Puliti Affair

The Puliti Affair and the 1924 ParisOlympics: Geo-Political Issues, NationalPride and Fencing TraditionsThierry Terret, Cecile Ottogalli-Mazzacavallo andJean Saint-Martin

During the Paris Olympic Games of July 1924, there were a series of ‘incidents’ in the

fencing competition that became known as the Puliti affair. At the centre of the troubleswas the Italian Oreste Puliti. The ‘affair’ had to be discussed by the ‘jury d’honneur’recently set up by the IOC. Both the IOC and the International Federation were

concerned with this issue for four more years. This article uses the Puliti affair to discussseveral aspects of nationalism in the mid-1920s: the growing tensions between Fascist

Italy and democracies such as Hungary and France, the specific Olympic status of fencingchallenged in Paris after three centuries of confrontation between the French and Italian

schools of fencing, and ongoing tensions between the IOC and the internationalfederations. Finally, the press perceptions of the incident in various countries are briefly

discussed.

During the 1920s, the need to reconstruct Europe stimulated a growing nationalismin the countries, which had been particularly involved in the First World War. [1]International sports competitions, [2] including the Olympic Games which,

according to Alfred E. Senn, were still in their ‘formative years’, played a role inthis process. [3] During the eighth Olympic Games, which took place in Paris

between 5 and 27 July 1924, some sports were more closely tied to national culturesthan others, and thus had greater power to rouse patriotic feelings. In fencing, for

instance, the weight of national heritage characterized countries such as Italy,Hungary and France. For centuries, these three countries had developed rival schools

of masters and specific techniques; sport was merely a new field to assert theirsupremacy.

Thierry Terret, Cecile Ottogalli-Mazzacavallo and Jean Saint-Martin, University of Lyon, France.Correspondence to: [email protected]

The International Journal of the History of SportVol. 24, No. 10, October 2007, 1281 – 1301

ISSN 0952-3367 (print)/ISSN 1743-9035 (online) � 2007 Taylor & FrancisDOI: 10.1080/09523360701505429

In this context, various unpleasant incidents occurred during the Olympic fencingtournament of 1924. The first took place on 30 June, during the final round-robin

pool in the team foil event between France and Italy. The referee awarded a point tothe Frenchman Lucien Gaudin – but the point was claimed by the Italian Aldo Boni,

cheered on by the frenzied Italian spectators. When the referee held to his decision, theItalian team left in a huff to the sound of the Fascist hymn rising from the bleachers.

The whole team were disqualified, and when they refused to apologize officially, theywere scratched from the individual foil event scheduled for the next day.

The hostile atmosphere continued during the other events, and reached its climaxa few days later during the individual sabre event, in what the 22 July issue of TheTimes described as ‘Italian violence’. The focus of the conflict was Oreste Puliti, the

leading Italian fencer, who was disqualified by one of the Hungarian judges, Georgesde Kovacs. [4] The protagonists took the whole thing very seriously, turning to the

IOC’s recently set-up jury d’honneur. The international Fencing Federation alsostepped in, further complicating diplomatic relations, and the ‘Puliti Affair’ was not

settled until 1928.In this article, the Puliti Affair is used to analyse several aspects of nationalism in

sport during the immediate post-war period. [5] First, the affair must be placed in itspolitical context at a time when Italian society was moving towards Fascism. Second,

the specific nature of fencing as a traditionally ‘national’ sport must be addressed for abetter understanding of certain underlying issues. Third, the IOC’s position wasrevelatory of the tensions between it and the international federations, and of the

difficulty of finding a diplomatic balance in view of the individual national attitudesinvolved. Finally, the Puliti affair involved ‘men of honour’, for whom values of class

and masculinity were crucial: their behaviour illustrates how strongly sport was linkedto gender and culture in the making of Europe at the beginning of the 1920s. [6]

It was precisely in response to nationalistic tensions and ‘incidents’ at the 1920Olympic Games that the British proposed solutions to curb unsportsmanlike

conduct, including violence, among contestants, leading to the IOC discussing thesubject in 1923. [7] A proposal to appoint the IOC executive committee as a juryd’honneur was put forward. [8] The name chosen for this new structure was

obviously rooted in the code of chivalry shared by the IOC aristocratic members. Thejury d’honneur was created, first and foremost, to provide an administrative

framework for settling all non-technical structural disputes. [9] It complemented thejuries proposed by the international federations, namely the field juries that refereed

and managed the events themselves and the juries of appeal for each discipline thatruled on any technical components or sporting matters that the field jury was unable

to deal with. [10]The Swiss citizen Godefroy de Blonay presided over the IOC executive committee

from 1921 to 1925, with the Belgian Henri de Baillet-Latour as vice-president. Theother members were Pierre de Coubertin and the Marquis Melchior de Polignac fromFrance, Sigfied Edstrom from Sweden and Jiri Guth-Jarkowsky from Czechoslovakia,

who gave up his seat to Reginald Kentish (Great Britain) for the 1924 games. In their

1282 T. Terret et al.

capacity as jury d’honneur, these six people had to settle the most serious disputes thatoccurred during those Parisian events. Some complaints emanated from the boxing

and athletic events, but it was fencing that required most of the jury’s energy,especially from 1924 to 1927 in what the committee called ‘the Puliti affair’. The aim

of this article is to analyse both the political and the cultural faces of nationalismwhich were reflected in this affair. However, complicating this first and central

analytical level were others, in which sport institutions on the one hand and theofficer’s code of honour on the other were involved. But before analysing them, let

examine the facts.

The Puliti Affair in Four Acts

Act One: Colombes, 16 July 1924

The preliminaries for the individual sabre events took place on 16 July. Out of the 47

contestants in the running, 28 qualified for the semifinals on the same day. TheItalian Puliti and the Frenchman Ducret performed particularly brilliantly that day.

The mood was tense. As the spectators and contestants were leaving the Colombesstadium to go back to Paris, an altercation broke out. One of the Hungarian fencers,

Alexandre (Sandor) Posta (the future Olympic champion in that event), overheard anexchange between Puliti and Santelli about the refereeing of his countryman qualifiedfor the semi-finals, which took place that same day. Twelve qualified for the final held

the following day. The Italian Puliti and the Frenchman Ducret performedparticularly brilliantly Kovacs. [11] Posta intervened, and the incident degenerated

rapidly into insults and threats.The molehill started to grow into a mountain the next day when Jules de Musza,

co-president of the Hungarian Olympic Committee and an IOC member, officiallynotified Pierre de Coubertin. [12] In his letter, he reported the scene in which the

Hungarian fencers saw their teammate Posta and his wife shouted at by ‘30 or 40Olympic contestants of Italian nationality’. He also said that the Italians had insultedall the Hungarian fencers who, because they were all officers, now had an obligation

to defend their honour once they returned to Hungary. He spoke of the ‘noblecharacter of the Olympic Games’, the ‘mutual loyalty of nations’ and ‘the interest of

the Hungarian contestants’ good name’, and officially called for the IOC executivecommittee to settle the matter in its capacity as jury d’honneur.

Act Two: Colombes, 17 July

The final took place on 17 July, in an atmosphere that was even more charged than

the day before. Of the 12 qualifying fencers, four were Italian. [13] According totradition, they fenced first. [14] As they did, it became obvious that Bertinetti,Sarrochi and Bini were not taking the offensive with their best contender, Puliti, who

came out of these bouts unfatigued and with a number of hits in his favour that was

The Puliti Affair and the 1924 Paris Olympics 1283

above the average. The jury president, Frenchman Adrien Lajoux, denounced themanoeuvre – forbidden by the rules – and the Hungarian judge, Kovacs, threatened

to withdraw if nothing were done about it. [15] Puliti then allegedly made somethreatening remarks against Kovacs, [16] which were overheard by Santelli, who

immediately informed the Hungarian. Kovacs lodged a complaint, leading to ameeting of the jury of appeal, presided over by Georges Van Rossem. The members

included the Hungarian marquis Pallavicini and the Frenchman Rene Lacroix. Afterdeliberating several hours on the two accusations levelled against the Italian (the

cheating and the threats), the jury finally decided to exclude Puliti from theindividual sabre events. Out of solidarity, the other Italians withdrew. [17] The jurythen decided to ignore the bouts completed thus far and to schedule a new final for

the remaining eight contenders the next day, 18 July, at nine o’clock in the morning.[18]

The Italians’ official reaction to Puliti’s disqualification was rapid. Before the newfinal could take place, Count Alberto Bonacossa wrote a letter in the name of the

Italian Olympic Committee to the president of the French Olympic Committee,Count de Clary, in very ‘diplomatic’ terms describing his own version of the events.

[19] As he saw it, Kovacs was the only one of the four judges to accuse the Italians ofcheating. And even though the field jury had not requested it, Bonacossa petitioned

the jury of appeal because he felt that its decision to start the event over again wasdebatable. According to him, the jury’s decision to exclude Puliti for threats wasbased on inaccurate information. He argued that during a discussion between Puliti

and Santelli about Kovacs’s attitude, Puliti apparently only said ‘If this goes on,things are going to come to a bad end’. [20] Bonacossa also stated that Sandor Posta,

the Hungarian witness to the discussion, did not speak Italian well enough to haveunderstood what was said and, furthermore, was too far away from the speakers to

have heard the exchange. Finally, in his opinion, the jury had been illegally set up anddid not even have the authority under the rules to exclude a contender! Emboldened

by his own attack, the delegate for the Italian Olympic Committee demanded that theexclusion be withdrawn.

Act Three: Folies Bergeres, 19 July

The day after the new final, Puliti and Kovacs happened to meet in front of thefamous Parisian cabaret, the Folies Bergeres. They had words and the exchange

became violent. Puliti struck Kovacs, and what had been no more than an incidentuntil then turned into a veritable ‘affair’. That same evening, Puliti described the

scene to two of his friends, Renato Anselmi and Marcello Garagnagi:

This evening I was involved in an incident with Mr Kovacs, a Hungarian jurymember who took a dislike to me during the matches I was competing in. Hishostility was clearly beyond the pale of even the most rudimentary good sportingmanners. Furthermore, the other jury members did not approve of his attitude, nor


did the jury of appeal, which ruled for my exclusion from the tournament onlyfollowing an incident that took place outside the Olympic meeting grounds. [21]

Puliti then described the altercation, defended his reaction as a man of honour and

asked his friends to be ready to serve as witnesses for the duel that would surely takeplace between himself and Kovacs:

I met Mr Kovach, who was accompanied by Mr Schenker, Mr Garay and threeother people. I myself was in the company of Mr Bini and Mr Anselmi. When Iaccosted him to demand an explanation, addressing him in Italian, a language thatMr Kovach has understood well enough on other occasions, I heard him answerthat he didn’t understand. I had my words translated into French, and when MrKovach did not deign to reply, I attacked him and slapped him. Mr Kovach retiredwithout making the slightest riposte, followed by his friends. I ask that you remainat my disposal to enter into communication with the representatives that MrKovach will be sending me, as is the custom among men of honour. [22]

Puliti was right: both he and Kovacs belonged to that fringe of the military

aristocracy for whom honour could not be compromised. Kovacs contacted twomembers of the Hungarian delegation, requesting that they ‘demand satisfaction’

from Puliti. In less diplomatic language, this meant informing the Italian that Kovacsaccepted his challenge. The demand for satisfaction was a dilemma for the twopotential witnesses, however, as they could not decide whether to consider the affair a

private one requiring settlement according to the code of honour – that is, a duelwith the offended one choosing the weapons to be used – or one in connection with

the Olympic fencing tournament and, therefore, to be settled by the Olympicauthorities. [23] The two Hungarians drafted a brief summary of the facts and

petitioned Jules de Musza, the president of their national Olympic committee tobring the matter before the IOC for an official decision as to its status. [24] All these

discussions took place on 20 July, and things moved very quickly because the missiveswere hand-delivered by messengers. That same day, Musza sent Coubertin a requestaccompanied by the two witnesses’ report. From then on, everyone waited for the

IOC’s decision on the matter – except for Puliti, who had already delayed hisdeparture and couldn’t wait any longer. He went back to Italy on the evening of 22

July. [25]

Final Act

The day before, however, on a train returning to Hungary, an argument broke outbetween Santelli and Colombetti, an Italian, during a stop at Turin. Colombetti

slapped Santelli and challenged him to a duel. [26] We don’t know if the duel evertook place between these two fencing masters. The dispute between Puliti andKovacs, however, did indeed lead to a duel in accordance with the code of honour.

The two men met at the Yugoslavian border in November 1924 for a sabre fight that


had nothing of a sporting event. After 30 attacks and an hour of relentless fightingthat left both adversaries seriously wounded, the duel was stopped by mutual

agreement and Puliti apologized to Kovacs for his violent conduct at the OlympicGames. [27] The honour of both men was intact and the Olympic authorities were

able to preserve appearances.

The Puliti Affair and the Jury D’honneur

Whether by design or chance, the IOC executive committee delivered its decision onthe matter referred to it by Jules de Musza just hours after Puliti’s departure. Thedelay was all the more opportune in that the IOC took a particularly firm stand.

Taking formal note of all the documents in the case and of the oath taken at theopening of the Olympic Games, the jury d’honneur reminded the national

committees of its request of October 1923 to keep nationalistic excesses undercontrol, [28] the text of which concluded with a pledge to impose sanctions on

anyone who failed to observe the sportsmanlike conduct expected in an Olympiccompetition. [29] This IOC request was even more significant in that the decision to

make it was concomitant with the decision to set up a jury d’honneur. [30] So theexecutive committee felt perfectly justified in taking a clear position against Puliti and

reprimanding the entire Italian team for his conduct. In its report, the committeeencouraged the international fencing federation (FIE) to go even further, stating thatthey:

declare Mr. Oreste Puliti to be excluded from the Olympic Games;remind everyone that the Italian sabre team showed solidarity with Mr Puliti bywithdrawing from the tournament following the jury of appeal’s decision againsthim and by participating in the clashes provoked by his misconduct;reprimand the entire team as a consequence;invite the Italian Olympic Committee and the international fencing federation toapply severe penalties to avoid a reoccurrence of such incidents;decide that the present document will be presented to the Italian and HungarianOlympic Committees and to the International Fencing Federation. [31]

The press announced these conclusions quite soberly, [32] and the matter might

have ended there. However, the jury of honour pronounced itself only on the strictlysporting aspect of the case, considering only the incidents that took place during the

events and not what happened later. By reprimanding the Italian team, it rejected theItalian Olympic Committee’s request without satisfying the Hungarians’ request for a

precise explanation of the series of events. The very next day, Jules de Musza hastilycontacted Coubertin to follow up on that point so ‘the IOC can deliberate again to

decide if the issue is one for IOC jurisdiction or if it is a private matter’. [33] Thepresident of the IOC hastened to reply that the Hungarian team was exonerated fromany blame and that ‘the jury d’honneur is not habilitated to decide whether or not

Mr Covacs should demand satisfaction from Mr Pulitti in a duel’. [34] But by


refusing to take a position, Coubertin in fact was admitting that the incidents takingplace after the tournament were not his responsibility, opening the door to a settling

of the dispute by the code of honour. The only obstacle to a duel then was the law;indeed, Kovacs later said that his country’s legislation forbidding duels was the only

reason why he had refused the fight. [35]The Hungarian side had hardly begun to ponder Coubertin’s reply when the

situation became further complicated by action taken by the International FencingFederation (FIE). The FIE’s executive committee voted for the temporary exclusion

of the four offending Italians from participation in international fencing events. [36]That was not enough for the IOC, however, which interceded with Rene Lacroix topush for FIE’s confirmation of the jury of appeal’s decisions about the individual

sabre event. This request placed Rene Lacroix in a tight spot because, in addition tohis role as secretary general of the FIE, [37] he not only presided over the French

Olympic Committee’s technical committee but was above all a member of the jury ofappeal that had excluded Puliti!

Lacroix thought he could get out of the situation by arguing from the legal point ofview. Although in principle the Olympic events took place in accordance with the

rules of the international federations, the FIE had no provisions for a jury of appeal infencing. Without its own jury of appeal, it was not in a position to confirm the

decisions of the IOC’s jury of appeal. [38] Unable to pass the buck to the fencingfederations, the IOC had to decide. Perhaps Coubertin decided to make thechampion Puliti pay for the Italian delegation’s rash act at the Lausanne conference

back in 1921. Indeed, the Italians had walked out on the conference to protest againstthe IOC president’s jockeying to stage the 1924 games in Paris and the 1928 games in

Amsterdam, even though Rome was also in the running. [39] Whatever the reason,the jury d’honneur chose to show its determination in the very first big affair it had to

deal with, and Puliti was excluded from the Olympic Games for life.In truth, Lacroix must have known that shifting all responsibility from the FIE to

the IOC would result in heavy penalties for the Italian champion. The internationalfederation was a veritable French stronghold at the time. Lacroix had had a hand inits creation in 1913 and another Frenchman, Maginot, had been presiding over it

since 1921. [40] Furthermore, Lacroix was secretary-general of the French FencingFederation, and Maginot its president. Moreover, with its 833 members, the French

federation dominated the FIE over Belgium, which had 302 members and over Italy,which was sixth in terms of size with only 66 members. [41] For reasons that were as

much linked to sport (French supremacy in fencing) as they were cultural (the Frenchfencing school was dominant) or diplomatic (the rise of Fascism in Italy), a French-

controlled FIE had nothing to gain by leaving the Italians in a strong position.The FIE had not said its last word on the subject, but with the resignations of IOC

president Pierre de Coubertin, FIE president Maginot (announced for 1925) and FIEsecretary-general Lacroix himself, the matter was temporarily set aside. In addition,this caused the end of the French domination. Even the Puliti-Kovacs duel in

November 1924 did not inspire a reassessment of the issue. Only once the Belgian


Baillet-Latour and the Dutchman Van Rossem were elected as presidents of the IOCand the FIE respectively did the FIE make a decision. At its convention at the Hague

on 17–18 April 1925, the FIE officially recognized the legitimacy of the jury of appealset up by the IOC in Paris. There were at least two consequences of this decision: the

claim filed by the Frenchman, Ducret, was thrown out and Posta’s win against Ducretduring the deferred final was confirmed. [42] The FIE also officially noted the

decision to exclude Puliti from the Olympic Games and took, in its own words, a‘very severe’ stance on the affair, though in reality it was more symbolic than

anything else. It excluded the Italian from any competition open to FIE members, butonly until 1 October 1925. Furthermore, the FIE did not officially contact Pulitiabout the matter before 24 October 1925 – some three weeks after the exclusion came

to an end! [43] Puliti was also to keep the FIE informed of his matches and send in aconduct report after each one until the next convention in 1927.

The telling difference in severity between the FIE and the IOC penalties can beexplained in several ways. Clearly, the administrative turnover in both institutions

could have played a role, starting with the departure of Lacroix. As a standard-bearerfor the French school of fencing, he could certainly have found advantage in the

IOC’s firm stance against its historical rival, Italy. Coubertin’s departure could alsohave been influential, as he seemed to be somewhat involved in managing the case,

even though Blonay theoretically was in charge of the jury d’honneur. The FIE’sdecision came in the more general context of tensions between the internationalfederations and the IOC and could be construed as a diplomatic way of declaring its

independence. [44] The Italian government was pursuing its push to place itsinstitutions under Fascist control more aggressively in 1925. [45] Sports were placed

under the control of the Comitato Olimpico Nazionale Italiano (CONI). [46] The FIEmight have found it inadvisable to risk cutting itself off from a country with the

largest pool of talented fencers at the time. Geopolitically speaking, Italy was also oneof the foremost central European nations.

Sports diplomacy and national fencing traditions

So far, we have discussed a series of disputes in the Puliti affair involving issuesaround supremacy in sport and international relations. To understand the way these

incidents developed, we need to take a look at how the cultural and political aspectscombined to produce two different versions of nationalism.

First of all, the Paris games were important for Italy which, under the newleadership of Benito Mussolini, had great expectations for the squadra Azzura’s

performance. The Italian leader thought that sport would be a model for theedification of the new Italian. The competition was seen as one of the best ways for

both the construction of Italianness and the positive diffusion of its image outside thecountry. [47] This ambition concerned especially men, being more ambiguous forwomen. [48] During the 1920s, Italian fencers (together with cyclists) [49] were

among the rare Italian athletes to shine internationally, so the Puliti affair was far


more than just a sports incident. It was one of the Mussolini regime’s first foreignpolicy issues. [50] The disqualification of the Italian sabre team and Puliti’s

permanent exclusion from the Olympic community were taken as yet anotherinstance of discrimination against Italy and national humiliation just when Italy’s

political leaders were going all out to obtain a review of the peace treaties perceived asbeing unfavourable for their country’s prestige. [51]

And while Italy and France appeared to be achieving something of a politicalrapprochement after January 1923, notably with respect to the Ruhr occupation,

which Italy supported, the Puliti affair was perceived by the public as a stab in theback to the still fragile French-Italian friendship. Thus, it was capable of upsetting oreven redirecting Mussolini’s ongoing ‘good neighbour policy’. [52] A year after the

Corfu affair [53] in the summer of 1923, intransigence on the part of the juryd’honneur could lead Italy to turn away from France to other European powers.

According to Pierre Milza and Serge Berstein,

rather than a dangerous alliance with bellicose France, better to seek arapprochement with Great Britain, the guarantor of European stability. Mussolinilet himself be convinced all the more easily that he was flattered by the praise fromsome British statesmen, including foreign minister Lord Curzon, about his anti-Bolshevik activities. [54]

The full ‘geosymbolic’ significance of the Italian fencers’ attitude becomes apparenthere as the expression of a refusal to submit on the part of the countries that felt

cheated by the Versailles Treaty. At the level of French-Italian relations, the episodewas revelatory of the ambiguity of the French and Italian governments at the time,

torn as they were between a desire for rapprochement and a diplomatic status quoforced on them by the First World War.

In the same way, over and above the technical and cultural differences, the victoryin 1924 of a Hungarian team over an Italian one took on a singular geopolitical

significance. Although Italy and Hungary had joined together in their efforts to havethe peace treaties reviewed (including the Treaty of Trianon, signed in Paris on 4 June1920, which was considered an intolerable diktat by the Hungarians), [55] the two

nations maintained rather tense relations in the mid-1920s, at least until 1927. Moreprecisely, the conservative Hungarian Prime Minister Istvan Bethlen’s policy

penalizing pro-fascist manifestations could only offend Mussolini. [56] The tensionwas at its highest point on 31 January 1923, when the League of Nations accepted

Great Britain’s proposal to recognize Hungary. As he gradually moved Hungarycloser to the League of Nations, Regent Miklos Horthy departed more and more from

the revisionist policy defended by Mussolini since the end of the First World War.[57]

So the Kovacs-Puliti incident turned into a bona fide affair of state between Italy,Hungary and France. The tensions observed during the Paris games and refereed bythe jury d’honneur were part and parcel of the power struggle among the three

nations. Even so, the cultural issue was at least as much a determining factor as the


political. The Puliti affair can also be understood from the point of view of thehistorical fencing differences among these countries as a function of the weapons

used. The French had been using the very lightweight foil ever since the eighteenthcentury as a training technique for duelling with epees. Italian fencing was marked by

a tradition of the duelling epee, and featured play based on speed and timing, whilethe French foil was used for educational and artistic purposes. When it came to foil or

epee fencing, the French and the Italians were at odds about which of the two mainfencing schools was superior to the other. This long-standing cultural conflict had

started with fencing masters and spread later to sportsmen in general.Sabre fencing was another matter of contention. The French and Italians focused

on the art of hitting with the point (thrust in weapons), while the Hungarians

specialized in the art of hitting with the cutting edge (cutting weapons). The Italianstook an interest in the sabre, which they used in duels. But while Italian masters had

expertise in all three weapons, Hungarians specialized in teaching and training in theart of the sabre, which even became their national weapon. Hungarian masters

acquired an international reputation and Hungarian sabreurs became the favouritesin tournaments as early as 1908. Hungarian supremacy in that art became

institutional when the International Fencing Federation was founded in 1913: 78nations chose Bela Nagy to draft the new federation’s rules for the sabre event. [58]

The Hungarians were still using the sabre in duels, [59] even after use of the weaponwas forbidden in settling honour disputes among Europe’s aristocratic officers. [60]

At the Paris games, the Italian fencing school was faced with a twofold challenge of

having to win against the French school in the foil and epee events, and against theHungarian school in the sabre events (where it succeeded brilliantly at the Antwerp

Games in 1920). [61] France also had its role to play in the sabre events, although itstradition was still under the influence of the Saumur and Saint-Cyr schools. As a

French fencing master said at the time, Hungarian techniques were more effective:‘The Hungarians, followed by the Italians ahead of us, employ a much better method,

which explains why France ranks fourth at most in sabre events.’ [62] Even so, in1924 one of the French team’s fencers, Roger Ducret, firmly believed that he had achance of winning: ‘Yes, we must also win in the sabre event! . . . My friends, when the

match is unequal, when it seems lost in advance, it is the moment to redouble ourefforts. . . . Our fencers have never fought better than when winning seemed

impossible. It is a tradition in French weaponry.’ [63] His ambition threw theItalian-Hungarian opposition in the individual sabre event off balance and

complicated the French-Italian rivalry even more.In secret, the sabre was Roger Ducret’s preferred weapon. He developed well-

thought-out watchful tactics and used valuable advice gleaned from fencing masterSantelli to compensate for his technical weaknesses, involving superior legwork

and rapidity compared to his adversaries. [64] He turned out to be a serious andunexpected contender in the final, which historically included only the Italians andthe Hungarians. To be defeated by a French fencer with no reputation as a sabre

specialist would have been a supreme insult to the Italians. The pressure mounted for


Puliti, who had more to lose in this encounter than his adversaries. Although healready enjoyed a solid reputation, he had only recently assumed the role of hero for

the Italians, when the talented Aldo Nadi turned professional just a few monthsbefore the games. [65] Under pressure from the Fascists and the public, then, Puliti

was a natural choice as Italian team leader in Paris. Since he had not yet really provedhimself, he had everything to prove during the Olympic foil and sabre events.

Following a disqualification in the foil event, a by-the-skin-of-the-teeth Italianvictory in the team sabre event could not suffice; [66] Puliti had to win the individual

event. The personal, national and cultural stakes involved made victory crucial. Andso the incident provoked by the Italian fencers can be interpreted as an opportunityto save the Italian school from a potential and politically symbolic athletic

humiliation in the context of a strong rivalry against Hungary and France.

Rehabilitating Puliti: A Diplomatic Necessity

During the three years between Puliti’s penalty from the IOC (and then from the FIE)for misconduct and the Amsterdam games in 1928, Italians became increasingly

interested in sport as Mussolini’s control over the activity became tighter. [67] Theregime eliminated traditional forms of Catholic and working-class sport and created

organizations such as the Opera Nazional Dopolavora (OND) for workers in 1925 andthe Gruppi Universiti Fascisti (GUF) after 1927, making sport a central instrument inIl Duce’s strategy to reinforce Italy’s national identity and convey Italy’s success and

power abroad. [68] The Italian Fascist orientation ‘towards a civilization ofcompetition’ [69] accelerated, and by the end of December 1928 a Sports Charter had

been drafted. [70] Italy’s success in the Amsterdam games became one of theMussolini’s goals. Puliti had recovered from his duel with Kovacs and was still one of

Italy’s best fencers – as well as an officer who was faithful to the Mussolini regime. Hewon the Mussolini Sabre Cup in November 1925, Cremona’s international

tournament in June 1926 and the Mussolini Sabre Cup and the Italian FascistMilitia Officers’ foil event in December 1926 before taking several months off tonurse an arm wound. He was clearly capable of giving Italy Olympic gold during the

next games in Amsterdam.Under the control of the Fascist CONI, the Italian Fencing Federation had been

conscientiously sending detailed reports about Puliti’s good conduct during thecompetitions in which he participated. By the spring of 1927, these reports turned

out to be useful arguments in preparing a plea to rehabilitate Puliti in time for theFIE convention to be held two months later. [71] Van Rossem, the president of the

International Fencing Federation, was not unreceptive to the pressure from Italy, buthe did not want anyone to think that he had caved in to Fascist demands. The only

way for him to save face was if the IOC were to go back on its decision. He wrote toBaillet-Latour on 18 April 1927 to explain that Puliti would probably be rehabilitatedat the next FIE convention. He added diplomatically that the IOC would have

beforehand the opportunity to revoke the penalty imposed by the jury d’honneur in


July 1924, to thus authorize him to participate in the next Olympic Games. [72] Thesubject was still too sensitive for the IOC, however, and Baillet-Latour replied that he

found it preferable to wait until he knew what the FIE would decide in June. [73]When the FIE met in The Hague on 3–4 June 1927, the delegates, even the French

and Hungarians, voted unanimously to rehabilitate Puliti. Only the exclusion fromthe Olympic Games remained on record. As this was the IOC’s decision, Van Rossem

renewed his request to Baillet-Latour. This time, his appeal included not onlyevidence of Puliti’s good conduct, but a clarification of the 1924 context: ‘Italian

fascism was in its early stages in 1924, and it was a time when the Italians were sweptby a certain agitation; Mr Puliti must have been one of the victims.’ He went on toconclude with what could almost be construed as a warning: ‘The FIE would attach

great importance to this [sic] request.’ [74]At the time, relations between the IOC’s president and the international

federations were becoming more and more difficult over the balance of respectiveresponsibilities and, especially, over a clear definition of amateur sport. While the

international soccer, tennis and skating federations were the source of most of thetension, [75] the fencing federation was also causing problems because many of its

top-level participants were fencing masters and teachers who could only be defined asprofessional. And since the Paris games, the IOC had been discussing the possibility

of eliminating the team fencing events from the Olympic programme. These twosources of friction, already present in 1924 and discussed at the FIE convention in1928, [76] were too sensitive for Baillet-Latour to take unrestrained action.

Just a year before the 1928 Olympic Games, the pressure was stepped up. TheCONI started to plead Puliti’s case directly, [77] and Van Rossem tried again at the

end of summer, assuring Baillet-Latour that the executive committee could alwaysexclude Puliti again if there were even the slightest problem. [78] Van Rossem’s

insistence did not mean that he was merely lending a favourable ear to Italy’sdemands. The ninth Olympic Games were to take place in Amsterdam in his own

country, and he had been appointed general commissioner. A disagreement betweenthe FIE and the IOC on Puliti’s participation would have placed him in an intolerableposition. Baillet-Latour was aware of all this, and gave in. Under the combined

pressure from fencing circles and Italy, he convened the jury d’honneur in Lausanneon 30 October 1927, which came to the decision ‘to lift the exclusion of Mr. Oreste

Puliti from Olympic competition’. [79] The CONI, the FIE and Bonacossa, who hadbecome a member of the IOC, were informed of it immediately. [80] Eight months

later, at the age of 28, Oreste Puliti won a new Olympic title in the team foil event,before winding up his international career in 1929 with the European championship

title. [81]

Press Coverage

Obviously, the Puliti affair did not go unnoticed in the press. Whether they were

covering the fencing events as a sports event, as illustration of the relationships


between the Olympic Games and nationalism, as evidence of the quarrels between theIOC and the international federations or even as a record of the initial decisions of

the IOC’s jury d’honneur, journalists at the time could hardly have avoided the affaireven if they had wanted to. Their interest in the incident was dictated by their

individual situations. [82]The Italian press was heavily exercised by the Puliti affair, especially as 1924 was

the year that state supervision began to close its grip on the press. The Fascistgovernment sought to indoctrinate the masses by controlling information and

moulding public opinion. [83] All newspapers, from large daily general-interestpublications such as Il Corriere della Sera to the main sports daily at the time, LaGazzetta dello Sport, were rapidly obliged to adopt the orthodox official line,

following the example of Il Popolo d’Italia, the Fascist party’s official publication.It came as no surprise, then, when the Gazzetta dello Sport launched into a defence

of the Italian fencers just after their disqualification from the cancelled 17 July finaland Puliti’s disqualification. The affair was perceived as being sufficiently serious that

its journalist concerned warned readers ‘not to be upset by the sombre tone’ of thearticle. [84] There followed an official attack on the Hungarian judge’s conduct and a

particularly moralistic piece about the Italian champion designed to show how unjustthe penalty was: ‘Every single one of Puliti’s bouts demonstrated – even to the blind!

– that his class places him far above any other adversary in the tournament.’ [85] Thedetails of the sequence of events were scrutinized and the supportive viewpoints ofItalian leaders generously quoted. And when it clearly became difficult to defend

some aspects of the aggressive conduct, the journalist fell back on male nationalpride, the fiery Latin temperament to explain or even justify it. A lengthy apologia

followed along the lines: ‘We Italians don’t lodge complaints. We react as men,directly, privately.’ [86] The piece ended in verbal abuse against the Hungarians, with

anti-Semitic and nationalistic overtones when the journalist accused Posta ofresembling a ‘gloomy cemetery vulture’ because of his ‘hooked nose’, or when he

attacked the ‘traitor’ Santelli for conduct ‘unworthy of an Italian’. [87] The journalistdid not criticize the French directly, but he remarked ironically about theirpropensity for discharging themselves of any responsibility. [88] It was clear to him

that the physically superior Italians had been denied a victory that was rightfullytheirs. [89]

The French people for their part played down the issue. Perhaps the absence offingers pointing at them explains the relative discretion of the French press about the

Puliti affair. Aside from the commentaries of two trade publications – L’escrime et letir, which denounced the Italians’ unsportsmanlike attitude, [90] and L’Auto, which

talked of an ‘unpleasant incident’ to describe the cancelled 17 July final [91] – it ishard to find any mention of the case’s subsequent events, even in the main French

sports press such as the Miroir des sports, the Echo des Sports or Sport. [92] In fact, thefew articles on the subject emanated less from journalists than from the protagonistsinvolved in one way or another in the affair, who used the press columns for self-

legitimation. One example was Rene Lacroix, who gave an update in the Miroir des


sports just after the games. [93] Another was Frantz Reichel, the kingpin of the Parisgames who, learning of Puliti’s requalification in 1927, [94] gave a boastful critique in

the Figaro on the way the jury d’honneur operated. The article provoked animmediate and irritated response from Baillet-Latour. [95] It is true that in the Paris

games fencing events, the French team’s overall results were less than hoped for, inspite of their first place. The French had trouble accepting Lucien Gaudin’s scratch

the first day of the tournament – an immense disappointment, coming as it did froman ‘exceptional’ champion. [96] Dredging up the fact later that the Italians, their

main rivals in the sabre event, had been disqualified could only have intensified that.Diplomatic caution and sport disappointment inspired the discretion and gravitythat the French journalists duly adopted throughout the affair, even taking refuge

behind ‘neutrality in sports’ in 1927 to clamour for a match between Lucien Gaudinand Oreste Puliti, the two best fencers of the moment, even though the IOC had not

yet rehabilitated Puliti. [97]This low-profile approach contrasts considerably with the virulent attacks in the

English-speaking press. The New York Times, for example, considered that the affairwas bad for the image of the games, arguing that the competition was now more

between nations than between athletes. [98] The British press was even more caustic.The Puliti affair provided additional evidence of the way the Olympic Games seemed

to be heading down a blind alley, and how the countries of continental Europe – suchas Italy and France – were incapable of truly sportsmanlike behaviour. On 22 July, theLondon Times correspondent described both the scene at the sabre final and the

Folies Bergeres altercation, denouncing the ‘Italian violence’. The next day, there werea few lines in the newspaper stating that the affair was closed. [99] This was part of a

long article that called into question the way the Paris games had been organized andwere conducted. The article presented the British and the Americans as the systematic

victims of hostility stimulated by the games. After a series of incidents that occurredin boxing, for example, the Puliti affair provided an argument for the campaign led

by Sir Harry Perry Robinson, the Paris correspondent for The Times, to discredit theOlympic Games and the continental idea of sport:

Miscellaneous turbulence, shameful disorder, storms of abuse, free fights and thedrowning of national anthems of friendly nations by shooting and boxing are notconducive to an atmosphere of Olympic calm. Disturbances of this kind,culminating in open expressions of national hostility might conceivably end inworse trouble than the duel which, it is feared, may take place as results of thepersonal quarrel in which a Hungarian and Italian fencer have allowed themselvesto justify to become involved. [100]

Conclusion

What was really the signification of the Puliti affair? It was only one out of a numberof incidents that occurred during the 1924 Olympic Games. However, it was the one

that created the most fuss. It was also the IOC jury d’honneur’s first case. The initial


conflict placed an Italian and a Hungarian in opposition under the scrutiny of theFrench, who had not the slightest reason – sporting, cultural or political – for seeing

the affair settled in favour of their major competitors.As often happens with this type of affair, there are several different possible

interpretations. Only by examining these from all angles can the complexity of theaffair be conveyed. Beyond its sequence of events, the Puliti affair mirrors the

juxtaposition of different levels of conflict that the jury had to put up with, whether itliked it or not. At a very basic level, winning fencing medals was crucial for nations

such as Hungary, France or Italy, as each country had understandable hopes in thisdiscipline. On top of this, was added a cultural challenge in which the stakes were thesupremacy of either the Italian school or the French school, two of the most significant

fencing schools in history. [101] Another institutional level of the conflict involved theintervention of the FIE at a time when the IOC was entering into delicate negotiations

with all the international federations during its 1925 convention in Prague. Andbecause the FIE prior this date was controlled by the French, the IOC was forced to

cave in to the FIE’s demand that Puliti be rehabilitated. The IOC also gave way whenconfronted with the rising nationalism of the Mussolini regime, instead of opposing it

through its jury d’honneur. So the last level was more clearly geopolitical, in so far asthe Puliti affair involved countries in which diplomatic relations were metamorphos-

ing due to the rise of new nationalistic movements in Europe. Furthermore, the Pulitiaffair confirmed for some that sport on the Continent was corrupted by excessivenationalism. The conflict was even used moralistically by the British to discredit the

organization of the Olympic Games, considered by them to be a French affair that hadlittle to do with true sportsmanship.

These different levels weighed on Puliti’s shoulders – all the more, because hebecame invested with a genuine nationalistic mission when he took the place of the

champion Aldo Nadi. However, these levels were clearly related to various faces ofnationalism as well as to masculine and aristocratic pride. Indeed, the concept of

masculine honour was supranational. It embraced several significant Europeannations. It was part and parcel of a concept of aristocratic masculinity stretching farback in European history. It played its parts in the form of a legacy, in fanning the

flames of the Puliti conflagration. By the late nineteenth century it had extended itsinfluence well beyond aristocratic circles and by the end of the century it was

fundamental to middle class male behaviour across Europe. [102] It was a moral codethat dictated attitude and action: the Puliti Affair embraced a gender level as well as

national and institutional levels.

Acknowledgements

The authors wish to thank Carolyn Nafziger and Sarah Morgan for their translationand checking of this paper. They are also indebted to Douglas Booth for hiscomments during the NASSH congress 2006, where an earlier and shorter version of

it was presented.


Notes

[1] Davis, Europe East and West.[2] Arnaud and Riordan, Sport et relations internationales.[3] Senn, Power, Politics, and the Olympic Games.[4] The protagonists’ names, especially those of Puliti and Kovacs, were frequently misspelled in

the various archives that we have used. In case of quotation, we have chosen to respect thespelling of these documents, even if it was wrong.

[5] This paper is mainly based on primary sources, including the archives of the IOC collected inthe file ‘Jury d’honneur: Puliti 1924–1927’, as well as both the national and internationalpress.

[6] Mangan, Making European Masculinities.[7] Renson, La VIIieme Olympiade Anvers 1920.[8] Initially created on 6 June 1921 to supply Coubertin during his absence, the executive

commission was soon to become a counter-power within the IOC. See Boulongne, ‘Lespresidences de Demetrius Vikelas et de Pierre de Coubertin’; Auger, ‘Une histoire politiquedu mouvement olympique’.

[9] Report on the IOC session, Rome, session of 10 April 1923, IOC archives, Lausanne.[10] On the jury of appeal and the field jury, see Comite olympique francais, Les Jeux de la VIIIe

Olympiade, 78.[11] Santelli was an Italian master, but he used to teach in Hungary and he joined the Hungarian

delegates in Paris. Thus, he was considered a ‘traitor’ to his fellow countrymen.[12] Jules de Muzsa, co-president of the Hungarian Olympic Committee, to Pierre de Coubertin,

[16 or 17] July 1924, file ‘jury d’honneur: Puliti 1924–1927’, IOC archives [hereafter ‘IOCjury d’honneur file’].

[13] In addition to three Hungarians, two Frenchman, a Danish, an Argentinian and aDutchman.

[14] Comite olympique francais. Les Jeux de la VIIIe Olympiade, 283.[15] ‘Le tournoi de sabre’. L’Auto, 18 July 1924.[16] The exact terms were not given in the Italian press nor were they in the French, British and

American presses. They are never clearly presented in the numerous letters archived in theIOC. However, the Belgium journal Le Soir reported that Puliti would have said towardsKovacs: ‘We are Fascist and we will deal with him as Fascist: hitting his head with a stick’(‘Les championnats de sabre. Le gros incident italien’, Le soir, 20 July 1924).

[17] L’escrime et le tir 43 (Aug. 1924).[18] After this second final, the Frenchman Ducret, the Hungarian Garaı and his compatriot

Posta had the same number of victories (5 on 7 assaults). The IOC decided to organizeanother tour, in contradiction with the FIE rules, which stipulated that the goal-averageshould be considered first. Under the IOC rules, Ducret was beaten by Posta and finishedsecond in the individual foil event. Dissatisfied by the decision, the French mastercomplained officially to the jury of appeal.

[19] Letter from Alberto Bonacossa, representative of the Italian Olympic Committee, to theCount Clary, President of the French Olympic committee, 17 July 1924, IOC jury d’honneurfile. Ironically, Bonacossa became an IOC member in 1925 (until 1953) where he integratedthe executive commission from 1935 to 1952. He was elected a Fascist deputy at the end ofthe 1920s.

[20] As we have seen before, these terms were notably different to those reported by the Belgiumpress.

[21] Oreste Puliti to Renato Anselmi and Marcello Garagnagi, 19 July 1924, IOC jury d’honneurfile.


[22] Ibid.[23] Letter from Georges Kovacs, n.d. [20 July 1924], double signature unreadable, IOC jury

d’honneur file.[24] Letter from Jules de Musza, 20 July 1924, IOC jury d’honneur file.[25] According to the correspondent of The Times (London), 23 July 1924, 14.[26] ‘Italian Violence’, The Times, 22 July 1924.[27] The Times, 14 Nov. 1924.[28] This point was crucial because Danubian Europe underwent at the time one of its main

geopolitical crises. See for instance Bernard, Nations et nationalismes en Europe centrale, andmore generally Castellan, Histoire des Balkans.

[29] Document added to the Report of the IOC session, Paris, 25 June–12 July 1924, IOC juryd’honneur file.

[30] Report of the IOC session, Rome, 10 April 1923, IOC jury d’honneur file.[31] Decision of the jury d’honneur, written document, 23 July 1924, and report of the IOC

session, Paris, 25 June–12 July 1924, IOC jury d’honneur file.[32] See for instance ‘Italian Fencer, Seeking Duel, Forever Barred From Olympics’, New York

Times, 24 July 1924.[33] Jules de Musza to Pierre de Coubertin, 24 July 1924, IOC jury d’honneur file.[34] Pierre de Coubertin to Jules de Musza, 25 July 1924, IOC jury d’honneur file.[35] ‘The Olympic Games. A Cause of Ill will. More evidence’. The Times, 23 July 1924, 14.[36] Rene Lacroix, ‘Apres les Jeux Olympiques’, L’escrime et le tir 42 (July 1924).[37] In fact, Rene Lacroix was in a very powerful position within the international federation at

this time. The president, Andre Maginot – another Frenchman – was ready to leave, but hewas replaced by Captain Van Rossem only on 1 January 1925. During this phase oftransition, Lacroix was quite free.

[38] Rene Lacroix to Pierre de Coubertin, 26 July 1924 and 31 July 1924, IOC jury d’honneur file.[39] See Coubertin, Memoires olympiques, and Boulongne, ‘Les presidences de Demetrius Vikelas

et de Pierre de Coubertin’, 201.[40] Maginot was the Minister of War between 1922 and 1924.[41] Lacroix, ‘Rapport presente le 26 juin a la Federation internationale d’escrime’, L’escrime et le

tir 42 (July 1924).[42] S. Feschotte, secretary-general of the Federation internationale d’escrime, to Baillet-Latour,

24 Oct. 1925, IOC jury d’honneur file. According to the changes in 1925, the executivecommission was ruled by the president of the IOC. This explains why the mail was addressedto Baillet-Latour.

[43] S. Van Rossem and S. Feschotte (International Fencing Federation) to Giuseppe Mazzini,president of the Italian National Fencing Confederation, 24 Oct. 1925, IOC jury d’honneurfile. See also ‘Congres de la FIE’, L’escrime et le Tir, April 1925.

[44] Auger, ‘Une histoire politique du mouvement olympique’; Carpentier, Le Comiteinternational olympiques en crises. During this meeting, the FIE departed from some of itsdecisions made during the Paris games.

[45] Milza, Mussolini, 570.[46] Teja, ‘The Transformation of the National Olympic Committee’.[47] Teja, ‘Le sport italien et les relations internationales’, 163. See also Pivato, Les enjeux du sport.[48] Gori, Italian Fascism and the Female Body.[49] Ottavio Bottecchia was the winner of the Tour de France in 1924.[50] Romano, Histoire de l’Italie.[51] Duroselle, Histoire diplomatique de 1919 a nos jours; Guillaume et al., L’Europe des

nationalismes aux nations.[52] Milza and Berstein, Le fascisme italien, 309.


[53] After the murder of the Italian General Tellini, sent to Greece to establish the new limits ofthe border with Albania, Mussolini ordered the bombardment and occupation of Corfu. TheItalian leader later accepted a compromise, thanks to the actions of both the Britishgovernment and the League of Nations.

[54] In January, the Treaty of Rome was signed by Italy and Yugoslavia, giving Mussolini aninternational image. The city of Fiume was returned to Italy and became a symbol of Italiannationalism. Mussolini recognized the USSR in February 1924, one week after the BritishGovernment. Three months later, E. Benes, president of the Czech Republic, attended Rome,where he discussed the first basis of a treaty of friendship with Italy. The good relations betweenItaly and Great Britain ended only in 1935. See Milza and Berstein, Le fascisme italien, 310.

[55] Pamlenyi, Histoire de la Hongrie.[56] Molnar, Histoire de la Hongrie.[57] Castellan, Histoire des Balkans.[58] France was in charge of the rules for the foil and the epee.[59] In France, the weapon for duel was generally the epee.[60] Jeanneney, Le duel; Baudot, Le duel et la republique. When the offence was light, the duellists

used cutting edge and protected the most sensitive parts of their body (heart etc); when theoffence was more serious, the duellists were half naked and used the point and the edge ofthe weapon. The duels were generally organized in arms rooms, under rules that dependedon the graveness of the offence. Several of the Hungarian fencers in the Paris games,Schenker for instance, had already experienced duels.

[61] At the sport level, the Italian hegemony ended precisely in 1924 when it was replaced by aHungarian supremacy.

[62] Trombert, L’art et la pratique de l’escrime, 65.[63] Joseph-Renaud, ‘Preparons-nous’, L’escrime et le Tir, August 1923.[64] Ducret, D’estoc et de taille.[65] Born in Livorno the son of a fencing master, Puliti followed in his father’s footsteps and

those of his brother Nedo, who won a medal in Antwerp. After 1922, he became for theItalians the one who could avenge the affront of French fencers. He several times met LucienGaudin, the French champion, in various bouts described by the transalpine press withnationalist fervour.

[66] The Italy-Hungary team sabre final saw the most difficult and disputed assaults. Both teamsfinished with the same number of victories (8 on 16), but the goal-average gave an advantageto the Italians.

[67] Fabrizio, Sport e Fascismo; Frasca, E il Duce le volle sportive.[68] Fabrizio, Storia dello sport in Italia; Gori, L’atleta e la nazione. Saggi di storia dello sport.[69] Passerini, Mussolini immaginario.[70] See Teja, ‘Le sport italien et les relations internationales’; Ferretti, Il fascismo e l’educazione

sportiva; Teja and Impiglia, ‘Italy’.[71] Giuseppe Mazzini (president of the Italian National Fencing Confederation) to Van Rossem,

president of the International Fencing Federation, 6/04/1927, archives IOC, file ‘Juryd’honneur: Puliti 1924–1927’.

[72] Van Rossem to Baillet-Latour, 12 April 1927, IOC jury d’honneur file.[73] Baillet-Latour to Van Rossem, 26 April 1927, IOC jury d’honneur file.[74] Van Rossem to Baillet-Latour, 18 June 1927, IOC jury d’honneur file.[75] The analysis of the conflicts between the IOC and these three federations is made by

Carpentier, Le Comite international olympique en crises, 257–315.[76] Leon Delevoye, ‘Les prochains jeux olympiques’, L’escrime et le tir 42 (July 1924); Ordre du

jour du congres de la FIE des 26 et 27 juillet 1928, June 1928, file ‘FIE 1921–1963’, IOCarchives.


[77] Montu to Baillet-Latour, 29 June 1927 and Ferretti to Baillet-Latour, 4 July 1927, IOC juryd’honneur file.

[78] Van Rossem to Baillet-Latour, 10 Sept. 1927, IOC jury d’honneur file.[79] Minutes of the jury d’honneur, 30 Oct. 1927, IOC jury d’honneur file.[80] Baillet-Latour to Lando Ferretti, Van Rossem and Bonacossa, 1 Nov. 1927, IOC jury

d’honneur file.[81] With no fencing world championships at this time, the status of European champion is,

alongside that of Olympic champion, the most prestigious.[82] It was of course not possible to analyse systematically the press of all these countries. Rather

we explore some of the newspapers of the countries that were particularly active in the Parisgames or concerned by the Puliti affair. However, it was not possible to consult theHungarian press.

[83] Cannistraro, La fabrica del consenso; Grazia, Consenso e cultura di massa; Milza and Berstein,Le fascisme italien.

[84] ‘Il cimento italo-ungherese al torneo di sciabola; La giuria di appello esclude Oreste Pulitidalla gara e tutti gli sciabolatori italiani si ritirano per protesta’, Gazzetta dello Sport, 18 July1924. We thank Karen Bretin for her help on this part of the study.

[85] ‘Tutti gli incontri di Puliti avevano mostrato anche ai ciechi che egli e di tale classe da nontenere avversari nel torneo’, Gazzetta dello Sport, 18/071924.

[86] Gazzetta dello Sport, 18 July 1924.[87] Ibid.[88] ‘Alla ottava Olimpiade continua la sfilata dei campioni di tutte le Nazioni; Il torneo

individuale di sciabola, il pensiero di Gaudin sull’incidente italo-ungherese’, Gazzetta delloSport, 19 July 1924.

[89] ‘La scherma olimpionica con giurie di appello e batoste senza appello’, Gazzetta dello Sport,22 July 1924.

[90] Jean Joseph-Renaud, ‘De loin’, L’escrime et le tir 42 (July 1924).[91] ‘Le tournoi de sabre’, L’Auto, 18 July 1924.[92] This contrasts with the general attitude of the French press towards Italy. See Milza, Le

fascisme italien et la presse francaise.[93] Rene Lacroix, ‘Escrime. Apres les Jeux Olympiques. Mise au point’, Le Miroir des sports, July

1924.[94] Frantz-Reichel, ‘La requalification de Puliti’, Le Figaro, 6 Nov. 1927.[95] Baillet-Latour to Frantz-Reichel, 8 Nov. 1927, IOC jury d’honneur file.[96] Lucien Gaudin enjoyed this special status from 1919. Captain of the French team,

he was the uncontested leader of the sport and a national hero. See Bollee, LucienGaudin.

[97] ‘Un beau match de fleuret franco-italien a organiser: Lucien Gaudin contre Puliti’, L’Auto,Aug. 1927, IOC jury d’honneur file.

[98] ‘London Sees End of Olympic Games’, New York Times, 23 July 1924; ‘Value of OlympicsDoubted by French’, New York Times, 23 July 1924. Recall that, in 1924, Italy and Great-Britain were on very good terms at the diplomatic level.

[99] ‘Italian Violence’, The Times, 22 July 1924; ‘The Olympic Games. A Cause of Ill Will. MoreEvidence’, The Times, 23 July 1924.

[100] ‘No More Olympic Games’ and ‘Olympic Games Doomed. Failure of the Ideal. DisgracefulScenes’, both The Times, 22 July 1924. See also ‘Olympic Games Trouble’, Sporting Life, 23July 1924.

[101] The official report of the games (p. 264) evoked the weight of the two French and Italianfencing schools in Paris. The text was written by Rene Lacroix.

[102] Mangan, Making European Masculinities.


References

Arnaud, P. ‘Des jeux de la guerre aux jeux de la paix. Sports et relations internationales (1920–1924)’. In Education et politique sportives, edited by P. Arnaud and T. Terret. Paris: Ed. duCTHS, 1995: 315–48.

Arnaud, P. and J. Riordan, eds. Sport et relations internationales. Les democraties face aux regimesautoritaires. Paris: L’Harmattan, 1998.

Auger, F. ‘Une histoire politique du mouvement olympique: l’exemple de l’entre-deux-guerres’.Unpublished PhD diss., Paris X University, 1998.

Baudot, P.-Y. Le duel et la republique. Grenoble: IEP, 1997.Bernard, M. Nations et nationalismes en Europe centrale. Paris: Aubier, 1995.Bollee, L.-F. Lucien Gaudin, le maıtre des armes. Saint-Malo: Ed. Cristel, 2001.Boulongne, Y.-P. ‘Les presidences de Demetrius Vikelas et de Pierre de Coubertin’. In Un siecle du

Comite international olympique. L’idee – Les Presidents – L’Œuvre, edited by R. Gafner.Lausanne: IOC, 1994: 13–203.

Braun, D. ‘Le sport francais entre les deux guerres et les Jeux Olympiques de 1924’. Relationsinternationales 38 (Summer 1984): 193–211.

Cannistraro, P. La fabrica del consenso. Fascismo e mass media. Rome/Bari: Laterza, 1975.Carpentier, F. Le Comite international olympique en crises. Paris: L’Harmattan, 2004.Castellan, G. Histoire des Balkans. Paris: Fayard, 1991.Comite olympique francais. Les Jeux de la VIIIe Olympiade. Paris 1924. Rapport officiel. Paris:

Librairie de France, 1924.Coubertin, P. de. Memoires olympiques. Geneve: BIPS, 1931.Davis, N. Europe East and West: A Collection of Essays on European History. London: Jonathan Cape,

2006.Ducret, R. D’estoc et de taille. Paris: Editions Medicis, 1949.Duroselle, J.-B. Histoire diplomatique de 1919 a nos jours. Paris: Dalloz, 1962.Fabrizio, F. Sport e Fascismo. La politica sportiva del regime 1924–1936. Rimini/Firenze: Guaraldi,

1976.——. Storia dello sport in Italia. Rimini/Firenze: Guaraldi, 1977.Ferretti, L. Il fascismo e l’educazione sportiva della nazione. Torino: UTET, 1928.Frasca, R.I. E il Duce le volle sportive. Bologna: Patron Editore, 1983.Gori, G. L’atleta e la nazione. Saggi di storia dello sport. Rimini/Firenze: Panozzo Editore,

1996.——. Italian Fascism and the Female Body. Sport, Submissive Women and Strong Mothers. London:

Routledge, 2004.Grazia, V. de. Consenso e cultura di massa nell’Italia fascista. Rome/Bari: Laterza, 1981.Guillaume, A., J.-C. Lescure and S. Michonneau. L’Europe des nationalismes aux nations. Paris:

Sedes, 1996.Jeanneney, J.-N. Le duel: une passion francaise (1789–1914). Paris: Seuil, 2004.Mangan, J.A. Making European Masculinities: Sport, Europe and Gender. London: Frank Cass, 2000.Milza, P. Le fascisme italien et la presse francaise, 1920–1940. Bruxelles: Ed. Complexes, 1987.——. Mussolini. Paris: Fayard, 1999.Milza, P. and S. Berstein. Le fascisme italien, 1919–1945. Paris: Seuil, 1980.Molnar, M. Histoire de la Hongrie. Paris: Perrin, 1996.Pamlenyi, Ervin, ed. Histoire de la Hongrie, trans. L. Podor. Paris: Horvath, 1974.Passerini, L. Mussolini immaginario. Storia di una biografia. 1915–1939. Rome/Bari: Laterza, 1991.Pivato, S. Les enjeux du sport. Paris: Castermann, 1994.Renson, R. La VIIieme Olympiade Anvers 1920: les jeux ressuscites. Bruxelles: COIB, 1995.Romano, S. Histoire de l’Italie du Risorgimento a nos jours. Paris: Seuil, 1977.


Senn, A.E. Power, Politics, and the Olympic Games. Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics Publishers,1999.

Teja, A. ‘The Transformation of the National Olympic Committee during the Fascist Regime’. InSport and Symbol. Symbol and sport, edited by F. van der Merwe. Sankt Augustin: AcademiaVerlag, 1996: 49–62.

——. ‘Le sport italien et les relations internationales au temps du fascisme’. In Sport et relationsinternationales. Les democraties face aux regimes autoritaires, edited by P. Arnaud andJ. Riordan. Paris: L’Harmattan, 1998: 163–203.

Teja, A. and M. Impiglia. ‘Italy’. In Europe Cultures in Sport. Examining the Nations and Regions,edited by J. Riordan and A. Kruger. Bristol and Portland, OR: Intellect Books, 2003: 139–59.

Trombert, G. L’art et la pratique de l’escrime, fleuret, epee, sabre. Paris: Publications Armand Girard,1931.


Documents

Puliti Affair