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JOSHUA J. DYCK VISITING SCHOLAR CENTER FOR CALIFORNIA STUDIES 2015-2016 ACADEMIC YEAR ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR, POLITICAL SCIENCE CO-DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR PUBLIC OPINION RESEARCH UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS LOWELL [email protected] @DRJJDYCK Propositions & Consequences Ballot Initiatives and Civic Engagement

Propositions & Consequences - California State University ... · CENTER FOR CALIFORNIA STUDIES . 2015 - 2016 ACADEMIC YEAR . ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR, POLITICAL SCIENCE . CO - DIRECTOR,

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Page 1: Propositions & Consequences - California State University ... · CENTER FOR CALIFORNIA STUDIES . 2015 - 2016 ACADEMIC YEAR . ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR, POLITICAL SCIENCE . CO - DIRECTOR,

J O S H U A J . D Y C K

V I S I T I N G S C H O L A R C E N T E R F O R C A L I F O R N I A S T U D I E S

2 0 1 5 - 2 0 1 6 A C A D E M I C Y E A R

A S S O C I A T E P R O F E S S O R , P O L I T I C A L S C I E N C E C O - D I R E C T O R , C E N T E R F O R P U B L I C O P I N I O N R E S E A R C H

U N I V E R S I T Y O F M A S S A C H U S E T T S L O W E L L

J O S H U A _ D Y C K @ U M L . E D U @ D R J J D Y C K

Propositions & Consequences Ballot Initiatives and Civic Engagement

Page 2: Propositions & Consequences - California State University ... · CENTER FOR CALIFORNIA STUDIES . 2015 - 2016 ACADEMIC YEAR . ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR, POLITICAL SCIENCE . CO - DIRECTOR,

Roadmap

Part I: A Puzzle Part II: Background Part III: Participatory Democratic

Theory Part IV: A New Theory and New

Evidence Party V: Summary and

Conclusion

Page 3: Propositions & Consequences - California State University ... · CENTER FOR CALIFORNIA STUDIES . 2015 - 2016 ACADEMIC YEAR . ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR, POLITICAL SCIENCE . CO - DIRECTOR,

A P U Z Z L E

Part I

Page 4: Propositions & Consequences - California State University ... · CENTER FOR CALIFORNIA STUDIES . 2015 - 2016 ACADEMIC YEAR . ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR, POLITICAL SCIENCE . CO - DIRECTOR,

The puzzle

Studies show turnout increases due to initiatives

No evidence of effects of ballot initiatives on trust, efficacy, knowledge, interest, etc.

Page 5: Propositions & Consequences - California State University ... · CENTER FOR CALIFORNIA STUDIES . 2015 - 2016 ACADEMIC YEAR . ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR, POLITICAL SCIENCE . CO - DIRECTOR,

B A C K G R O U N D

Part II

Page 6: Propositions & Consequences - California State University ... · CENTER FOR CALIFORNIA STUDIES . 2015 - 2016 ACADEMIC YEAR . ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR, POLITICAL SCIENCE . CO - DIRECTOR,

Direct Democracy •Historic Roots

•Definitions

•Usage

•Policy Content

•Contentious debates

0102030405060708090

100

1904 1916 1928 1940 1952 1964 1976 1988 2000 2012

Nu

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f In

itia

tive

s

Year

Page 7: Propositions & Consequences - California State University ... · CENTER FOR CALIFORNIA STUDIES . 2015 - 2016 ACADEMIC YEAR . ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR, POLITICAL SCIENCE . CO - DIRECTOR,

Roots and Reform

Progressive Era Foundations

Understanding the purpose of Progressive Era Reforms Political Parties Corruption Juxtaposition of the ballot initiative

with meritocracy and Strong Mayor systems

Hybrid Democracy Direct Democracy

Reconciling with Representative Democracy Madison’s tyranny of the majority

Page 8: Propositions & Consequences - California State University ... · CENTER FOR CALIFORNIA STUDIES . 2015 - 2016 ACADEMIC YEAR . ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR, POLITICAL SCIENCE . CO - DIRECTOR,

Adoption and Usage

Table 1. Initiative History and Usage, 1898-2010

State

Year of Adoption Legislative Domain Total Initiatives

1898-2010

Average Biennial

Initiatives

Alaska 1956 Statute Only 47 1.7 Arizona 1911 Both 172 3.4 Arkansas 1910 Both 120 2.4 California 1911 Both 340 6.8 Colorado 1912 Both 215 4.3 Florida 1972 Constitutional Only 32 1.6 Idaho 1912 Statute Only 28 0.6 Illinois 1970 Constitutional Only 1 0.0 Maine 1908 Statute Only 52 1.0 Massachusetts 1918 Both 72 1.5 Michigan 1908 Both 72 1.4 Mississippia 1992 Constitutional Only 2 0.2 Missouri 1908 Both 81 1.6 Montanab 1904 Both 77 1.4 Nebraska 1912 Both 46 0.9 Nevada 1905 Both 54 1.0 North Dakota 1914 Both 179 3.7 Ohio 1912 Both 77 1.6 Oklahoma 1907 Both 85 1.6 Oregon 1902 Both 355 6.5 South Dakota 1898 Both 64 1.1 Utahc 1917 Statute Only 20 0.4 Washington 1912 Statute Only 163 3.3 Wyoming 1968 Statute Only 6 0.3 a Mississippi passed it in 1914, but it was ruled unconstitutional in 1922 b Montana Added the Constitutional Initiative in 1972 c Utah voters approved of the ballot initiative in 1990, but the legislature balked at implementing the law until 1917

Page 9: Propositions & Consequences - California State University ... · CENTER FOR CALIFORNIA STUDIES . 2015 - 2016 ACADEMIC YEAR . ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR, POLITICAL SCIENCE . CO - DIRECTOR,

Content and Conflict California had 208 initiatives from 1970-2012; 76 of them were classified as “tax,” “bond,” or “budget” initiatives by NCSL

Page 10: Propositions & Consequences - California State University ... · CENTER FOR CALIFORNIA STUDIES . 2015 - 2016 ACADEMIC YEAR . ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR, POLITICAL SCIENCE . CO - DIRECTOR,

Civic Engagement

A measure of the connectedness of citizens and government/society Voting/Turnout as civic duty Political Interest Political Awareness/Knowledge Trust (Political and Social) Efficacy (Internal and External)

Presenter
Presentation Notes
In simpler terms, in a society with greater civic engagement, citizens are more active, more interested, more knowledgeable and more engaged with all aspects of government. They trust the government because they see themselves as part of the government, and the government as responsive to them.
Page 11: Propositions & Consequences - California State University ... · CENTER FOR CALIFORNIA STUDIES . 2015 - 2016 ACADEMIC YEAR . ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR, POLITICAL SCIENCE . CO - DIRECTOR,

Effects talked about by scholars

Primary

Secondary

Page 12: Propositions & Consequences - California State University ... · CENTER FOR CALIFORNIA STUDIES . 2015 - 2016 ACADEMIC YEAR . ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR, POLITICAL SCIENCE . CO - DIRECTOR,

Effects

Primary

Secondary

Page 13: Propositions & Consequences - California State University ... · CENTER FOR CALIFORNIA STUDIES . 2015 - 2016 ACADEMIC YEAR . ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR, POLITICAL SCIENCE . CO - DIRECTOR,

P A R T I C I P A T O R Y D E M O C R A T I C T H E O R Y

Part III

Page 14: Propositions & Consequences - California State University ... · CENTER FOR CALIFORNIA STUDIES . 2015 - 2016 ACADEMIC YEAR . ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR, POLITICAL SCIENCE . CO - DIRECTOR,

Spillover Effects

The direct democracy experience is different

How is it different? The act of voting is different The issues we consider are different The cost of voting is different The perceived benefits of voting or not

voting are different The expectations for voters are different

Question: does direct democracy

increase civic engagement?

Page 15: Propositions & Consequences - California State University ... · CENTER FOR CALIFORNIA STUDIES . 2015 - 2016 ACADEMIC YEAR . ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR, POLITICAL SCIENCE . CO - DIRECTOR,

The current theory

Participatory democratic theory as applied to ballot measures

Ballot Measures

Our own capabilities

The capabilities of others

The effectiveness of government

Higher Levels of Participation

• Direct legislation engages citizens through involvement in their democracy; empowerment is key to this theory

Page 16: Propositions & Consequences - California State University ... · CENTER FOR CALIFORNIA STUDIES . 2015 - 2016 ACADEMIC YEAR . ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR, POLITICAL SCIENCE . CO - DIRECTOR,

What the empirics support

Participatory theory

Ballot Measures

Our own capabilities

The capabilities of others

The effectiveness of government

Higher Levels of Participation

Knowledge Engagement/Interest Internal Political Efficacy

Page 17: Propositions & Consequences - California State University ... · CENTER FOR CALIFORNIA STUDIES . 2015 - 2016 ACADEMIC YEAR . ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR, POLITICAL SCIENCE . CO - DIRECTOR,

What the empirics support

Participatory theory

Ballot Measures

Increasing Views of Own Capabilities

The capabilities of others

The effectiveness of government

Higher Levels of Participation

Generalized Social Trust Political Discussion Cross-cutting political discussion

Page 18: Propositions & Consequences - California State University ... · CENTER FOR CALIFORNIA STUDIES . 2015 - 2016 ACADEMIC YEAR . ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR, POLITICAL SCIENCE . CO - DIRECTOR,

What the empirics support

Participatory theory

Ballot Measures

Our own capabilities

The capabilities of others

The effectiveness of government

Higher Levels of Participation

Political Trust External Political Efficacy

Page 19: Propositions & Consequences - California State University ... · CENTER FOR CALIFORNIA STUDIES . 2015 - 2016 ACADEMIC YEAR . ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR, POLITICAL SCIENCE . CO - DIRECTOR,

Trust From Dyck (2010)

Page 20: Propositions & Consequences - California State University ... · CENTER FOR CALIFORNIA STUDIES . 2015 - 2016 ACADEMIC YEAR . ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR, POLITICAL SCIENCE . CO - DIRECTOR,

Political Awareness (from Seabrook, Dyck and Lascher 2015)

% Effect of 1 additional initiative per year, on average, on political knowledge

Page 21: Propositions & Consequences - California State University ... · CENTER FOR CALIFORNIA STUDIES . 2015 - 2016 ACADEMIC YEAR . ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR, POLITICAL SCIENCE . CO - DIRECTOR,

Null Effects are the norm

Political Efficacy Some evidence that ballot measures

decrease internal efficacy among long-resource voters

Political Interest Inconsistent evidence

Page 22: Propositions & Consequences - California State University ... · CENTER FOR CALIFORNIA STUDIES . 2015 - 2016 ACADEMIC YEAR . ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR, POLITICAL SCIENCE . CO - DIRECTOR,

What the empirics support

Participatory theory

Ballot Measures

Our own capabilities

The capabilities of others

The effectiveness of government

Higher Levels of Participation

Why?

Page 23: Propositions & Consequences - California State University ... · CENTER FOR CALIFORNIA STUDIES . 2015 - 2016 ACADEMIC YEAR . ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR, POLITICAL SCIENCE . CO - DIRECTOR,

A N E W T H E O R Y ( A N D S O M E N E W E V I D E N C E )

Part IV

Page 24: Propositions & Consequences - California State University ... · CENTER FOR CALIFORNIA STUDIES . 2015 - 2016 ACADEMIC YEAR . ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR, POLITICAL SCIENCE . CO - DIRECTOR,

Why does turnout increase?

Participatory theory argument falls apart Was never really logically coherent

(Rosenstone and Hansen 1993)

How do we increase turnout? Decrease the costs Increase the benefit Increase the expressive benefit of

voting – Civic Duty Create Social Pressure through

campaigns

Page 25: Propositions & Consequences - California State University ... · CENTER FOR CALIFORNIA STUDIES . 2015 - 2016 ACADEMIC YEAR . ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR, POLITICAL SCIENCE . CO - DIRECTOR,

An alternative theory Propositions

Conflict-centered process Schattschneider on conflict Dahl on the mobilization of conflict

Elite Behavior:

The incentive structure for ballot initiatives encourages extremism Ballot initiatives completely change the way we understand agenda

setting Ballot initiatives increase the number of interest groups More money more ad space more efforts to influence and

mobilize

Mass Behavior:

Mobilization without interest campaign mobilization Voters will trust the government at lower rates ; like direct

democracy in the abstract, but dislike it in practice Issue space will be more developed and therefore more partisan

Despite the hopes of reformers, most of this conflict reinforces and intensifies partisan divides

Page 26: Propositions & Consequences - California State University ... · CENTER FOR CALIFORNIA STUDIES . 2015 - 2016 ACADEMIC YEAR . ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR, POLITICAL SCIENCE . CO - DIRECTOR,

Some evidence that already exists…

Partisan bias in mobilization Tested in one state by Dyck and Seabrook (2010)

Ballot initiatives will increase policy-specific knowledge, but not general knowledge Seabrook, Dyck and Lascher (2015) Nicholson (2003)

The most conflictual and competitive initiatives will lead to the biggest turnout increases Childers and Binder (2011) Biggers (2015)

Ballot initiatives decrease trust in government Dyck (2010)