31
TETRAD i3 Inc. Mobile Early Warning, Intervention and Response to Nuclear Terrakts October 19, 2004 Washington Boca Raton Moscow

Radterrorism Spb Oct04

Embed Size (px)

Citation preview

Page 1: Radterrorism Spb Oct04

TETRAD i3 Inc.

Mobile Early Warning, Intervention andResponse to Nuclear Terrakts

October 19, 2004

WashingtonBoca Raton

Moscow

Page 2: Radterrorism Spb Oct04

Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc. 2

Our Starting Points

• Terrorism is a network phenomenon, not only a “hydra” but a culture with viralattributes

• Technology must be assumed to be completely available to the terrorist and is nolonger an issue of “can it come from former WMD centers or supplies” or is it beingdone in a rogue state camp. US, CA, UK, NL, FR, DE, RU, JP are not “roguestates” but have been basing and staging operations for techno-terrorists.

• Radiation terrorism and the “RDD” is a very attractive modality because it is one ofthe most effective for social-economic-political (SEP) destabilizationEVEN IF THE BOMB KILLS NO ONE

• The likeliest targets for an RDD are those with the highest SEP disruption value

• The likeliest process of assembling an RDD involves multiple trips, parts,components and is absolutely unlikely to be a classic single-source for theradioactive component

• The most effective and deployed preventive countermeasures should also providefirst-responder value and vice versa

Page 3: Radterrorism Spb Oct04

Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc. 3

Nomad Eyes™ and Asymmetric ThinkingApplied to Asymmetric Threats

• Applying the model and methods of terrorism thinking and principles of actionINVERSELY to develop countermeasures that are:

• rapidly and easily deployable (today, not after two years of $$ R&D)• robust but very flexible and fault-tolerant• low-cost, low-tech, easy-to-use, disposable technology where it counts - in the

street and neighborhoods• engages and uses the victims themselves (the general population, “us”)• extensible and reconfigurable as new sensing capabilities evolve (e.g., chem, rad)• usable today as a testing platform in the real-world to build better

countermeasures in the future• disruptive and unpredictable in the eyes of the terrorists - an “enemy in the dark”

to which they cannot know where, when, or how to respond

Page 4: Radterrorism Spb Oct04

Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc. 4

Examination of Terrorist Methods “inside out”and Means of Employing the Victims and Targets for Defense

You can’t take this on a plane or intomany buildings

You can take these almost anywhere.

So do they.

THIS was the key weapon for 9-11and for АВТОЗАВОДСКАЯ

It is also one of the key defenses.When These

Turn Into Those.

Page 5: Radterrorism Spb Oct04

Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc. 5

Value of Mobile Wireless Portable and Handheld Netsfor an Asymmetric, Dynamic Countermeasure System

For Rad Terrorism but also for othertypes and necessarily looking for all,not only one Mobile units using both cellular and

wireless internet/intranets

Freeform but adhering to industrystandards

Incorporating the General Public

Incorporating the commercial sector(advertising and consumer products)

Asynchronous, Atypical, Asymmetric Sensor Fusion

Page 6: Radterrorism Spb Oct04

Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc. 6

Terrorism and Hunting Elephants1. It is hard to miss hitting an elephant even with apoor weapon

2. It is hard to kill one with inadequate technology

3. When the son or grandson of some unfortunatehunter grows up, he will seek out the Big One with avengeance, for a trophy-kill born out of revenge for hisfather’s demise

4. He will take the time to consider innovativetechnology and tactics

America and Russia are classic examples of“Elephant” Targets for Rad and other Substance-Based TerrorismExtensive Surface, Open Borders despite border-controlcountermeasures

Extensive Commerce that cannot be halted or curtailed

Different types of open traffic to and within

Extensive non-reducible non-military nuclear industry

Well-established in-country operating front-line enemy bases

Open, non-reducible communications infrastructure availablefor the enemy

Page 7: Radterrorism Spb Oct04

Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc. 7

But where are the likely targets and means?

In the public mind’s-eye and Angst

And the less-likely form for many reasons

Psycho-Shock is the Aim andNuclear Radiation is Powerfuleven in non-lethal doses

Mass-dispersion withuncertain contact anddegree will create themost widespread fears

Page 8: Radterrorism Spb Oct04

Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc. 8

Targets

OBJECTIVES similar/different

MOTIVES different but complementary

TARGETS different/similar

Consider only the two main targets

Harm an ethnic enemy

Harm largest numbers

Create fear in the largest numbers

Disrupt mass transportation

Destabilize government

Focus on popular (transport)infrastructure

Disrupt economy

Create dramatic shocks that diminishconfidence in govt’s ability to protect

Create logistic/information network havoc

Create electorate unrest, instability

Destabilize government

Focus on economic infrastructure

Page 9: Radterrorism Spb Oct04

Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc. 9

RDD in the context of conventional attacks

• Most likely choice is with massive dispersion through conventional+inflammatoryattack

• Spread the most compounds in the most uncertain paths among the largestnumber of possible affected victims

• Affect the maximum number of structures including transportation routes

• Aim for closure and disruption of normal use/traffic - it does not have to be foryears, just months or weeks

• Multiple small disruptive attacks easier and more effective than one block-buster

Considering SEP Disruption and Destabilization as the “prime-directive” ofterrorist organizations capable/active in planning RDD and chem-bio tactics

Page 10: Radterrorism Spb Oct04

Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc. 10

Nomad Eyes™ Architecture and Principles (I)

Prevention by Detection of the Planning Operation

Movement of multiple types of components, not only RAD substances

Time-matching and space-matching of logically connective, supportive events

“Sensor Fusion” of the Unordinary (Необычный) Kind -Tracer RAD readings perhaps not individually remarkablePhotos of suspicious individuals and vehicles that have some “matches”Exceptional shipping orders, out-of-sequence, special-route, handlingParallel transit/shipment/transaction of non-contraband components useful in an RDD

Goal toward Inverse Reasoning and Abductive Assimilation with other KBs / Xsys

Fall-Back Value: Emergency public alerts and First-Responder capabilities

Page 11: Radterrorism Spb Oct04

Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc. 11

Nomad Eyes™ Architecture and Principles (II)

EVENT !

EVENT !

Class (x) objects received by servers resultsin generation of n graphs representinghypothetical x y… relational maps; themajority are discarded, but events of interesttrigger feedback to both autonomous andhuman-based nodes for additional collectionand reorienting. No node or subset of nodesis reliant and the whole may be considered asa dynamic-geometry cellular automata.

Page 12: Radterrorism Spb Oct04

Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc. 12

MIMD, ETL, ADaM, MENE, Gaming

Data collection and sensor communication based upon classic MIMD parallel processing

♦ Fault tolerance, fail-safe♦ Load balancing♦ Doesn’t communicate? Go to the next/nearest available

Agent-enabled Extract-Transfer-Load processing from classic VLDB technology

♦ Up to 2K rows/sec, 80M rows/day♦ Graph-theoretic architecture adapts well with semantic maps, topic maps, fuzzy logic♦ Agents trigger DB queries in DW, others DBs, notifications to authorities, public

MENE - Morphic Exploratory Navigational Environments

♦ For authorities and responders - high-res 3D Adobe Atmosphere VR worlds♦ For the general public - reduced-scale/detail navigation via cell phones♦ GPS-enabled or not

Turning self-protection and communal security into a Game to get People Active

♦ Implicit, subtle educational-value mobile phone games with contests♦ MIT collaborators - Comparative Media Studies (Klopfer, Jenkins et al)♦ Get attention, participation, and free pertinent data with Positive Reinforcement

Page 13: Radterrorism Spb Oct04

Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc. 13

ADaM is Fast

0

2 0 0 0

4 0 0 0

6 0 0 0

8 0 0 0

1 0 0 0 0

1 2 0 0 0

1 4 0 0 0

1 6 0 0 0

T ypi

cal F

a stlo

adT y

pica

l Tp u

mp

T ypi

cal M

ixed

P ea k

Fa s

tloa d

P ea k

Tp u

mp

P ea k

Fst

ld &

Tp u

mp

T ra n

spa r

e nt F

a stL

T ra n

spa r

e nt T

p um

pS p

e cia

l Fa s

tL"K

itch e

n S i

n k"

P ea k

ET L

Te st Typ e

Rows/S

ec

T yp ica l F a stlo a d

T yp ica l T p u m p

T yp ica l M ixe d

P e a k F a stlo a d

P e a k T p u m p

P e a k F stld & T p u m p

T ra n sp a re n t F a stL

T ra n sp a re n t T p u m p

S p e cia l F a stL

"K itch e n S in k"

P e a k E T L

Page 14: Radterrorism Spb Oct04

Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc. 14

And This is Why

ETL Set (withETLPs)

ETL Set (withETLPs)

Actor objects(nodes)

ETLPs (withactors)

ADaM exec(program)

00

+

-

-

0

-

-

00

+

-

-

0

-

-

00

+

-

-

0

-

-

00

+

-

-

0

-

-

00

+

-

-

0

-

-

00

+

-

-

0

-

-

00

+

-

-

0

-

-

00

+

-

-

0

-

-

P_graph of ETLP (5)

P_graph of Exec(1)

P_graph of ETLS (2)

Page 15: Radterrorism Spb Oct04

Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc. 15

Tidewater -- Newport-Norfolk (I)

Page 16: Radterrorism Spb Oct04

Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc. 16

Tidewater -- Newport-Norfolk (II)

7,400 of @ 400K importers account for more than 80% of imports to USA

Prior to 9/11/2001, less than 2% of 6,000,000 containers inspected

Port Name Tons (1,000's) [2002 stats]

Norfolk Harbor 27,901,354

Newport News 11,300,962

Dual Vulnerability, Dual Terrakt Strategies

(1) Ship-in, use elsewhere (e.g., NYC, Washington)

(2) Disrupt the Port

Suez-class cranes, @ 70m length

Forty 50-ton containers per hour - capacity

Page 17: Radterrorism Spb Oct04

Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc. 17

Port of Baltimore

2M+ residents in Baltimore and surrounding urban center

Main East-Coast rail and interstate highways traverse region

> 30M tons per year, mainly containers

Page 18: Radterrorism Spb Oct04

Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc. 18

Today’s consumer-class RAD components

Our simple conversion with Nomad Eyes™

Li-ion

Rad-sensor element

A/D logic Nomadiksor

othermProc

Existing mobile phonelogic

Interface logic to wireless internet

Page 19: Radterrorism Spb Oct04

Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc. 19

Deployment - Where and How

• Static but ad-hoc– Passage locations and nexus points for cargo and transfer vehicles– Likeliest places but not limited to one configuration

• Pseudo-random

• Personal mobile units– Assigned to staff personnel– Personal cell phones

• Unpredictable - a “two-edged sword” that cuts in in favor of the Defenders– Inverse predictive models can be applied better to the data “mass”– Al Qaeda (or “X”) cannot predict where are our eyes and ears

• Sun Tzu (“Art of War”) - Always Make Your Enemy NervousNervous

Page 20: Radterrorism Spb Oct04

Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc. 20

More on Compound Eyes

Multiple TYPES of sensor data

Multiple INSTANCES at multiple TIMES

INVERSE Methods applied “as if” in surface/subsurface imaging:

the task is to find what events and processes may be the modifiers ofknown or deducible behaviors

USING

•Abductive rules

•Bayesian probabilistic inference

•Fuzzy inference

•Heuristics and “common sense” rules

For all the value of sophisticated detectors, an “outlier” element or two could make all the difference:

Requests for building or water/sewer line plans Repeat-visits of unusual vehicle or people

“Non-sequitur” orders of shielding-quality materials Unusual change in shipping order or pickup

Page 21: Radterrorism Spb Oct04

Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc. 21

Our Technology Focus:Inverse, Nonlinear, Counter-Intuitive (sometimes)

Source

The Object causes diffusion and scattering of the Beam but the laws governing propagation and movement indifferent media are known or can be ascertained. Working backwards from the Result, one computes andestimates the Object on the bsais of how the Beam must have changed in order to produce the Result instead of apattern, computable, for what there would have been if no Object had been present. Now, transfer this InverseModel ought of imaging and into the world of semiotics and intensions. Now, one can do inverse thinking fromsomething Sensed and Observed, in actuality, to determine what were some of the intervening steps and processesout of the usual and ordinary process that would have produced something different, most likely less complex.

Page 22: Radterrorism Spb Oct04

Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc. 22

Making Sense of the Data (I)

• Basic diffusion equation - usable as starting point for inverse problems

• Time-transition is accomplished in Fourier domain

• Transition backwards in time requires amplification of high frequencycomponents - most likely to be noisy and skewed

tu

kxu

∂∂

=∂∂ 1

2

2)()0,( xfxu = 0),(),0( == tautu

∑∞

=

π=

1

sin)(n

n axnfxf dx

axnxf

af

an

π= ∫ sin)(2

0

( )∑∞

=

π−

π=

1sin),(

2

n

tankn a

neftxu Parti

cula

r cre

dits

- R

oger

Duf

our,

MIT

Page 23: Radterrorism Spb Oct04

Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc. 23

Making Sense of the Data (II)

Parti

cula

r cre

dits

- R

oger

Duf

our,

MIT

• Heuristic and a priori constraints needed to maintain physical realism andsuppress distortions from inverse process

• First-pass solution best match or interpolation among a set of acceptablealternatives

• Final solution may minimize the residual error and the regularization term

Xx s.t. yAxxx

∈−= minargˆ

2

2

2

2)(minargˆ xxLyAxx

x−λ+−=

Regularization offers fidelity to the observed data and an a priori determined (e.g., higher-scale-observed) solution model

Page 24: Radterrorism Spb Oct04

Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc. 24

Making Sense of the Data (III)

• Diffusion _ Attraction• Modeling situations and schemas

as composite “images” in n-D• Iterative process with

exploration of parallel tree paths– Speculative track; not required

for Nomad Eyes sensor fusionto be useful to analysts

– Purpose is to enable automationof the analysis and forecastingpost-collection process

– Area of active current research

Parti

cula

r cre

dits

- J.

P. T

hirio

n, IN

RIA

Page 25: Radterrorism Spb Oct04

Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc. 25

Making Sense of the Data (IV) - I3BAT

Sensor 1 Sensor 2

Property 1

Background

Property 3

Property 2

• Multiple modalities– Acoustic, EM, Optical, Text,

NLP, SQL, AI-reasoning…• All looking at the same topic of

interest (aka “region”)• Each sensitive to different

physical/logical properties– “Trigger” data– Contiguity (space/time)– Inference relations– “Hits” with conventional DB

queries (immigration, knownassociations, otherinvestigations)

• Compare with Terrorist CadreTactic models (schemas, maps)Particular credits - Eric Miller, NEU

Page 26: Radterrorism Spb Oct04

Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc. 26

Public involvement, education, gaming

Citizen Corps concept

Educational Games

Flexible E-Paper (FOLED) Commerciali$m

Volunteer Activists

Children, adults

Individual, team

Public kiosks, signs Contests, ads, prizesrelated to games

Page 27: Radterrorism Spb Oct04

Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc. 27

First Responder Capability as well

Notify Maximum Numbers of People ASAP after Terrakt

Redirect Survivors

Keep Other People Away

Assist People Finding Loved Ones

Provide Essential Life-Saving Information Real-Time

Coordinate and Inform First-Responder Teams

Locations of People

Active Sensor Array including useful data from public

Coordinate with volunteers

Page 28: Radterrorism Spb Oct04

Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc. 28

Current Status

Corporate-partnerships

IRAD program

I3BAT Phase 1

ADaM prototype completed

OpenNet prototype completed

Collaboratory prototype completed

Developments with US federal, state homeland security programs

Nomad Eyes Global “Peace Proliferation”

Page 29: Radterrorism Spb Oct04

Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc. 29

Acknowledgements

• J. P. Thirion (INRIA, France)• Roger Dufour (MIT, USA)• Eric Klopfer, Henry Jenkins (MIT, USA)• Eric Miller (NEU, USA)• Center for Surface and Subsurface Imaging

and Sensing• ST Microelectronics, SA• Adobe Corporation

Page 30: Radterrorism Spb Oct04

Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc. 30

A tetrahedron is the strongest and moststable natural geometrical structure

In business and finance as wellas in math and science

HealthcareDisease MgtHealthNVest

ClinicalTherapy

I3DIT

PersonalHealth

BioScan

HomelandSecurity

Nomad Eyes I3Integrative

InverseIntelligence

1+1+1+1 = More -----------------The S4 Synergy

Page 31: Radterrorism Spb Oct04

Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc. 31

Contacts

• Martin J. Dudziak, PhD (Technology)– (954) 545-4500– +7-926-530-1211 or +7-095-172-6369 Moscow (GMT +3)

[email protected] (also [email protected])

• Brent A. Kish (Contracts)– (954) 545-4500– (954) 614-4172– [email protected]

• Tamara F. Koval, MD (Project Mgr; Int’l Relations)– (804) 647-0374– [email protected]

TETRAD I3 Inc., 1206 NW 45 St., Pompano Beach FL 33064