Presidential Leadership on Foreign Policy, Opinion Polling, and the Possible Limits of “Crafted Talk”

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Presidential Leadership on ForeignPolicy, Opinion Polling, and the PossibleLimits of “Crafted Talk”Brandon Rottinghaus aa Department of Political Science , University of Houston ,Published online: 30 Apr 2008.

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UPCP1058-46091091-7675Political Communication, Vol. 25, No. 2, 298699 2007: pp. 1–42Political Communication

Presidential Leadership on Foreign Policy, Opinion Polling, and the Possible Limits of “Crafted Talk”

Presidential Leadership and Crafted TalkBrandon Rottinghaus BRANDON ROTTINGHAUS

The strategy of “crafted talk” (or framing) suggests that a politician uses publicopinion to anticipate the most alluring, language to convince the public to follow apolitician’s own preferred policy (Jacobs & Shapiro, 2000). This manipulatory behav-ior by presidents has important consequences in the realm of constructing foreignpolicy, especially if the policy involves military service personnel, international pres-tige, or foreign conflict. However, no scholar has investigated White House archivaldata to examine the theoretical nuances of presidential “crafting” talk when construct-ing arguments for foreign policy. This article examines three case studies using inter-nal polling memoranda and focus group results concerning the Vietnam War underPresident Johnson, the signing of the INF Treaty with the Soviet Union underPresident Reagan, and the Gulf War under President Bush. In each of the three cases,public opinion places serious constraints on presidential framing of foreign policy.Implications for the effectiveness of political framing and the limits of presidentialpersuasion are discussed.

Keywords “crafted talk”, foreign policy, presidential leadership, public opinion

Scholars have pointed to presidential leadership as a key consideration for the literature onforeign policy and public opinion (Foyle, 2004), and many studies have examinedpresidential use of the “bully pulpit” to sell foreign policy, beginning with WilliamMcKinley “selling” (with the help of the “yellow” press) the Spanish-American War in1898 (Hilderbrand, 1981). Yet, we know little about how these campaigns relate to thetheoretical boundaries of public opinion. Furthermore, few studies look inside the “blackbox” of the White House to examine presidential “selling” of foreign policy, and no studyhas explored internal presidential decisions using “crafted talk” to shape arguments forforeign policy. This article extends the literature of the use of internal White Housepolling to shape opinion on issues of foreign policy and pairs this with a discussion ofpresidential rhetorical leadership of public opinion on foreign policy through archival-based case studies. By extension, this article theoretically investigates this topic by linkingit to the theory of opinion manipulation through “crafted talk” and policy framing.

In particular, the following question is examined: Does public opinion constrain pres-idential use of “crafted talk” when formulating public arguments on foreign policy?Scholars have called for supplemental work in this area concerning the relationshipbetween the president and the public, especially using archival data (Hall, 2002). Holsti

Brandon Rottinghaus is Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Houston.Address correspondence to Brandon Rottinghaus, University of Houston, Department of

Political Science, Phillip Guthrie Hoffman Hall, Room 447, Houston, TX 77204-3011, USA.E-mail: [email protected]

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Presidential Leadership and Crafted Talk 139

(1992) suggested the need for more work utilizing archival sources to illustrate thisrelationship between fashioning foreign policy and public opinion as a resource. Simi-larly, Jacobs and Shapiro (2000) concluded Politicians Don’t Pander by arguing:

Additional research is required to uncover the causal mechanisms that explainthe variations of responsiveness over time. Focusing on archival evidence con-cerning the behavior of authoritative government officials like U.S. presidentsoffers a promising approach to explaining changes in political behaviorand strategy. (p. 298)

The manner by which presidents determine (and utilize) public preferences is also under-studied. Entman (2004) notes, “prior research into the impact of public opinion on publicpolicy offers surprisingly little insight into exactly how elites figure out what the public isthinking” (p. 123). To address my research question and fill in these identified empiricalgaps in the literature, I examine three case studies through internal polling memoranda andfocus group results concerning the perpetuation of popular support during the VietnamWar under President Johnson, the “selling” of the INF treaty signing (1987) underPresident Reagan, and the genesis of the Gulf War under President Bush. These in-depth,inside the “black box” case studies allow examination of motivations, arguments, andframe construction during some of the most significant moments in American foreignpolicy.

The Dynamics of “Crafted Talk” and Political Framing

The strategy of crafted talk suggests that politicians use public opinion to anticipate themost alluring language to convince the public to support the politician’s own preferredpolicy (Jacobs & Shapiro, 2000). However, the existence of crafted talk has yet to be fullyexplored, with no studies directly substantiating the claims made in Politicians Don’tPander to demonstrate the nuances of this phenomenon (see Hall, 2002). Jacobs andShapiro (2000), of course, adeptly discuss two expanded domestic policy cases studies: onefrom the Clinton health care reform effort early in his term and one from the RepublicanParty’s 1994 “Contract with America.” Both policies, they argue, overreached and eventu-ally failed. This finding is consistent with evidence from Edwards (2003) that suggeststhat presidents, despite repeated attempts, typically are unsuccessful at leading publicopinion. Even with these cases, however, our theoretical knowledge is inherently limitedwithout further studies describing the boundaries of crafted talk across additional issuesand multiple presidencies. This article explores the theory of crafted talk and attempts toextend the empirical evidence to issues of presidential rhetorical arguments on foreignpolicy.

The prospect of crafted talk is simple enough. Jacobs and Shapiro (2000) argue thatone way in which politicians are “responsive” to public opinion is by pursuing the strategyof crafted talk to “change public opinion in order to offset the potential political costs ofnot following the preferences of the average voters” (p. xiii). Politicians “track publicopinion not to make policy but rather to determine how to craft their public presentationsand win public support for the policies they and their supporters follow” (p. 48). In short,pollsters don’t reshape policies—they reshape arguments for policies. This prospect couldhave dramatic consequences in the realm of foreign policy, especially if the policyinvolves commitment of troops internationally or United States prestige (see Foyle, 2004;Western, 2005b).

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140 Brandon Rottinghaus

Concepts of crafted talk and political framing are close cousins.1 Indeed, the framingliterature clearly demonstrates (like crafted talk) the possibility of the shaping of publicpreferences by the highlighting of certain points or the way in which an argument is pre-sented. Many studies in this theme argue that citizens’ political preferences are inherentlymalleable with consistent framing effects (Chong, 1993). Political actors can implement“policy metaphors” to constrain the beliefs of the mass public, even those who are highlypolitically sophisticated (Lau & Schlesinger, 2005). Entman (2004) argues that WhiteHouse framing begins the process of “cascading activation” on foreign policy, where theframe articulated by the president has a significant effect down the cue-giving chain(including elites, the media, and the public). The implication for presidential leadership isthat presidents should theoretically be able to motivate public opinion in a way mostfavorable to their own policy preferences, and we can test assumptions about when andhow framing affects work in foreign policy with our case studies.

Specifically, by using public opinion polling and focus groups, presidents are able tolocate the preferences of most Americans (or “centrist opinion”) on foreign policy matters.Presidents using crafted talk attempt to move majority public opinion to their own pre-ferred location. Crafted talk takes the preferences of a majority of Americans into accountbut attempts to relocate these policy preferences with targeted public relations strategies.This assumes public opinion is malleable and that long-standing salient opinion on anissue can be moved by a persuasive president. Specifically, politicians accomplish this byattempting to find words and phrases (crafted talk) that appear to comport with majorityopinion but actually package unpopular elements of a policy with popular elements.2

Presidents may also be attempting to use these framing techniques to sustain their ownpolitical base (Cohen, 2006).

Expectations of Foreign Policy and Public Opinion

This article closely examines the dynamics of crafted talk through foreign policy casestudies and guided by theoretical expectations. These expectations suggest that, given theunique limits of public opinion on foreign policy, presidential persuasive tools designed tomove public opinion with crafted talk strategies can work but will be limited to that whichthe public will accept, or in short, public opinion on foreign policy will constrain domesticmobilization strategies. Presidents may therefore have less framing power than expectedbecause of these real constraints on foreign policy. Indeed, scholars experimentallyexamining the limits of framing conclude that political actors might be limited by issues ofcredibility when succeeding at framing an issue in a manner persuasive to the public(Druckman, 2001). It is on this point where the discussion of framing and crafted talkcontradicts findings in the public opinion literature on the weight of public opinion in con-straining foreign policy, and it is here where this article makes its primary contribution.I explore the theoretical underpinnings of this tension in the subsequent paragraphs.

To begin this theoretical exploration, I start by presuming presidents reject the thinkingthat the public is unconcerned, indifferent, or “lack[s] the intellectual structure and factualcontent” on issues of foreign policy (Almond, 1950, p. 53). The “Almond-Lippmann”consensus suggested the public is incapable of making appropriate decisions on arcanematters of foreign policy and their opinion should therefore be discarded (Lippmann,1922, p. 20; Converse, 1964). However, much contemporary theorizing has demonstratedthis suggestion to be false and that opinion on foreign policy remains stable over time(Page & Shapiro, 1992; Holsti, 1996). Although public input may not be sufficient to ini-tiate a policy, public opinion can hasten to shape the contours of the policy (Sobel, 2001).

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Ultimately, scholars have found that public opinion has a strong influence on policy-making or, at the very least, provides boundaries of operating ability for policy makers(Russett, 1990; Powlick, 1991; Foyle, 1999, 2004; Kull & Ramsay, 2003; Larson &Savych, 2005).

In foreign policy, in contrast to domestic policy, this opinion-policy connection iscritical to policy success for presidents. Several studies have demonstrated that publicopinion sets broad parameters to shape and constrain actions that can be taken by foreignpolicy makers (see Foyle, 1999). Sobel (2001) also argues that “public opinion constrains,but does not set, American foreign intervention policy” (p. 5). The association betweenthese actors involves electoral consequences where policy makers fear retribution at thevoting booth should they pursue unpopular policies in the world arena (Marra, Ostrom, &Simon, 1990). Consequently, opinion and policy “interact,” necessitating that leaders bothreact to and lead public opinion (Russett, 1990). As a result, public opinion serves as afirst “dike” of policy options, since public officials presume they need public approval (orat least lack of disapproval) to enact a new policy (Powlick, 1991).

In short, given the importance of public opinion, the White House will treat publicopinion as a serious and important input (and constraint) into foreign policy persuasion. Itis therefore a necessary condition that public opinion matters in presidential constructionand buttressing of support for foreign policy. There are several political reasons for this.Presidential popularity, also an important resource in itself, has been linked to success inforeign policy (Brody, 1991; Oneal & Bryan, 1995), and popularity (but not unpopularity)is an effective source on shaping public perception on television (Jordan & Page, 1992).The lack of post-Vietnam consensus on the direction of United States foreign policynecessitated the activation of public opinion as an important consideration in constructingforeign policy (Wittkopf, 1990; Holsti, 1992; Wittkopf & McCormick, 1993). Further,when presidents erroneously assume public opinion on foreign policy is too malleable orlacking in structure, they often fail to adequately advance their foreign policy agenda(Katz, 2000).

Scholars have subsequently found several conditions limiting presidential leadershipof foreign policy, primarily where a president cannot simply strong-arm public opinionwith his rhetoric. “Domestic criticism” is inevitably triggered with an international crisis,ensuring presidents cannot act alone but only in concert with other actors, such asCongress, the media, and the public (Hess, 2001). Attentive public opinion has also beenshown to be prohibitive of international action, unless there is a belief that the president is“highly confident of success” (Baum, 2004). On issues of international conflict, presidentshave been shown to “lead” public opinion only inasmuch as the public desired internationalmilitary intervention before the administration explained its case (Foyle, 2004). Entman’s(2004) impressive theoretical exploration of framing effects on foreign policy from theWhite House finds that the anticipation of public preferences has a “reverse cascade” effectof shaping public policy. A “rally” effect can be potent for motivating opinion but willalso be limited by a potential lack of agreement among opinion leaders (Brody & Shapiro,1989).

Therefore, if my assertion concerning the constrains of opinion on foreign policy iscorrect, we should expect to see presidents limiting their persuasive rhetoric and being con-strained by that which their internal focus group and polling results indicate is acceptable tothe majority of the public. Presidents may succeed at leading public opinion by framing,but public opinion will limit their options. These limits include salient opinions that existedat the time the president took office, such as broad desires for limited conflict and peacefulcoexistence with geopolitical neighbors as well as specific opinions on policies involving

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conditions on military engagement and treaty negotiations. Specifically, baseline publicopinion should be a key concern (among other concerns) for communications strategistswhen internally discussing building support for foreign policy decisions. If the WhiteHouse were seen as ignoring or dismissing public preferences as an important consider-ation in the process of selling foreign policy, then the present expectation would be provedincorrect.

Archival Method and Case Selection

A comprehensive presidential archival search is an informative way to analyze presiden-tial history. It is often difficult, but not impossible, to treat archival data analysis of thissort in a truly systematic manner. In that sense, as is the situation with most case study–based works, I am unable to definitively prove my assertions. However, given the range ofcases and my interpretation of theories of behavior and leadership, I can say with somecertainty that my assertions here are plausibly correct. Ultimately, though, I am carefulwhen discussing casual connections and proposing absolute conclusions. In this section,I explore the advantages and disadvantages of addressing theoretical questions witharchival material to clarify the contributions and limitations of my analysis. In addition,I discuss my case selection method.

Although I am confident in my search strategy, the sheer volume of presidential doc-uments precludes a full accounting of all of the White House poll results or memoranda inwhich polling was discussed among the senior staff.3 As a result, one can never be fullycertain that a complete set of polling documents can be found. For instance, one set ofpolling data may be interpreted in one way by an individual adviser, while another inter-pretation from another staff member (or several sets of interpretations) may be missing,excluded, misfiled, or simply destroyed.4 Relying on a single document for an evaluationof “what the White House was thinking” can therefore often be misleading. For this rea-son, I have selected a case study approach to my analysis—one that allows perspective onthe depth and scope of the discussion inside the White House. In addition, I use supple-mentary primary and secondary sources to corroborate my archival findings.

The cases selected for this article span a broad range of types of interventionsand negotiations (wars and arms control talks), varieties of conflict duration (both shortand drawn out), and several episodes involving different presidents across time (mid-20th-and late-20th-century presidents) and across electoral circumstances (first-and second-term presidents), thus allowing for unusual variation in cases to examine my expectations.Although narrowly presented and stylized, the cases selected and observations discussedreflect a breadth and depth necessary for successful description and exposition of analyticalclaims (see King, Keohane, & Verba, 1994).5 Although the present cases were not ran-domly selected, they do conform to a standard cross-sectional design, allowing me to deter-mine if the two variables studied (presidential rhetoric and public opinion) are associated(Schutt, 1994). Evidentiary proof in this context lies in the preponderance of documentationpointing in the same direction (Yin, 2002). The longitudinal nature of the data also allowsappropriate time-ordered causal claims.

“An Honorable Peace”: The Vietnam War

Vietnam altered scholarly assumptions about the role of public opinion in constructingforeign policy (Holsti, 1992). In particular, the breakdown in consensus regarding theproper use of force and over the international objectives important to the United States

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created an atmosphere where presidents needed to pay attention to public opinion inshaping foreign policy (Lunch & Sperlich, 1979). In fact, as we will see, there is a strongelement of this phenomenon before the Vietnam War ended—as early as 1965, theJohnson administration was concerned with ensuring public support for (or lack of opposi-tion to) their military policies in Vietnam (Gardner, 1995, p. 255). Previous work hasfound similar patterns of public opinion forming policy boundaries. Specifically, Zaller(1994) argues that Johnson followed public opinion by “leading it into a war that neitherhe nor the public wanted” (p. 250). Subsequent to the Johnson administration, the Nixonadministration was also limited in the actions it could take by the “war weariness” of thepublic (Katz, 1997, p. 507).

As expected, the White House was concerned with the durability of public opinion andvalued it (even feared it) in policy-making. For the Johnson administration, the ongoingconflict in Vietnam represented a protracted struggle to win public opinion on foreign pol-icy in spite of mounting casualties and the potential of a damaging international stalemate.Hayes Redmon (special assistant to the president) sent a memorandum to Bill Moyers(press secretary) on the Vietnam War framing the administration’s approach to publicopinion: “Polls do not make policy. Yet, I think it is essential that we do all we can toinsure public support for our policies. Polls can tell us what people will and will notsupport.”6 Using these data, the administration sought to argue for a “partial mobilization”(rather than a “total mobilization”) of the home front over an extended duration of timeuntil the war could be concluded (Gardner, 1995, p. 253).

It was clear to the Johnson administration that, based upon public opinion polls, therewere strict limits on the escalatory action the public would accept in Vietnam (see alsoHolsti, 1996, p. 40). In a memorandum to Bill Moyers, Hayes Redmon argued that thepublic might support escalation, “yet there are limits to the amount and kind of escalationthat the public will support.”7 Redmon argued that 7 out of 10 opposed extending the groundwar to North Vietnam, 7 out of 10 opposed the use of battlefield nuclear weapons, and two-thirds believed the U.S. should not bomb the mainland Chinese.8 Fighting a “limited war”was not the preferred option, but was the only opinion the president could engage given theobserved opinion split—the public simultaneously desired an end to the war but a continu-ation to “hold the line” without unnecessary escalation (Dallek, 1998, p. 257).

In particular, the public was very concerned with the ending of the war in a negotiatedmanner. Johnson’s internal polls showed, in February 1965, that 75% of the publicfavored a negotiated settlement, and, in a prescient prediction, that only 30% of the publicthought the U.S. would “eventually win”, while 58% held that there would be “a compro-mise with nobody really winning.”9 Bill Moyers concluded in a memorandum to the pres-ident: “Yet, if the public supports our military increases to date, they are even moreoverwhelmingly in favor of attempts at negotiated settlement.”10 Similarly, in a memoran-dum to Hayes Redmon, Tad Cantril (special assistant to the president) wrote, “The view ofthe public, however, is not confused and not inconsistent: peace is the overbearing con-cern of the American people.” He concluded by noting, “All is dwarfed by the concern forpeace and escalation is seen as but a way to it.”11 Additionally, in a memorandum to Pres-ident Johnson, Moyers wrote:

All this indicates that the public has supported our policies—includingincreased military efforts—to date. This is primarily because they want us tobe in a position to negotiate from strength. They want—and even anticipate—a negotiated, compromise peace. They have supported escalation because theyhope it will bring peace more quickly.12

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Beginning with the initial bombing of North Vietnam in 1965 and the buildup of troops in1966, a “permissive majority” of the public supported President Johnson, but the rally effectwas beginning to diminish (Sobel, 2001). Moyers concluded the above memorandum to thepresident by noting, “the great danger for the future lies in frustration of this goal [peace].”13

Poll data gave President Johnson a clear understanding of the limitations and expecta-tions of public opinion and gave the administration a way to craft rhetoric on Vietnamconsistent with an apprehensive public. Ultimately, the administration proffered languagein line with public expectations. When discussing the effect of such public opinion data onthe administration’s ability to sell the policy, Cantril argued to Redmon:

(1) Almost any Presidential initiative offering the slightest hope of peace willbe well received by the American people. (2) The public can be given greaterunderstanding of the nature of the Vietnamese war and of Vietnamese life bygreater discussion of the non-military aspects of the war.14

Bill Moyers had made the same point earlier (at the end of the previous year) by noting:“To maintain public support we need a series of moves—preferable [sic] dramatic—toassure them [the public] that we are active in the pursuit of peace.”15

The Johnson administration used these data in shaping policy language on Vietnam inseveral ways. In a strategy memorandum detailing how to handle the Vietnam crisis in thepublic, Hayes Redmon wrote to Bill Moyers that the administration should “reaffirm U.S.determination to achieve an honorable peace—a determination which all sounding ofAmerican opinion [shows] is shared by the overwhelming majority of Americans of allages and in all sections of the country.”16 The Johnson White House repeatedly made useof the “bully pulpit” to attempt to lead public opinion within the boundaries of the public’sdesire for peace. A memorandum from Hayes Redmon to Bill Moyers notes:

Thus it seems important for the President to help the public construct somerealistic assumptions and expectations. Statements such as his last night areimportant and should be repeated frequently: “We persist because we believethat cooperation, not hostility, is the way of the future. That day is not here. Itmay be long in coming, but it is clearly on its way. And it must come.”17

Consistent with this, Meernik and Ault (2001) found that the public uses peace andsecurity as criteria for evaluating presidential foreign policy.

Similarly, in reading these public preferences, based upon the limitations of publicsupport for an expanded war, Hayes Redmon outlined a public relations strategy (to BillMoyers) in January of 1966 with the hopes of shoring up support for the administration’sVietnam policy. Redmon outlined a number of points for rhetorical inclusion in presiden-tial speeches, including:

—Reaffirm U.S. determination to achieve an honorable peace—a determina-tion which all soundings of American opinion show is shared by the over-whelming majority of Americans of all ages and in all sections of the country.

—Indicate what “victory” means: not completely demolishing N. Vietnam,etc., but negotiate a settlement that would assure independence, freedom fromvicious attacks, freedom to set up government of own choice. (People areconditioned to this view of victory).

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—No one is more eager than the President to reach an honorable settlement ofthe war. The American people may be confident that this government is doingall it can to assure that aim. The American people and people all over theworld may be assured that any peace feeler this government learns about willbe considered carefully and positively.18

He concluded by arguing “we must make clear we intend to avoid nuclear war” and theyare working with the Chinese government to pressure North Vietnam to negotiate peace.Given this evidence, the administration was careful to craft a policy within the boundariesof what it assumed the public would accept: their desire for peace.

Scholars point to the Vietnam War as a critical point of demarcation for the emergingimportance of public opinion in crafting support for foreign policy. President Johnson andhis staff recognized this significant role and consistently tailored their rhetorical languageto these public preferences when determining how to “sell” the policy, attempting to holdoff the “hawks” and “doves” simultaneously. Their rhetorical approach was limited bythese wide-ranging constraining factors, especially relating to the broad goals of theconflict (a desire for peace from both camps and no expansion of the war to China) and thespecific tactics used (conventional weapons versus nuclear weapons). These expansiveconstraints limited the arguments the White House could muster for its policy andrestricted the military tactics that could be undertaken.

“Peace Through Strength”: Signing the INF Treaty

From an early stage the Reagan White House was aggressive with its approach to theSoviet Union and in bulking up American military strength (Rice, 1990). This approachseemed to comport with majority opinion in the early 1980s—indeed, this “confrontation”opinion had been prevalent in the United States since the 1940s (Holsti, 1996, p. 73).However, as the Reagan administration began to successfully revitalize the United Statesmilitary, the public’s attention began to turn toward a preferred strategy of negotiation(especially on arms control) and peaceful coexistence (Holsti, 1996, pp. 68, 72). Thesecond case study explores the culmination of these negotiations. In particular, I explorethe years preceding President Reagan and General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev’sagreement on the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty (on December 8, 1987)that aimed to destroy all medium- and short-range nuclear weapons (approximately 4% ofthe total arsenal) in Europe capable of reaching targets in Europe and Western Russia.19

This was historic because it eliminated an entire class of weapon, rather than reducingweapons stockpiles (Powaski, 1998, p. 256).

As early as 1981, the president’s advisers were attempting to determine the bound-aries of public opinion, suggesting it had importance to the administration. The underlyingstate of opinion indicated that reducing tensions with the Soviet Union was popular, evenas the administration (and President Reagan in particular) desired a tough stance with littlecommunication (Cannon, 2000). Richard Beal (special assistant to the president) argued toEdwin Meese (counselor to the president) in a memorandum that “Americans stronglysupport, at least at this juncture when there is no clear-cut crisis, reducing tensions withthe Russians.”20 However, he also noted “the United States should, above all else, doeverything in its power to maintain peace in the world.” He concluded, “the publicsupports assertive, even aggressive foreign policies” but not necessarily in deployment ofmilitary forces. This comports with what opinion scholars have found regarding theprospect of “good relations” with the Soviet Union (Holsti, 1996, p. 78).

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On the issue of nuclear arms control, by the end of Reagan’s first term (before the INFTreaty summit) more of the public felt that the Soviet Union was equal in nuclear strength tothe United States (40% to 14%, with 42% believing them to be equal), reversing the trendsuggesting the Soviet Union was stronger in this regard earlier in the president’s term.21 Thepotential for reduction in these arsenals was a popular idea as well. Seventy-two percent ofthe public agreed that if the two nations had equal strength in nuclear weaponry, “nuclearweapons must be reduced dramatically to assure lasting peace and security.”22 But a com-plete freeze on nuclear weapons would not be a popular option. Reagan pollster RichardWirthlin found that a strong majority (57%) of the public agreed that a nuclear freezewould “lock the United States into a position of permanent military inferiority” and would“provide the Soviets with no incentive to negotiate for what we really want—a reductionin nuclear weapons.”23

An “aggressive” approach to “peace” through arms control seemed to be a recipe forsuccess in responding to public opinion. Indeed, Fischer (2000) finds a shift in the admin-istration’s public posture from hard-line rhetoric to conciliation reflecting domestic pres-sure before the 1984 elections. By most accounts, this is precisely what the administrationengaged in from the beginning, even risking failure. Gallup surveys taken at the time ofthe announcement of the INF Treaty revealed it to be overwhelmingly popular with thepublic, driven in part by President Reagan, “whose harsh antiarms control rhetoric duringthe 1980 election campaign endowed him with the public image of a leader who would notrush into unfavorable agreements or otherwise be hoodwinked in superpower negotia-tions” (Holsti, 1996, p. 72). Indeed, President Reagan may have been uniquely situated tobroker this treaty (Sigelman, 1990).

One of the most significant tools in identifying themes to shape presidential languageis the focus group, a tool used extensively by the Reagan and Bush White Houses. Focusgroups are designed to elicit specific ideas or phrases identified by a focus group partici-pant, and these views are assembled by demographic category (Heith, 2003). Therefore,these sessions with members of the public offered the White House a supplementalaccount of public opinion—one that may be lost in close-questioned polling data. Thefocus groups for the treaty signing and summit communications strategy were conductedin Philadelphia on October 5, 1987, with two groups of 10 and 11 participants.24 The ques-tions in the focus group ranged from where the signing of the treaty should take place tothemes important to the summit negotiations and key considerations of any eventualagreement.

As a result of the perceived military parity between the two nations, the “peacethrough strength” theme resonated strongly with the members of the focus group. Theauthors noted, “Americans clearly recognize that our military strength has played a signif-icant role in keeping the Soviets in check as well as motivating them to negotiate agree-ments with us.”25 In addition, many of the participants in the focus group citedstrengthening the United States military as a critical factor in the summit and a strongpoint for beginning negotiations. One respondent suggested:

I feel that the Russians only know one thing, and that is “strength.” If they seethat they cannot bully and that you are willing to stand pat on what you saythen they are going to sit down and talk.26

Reagan’s abrupt departure from a discussion at the Reykjavik summit a year earlier solid-ified his “tough” approach but also underlined his desire to deliver popular arms reduc-tions (Matlock, 2004, p. 225). The public did believe, however, that a proposed summit

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would plant a “seed of trust they hope will grow and bear fruit” and eventually “reduce thenumber of weapons the Soviets have aimed at the United States.”27 Indeed, the summittheme that scored the highest (out of the five themes tested) was “First Step for Peace.”28

Again, however, there were expressed limits to the acceptable rhetorical discussionand implementation of the treaty, and Reagan administration officials clearly heeded theseconstraints. Although the “peace through strength” theme was popular, the results of thefocus group indicated that the theme should be “limited to use as a rationale for Reaganadministration policies (military spending, SDI, etc.) which have led up to the summit andfor the continuation of such policies after the summit.” There was “considerable resis-tance” to the “peace through strength” concept, and it “should not be used as a broaderumbrella theme for the entire summit.”29 Although bargaining with such high stakes asnuclear weapons in Europe aggravated members of his own party, President Reaganunderstood that the American public wanted peace but not an unacceptable peace(Powaski, 1998, p. 255). He commented 3 days before Gorbachev arrived in Washingtonfor the treaty signing, “Well, I think as long as you’ve got a chance to strive for peace youstrive for peace. But you don’t have peace and surrender.”30

The focus group results also indicated that the major concern about the summit wasthe lack of trust the public had for the Soviet Union to keep their end of the bargain. Thereport notes “people are particularly concerned that it would be too difficult to make surethat the Soviets actually comply with the treaty. The public wants to be sure that Sovietcompliance, with whatever agreement is reached, can be verified.”31 President Reaganassuaged these fears by commenting in media interviews (and the next day at the HeritageFoundation) that he would only sign an agreement that served the best interests of theUnited States (Matlock, 2004, p. 272). The eventual treaty, as signed by the parties inWashington, included stringent on-site verification measures of progress of reduction inINF. President Reagan mentioned these verification measures several times as “somethingnew with far-reaching implications” in his televised address to the nation the dayGorbachev left Washington.32 Despite Republican Party and CIA objections to the inspec-tions, the administration’s inclusion of these provisions to the treaty suggests the impor-tance of courting public opinion on this issue.

The Reagan administration realized early in its term that the public wanted peacegenerally and would go so far as to endorse the reduction of weapons and the warming ofthe relationship with the Soviet Union to accomplish that goal. On both points, the Reaganadministration responded with policy proposals and specific language that correspondedwith the public’s preferences. Of course, the White House also realized that this peacewould not come at any cost—the administration sought to determine the limits of thispolicy (especially on the IMF Treaty’s verification procedures and a nuclear “freeze”) andaltered its policy as a result. Therefore, importantly, the strategy of policy framing by theReagan administration finds success here, but only in regard to the established boundariesof opinions on the broad aspiration of peace in the world.

“This Aggression will not Stand”: The Gulf War

The Bush administration was greatly concerned about the boundaries of public opinion,primarily because the specter of Vietnam enhanced the importance of public opinion as aconstraint. Specifically, public opinion strongly affected “the way in which this ultimatesolution [the public relations campaign on the Gulf War] was implemented” (Sobel, 2001,p. 159). As with the previous two case studies, we see that public opinion constrained theWhite House’s strategy to “sell” the Gulf War to the public, and the White House offered

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arguments in favor of conflict within the boundaries of current majority opinion. Hess(2001) notes that President Bush was determined “not to lead where others would notfollow” (p. 196). Zaller (1994) also argues that politicians seeking reelection (and GeorgeBush on the Gulf War in particular) who are under the threat of electoral retribution “takegreat care to lead public opinion only toward goals that the public will, in retrospect if notalways in prospect, applaud” (p. 250).

The White House again turned to focus groups to determine the boundaries of publicopinion, and the Bush White House was interested in circulating the results of the focusgroup to key principals such as Secretary Cheney, General Powell, and General Scowcroft“as well as whoever might be writing the President’s remarks regarding the Gulf.”33 Zaller(1994) notes that the Bush White House, while generally not adept at public relations,made a concerted effort during the Gulf War to convince the public to accept the policiesthe White House judged best (a key component of “crafted talk”). Importantly, however,we find public opinion constraining (and reshaping) what the White House initially arguedin public after the discovery of the unpopularity of certain themes. The 11 focus groupswere conducted in December of 1990 (after the Iraqi invasion and after President Bushmoved troops to Saudi Arabia) in four cities (New York, San Francisco, Dallas, andKansas City) with 8 to 10 people in a group. The results of all of the discussions weresummarized into one narrative report.34

The Vietnam War left the American public skeptical toward foreign interventionunless using force was necessary to protect self-defined interests (Wittkopf, 1990, p. 4). Inparticular, the public is shown to be more permissive toward restraining aggressivemilitaries abroad rather than engaging in long-term internal political change (Jentleson,1992; Jentleson & Britton, 1998). The first critical step for the Bush administration was toensure that the public approved of the potential actions to be taken in response to SuddamHussein’s invasion of Kuwait and, specifically, that Desert Shield was not like Vietnam(which the president routinely did; see Sobel, 2001, p. 147). In short, administrationofficials had their work ahead of them if they were to convince the public to use force inthe Middle East, suggesting the importance of restrictive public opinion to the prospect ofpersuading the public. Roger Ailes noted to the president in a memorandum that thepresident’s pollsters “believe the President must have public support for a war and theybelieve that support does not currently exist [in December of 1990].”35 The findingsshowed that the “people seem to be quite informed about the reasons for our interest andinvolvement,” but “in many cases, they have not embraced the cause.”36

For this reason, attempting to sell the public on war in the Gulf was critical—at thetime of the focus groups (in December of 1990) the percentage of Americans who felt thecountry was escalating to war “too quickly” rose to almost 50% (Sobel, 2001, p. 162). TheWhite House understood this dynamic and made sure to involve the public in its decisionmaking, a connection that worked (Woodward, 1991, p. 337; Mueller, 1994, p. 116). Thisreticence to engage internationally was clearly related to the “Vietnam syndrome” wherethe public was reticent to use force abroad. The focus group report notes that the “mostdramatic and pervasive theme” was the “necessity of avoiding ‘another Vietnam.’”37 Thedecision to not invade Baghdad at the conclusion of the war may have been a result of notwanting to get bogged down in a quagmire like in Vietnam (Sobel, 2001, p. 156) or aninternal regime change unpopular with the public (see Jentleson, 1992).

The primary justification for the Gulf War was to remove Saddam Hussein’s forcesfrom Kuwait—a popular idea according to the focus groups. Most of the public felt that“there is strong sentiment regarding the practical and moral imperative of free nations tostop Hussein and remove him from a position of power.” The focus group participants

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indicated, “Saddam Hussein is a madman who is trying to take over the world. Go in thereand blow him up” and “He’s a real dictator. He would have gone into Saudi Arabia ifnobody had stopped him.”38 The participants perceived him as an aggressor “against aninnocent people, an international outlaw, and as a threat to the world’s oil supply.”39 Thiswas also a popular justification for intervention in opinion polls (Mueller, 1994, p. 39).Interestingly, the president’s discussion of a “new world order” the United States couldcreate without despots like Hussein (not included in the thematic focus group discussions)was dropped when it proved to be unpopular (Sobel, 2001, p. 150).

Of course, there were caveats to the kind of war the public wanted to fight. Severaljustifications for war were not popular, especially the prospect of going to war foreconomic (namely oil) reasons. Other reasons for going to war were not popular with thepublic, such as “returning Kuwait to its former rulers,” “protecting Israel,” and the UnitedStates as “world policeman.”40 These kinds of considerations were reflected (without thebenefit of focus group analysis) in President Bush’s initial statements after the Kuwaitinvasion, where he spoke of the “brutal aggression launched” against Kuwait andindicated resolutely that “this will not stand” (quoted in Hess, 2001, p. 164), but weredropped from the administration’s talking points after new, more popular themesemerged.41 References to unpopular focus group themes (such as the “world policeman”and “oil” arguments) also disappear from briefing sheets from the early December (beforethe focus group) to the new January (after the focus group) talking points, suggesting theadministration’s public relations approach was responding to opinion limits.42

The nature of the force used to oust the Iraqi army was also a concern, and thisopinion stricture likely encouraged the administration to pursue overwhelming force thatis “swift, decisive and relatively cost-free,” as it had done in previous skirmishes such asGrenada (Wittkopf, 1990, p. 154). Many of these trepidations related to the possibleduration of the war. For instance, many respondents in the focus groups indicated that theyviewed the Iraqi military as “just as difficult, or even more difficult to fight as the NorthVietnamese were in the not-so-distant past.”43 Another set of respondents indicated theywere hesitant because the Vietnam War was “a war we had to watch—night after night.”Other fears stemmed from the concern that the United States should be a leader and couldhandle the crisis but “not a protracted, economically and humanly draining conflict, thatends up debilitating us even more.”44

Ultimately, those in the focus groups indicated, “most all do believe that the U.S.could conceivably win an all-out, short term, military battle” assuming we “use all ourresources.” Several respondents indicated “no one wants to drag this out for too long,”noting that we should “make it quick,” “get it over with,” and “the faster the better.”45 Theadministration was clearly concerned with the “time as a weapon” problem the reportdescribes and publicly sought to assuage the public’s concerns. Military commanderscommented that “if the war could be won quickly enough, [negative] public support wouldnever become an issue” (quoted in Zaller, 1994, p. 264). President Bush addressed thesefears by commenting that “the war would be over in a matter of days” (Sobel, 2001, p.147). This public relations strategy seemed to work. By January of 1991, more than 74%thought the war would be relatively short (Mueller, 1994, p. 46).

Another public concern was that the United States might be in the conflict alone likeit was in Vietnam. One respondent noted fearing that the “U.S. bears the burden . . .alone.” Similarly, others felt a risk of “isolation, despair and a fall from internationalrespectability.”46 The administration’s international coalition comprised most nations,including the support of the United Nations, which suspended trade with Iraq and even-tually demanded an Iraqi withdrawal in two resolutions (661 and 678) (Hess, 2001).

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Indeed, most of the talking points (four out of five) given to President Bush by JohnSununu (chief of staff) referenced the importance of a “group” effort: “We are not alone,etc.,” “The U.N. has decreed the international law to deal with this problem,” “We haveforged an historic coalition,” and “We have used the diplomatic course in an unprece-dented way.”47

Reflecting these worries, the people wanted to see evidence of “pressure andprogress,” not simply rushing into war. They “want to feel that President Bush has “doneeverything possible” before our troops are sent in to a “shooting war.” Everyone wantsto know that every effort was made to negotiate a peaceful settlement.”48 The president,however, should not respond to the threat by going overboard—this would only create“paranoia.” The president needs to appear to be “in control.”49 In the concluding section,the report summarizes, “it is especially critical that people feel we have exhausted allviable alternatives before initiating offensive military action.”50 Focus group materialindicated that “people respond positively when reminded: Saddam started it, of all thesteps taken by the President to resolve this peacefully, we are showing restraint and theU.S. is not the aggressor.”51

This “boldness with caution” mantra became the refrain from the White House (inparticular the President) in response to all actions by the Iraqi government from the resolu-tions at the United Nations to offering 2 months to withdrawal to the President’s letter toSaddam Hussein (see Hess, 2001, p. 195).52 The gradual lead up to war allowed theadministration to steadily persuade the public that the administration was doing every-thing it could to avoid conflict. In announcing the “need for an offensive military option,”President Bush responded to a question asking him if he was going to war by stating “I’mnot—we—I would love to see a peaceful resolution to this question. And that’s what Iwant” (quoted in Sifry & Cerf, 1991, 228). The President assured a war-weary public thathe would go “an extra mile for peace,” and his conciliatory actions reaffirmed this beliefamong the public (Hess, 2001, p. 184). Efforts to engage in diplomacy, especially theproposal to send James Baker to Baghdad on the brink of war, were overwhelminglypopular (Woodward, 1991, p. 337). By January of 1991, nearly 60% of the public believedthe United States did all it could to avoid war (Muller, 1994).

As the first major military conflict since Vietnam, the Gulf War (especially themonths before the hostilities began) reinforced the important role of public opinion inshaping support. Although majority support was eventually reached, it was primarilythrough careful crafting of the kind of conflict the American people wanted to see that theAmerican public accepted the prospect of United States intervention. Specifically, thepublic wanted a quick conflict (not a drawn-out conflict like Vietnam), a decisive andoverwhelming victory, a “cost free” conflict (referring to the number of casualties), andshared international responsibility for the mediation and outcome of the conflict. Interest-ingly, changes in public opinion also led to changes in the administration’s rhetoric, wherethemes of “a new world order” and the United States as “world policeman” were droppedafter they were found to be less popular than other themes. This clearly implies the impor-tance and constrictive nature of public opinion as a factor in achieving foreign policyobjectives.

Conclusions and Discussion

In all three cases presented here, public opinion broadly constrained the public relationsstrategies of presidents in leading public opinion on foreign policy (but not necessarily thesuccess of the policy). Specifically, these administrations were concerned about public

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opinion and were constrained in persuading the public with arguments reflective ofcurrent opinion, suggesting limits of political framing as a policy leadership tool. DuringVietnam, the Johnson administration was constrained from arguing for a dramatic escala-tion of the war by a public desire for peace. In the INF Treaty negotiations, the ReaganWhite House was tethered to negotiating arms control but was also required to ensurecertain provisions (such as verification) because of public concern. In the lead up to theGulf War, President Bush confronted the specter of Vietnam’s legacy in public opinionand shaped his war rhetoric according to acceptable precepts of international intervention.Overall, presidents do care about public opinion in foreign policy, and, importantly, thisopinion tends to reign in the ability of the White House to shape foreign policy outcomeswith rhetoric alone.

These findings also reveal additional nuances to the theory of “crafted talk.” Jacobsand Shapiro (2000) advanced their hypothesis in light of apparent declining responsivenessto public opinion and in the wake of technology that allows presidents to accurately under-stand public preferences. The trouble with this assumption is that opinion on domesticpolicy is qualitatively different from opinion on foreign policy—each has distinct limitsand breaking points where the public is willing or not willing to accept certain policies.Evidence from my three case studies suggests that the persuasion of foreign policy doeshave particular limits and that those limits are formed by the public’s grand organizationalview of the world and resistance to conflict (see Wittkopf, 1990). “Crafted talk” can work,but possibly only in conditions where the president already has support, public opinion ismalleable, where the public is more likely to agree anyway (Foyle, 2004), where the“frame” is acceptable to the public (Entman, 2004), or where the president is unable toachieve the predetermined objective (Bostdorff, 1994).

Further, these findings seem consistent with those of scholars who study the effectsof framing and find that there are important limits on the effect of elite framing, espe-cially in situations where citizens have access to multiple sources of information(Druckman & Nelson, 2003). Indeed, Druckman (2004) also notes “elite competitionand heterogeneous discussions limit and often eliminate framing effects” (p. 683) sug-gesting that although presidents do have considerably loud voices in foreign policy,their ability to frame arguments (and thus shape public opinion) is inherently limited bythe political environment in which they operate. Entman (2004) also finds that framingmatters most when presidents work within the dominant foreign policy paradigm (suchas the “Cold War”) rather than outside of it (pp. 152–153); indeed, those presidentsattempting to frame policy outside of this boundary are destined to fail. This articleextends and illustrates this literature by documenting the manner in which presidentialframing is constrained.

The strategy of crafted talk also assumes that public opinion can be shaped togarner a positive public reception of public policy—identified by Jacobs and Shapiro(2000) as “simulated responsiveness.” However, given the stubbornness of publicopinion on foreign policy, as evidenced by the public’s consistent desire for peaceover war, using crafted talk as a strategy to change opinion has distinct limits. Craftedtalk as a manipulative approach to presidential leadership on foreign policy is not easyto achieve, even with the considerable leverage the White House possesses on mattersof foreign policy. The present case studies illustrate the reticence of the White Houseto frame policy choices outside the restrictions of popular opinion. Sobel (2001)concurs with this point and notes that the Bush White House attempted to shapepublic opinion through its foreign policy during the Gulf War, but it was publicopinion that ended up shaping foreign policy (p. 159). Concerns about presidential

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manipulation of opinion through framing in constructing foreign policy are somewhatminimized by the evidence from this article.

Notes

1. I thank an anonymous reviewer for calling this point to my attention and assisting with theliterature review.

2. For instance, on the issue of the 1994 Clinton health plan, Jacobs and Shapiro argue thatClinton and his advisers discounted the opinion of most Americans (especially concerning the sizeand cost of the program) and attempted to move public opinion with targeted political language(from focus groups) to convince the public to accept the White House’s preferred policy. In order tocombine into a single theme those popular elements of the policy (universal coverage) with unpopu-lar elements (concerns about costs and government bureaucracy), the White House decided on“Security for All” as a theme.

3. Polling data or polling memoranda presented in this project conform to a basic standard orqualification when selecting a valid document. Heith (2004), in her comprehensive study of thepolling memoranda sent by and to White House staffers from the Nixon to Bush administrations,defines the material she selected as containing “formal and informal memoranda, handwritten notes,pollster reports, and other various written documents.” The documents collected, selected, andreported for this project followed this criterion. The document search for this project included polland focus group results from a variety of sources. The White House Central Files in the presidentialarchives including and subsequent to John Kennedy are divided into two types of files: General andExecutive Files. General Files were handled by lower level White House staff members and includememoranda, letters, or reports from individual citizens or “non-important” interest groups.Executive Files are similar memoranda, letters, or reports, except that these forms were from higherprofile (or “important”) groups such as members of Congress, former presidents, influential citizens,or members of the media, and these letters were written by or to senior White House staff. It is there-fore more appropriate to view the latter files with greater concern and with more intensity because itis these files where most of the important policy decisions are made, in particular those wherepolling might be used to formulate policy. Papers of key individuals who served as administrativesecretaries, press department officials, policy advisors, or department secretaries (especially in thearea of foreign affairs) were systematically selected for review with the assumption that these indi-viduals would be the most likely to use public opinion polling data and would have access to thesedata. General papers of the president were also surveyed for evidence of public opinion polling,including the White House Central Files, the White House Official Files, the President’s PersonalFiles and the President’s Secretary’s Files. Specific issues, which are the subject of the case studieshere, were searched in the White House Subject File.

4. A prominent disadvantage in using archival research is the possible selection bias problem.For all presidential administrations, many small but significant events, such as personal thoughts orphone calls, were not recorded (Howell & Pervenier, 2001). Important and relevant documents couldhave been lost or discarded either by the principal author or by staffers when sorting materials (Hill,1993). Also some of the materials uniquely relevant to an analysis of presidential involvement withpublic opinion are not yet open to the public. Similarly, even if the material has been reviewed,certain holds can be placed on the material based upon a P-5 classification (confidential advice fromstaff member to the president) by an archivist or based upon a restrictive “deed of gift.” Myapproach, however, remedies this selection problem by relying on a wide range of availabledocuments (both primary and secondary) to explain my positions and evaluate my arguments.

5. Others have successfully employed these techniques with mid-20th-century presidents (seeFoyle, 1999; Western, 2005a). Armed with the fertile information from the actual time of decisionmaking, researchers can find out what the president and his staff knew and when they knew it. Wecan therefore identify important timing sequences to investigate how public opinion had an effect ondecision making, a key consideration for testing our hypotheses and getting a fresh look at thistheoretical quandary.

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6. Lyndon Johnson Library, White House Central Files, PR 16 12/15/65–1/21/66, “Moyers toPresident,” December 27, 1965, Box 346.

7. Ibid.8. Ibid.9. Ibid.10. Lyndon Johnson Library, White House Central Files, PR 16 12/15/65–1/21/66, “Moyers to

President,” December 27, 1965, Box 346.11. Lyndon Johnson Library, Aides Files (Panzer), WH Cantril, Tad, “Cantril to Redmon,”

September 21, 1966, Box 326.12. Lyndon Johnson Library, White House Central Files, PR 16 12/15/65–1/21/66, “Moyers to

President,” December 27, 1965, Box 346.13. Ibid.14. Lyndon Johnson Library, Aides Files (Panzer), WH Cantril, Tad, “Cantril to Redmon,”

September 21, 1966, Box 326.15. Lyndon Johnson Library, White House Central Files, PR 16 12/15/65–1/21/66, “Moyers to

President,” December 27, 1965, Box 346.16. Lyndon Johnson Library, Aides Files (Panzer), Misc. Polls T-V, “Redmon to Moyers,”

January 12, 1966, Box 217.17. Lyndon Johnson Library, White House Central Files, PR 16 6/23/66–8/15/66, “Redmon to

Moyers,” July 13, 1966, Box 347.18. Lyndon Johnson Library, Aides Files (Panzer), Misc. Polls T-V, “Redmon to Moyers,”

January 12, 1966, Box 217. Redmon indicated in the memorandum that he developed these points“in talks with my new found public opinion research friends.”

19. Holum (1997) describes the technical aspects of the treaty: “The INF Treaty requireselimination of all LRINF missiles (ranges between 1,000 and 5,500 kilometers) by June 1, 1991, andall SRINF (ranges between 500 and 1,000 kilometers) missiles within 18 months. In all, 2,692missiles are to be eliminated. In addition, all associated launchers, equipment, support facilities, andoperating bases worldwide are to be eliminated or closed out from any further INF missile systemactivity.” See also Haslam (1990, pp. 164–174).

20. Ronald Reagan Library, Richard Beal Files, Public Opinion Polls, “Beal to Meese,” April 3,1981, OA 7237, Box 5 of 6.

21. Ronald Reagan Library, Michael Deaver Files, “DMI Report: A Study of NationalAttitudes,” April 7–10, 1983, OA 7622, page 69. The full question read, “At the present time, whichnation do you feel is stronger in terms of nuclear weapons . . . the United States . . . or . . . the SovietUnion .. or do you think they are equal in strength?”

22. Ronald Reagan Library, Michael Deaver Files, “DMI Report: A Study of NationalAttitudes,” April 7–10, 1983, OA 7622, page 69. The full question read, “I’m going to read you twoopinions about nuclear weapons. Some people favor the first option, others the second. Please tellme which one is closest to your opinion. Position A: We must build as many nuclear weapons asquickly as we can so that we won’t be pushed around by the Russians anymore. Position B: Once theSoviets and the United States have about the same strength in nuclear weapons then nuclearweapons must be reduced dramatically to assure lasting peace and security.”

23. Ronald Reagan Library, Richard Wirthlin Files, Wirthlin Survey [3], “Wirthlin toMeese, Baker and Deaver,” April 14, 1982, OA 7318. The question was asked as follows:“Smith believes that we must immediately bring a complete halt to the nuclear arms race bynegotiating with the Russians to freeze the testing, production and further deployment ofnuclear warheads and missiles. Jones believes that such a freeze would lock the United Statesinto a position of permanent military inferiority and this would not only be disadvantageous,but dangerous, and provide the Soviets with no incentive to negotiate for what we really want—a reduction in nuclear weapons.”

24. The groups each contained 4 Republicans, 3 independents, and 5 Democrats, half males andhalf females. Focus groups were also conducted in advance of President Reagan’s trip and summit inMoscow, in Philadelphia as well (Cannon, 2000, p. 705).

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25. Ronald Reagan Library, PR 15, 513549–528111, “Communications Focus Groups inPhiladelphia, Pennsylvania,” October 5, 1987, Box 20, page 2.

26. Ibid, page 4.27. Ibid, page 9.28. Ibid, page 8. The other summit themes tested and rejected were “Moving Toward the Promise

of Peace,” “Brightening the Hope for Peace,” “A Step in a New Direction,” “Peace through Strengthand Realism,” and “Little More Hope for the Human Heart.”

29. Ibid, page 2.30. Public Papers of the President: Ronald Reagan, “Interview With Television Network

Broadcasters,” December 3, 1987.31. Ronald Reagan Library, PR 15, 513549–528111, “Communications Focus Groups in

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania,” October 5, 1987, Box 20, pages 6–7. Even General Secretary Gorbachev,after President Reagan repeated the “trust but verify” phrase associated with his contingency on the treaty,jovially remarked “you repeat that at every meeting” (quoted in Cannon, 2000, p. 696).

32. Public Papers of the President: Ronald Reagan, “Address to the Nation on theSoviet-United States Summit Meeting,” December 10, 1987.

33. George H. W. Bush Library, White House Chief of Staff Files, Polling 1991 [1 of 3], “Ailesto Sununu and the President,” February 9, 1991, CF 00473 (2 of 4).

34. The “respondent types” included were “Mainstreamers” (ages, 25–60), “Succeeders”(25–60), “Reformers” (25–60), “College Students” (18–24), and “Young Non-College” (18–24).A footnote indicated that African Americans were underrepresented by this study.

35. George H. W. Bush Library, White House Chief of Staff Files, Polling 1991 [1 of 3], “Ailesto Sununu and the President,” February 9, 1991, CF 00473 (2 of 4).

36. George H. W. Bush Library, White House Chief of Staff Files, Polling 1991 [1 of 3], “ThePersian Gulf: Viewpoint of the American People,” December 1990, CF 00473 (3 of 4), Box 44.Emphasis in original.

37. Ibid, page 11. Emphasis in original.38. Ibid, page 6.39. Ibid, page 6.40. Ibid, pages 7–8.41. Public Papers of the President: George Bush. “Remarks and an Exchange With Reporters

on the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait,” August 5, 1990.42. The December briefing can be found at: George H. W. Bush Library, White House Chief of

Staff Files, Persian Gulf Working Group, “Memorandum to Working Group,” December 3, 1990,CF 00472, Box 12 (FOIA 98–0099). Compare to the January briefing at: George H. W. BushLibrary, White House OCA (Will Gunn Files), Persian Gulf (2), “Gulf Strategy,” December 31,1990, OA/ID: 03922, Box 11/66 (FIOA 98–0099).

43. George H. W. Bush Library, White House Chief of Staff Files, Polling 1991 [1 of 3], “ThePersian Gulf: Viewpoint of the American People,” December 1990, CF 00473 (3 of 4), Box 44, page 9.

44. Ibid, page 15. Emphasis in original.45. Ibid, page 17.46. Ibid, page 11. Emphasis in original.47. George H. W. Bush Library, White House Chief of Staff Files, Persian Gulf Working

Group (CF 00472), “Sununu to the President,” no date, Box 12 (FOIA 98–0094).48. George H. W. Bush Library, White House Chief of Staff Files, Polling 1991 [1 of 3], “The

Persian Gulf: Viewpoint of the American People,” December 1990, CF 00473 (3 of 4), Box 44, page19. Emphasis in original.

49. Ibid, page 19.50. Ibid, page 30. Emphasis in original.51. George H. W. Bush Library, White House Chief of Staff Files, Polling 1991 [1 of 3], “Ailes

to Sununu and the President,” February 9, 1991, CF 00473 (2 of 4).52. Public Papers of the President: George Bush. “The President’s News Conference on the

Persian Gulf Crisis,” January 9, 1991.

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