Leonardo

Principles of Perceptual Learning and DevelopmentAuthor(s): Eleanor J. GibsonSource: Leonardo, Vol. 6, No. 2 (Spring, 1973), p. 190Published by: The MIT PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1572721 .

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Letters Letters Letters Letters

which energy outputs are directed at a high level but with little regard for coping with the environment, which, as he states near the beginning of the book, is one of the purposes of knowledge. Perhaps my own limitation is in considering awareness of purpose and effect as integral aspects in the measurement of knowledge. I would agree that the amount of energy directed by a substance is more conducive to quantification than how it is directed or what is its effect. It is clear that the use of energy may bolster the existence of the substance directing it, placing it at a high numerical level on the empirical scale but, if such knowledge is applied without cognizance of its over-all effects (which may be negative), it signifies power more than knowledge.

James W. Davis 345 Johnson St.

Macomb, Ill. 61455, U.S.A.

'Principles of Perceptual Learning and Development'

While I suppose I should be grateful to Pierre Mounoud for a review of my book (Leonardo 6, 69 (1973)) that is not unfavorable, I cannot forego pointing out what appear to be one or two dis- agreements between us.

When he said that my chapter on how children perceive by means of pictures was 'not original', he implied that there are established theories of how children learn in this way or that everybody already knows how children learn from pictures. What everybody thinks he knows is that they do learn but not how or why. There are vague commonsense notions about it but they are nearly all misleading. My chapter, in fact, adopted a quite radical approach to the problem. No one previously had even attempted to deal with the development of the kind of perception that we get by looking at pictures, although this is a very important question for artists as well as psychologists. The chapter is not as 'well elaborated' as I should like, since research is lacking. That is because a theory has, until now, been lacking to analyze what sort of differentiations a child learns to make in looking at pictures so as to give the research a direction.

A second disagreement I have with Mounoud is his implied criticism that my concept of perception is not really an active one. But what could epitomize activity better than search and exploration? Mounoud's appeal to some mysterious 'internal organization or structures' does not suggest activity to me. What are these structures? Where do they come from? Not from exploring the world ? I can guess, of course, what Mounoud is referring to. Being a Genevois, he is undoubtedly referring to Piaget's concept of the schema. But Piaget has never made very clear what the schema has to do with perceptual development. An infant has learned to differentiate many distinctive features of things in the world long before any activity other than

which energy outputs are directed at a high level but with little regard for coping with the environment, which, as he states near the beginning of the book, is one of the purposes of knowledge. Perhaps my own limitation is in considering awareness of purpose and effect as integral aspects in the measurement of knowledge. I would agree that the amount of energy directed by a substance is more conducive to quantification than how it is directed or what is its effect. It is clear that the use of energy may bolster the existence of the substance directing it, placing it at a high numerical level on the empirical scale but, if such knowledge is applied without cognizance of its over-all effects (which may be negative), it signifies power more than knowledge.

James W. Davis 345 Johnson St.

Macomb, Ill. 61455, U.S.A.

'Principles of Perceptual Learning and Development'

While I suppose I should be grateful to Pierre Mounoud for a review of my book (Leonardo 6, 69 (1973)) that is not unfavorable, I cannot forego pointing out what appear to be one or two dis- agreements between us.

When he said that my chapter on how children perceive by means of pictures was 'not original', he implied that there are established theories of how children learn in this way or that everybody already knows how children learn from pictures. What everybody thinks he knows is that they do learn but not how or why. There are vague commonsense notions about it but they are nearly all misleading. My chapter, in fact, adopted a quite radical approach to the problem. No one previously had even attempted to deal with the development of the kind of perception that we get by looking at pictures, although this is a very important question for artists as well as psychologists. The chapter is not as 'well elaborated' as I should like, since research is lacking. That is because a theory has, until now, been lacking to analyze what sort of differentiations a child learns to make in looking at pictures so as to give the research a direction.

A second disagreement I have with Mounoud is his implied criticism that my concept of perception is not really an active one. But what could epitomize activity better than search and exploration? Mounoud's appeal to some mysterious 'internal organization or structures' does not suggest activity to me. What are these structures? Where do they come from? Not from exploring the world ? I can guess, of course, what Mounoud is referring to. Being a Genevois, he is undoubtedly referring to Piaget's concept of the schema. But Piaget has never made very clear what the schema has to do with perceptual development. An infant has learned to differentiate many distinctive features of things in the world long before any activity other than

which energy outputs are directed at a high level but with little regard for coping with the environment, which, as he states near the beginning of the book, is one of the purposes of knowledge. Perhaps my own limitation is in considering awareness of purpose and effect as integral aspects in the measurement of knowledge. I would agree that the amount of energy directed by a substance is more conducive to quantification than how it is directed or what is its effect. It is clear that the use of energy may bolster the existence of the substance directing it, placing it at a high numerical level on the empirical scale but, if such knowledge is applied without cognizance of its over-all effects (which may be negative), it signifies power more than knowledge.

James W. Davis 345 Johnson St.

Macomb, Ill. 61455, U.S.A.

'Principles of Perceptual Learning and Development'

While I suppose I should be grateful to Pierre Mounoud for a review of my book (Leonardo 6, 69 (1973)) that is not unfavorable, I cannot forego pointing out what appear to be one or two dis- agreements between us.

When he said that my chapter on how children perceive by means of pictures was 'not original', he implied that there are established theories of how children learn in this way or that everybody already knows how children learn from pictures. What everybody thinks he knows is that they do learn but not how or why. There are vague commonsense notions about it but they are nearly all misleading. My chapter, in fact, adopted a quite radical approach to the problem. No one previously had even attempted to deal with the development of the kind of perception that we get by looking at pictures, although this is a very important question for artists as well as psychologists. The chapter is not as 'well elaborated' as I should like, since research is lacking. That is because a theory has, until now, been lacking to analyze what sort of differentiations a child learns to make in looking at pictures so as to give the research a direction.

A second disagreement I have with Mounoud is his implied criticism that my concept of perception is not really an active one. But what could epitomize activity better than search and exploration? Mounoud's appeal to some mysterious 'internal organization or structures' does not suggest activity to me. What are these structures? Where do they come from? Not from exploring the world ? I can guess, of course, what Mounoud is referring to. Being a Genevois, he is undoubtedly referring to Piaget's concept of the schema. But Piaget has never made very clear what the schema has to do with perceptual development. An infant has learned to differentiate many distinctive features of things in the world long before any activity other than

which energy outputs are directed at a high level but with little regard for coping with the environment, which, as he states near the beginning of the book, is one of the purposes of knowledge. Perhaps my own limitation is in considering awareness of purpose and effect as integral aspects in the measurement of knowledge. I would agree that the amount of energy directed by a substance is more conducive to quantification than how it is directed or what is its effect. It is clear that the use of energy may bolster the existence of the substance directing it, placing it at a high numerical level on the empirical scale but, if such knowledge is applied without cognizance of its over-all effects (which may be negative), it signifies power more than knowledge.

James W. Davis 345 Johnson St.

Macomb, Ill. 61455, U.S.A.

'Principles of Perceptual Learning and Development'

While I suppose I should be grateful to Pierre Mounoud for a review of my book (Leonardo 6, 69 (1973)) that is not unfavorable, I cannot forego pointing out what appear to be one or two dis- agreements between us.

When he said that my chapter on how children perceive by means of pictures was 'not original', he implied that there are established theories of how children learn in this way or that everybody already knows how children learn from pictures. What everybody thinks he knows is that they do learn but not how or why. There are vague commonsense notions about it but they are nearly all misleading. My chapter, in fact, adopted a quite radical approach to the problem. No one previously had even attempted to deal with the development of the kind of perception that we get by looking at pictures, although this is a very important question for artists as well as psychologists. The chapter is not as 'well elaborated' as I should like, since research is lacking. That is because a theory has, until now, been lacking to analyze what sort of differentiations a child learns to make in looking at pictures so as to give the research a direction.

A second disagreement I have with Mounoud is his implied criticism that my concept of perception is not really an active one. But what could epitomize activity better than search and exploration? Mounoud's appeal to some mysterious 'internal organization or structures' does not suggest activity to me. What are these structures? Where do they come from? Not from exploring the world ? I can guess, of course, what Mounoud is referring to. Being a Genevois, he is undoubtedly referring to Piaget's concept of the schema. But Piaget has never made very clear what the schema has to do with perceptual development. An infant has learned to differentiate many distinctive features of things in the world long before any activity other than looking and listening is available to him, in short, before he has a balanced schema in which, using Piagetian terminology, assimilation and accommo-

looking and listening is available to him, in short, before he has a balanced schema in which, using Piagetian terminology, assimilation and accommo-

looking and listening is available to him, in short, before he has a balanced schema in which, using Piagetian terminology, assimilation and accommo-

looking and listening is available to him, in short, before he has a balanced schema in which, using Piagetian terminology, assimilation and accommo-

dation are in structural equilibrium. No doubt many 'problems of structure remain to be considered' but let us remember, meanwhile, that there is structure in the world and that even the young infant actively searches for it.

Eleanor J. Gibson Susan Linn Sage Professor

of Psychology Cornell University

Ithaca, N.Y. 14850, U.S.A.

'The Aesthetic Field: A Phenomenology of Aesthetic Experience'

I welcome R. Michau's thoughtful reactions to my book in his review of it (Leonardo 6, 70 (1973)). No book can satisfy every critical mind and that is quite as it should be, for we can all profit from sympa- thetic disagreement. It is, however, true that mis- understandings can and do occur and it is here that an author's response may be of some use.

Michau's reaction to my criticisms of the com- munication theory of art are somewhat surprising, since his support for it seems not so much a defense of the communication theory as of what might be called a 'communion' theory. And that appears to me to be entirely correct. The experience of art involves not so much the transmittal of experience from artist to observer as a sharing among people and objects that participate in an aesthetic situation. Such sharing is indeed a social act of profound significance, as he correctly points out.

As for Michau's characterization of the artist, I am in complete agreement. I regret not having been clear enough in explaining the difference between the artist's role as analyzed externally and his particular engagement with art as experienced within the aesthetic field. That such a difference exists is essential to my position.

Finally, in writing a book on aesthetics, I defer completely to the central place that must be given to aesthetic experience. Being conscious of the inappropriateness of trying to invoke such experi- ence while engaged in an examination of it, I have attempted the lesser but perhaps still useful task of understanding it.

Michau's serious and sympathetic attention to my book is the most any author can ask for.

Arnold Berleant C. W. Post Center, Long Island

University Greenvale, N.Y. 11548, U.S.A.

'Fine Art of Portraiture'

The general opinion of my students to whom I have shown N. Narotzky's review of my book (Leonardo 6, 73 (1973)) is that the critic must have looked only

dation are in structural equilibrium. No doubt many 'problems of structure remain to be considered' but let us remember, meanwhile, that there is structure in the world and that even the young infant actively searches for it.

Eleanor J. Gibson Susan Linn Sage Professor

of Psychology Cornell University

Ithaca, N.Y. 14850, U.S.A.

'The Aesthetic Field: A Phenomenology of Aesthetic Experience'

I welcome R. Michau's thoughtful reactions to my book in his review of it (Leonardo 6, 70 (1973)). No book can satisfy every critical mind and that is quite as it should be, for we can all profit from sympa- thetic disagreement. It is, however, true that mis- understandings can and do occur and it is here that an author's response may be of some use.

Michau's reaction to my criticisms of the com- munication theory of art are somewhat surprising, since his support for it seems not so much a defense of the communication theory as of what might be called a 'communion' theory. And that appears to me to be entirely correct. The experience of art involves not so much the transmittal of experience from artist to observer as a sharing among people and objects that participate in an aesthetic situation. Such sharing is indeed a social act of profound significance, as he correctly points out.

As for Michau's characterization of the artist, I am in complete agreement. I regret not having been clear enough in explaining the difference between the artist's role as analyzed externally and his particular engagement with art as experienced within the aesthetic field. That such a difference exists is essential to my position.

Finally, in writing a book on aesthetics, I defer completely to the central place that must be given to aesthetic experience. Being conscious of the inappropriateness of trying to invoke such experi- ence while engaged in an examination of it, I have attempted the lesser but perhaps still useful task of understanding it.

Michau's serious and sympathetic attention to my book is the most any author can ask for.

Arnold Berleant C. W. Post Center, Long Island

University Greenvale, N.Y. 11548, U.S.A.

'Fine Art of Portraiture'

The general opinion of my students to whom I have shown N. Narotzky's review of my book (Leonardo 6, 73 (1973)) is that the critic must have looked only

dation are in structural equilibrium. No doubt many 'problems of structure remain to be considered' but let us remember, meanwhile, that there is structure in the world and that even the young infant actively searches for it.

Eleanor J. Gibson Susan Linn Sage Professor

of Psychology Cornell University

Ithaca, N.Y. 14850, U.S.A.

'The Aesthetic Field: A Phenomenology of Aesthetic Experience'

I welcome R. Michau's thoughtful reactions to my book in his review of it (Leonardo 6, 70 (1973)). No book can satisfy every critical mind and that is quite as it should be, for we can all profit from sympa- thetic disagreement. It is, however, true that mis- understandings can and do occur and it is here that an author's response may be of some use.

Michau's reaction to my criticisms of the com- munication theory of art are somewhat surprising, since his support for it seems not so much a defense of the communication theory as of what might be called a 'communion' theory. And that appears to me to be entirely correct. The experience of art involves not so much the transmittal of experience from artist to observer as a sharing among people and objects that participate in an aesthetic situation. Such sharing is indeed a social act of profound significance, as he correctly points out.

As for Michau's characterization of the artist, I am in complete agreement. I regret not having been clear enough in explaining the difference between the artist's role as analyzed externally and his particular engagement with art as experienced within the aesthetic field. That such a difference exists is essential to my position.

Finally, in writing a book on aesthetics, I defer completely to the central place that must be given to aesthetic experience. Being conscious of the inappropriateness of trying to invoke such experi- ence while engaged in an examination of it, I have attempted the lesser but perhaps still useful task of understanding it.

Michau's serious and sympathetic attention to my book is the most any author can ask for.

Arnold Berleant C. W. Post Center, Long Island

University Greenvale, N.Y. 11548, U.S.A.

'Fine Art of Portraiture'

The general opinion of my students to whom I have shown N. Narotzky's review of my book (Leonardo 6, 73 (1973)) is that the critic must have looked only

dation are in structural equilibrium. No doubt many 'problems of structure remain to be considered' but let us remember, meanwhile, that there is structure in the world and that even the young infant actively searches for it.

Eleanor J. Gibson Susan Linn Sage Professor

of Psychology Cornell University

Ithaca, N.Y. 14850, U.S.A.

'The Aesthetic Field: A Phenomenology of Aesthetic Experience'

I welcome R. Michau's thoughtful reactions to my book in his review of it (Leonardo 6, 70 (1973)). No book can satisfy every critical mind and that is quite as it should be, for we can all profit from sympa- thetic disagreement. It is, however, true that mis- understandings can and do occur and it is here that an author's response may be of some use.

Michau's reaction to my criticisms of the com- munication theory of art are somewhat surprising, since his support for it seems not so much a defense of the communication theory as of what might be called a 'communion' theory. And that appears to me to be entirely correct. The experience of art involves not so much the transmittal of experience from artist to observer as a sharing among people and objects that participate in an aesthetic situation. Such sharing is indeed a social act of profound significance, as he correctly points out.

As for Michau's characterization of the artist, I am in complete agreement. I regret not having been clear enough in explaining the difference between the artist's role as analyzed externally and his particular engagement with art as experienced within the aesthetic field. That such a difference exists is essential to my position.

Finally, in writing a book on aesthetics, I defer completely to the central place that must be given to aesthetic experience. Being conscious of the inappropriateness of trying to invoke such experi- ence while engaged in an examination of it, I have attempted the lesser but perhaps still useful task of understanding it.

Michau's serious and sympathetic attention to my book is the most any author can ask for.

Arnold Berleant C. W. Post Center, Long Island

University Greenvale, N.Y. 11548, U.S.A.

'Fine Art of Portraiture'

The general opinion of my students to whom I have shown N. Narotzky's review of my book (Leonardo 6, 73 (1973)) is that the critic must have looked only at the pictures, which admittedly were poor color reproductions, and given only cursory attention to the text.

at the pictures, which admittedly were poor color reproductions, and given only cursory attention to the text.

at the pictures, which admittedly were poor color reproductions, and given only cursory attention to the text.

at the pictures, which admittedly were poor color reproductions, and given only cursory attention to the text.

190 190 190 190

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