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This article was downloaded by: [Simon Fraser University]On: 13 November 2014, At: 17:42Publisher: RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH,UK
International Journal of PublicAdministrationPublication details, including instructions forauthors and subscription information:http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/lpad20
Public Management ReformDrivers in ThailandAlex M. Mutebi a & Piyawat Sivaraks ba Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy , NationalUniversity of Singapore , Singaporeb Office of the Civil Service Commission (OCSC) ,Government of Thailand , Bangkok, ThailandPublished online: 24 Jul 2007.
To cite this article: Alex M. Mutebi & Piyawat Sivaraks (2007) Public ManagementReform Drivers in Thailand, International Journal of Public Administration, 30:10,1083-1102, DOI: 10.1080/01900690701230127
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01900690701230127
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Intl Journal of Public Administration, 30: 1083–1102, 2007Copyright © Taylor & Francis Group, LLCISSN 0190-0692 print / 1532-4265 onlineDOI: 10.1080/01900690701230127
LPAD0190-06921532-4265Intl Journal of Public Administration, Vol. 30, No. 10, May 2007: pp. 0–0Intl Journal of Public AdministrationPublic Management Reform Drivers in Thailand
Public Management Reform Drivers in ThailandMutebi and Sivaraks Alex M. MutebiLee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University
of Singapore, Singapore
Piyawat SivaraksOffice of the Civil Service Commission (OCSC), Government of Thailand,
Bangkok, Thailand
Abstract: Public management reforms drivers in much of the developing world areoften reduced to external events rooted in economics and market-based principles. How-ever, in so doing, other reform drivers outside this paradigm are relegated to secondarystatus. We examine the influence of four non-market drivers of public managementreforms in Thailand between the late 1980s through the 1990s. Whereas reform driversare difficult to separate from each other as they tend to share common effects, we findthat competing drivers of reform outside the dominant economics and market-basedones, were also equally influential, even though they may not have been dominant.
Keywords: public management, public administration, bureaucratic reform, Thailand
INTRODUCTION
Numerous countries, both developed and developing, embarked on publicmanagement reform initiatives during much of the 1980s and 1990s with dif-ferent schools informing the various reform initiatives about how governmentshould and could work, as well as about the shortcomings of what had beenlong-established models of government and public management.[1] Thosereforms were rationalized on a number of grounds, ranging from economicsand the costs of government programs, through partisan politics and a search
The authors would like to thank Brian Hunt for his comments on an earlier versionof this paper.
Address correspondence to Alex M. Mutebi, Assistant Professor, Lee Kuan YewSchool of Public Policy, National University of Singapore, 469C Bukit Timah Road,Oei Tiong Ham Building, Singapore, 259772; E-mail: [email protected]
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1084 Mutebi and Sivaraks
for political advantage, to idealistic non-market based normative goals. Yet,these reforms are all too often portrayed as having largely been part of a glo-bal wave of change rooted mostly in the economics and market-based ration-ales—a conclusion that largely overlooks reforms drivers outside thisparadigm.[2] In truth however, most reform initiatives had not one, but variousdrivers, normally a convergence of political opportunity, the spread of ideasabout reform, and economic crises.[3]
As was the case for several other countries in East Asia, Thailandembarked on a large public sector reform effort during the late 1990s, many ofwhich are still underway. These reforms have frequently been cast as havingprimarily been rooted in economic principles (especially efficiency) and in sodoing, relegating other drivers outside of this view to secondary status.
In this article, we make the case that in addition to global trends largelybased on economic principles as well as other market-based considerationsinternal to Thailand, there were other equally important reform drivers. In par-ticular, normative and largely non-market based reasons (including amongothers, the demand for greater transparency and participation, and the need toreform the value system of public servants) were key factors. Disaggregatingthe various reform drivers as apposed to merely seeing all reform effort as partof some undifferentiated global wave of economics and market-based para-digm is essential for a more complete appreciation of Thailand’s public man-agement reform efforts.
Section II takes brief stock of some theoretical considerations on publicmanagement reform drivers in general. Section III gives a broad overview ofThailand’s public management reform program. Section IV examines the variousmarket and non-market drivers of those reforms. Finally, section V concludes.
PUBLIC SECTOR REFORM DRIVERS—THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS
A very basic distinction can be made of the most common models of changethat informed most public management reform efforts of the 1980s and 1990s:On the one hand are schools of thought that seek to promote market-basedideas in the public sector, particularly efficiency, flexibility, and less regula-tion and red tape; and on the other, more normative and less market-drivenones that emphasize particular values such as more transparency and account-ability as well greater participatory mechanisms in the public sector. Theselatter influences on administrative practices provide an alternative frameworkthrough which to analyze patterns of administrative change rather the formerones steeped in market-based ideas.
To be sure, the most influential ideas in public management reform in thelast half century have been those seeking the promotion of market-based ideasin the public sector, almost all of them offshoots of William Niskanen’s
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Public Management Reform Drivers in Thailand 1085
economic theory of the bureaucracy. Niskanen argued that bureaucrats hadpersonal objectives which differed from those of both their political supervi-sors and the general public and which they furthered by use of their monopolypower.[4] Subsequent refinements of his argument sought to explain why gov-ernment budgets tend to grow very large year after year.[5]
Niskanen’s key legacy—orthodoxy in some quarters today—is theassumption that the public sector works better when based on market princi-ples, given that most public agencies are similar to monopolies in the privatesector in that they are subject to few incentives to make them more efficient.The extreme application of market-based prescriptions for reform based onsuch argumentation is privatization. Other examples of other Niskanensianideas on how the public sector can learn from the market include: the separa-tion of policymaking from policy implementation[6]; the movement towardsperformance-based public personnel compensation as well as the outright hir-ing of individuals from the private into the public sector[7]; creating “internalmarkets” within the public sector to mimic the incentive structure in the pri-vate sector[8]; “empowering” consumers of public services, for examplethrough vouchers.[9]
Another prominent market-based philosophical approach informing pub-lic management reform is one steeped more in institutional economics andtransaction cost theory. In general, it argues for several inter-related ideas:greater deregulation, devolution and decentralization in the public sector tocreate a more flexible government. Generally speaking, the underlying argu-ment here is that conventional public management is excessively hierarchicaland thus inefficient, with decision-making power inordinately located at thetop. To change that, more devolved responsibilities as well as finances tolower levels of government is prescribed.
To be sure, recommendations for more devolved and decentralized dis-pensations usually extend beyond public employees to encompass the publicespecially in the design and implementation of public programs.[10] Clients ofpublic programs are seen as having very little influence under traditionalbureaucratic structures. At times information technology is seen as one way offlattening the hierarchies in public bureaucracies and thus as a reform driver inits own right, the underlying argument being that information technologybreaks down economies of scale and expands the domain of markets whilereducing that of hierarchies.[11] In this context, the deregulation school’s mainaim is to either eliminate or overhaul many of the myriad rules and regulationsthat tend to accumulate over the years and which very often become quiteinhibitory to efficient and effective public management.[12] Typically, thefocus of reform is increasing managerial freedom through changes in the hir-ing, firing and compensation of public employees, the budget process, and theprocurement of goods and services for public bureaus.[13] In so doing, reformadvocates believe that public organizations will are capable of responding tochanges in the socio-economic environment.[14]
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Unlike the economics-based market ideas, are other prominent philo-sophical agents of public management reform that are more political andnormative. One such normative influence on public management thatprovides an alternative framework for reviewing the pattern of publicmanagement change outside the market-based paradigm primarily focuseson both the promotion of greater transparency and accountability in publicaffairs.[15]
Probably the most important initiatives here concern the promotion of oneor several of the following: support for independent media, promoting finan-cial disclosure by public officials, open budgeting processes, adequate andeffective internal control systems, suitable financial management systems, andfinancial and compliance reporting; support for the establishment of auditoffices, inspectors general offices, third party monitoring of government pro-curement processes, and anti-corruption agencies; the promotion of respon-sive, transparent, and accountable legislatures that ensure legislative oversightand whistle-blower protection; and the promotion of judicial reforms thatcriminalize corruption and promoting law enforcement that prosecutes corrup-tion.[16] The value of transparency is seen as leading to more accountabilityand trust, and in turn, to greater freedom.
Another more normative idea often advanced to reform public manage-ment relates to the need to transform the culture and values of public adminis-tration systems, especially as those systems find themselves at crossroads in arapidly changing world. During much of the last quarter century, the publicsector throughout much of the liberal democracies around the world as well asin much of the developing world was buffeted by successive and overlappingwaves of change—fiscal pressures, demographic changes, multiculturalism,technological and economic changes—and most provocatively a dislocationof many of the relationships and expectations that previously linked citizenswith their governments.[17] These changes and governments’ response to themhighlighted the need for reform programs to rebuild public sectors from theinside out, especially revising the ethical foundations and values that grounddemocratic government and public service.
To the extent that the various drivers of change provide alternative frame-works for reviewing recent public management reforms, we should find evi-dence of their influences on public management practice in various nationalcontexts, including Thailand. First though, we will briefly examine the coun-try’s recent public sector reform efforts in the section below.
CONTEXT OF STUDY: THAILAND’S RECENT PUBLIC SECTOR REFORM EFFORTS
Thailand’s political Thailand’s bureaucracy in much of the last century servedas the bedrock of stability for the state, especially in contrast to (or perhaps, as
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Public Management Reform Drivers in Thailand 1087
a result of) the unstable and usually short-lived political leadership.[18] Asmilitary coups and democratic experiments both brought into power andsubsequently disposed of various political factions, the highly centralizedbureaucracy served as an important stabilizing societal glue perhaps only sec-ond to the monarch.
Yet, even such a powerful bureaucracy with its traditional publicadministrative system had many major downsides. From a managerialpoint of viewpoint, it was exceedingly input-focused and control-oriented,resulting in some particularly debilitating effects on the performance ofgovernment agencies especially in terms of efficiency and responsivenessto the needs of the general public. The system was overly centralized, itscivil servants increasingly underpaid although quite well-trained; hadexcessive and unnecessary regulation and; generally lacked participatorymechanisms for not only the general public, but also for many of the itsrank and file. By the late 1980s, it had become clear that the system of pub-lic management had become increasingly unsuitable to the environment ofrapid private sector-led double-digit economic growth, necessitating majorreforms.
To be sure, Thailand has a long history of efforts to reform its publicadministration going all the way back to the reign of King Chulalongkorn orRama IV (1868–1910) who was the very first of Thailand’s modern leaders tomake a concerted effort at revamping the overall system. In the period since,particularly after the abolition of the absolute monarchy in 1932, public man-agement reforms of one kind or the other have been important components inthe policy statements of almost all subsequent governments. Typically, thereform efforts were initiated by establishing an oversight committee called thePublic Service Reform Committee, usually chaired by a Deputy Prime Minis-ter in charge, with the Office of the Civil Service Commission (OCSC) serv-ing as Secretariat and a Deputy Secretary-General to the OCSC acting asSecretary to the Committee.[19]
The first such commission, dubbed the Advisory Committee on Manage-ment Regulation and Public Sector Organization (Kana Tee Pruksa RabiebBoriharn Lae Ongkarn Khong Rat), was created in 1959 under the GeneralSarit’s premiership. By 1980 there had been eleven such committees, five ofthem created under Prem Tinsulanonda’s premiership alone.[20] Commission-ers, whose role was to advise on reform in specific areas (usually major legis-lation on manpower and organizational restructuring and design), often lackeda consistent vision of the whole picture and were usually connected to theexisting government. The lack of an articulated vision and strategic approachresulted in contradictions and a lack of direction of the reform process, result-ing in turn into few significant improvements. Furthermore, not only did thevarious commissions’ lifespans usually last as long as their short-lived autho-rizing governments did, commissioners (who were civil servants) had toattend to their regular work.
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The origins of the current wave of public sector reforms—the subject ofthis article—are closely associated with the short-lived, but very influential pre-miership of the technocrat, Anand Panyarachun (1991–1992). Under govern-ment directive and with little fanfare, the Office of the Civil ServiceCommission (OCSC) launched a major initiative intended to restructure the sizeof government organizations as well as to improve the morale of civil servants.Subsequent administrations, including Chuan Leepkai’s first term (1992–1995)as well as Chavalit Yongchaiyudh’s brief tenure (1996–1997), oversaw follow-up initiatives which were bent on revamping public management, with a partic-ular focus on updating civil service training and development, setting standardsfor downsizing and cost-containment in the public sector.
Reform efforts really gathered momentum, however, in the wake of theAsian economic crisis and the passage of the new Constitution, both of whichtook place in 1997. The financial crisis in particular, highlighted the need forbroad-based public sector reforms in Thailand in two major respects. First, thesudden end of Thailand’s boom raised questions of the fundamental compe-tence of the Government in managing economic affairs and, more broadly, inits ability to deliver services. After a decade of surpluses, the combination ofrecession-induced lower revenues, rising expenditures in response to thesocial needs of the crisis, and the public costs of restructuring the financialsystem created huge deficits that put the country’s public finances under seri-ous pressure.[21] Second, the reform agenda received renewed impetus withthe passage of the new constitution that specifically provided for increased cit-izen participation, enhanced transparency and decentralization.[22]
The second Chuan Administration (1997–2001) responded to these pres-sures by launching an ambitious program to reform public management pri-marily aimed at a more performance-oriented financial and human resourcesystem, a more flexible and effective civil service, and greater transparency atall levels of the vast bureaucracy. The reform efforts, co-financed in part bymultilateral institutions and bilateral donors, targeted not only the govern-ment’s central agencies, but also line ministries particularly those of healthand education to commerce.
The latest, and in what may turn out in some respects to be the boldest,initiative to shake up the Thai bureaucracy since King Chulalongkorn’s, aretwo pieces of legislation promulgated with much fanfare in October 2002: theMinisterial Restructuring Act and the Public Administration Act. The Acts,largely focused on organizational restructuring of the vast bureaucracy, cre-ated among other things, six new ministries and many more departments pur-portedly to make the bureaucracy better able to respond to the people’s needs,while also streamlining the operations of government agencies, and accelerat-ing national development in a holistic manner.[23]
Table 1 below, summarizes the major public management reform pro-grams as well as the some of the key reform areas under the several recentThai prime ministers.
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Tab
le 1
.M
ajor
Pub
lic M
anag
emen
t Ref
orm
Pro
gram
s in
Tha
iland
: 199
0–20
02
Prem
ier
and
Gov
ernm
ent T
ype
Key
Law
s an
d L
egis
latio
nSt
ated
Aim
s an
d M
ajor
Ref
orm
Dir
ectio
ns
Ann
and
Pany
arac
hun
(199
1–19
92)
Tec
hnoc
rati
c/A
utho
rita
rian
–C
ivil
Serv
ice
Ref
orm
an
d D
evel
opm
ent
Proj
ect (
1991
)
–ci
vil s
ervi
ce m
oder
niza
tion
and
effi
cien
cy im
prov
emen
ts th
roug
h (i
) re
stru
ctur
ing
gove
rnm
ent o
rgan
izat
ions
and
pub
lic p
erso
nnel
con
tain
men
t, (i
i) c
ivil
serv
ice
wor
kloa
d si
mpl
ific
atio
n an
d gr
eate
r ut
iliza
tion
of in
form
atio
n te
chno
logy
and
(iii
) pu
blic
ser
vice
s en
d-us
er e
nhan
cem
ents
;–
impr
ovin
g qu
ality
and
eth
ical
val
ues
of c
ivil
serv
ants
thro
ugh
(i)
targ
eted
per
sonn
el
recr
uitm
ent t
o at
trac
t mos
t com
pete
nt in
divi
dual
s; (
ii) d
evel
opm
ent o
f cl
eare
r an
d im
prov
ed c
aree
r ad
vanc
emen
t lad
der
base
d on
exp
ertis
e an
d pr
ofes
sion
al e
xper
ienc
e,
(iii)
enh
ance
men
t of p
robi
ty a
nd lo
yalty
with
in th
e ci
vil s
ervi
ce; a
nd (
4) c
ompe
nsat
ion
refo
rm li
nked
to p
ositi
on c
lass
ific
atio
n an
d na
ture
of
wor
k.C
huan
Lee
pkai
I
(199
2–19
95)
–C
ivil
Serv
ice
Act
(1
992)
am
endm
ent
–st
anda
rds
for
publ
ic s
ecto
r pe
rson
nel d
owns
izin
g an
d pu
blic
sec
tor
expe
nditu
re c
ost
cont
ainm
ent;
Dem
ocra
tic
Coa
liti
on/
Con
sens
us-b
ased
–M
anag
emen
t of C
hang
e in
the
Tha
i Civ
il Se
rvic
e (1
994)
–ch
angi
ng ro
le o
f gov
ernm
ent r
ole
from
trad
ition
al o
ne o
f im
plem
enta
tion,
con
trol
, and
op
erat
ion
to th
at o
f po
licy
mak
ing,
fac
ilita
tion,
and
mon
itori
ng.
–re
view
of
basi
c st
ruct
ure
and
resp
onsi
bilit
ies
of g
over
nmen
t age
ncie
s to
str
eam
line
and
rest
ruct
ure
them
;–
intr
oduc
tion
of in
cent
ives
to im
prov
e an
d m
onito
r ci
vil s
erva
nts’
wor
k pe
rfor
man
ce,
and
prom
otio
n of
app
licat
ion
of th
e pr
inci
ples
of
cust
omer
ser
vice
and
ori
enta
tion.
–Pr
opos
als
to (
i) e
stab
lish
adm
inis
trat
ive
Cou
rt; (
ii) a
men
d an
d tig
hten
law
s on
ant
i-co
rrup
tion;
(iii
) de
cent
raliz
e m
anag
emen
t fun
ctio
ns a
nd a
utho
rity
; (iv
) im
prov
e ef
fici
ency
of
polic
e; a
nd (
v) r
estr
uctu
re p
ublic
pro
secu
tor
offi
ce.
–S
alar
y an
d P
ositi
on
Allo
wan
ce A
ct (
1995
)
(Con
tinu
ed)
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Tab
le 1
.(C
onti
nued
)
Prem
ier
and
Gov
ernm
ent T
ype
Key
Law
s an
d L
egis
latio
nSt
ated
Aim
s an
d M
ajor
Ref
orm
Dir
ectio
ns
Ban
harn
Sila
paar
cha
(199
5–19
96)
–C
ontr
actin
g-ou
t of
publ
ic s
ecto
r w
ork
to p
riva
te s
ecto
r
Dem
ocra
tic
Coa
liti
on/
Con
sens
us-b
ased
–B
ette
r pu
blic
ser
vice
del
iver
y th
roug
h se
rvic
e de
liver
y gu
idel
ines
for
dep
artm
ents
–In
trod
uctio
n of
res
ult-
base
d m
anag
emen
t pilo
t pro
ject
s in
Dep
t. of
Agr
icul
tura
l E
xten
sion
(19
95–1
996)
and
Dep
t. of
Loc
al A
dmin
istr
atio
n (1
995–
1996
) [l
ater
fo
llow
ed b
y D
ept.
of I
ndus
try
Pro
mot
ion
(199
6 –
1997
); T
hai I
ndus
tria
l Sta
ndar
ds
Inst
itut
e (1
996–
1998
); a
nd S
ocia
l Sec
urit
y O
ffic
e (1
996–
1999
)].
Chu
an L
eepk
ai I
I (1
997–
2001
)D
emoc
rati
c C
oali
tion
/C
onse
nsus
-bas
ed
–P
ublic
Org
aniz
atio
n A
ct
(199
9)–
revi
sion
of
role
s, f
unct
ions
and
man
agem
ent o
f pu
blic
sec
tor
orga
niza
tions
(lim
iting
go
vern
men
t age
ncy
func
tions
to e
ssen
tial c
ore
activ
ities
and
est
ablis
h ef
fect
ive
stra
tegi
c pl
anni
ng a
nd r
esul
ts-b
ased
app
roac
hes)
–O
ffic
ial I
nfor
mat
ion
Act
(19
99)
–bu
dget
, fin
ance
, and
pub
lic p
rocu
rem
ent r
efor
m (
revi
se b
udge
t sys
tem
s, g
ive
grea
ter
flex
ibili
ty to
pub
lic a
genc
ies;
dev
olve
res
pons
ibili
ty f
or b
udge
t man
agem
ent;
impr
ove
acco
unta
bilit
y an
d co
ntro
ls in
age
ncie
s; e
stab
lish
mor
e co
st e
ffec
tive
proc
urem
ent
arra
ngem
ents
)–
Reg
ulat
ion
of th
e O
ffic
e of
the
Pri
me
Min
iste
r on
Goo
d G
over
nanc
e (1
999)
–Fr
eeze
on
crea
tion
of n
ew d
istr
icts
and
sub
-dis
tric
ts–
pers
onne
l man
agem
ent r
efor
m (
revi
se c
lass
ific
atio
n re
mun
erat
ion
and
appr
aisa
l sy
stem
s; c
reat
e se
nior
exe
cutiv
e se
rvic
e (2
000)
, cha
nge
wor
k co
nditi
ons;
‘ri
ght-
size
’ w
orkf
orce
thro
ugh
hiri
ng f
reez
es a
nd e
arly
ret
irem
ent (
1999
–200
0), i
mpr
ove
recr
uitm
ent a
nd te
rmin
atio
n ar
rang
emen
ts)
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–le
gal r
efor
m (
mak
e ex
istin
g la
ws
easi
er to
inte
rpre
t, im
prov
e sp
eed
and
effi
cien
cy f
or
draf
ting
and
enac
ting
law
s, r
emov
e lo
opho
les
and
unne
cess
ary
regu
latio
n); a
nd–
refo
rm o
f cu
lture
and
val
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ublic
sec
tor
(est
ablis
h se
t of
valu
es a
nd c
ode
of e
thic
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t off
icia
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titud
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t cor
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pro
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to e
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l exa
mpl
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999)
)T
haks
in S
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ra
(200
1–20
06)
Dem
ocra
tic/
Pop
ulis
t
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inis
teri
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estr
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r-in
g A
ct (
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200
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cy im
prov
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ts a
nd f
oste
ring
goo
d go
vern
ance
thro
ugh
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rest
ruct
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g of
go
vern
men
t min
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to e
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tion
in d
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ing;
(iii
) im
prov
ing
qual
ity o
f pu
blic
ser
vice
s; (
iv)
conc
erte
d at
tem
pts
to c
oord
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ing
polit
ical
, pub
lic,
and
civ
ic s
ecto
rs to
war
ds th
e at
tain
men
t of
natio
nal g
oals
–P
ublic
Adm
inis
trat
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Act
(O
ctob
er 2
002)
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stab
lishm
ent o
f hi
gh-l
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Pub
lic S
ervi
ce D
evel
opm
ent C
omm
ittee
–H
R o
verh
aul i
nclu
ding
: sem
i-an
nual
per
form
ance
eva
luat
ion,
sal
ary
adju
stm
ent a
nd
bonu
s sy
stem
for
civ
il se
rvan
ts a
nd b
onus
sys
tem
(20
02);
and
fas
t-tr
ack
syst
em
(200
3); h
igh-
qual
ity r
ecru
itmen
t allo
win
g fo
r la
tera
l ent
ry f
rom
out
side
gov
ernm
ent
esp.
at s
enio
r le
vel;
–In
trod
uctio
n of
“C
EO
Gov
erno
r” (
2002
[an
d la
ter
“C
EO
Dip
lom
at”
] sc
hem
es to
en
hanc
e te
amw
ork
and
coor
dina
tion
betw
een
vari
ous
agen
cies
in p
rovi
nces
and
ov
erse
as m
issi
ons
and
polit
ical
lead
ersh
ip–
enha
nced
ant
i-co
rrup
tion
driv
es f
ocus
ing
on h
igh-
leve
l dis
mis
sals
–pr
omot
ion
of e
-gov
ernm
ent a
t all
leve
ls
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EVIDENCE—THAI PUBLIC SECTOR REFORM DRIVERS
Whereas the various schools of thought influencing public managementreform can be classified in any number of ways (e.g., internal vs. external,voluntary vs. coercive, etc.), we use the market vs. non-market dichotomy forour purposes in our bid to disaggregate the key reform drivers in the Thaicase. We realize that such a dichotomy is mostly an academic enterprise giventhe various factors are inter-linked and have blurring distinctions not quite fit-ting this taxonomy, but it assists in making our case. Also, given that theyshare common effects, drivers of reform are always difficult to disentanglefrom each other. The non-market reform drivers we focus on in this part aremeant to represent reform forces outside the economic and rational intellec-tual traditions. As observed by some scholars, public sector reforms are acombination of discourse and policies.[24] For the sake of brevity, we onlyconsider, and in general terms, the extent to which the various reform driversare evident in the Thai case.
As noted earlier, there are several drivers of public management reforms.In the case of Thailand, the little practitioner literature that exists has tended tomostly ascribe the country’s reforms efforts to market-based factors includingbeyond fiscal stress, government deficits and international pressure to change(see, for example, Asian Development Bank 1999, World Bank 1999).Because these factors have indeed been critical to the country’s reform effort,we briefly discuss them first below.
Market-Oriented Drivers
Thailand, like many other countries throughout the world, was greatly influ-enced by the impact of globalization and technological development espe-cially in the last quarter century. As economic processes and economicdevelopment within the country and in relations with other nations becamemore complex, so did the country’s social and political processes. The compe-tition for international investment and economic growth in particular,increased external pressures for bureaucratic reform as Thailand’s traditionaladministrative mechanisms were increasingly ill-equipped to handle thenational and world situation.[25]
Besides the problems of overstaffing, duplication, and excessive central-ization, for example, civil servants were bogged down by antiquated workpractices, long lead times to decision-making, and predilection for graft, alack of response to and accountability for the public, and a strong drift of themost capable people out of the service into the private sector.[26] Indeed, theinadequate compensation for public sector employees in general, and for themore senior levels in particular, when compared to remuneration attainable inthe private sector, had a demoralizing effect and was one cause of ineffective
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performance by civil servants. In addition, a rapid increase in the number ofgovernment employees, partly as ad hoc responses to the external pressuresdescribed above required increasing proportions of public expenditures forpersonnel costs to as high as 45 percent.[27]
Public management reforms were thus necessary to both bring the coun-try to the stage where it could compete with others, and also to keep it there.Following the 1997 economic crisis unfolded and the subsequent deficits thataccompanied it unfolded, the Thai bureaucracy was ripe for reform. The rapidaccumulation of public debt to cover the burgeoning deficits for example,required better financial management to do more with less—a requirementthat opened the window for overcoming several institutional weaknesses andimproving the performance of the public sector by allowing several funda-mental reforms. These included the privatization of a number of state enter-prises; reforms in the central bank; legislation to corporatize many stateenterprises and the creation of autonomous public organizations; and variousprojects aimed at strengthening the capability of the civil service, budgetingand financial management; and even the streamlining of the way the cabinetworked. Many of these reforms got their imprimatur in May 1999 when theCabinet adopted a Public Sector Management Reform Plan that provided thegovernment’s vision for institutional change and were buttressed by externalpressure from bilateral and multilateral donors as well as the investmentcommunity.
The Ministerial Restructuring Act (2002) as well as the Public Adminis-tration Act (2002) are also largely grounded in the reduction of inefficiency,high transaction costs as well as in other mostly market considerations. Forexample, the stated rationale of creating six new ministries in the former Actwas to eliminate functional overlaps among several agencies in the key areasof water, energy, environment and natural resources which had resulted in theabsence of ownership and culpability.
Prior to these Acts, five to six ministries were normally involved in eachof those issue areas. Likewise, the government’s plan to create “clusters” orgroups of related departments within each ministry were, at least in theory,aimed at promoting policy coordination and doing away with the silo-mentalitycommon in Thai departments. Thus, for example, the natural revenue clusterwithin the Finance Ministry would include the departments of Revenue,Excise, and Customs—previously almost completely autonomously run fromeach other and often resulting in incoherent and fragmented policy at the minis-terial level. Similarly, the 2002 changes in civil servants’ performance evalua-tion salary adjustments in the latter Act were meant to give added incentivesto otherwise poorly paid bureaucrats.
With regards to reforms to decentralize responsibilities and finances fromthe central government to subnational governments that took off in the latterhalf of the 1990s, they are generally attributed to former Prime MinisterChuan Leepkai’s first administration (1992–1995).[28] An abortive crackdown
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on pro-democracy demonstrators in 1992 had not only helped concretize theexpectations of the general population regarding political and economicreform, but had also compelled almost all the major parties in the 1992national election campaign to embrace electoral platforms promising toadvance decentralization through local elections and subnational fiscalautonomy.[29]
Another reason that compelled the then government to begin a reexami-nation of the relationship between the central and subnational governmentswas the recognition by the country’s leaders that the central government couldnot solve the various problems of provincial Thailand without substantialalteration of central-local relations. In particular, central government politi-cians recognized that the ability of subnational governments to deliver ser-vices both effectively and efficiently would at the very least require afundamental rethinking of the problems facing local governments. Thai localgovernments had long faced a multiplicity of problems: inadequacy of reve-nue, low popular support and participation, internal conflicts within thebureaucracy, poor cooperation with external agencies, weak and inadequateauthority to perform functions, and unsuitability of administrative structures.
So, in December 1992, the Chuan government established a committee toreview the subnational government system and to recommend reforms withthe ultimate aim of increasing the efficiency and capacity of local governmentunits in the changing environment. Two years later in 1994, the governmentinaugurated the most far-reaching proposals for local self-government reformthan had ever been proposed in Thailand including the Tambon Council andTambon Administration Organization Act.[30]
Ultimately, it was the 1997 Constitution that catalyzed the various eco-nomic and market-based reform drivers. Pressures of globalization, particu-larly international capital markets highlighted the need for the Thaibureaucracy to be more innovative, rational, productive and efficient. In addi-tion, various interests including business and civic associations pressed hardfor change, as did various multilateral agencies and bilateral donors who usedtheir financial muscle as leverage to push for public management reform.
Normative Drivers
In addition to the economics and market-based drivers above, several othersrooted mostly in normative values, can be said to inform Thailand’s publicmanagement reforms. In particular, the need for a more open, more account-able, more transparent, and more participatory management of public affairscombined to highlight the necessity of transforming the culture and values ofThai public officialdom.
The Thai bureaucracy has long been plagued by a lack of transparencyand accountability, breeding in turn, unrelenting corruption and lethargy.[31]
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This is in part due to a legal system allows the country’s centralized bureau-cracy to own and exploit public resources with few restrictions thus generatingnumerous opportunities for graft.[32] Such a system, largely non-transparentand with obsolete laws and regulations, generally lacks adequate monitoringand control mechanisms.
Thailand’s rapid economic development during the two decades beforethe 1990s, as well as the concomitant spread of democratic ideas and idealsinto much of the country meant that much of the citizenry had became morekeenly aware of what they saw as their rights and freedoms.[33] The twinforces of democratization and globalization particularly encouraged ordinarycitizens to increasingly demand of their government as well as its bureaucracyto be more transparent and accountable to them as opposed to the whims ofvested interests.
A corollary normative influence on public management reform in Thai-land from rising expectations of a more accountable and transparent publicadministrative system was the demand by citizens for greater participation inall aspects of public affairs. A key to understanding such demands lies in thecountry’s institutional arrangements for much of the 20th century. When, in1932, the absolute monarchy was put an end, the country’s basic institutionsdid not undergo any fundamental change except to substitute the rule of themonarch for that of a bureaucratic and military elite.[34] As had been the caseprior to 1932, most matters on public affairs was all still centered in Bangkokall through some 53 or so governments prior to 1997. The majority of publicsector employees at the various levels of government for example, were eitherappointed from, or posted by the center.
By the early 1990s, provincial citizens were demanding greater participa-tion in the affairs of government, as well as quality public goods and services.Similar demands for a more participatory dispensation were even more effec-tive in Bangkok-based pro-democracy groups such as the Confederation ofDemocracy Movements and the Committee for the Promotion of Democracyfor example, were also lending their support to Thais elsewhere who alsowanted help the spread of more democratic and participatory ideas into boththe ordinary population as well as in public administration. By the early1990s, Thai politicians from across the ideological divide recognized that theprestige of the bureaucracy had declined so much over the years that majorreforms were inevitable.[35]
Market and Non-Market Drivers
The demands for an open, accountable, transparent and participatory publicmanagement system along with a public management system that was bothhighly centralized and inefficient combined to highlight the necessity of trans-forming the culture and values of Thai public service.
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To be sure, researchers had long observed that the Thai bureaucracy wasnot particularly characterized by productivity, rationality, accountability,transparency, participation, innovation, or efficiency.[36] Several valueswhich, though not immutable, have had impressive stability and persistence inthe Thai bureaucracy over time: the excessive valuing of hierarchical status;the excessive reliance on personal relationships as opposed to formal rules andregulations as the primary bases of behaviour within the system; and the largerthan expected desire to preserve membership in the service in part due to theless attractive alternatives outside the bureaucracy.[37] It is thus unsurprisingthat insidious rent-seeking and various forms of opportunistic behaviourthrived in such a personalized and opaque system.[38]
By the mid-1990s, reform advocates both within and outside governmentrealized the need to overhaul of Thailand’s public administrative system forone that was not only more efficient and less bureaucratic, but one that wasalso more transparent, accountable, and clean. Later that decade, Thailand didfinally embark on an ambitious public sector reform effort, much which is stillunderway and changing. Driving those reforms were a combination of bothmarket and non-market reasons. In addition to global trends largely based oneconomic principles as well as other economics-based considerations internalto Thailand, there were other equally important reform drivers that were morenormative in nature, including among others, the demand for greater transpar-ency and participation in the management of Thai public affairs. Taking apartthe various reform drivers is important for a more complete appreciation ofthe country’s public management reform efforts.
CONCLUSIONS
Various factors influence any public management reform program. Oftentimes however, the genesis of these reforms is interpreted narrowly highlight-ing mostly the efficiency and market-based factors even though other reasonsoutside this paradigm are also important agents of change.
This article examined some of the underlying reasons for Thailand’sefforts at public management reform starting around the mid-1990s andattempted to highlight both market and non-market drivers. Evidence of theinfluences of normative drivers on the country’s public management reform isexamined. Whereas reform drivers are difficult to separate from each other asthey tend to share common effects, we find that several factors of reform out-side the dominant economics and market-based paradigm were also influen-tial, even though they may not have been dominant.
The Thai bureaucracy has long exhibited symptoms of poor public man-agement: a highly-centralized and opaque system with little participatorymechanisms; widespread citizen dissatisfaction with quality of service deliv-ery; and a general lack of productivity, rationality, innovation, and efficiency
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in the bureaucracy due in part to poorly trained, underpaid and unresponsivecivil servants as well as excessive and unnecessary regulation—with the asso-ciated opportunities for rent-seeking. These problems accumulated until, inthe mid-1990s, significant pressure was brought to bear on the government tostreamline, modernize and improve its administrative system to contend withthe challenges and demands of a frenetically growing economy, a rapidlyexpanding private sector, and greater expectations by the populace for notonly efficient public services, but also for a more open and accountable sys-tem of public administration in general.
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administration for the combined central and sub-national governments;The Government Restructuring Act of 1991 (last amended in 2001) whichdelineates the structure and operations of government organizations; andthe Civil Service Act of 1928 (last amended in 1992) which describes therights and responsibilities of civil servants.
20. After 1980, the committees took on different names including, “Commit-tee on Bureaucratic Reform and Public Administration,” “Committee onPublic Administration Development,” and “Bureaucratic ReformCommittee.”
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22. For example, sections 56 and 57 of that constitution established indepen-dent organizations on environment and consumer protection; section 230which gave the executive more flexibility to establish government agen-cies and/or the transfer of functions from them through royal decrees asopposed to the usually long and tedious legislative process (so long asincreases in personnel met certain conditions). See in this regard, Con-nors, M.K. Political Reform and the State in Thailand. Journal of Con-temporary Asia 1999, 29 (2), 202–226; Klein, J.R. The evolution ofThailand’s Human Rights Commission 1992–2001. In Thailand’s NewPolitics: KPI Yearbook 2001; M. Nelson, ed.; King Prajadhipok Instituteand White Lotus Press: Bangkok, 2002; 25–65; Prudhisan Jumbala Thai-land: Constitutional Reform Amidst Economic Crisis. Southeast AsianAffairs 1998, 265–291; World Bank. Report and Recommendation of thePresident of the IBRD to the Executive Directors on a Proposed PublicSector Reform Loan (Grey cover P-7335-TH) International Bank forReconstruction and Development (IBRD): Washington, DC, 1999.
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24. Kaufman, H. Time, Chance, and Organizations: Natural Selection in aPerilous Environment; Chatham House: Chatham, N.J., 1985; Barley, S.;
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Kunda, G. Design and Devolution: Surges of Rational and NormativeIdeologies of Control in Managerial Discourse. Administrative ScienceQuarterly 1992, 37 (3), 369–399.
25. World Bank. Report and Recommendation of the President of the IBRDto the Executive Directors on a Proposed Public Sector Reform Loan(Grey cover P-7335-TH) International Bank for Reconstruction andDevelopment (IBRD): Washington, DC, 1999.
26. Asian Development Bank. Governance in Thailand: Challenges, Issues,and Prospects. Programs Department (West), Division III and Strategyand Policy Office: Manilla, Philippines, 1999; Bowornwathana, B.Responses of [the] public administration system of Thailand to globalchallenges. In Globalization and the ASEAN Public Sector; Salleh, S. H.and Carino, L. V., eds.; Asian and Pacific Development Center: KualaLumpur, 1995; 365–430; Bowornwathana, B. Transforming Bureaucra-cies for the 21st Century: The New Democratic Governance Paradigm.Public Administration Quarterly 1997, 21 (3), 294–308.
27. Chuan Leepkai. Speech on Government’s Public Sector Reform Program,Santi Maitri Hall, Government House, Bangkok; Public Relations Depart-ment, Office of the Prime Minister.
28. Some have suggested that decentralization can be said to go back to as faras the 1953 when the central government transferred some functions andduties to subnational government by amending the Municipal Act of1933. See in this regard, Likhit, D. The Bureaucratic Elite of Thailand: AStudy of Their Sociological Attributes, Educational Backgrounds andCareer Advancement Pattern; Thai Khadi Research Institute ThammasatUniversity: Bangkok, 1978.
29. For example, the Phalang Dharma Party and the Solidarity Party bothunreservedly endorsed to introduce local elections of provincial gover-nors. The Democratic Party and the New Aspiration Party also pledgedthemselves to decentralization programs although not as ambitious as theformer two.
30. The Act aimed to decentralize administrative power to local people and torevitalize the people’s participation in community development affairs,while at the same time also decentralizing decision-making power to peo-ple at the Tambon and village levels.
31. See, in this regard, Asian Development Bank, 1999; Likhit, D., 1972;Riggs, 1966; Siffin, 1966.
32. Pasuk P.; Sangsit, P. Corruption and Democracy in Thailand; PoliticalEconomy Centre Faculty of Economics Chulalongkorn University:Bangkok, 1994; Xuto, S. Government and Politics of Thailand; OxfordUniversity Press: Singapore, New York, 1987.
33. Phatharathanunth, S. Civil society and democratization in Thailand: Acritique of elite democracy. In Reforming Thai Politics; McCargo, D.,Ed.; Nordic Institute of Asian Studies: Copenhagen, Denmark, 2002;
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125–142; Pasuk Phongphaichit; Baker, C.J. Power in transition: Thailandin the 1990s. In Political Change in Thailand: Democracy and Participa-tion; Hewison, K., Ed.; Routledge: London, New York, 1997; 21–41;Thabchumpon, N. NGOs and grassroots participation in the politicalreform process. In Reforming Thai Politics; McCargo, D., Ed.; NordicInstitute of Asian Studies: Copenhagen, Denmark, 2002; 183–199.
34. Pasuk P.; Baker, C.J. Thailand, Economy and Politics; Oxford UniversityPress: Oxford; New York, 2002; Siffin, 1966; Xuto, 1987.
35. Hewison, 1997; Phatharathanunth 2002; Pasuk and Baker, 1997; Thab-chumpon, 2002.
36. See for example, Pasuk and Sangsit, 1994; Riggs, 1966; Siffin, 1966;Suwanagul, K. The Civil Service of Thailand. Ph.D. dissertation, NewYork University, 1962.
37. Likhit 1978; Office of the Civil Service Commission (OCSC). CreatingClean, Transparent and Accountable Public Service Through a Partner-ship Approach. Paper presented at the ASEAN Conference on Civil Ser-vice Matters, Hanoi, Vietnam, October 16–18, 1994; Siffin, 1966;Thinapan, N. Bureaucratic Corruption in Thailand: IncongruitiesBetween Legal Codes and Social Norms. Monograph on Public Adminis-tration [#26]. Bangkok: National Institute of Development Administra-tion, Bangkok, Thailand, 1977.
38. Nattakrit, T. Corruption and Thailand’s Economic and Political Develop-ment. LL.M. thesis, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1996.
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