PubCorPapers Edits

8/8/2019 PubCorPapers Edits

1/33

INTRODUCTION

Article X of the 1987 Constitution mandates the creation of

a local government code. It was eventually enacted featuring

remarkable changes in the system of governance whereby the

central government devolves certain functions to the local

government units (LGU) namely the province, municipality, city,

and barangay. The purpose of which is enable these units to be

self-reliant and more responsive to the needs and preferences of

its communities. It leads to a more accountable decision-making

and greater innovation in how public services are delivered

within its jurisdiction (Gonzales, Eleanor M, 2000,

Decentralization and Political Participation in the Philippines).

The formulation and enactment of the Local Government

Code of 1991 was inspired by the long years of Marcos

dictatorship. It is a complete move away from a highly

centralized form of government towards genuine autonomy for

local government units. The LGC of 1991 categorically specifies

that the State "shall provide for a system of decentralization

whereby LGUs shall be given more powers, authority,

responsibility and resources. Hence, the general principles of the

Code are put in operation through the following mechanism: (1)

devolution of five basic services from the national government's

regional offices to the local government units; (2) strengthening

of people's participation in local governance; (3) increasing

revenues for local government units through the provision of an

increased share in nationally imposed taxes; and (4)

strengthening the powers of local chief executives and councils.

1


2/33

OBJECTIVE

To be able to identify the success and benefits, the gaps

and the advantages in the creation and implementation of the

Local Government Code of 1991 by presenting some ideal and

innovative ideas applicable to other LGUs which has already

been implemented in the other LGUs while on the other hand

laid down the shortcomings and ineffective application of the

Code.

2


3/33

SUCCESS AND BENEFITS IN THEIMPLEMENTATION OF THE LOCAL

GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991

Sen. Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., the author of the Local

Government Code says that, It was by far one of the most

revolutionary pieces of legislation that radically transformed the

very nature of Philippine politico-administrative system at the

national and local levels. Indeed, the Local Government Code of

1991, also known as the Local Autonomy Act, set-off the process

of reinventing and redefining the discourse of local governance

in the Philippines. (Pursuing Our Collective Struggle for Local Autonomy:

Amending the Local Government Code of 1991)

Among the basic services devolved to LGUs were

agriculture, health, social services, maintenance of public works

and highways, and environmental protection. The extent of

services devolved to them depends upon the nature of the LGU.

For instance, the barangays, which are the smallest political

subdivision of the country, were given the responsibility for

agriculture support services, maintenance of health centers and

day care centers, promotion of general hygiene, maintenance of

barangay roads, bridges and water supply, infrastructure and

barangay justice.

The municipalities and cities, on the other hand, were

given the responsibility to conduct on-site research services for

agriculture and fishery, implement community- based forestry

projects, projects on primary health care, maternal and child

care, and communicable and non-communicable disease control

services, social welfare services, solid waste disposal,

3


4/33

infrastructure facilities including school buildings and municipal

roads and bridges. Provinces are required to extend agricultural

extension services, environmental protection, social welfare

services, infrastructure, low-cost housing projects, and health

services.

Sources of Funds

One of the commendable provisions of the Code is the

higher share of the LGUs from the national internal revenue

taxes and of the national wealth. Prior to the enactment of the

1991 Code, the LGU's share from the national wealth was only

about 11% but upon its effectivity, it was increase to 40%

(Philippines: Strengthening the Role and Function of Local Authorities, UN-

HABITAT, www.unhabitat.org). With this, the LGU is made to be more

capable to operate by its own through the use of the said fund in

accordance with the national programs but still respect

interdependence with the national government plans although

the LGU concerned may still be allowed to spend their fundsaccording to its respective priorities.

The LGU's share, as what we call it, the Internal Revenue

Allotment (IRA) is automatically released to the respective LGUs

and is not subject to any lien or holdback. (Pimentel v. Aguirre)

Portion of the IRA, (20% thereof) is statutorily allocated to the

development programs of the LGU concerned. In this case

however, implementation and monitoring has many problems

despite the numerous requirements and counter-checking before

the same shall be disbursed for such purpose.

4


5/33

Additional Sources of Funds and Proper Management

In addition to the IRA, LGUs are also empowered to create

their own source of revenues in consonance with the Section 6

Article X of the Constitution. However, not all LGUs especially

the barangay are practicing this supposedly additional income

generating mechanism like local property taxes, levies, business

taxes, licenses, and other fees and charges but rather relied

purely on the revenue allotment coming from the national

government. This is because most of the chief executives

elected lack the expertise in the creative administrative and

managerial methods to supervise LGUs under their respective

territorial jurisdiction.

By and large, the Local Government Code provided much

needed powers and authority to the Local Chief Executives and

Local Sanggunian. The devolution of powers of the central

government provided them with the opportunity to chart and

better manage the direction of development for their individual

LGU. Before the implementation of the Code, the local

government units had to seek the consent of the national

government in procuring even a single nail needed for any

infrastructure project. At that time development planning was

also centralized and the LGUs could not intervene on programs

and projects implemented by the national government agencies

within their area of jurisdiction. This situation has been totally

reversed. It is now the LGUs that identify, plan, implement andfinance local projects. National government agencies are also

mandated to work in close coordination with LGUs in regard to

the implementation of their programs and projects in the area.

As examples, the provinces may now impose a tax on (a)

transfers of real property; (b) businesses of printing and5


6/33

publication [ not on news papers] (c) franchises; (d) sand and

gravel; (e) professions; (f) amusements enterprises; and (g)

delivery vans of all kinds of products.

If implemented and studied properly, revenue generating

capability of an LGU can be a huge mechanism attributable to

the success in the implementation of the Code in its ultimate aim

to make LGUs become totally self-reliant. In South Africa, they

established neighborhood committees to engage the resources

of communities in addressing economic and infrastructure

problems and government partnership with community-based

organizations for tax collection. In, Kenya, local governments

changed their system of having multiple business licenses to

having one single business permit so as to simplify their

licensing process, thus, reducing red tape in the local

government, and of course, lesser expenses for the procurement

of supplies, official receipt printing and personal services. In

these examples, the municipalities are seen to be addressing

their need for a strong local revenue source by enhancing their

abilities to access the revenue base (through creativeadministrative and managerial methods) which in fact, increased

the tax collection rate average by 300 percent in 2003 (United

Nations Development Program Philippines,

http://www.undp.org.ph).

In the Philippines, Cebu City used a computerized

assessment and appraisal procedures related to property taxes

which enabled them to track down the tax collectibles while San

Fernando Pampanga, adapted its public governance system

(PGS), which uses scorecards to measure performances and

accomplishments. The PGS is an adaptation of the Balanced

Scorecard (BSC), a measurement and management system for

businesses developed by the Harvard Business School that has

6


7/33

been used by public institutions worldwide. The adoption of the

PGS has been credited for the improvement of the business

climate in the city. Since its implementation, San Fernando has

since attracted 2,200 businesses, or an average of 16 percent

annually over the past three years. Business and real property

taxes collected from these establishments have decreased the

citys dependency on the internal revenue allotment (IRA), from

52.85 percent in 2007 to 49 percent in 2008.

Another positive feature of the Code is the power of the

LGU to legislate even the barangays. One of the good example

as pointed out by UNESCO in its analysis in relation to the

legislative power of the LGU is the City Ordinance 1344 issued by

Cebu City which creatively facilitate the development of low-cost

housing, allowing the use of a trust fund generated from the sale

of city-owned lots exclusively for shelter and its related

expenditure. The city also used its law-setting ability to increase

the participation of vendors' association in market management

which is recognized by the Revised Management Code (Matthew

Andrews and Anwar Shah, Assessing Local Government Performance in

Developing Countries).

People Empowerment

The Code also provides the legal and institutional

infrastructure for expanded participation of civil society in local

governance. More specifically, it allocates to non-governmentalorganizations (NGOs) and peoples organizations (POs) specific

seats in Local Special Bodies (LSBs). These special bodies include

the Local Development Council, Peace and Order Council, Local

Health Board, Local School Board, Pre-bids Qualification and

7


8/33

Awards Committee, People's Law Enforcement Board and other

local councils that may be created by the LGU. Because of their

ability to organize and mobilize the people, one door wide open

for NGO and PO participation in governance is in the area of

promoting local accountability and answerability, specifically

through the recall and peoples initiative provisions.

The role of people's and non-governmental organizations

are also provided in the Code intending to make them active

partners in the pursuit of local autonomy, thus, the role of NGOs

is seen as complementary, supplementary and supportive of the

efforts of local governments and the pursuit of full autonomy.

However, in some areas of the Philippines, it is not liberally

practiced as necessary as it is supposed to be. Normally, the

authority remains in the full control of the local chief executives

and the legislative power remains to the Sanggunians. If the

citizens are liberally involved in the planning and appropriation,

it guarantees effective planning, project implementation and

monitoring which puts harder on the abusing LGU officers to

misappropriate the funds into something else thereby thecorrupt practices are somehow eradicated.

In Costa Rica, a county representative championed the

development of a program giving local citizens direct authority

over discretionary funds allocated to them from higher levels of

government. These discretionary funds were traditionally used

by representatives to develop lines of patronage and clientelism

in their communities but are now channeled directly to district

councils for local allocation. The district councils have to show

evidence of direct consultation with their citizens when using the

funds. As literature suggests, the resource allocation process is

more responsive and where the communities can see works

being targeted and completed (Matthew Andrews, Anwar Shah,

8


9/33

Assessing Local Government Performance in Developing

Countries).

In the Philippines, some LGUs recognizes the constitutional

and codal provisions in people empowerment (while others

retain the exclusive planning and appropriation power to the

Sangguninan), have effectively exercised the power to legislate

by creating ordinances involving its citizen to the effective

management of the local government unit it belongs. Take for

example the City of Naga which passed its "Empowerment

Ordinance" in late 1995. This unique legislation promotes active

partnership between the city government and the people in the

formulation, implementation and evaluation of government

policies through the Naga City Peoples Council (NCPC). The

participatory process resulted in the formulation of a total of

thirty strategic management plans including three citywide

programs: the clean-up of the Naga River, the management of

solid waste, and the revitalization of the Naga City Hospital. It led

to the establishment of the Naga City Investment Board, a

private sector initiative with members from the Naga CityPeoples Council that promotes investment and local economic

development. The Integrated Livelihood Master plan has been

adopted to harmonize national and local livelihood programs.

The Public Service Excellence Program and the Citizens

Guidebook of City Government Services have resulted in marked

improvements in service delivery and accountability (UN-

HABITAT, Good Policies and Enabling Legislation For Attaining

the Millennium Development Goals: a Methodology for Review

and Documentation).

9


10/33

Barangay Empowerment

In addition to the LGUs achievements as far as its

legislative power is concerned is the implementation of a

government code in barangay level. It was in 2004 when thebarangay officials of Sanito in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay

introduced its own Sanito Barangay Government Code of 1994 to

address the influx of informal settlers, worsening peace-and-

order situation, widespread poverty, and the limited financial

capability which has been their problem since about one year

ago. It was one of the local government units' initiatives which

garnered an award for best practices given by Galing Pook

Foundation, with sponsorship from the United Nations

Development Programme and SNV Netherlands. They patterned

it after the Local Government Code but reduced to the barangay

level. The Barangay Code, which was amended in 2005, gave

Sanito the power to impose additional fees like Barangay Public

Works Development Fee, Barangay Water Development Fee, and

the Coastal Resource Development Fee. The Code also required

the collection of P30 per month as garbage collection fees and

designated retired military and police officials as members of the

barangay anti-crime units. The fees collected by the barangay

increased the local generated income to P700,000.00 per year

from a mere P49,000 before the passage of the Barangay Code.

The increase in local income has made them less dependent on

the IRA (United Nations Development Program Philippines,

http://www.undp.org.ph).

The Local Government Code of the Philippines further

provides for a desirable organizational stucture and staffing

pattern of the LGUs that commensurate to its service

requirements and financial capability. It also provides and

10


11/33

defines the powers, duties, functions and compensation of its

officers and employees (Philippines: Strengthening the Role and Function

of Local Authorities, UN-HABITAT, www.unhabitat.org). The most

commendable of these provisions is the appreciation of the

barangay officials' entitlement to salaries and wages in the form

of honorariums which was not recognized prior to the enactment

of the Code, including the power to legislate like that of the

municipal, city and the province.

Another feature of the Code is the provision giving the

Barangays to handle and resolve disputes and small cases within

its jurisdiction through the Lupon, thus, lessen the cases being

filed in the actual Courts. In addition to that, barangays now

have the power to establish and maintain a barangay health and

daycare centers.

11


12/33

GAPS IN THE IMPLEMENTATIONAND NEGATIVE IMPACTS OF THE

LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE

Lack of Concrete Project Monitoring System and FeedbackMechanism

What maybe the flaw in the management of the

developmental fund is the absence of provisions which directly

involves the citizens in the formulation and planning in the local

government units monumental undertakings and the authorityto assess the results of the projects intended to accomplish. In

many instances, the 20% allocation in infrastructure is, as per

records, has already been disbursed yet there is no physical

existence of the supposed project, or if there any, most often

than not, are unfinished. In the case of the Pavia Housing Project

in Iloilo, the Province suffered a P130 Million in 2003 and left

abandoned until now. It is one example of the many failures in

the implementation and monitoring of projects engaged by the

local government unit.

The Code mandates the LGU to work with the LGE in

promoting, supporting or even initiating NGOs and POs to

organize themselves and participate in local governance but

in fact, even if these organizations cannot complete the

requirements set by the Code. In the absence of civil society

members in special local bodies, as stated in the Code, some or

all of them can be taken in to fill the positions as a way to

encourage popular participation and self-organization. The LGE

in the town did not perform these tasks. Instead, he worked to

discourage civil society participation. This is why the sometimes

12


13/33

the NGO representative in the health board, for example, is not

an NGO worker, nor does she have any knowledge about why an

NGO representative is needed in the board. All of the supposed

civil society members of the local special bodies are handpicked

individuals representing nonexistent NGOs, POs, and private

sector organizations.

Inadequacy to Generate Additional Sources of Funds andProper Management

In addition to the IRA, LGUs are also empowered to create

their own source of revenues in consonance with the Section 6

Article X of the Constitution. However, not all LGUs especially

the barangays are practicing this supposedly additional income

generating mechanism like local property taxes, levies, business

taxes, licenses, and other fees and charges but rather relied

purely on the revenue allotment coming from the national

government. This is because most of the chief executives

elected lack the expertise in the creative administrative and

managerial methods to supervise LGUs under their respective

territorial jurisdiction.

Dependency in the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA)

LGUs are characterized by dependency: transfers via the

IRA account for 64 percent of LGU revenues. High dependence

on transfers is a disincentive for LGU revenue mobilization. Hard

decisions on raising revenues to cover local expenditures and

justifying to the public the need to raise taxes in order to provide

public services are avoided by LGU officials. The dependence

13


14/33

may also impair the development of local government capital

markets, because lending to LGUs has been made largely

because of the security given by the IRA intercept.

In a paper entitled, Ten Years of the 1991 Local

Government Code, presented at the National Defense College of

the Philippines (NDCP) Strategic Studies, Guadioso C. Sosmea,

Jr. wrote, If the national government will withhold the Internal

Revenue Allotment (IRA) for local governments, about 85% of

them will collapse and close down. This is because local

governments have a very high IRA dependency.

LGUs are underperforming on own-source revenue

collection and administration, reducing the credibility of the local

tax system and contributing to a culture of noncompliance. At

present, own-source revenue constitutes only 36 percent of total

LGU revenues. Moreover, local revenue codes have created a

panoply of taxes, fees, and charges, many under-collected and

some simply uncollected

The failure of the LGU executives and the member of the

local legislative bodies to look into and imitate the success andbest practices of the other LGUs seemed to be incomprehensible

or maybe they just ignore it for their own personal interest.

Unessential Consideration of a Province as a Funded LGU

This is another provision in the Code where a province is

considered as an LGU having its own officers and employees and

funds. Based on various writings a province is a geographic area

that has some governance secondary to the governance of a

central state or country. In France, outside of Paris is part of the

province. A province can also be used as merely an

14


15/33

expression to define an area. In other words, a province, acts

similar to that of a state but reduced into smaller area. In some

way, it can be considered as redundant. It is like a common

corporation that pays excessive personal services by keeping

numbers of executives like President for Operations, Vice-

President for Operations, President for Finance, Vice-President

for Finance, etc and that presidents and vice-presidents also

maintains number of paid personnel under them. Simply put, it

sets out as redundancy paying for unnecessary expenses. If only

one executive can function with lesser difference of having an

assistant, then, there is no much need in keeping two.

The present set up of the Philippine Local Government

Code in terms of the province seem to be unnecessary. The

funds provided to them should have been directly issued to the

poorer municipalities and barangays it covers for proper

appropriations of the IRA. Besides, any project it implements is

also the same concerned projects of a municipality or city where

the project is located or provided. Further, the offices of the

provincial authorities are also located in the capital town or citiesof a province, so what is the need of maintaining too many

offices as it confuses the constituents where to go. For example,

an ordinary citizen will go to the Office of the Mayor seeking for

some assistance but the employee there suggests to proceed to

the Office of the Governor as the latter has no more funds for the

need of that citizen. Once that citizen steps in the Office of the

Governor, the employee there would also advice him to proceed

to the Mayors Office for the same reason, and vice versa. In

other words, it confuses the people as to where to go in times of

their need. It is however okay, if, either of the offices can

automatically responds to the peoples at once. The problem of

15


16/33

the missing middleprovinces have a very weak role in the

architecture of decentralization.

The best proof to show that the province has no much

relevance in the effective process of decentralization is the

acknowledgment of highly urbanized and independent

component cities. These two types of LGUs exist without the

need of supervision from the province it belongs. It acts on its

own without the provinces intervention. Without, the province,

does it make a common municipality or city to collapse? Most

probably, the answer is in the negative.

Although the national government has to deal in some with

more than 1,500 LGUs nationwide, the demand of keeping a

provincial offices maybe unnecessary as it can be assumed by

the Congressmen themselves in terms of representing the

province in the national arena.

Currently despite the existence of the province as the

biggest LGU in terms of jurisdiction, there is no national forum

where the key stakeholders, such as elected and appointed

officials from the national and LGU-level legislative andexecutive branches can debate and decide on significant

decentralization-related issues and constraints.

LGU budgeting and resource management

Many aspects in the budget and appropriations

management remain an issue in the LGUs. Institutionalized

planning is weak in LGUs. Only 3050 percent of LGUs have local

development councils in place. Moreover, the Regional

Development Plan (RDP) formulated by the Regional

Development Council is seldom, if ever, taken into consideration

16


17/33

by the LGUs. Conversely, RDPs tend to focus solely on

interprovincial projects and ignore local development plans.

There is also a disconnect between national planning on the

one hand and regional or provincial planning on the other.

LGU budget formulation and execution is largely

nontransparent due to the lack of effective community

participation in local budget preparation and monitoring, poor

income estimates used by LGUs for budget formulation, and the

practice of granting additional personnel benefits out of

savings. In the case of the Province of Iloilo as per COAs

findings for the year 2009, it had exceeded its personal services

limitation of 45% thereby resulting to the disallowance of the

additional year-end benefits granted to all its employees.

Personal services expenditures constitute the largest LGU

expenditure category, squeezing capital outlays and

maintenance and other operating expenditures (MOOE). The

ratio of personal services to LGU expenditure has not changed

significantly in aggregate between 1991 and 2003, but there are

variations across levels of local government: this ratio declinedfor cities and increased for municipalities and provinces. Though

personal services expenditure is formally capped at 4555

percent of total LGU resources, it is higher in reality.

Accountability and transparency in LGU procurement leave

much to be desired, despite a growing number of innovations

and examples of good practice. Administrative controls over

procurement are generally weak, and effective mechanisms to

track LGU procurement are lacking.

In an article entitled Despite Anomalies, There are Few

Checks on Corrupt Local Officials by Tess Bacalla, she

mentioned of a study conducted in some parts of Mindanao,

meanwhile, traced delays in one area to the ignorance of the

17


18/33

requisitioning offices when it came to accomplishing the

purchase request form. Some local governments, on the other

hand, chose to pre-select the suppliers whenever they were

buying goods through canvassing. The study noted there was

also no clear delineation of functions among the procurement

personnel, not only leading to delays, but also allowing those

involved with ample discretion that could tempt them to commit

anomalies.

In addition, she further said that the study found that

unnecessary delays in many aspects of the procurement process

such as the release of payments to suppliers led to other

problems. Some suppliers, for instance, lost interest in doing

business with the local governments, thereby depriving these of

a wider choice, as well as the best possible value for the least

amount of money.

Governance and political economy

The 1991 decentralization was an attempt to

fundamentally restructure the state following a lengthy period of

centralized authoritarianism. Power was devolved from national

institutions to local ones. However, at the local level, institutions

continue to be captured by elites, especially dominant political

families that seek to perpetuate political dynasties within LGUs

and, for the more successful ones, across government levels.

The dominance of particular political clans has had discernible

effects on LGU performance.

The appreciation of Party List system is improperly

misused by the tycoons in politics which is also tolerated by

the COMELEC. Many used it as a cloak because they have

18


19/33

nowhere else to go. Some create their own suppose list as if

representing a particular group of marginalize sector but in fact,

they are not at all belong to such. The original spirit laid down

by the Constitution has already been lost. Most countries in

Europe, as well as Russia, South Africa and Israel favor some

form of party-list system because it opens up the political

process beyond one or two dominating political parties. It may

have worked in these countries but sad to say, not in the

Philippines, or if it does, it cannot be easily noticed. Maybe the

most talked about issue in the party list was when Mickey

Arroyos bid as representative for the supposed promotion of the

rights of tricycle drivers and security guards. It was questioned

by the many other sectors because according to them and thats

actually the fact, that Arroyo is not at all an affiliate or member

of either of the groups --- so how can he possibly represent them

when not once in his life he never drive a tricycle for fare nor

employed as security guard!

Continuing Political Dynasty

No law has ever been practiced in society without practical

modifications or even violations. Social reality is always a

confluence of forces that constitute and constrain day to day

experiences.

Before the implementation of the Local Government Code,

the clan already controlled local politics through the use of

various strategies ranging from the extralegal (patronage,

charity, compadrazgo) to the illegal (fraud, violence and

terrorism) while cornering for itselfand for its own maintenance

the resources of the municipal and provincial coffers. Before

19


20/33

the implementation of the Code, the municipal resources (funds,

equipment) were already being used by the mayor for the

personal gain of his loyal henchmen and political allies.

The Code failed to alter this practice. In fact, the Code

exacerbated the situation as its provisions left the socioeconomic

and political fields open to further clan misuse and abuse. As it

was before, it is still the loyal henchmen and political allies who

oversee and manage the clans political interests in the

municipality. These political caretakers are composed mostly of

relatives of the clans long-time political friends who divide

among themselves the loot available in the municipality. The

best which is also the worst example of political dynasty-ism is

the Ampatuans in the province of Maguindanao where they

dominated not only the political body but also the local economy.

The family is known to own almost the huge businesses

throughout the province from pharmacy and shopping centers to

gas stations. They are also known in stockpiling weapons for

protection and as status symbol.

But before the Ampatuans case surfaced, local politicaldynasty is so known, almost ordinary and most probably are

acceptable in every sense of the word despite the Constitutional

provision prohibiting it. The legislature which is in-charged in the

construction of the enabling law on how to implement the

prohibition of political dynasty remains to be ignoring. But

understandably, no one should expect the wise men of the

congress to shoot their own foot and hoofs.

It seems that the people have no choice but to accept

political dynasty even if it is prohibited by the constitution. It is

like a relief food packed inside a styrofoam with the label of the

name of politician. If you're a flood victim, to avoid starving to

death in the middle of a cold storm and flood. You have no

20


21/33

choice but to eat your pride and principle and get the donated

food by the politician.

Downside of the Three-year Term of the Elected LocalGovernment Officials

There is time, which is not so often, a candidate outside of

the clan wins the votes of the local electorate. But before he can

be able to fully implement changes in the LGU, he is already put

out of the service because of the three-year term of office. It isseen as a hindrance to the institutionalization of the Local

Government Code and to building the capabilities of local

officials. This is because local elected officials do not have

enough time to plan and execute many of their programs within

a short time frame of three years. It is a common experience

that when a new set of elected officials assumes office after the

three-year term, new programs evolve and continuity is lost.

Thus, there is a need to amend the constitutional provision on

the tenure of local government officials and campaign for a

longer term, let say six years for new electionist and three years

for re-electionists. The six years for new electionist is deemed to

be proper so that recall shall be best appreciated and the tenure

of the successor is longer by three years as compare to the at

least one year in the present set up.

This is precisely why local governments were not able to

really transform obsolete structures and organizations to meet

the requirements of solving modern day problems. Efficiency and

effectiveness can be achieved when local governments adapt

private sectors strategies, techniques and technology, systems

21


22/33

of management and information technology, where deemed

appropriate and tested.

22


23/33

SUGGESTIONS FOR PRIORITYACTION

Actions are needed now. Given the mixed track record of

decentralization, it would be desirable to review the architecture

for decentralization. However, this could take time, and action is

needed now to avoid both deterioration in services as well as

limitations on funding coming from the national Government.

Below are just some of the many immediate possible

actions that could be accomplished with and without legislation,

and fairly quickly, by both national and local governments.

Actions not requiring legislation

There should have an immediate formulation of

appropriate systems as part of the Implementing Rules and

Regulations (IRR) for the project implementation and feedback

mechanism, such as the Planning and Oversight Committee and

Project Result Committee. With these, the LGE and the

Sanggunians will be made more aware of the demand for

transparency

Strengthening the Revenue Generating System in theLGU

Own-source revenue collection could be significantly

improved through administrative actions, such as providing

incentives (a) to LGUs to increase collection of real property

tax and business tax, (b) to cities and provinces to conduct

23


24/33

the generalized revenue assessment every three years, (c)

to cities and municipalities to use minimum (presumptive)

gross sales figures to calculate the tax liability for

establishments required to pay the business tax, and (d) for

disclosure of LGU financial information and benchmarking

LGU fiscal and financial performance. Some of these are

actually being done in other LGUs all throughout the

country. To address this, there should have a continuing

study provided for the local legislative body. The national

government should provide guidelines based on the best

practices from other successful LGUs for implementation in

other LGUs which has the potential of doing the same in

their own locality.

We should not however, limit ourselves in the

Philippine setting but rather go beyond. Take for example

the South Africas and Kenyas system in issuing business

licenses. They maintains unified issuance of receipts

covering all kinds of fees and other charges thus, limits the

printing of receipts, personal services and the accounting ofthe same. With these, red tape is eliminated and

malversation of fund is harder to be committed because of

the unified receipt. If some receipt is missing, only one

person or only one department shall be held liable thus

cases can easily be resolved.

Strict Implementation and Review in the Appropriationand Resource Management

Budgeting and resource management could be

improved by strengthening the planning and investment

appraisal and monitoring. It shall include the publics24


25/33

participation in the process and keep the budget documents

open. There should have an effective personnel information

system linked to payroll to avoid ghost personnel.

In infrastructure project, the LGE concerned should

present to public through a general assembly status of

project implemented base on the by-phase accomplishment

as indicated in the approved action plan. Any irregularities

must be properly explained and the failure thereof shall lead

to disciplinary actions.

Actions requiring legislation The system of governance must be properly reviewed

again. SECTION 521 of the Code mandates a regular review of

the Code every five years but the Congress has failed to comply.

If taken seriously, the following may help improve the system of

governance in the Philippines.

Governance and Political Review

Party List System

The Party List system be reviewed again as to what

level of participation they maybe allowed to participate in

the legislature. This is because if the citizen in the local

level is empowered and optimized, there is no longer a need

for sectoral representation in the Congress. Besides, in the

present situation, the party list are now being used by many

political perverts for their personal benefits and the funds

issued to them are also spent without the knowledge of the

suppose sector they represent.

25


26/33

The Three-Year Term

The three-year term on the local elective officials must

be increase from 3 years to 5 or six years for the new

electionist while the re-electionist remains to be 3 years.

The purpose of this is to give the new administration

sufficient time to implement the programs it proposed

during his campaign. The 5 and 6 years will also appreciate

the essence of recall as it allows longer time for the

successor, if ever, to spend extra 3 years to continue the

unserved tenure of the recalled local elective official. The

re-electionist will also be limited in 3 years to make him

think that if he fails to satisfy the expectations of his

constituent, he will have the thought of losing in the next

election.

The Province

Moreover, the missing-middle relevance of the

province in the decentralization is in the gray area because

if taken closely, a municipality or a city may exist without

the supposed supervision of the province. The same case

with the barangays because it may exist as well even

without a municipality or city. Actually, the province, the

municipality, a city, or a barangay can co-exist, and that is a

reality. But the question is, do they need to have

corresponding separate powers? Of course they do, but all

of them need to have funds? The municipality, city and

barangays yes, but province, no!

26


27/33

Take a look at the present case. There are highly

urbanized and independent component cities that do not

require the supervision of a province, and therefore, there is

no reason to believe that the ordinary or poorer municipality

or city for that matter cannot do without the province. The

officials in the province maybe retained but no more funds.

The 23% from IRA intended for the province is best directly

allocated to the poorer municipalities to enable them to

cope with the cities, besides, most projects implemented by

the province are always located in a municipality of city.

There is no such specific place like province, like when

one lives in Lambunao, Iloilo say, I will go to the province.

What province for he already is already in the province, that

is outside of the city of Iloilo. But one can say, I will go to

the city, or municipality, or barangay, because that can be

specifically spoken when you live within the province.

Further, the functions of the provincial officials shall

not be more than legislative, supervisory and monitoring

capacities only while the infrastructure concerns shall be adevolved purely to municipality or city concern. With that,

the provincial officers can be able to maximize and focus on

the legislation, implementation, review and monitoring of

the municipalities and cities under its jurisdiction.

Political DynamismNone of the suggestions for action on decentralization

are new to Philippine policy makersbut each is fraught

with complexity. The challenge is to design the technical

solutions and address the political economy challenges

27


28/33

through a consultative process, so that an appropriately

prioritized and sequenced set of actionspolitically feasible,

administratively implementable, and fiscally sustainable

can be agreed on and implemented. One of which is maybe

not so new yet so old. Its like, it is already part of every

Filipinos skin the political dynamism.

The 1987 Constitution prohibits political dynasty but

no law has ever been passed to enable the said provision.

Because of this issue, almost every province in the country

is being controlled by its own political clan. One can notice

that in a province, the Congressman is the father, the

Governor is the uncle, one of municipalities is under the

mayoralty of the son, and so on. The list would not just end.

Continued practice of political patronage is the

obstacle most often cited to the implementation of

decentralization, but concrete recommendations on how this

can be checked have not been offered.

The Congress must enact a law providing for the

limitation of numbers or positions one family can have in thelocal government to avoid full control of the local

government fund. It may hurt their political clan and career

but there should have no Filipino in the country to think only

of themselves but for the full development and progress of

the Philippines.

28


29/33

29


30/33

CONCLUSION

The structural weaknesses of democracy in the Philippines

act as a binding constraint for democratic deepening under adecentralized framework. The historical basis of state formation

has led to the establishment of a polity with the following

characteristics: competitive elections reliant on local patronage

based networks rather than program based political parties;

localities susceptible to capture because of weak civic

disciplines.

These norms underlying the polity are deeply implicated in

how decentralization was designed and how it is being

implemented. The prospects of broadening and strengthening

decentralization and local autonomy is bright as evidenced by

models of good and best practices in local governance because

decentralization has shown us that unique situations exist in

different local governments that only they know how to manage.

It has shown us that it has changed the profile of local leadership

drawing more leaders from a wider range of society. It has, in

many areas increased media vigilance and accountability

because of more active citizen participation in local governance.

For progressive groups, it thus makes the case for

rethinking local governance work beyond the ambit of

participatory planning processes and local development councils.

Empirical data also suggests that the devolution of authority and

resources has not led to a marked improvement in the delivery

of services for the poor. Various mechanisms should be

institutionalized and operationalized to improve

intergovernmental and non-governmental relations and

cooperation to provide the regional policy solutions and

30


31/33

coordinated actions to address regional issues and development

concerns. National, regional, provincial, city and municipal

development will have no impact if not informed by a

participatory barangay development and investment plans

thereby providing coherent planning, direction and action

towards improving delivery of basic and support services for

poverty reduction. The point of reference should be at the basic

political unit which is the barangay rather than at the national

level (through the province, through the municipality or city)

because it is at the barangay level where real lives are really

affected by the responsiveness or irresponsiveness of

government programs, projects and activities being

implemented. People in the communities are the ones who know

what their real needs are and the problems besetting them.

The graver political problem that underlies the problems in

service delivery for the poor is the continuing lack of

responsiveness of local governments to the needs of the

disadvantaged. This is aggravated by the framework for

intergovernmental transfersincluding the IRA formula. ThePhilippines' dysfunctional democracy thus requires a bipolar

therapy: strategic political action to address the structural

constraints, on one hand, and incremental political work to

contend with their technical manifestation, on the other. The

former relates to the political project of shoring up the power of

progressive forces to contest the basis of the political status quo

and the voicelessness of the disadvantaged. The latter relates to

continuing the advocacy for reforms in the electoral and

representative system as well as the necessary reforms in the

decentralization framework highlighted in this paper.

31


32/33

Additional References

Bhargava, V. 2000. Combating Corruption in the Philippines. The World Bank Philippine Country Management

Unit: Manila, Philippines.

Blair, H. 1996. Supporting Democratic Local Governance: Lessons from International Donor ExperienceInitial

Concepts and Some Preliminary Findings. Paper prepared for the annual meeting of the American Political

Science Association, San Francisco, California. August 29September

Brillantes, A. B., Jr. 1994. Redemocratization and Decentralization in the Philippines: The Increasing Leadership

Role of NGOs. International Review of Administrative Sciences.

Esguerra, J. 2003. Participation and Responsiveness and Clientelistic Settings. Presentation before the

seminar on People First in Service Delivery, Asian Development Bank, Manila.

Fabros, A. 2003. Civil Society Engagements in Local Governance: The Case of the Philippines.

Fung A. and E. Olin Wright. Thinking about Empowered Participatory Governance, pp. 342 in Deepening

Democracy: Institutional Innovations in Empowered Participatory Governance.

Gabito, M. 2001. Status of Compliance with Department of Interior and Local Government Memorandum

Circular No. 200189, Conference on Participatory Local Governance, Traders Hotel, Manila, October.

Hedman, E. and J. Sidel. 2000. Philippine Politics and Society in the Twentieth Century: Colonial League of Cities

in the Philippines (LCP). 2006. Summary of the Draft LCP Position Paper on Local Government Financing and

Fiscal Management (under EO 444 and in support of EO 366).

Manasan, R. 2004. Local Public Finance in the Philippines: In Search of Autonomy with Accountability. PIDSDiscussion Paper Series no. 200442. December 2004. Philippine Institute for Development Studies: Makati,

Philippines.

Philippine Development Forum (PDF). 2006. Strengthening Local Governance: Progress and Challenges.

Discussion paper presented in a meeting of the PDF Consultative Group and Other Stakeholders, Tagaytay City

Philippines, March 3031.

Quimpo, N. 2004. The Left and Democratisation in the Philippines. PhD Dissertation manuscript.

Ramos, C. 2003. Another World: Reflections on Participatory Budgeting in Porto Alegre, Political Brief 11(2),

June 2003.

Rocamora, J. 2003. Legal and Policy Frameworks for Participation in the Philippines. Unpublished manuscript.

Institute for Popular Democracy: Manila, Philippines. 1998. Philippine Political Parties, Electoral System and

Political Reform. Accessed from http://www.philsol.nl/ on January, 2007.

Rondinelli, D. 2000. What is Decentralization? in Decentralization Briefing Notes, eds. J. Litvack and J. Seddon.

World Bank: Washington DC, USA.

32


33/33

Selee, A. 2004. Exploring the Link between Decentralization and Democratic Governance in Decentralization

and Democratic Governance in Latin America, eds J. Tulchin and A. Selee.

Soriano, M.C., J. Steffensen, E. Makayan and J. Nisperos. .2005. Assessment of NonIRA Transfers and Other

Funds for Devolved Services in the Philippines: Final Main Report. Manuscript

White, R. and P. Smoke. 2005 East Asia Decentralizes in in East Asia Decentralizes: Making Local

Governments Work. World Bank: Washington DC, USA.

World Bank.2004. Decentralization in the Philippines: Strengthening Local Government Financing and

Resource management in the Short term. Report No. 26104PH.

Documents

PubCorPapers Edits