RASYID AL-GHANNOUSYI’STHOUGHT ON ISLAMIC DEMOCRACY · 2020. 7. 30. · To al-Ghannousyi and other Islamic thinkers, democracy is not an Ideology or philosophy to be emulated by

Jaqfi: Jurnal Aqidah dan Filsafat Islam27

RASYID AL-GHANNOUSYI’STHOUGHT ONISLAMIC DEMOCRACY

LukmanThaib & Bara’Barakat Hamad al-Gharibeh. Bharuddin ChePa, ZaidiAbdul Rahman

Email: Lukman Thaib: [email protected]

Deptod Siyasah Shar’iyyah, API- University of Malaya, Malaysia_________________________

AbstrakRasyid al-Ghannousyi, pemikir, pembaharu, pemimpin dan pendiri partai politik al-Nahdhah di Tunisia, tak syak lagi adalah salah seorang pelopor kebangkitan Islamkontemporer. Keberanian dan kepeloporannyanya berkontribusi dalammembangkitkan kesadaran dan kepedulian politis Islam terkait dengan akibat-akibatyang berbahaya dan jahat dari rejim otoriter Zainal Abidin Bin Ali di Tunisia.Tulisan ini mengeksplorasi kehidupan dan pemikirannya dengan fokus khusus padapendekatannya terhadap demokrasi dan kesesuaiannya dengan Islam, kebebasanpublik dan sipil, hak-hal politik warga non-Muslim di Negara Islam dan konseplegitimasi politik dalam pemikiran politik Islam.

Kata Kunci:Kebebasan publik dalam Ilsam; dekokrasi dan demokrasi Islam; hak-hak politik

dan legitimasi politik.

A. PEDAHULUAN1. Al-Ghannousyi’s Stand on

Democracy

The relationship between Islamand the West and the future prospectsof that relationship has been a source ofcontroversy for contemporary Muslimthinkers and activists. Most, if not all,advocate independence from the Westpolitically, economically, andculturally. This stance is based on the

perception that Islamic and westerncivilizations are diametrically opposedas far as their theological andworldviews are concerned. However,the Islamists vary as far as their posturetoward the West is concerned. Theradicals have totally rejected the West,whereas the moderates do not totallypreclude relations with the West butbelieve in selective borrowing from it.

Al-Ghannousyiand otherssuch asHassan al-Turabi, Muhammad Asad

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and MalekBennabiwere amongtheforemost supporters of the latterstance.41 To be more accurate, anevolution in al-Ghannousyi’s attitudetowards the West is discernible fromone of total rejection of everything thatcame from the West to what hedepicted as relative rejection(al-rafd al-nisbi)or objective interaction(al-tafa>’ul al-mawdu>’i).42Al-Ghannousyi views Western thought andphilosophy primarily addressed thesociological and psychologicalproblems of the West and offeredsolutions applicable to its societies,which was culture-bound in nature,43

and thus cannot be rejected in theirtotality. The Islamists should notblindly reject everything that comesfrom the West. To him a moreconstructive and positive interactionwith the West requires Muslims toborrow from the West that which iscompatible with Islam and to rejectwhat is incompatible to Islam.

To al-Ghannousyi and otherIslamic thinkers, democracy is not anIdeology or philosophy to be emulatedby Muslims;it is only as a “politicaltool”or instrument for electing,checking, and rotating political powerand for protecting the civil liberties and

41 Al-Fateh A. Abdelsalam, “Rashid al-Ghannousyi: Portrait of a Contemporary IslamicThinkers and Activist”, 341.42 A.S. Tamimi, Rashid Ghannousyi: A DemocratWithin Islamism, 36.43 Al-Fateh A. Abdelsalam, “Rashid al-Ghannousyi: Portrait of a Contemporary IslamicThinkers and Activist”, 342.

basic rights of citizens. He admits thatMuslims need to learn from the West,which after centuries of struggle hasfound the spirit of dialogue. Muslimsneed to learn how to build a democraticpluralistic system from the West, but asMuslims, he says that democracy is apart of Islam and he holdsrationalism,humanism, the possibilityof interpretation(ijtihad), the existenceof diversity within Islam, the concept ofpopular consultation(syu>ra>), and theapplication of the concept of consensus(ijma’) which is strongly rooted inIslam,which he considered tools ofWestern democracy compatible withthese Islamic democratic values andprinciples. 44

Al-Ghannousyi is implying thatthat there is the possibility thatdemocracy may have Islamic roots.45

Europe benefited from the Islamiccivilization’s heritage of engineeringand mathematics, and as a resultadvanced technology. It seems perfectlyreasonable that Europeans may have‘borrowed’ other ideas as well. Inaddition, MalekBennabi in his bookal-Isla>m wa al-Dimuqra>tiyyah’(Islamand Democracy) posed the question: Isthere democracy in Islam? For whichBennabianswered in the affirmative:Islam is a democratic ideology that

44Gudrun Kramer, “Islamist Notions ofDemocracy”, in Middle East Report, July-August (1993), 2-8.45 Mohamed .E, Hamdi, The Politicisation ofIslam: A Case Study of Tunisia, 104; A.S. Tamimi,Rashid Ghannousyi: A Democrat WithinIslamism,8.


bestows on Muslims political and socialrights and the right to resistenslavement. He observed thatdemocracy was practiced in the firstIslamic state of the righteous caliphs(Khulafa>’ al-Ra>shidu>n); however,this democracy ceased to exist as theUmayyads took over theCaliphate(khila>fah) and transformed itinto a dynastic rule.

Al-Ghannousyi was profoundlyinspired by the ideas of MalekBennabion democracy and found them moremature than those espoused by theschool of SayyidQutb, which rejecteddemocracy. However, despite hisacceptance of democratic tools, al-Ghannousyi strongly criticises parts ofWesterndemocracy. First, he points outthe historical problems of generalsuffrage. In the beginning only menwith property were allowed to vote andwomen’s suffrage was onlyaccomplished in the first half or themiddle of the 20th century. Second, hefurther criticises the Westerndemocracy of today as “a multi-partysystem of governance exercised by anelite of political leaders”.46It is temptingto interpret al-Ghannousyi’sargumentation as a criticism of theprocedural and formal democracyperspective. If he resents a systemwhere political power is fought overwithin an elite of political leaders, al-Ghannousyi is approaching asubstantive argumentation. This stance

46 A.S. Tamimi, Rashid Ghannousyi: A DemocratWithin Islamism,86

promotes better accountability frompoliticians, and greater publicparticipation in politics. Although heembraces the instruments of democracylike elections and the parliamentarysystem, but at the same time al-Ghannousyi criticizes the philosophiesof Western liberal democracies. It isespecially the secular and nationalisticvalues that he rejects.47 For ademocratic regime to succeed it wouldneed to be founded on soundphilosophies and humanistic values. Toal-Ghannousyi, such a philosophy canbe found in Islam.48 If one moves awayfrom the understanding that democracyis a strictly Western concept, theargumentation of al-Ghannousyi opensfor an Islamic democracy as asubstantive model.

B. HAsil dan Pembahasan1. His Early Life

Rasyid al-Ghannounsyi was bornon 22 June 1941 in a small village ofHamma in the province of Gabes nearthe southeastern coast of Tunisia duringthe turbulence of World War II. Al-Ghannousyi grew-up under theseconditions of World War II. His fatherwas treated by the villagers as a teacherand a Mufti. His maternal uncle, al-Bashir, had a great influence over hisyoungnephew. Al-Bashir was anenthusiast of Pan-Arabism and its

47 Carsten Thomassen.“Religiostro pamenneskerettigheter”, 2.48 A.S. Tamimi, Rashid Ghannousyi: A DemocratWithin Islamism,89.


leader, Jamal Abdul Nasser of Egypt.Al-Ghannousyi would listen attentivelyto his uncle’s analysis of politicaldevelopments during that tumultuousperiod. In addition to this early“political education”, as a child, al-Ghannousyi witnessed the emergenceof the armed struggle against the Frenchcolonizers. The heavy-handed policyand ruthlessness of the colonizersimbued him with a deep aversiontowards colonialism. In addition, hisearly readings about the atrocitiescommitted by Zionist terrorist gangsagainst Palestinians in the late 1940sdeeply affected him.49

At the age of eighteen, al-Ghannousyi left the village for thecapital, Tunis, to pursue his secondaryschool education at the prestigiousmadrasah al-Zaytunah, where heobtained a degree in theology. Upongraduation al-Ghannousyi joined theKhaldunia Secondary School. The yearsal-Ghannousyi spent in al-Zaytunahexposed him, and made him moresensitive, to the identity crisis which theFrench, and after independence, theBourguiba Government, had createdthrough the extensive secularization ofTunisia. In the name of modernization,Bourguibasidelined Tunisia’s Arab–Islamic heritage replacing it with theofficial and elite Francophile culture.For Bourguiba, Islam represented thepast, and the West was Tunisia’s only

49 A.S. Tamimi, Rashid Ghannousyi: A DemocratWithin Islamism, (Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress, 2001), 3-6.

hope for a modern future.50 Al-Ghannousyi summed this identity crisisas follows: “I remember we used to feellike strangers in our own country. Wehad been educated as Muslim andArabs, while we could see the countrytotally moulded by the Frenchculture”.51

His Arabic education at al-Zaytuna naturally barred him fromentering the French-speakingUniversity at home, so in 1964 he wentto Damascus where he enrolled in theFaculty of Letters wherein hestudiedphilosophy. His philosophicalstudies deeply influenced his thought,and its impact was discernible in hiswritings and mode of thinking. As astudent he briefly joined a secular Pan-Arab Party, the Syrian NationalistSocial Party, which was influenced byJamal Abdul Nasser of Egypt. While inSyria,he also established close contactwith the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood(Syrian Ikhwa>nulMuslimi>n), whichresulted in his strong attachment to theideology of the Muslim Brotherhood,which he subsequently “adopted in itstotality”.52 In 1968 al-Ghannousyigraduated with a master’s degree inphilosophy, and left for France tofurther his studies at the Sorbonne.

50 John Esposito, The Islamic Treat, Myth andReality, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992),153.51 Abdul Wahhab al-Affendi, “ The Long MarchForward ” in Inquiry, (London: 1987),124.

52 Linda G. Jones, “Portrait of Rashid al-Ghannousyi” in Middle East Report, (WashingtonD.C., 1988), 170.


However, his studies at the SorbonneUniversity had to be cut short becauseof family difficulties, and he returnedhome in 1969 and taught philosophy ina secondary school.53

While teaching philosophy, al-Ghannousyi Islamizedthe curriculumwhich to him reflected a materialisticWestern philosophical bias as presentedin Marxism, Freudianism, Darwinismand existentialism. To al-Ghannousyi,the curriculum primarily addressed thepsychological and sociological issues ofWestern societies and was not suited forthe problems faced by Islamic societies.In his critical analysis, he presentedIslam as an alternative to his youngstudents throughout the 1970s54 and ashis students went to university, hisideas began to take root.

2. Al-Ghannousyi’sInvolvement in the IslamicMovement

The history of the contemporaryIslamic movement in Tunisia is knownas the HarakahAn-Nahdah(TheRenaissance Movement).55It was firstfounded in 1970 as al-Jama’ah al-

53 A.S. Tamimi, Rashid Ghannousyi: A DemocratWithin Islamism,4.54 Al-Fateh A. Abdelsalam, “Rashid al-Ghannousyi: Portrait of a Contemporary IslamicThinkers and Activist”, in Contemporary IslamicPolitical Thought: A Study of Eleven IslamicThinkers, (Kuala Lumpur: International IslamicUniversity Malaysia, 2009), 338.55 Mohamed .E, Hamdi, The Politicisation ofIslam: A Case Study of Tunisia, (Colorado:Westview Press, 1998), 7.

Isla>miyyah(The Islamic Group), thesame movement was renamed toHarakah al-Ittija>h al-Isla>mi orIslamic Tendency/Trend Movement(ITM)in 1981. The movement finallysettled on the name Hizbial-Nahdahin1988, removing religious connectionsfrom the name after pressure from thegovernment. Despite the resignation ofa few of its leaders with the formationof the new group, the majority of itsmembers remained loyal to Al-Nahdahmaking it the main oppositionalforce in Tunisia .56

From the mid-60s the Al-ZaitunaMosque served as a gathering place fortraditional scholars avoidingBourguiba’s secularizationpolicies57which aimed at modernisingTunisia and weaken the religiousinfluence in the country; believing theroad to modernization was throughsecularism.Some of these scholars helddiscussion circles. It was through thismeans that the founding figuresRasyidal-Ghannousyi, Abdul Fatah Mourouand Ahmida al-Naifer met.58Due to thegovernment ban of such organizations,the group (al-Jama’ah) remainedunderground, but its leaders operatedunder the platform of a government-sponsored society called “The Societyfor the Preservation of the Holy

56 Mohamed .E, Hamdi, The Politicisation ofIslam: A Case Study of Tunisia, 7.57 Emad Eldin Shahin, Political Ascent:Contemporary Islamic Movements in NorthAfrica, (Colorado: Westview Press, 1997), 67.58 Mohamed .E, Hamdi, The Politicisation ofIslam: A Case Study of Tunisia, 16.


Qur’an”. According to al-Ghannousyi,they acted as a religious and culturalresponse to Bourguiba’s anti-religiousand pro-Western policies.59 Thepolitical,social,economic and culturalbackwardness of the Tunisian society,which was heavily influenced by theWest, as well as its loss of identity andmorals, called for a return to Islam.60

This continuous removal from Arab andMuslim culture and identity wouldexplain why many turned to theIslamists. Al-Ghannousyi and hiscolleagues used aforementionedplatform with the express desire torebuild the “Arab-Muslim character” ofTunisian society, drawing from theteachings of such Muslim revivalists asAbu ‘Ala al-Maududi, Hassan al-Bannaand SayyidQutb. However, as soon asthe government found out about theactivities of that cell, it expelled itsmembers. This signalled the beginningof a long relation of animosity withtheBourguiba government.

Bourguiba was a popular leadingindependence-figure and as such therewas little opposition when he seizedpower in 1956. He is still regarded bymany as a leader without a strongpolitical direction. This can be seen inthe various natures and directions of hispolicies. When for instance the socialistexperiment failed,Bourguiba tried an‘open door’policy through economic

59 Mohamed .E, Hamdi, The Politicisation ofIslam: A Case Study of Tunisia, 12.60 John Esposito, The Islamic Treat, Myth andReality, 163.

liberalization. These shifts in policyshowed that Bourguiba lackedideological roots in politics, whichclearly gave the president a legitimacyproblem.

Additionally, when the shiftingpolicies did not work, and poverty andunemployment rates were continuouslyrising, the confidence in thegovernment was in decline as the crisisof efficiency spread. Withunemployment rates as high as 25% ofthe population, most of whom wereyouths under the age 20,61 the Islamistsincreasingly became a viable alternativegovernment. The Islamists grasped theopportunity by participating in the 1978demonstration of the General Union ofTunisian Workers (UGTT), whichaimed at defending workers’ rights andpropagating an Islamic policy ofdevelopment. The governmentdeployed its military to stop thedemonstrations, which resulted in asignificant shift of public support fromthe government to the Islamists.

In 1979 the movement’s supportwas wider than anyone had expected.The movement’s journal al-Ma’rifahhad increased from 6000 reviews in1971 to 25000 review in 1979.62 Themovement leaders felt they had toreconsider their activity and called for a

61 Emad Eldin Shahin, Political Ascent:Contemporary Islamic Movements in NorthAfrica, 74.62 Marion Boulby, “The Islamic Challenge: TunisiaSince Independence”, in Third World Quarterly,vol.10, no2. (1988), 600.


conference to discuss and decide on themovement’s future.63 70 of the mostprominent members attended and inAugust, 1979, agreed upon aconstitution for their secret association(MIT). Rasyid al-Ghannousyi waselected president(Amir) and a detailedstructure for the whole organizationwas worked out.

As 1980 drew to a close and 1981began, two incidentsaffected the policyof the movement(ITM), and in themonth of December 1980 two of itsmembers were arrested, and themovement calculated that it was only amatter of time before the governmentand the police would know about themovement’s activities and take action.However, in the same year, the newPrime Minister, Mr.Mazali,who theyregarded as a political liberalist wasappointed and encouragedBourguibatoopen up for politicalpluralism in April 1981.64 This eventresulted in the movement’s (MIT) pushtoward openness. It applied for officialrecognition as a political party in June1981 with great expectations.65Thispolitical openness however did not lastlong and in autumnof 1981, 61 of themovement’s leaders werearrested.66

63 Mohamed .E, Hamdi, The Politicisation ofIslam: A Case Study of Tunisia, 34.64 Emma C. Murphy, Economic and PoliticalChange in Tunisia, (Basingstoke: MacMillanPress, 1999), 63.65 Mohamed .E, Hamdi, The Politicisation ofIslam: A Case Study of Tunisia, 38.66 Emad Eldin Shahin, Political Ascent:Contemporary Islamic Movements in North

MIT was not recognized as a politicalparty but other opposition parties weretolerated. Still, these parties had to waituntil 1983/1984 to be fullyrecognized.67 Nevertheless, due toheavy loans from the World Bank, andto fulfil the World Bank’s requirementfor new loans, in 1983 the governmentcut the state subsidies on wheat, whichdoubled the price of bread and pastaproducts.68 This led to ‘bread riots’ inJanuary 1984 throughoutTunisia.69Although the riots wereessentially a popular response to thesocio-economic situation,70the Islamistsmanaged to turn this situation to theiradvantage; Islamists rhetoric was usedin the demonstrations and support forIslam was massive.

To calm the situation the PrimeMinister Mazali managed to convincePresident Bourguiba to free most of theIslamists arrested in 1981.71 The Mazalirelaxed policy toward the Islamistsgroup was to neutralize the Islamists

Africa, 87. Marion Boulby, “The IslamicChallenge: Tunisia Since Independence”, 609.67 Emma C. Murphy, Economic and PoliticalChange in Tunisia,64.68 Marit Tjomsland, This but also the other:Expressions of the Islamic Trend in Tunisia,(Bergen: University of Bergen, 2000), 89.69 Mohamed .E, Hamdi, The Politicisation ofIslam: A Case Study of Tunisia, 47.

70Gudrun Kramer, “The Integration of theIntegrists: A Comparative Study of Egypt, Jordanand Tunisia” in GhassanSalame(ed.), DemocracyWithout Democrat? The Renewal of Politics inMuslim World, (London: I.B. Tauris Publishers,1994), 201.71 Marit Tjomsland, This but also the other:Expressions of the Islamic Trend in Tunisia, 89.


while undermining the worker’s union(UGTT).72 But President Bourguiba didnot trust the Islamists (MIT) who bythat time was clearly the strongestopposition force in Tunisia. This led tothe ousting of Prime MinisterMazali in1986 and the Islamists were again putunder heavy repression,73and the newPrime Minister ZainalAbidinBin Aliwas appointed. In March 1987, therepression culminated in a major crack-down on ITM where hundreds werearrested and accused of planning tooverthrow the Tunisian government.74

The New Prime Minister, BenAli however, believed Bourguiba hadfailed to implement democracy inTunisia and set forth a bloodless coupd’etat on Novermber 7th 1987, whichoverthrew the Bourguiba presidency.Ben Ali became President and promisedhe would democratize Tunisia. The newPresident also accused his predecessorof disregarding the Arab and Islamicidentity of Tunisia, which would nowbe restored under a new regime,75 andhe announced a wish for politicalreconciliation and illustrated this byreleasing nearly all Islamist prisoners

72 Abdul Baki Hermassi, “The Rise and the Fall ofIslamist Movement in Tunisia”, Laura Guazzone(ed), The Islamist Dilemma: The Political Role ofIslamist Movements in Contemporary ArabWorld, (Reading: Ithaca Press, 1995), 107.73 Marion Boulby, “The Islamic Challenge: TunisiaSince Independence”, 610.74 Marit Tjomsland, This but also the other:Expressions of the Islamic Trend in Tunisia, 93.75 Mohamed .E, Hamdi, The Politicisation ofIslam: A Case Study of Tunisia, 64.

connected to MIT.76 This was followedby a mutual acceptance between MITand the new ruler(Ben Ali). Theycooperated with the PacteNationale, anexpression of political consensusamong all political groups aimed atgetting Tunisia back on tract.77 TheMIT was represented in the HighIslamic Council, a governmentappointed body that dealt with allreligious matters in a consultativemanner. The Islamic studentorganization was also legalized, but anofficial recognition of MIT was still puton hold.78

The ITM tried hard to win theconfidence of the Ben Ali government.They even changed their name fromITM to Hizbial-Nahdah(TheRenaissance Party) to fulfil thegovernment’s requirements that nopolitical party could be based onreligious values.79 Nevertheless, al-Nahdah was forbidden to participate asa political party in the 1989 elections.Instead they participated and contestedas independent Islamist candidates80

76 Marit Tjomsland, This but also the other:Expressions of the Islamic Trend in Tunisia, 9577 Abdul Baki Hermassi, “The Rise and the Fall ofIslamist Movement in Tunisia”, 109. MaritTjomsland, This but also the other: Expressions ofthe Islamic Trend in Tunisia, 95.78 Abdul Baki Hermassi, “The Rise and the Fall ofIslamist Movement in Tunisia”, 110.79 Abdul Baki Hermassi, “The Rise and the Fall ofIslamist Movement in Tunisia”, 111. Mohamed.E, Hamdi, The Politicisation of Islam: A CaseStudy of Tunisia, 64.80 Emad Eldin Shahin, Political Ascent:Contemporary Islamic Movements in NorthAfrica, 100.


covering 20 of a total of 25constituencies(La Presse:1989b).According to official results given to LaPresse, the government party (RCD)obtained 34% of the votes, theindependent candidates won 54% of thevotes and the rest of the official partiesobtained approximately 5% support(LaPresse. 1989a). Al-Nahdah’s support inthe major cities,including Tunis, wasaround 40% of the votes. Regardless ofwhether the election results wereaccurate or not, they strongly indicatedthat the Islamic groups had become anestablished oppositional force inTunisia, rendering then a threat to BenAli’s regime. Two factors seemed tohave influenced the government’sdecision: the impressive performance ofal-Ghannousyi’s candidates in thenational election which highlighted al-Nahdah’s political potential, and thevictory of the Islamic Salvation Front(FIS) in the 1989 municipal elections inAlgeria. These developments cluedPresident Ben Ali and many Muslimrulers to the dangers posed byIslamists.81

3. Al-Ghannousyi’s ExileShortly after, themovement’s

name changed to al-Fajr but soon afterthe government put an end to this newmovement. Al-Ghannousyi went intoexile to London in May 1989. In hisexile, al-Ghannousyi dedicated most of

81 Emad Eldin Shahin, Political Ascent:Contemporary Islamic Movements in NorthAfrica, 101.

his energy to the cause of da’wah andpolitical activism.However, the fate ofIslamists in Tunisia was grim. TheTunisian government took measures tocontrol Islam by installing governmentappointed imams andclosing themosque after prayers. Al-Nahdah’smembers were arrested and theirfamilies and sympathisers wereeliminated. By 1992 AmnestyInternational reported that at least 8000followers of al-Nahdah wereimprisoned in Tunisia.82 Thegovernment was now clearly intolerantof any public dissent(Shahin.1997:103).83 The announcedelectoral reform of 1994(Dunn.1996:162) resulted in littlechange. Even though 19 seats inparliament were now reserved for theopposition parties, the opposition wasunableto win any additional seats.Moreover, it seems like Ben Alistrengthened his position as anautocratic President when arresting theformer head of the Tunisian League forHuman Right Muncif al-Marzuqi, whentrying to challenge Ben Ali forPresident.84After eliminating hisopponent, Ben Ali won the usual99.91% of votes in the 1994 elections.

82 Emad Eldin Shahin, Political Ascent:Contemporary Islamic Movements in NorthAfrica, 101.83 Emad Eldin Shahin, Political Ascent:Contemporary Islamic Movements in NorthAfrica, 103.84 Emad Eldin Shahin, Political Ascent:Contemporary Islamic Movements in NorthAfrica, 103.


Ever since the beginning of the1990s it has been impossible for al-Nahdah to act openlyinTunisia. Al-Nahdah has continued its work byholding conferences abroad. In 1995they restructured the organization andredefined its policy towards theTunisian regime. Most importantly,they stressed their non-violent natureand decided working for the preventionof further political polarization insociety by fighting for political rights ofthe entire Tunisian society. Living inexile in London,Rasyid Ghannousyiwas re-elected leader of al-Nahdah atthis conference with only 52% of thevotes.85 He established an al-Nahdahoffice in London, and constantly travelsto give lectures and interviews aboutthe al-Nahdah policy. He maintainedregular contact with other Islamistgroups, but argues for variations inIslamist policy in that differentcountries requires solutions adjusted totheir specific context(Interview with theauthor, June 2003).

4. Al-Ghannousyi’s PoliticalThought

During the 1970s and 1980spolitical ideas such as public freedomand Islamic democracy was never anissuefor Islamist groups in Tunisia. Al-Ghannousyi and his colleaguesemphasized the question of educationand morality.86 Al-Ghannousyi wanted

85 A.S. Tamimi, Rashid Ghannousyi: A DemocratWithin Islamism,72.86 Mohamed .E, Hamdi, The Politicisation of

an educational system that was Arabinstead of Frenchthat emphasized onreligious education. It was throughclose contact with the Algerian Muslimintellectual and thinkerMalekBennabi,who al-Ghannousyi considered “apillar of Islamic thought and arevivalist of IbnKhaldun’s Islamicrationalism”.87To al-Ghannousyi,Bennabi’smethodology was differentfrom what had been accepted inorthodox Islamic methodology whichenvisioned reality as derived solelyfrom the religious text.88Theseexperiences had a profound impact onal-Ghannousyi who came to conceiveIslamic rationalism as a symbiosis ofreason and revelation.

This new outlook sensitized al-Ghannousyi to some of the majordeficiencies in the traditional Islamicmovement. The sources of thisdeficiency lay within the traditionalIslamic movement itself. Al-Ghannousyi cited two events of thedeliberating issues of the Tunisiansociety at that time, namely the issuesof the ‘working class ’and the ‘role andposition of women’ in society. ToGhannousyi, the Islamists in Tunisiahave failed to mobilize the workingclass; leaving the door wide open forthe proponents of other ideologies todominate this sector. Likewise, al-

Islam: A Case Study of Tunisia, 102.87 A.S. Tamimi, Rashid Ghannousyi: A DemocratWithin Islamism,31.88 Al-Fateh A. Abdelsalam, “Rashid al-Ghannousyi: Portrait of a Contemporary IslamicThinkers and Activist”, 338.


Ghannousyi argued that the influence ofthe Islamists on the female sector hasalso been restricted for the same reason.The reason behind these failures can beattributed to the Islamists’ ignoranceand insensitivity regarding the politicaland social problems of the workingclass and lack of awareness andinsensitivity toward the oppression,degradation, restrictions of women’srole inthe life of society that they haveendured during the long centuries ofdecline. It was natural that womenbecame influenced by the enticementsof the West, because they had beensuffering under the yoke of anoppressive, false Islam, sustained by thesilence of the “men of religion”.89 Whatthe Muslim woman needed was aliberation movement to restore her toherself and to her innate nature as aguardian of the heritage of mankind anda partner of man in liberating herselfand him from the forces of exploitation.According to al-Ghannousyi, theIslamists group must also breakawayfrom the traditional belief that theworkers union such as ‘General Unionof Tunisian Workers(UGTT)’ inTunisia was alien to the Islamic view oflife which disapproves of class conflictand bears no pretence of absolutequality in material status.

Due to this daring thought of al-Ghannousyi the Tunisian workersunions were attracted to his ideas and

89 Al-Fateh A. Abdelsalam, “Rashid al-Ghannousyi: Portrait of a Contemporary IslamicThinkers and Activist”, 339.

many of the Tunisian workers weredrawn to al-Ghannousyi’smessage.Over the next few years theIslamic movement became a majorforce in the UGTT as more and morerural and urban workers openlysympathized with the Islamists. Thatwas a daring move which put al-Ghannousyiand his movement in a classof their own. Although within theperiod of 1970-78, the Islamicmovement in Tunisia remained focusedon the religio-cultural transformation ofsociety, however, in the late seventiesas a result of the trade union’sdemonstrations, the movement had tofocus more seriously on political issuesin reaction to the domestic situation inTunisia. The Islamists foundthemselves forced to rethink their ideasand strategy. It was an uphill task foral-Ghannousyi and his movement inaddressing current issues of workers’rights, jobs, wages, poverty,westernization versus a more authenticnational and cultural identity,democracy, political participation andpolitical freedom were raised; thuspresenting a living Islam rather than the“Museum Islam”.

According to al-Ghannousyi, thisshift was a necessary step for themovement to “link with the realities ofthe Tunisian society”. Thesecircumstances compelled him and themovement to emphasize two axes: theaxis of identity and the axis of civilliberty. The movement aimed to defendIslam as an identity, not only a state or


way of life, and in order to fight for theprinciple of civil liberties the Islamicmovement found it necessary to co-operate with other oppositional forceswithin Tunisia(Interview with al-Shira.1994:3).

5. Public and Civil Liberties

For the Tunisian government andits ruling Destourian Socialist Party,Islamism was an anathema to theirespousal of “modernity” and“progress”. By July 1981, the Tunisianregime moved to round up al-Ghannousyi and all known leaders andmembers of the ITM and imprisonedthem. Al-Ghannousyi remained inprison from 1981 to 1984.90 While inprison, he memorized the Qur’an,studied some works on tafsir and fiqh,and completed the draft of his bestknown book “al-Hurriyah al-‘Ammah fial-Dawlah al-Islamiyyah” (PublicLiberties in the Islamic State), which hecompleted later on while living in exilein London. It was published in 1993 bythe Centre of Arab Unity Studies inBeirut.

According to al-Ghannousyi, themission of his movement is to win thestruggle for civil liberties(TunisianInsight.1997).In one of his most recentarticles entitled “Freedom First”, al-Ghannousyiattempted to demonstratethe relationship between the democraticprocess and liberty. Al-Ghannousyiconsiders individual liberties as the

90 Mohamed .E, Hamdi, The Politicisation ofIslam: A Case Study of Tunisia, 103.

cornerstone of governance(http://www.aljazeera net.12/21/2009).To support his argument,he asserted that Yusuf al-Qaradawibelieved that “liberty” must takeprecedent even over applications ofIslamic belief as embodied in Islamiclaw(syari’ah),and according to him, thisfreedom is achieved through religion. Inhis view, Islam was revealed toguarantee man’s essential needs.91Suchguarantees given through Islamconstitute, according to al-Ghannousyi,the general framework of human rights.

In establishing and refining alegal framework for man’s freedom, al-Ghannousyi credits al-Shatibi(d.1388A.D.) for elaborating this framework inhis book al-Muwafaqat, which sets outthe Maqasid al-Syari’ah(the objectiveof Islamic law) as being the realizationof the main interest of humanity. Theseinterests are classified into daruriyat(essential needs), hajiyat (important,but not essential needs), andtahsiniyat(ameliorative needs). The firstclass consists of guarantees necessaryfor the protection of faith, life, reason,progeny, and wealth. The idea is thatIslam, as a religion, was revealed forthe purpose of guaranteeing andpreserving man’s essential needs. Theguarantees provided by Islam foraccomplishing this end constitute thegeneral framework of human rights,including the right to choose a faith, theright to life, the right to education, the

91 A.S. Tamimi, Rashid Ghannousyi: A DemocratWithin Islamism, 76.


right to free expression, the right tohave a family, and the right to ownproperty.92

Al-Ghannousyiopines that thefirst and most important human rightguaranteed by Islam is the freedom ofbelief, which he defines as theindividual’s right to choose his faithfree from any compulsion. He explainsthat by virtue of being a God-givenright, freedom of choice is sanctifiedand guaranteed by Islamiclaw(shari>’ah). The golden rule in thismatter, he points out, is found in theQur’anic verse: “No compulsion inreligion” (QS 2:256). It is from this rulethat the rights of non-Muslims in anIslamic state derive legitimacy. Al-Ghannousyi addresses this topic indetail in his book titled ‘Huqu>qGhayral-Muslimi>n fi> al-Mujtama’ al-Isla>mi(The Right to Nationality Statusof Non-Muslim Citizens in a MuslimNation)’ published by the IslamicFoundation in America in 1990.

Al-Ghannousyi is quite negativeto the liberal view on freedom.According to him, liberties in the Westare guaranteed through stateinstitutions, but they are only formal, heargues. Man is given the theoreticalright to do various things, but he is notgiven any real power to fulfil theserights. He criticizes the way a limited

92 Rashid al-Ghannousyi, “The Participation ofIslamists in a Non-Islamic Government”, inAzzamTamimi (ed.), Power Sharing Islam,(London: Library of Muslim World Publications,1993), 43.

group of citizens have monopolizedpower, wealth, and culture.93 Thisfollows the critique given by the NewLeft, Marxists and the substantivedemocracy perspective on liberalism.Power and wealth is gathered in thehands of a small group of elites.Equality and total freedom is not reallyachieved for the rest of the citizens.Hence,al-Ghannousyi also arguesagainst what he calls ‘negativefreedom’.This liberal view saw the needto secure citizens from the state. Al-Ghannousyi holds a more ‘positiveconcept of freedom’. He is compared toKant who held that freedom is theability to realize oneself. Choices areconnected to obedience toward morallaw.94 In comparison, al-Ghannousyisees the moral law as obedience toIslam. In his version, freedom isachieved through servitude to God. Hebelieves the main message in Islam is toguarantee human rights.95 The objectiveof Islamic law (shari>’ah) is meant toserve the interest of human beings, saysal-Ghannousyi. Religion depends ontrue faith and free will, thus the startingpoint of Islamic human rights is thefreedom of belief.96 In his book “Public

93 A.S. Tamimi, Rashid Ghannousyi: A DemocratWithin Islamism,7394 A.S. Tamimi, Rashid Ghannousyi: A DemocratWithin Islamism,75.95 Carsten Thomassen.“Religiostro pamenneskerettigheter”. Interview with RashidGhannouchi for 3. Verden Magasinet X, 6/98.Found at: www.solidaritetshuset.Org/x/9806/islam.htm (1998), 1.96 Mohamed .E, Hamdi, The Politicisation ofIslam: A Case Study of Tunisia, 107.


Liberties in the Islamic State” he listsseven basic rights:Equality(all citizensare equal before the law), freedom topractice religious worship, freedom topropagatereligions other than Islam,freedom and dignity of the humanbeing, freedom of thought andexpression, and freedom of privateownership and socialrights(employment, health care andsocial security).97 These values are inaccordance with democratic values. Thequestion is whether they are respectedwithin the Islamic democracy…?.

6. Al-Ghannousyi’sConception of IslamicDemocracy

The most important questionsthat revolve around the compatibility ofIslam and democracy are the potentialresources of the Islamic tradition tooperate effectively to meet the demandfor popular democratic participation inthe contemporary political system. TheQur’an and the Syari’ah only providesome fundamental principles pertainingto the political and constitutional affairsof Muslims. In other words, thesyari’ah does not prescribe any uniformsystem of government for Muslimcountries. Al-Ghannousyi holds theview that “Islam does not include apolitical system”,98 however, he

97 Mohamed .E, Hamdi, The Politicisation ofIslam: A Case Study of Tunisia, 108.98 Turkish Daily News (13 November 1996).Interview with Rashid Ghannousyi. Found at:www.turkishdaily

believes “there are political guidelinesand values found in Islam, but there isno detailed political system tofollow”.99 The syari’ah has refrain fromproviding detailed regulations for allthe changing requirements of Muslimsocial existence. According to al-Ghannousyi, God has left the formingof a political system to the people, aslong as they do not separate religioncompletely from politics. He said“politics should be inspired by Islamicvalues. These values inspired by thesyari’ah should have an importantimpact on political conduct”.100

The issue of legislation in a statebased on Islamic law (syari’ah) relatesto many problems of administrationwhich are not touched upon by theIslamic law.It is believed that with thepassage of time the practical form ofgovernment for any country willnaturally change and therefore theIslamic law (syari’ah) has left it to thecommunity(ummah) to develop relevantforms of political and governmentalsystems through an exercise ofindependent reasoning (ijtihad) inconsonance with the spirit of the lawand the best interest of the nation.101 In

news.com/tdn/old_editions/11_13_96/feature.htm

99Nina Eikesaeth, Islamism and Democracy:Is the Tunisian al-Nahdah and Example ofDemocratic Islamist Movement? (Oslo:University Oslo, 2003), 78.

100Nina Eikesaeth, Islamism and Democracy:Is the Tunisian al-Nahdah and Example ofDemocratic Islamist Movement? (Oslo:University Oslo, 2003),78.101LukmanThaib, Democratic Values in the


matters affecting the communal aspectof community life, no legislationreasoning or decision can be left to thediscretion of individuals, but thedecision must be based on a definiteconsensus(ijma’) of the wholecommunity(ummah).This can beimplemented through the process ofmodern forms of public participationsuch as referendums or generalelections.This indicates that Islam onlyprovides broad principles and a generalframework in the area of worldlyinteractions(mu’a>malah) which makesit possible for the Muslim communityto evolve and meet the needs of everyage.

According to al-Ghannousyi,after a hundred over years of conflictresolutions, Western communities havefound that their differences can besolved through political means insteadof bloody war. Muslims areincreasingly adopting democracy.102Al-Ghannousyi’s theory of compatibilitybetween Islam and democracy stemsfrom the assumption that thegovernment in Islam embodies acivilian authority that is answerable tothe public. It would follow that therewould be no place for theocracy inIslam because policy-makers could, andought to, be opposed or criticized byindividuals or groups if their policy-making were thought to be ill-advised

Islamic Political System & Muslim Politics inMalaysia, (Kuala Lumpur: Printed by UMPublishers, 2012), 5.102 Turkish Daily News (13 November 1996).

or misguided.103 Stemming from theconcept of enjoining good andforbidding evil (al-amrbilma'ruf wan-nahyu‘anilmunkar) is the convictionthat standing up to the authorities whenthey go wrong, or endeavouring tocorrect them, is one of the mostimportant duties in Islam.

7. Al-Ghannousyi’s PoliticalSystem Based on Values

Al-Ghannousyi believed thatalthough Islam does not provided adetailed political system to follow;there are nonetheless politicalguidelines and principles such aspopular consultation (shu>ra>),majority rule (al-hukmu al-aghla>biyyah), popular sovereignty(al-siya>dah) and maqa>sid al-shari>’ahwith its five principles.According to him, Islam includes theseseveral principles that are shared withdemocratic values in the moderngovernmental system. These democraticvalues in Islam are inspired by thesyari’ah and should have an importantimpact on political conduct.

The Islamic system ofgovernment, which he proclaims to bethe ultimate project of the modernIslamic movement, is said by him to becharacteristically bound by a set ofdivine guidelines. It is a system that isaimed at achieving justice and peace inthe world. The philosophy behind this

103 A.S. Tamimi, Rashid Ghannousyi: A DemocratWithin Islamism,90.


is that Islam is God’s final Word tohumanity, and is therefore, bynecessity, a comprehensive and globalmessage of mercy and justice to allmankind. An important component ofthis message is the body of laws knownas syari’ah(Islamic law).

Al-Ghannousyi explains thatsyari’ah, which he sometimes definesas a set of broad guidelines as opposedto a body of laws, is entirely fair andmerciful, having been revealed by Godfor the purpose of serving and guardingthe interests of humanity.104 As such,Islamic law(syari’ah)transcends thelimits of time and place. This is theunderpinning of the science of Islamicjurisprudence (‘ilmusu>l al-fiqh)founded by Imam al-Shafi>’I (d.819),and the science of purposes (‘ilm al-maqa>sid), founded by Imam al-Shati>bi (d.1388). Both of thesesciences are of crucial importance to al-Ghannousyi in his endeavour to findwithin Islamic law itself the precepts ofan Islamic democratic system ofgovernance. This is crucial simplybecause no political theory can beconsidered Islamic if formulatedoutside the domain of Islamic law(syari’ah). It would simply beillegitimate from an Islamic point ofview.

To avoid confusion between theprecepts of an Islamic democratic

104 Rashid Ghannousyi , “The Basic Principles ofan Islamic State”, a paper presented toSymposium on Christian-Islamic Dialogue,(Germany, June 1994), 7.

system of governance and the humanrights in Islamic law, there is a need tocompare how Larry Diamond, co-editorof the Journal of Democracy, andLeonardo Morlino, a specialist incomparative politics at the Universityof Florence, ascribe seven features toany democracy: individual freedom andcivil liberties; rule of law; sovereigntyresting upon the people; equality of allcitizens before the law; vertical andhorizontal accountability forgovernment officials; transparency ofthe ruling system to the demands of thecitizens; and equality of opportunity forcitizens..105 This approach is veryimportant to Western liberaldemocracy, since it emphasizes civilliberties, human rights andfreedoms,instead of over-reliance onelections and the formal institutions ofthe state (Robert A. Dahl.1998:76). Ifobserved carefully, these WesternLiberal democracy features are equal toal-Shatibi’s theory of a requirement orinterest(maslahah) and theory of theobjectives of al-shari>’ah(maqa>sidal-shari>’ah),which according to himserves to protect five major exigencies:faith, life, mind, progeny and property.

Drawing on al-Shatibi, al-Ghannousyi refers to guidelines andregulations the objective of which is themaintenance of basic human interestsand protecting them from infringementor corruption. “These guidelines and

105 Larry Diamond, Democracy in DevelopingCountries, (London: Andamantine Press, 1988),218-260.


regulations together form a framework,which is spacious enough to compriseall known fundamental rights such asthe right to life, to freedom of choice,toeducation, to owning property, and toparticipate in public life, and in theestablishment of a just system ofgovernment”.106 This indicated that al-Ghannousyi agreed to the view thatmany of the Islamic values are sharedwith democratic values. In addition tosovereignty of the people there are“political pluralism, protecting minorityrights and tolerance, political powerbased on free elections and respectingbasic rights and freedoms”.107Based onthese shared values between Islam anddemocracy many Western scholars whohave learned the objectives of theIslamic law (maqa>sid al-shari>’ah)and the democratic discourse throughIslamic concepts such as popularconsultation(shu>ra>), publicconsensus(ijma>l-ummah), the majorityprinciple for decision-making(al-hukmal-aghla>biyyah), and independentinterpretive judgment(ijtiha>d) haveconcluded that Islam is not onlycompatible with democracy but that aform of democracy was practiced priorto Abbasid rule.Based on this form ofreasoning, GudrumKrame, chair of theInstitute of Islamic Studies at the FreeUniversity in Berlin, concluded that thecentral stream in Islam “has come to

106 Rashid Ghannousyi, “Human Rights in Islam”,a paper presented to a Symposium of theAssociation of Muslim Lawyers,(Birmingham,June 18, 1995).107 Turkish Daily News (13 November 1996).

accept crucial elements of politicaldemocracy; pluralism, politicalparticipation, governmentalaccountability, the rule of law, and theprotection of human rights”.108 In heropinion, the Muslim approach to humanrights and freedom as mentioned in al-Shatibi’sconcept on the objectives ofIslamic law(maqa>sid al-shari>’ah) ismore advanced than many Westernersacknowledge.

a. Political Rights andLegitimacy

In his book of al-Hurriyah al-‘A al-Dawlah al-Isla>miyyah, al-Ghannousyi analysed anumber of basic principles politicalthought of a contemporary “IslamicState”. Foremost among these are thepolitical right of a citizen and thepolitical legitimacy in Islam. Becauseof their centrality to his politicalthought, these two concepts warrantsome analysis.

It is important to understand that inan Islamic political system, through theconstitutional idea of the popularCaliphate and the principleofsyu>ra(popular consultation), theIslamic law(shari>’ah) confers upon alladult Muslims, with the possibleexception of some convicted criminals,equal political rights, irrespective ofrace, colour, religion, language andsocio-economic status. The right to

108 Gudrun Kramer, “Islamist Notions ofDemocracy”.


participate in discussion, or to beconsulted over all major public issuesnot categorically settled by the revealedtext (nusu>s), for example, is only oneof those universally guaranteed politicalrights. This equality gave tocitizens(Muslim ummah) of a Muslimor an Islamic state the right toparticipate in the decision-makingprocess of the Islamic state. The basicreason for popular participation in thedecision-making process of the Islamicgovernment is that political rights, likealmost all other rights guaranteed by theIslamic law(shari>’ah), entailnumerous religious and legalobligations.

The fulfilment of these obligationsmakes political participation itself anobligation of the community(Muslimummah). One main obligation is toensure that the affairs of the worldlykingdom are conducted in accordancewith the divine law(shari>’ah); as thisconstitutes the primary purpose of thecovenants of Islam. Since theapplication of the Islamic lawshari>’ah represent both a personal anda collective obligation upon Muslims,for that reason it is essential for everycitizen to participate in the decision-making process. From this perspective,political participation in Islamconstitutes both an exercise of rightsand a fulfilment of religiousobligations. The ideal method for suchpolitical participation, it may seem, isthat of direct popular consultation(general election).

Human experience, however, hasshown that direct popular participationin decision-making is possible only insmall communities as the problem ofsize makes direct popular participationimpossible. The obstacle of a largeterritory and sizeable population makesome sort of representative governmentthe available practical option to ensurethat participation in the decision-making process in any large state iseffective. In fact, the idea ofgovernment by representation in Islamis derived from this necessity. The term“waka>lah”(representation) accordingto the Islamic law(shari>’ah) means:“The appointment of a deputy for thepurpose of acting on one’s behalfconcerning matters in whichrepresentation is legally valid”.109 Thisdefinition covers all types ofrepresentation including politicalrepresentation.

With regard to the right ofnationality of non-Muslim citizens in anIslamic state, al-Ghannousyi started hisdiscourse with a brief outline of theessential components comprising theprinciples of justice,equity,security, andcommunity and the protection grantedto non-Muslims citizen in a Muslimstate as rights embodied in the divinelaw. There is one nationality for thosewho live in an Islamic state, be theyMuslims or non-Muslims. They allenjoy three inviolable rights; the first of

109 Abdul Wahhab Khallaf, Masha>dir Tasyri’ al-Isla>mi Fi> Ma>la Nass Fi>hi, (Kuweit: Dar al-Qalam, 1970), 166.


these rights is equality, which ispositive and comprehensive regardlessof race,ethnic origin, colour, socialstatus or creed. The second right isfreedom, which encompasses freedomof thought and freedom of beliefincluding the right of non-Muslims in aMuslim state to build churches,temples,monasteries,synagogues, and so on. Thethird right is the freedom of movementincluding the right to establish schoolsand religious institutions.110

Apart from the position of headof state, Muslim writers disagree onwhich positions or which publicfunctions should be allowed or deniedto non-Muslims in an Islamic state. Al-Ghannousyi rejected the stance ofscholars who argued that non-Muslimcitizens are not eligible to hold seniorpositions in the Islamic state.111 Itseems that al-Ghannousyi was of theopinion that as long as non-Muslimcitizens have the right to participate inelections at all levels, it follows thatthey qualify to occupy any positions inthe state except that of the head ofstate.112

8. Legitimacy

The term of legitimacy has been

110 Rashid Ghannousyi, The Right to NationalityStatus of Non-Muslim Citizens in a MuslimNation, (North America: The Islamic Foundationof America, 1990), 60-61.111 Said Hawa, Al-Madkhal Ila> Dakwah al-Ikhwa>n al-Muslimi>n, (Jordan: AmmanPublishers, 1979), 17.112 Rashid Ghannousyi, The Right to NationalityStatus of Non-Muslim Citizens in a MuslimNation, 85.

defined as “a sovereign or his rights torule” (Webster. 1961:141). A faction inFrance which after the revolution of1830 continued to support the claims ofthe elder line of the House of Bourbonas the legitimate sovereign by divinerights, came to be known as“legitimist”.113 In England, the wordlegitimist is applied to any supporter ofmonarchy by hereditary right as againstany other title. In International politics,legitimacy was the principle invoked atthe Congress of Vienna (1814-1815) tojustify the restoration of countries andruling families abolished ordispossessed during the epoch of theFrench Revolution and Napoleon, apolicy with which the names ofTalleyrand and Matternich areassociated.114

The question of the legitimacy ofpolitical authority and government inthe Muslim world was neverrealistically solved. Rulers and wieldersof power never succeeded in gainingfull and total recognition of the legists,and if they did. It was out of“necessity” and expediency. The reasonfor this was due to the reluctance toadapt to the changes in the body politicof the early Islamic community and theinability to achieve a synthesis betweenthe eternal principles of Islam andsocial changes.

113 Carl J. Fedrich, EncyclopaediaBritanica, Vol.XIII. (Chicago: William Benton Publisher, 1969),880.114 Karl W. Deutch, Encyclopaedia Americana,Vol. XVII. (Danbury: Grolier Inc., 1967), 224 .


Authority is the supreme seat oflegitimation. It is sovereign andindependent. It is also the ultimate courtof punishment and reward, and thesource of creation (legislation) andannulment. Whereas authority is theright to lead and command, power is thesupreme legitimate force. Powerobliges people to obey the willexpressed by authority. The confusionthat has always reigned among certainwriters derives from the fact that Islamhas not evolved a term of its own tospecifically designate authority(auctoritas). Various expressions suchas al-amr(QS 7:54), al-hukm (QS12:40,28:88), al-mulk (QS 4:54) havebeen used in the Holy Qur’antodesignate authority. The same wordshave been likewise applied to power(Potestas). Although these Qur’anicverses confirmed that ultimate authoritybelongs to God alone, however, God’sauthority cannot operate in the humansociety as He himself cannot become animmediate ruler in the politicalconnotation.115For that reason we alsofound that besides the Qur’anemphasizing the sovereignty of God, atthe same time it repeatedly refers toman as His vicegerent (khali>fah) onearth (QS 2:30; 7:74; 7:129). Thisexplains to us that the concept ofauthority which belongs to Godaccording to its classical concept hasbeen replaced by the concept ofvicegerency (khali>fah)of God. In line

115 LukmanThaib, Political System of Islam, (KualaLumpur: Amal Publisher, 1994), 32.

with this line of reasoning, a famousQur’anic commentator al-Alusi said:“The rule of the Holy Prophet (PBUH)is in fact, the rule of God. After theProphet, his ummah (Muslimcommunity) succeeds to power torule”.116 However, the Muslimcommunity (Ummah) places itselfunder self-limitation by declaringindividually as well as collectively themoral sovereignty of God. Hence,according to Islamic theory, thesovereign power or authority isdelegated by God to the Muslimcommunity (Ummah) as a trust. TheUmmah can therefore legitimatelyexercise this delegated authority only inaccordance with His will (theshari>’ah).

It is very clear that politicalauthority on earth is a gift to theMuslim community as God’s vicegerent(khali>fah), but it is a sacred trust to beexercised by rulers of the Muslimcommunity for implementing the willof God (shari>’ah) for the bettermentof the Muslim community at large.Hence, it is legitimate only whenexercised within the bounds and inaccordance with the principles ofjustice and equality as set forth in theQur’an. Based on thisreasoning,according to al-Ghannousyi, thelegitimacy of the Islamic state can bederived from two primary sources: the

116Shiha>b al-Di>n Mahmu>d al-Baghda>di al-Alu>si, Ru>h al-Ma’a>ni fi>Tafsi>r al-Qur’a>nal-Kari>m,Vol. 2. (Cairo: Matba’ah al-Munirah,1965), 176.


revelation as represented in the Qur’anand Sunnah (al-Nass), and the secondsource of legitimacy is popularconsultation(Shu>ra>). To al-Ghannousyi, the authority of theIslamic law (shari>’ah) surpasses anyother authorities in the Islamic state,and its supremacy as the source oflegitimacy is unquestionable.117 To al-Ghannousyi the Shari>’ah andSyu>raare inextricably linked. It is theUmmah that collectively deputises forGod in implementing His will(shari>’ah) and is, therefore,accountable to Him alone. The Muslimcommunity thus establishes a statewhose government is accountable to iti.e., the Muslim community (Ummah)delegates to the Islamic government theauthority to implement policies inaccordance and in full concordancewith the shari>’ah. The communityalso exercises its supreme authorityover government through popularconsultation (Shu>ra>).

Al-Ghannousyi argued thatMuslims can use mechanisms ofWestern democracy to develop theconcept of popular consultation inIslam (Shu>ra>) in order to produce anauthentic Islamic form of democraticgovernment.118 He hoped that anIslamic model of democracy which iscompatible with the shari>’ah andcapable of shielding the citizens against

117 Rashid Ghannousyi, “The Basic Principles ofan Islamic State”.118 Rashid Ghannousyi, “The Basic Principles ofan Islamic State”.

injustice and despotism would emergeone day. However, he acknowledgedthat the transition to democracy in theMuslim world, particularly the ArabWorld, is hindered by a number ofobstacles. Foremost among theseobstacles are the project ofsecularization, the territorial state, thenew world order and the rejectionistattitude toward democracy espoused bysome Islamic groups.

C. CONCLUSIONContrary to the assertion of his

critics, al-Ghannousyi consideredrevelation (al-Nass) to be the ultimateframe of reference for his ideas. As athinker and an activist it seems that hisprimary concern has been to findsolutions to the sufferings of hiscountry, Tunisia, and other Muslimcountries which have been afflicted bydespotic and totalitarian systems ofgovernment. He argued that democracyis the solution for the problem ofdespotism. However, he treateddemocracy not as an ideology thatcould be imported and copied byMuslim countries, but as a tool or set ofmechanisms for electing, checking,dismissing the government of the dayand for protecting the civil liberties andthe basic rights of citizens. Al-Ghannousyi used the theory of faragh(separation theory) to rebut theIslamists’ rejection of democracy. Herejected the widely acceptedassumption by Western writers thatboth secularism and modernism are


essential prerequisites of democracy.

One dilemma concerning Islamand democracy is the reluctancetowards human made laws. Religiousforces are often eager to promote theIslamic law (shari>’ah) as a sufficientpolitical and legal system. This stand isobviously hindering the formation ofdemocratic politics due to a negativeattitude towards more modernsolutions. In his opinion, the Qur’anand the Sunnah of the Prophet (PBUH)is God’s final revelation to the people,and accordingly this wisdom iscomplete.One has to agree that the waywe view democracy today is a result of

modern developments and knowledge.Accordingly, if arguing that an Islamicsystem based on shari>’ah isdemocratic, one would assume that thissystem is open for modern adjustment.Among Islamists one can findspokespersons for modern adjustments.Extensive use of interpretation(ijtiha>d) is the solution they offer.These groups are often more willing tochange the political system than thosein power. However, many Islamists arenot planning to change the systemtowards a democratic one,and thosewho are promoting democratizationface the problem that few believe theirefforts to be sincere.


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