Race in American Politics

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xii CONTFNBUTORSHOWARD SCHUMAN is professor and research scientist emeritus at the Institute of Social Research, University of Michigan, and coauthor of Questionsand Answers in Attitude Surveys (1981) and Racial Attitudes in America(1997).DAVID 0. SEARS is professor of psychology and political science and director of the Institute for Social Science Research at UCLA. He is coauthor ofThe Politics ofViolence: The New Urban Blacks and the Watts Riot (1973)and Tax Revolt: Something for Nothing in Calfornia (1985).

JIM SIDAN I US is professor of psychology at UCLA and coauthor of SocialDominance: An Intergroup Theory of Social Hierarchy and Oppression(1999).PAM SINGH is a doctoral candidate in political science at UCLA.PAUL M. SNIDER MAN is professor of political science at Stanford University. He is coauthor of Reasoning and Choice: Explorations in Political Psychology (1991) and Reaching beyond Race (1997).MARYLE E C. TAYLOR is associate professor of sociology at PennsylvaniaState UniversitSTEVEN A. TU C H is professor of sociology at George Washington Univer

sity and coeditor of Racial Attitudes in the 1990s (1997).

PoliticsFraming the DebatesDAVID 0. SEARSJOHN J. HETTSJIM SIDANIUSLAWRENCE BOBO

he place of African Americans in American society has been a controversial question on the political agenda throughout Americanhistory. The system of chattel slavery established at the very outsetgenerated intense debates for over two hundred years, even in theframing of the major founding documents of th e nation, and ultimately triggered a bloody Civil War. Even after formal emancipation,the Southern Jim Crow system of official discrimination and segregation and parallel, though somewhat mildei practices in t he Nor thkept blacks in an officially designated lower-caste status.That began to erode afterWorld War II, perhaps most symbolicallyin 1954 in the unanimous Supreme Court ruling that racially separateschool systems were unconstitutional because they were inherentlyunequal. Steadily growing institutional strength and political organization in Southern black communities soon led to increasingly numerouscivil rights protests. Federal governmentpolicy finally shifted dramatically when the 1964 Civil Rights Act provided guarantees of equal opportunity and the 1965j ngJ3ihts Act secured full black enfranchisement.Ironically, Northern urban ghettos almost immediately began toerupt in long ho t summers of violence. Racial problems came to beviewed by the general public as among the nations most importantproblems, and many observers felt that America was in a state of racial crisis. A presidential commission concludedwith great pessimismthat our nation is moving toward two societies, one black, one white

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8 DAVID SEARS, JOHN HETTS, JIM SIDANIUS, LAWRENCE BOBO RACE IN AMERICAN POLITICS 9proportionate hiring voluntarily. However, here, to o, a n increasinglyconservative Supreme Court began to pull back in the late 1980s.5Almost all affirmative action programs in col lege admissions havebeen voluntary They expanded greatly in the 1970s. In the Bakke v.Regents of the University of Cal(fornia case in 1978, t he Sup remeCourt outlawed explicit racial quotas, though still allowing race to beused as one factor among many in admissions decisions. Bu t in theHopwood v. Texas case i n 1996, it ruled out preferential standards ofadmission to the University ofTexas, and that fall a statewide initiativeeliminated affirmative action by s ta te and local governments in California, including by public universities.6Guaranteeing blacks right t o vote had been a central objective ofthe civil rights movement. The 1965 Voting Rights Act had placed federal officials in specific districts with histories of discrimination inorder to facilitate black voter registration. Although this greatly increased black voter turnout, the number of black elected officials stillfell far short of proportionality. When that act was renewed in 1982,therefore, Congress and the Justice Department agreed that legislative redistricting plans should be required to maximize the number ofmajority-minority districts, with the goal of increasing minority representation. This, too, was ultimately reversed by the Supreme Court,in Shaw v. Reno in 1993 (Thernstrom and Thernstrom 1997, 426).27Finally, the question of multiculturalism in educational curriculahas pitted cultural minorities desire for recognition and respectagainst the goal of assimilating all Americans to the broader society.Controversy has arisen over using languages other than English,teaching ethnic history, broadening the traditional canon to includeother cultural traditions, requiring courses in cultural diversity, andeven occasionally rewriting the curriculum entirely, as in Afrocentriccurricula that reinterpret traditional disciplines from an African perspective. These debates also raise more fundamental questions aboutgroup-based as opposed to individually based rights, difference-blindtreatment, and state neutrality with respect to groups (Glazer 1997;Hollinger 1995; Peterson 1995; Appiah and Gutmann 1996).28Effect standards for the elimination of discrimination, often nowdescribed as race-conscious remedies, have been intensely debated.Supporters argue that institutional racism and whites resistance tochange have been so deeply and subtly embedded in the en ti re fabric ofAmerican society that little would have changed if more proactive methods had not been used. They argue that demanding findings

of intent is beside the point o r even a mere distracting excuse; whatis needed is proof of equality. Opponents have argued that race-conscious remedies may in fact not have been necessary because substantial progress was already well under way and that such policiesactually have slowed racial progress by angering otherwise sympathetic whites (Thernstrom and Thernstrom 1997, 538; Sniderman andPiazzi 1993).PUBLIC OPINION ON RACIAL ISSUESIn a democracy, a natural question about such a long-standing publicconflict is what the public wants and why. Addressing those questionsis ou r primary purpose in this volume.THE JIM CROW BELIEF SYSTEM

A formalized ideology of white racial superiority began to develop inthe years prior to the Civil War; in response to abolitionist challengesto slavery. After Emancipation, the Jim Crow system of legalized discrimination and segregation gradually took hold over the later yearsof the nineteenth century, built on the foundations of that white supremacist ideology. By all accounts, it was broadly accepted in theSouth and indeed was quite common throughout the nation beforeWorld War I I.It had three major components. One was racialism, the belief thatblacks were inherently inferior to whites because of their race. A second was a formal pattern of social distance and segregation, such thatblacks were supposed to stay in their place, separate and subordinate to whites, especially in public. Public facilities were racially segregated, and blacks and whites were n ot to be personal friends or todate or marry. A third was a legalized pattern of discrimination, suchthat blacks were no t allowed to vote and were provided with separateand inferior schools, while whites were given preference in employment and elsewhere.9This belief system came under attack from intellectuals in the1930s and 1940s, capped most visibly in 1944 by Gunnar Myrdals TheAmerican Dilemma.0 Fortunately, an early survey by the NationalOpinion Research Center in 1942 provides benchmark data againstwhich later changes can be measured. Since then, white support forall three elements seems to have precipitously declined. Here we drawprincipally on the most complete analyses available, those of Schuman


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28 DAVID SEARS, JOHN HETTS, JIM SIDANIUS, LAWRENCE BOBO RACE IN AMERICAN POLITICS 29those alternatives. This approach is thus institution-oriented ratherthan actor-centered. However, these authors have generally notused any particular descriptive label, so we will simply describe it as apolitics-centered approach.5One proposition in particular stands at center stage: as far as whitesare concerned, there is no longer the issue of race, no simple, emotional, gut-level response to any racial issue, driven by attitudes toward\ blacks themselves. Instead, the politics of race has evolved into a variety of distinct policy agendas, such as equal treatment, social welf are for blacks, and race-conscious policies (e.g., affirmative action).Whites attitudes vaiy considerably across these areas in three ways.Their level of policy support varies considerably, with opposition toaffirmative action being most intense and pervasive (Sniderman andCarmines 1997a). Their policy attitudes cluster within each arearather than reflecting consistent support or opposition to all racialpolicies across agendas. And opposition to each set ofpolicies is determined more by its unique politics than by racial animus or group interests. As a result, different predictive models are required to explainopposition to the three different sets of policies (Sniderman andPiazza 1993).Most important, therefore, is general political ideology becauseelites tend to frame all domestic issues in ideological terms. Conservatives and liberals differ especially in the value they place on governmental solutions to social problems, so the preferred role of government should perhaps be the most central explanatory factor in whitesattitudes. But general moral values are important as well. Fo r example, fundamental considerations of fairness and equal treatmentare especially important in generating opposition to affirmative actionbecause they thrust in exactly the opposite direction from it: in thename of achieving racial equality and tolerance. . . the ideals of equality and tolerance have themselves been upended (Sniderman andPiazza 1993, 177; Sniderman and Carmines 1997a, 3). College-educated people are especially likely to use their ideology and valuesin responding to racial issues because they a re mos t practiced withsuch abstractions. However, this perspective takes issue with the newracisms emphasis on whites perceptions that blacks violate individualistic values and relegates them to a minor role (Sniderman and Piazza 1993, 5664; Sniderman and Carmines 1997a, 3133).These authors do recognize some continued role of racism in influencing whites opinions about racial issues. In fact, they frequentlyallude to the minority ofwhites who continue to express negative ste

reotypes of blacks in sample surveys. However, their view of the roleof racism is rather circumscribed. Indeed, they present evidence toindicate that opposition to affirmative action is likely to generate racialhostility in addition to being the product of it (Sniderman and Piazza1993). Prejudice, in their view, is a strong determinantneither of racialpolicy ,preferences nor of seemingly nonracial explanatory factors,such as political ideologn egalitarian values, and judgments of the fairness of various policies. Such effects as it has are said to be moreprominent among the less educated (Sniderman and Piazza 1993).And in their most recent writings, they emphasize the growing numbers ofwhites of good will toward blacks and their strengthening desire to see that blacks are better off. They suggest that the racial tolerance exhibited by most whites on matters of principle is genuine byshowing that whites generally do not use race-neutral justifications tosingle out blacks disproportionately for negative treatment, even whengiven the opportunity to do so (Sniderman and Carmines 1997a, 6570, 8992, 13538).More recently these theorists have suggested that prejudice mayactually be a stronger political force among liberals than among conservatives. Even nonprejudiced conservatives have principled, race-neutral reasons for opposing governmentally based racial policies,whereas prejudiced liberals are torn between their ideological preference for governmental solutions and their prejudice against blacks.They provide evidence both that prejudice has a larger impact on theracial policy attitudes of liberals than on those of conservatives andthat liberals show more hesitation in expressing their attitudes towardracial policies, presumably due to their ambivalence. They suggestthat liberalism is in crisis because elites support for race-consciousremedies has generated a great deal of unacknowledged anger inthe rank and file (Sniderman and Carmines 1997a, chap. 3)66Indeed, so far from race being the quintessentially intractable issue, on which white people are immovably pro or con, these theoristsargue that the public can be snore easily swayed about racial policiesthan previously supposed, if convincing moral arguments are made,because attitudes toward racial policy are at heart about politics andnot race. They argue for a political reprioritization by liberals becausethe liberals race-conscious policy agenda has made things worse, no tbetter. Policies like affirmative action violate traditional American values because such policies are exclusive and race-targeted. They suggest a shift to more universalistic color-blind policies, with justifications that appeal to moral principles reaching beyond race. They

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38 DAVID SEARS, JOHN HETTS, JIM SIDANIUS, LAWRENCE BOBO RACE IN AMERICAN POLITICS 39questions activate thoughts about individualism and the role of government, but no t about race. Finally, they provide several rebuttals ofthe contention that racial resentment merely reflects ideological conservatism and no t racial prejudice.David Sears, P. J. Henry, and Rick Kosterman build on the generalconsensus that symbolic racism is a most powerful ingredient of opposition to racial policy. But they note the vexing question of its origins.Does it really stem from a mixture of racism and traditional values,particularly individualism, as originally asserted? And what is the roleof egalitarian values that have no manifest connection to race? First,they provide additional evidence that symbolic racism is distinctly racial, and distinctive from conservative political ideology, in whites attitudes. However; it seems to be more closely associated with inegalitarian than with individualistic values. A deconstruction of attitudesabout equality yields overwhelming support for the principles of equaltreatment and opportunity; but much division about how far to pursuefurther equality in practice. They find that egalitarianism as ordinarilymeasured in public opinion data is composed of two separate dimensions. The first again taps whites broadly consensual commitment toprinc ip les of equal opportunity and equal treatment. The second,however; appears to tap resistance to further efforts to increase equality. They then present evidence that the latter is much more closelylinked to both symbolic racism and attitudes toward racial policy and,more surprising, to individualistic attributions for poverty and racialdisadvantage. This suggests that the apparent link between symbolicracism and inegalitarian values may not be w hat it seems. Symbolicracism may ref lect not opposition to equal opportunity, bu t resentment of a free ride for blacks who are seen as no t leading lives consistent with the ethic of individual responsibility. If so, whites resist ance to change would seem to stem more from their perceptions ofblacks lack of commitment to individualism than from inegalitarianism in the usual sense.Marylee Taylor uses the effects of racial context as a way to assessthe role of whites racial sentiments in influencing their racial policypreferences. Combining survey data and Census information, shemeasures the size of the black population in the white respondentsenvirons. As it increases, so does white antipathy toward b lacks onsuch dimensions as traditional prejudice, attitudes toward racial poiicy, racial resentment, perceived group threat, and individualistic attributions for black disadvantage. In contrast, racial context is no t relatedto attitudes about nonracial social policies. She concludes that such

findings strongly suggest that opposition to racial policy is in fact basedon racial considerations, and perhaps on racial threats. She anticipates,as do we, further research that outlines the processes that lead to suchobserved effects of racial context.Lawrence Bobo highlights and explores three points about publicopposition to affirmative action. First, many different types of socialpolicy aie grouped under the category heading of affirmative action,and whi tes are not equal ly opposed to all of them. Second, beliefsabout its costs and benefits, though a substantial part of the publicdebate, have no t been carefully examined in studies ofpublic opinion.Third, the role of group interests in attitudes toward racial policy hasbeen substantially underestimated because the attitudes of blacks andother minorities have too often been ignored. He finds substantial differences among racial/ethnic groups in their attitudes toward affirmative action: blacks and Lat inos are more favorable than whites, whileAsians attitudes tend to resemble whites. Moreover, these differences survive controls on various attitudinal and demographic variables, suggesting a role for group interests. Bobo finds little evidencethat such differences are moderated by education, contrary to Snider-mans politics-oriented theory.Michael Hughes and Steven Tuch, like Sears and his colleagues,explore individualistic and structural attributions for poverty. Most important, their analysis of stratification ideology is broadened both byexamining the views of Asian, Hispanic, and black as well as whiterespondents and by examining how they apply it to Asian and Hispanicpoverty as well as to black poverty. They find that whites are the leastlikely to make structural attributions. However; whites are also lesslikely (though not to the same degree) to make individualistic attributions. These differences generally hold irrespective of target group.They also find, as expected, that structural attributions contribute tomore liberal racial policy preferences. More surprising, they find thatindividualistic attributions cancel those effects of structural beliefs,so they, too, suggest renewed pursuit of the role of individualism. Incommon with other authors, they find substantial effects of racial resentment and, to some degree, political conservatism. Finally, theyfind substantial group differences that survive controls on a host ofattitudinal and demographic variables and, like Bobo, conclude thatperceived group interests may play a more substantial role in supportfor racial policy than previously thought.Jim Sidanius, Pam Singh, John Hetts, and Chris Federico carry outa critical comparison of social dominance theory with Snidermans p0-


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42 DAVID SEARS, JOHN HETTS, JIM SIDANIUS, LAWRENCE BOBO RACE IN AMERICAN POLITICS 43paragement of minority groups. He urges greater research attentionto whites who promote greater racial equality rather than focusingsolely on those who oppose it.Jennifer Hochschild suggests that some of the debates contained inthis volume stem as much from differences in style of intellectual workas from substantive disagreement. Some of the authors are splitters,who contrast alternate theories in either-or fashion, while others arelumpers, who proceed in both-and style. The latter being more toher taste, she is inclined t o find merit in all the approaches represented here. She has several suggestions for future research. First,she is critical of the narrowness of the standard conceptualization andmeasurement of such key concepts as affirmative action, individualism, egalitarianism, and group identity. She believes the field wouldbenefit from a broader range of methods, supplementing the standardsurvey interview with focus groups, experimentation, intensive interviews, and open-ended questions. She applauds a multifocal approach to intergroup conflict, considering no t just the American black-white divide, but also other American ethnic groups as well as European ethnic conflicts. Finally, she urges attention to social structure aswell as to attitudesindeed to h ow social structures may affect thelife chances of minority groups without anyone intending it or recognizing it.Michael Dawson argues that racial attitudes in America mus t beunderstood within the context of a continuing racial hierarchy. Thishierarchical order has not only structured social and political life inAmericas past, but also affects many aspects of contemporary American life. He , therefore, generally comes down with the social structural rather than the politics-centered scholars in these debates. Atthe same time, he does agree with the lat te r that politics really domatter: even if many white Americans are unwilling to accept fundamental racial equality, their racial atti tudes cannot be exclusivelyunderstood in terms of antiblack resentment, antiegalitarianism, orgroup dominance.Most pointedly, he goes on to comment on the racialization of theresearch process itself. The research conducted by white and blacksocial scientists tends to be fragmented along racial lines. No t onlydo minority and white social scientists often occupy separate researchcommunities, primarily investigating opinion within their own racialgroups, bu t also they tend to employ substantially different explanatory models. This racial division of labor may have some malignantconsequences. For example, minority researchers often show consid

erable scholarly bilingualness by reading and thinking about thework of both white and minority researchers, while white researchersoften tend to ignore the work of minority scholars. Moreover, whitesocial scientists tend to normalize their own explanatory models asmore objective and falling within the range of acceptable scientificdiscourse, while perceiving the work of minority scholars as politicallybiasedand scientifically suspect. That may no t only contribute to thefragmentation of the polity as a whole, but also make it more difficultfor us all to understand the intersection between race and politics inAmerican society. Much will be gained if social scientists, like ordinaxycitizens themselves, make a greater effort to listen to one anotheracross the racial divide. This book is a modest effort in this direction.FINAL WORDS

In 1903, W E. B. Du Bois forecast that the defining problem of thetwentieth century would be the color line. By 1944, Gunnar Myrdalhad issued a more optimistic prediction: that the color line was not aninsurmountable divide because it rested on the fundamentally unstable contradiction of racial prejudice with core American values. Overhalf a century later, both points of view continue to have their vigorousadherents in American social science.Disagreement is a powerful engine of scientific advance. It sharpens conceptual boundaries, directs attention to neglected issues,and, of course, prompts the design of would-be decisive experiments(Gilovich, Medvec, and Kahneman 1998, 602). We agree with this description of scientific debate. Th e debate in this field has sometimesbeen acrimonious, bu t it has yielded increasingly focused, refined, andtestable theoretical perspectives on public opinion toward racial poiicy. In fact, we find that t he debate in this very volume suggests anumber of conceptual and theoretical refinements as well as a numberof intriguing new directions. Our hope is that this volume will helpestablish and extend a dialogue that will lead to clarification, amongscholars as among peoples of different national backgrounds, of differen t political preferences, and, yes, of different skin colors.

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Race in American Politics