to know that she is drink ing H,O. When she com es to know that she is

drink ing H,O, she knows something new, but it is a new way of knowing an

old fact. The fact that she is drinking water is the same fact as that she is

drink ing H,O. The exem plarization of our conscious states to yield a new way

SYMPOSIUM 421

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of knowing may be like this example. It may not. What I have said leaves

the metaphysical issue open. My interest was with representation and

knowledge. Ontology is another matter.

Infallible Belief of the Self-Presenting. Exemplarization does, however,

explain the psychology and semantics of self-presentation. The states a~

apprehended though themselves by serving as exemplars that represent theclass of things of which they are a member. Does this mean that exemplariza-

tion yields infallible belief concerning consc ious states? It depends on what

one requires in the way of infa llibility. It is logically possible to believe that

one is in pain when one is not as I have argued for a quarter of century

because one might believe that one is in pain on the basis of a false general

assumption about when one experiences pain. However, the question that

now confronts us is whether a person has infallib le belief in the existence of

a consc ious state based on the exem plarization of it. Again, however, theanswer is that it is logically possible to be in error. The psychology may go

awry in the activity of exemplarization, and I might, in fact, use the exem-

plarized state to represent a class of states that does not include the exemplar

itself.

It is worth noting at this point that a given state can be used to represent

diverse classes. It was Reid who noted that the same sensation that is a sign

of the existence of a sensation may, at the same time, be a sign of the exis-

tence of some external quality. A sensation of sound may signify the sensa-tion at the same time that it signifies an external property which gives rise to

the sensation. Exemplarization requires an exem plar and the generalization of

it to stand for a class of states or objects. Philosophers become much exer-

cised over the fact that we can generalize in different ways, that we can let the

same item stand for diverse classes of objects. One must note the fac t, but the

question of why we generalize the way we do rather than in som e other way

is, I think, of little philosophical interest. As we have noted, anim als gener-

alize, even ones of very modest cognitive capacities, and the question of why

they generalize as they do is a question of empirical inquiry. How they and

we generalize is the result of nature and nurture and a m ixture thereof which

cannot be sorted out by philosophical speculation. I do not see any deep theo-

retical issues connected with it. G eneralization is, though necessary for

exemplarization, not sufficient for exemplarization. A representation m ust

have a functional role in inference to supplement the application of the

exemplar to other states.30Since exemplarization is a psychological activity

30 For a more detailed account of the funCtiOM1 role invo lved in exemplarization, see Keith

Lehrer, “Meaning, Exemplarization and Metarepresentation,” in Metarepresentations: A

Mulridisciplinury Perspective, Dan Sperber. ed., (Oxford: Oxford University Press,

2000). 299-310 and Adrienne Lehrer and Keith Lehrer, “Fields, Networks and Vectors,”

in Grammar and Meaning, F. R. Palmer, ed., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,

1995), 26-41.

428 KEITH LEHRER

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involving generalizing to a class, it is logically possible that a person might

generalize from an exemplar to a class of things that fails to include the

exemplar itself. A person might be cognitively defective or just odd in the

way they exemplarize.

What should be noted, however, is that successful exemplarization will

yield a representation that represents the exemplar itse lf. So, here we reach akind of infallibility that explains Chisholm’s original suggestion that i t

makes no sense to suppose that we could be in error about such states. The

infallibility is grounded in the contingent fact of the success of our exem-

plarization. Moreover, this feature of exem plarization is epistemologically

significant because of the connection with self-presentation. We can appre-

hend, and, indeed, know the existence of such states immediately by our

exemplarization of them . Does that make m e a foundationalist about such

states? Not exactly. It is not sufficient for knowledge of our conscious statesthat they be exemplarized to represent themselves in the belief that they exist.

Exemplarization, as we have just noted, can be unsuccessfu l. What about

successful exemplarization? That will insure truth. How ever, the attainment

of truth by some successful process does not by itself insure the kind of ju sti-

fication that converts to know ledge, at least the kind of knowledge, reflective

knowledge, as Sosa3’ alls it, or discursive knowledge, as I have called it, that

plays a role essential in reasoning , most c ritically, in confirmation and refuta-

tion. I shall not repeat my arguments to avoid being tedious. My fundamental

claim is that one must be able to defend what one accepts against objections,

to reason about it and with it to defend it, in order to have knowledge. A

crucial assumption in such defense is that one is rational, trustworthy and,

finally, successfully reliable in what one accepts in the way one does, for

example, in the way one accepts what one does about one’s own conscious

states. Successful exemplarization insures success, to be sure, but it leaves

open questions and objections about one’s rationality, trustworthiness and

successful reli ab ilit~ .~’

The preceding remarks raise the question of how we can know that we are

rational, trustworthy and successfully reliable in what we accept. Let us

confine ourselves to rationality and a few remarks on how a referential loop

can solve the problem of the rationality of self. The problem is again one of

a threatened regress. Once I pose the question of whether I am rational to

accept what I do, it appears that I can only answer that question by appealing

to something else that I accept which I must be rational to accept. We may

avoid the regress by insisting that w e just are rational without explanation.

3 ’

’*

Ernest Sosa, “Reflective Knowledge in the Best Circles,” The Journal of Philosophy, vol.

XCIV, (1997),410-30.

For my most recent treatment of these issues, see Keith Lehrer, Theory of Knowledge,

Second Edition, (Boulder: Westview Press, 2000). Ch. 9.

SYMPOSlUM 429

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That leaves us with an irrational surd as a starting point or ending point in

the philosophical discussion which will be unsatisfying to those, like

myself, who regard explanation as prime desideratum of philosophy. The

regress is avoided once we arrive at the representation of the self by itself as

rational. The rationality of the self explains why it is rational for the self to

accept what it does. The rationality of acceptance is explained by the rational-ity of the self. What about the acceptance of the rationality of self? The same

is true of it. The rationality of my accepting that I am rational is explained

by my rationality. That closes the loop of rationality which has an exact

analogy in the loops of trustworthiness and successful reliability.

Explanatory power is contained in the loop. Once the need for and the

power of the loop are recognized, the loop expands in widening circles of

explanation. Exemplarization is one central loop in the widening circle of

loops in ep istemological explanation. Contemplate the power of the loop.